Manotok v.

Barque, Part III : The August 24, 2010 En Banc Decision

Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the
Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for
the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution
of the Barques title.
Part II, on the other hand, is a summary of the December 18, 2008 en banc resolution that
reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further
proceedings.
In this entry, we will look at the summary of the Courts August 24, 2010 en
banc decision that (1) DENIED that the Manotoks petitions, the Manahans petition-in-intervention,
and the Barques petition for reconstitution; (2) declared NULL AND VOID TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L.
Barque, and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan; (3) ordered The
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City to CANCEL the said titles; and
(4) DECLARED that the subject Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to
the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to
the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
We will also look at the dissenting opinions of the minority.

The intervening facts

After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several
motions for reconsideration with the 1 st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The
decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the
Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to
the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.

Meanwhile, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-ininterest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot.
On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en bancresolution that SET ASIDE the
decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1
abstention, the CourtREVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA,
andREMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of the
Manotoks title.
In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace
their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which

was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their
respective claims that may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok
title.
The CA then submitted to the SC a Commissioners Report that served as basis for Courts
August 24, 2010 en banc decision.
How the court en banc voted
The Court voted 9-5 with 1 abstention. Justice Villarama, Jr. wrote theopinion for the Court.
Concurring with him were Chief Justice Corona, andJustices Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, and Mendoza.
Justice Carpio, with whom Justices Velasco, Jr., and Brion concurred, wrote a dissenting
opinion. Justice Carpio Morales wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice
Sereno likewise dissented and reserved the right to issue a separate opinion. Justice Nachura did
not take part.
The issue
The core issue identified and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of
the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title?
The Courts ruling
The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary
of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of
the Manotok title.

The ponencia of Justice Villarama

Justice Villarama cited as the central legal basis of the Courts rulingSection 18 of Act No.
1120, which provides: SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. He then
explained:
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by
the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). . . [T]he approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. xxx.

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[T]he absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate
and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid
titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. The Manotoks reliance on the presumption of
regularity in the statutorily prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of their
deed of conveyance is untenable. In our Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., we underscored the mandatory requirement in Section
18, as follows:
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: No lease or sale made
by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act
shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources).
Thus, petitioners claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval
of the Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or
inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as
enunciated in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao vs. Court
of Appeals. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.
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In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the
subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in the first place.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB,
conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. In fact, Exh. 10 was not included among those official documents submitted by the OSG to
the CA. We underscore anew that friar lands can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the
requirements of Sections 11, 12 and 18 of Act No. 1120. It was thus primordial for the Manotoks to prove
their acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to do. Accordingly, this
Court has no alternative but to declare the Manotok title null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate as still part of the Government's patrimonial property, as recommended by the CA.
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes
and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to
prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Manotok after the latter had paid
in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No.
22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of
deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy
presented (Exh. 5-A) as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually
existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner. While
TCT No. 22813 was mentioned in certain documents such as the deed of donation executed in 1946 by
Severino Manotok in favor of his children and the first tax declaration (Exh. 26), these do not stand as
secondary evidence of an alleged transfer from OCT No. 614. This hiatus in the evidence of the
Manotoks further cast doubts on the veracity of their claim.

As we stressed in Alonso:
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an ironclad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the
paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the
disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land,
remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of
the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into
ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein
expressly provided, is founded on the the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or
agents to whose care they are confided. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions
of Act No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok
title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of
the Government.