Full Case Officers

EN BANC
G.R. No. 106692 September 1, 1994

MILA MANALO, Petitioner, v. RICARDO GLORIA, in his capacity
as the Acting Secretary of Science and Technology, and
PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, Respondents.
Irineo B. Orlino for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for "certiorari and mandamus" filed on 3
September 1992 urging us to render judgment:
(1) Declaring the 1st Indorsement dated 14 December 1990 of the
respondent Secretary of Science and Technology, (Annex "E"
hereof), and Resolution No. 91-1036 of the respondent Civil Service
Commission (Annex "G" hereof) null and void;
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(2) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

pay the back wages of the petitioner for the period from April 16,
1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the
date she was reinstated; and
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(3) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

pay the petitioner the salary equivalent to the salary of a Planning
Assistant from the time of her reinstatement and thenceforward. 1
In their comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for the
respondents on 2 December 1992, the respondents claim that the
petitioner received a copy of respondent Civil Service Commission's

(CSC) Resolution No. 91-1036 of 29 August 1991 on 5 September
1991 and pray that the petition be dismissed because, on
procedural grounds, it was filed out of time and the petitioner
violated paragraph 4 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular
No. 28-91; and, on substantive grounds, the decision in G.R. No.
81495 of
4 June 1990 2cannot apply together since she is not a party therein.
Moreover, her position was legally abolished, she did not appeal
from the abolition, and instead of joining her other co-employees in
assailing the legality of their separation from the service, she
requested appointment to a position comparable to her former
position. Thus, she was appointed to the position of Clerk II on
15 May 1989, which she accepted without reservation.
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Indeed, the petitioner failed to comply with the aforesaid Circulars.

She does not also deny that she received a copy of the challenged
Resolution
No. 91-1036 on 5 September 1991. Pursuant to Section 7,
subdivision A (Common Provisions), Article IX of the
Constitution, 3the petitioner had only thirty days from 5 September
1991 within which to bring the said resolution to this Court via a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 4The
instant petition was filed only on 3 September 1992 or eleven
months and twenty-eight days after her receipt of a copy of the
challenged resolution, indisputably beyond the constitutionally
mandated period. On this score alone, the petition must be
dismissed.
Even on its merits, the petition must likewise fail. The

uncontroverted facts culled from the pleadings of the parties, as
well as from our decision of
4 June 1990 in Mendoza vs. Quisumbing 5and companion cases,
render this conclusion inevitable.
Before 16 April 1988, the petitioner held the position of planning

Assistant in the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI), an
agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), with
an annual salary of P26,250.40.
On 30 January 1987, the President of the Philippines issued E.O.

No. 128 reorganizing the DOST. Section 21 thereof provides for the
reorganization of the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
and the PNRI. Conformably therewith, PNRI was reorganized and a
new staffing pattern or position structure, which abolished certain
positions, was adopted. A list of employees who would be retained
under the new position structure was posted in the PNRI premises.
Those excluded were placed in a manpower pool for possible
placements in other DOST agencies. Appointments under the new
position structure were thereafter issued to the retained
employees.
Among the abolished positions was that of the petitioner. The

petitioner, however, "made an appeal with the DOST/RAB to place
her to any comparable position to which her qualification would
fit," 6which was favorably acted upon by her appointment to the
new position of Clerk II with an annual salary of P17,640.00 on 15
May 1989. 7She accepted her appointment as Clerk II, a position
she presently holds.
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In view of our Decision of 4 June 1990 in Mendoza

vs. Quisumbing and more particularly of the companion case, G.R.
No. 81495 (Arizabal vs. Leviste), wherein we held:
4) In G.R. No. 81495, the petition is DISMISSED. Except in the
cases of those who have retired or opted to be phased out and who
have received their separation and retirement benefits, the
petitioners are ordered to retain the private respondents-employees
in the reorganized department under the new staffing pattern with
positions and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former

positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries.
the petitioner (who was neither a party in G.R. No. 81495 nor in the
case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City subject thereof)
sent a letter to the Director of the PNRI, dated 3 September
1990, 8requesting the payment of back salaries for the period
commencing from the abolition of her office until she was appointed
as Clerk II and the payment of salary "comparable or equivalent to
her former position as Planning Assistant from the time she was
phased out up to the present." The PNRI referred this request to the
DOST on 12 November 1990. 9
In a 1st Indorsement dated 14 December 1990, 10the DOST denied

the request because she was not a party in G.R. No. 81495 and
because there was no finding under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6656
(Reorganization Law) that the petitioner was illegally terminated.
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library
On 4 March 1991, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter 11to

the public respondent CSC requesting that in view of the DOST
denial of her request, the CSC should "order the PNRI to pay Ms.
Manalo back wages during the period she was phased out up to her
reinstatement to the lower position of Clerk II, and, in addition that
she be paid the difference between the salary of a Planning
Assistant and that of a Clerk II."
In its Resolution No. 91-1036 of 29 August 1991, 12the CSC denied

the request because the petitioner was not a party in G.R. No.
81495, and although the position of Clerk II is admittedly lower in
rank and salary than her previous position of Planning Assistant,
upon her request after she had been phased out, she assumed the
duties of Clerk II without reservation.
From these facts, it is clear that both the indorsement and the
resolution were not issued with abuse, much less grave, of
discretion. The petitioner was not compelled to accept the new

position. Instead of questioning the new position structure or taking
the other alternatives of either accepting separation pay or retiring
from the service, she expressed preference for appointment to the
new position, voluntarily accepted the appointment thereto, and
assumed the new position without reservation. Reluctance or
involuntariness in relation thereto is not asserted in her petition and
in her letters of 3 September 1990 and 4 March 1991.
The mandamus aspect of this case refers to the payment of the

petitioner's (a) "back wages . . . for the period from April 16, 1988,
the date she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she
was reinstated," and
(b) "salary equivalent to the salary of a Planning Assistant from the
time of her reinstatement and thenceforward."
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil
action available to an aggrieved party when any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes a person from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which that person is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner's claim for "back
wages" could be the appropriate subject of an ordinary civil action
and there is absolutely no showing that the said remedy is not plain,
speedy and adequate. It does not even seem that the petitioner has
given some priority to her claim. She did not claim for it in her
3 September 1990 letter to the PNRI. The first time she mentioned
it was in her 4 March 1991 letter to the CSC. Thereafter, and before
she filed this petition, she did nothing.
As for the payment of salary equivalent to that of a Planning

Assistant, it is clear that the petitioner does not seek reinstatement
to the position of Planning Assistant. Since she had in fact asked for
her retention in the PNRI and for her appointment to a new position
and was accordingly appointed as Clerk II, a position which she
voluntarily accepted and which she continues to hold until now,
estoppel, which is clearly present, bars her obtainment of the
desired relief.
We are not persuaded by the suggestion that the petitioner is only

seeking execution of the decision in Arizabal vs. Leviste. The
petitioner is not a party therein and is not, therefore, entitled to its
execution.
Nor do we agree with the plea in the dissenting opinion that we

take
this case as one for mandamus in the light of our decision
in Cristobal vs. Melchor. 13The factual milieu therein does not obtain
in this case. Unlike Cristobal who was never reinstated despite his
persistent pleas, the herein petitioner asked for and was appointed
to the new position of Clerk II, which she accepted without
reservation. In Cristobal, this Court considered the viability of an
action for mandamus and the grant of favorable relief thereunder
even if the said action was filed after one year from the accrual of
the cause of action, because it was the "act of the government
through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive
Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to
the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's . . . complaint for
reinstatement." 14It appeared therein that Cristobal and the other
dismissed employees were assured by Executive Secretary Mutuc
that he would work for their reinstatement; however, Mr. Mutuc was
replaced by other Executive Secretaries to whom Cristobal "over
and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who
gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and reemployed at the 'opportune time.'" This "continued promise of
government officials concerned led Cristobal to bide his time and
wait for the Office of the President to comply with its
commitment." 15
Even granting that the petitioner can avail herself of the writ
of mandamus, we find no special or cogent reason to justify
acceptance of this petition as an exception to this Court's policy
concerning the hierarchy of courts in relation to cases where it has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. In People vs. Cuaresma, 16this Court stated:
A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate
Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
heirarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those maters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the

restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this
regard, supra - resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase,
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" - was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing
with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the
expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would
have had to be filed with it." (citations omitted)
And in Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez,
this Court said:
17
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a

propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition.
No pronouncement as to cots.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
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Cruz, Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concuring:
I concur subject to my ponencia in Aldovino v. Alunan. 1I will

explain.
I agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan that the declaration
of nullity of the assailed reorganizations in Arizabal
v. Leviste 2 nullified also in effect the separation of petitioner from
the service; hence, theoretically, she could not be deemed to have
been terminated. However, her act of signing up for another
position, albeit lower, within the same office amounted to an
abdication of her right to hold her former position. In other words,
despite her separation, petitioner remained, in legal contemplation,
as incumbent Planning Assistant of DOST. But the effect of her
unqualified assumption as Clerk II is resignation from her former
office as she cannot be holding both offices at the same time.
Significantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority

opinion that after the reorganization, petitioner never questioned
her removal until the decision in Arizabal. She seemed contended
with what fate befell her. Before then, there was no indication
whatsoever that she resented her separation. She assumed the
position of Clerk II without any condition or qualification; neither did
she express interest in her reinstatement as Planning Assistant. Her

actuation is indicum that she "opted to be phased out," to use the
language of Arizabal. Consequently, she is not entitled to
reinstatement to her former position.
Her situation is far different from that of most petitioners and

intervenors in Aldovino who, from the start of their separation,
unceasingly fought for their positions and demanding reinstatement,
although in different fora - some administratively, others judicially
and extra-judicially. The ruling in Cristobal v. Melchor 3cannot save
her as it should only be applied sparingly and only in extreme cases
of injustice. Her case is not one of them. She does not appear to be
a victim of injustice.
I also vote for the denial of the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
Arizabal vs. Leviste and the consolidated cases involving the
reorganization of various government departments and agencies,
emphatically held:
We are constrained to set aside the reorganization embodied in
these consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and
agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of
unlimited discretion and "progressive" ideas on reorganization
instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear
letter and spirit of the two constitutions and the statutes governing
reorganizations. 1
In dismissing the petition of the Secretary of the Department of

Science and Technology (DOST) and the Director and members of
the Reorganization Evaluation Committee of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute seeking annulment of the orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City restraining them from dismissing various
employees of the PNRI under Executive Order No. 128, we ordered
the petitioners therein to retain the said employees under the new
staffing pattern with positions comparable or equivalent
to theirformer ranks and salaries. Specifically, we ruled that:
positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries. 2
The clear import of our decisions in these consolidated cases was

that without exception 1)all the reorganizations embodied in the
consolidated cases were set aside, and; 2) in cases where it was
plainly impossible and impracticable to comply with our holding
in Mendoza, we allowed a modification of our holding, provided
those affected were restored topositions of similar rank and salary,
if said employees did not opt for retirement or separation. Even
assuming that petitioner allowed to have her name placed in a
manpower pool for purposes of being assigned to another job,
consistent with this Court's holding inArizabal vs. Leviste, equity
demands that she should have been automatically reassigned to a
position both of comparable rank and salary.
A lot has been said about the fact that herein petitioner was not
among the original private respondents in G.R. No. 81495.
Considering our decision in Arizabal and the subsequent case, De
Guzman v. CSC, infra, her failure to join the petitioners
in Arizabal was not fatal to her petition for reinstatement and back
salaries. In Cristobal vs. Melchor 3where the doctrine of laches was
invoked to defeat the petitioner's demand for reinstatement to his
former position with the Office of the President, this Court held the
statute of limitations (provided for in Section 16, Rule 66, of the
Rules of Court) inapplicable because there was no acquiescence or
inaction on the part of Cristobal which would amount to an

abandonment of his right to reinstatement. Addressing the
contention that he was not one of the parties to the civil case and
could not benefit from the lower court's decision in the said civil
case, we held that:
Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but
his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action (Emphasis
ours). During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to
press his request for reinstatement together with the other
employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.
More importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily

spending time and money by going to court - to rely upon the
outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his
interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the
plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought. On this point,
we find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States
Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and
persuasive, and We quote:
The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that
there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence
in seeking a remedy. Here plaintiffs, of others representing them,
protested . . . and ever since they have . . . persisted in the diligent
pursuit of a remedy . . . . Where the cause of action is of such a
nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only
of the plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not
essential that each such persons should intervened (sic) in the suit
brought in order that he be deemed thereafter free from the laches
which bars those who sleep on their rights. (250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct.
536, 63 L. Ed. 1099, 1106-1107; Emphasis supplied. See also
Overfield vs. Pennroad Corporation, et al. 42 Fed. Supp. 586,
613). 4
Significantly, in Cristobal, the plaintiff filed his complaint for

reinstatement on August 10, 1971 or more than nine (9) years after
his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office
were terminated.
The similarity in the circumstances of the petitioner and the private

respondents inArizabal and our ruling in Cristobal militates against
public respondents' assertion that petitioner herein could not benefit
from our decision in the former case. Furthermore, we did not limit
our holding in the Mendoza and Arizabal cases only to the
petitioners therein.The decision was obviously broad enough to
include all of those employees affected by the reorganizations we
set aside in those consolidated cases such that 1) reinstatement
should have been automatic, and; 2) it was not essential that
petitioner should have intervened inArizabal or joined the other
PNRI employees in assailing the legality of their separation, for her
to benefit from our holding.
Petitioner's demotion to a mere Clerk II position with a salary of

P17,640.00 from that of Planning Assistant II with compensation of
P26,250.00 and the respondents' failure to rectify this situation
were clearly in blatant contravention of both the letter and spirit of
our orders in Mendoza and Arizabal.
With due respect, I cannot simply reconcile myself with the

majority's rationalization that petitioner was not compelled to accept
the new position, that instead of questioning the new position
structure or taking the alternative of separation or retirement, she
expressed preference for the new position and voluntarily accepted
appointment thereto. On April 16, 1988 petitioner was removed
from her earlier job as a result of the PNRI reorganization. She was
unemployed for fourteen months. On June 15, 1989, she accepted a
Clerk II position with a salary considerably less than the one which
was abolished as result of the new staffing structure. From these
circumstances, one can hardly assume that she accepted the
unconscionable demotion "voluntarily." She did not have must

choice. It was an option between the degradation of having to
accept a lowly position with a salary reduced by more than one third
and the pangs of hunger out of joblessness, at a time when heads
of government departments and agencies were engaged in their
orgy of throwing out from office hordes of government workers in
the guise of reorganization, running roughshod on their rights of
due process and security of tenure. In her unfortunate plight,
petitioner, like the dismissed clerk in Cristobal who did not have the
luxury, time and money to go to court to protect his rights, must
also have relied on the outcome of the case filed by her coemployees, given the similarity of her situation to that of theirs.
As I see it, the majority opinion assumes that this case merely
involves the validity of final orders of the Civil Service Commission
on the separation, removal or termination of a public officer. I beg
to disagree. The issue brought before us affects the extent to which
DOST has complied with our decision (in Mendoza) setting aside the
reorganizations involving these government agencies and our
holding (in Arizabal) directing petitioners in G.R. No. 81495 to
reinstate their employees to positions of similar rank and salary.
Such being the case, it would be inappropriate, in my mind, to
misdirect our attention to petitioner's failure to comply with
procedural steps relating to the CSC's order, rather than on the
results of the abolition of the office itself. That would be mistaking
the trees for the forest.
There is no disagreement on the proposition that a valid abolition of

an office is neither a separation nor a removal. Where, however, the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to
hold office. 5In Cruz vs. Primicias 6 where the validity of the
reorganization of provincial departments in the Province of
Pangasinan was assailed by government employees terminated as a
result of abolition of their offices, the Court, said:
No removal or separation of petitioners from service is here

involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a
legal question that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known
rule also that
a valid abolition of offices is neither removal or separation of the
incumbents.And of course, if the abolition is void the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
xxx xxx xxx
As well settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where
the abolition is made in bad faith, for political and personal reasons,
or in order to circumbent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees, it is null and void. 7
One of the points raised by the respondents in Primicias to defeat

the petitioners' challenge against the validity of the abolition of their
offices was precisely a procedural point: their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. In laying the question to rest, the Court
emphasized that the petitioners therein never actually ceased to
hold office if the abolition was null and void. Being null and void,
their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies was clearly
beside the point.
As recently as March 11, 1994 in De Guzman vs. Civil Service

Commission 8where we clearly reiterated the fact that "we nullified
the reorganization of respondents DOST and PNRI," 9in Arizabal
vs. Leviste, we held, citing Arizabal, that:
An abolition which is not bona fide but is merely a device to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of the civil service
employees is null and void.10
In the case at bench, therefore, the effect of our decision in the

above-cited consolidated cases and in De Guzman was to bring back
those employees adversely affected by these reorganizations as far
as practicable to the status quo on the day their positions were
abolished. Consequently, as petitioner is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office, it follows that the appealed decisions of the
DOST and the Civil Service Commission have no practical force and
effect, to begin with. By operation of law, she was entitled to all the
rights and privileges which accrued to her by virtue of the office she
held. Her failure to appeal the respondent Commission's decision
within the thirty-day period required by the Constitution was,
therefore, immaterial because in the eyes of the law, her
entitlement to the position of Planning Assistant (or to an equivalent
one) and to the emoluments and privileges attached to the same
had never actually ceased. From a practical point of view, her initial
request for reinstatement to the position of Planning Assistant
II, was in effect a request for compliance with our earlier orders in
the Mendoza and Arizabal cases. The DOST's refusal to comply with
the said orders, its failure to restore petitioner to the status quo,
and the CSC's Resolution of 29 August 1991 were therefore made in
excess of respondent's jurisdiction. Compliance with our decision
ordering the public officials concerned to restore employees affected
by the reorganization of the PNRI to the status quo as far as
practicable in Arizabal vs. Leviste was not discretionary, but made
obligatory by our orders in the Mendoza and Arizabal.
The majority opinion has made much out of the petitioner's failure
to comply with Article IX of the Constitution requiring that such
petitions be filed within thirty days from receipt of the assailed
resolutions, and Circular I-88 which requires a verified statement of
material dates in these petitions. As we had already made a clear
and unequivocal pronouncement in Arizabal to restore the illegally
dismissed employees to positions comparable or equivalent to those
they formerly held, "but not lower than their former ranks and
salaries" (except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to

be phased out and who have received their separation and
retirement benefits), the only thing left to do for DOST was to
implement or execute the directive. Petitioner's recourse to CSC
from the adverse ruling of DOST was a superfluity as petitioner
could have come to this Court to execute or implement its final
orders. Hence, the prescriptive period mandated by Article IX of the
1987 Constitution could not have run. Moreover, the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure mandates that, as in Mendoza
vs. Quisumbing and the Dario vs. Mison11cases, we disregard the
procedural roadblocks erected by the public respondent in order to
defeat what is otherwise a valid claim. A much more equitable result
would have followed had we proceeded to treat the case at bench
essentially on its own merits, particularly when we consider that the
questioned delay in this case was even far less than the assailed
delays in Dario vs. Mison and in the earlier case of Cristobal
vs. Melchor.
In Dario, which we cited with favor in Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, we

stated that:
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure . . . and
other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the
demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the
public service . . . and because of the serious implications of these
cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the
rights of public servants. 12
The Constitution, no less, demands a similar treatment of the
procedural roadblocks that stand in the way of petitioner's valid
claim.
I vote to grant due course to the petition and to enter judgment as
follows:
1. Declaring Resolution No. 91-1036 of respondent Civil Service

Commission as null and void for being issued in grave abuse of
discretion;
2. Ordering respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

reinstate the petitioner to the position of Planning Assistant, or if
this is not possible, to another position of equivalent rank; and
3. Ordering the Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the

backwages of petitioner for the period from April 16, 1988, the date
she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was
reinstated.
Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., concurring:
I concur subject to my ponencia in Aldovino v. Alunan. 1I will

explain.
I agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Kapunan that the declaration
of nullity of the assailed reorganizations in Arizabal
v. Leviste 2 nullified also in effect the separation of petitioner from
the service; hence, theoretically, she could not be deemed to have
been terminated. However, her act of signing up for another
position, albeit lower, within the same office amounted to an
abdication of her right to hold her former position. In other words,
despite her separation, petitioner remained, in legal contemplation,
as incumbent Planning Assistant of DOST. But the effect of her
unqualified assumption as Clerk II is resignation from her former
office as she cannot be holding both offices at the same time.
Significantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority

opinion that after the reorganization, petitioner never questioned
her removal until the decision in Arizabal. She seemed contended
with what fate befell her. Before then, there was no indication
whatsoever that she resented her separation. She assumed the

position of Clerk II without any condition or qualification; neither did
she express interest in her reinstatement as Planning Assistant. Her
actuation is indicum that she "opted to be phased out," to use the
language of Arizabal. Consequently, she is not entitled to
reinstatement to her former position.
Her situation is far different from that of most petitioners and

intervenors in Aldovino who, from the start of their separation,
unceasingly fought for their positions and demanding reinstatement,
although in different fora - some administratively, others judicially
and extra-judicially. The ruling in Cristobal v. Melchor 3cannot save
her as it should only be applied sparingly and only in extreme cases
of injustice. Her case is not one of them. She does not appear to be
a victim of injustice.
I also vote for the denial of the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
Arizabal vs. Leviste and the consolidated cases involving the
reorganization of various government departments and agencies,
emphatically held:
We are constrained to set aside the reorganization embodied in
these consolidated petitions because the heads of departments and
agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of
unlimited discretion and "progressive" ideas on reorganization
instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear
letter and spirit of the two constitutions and the statutes governing
reorganizations. 1
In dismissing the petition of the Secretary of the Department of

Science and Technology (DOST) and the Director and members of
the Reorganization Evaluation Committee of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute seeking annulment of the orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City restraining them from dismissing various

employees of the PNRI under Executive Order No. 128, we ordered
the petitioners therein to retain the said employees under the new
staffing pattern with positions comparable or equivalent
to theirformer ranks and salaries. Specifically, we ruled that:
positions but not lower than their former ranks and salaries. 2
The clear import of our decisions in these consolidated cases was

that without exception 1)all the reorganizations embodied in the
consolidated cases were set aside, and; 2) in cases where it was
plainly impossible and impracticable to comply with our holding
in Mendoza, we allowed a modification of our holding, provided
those affected were restored topositions of similar rank and salary,
if said employees did not opt for retirement or separation. Even
assuming that petitioner allowed to have her name placed in a
manpower pool for purposes of being assigned to another job,
consistent with this Court's holding inArizabal vs. Leviste, equity
demands that she should have been automatically reassigned to a
position both of comparable rank and salary.
A lot has been said about the fact that herein petitioner was not
among the original private respondents in G.R. No. 81495.
Considering our decision in Arizabal and the subsequent case, De
Guzman v. CSC, infra, her failure to join the petitioners
in Arizabal was not fatal to her petition for reinstatement and back
salaries. In Cristobal vs. Melchor 3where the doctrine of laches was
invoked to defeat the petitioner's demand for reinstatement to his
former position with the Office of the President, this Court held the
statute of limitations (provided for in Section 16, Rule 66, of the

Rules of Court) inapplicable because there was no acquiescence or
inaction on the part of Cristobal which would amount to an
abandonment of his right to reinstatement. Addressing the
contention that he was not one of the parties to the civil case and
could not benefit from the lower court's decision in the said civil
case, we held that:
Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but
his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action (Emphasis
ours). During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to
press his request for reinstatement together with the other
employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.
More importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily

spending time and money by going to court - to rely upon the
outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his
interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the
plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought. On this point,
we find a statement of Justice Louis Brandeis of the United States
Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and
persuasive, and We quote:
The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that
there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence
in seeking a remedy. Here plaintiffs, of others representing them,
protested . . . and ever since they have . . . persisted in the diligent
pursuit of a remedy . . . . Where the cause of action is of such a
nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only
of the plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not
essential that each such persons should intervened (sic) in the suit
brought in order that he be deemed thereafter free from the laches
which bars those who sleep on their rights. (250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct.
536, 63 L. Ed. 1099, 1106-1107; Emphasis supplied. See also
Overfield vs. Pennroad Corporation, et al. 42 Fed. Supp. 586,

613). 4
Significantly, in Cristobal, the plaintiff filed his complaint for
reinstatement on August 10, 1971 or more than nine (9) years after
his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office
were terminated.
The similarity in the circumstances of the petitioner and the private

respondents inArizabal and our ruling in Cristobal militates against
public respondents' assertion that petitioner herein could not benefit
from our decision in the former case. Furthermore, we did not limit
our holding in the Mendoza and Arizabal cases only to the
petitioners therein.The decision was obviously broad enough to
include all of those employees affected by the reorganizations we
set aside in those consolidated cases such that 1) reinstatement
should have been automatic, and; 2) it was not essential that
petitioner should have intervened inArizabal or joined the other
PNRI employees in assailing the legality of their separation, for her
to benefit from our holding.
Petitioner's demotion to a mere Clerk II position with a salary of

P17,640.00 from that of Planning Assistant II with compensation of
P26,250.00 and the respondents' failure to rectify this situation
were clearly in blatant contravention of both the letter and spirit of
our orders in Mendoza and Arizabal.
With due respect, I cannot simply reconcile myself with the

majority's rationalization that petitioner was not compelled to accept
the new position, that instead of questioning the new position
structure or taking the alternative of separation or retirement, she
expressed preference for the new position and voluntarily accepted
appointment thereto. On April 16, 1988 petitioner was removed
from her earlier job as a result of the PNRI reorganization. She was
unemployed for fourteen months. On June 15, 1989, she accepted a
Clerk II position with a salary considerably less than the one which
was abolished as result of the new staffing structure. From these
circumstances, one can hardly assume that she accepted the
unconscionable demotion "voluntarily." She did not have must
choice. It was an option between the degradation of having to
accept a lowly position with a salary reduced by more than one third
and the pangs of hunger out of joblessness, at a time when heads
of government departments and agencies were engaged in their
orgy of throwing out from office hordes of government workers in
the guise of reorganization, running roughshod on their rights of
due process and security of tenure. In her unfortunate plight,
petitioner, like the dismissed clerk in Cristobal who did not have the
luxury, time and money to go to court to protect his rights, must
also have relied on the outcome of the case filed by her coemployees, given the similarity of her situation to that of theirs.
As I see it, the majority opinion assumes that this case merely
involves the validity of final orders of the Civil Service Commission
on the separation, removal or termination of a public officer. I beg
to disagree. The issue brought before us affects the extent to which
DOST has complied with our decision (in Mendoza) setting aside the
reorganizations involving these government agencies and our
holding (in Arizabal) directing petitioners in G.R. No. 81495 to
reinstate their employees to positions of similar rank and salary.
Such being the case, it would be inappropriate, in my mind, to
misdirect our attention to petitioner's failure to comply with
procedural steps relating to the CSC's order, rather than on the
results of the abolition of the office itself. That would be mistaking
the trees for the forest.
There is no disagreement on the proposition that a valid abolition of

an office is neither a separation nor a removal. Where, however, the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to
hold office. 5In Cruz vs. Primicias 6 where the validity of the
reorganization of provincial departments in the Province of
Pangasinan was assailed by government employees terminated as a

result of abolition of their offices, the Court, said:
No removal or separation of petitioners from service is here
involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a
legal question that is for the Courts to decide. It is a well-known
rule also that
a valid abolition of offices is neither removal or separation of the
incumbents.And of course, if the abolition is void the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
xxx xxx xxx
As well settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where
the abolition is made in bad faith, for political and personal reasons,
or in order to circumbent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees, it is null and void. 7
One of the points raised by the respondents in Primicias to defeat

the petitioners' challenge against the validity of the abolition of their
offices was precisely a procedural point: their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. In laying the question to rest, the Court
emphasized that the petitioners therein never actually ceased to
hold office if the abolition was null and void. Being null and void,
their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies was clearly
beside the point.
As recently as March 11, 1994 in De Guzman vs. Civil Service

Commission 8where we clearly reiterated the fact that "we nullified
the reorganization of respondents DOST and PNRI," 9in Arizabal
vs. Leviste, we held, citing Arizabal, that:
An abolition which is not bona fide but is merely a device to

circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of the civil service
employees is null and void.10
In the case at bench, therefore, the effect of our decision in the

above-cited consolidated cases and in De Guzman was to bring back
those employees adversely affected by these reorganizations as far
as practicable to the status quo on the day their positions were
abolished. Consequently, as petitioner is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office, it follows that the appealed decisions of the
DOST and the Civil Service Commission have no practical force and
effect, to begin with. By operation of law, she was entitled to all the
rights and privileges which accrued to her by virtue of the office she
held. Her failure to appeal the respondent Commission's decision
within the thirty-day period required by the Constitution was,
therefore, immaterial because in the eyes of the law, her
entitlement to the position of Planning Assistant (or to an equivalent
one) and to the emoluments and privileges attached to the same
had never actually ceased. From a practical point of view, her initial
request for reinstatement to the position of Planning Assistant
II, was in effect a request for compliance with our earlier orders in
the Mendoza and Arizabal cases. The DOST's refusal to comply with
the said orders, its failure to restore petitioner to the status quo,
and the CSC's Resolution of 29 August 1991 were therefore made in
excess of respondent's jurisdiction. Compliance with our decision
ordering the public officials concerned to restore employees affected
by the reorganization of the PNRI to the status quo as far as
practicable in Arizabal vs. Leviste was not discretionary, but made
obligatory by our orders in the Mendoza and Arizabal.
The majority opinion has made much out of the petitioner's failure
to comply with Article IX of the Constitution requiring that such
petitions be filed within thirty days from receipt of the assailed
resolutions, and Circular I-88 which requires a verified statement of
material dates in these petitions. As we had already made a clear
and unequivocal pronouncement in Arizabal to restore the illegally

dismissed employees to positions comparable or equivalent to those
they formerly held, "but not lower than their former ranks and
salaries" (except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to
be phased out and who have received their separation and
retirement benefits), the only thing left to do for DOST was to
implement or execute the directive. Petitioner's recourse to CSC
from the adverse ruling of DOST was a superfluity as petitioner
could have come to this Court to execute or implement its final
orders. Hence, the prescriptive period mandated by Article IX of the
1987 Constitution could not have run. Moreover, the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure mandates that, as in Mendoza
vs. Quisumbing and the Dario vs. Mison11cases, we disregard the
procedural roadblocks erected by the public respondent in order to
defeat what is otherwise a valid claim. A much more equitable result
would have followed had we proceeded to treat the case at bench
essentially on its own merits, particularly when we consider that the
questioned delay in this case was even far less than the assailed
delays in Dario vs. Mison and in the earlier case of Cristobal
vs. Melchor.
In Dario, which we cited with favor in Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, we

stated that:
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure . . . and
other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the
demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the
public service . . . and because of the serious implications of these
cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the
rights of public servants. 12
The Constitution, no less, demands a similar treatment of the
procedural roadblocks that stand in the way of petitioner's valid
claim.
I vote to grant due course to the petition and to enter judgment as

follows:
1. Declaring Resolution No. 91-1036 of respondent Civil Service
Commission as null and void for being issued in grave abuse of
discretion;
2. Ordering respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

reinstate the petitioner to the position of Planning Assistant, or if
this is not possible, to another position of equivalent rank; and
3. Ordering the Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the

backwages of petitioner for the period from April 16, 1988, the date
she was illegally dismissed, to June 14, 1989, the date she was
reinstated.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D.

MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and
VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,
HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL
BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY
JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486
created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were effected
through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws,
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused
of violations of Republic Act No. 3019[4] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code[5] is the
central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005
and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay
down in the Binay cases.
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83

On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. [7] The
informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of
Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year
delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to
the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending
the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to
quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to the
motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion
and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court
ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with
one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019[8] and the informations containing these
charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion
to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among
other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995,
issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the
order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on
May 16, 1995.[10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to
the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated
June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject
cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion,
holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the
compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the
commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity,
the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases
therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been
classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at the time of the
commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower
than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were
committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989
was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident
that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification
of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter,
is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification
Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor
at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a
conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused
herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is
equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said
Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of
the Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of
Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the
position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27. [11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001,
21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6,
1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also
asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and
arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of
alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that
the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the
informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable
cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are
officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas,
charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also
officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint
charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR
Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This was docketed
in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla
recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion
concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman
Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the
information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court. [12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against
petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution,
but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the
same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas
filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido
Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the
overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as
OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos
recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and
(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was recommended
for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in
OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time
before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17,
1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially
the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two
informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double
jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a Resolution dated June
21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court
resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to
refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No.
7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC
issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue
of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed
their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case
for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent
respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal
mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of
an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial
jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver
from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing
earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another
court of the same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule
on duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be
dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty
of forum shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay
petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question
of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15] the
pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00
shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been
arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when
the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of
Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:
a.
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c)
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e)
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f)
City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b.
Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c.
Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No.
8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section
10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997
in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of he Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because:
(1)
At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal
mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2)
Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3)
Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to
come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an
intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification [17] from the City Personnel Officer of Makati
stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March 1987
to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No.
6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification [18] from the Municipal
Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal

Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of
November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary
constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of
May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may
serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of

government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government

officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in
pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of an officials position should be the
determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but
dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade defined in
Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject
matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities
and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such
classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. [22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty,
responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is
the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed for his
Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective
local government unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate
President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to
determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable
and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said
section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to
prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in
Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An
officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the Court must take judicial
notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local
officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975.[25]
B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section
4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As
what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded
from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and
unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning
rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It
is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of nonexclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not
apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,
[27]
or where the enumeration is by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section
4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down
each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above. The same rationale
applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to
be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade
27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding

to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by
the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the
Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from
the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this
case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius
est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but
it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate
as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127
SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It
must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus,
where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). [30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come
from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would
defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement
its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions
with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the
Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited
means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay
officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and
the like -- who are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases
such as malversation, estafa and theft. xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that
only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under
the jurisdiction of the court.[31]
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a
legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular
legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such opinions do not
necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]
D
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be
referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in
determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over
a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The
provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its provisions
on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this
extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in
other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975 should be any different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction,
and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to regular courts,
but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer
all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the
term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the law
in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
uses the term regular courts, not proper courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1.
If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval
of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2.
If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of
R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be
referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be
referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the
approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said
cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event should be
applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., [36] The Court explained the purpose
of the foregoing provision.
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans]

jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for
a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does
not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x
x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the
original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on
pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed the
commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case
pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A.
8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already devoted to the
presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption
would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases the trials of which have not yet
to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1.
If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the
approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2.
If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval
of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it
retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case
shall be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court,
the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court
retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said
cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has
been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, [39] is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has
been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[42]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. [43] In
the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of
the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The unexplained
inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to
speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing
prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of
personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The
Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice
caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to
invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the
constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, considering also the complexity of the
cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to
speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of
the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later
with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavitcomplaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson
Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz,
Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John
Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple
Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of
Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA
on the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987
to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of
the Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA
furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the
latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was
informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the
Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in
the report and is subject to change or modification depending upon the
explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this
information from the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received
by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring
preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22,
1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above
elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its
findings and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings
No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA findings,
Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding
subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counteraffidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on
June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990,
Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental
Affidavit on November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990,

October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari in
G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court
against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with a
manifestation that said petition is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding
No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations
incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar
Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its
Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor,
who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for
review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its
review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of
the Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations. [50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit
(COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA
findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus
justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw
findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination
of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than
the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team
members had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis
of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal
and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary
investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from
the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the
fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the aboveentitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely
two (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April
30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente
lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention,
however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the
subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in
question are valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a
question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof. [52] Petitioner in this case has failed
to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following
issues raised by them:
(1)
The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information
alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2)
Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan
considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the
Regional Trial Court.
(3)
jeopardy.
The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of
information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. [53] They claim that the filing of the information
in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the
RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case
pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not
by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. [54] As a consequence of this principle,
the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no
jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later
with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because
it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the
only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest
the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in

derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases [56] that estoppel prevents a party from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however,
remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law.
[57]
Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently
invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such
jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly
asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a
motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs
jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the
motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve
the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse
to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves
party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of
a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is
required to be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. [58]Even then, the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. [59] Violations of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60]is a public offense. Social and public
interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can
not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy
even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that
had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of
the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.[63] Their remedy
was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule
against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is
one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single
punishment for various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information
under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but
with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum
shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.[65] We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two
informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a
complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing,
filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of
officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners
of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same
offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later
learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the
case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo,
Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins J. Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurs with J. Panganibans separate opinion.
Buena,
Gonzaga-
[1]
See Presidential Decree No. 1606, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 1860 and
1861. (Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999.)
[2]
An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.
[3]
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
[4]
Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[5]
Illegal use of public finds or property.
[6]
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 21001 (For: Viol. Of Art. 220, Revised Penal Code [Illegal Use of Public Funds]).
[7]
Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 21005 and 21007 (For: Viol. Of Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019 [The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act]).
[8]
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
[9]
G.R. Nos. 119781-83.
[10]
Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., supra.
[11]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, pp. 56-57.
[12]
Rollo, G.R. No. 128136, p. 49.
[13]
Id., at 16-17.
[14]
Entitled Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to be known as Sandiganbayan and for
Other Purposes, promulgated 10 December 1978.
[15]
Entitled Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes, promulgated 23 March 1983.
[16]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, pp. 18-19. Emphasis in the original.
[17]
Id., at 45.
[18]
Rollo, G.R. No. 128136, p. 115.
[19]
Section 5, Article IX-B.
[20]
An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and other
Purposes.
[21]
A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government and
integrating the same.
[22]
[23]
[24]
Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.

Section 10 and 19 (b), R.A. No. 6758.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. -- A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, xxx the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial department of the Philippines, xxx.
[25]
See Conrado B. Rodrigo, Jr. et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. No. 125498,
February 18, 1999.
[26]
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 819 (1997); Victoria vs. Commission on
Elections, 229 SCRA 269 (1994); Allarde vs. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 (1993); Pascualvs. PascualBautista, 207 SCRA 561 (1992); Fagel Tabin Agricultural Corp. vs. Jacinto, 203 SCRA 189 (1991); Insular Bank of
Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 (1984); Insular Lumber Co. vs. Court
of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA 710 (1981).

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 106692 September 1, 1994

(2) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

(3) Ordering the respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

petitioner received a copy of respondent Civil Service Commission's

Indeed, the petitioner failed to comply with the aforesaid Circulars.

Even on its merits, the petition must likewise fail. The

Before 16 April 1988, the petitioner held the position of planning

On 30 January 1987, the President of the Philippines issued E.O.

Among the abolished positions was that of the petitioner. The

In view of our Decision of 4 June 1990 in Mendoza

positions and salaries comparable or equivalent to their former

In a 1st Indorsement dated 14 December 1990, 10the DOST denied

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On 4 March 1991, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter 11to

In its Resolution No. 91-1036 of 29 August 1991, 12the CSC denied

discretion. The petitioner was not compelled to accept the new

The mandamus aspect of this case refers to the payment of the

As for the payment of salary equivalent to that of a Planning

We are not persuaded by the suggestion that the petitioner is only

Nor do we agree with the plea in the dissenting opinion that we

crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the

this Court said:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a

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Cruz, Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

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I concur subject to my ponencia in Aldovino v. Alunan. 1I will

Significantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority

she express interest in her reinstatement as Planning Assistant. Her

Her situation is far different from that of most petitioners and

I also vote for the denial of the petition.

In dismissing the petition of the Secretary of the Department of

The clear import of our decisions in these consolidated cases was

inaction on the part of Cristobal which would amount to an

More importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily

Significantly, in Cristobal, the plaintiff filed his complaint for

The similarity in the circumstances of the petitioner and the private

Petitioner's demotion to a mere Clerk II position with a salary of

With due respect, I cannot simply reconcile myself with the

unconscionable demotion "voluntarily." She did not have must

There is no disagreement on the proposition that a valid abolition of

No removal or separation of petitioners from service is here

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One of the points raised by the respondents in Primicias to defeat

As recently as March 11, 1994 in De Guzman vs. Civil Service

In the case at bench, therefore, the effect of our decision in the

salaries" (except in the cases of those who have retired or opted to

In Dario, which we cited with favor in Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, we

1. Declaring Resolution No. 91-1036 of respondent Civil Service

2. Ordering respondent Secretary of Science and Technology to

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3. Ordering the Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the

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I concur subject to my ponencia in Aldovino v. Alunan. 1I will

Significantly, it appears from the statement of facts of the majority

whatsoever that she resented her separation. She assumed the