In September 1992, Senators Dole and Biden introduced bipartisan legislation

that provided for US military assistance not exceeding $50 million in equipment to
be made available to the Bosnian Government once the embargo was lifted. 27 This
was the first legislative initiative aimed at providing military assistance to Bosnia,
and it was conditional on the preparedness of US allies to join in such an assistance
effort.28 Though it was dependent on the lifting of the embargo, this legislation was
to herald a series of legislative initiatives with a similar policy aim; and by the end of
1992, Dole had come to the conclusion that lifting the embargo was the best policy.
The UN arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in 1991 had remained in place after
Bosnias independence, depriving Bosnia of its right to self-defence. The embargo
had frozen the military advantage in favour of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Efforts
to lift the arms embargo soon became the focus of Congress as it formulated US
policy towards Bosnia.
On 17 December 1992, Dole and 12 other senators wrote to President Bush
stating that the genocide of the people of Bosnia is continuing we believe that the
UN arms embargo against Bosnia must now be lifted.
Clinton wrote in his memoirs, he was faced with dug-in positions when he assumed
office. I was reluctant to go along with Senator Dole in unilaterally lifting the arms
embargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations, wrote Clinton, adding that he
was also not in favour of using unilateral airpower that would strain the NATO
alliance.40 Since 1992, Senator Dole had been calling for an end to the arms embargo
and use of air power against the Bosnian Serb military; and Democratic congressman
Frank McCloskey had been advocating an identical policy. Bosnian Government
officials had also been proposing the same thing for some time. While the exact
origins and ownership of lift and strike cannot be attributed to one individual, the
policy was officially adopted by the incoming Democratic administration in early
26 H. Kari
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1993. John Major recalled that when he visited Washington in February 1993, the
American opinion had become almost evangelical for the policy of lift and strike
lifting the arms embargo and starting air strikes against Bosnian Serbs which
greatly concerned us.41 Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was to
write many years later that the American administration was under constant
pressure from Senator Bob Dole, Margaret Thatcher, and other partisans of lift.42
It was clear that Doles advocacy for this policy option was starting to have an
impact.
And unilateral American action in Bosnia was not an
option as the administration did not want to become solely responsible for Bosnia.
Eventually, on 1 May 1993, Clinton made the
decision to adopt the lift and strike policy that Senator Dole and Representative
McCloskey had been advocating.
Bob Doles first legislative proposal to end the embargo on Bosnia came in May
1993, only four months after the new administration had taken over. On 27 May
1993, Dole introduced the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1993 to lift the
embargo on Bosnia and authorise up to $200 million in military aid to the Bosnian
Government. In a press statement, Dole emphasised that the embargo was
introduced prior to Bosnias independence and prior to the aggression on Bosnia.
He argued that continued application of the embargo continues to impair Bosnias
right to self-defence. encouraging further aggression. He also acknowledged the
multilateral approach favoured by President Clinton but criticised the focus on
multilateralism as a goal in itself.52 On 20 July 1993, Clinton wrote to Dole stating

that he supported lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and that the USA supported
an attempt by the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN to lift it. The effort failed to
convince the allies, though, and Clinton reiterated that the approach from the
beginning had been to maintain Western unity and preserve alliance cohesion.

Conclusion
The foreign policy activism of Senator Bob Dole in shaping US policy towards
Bosnia, from the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the Dayton Peace Accords, is
often
overlooked but its impact cannot be overstated. Doles interest in Yugoslavia
extended back to the mid-1980s, positioning him to understand the currents
of
change that overwhelmed the country in the early 1990s. He was among the
first
legislators in the Western world to understand the nature of Milosevics
policy of
territorial expansion and he sought to frame the policy debate accordingly.
And
during the war in Bosnia, Dole focused his legislative spotlight on lifting the
arms
embargo imposed on Yugoslavia but applied to Bosnia. Realising very early
on that
this impaired Bosnias ability to defend itself, Dole worked tirelessly to repeal
this
policy. He undertook five major legislative proposals including introducing a
bill,
offering an amendment, attaching an amendment to a defence authorization
bill, and
introducing new legislation in 1995 in his capacity as Majority Leader.
Though supportive of multilaterally lifting the embargo, Dole quickly realised
the infeasibility of this approach and from 1993 pushed for a unilateral
approach.
His legislative efforts served to pressure the Clinton administration and
provided the
administration with potential leverage in its dealings with reluctant allies.
And after
the Dayton Peace Accords were reached, Dole again asserted himself,
persuading a
number of fellow Republicans to support Clintons decision to deploy US
troops to
enforce the peace in Bosnia.
Senator Bob Dole was at the forefront of congressional efforts to shape US
policy on Bosnia and was unquestionably committed to keeping the issue of
Bosnia

at the top of the legislative agenda. Struggling against the instincts of both
the Bush
and Clinton administrations as well as many members of Congress, the
senior
legislator and war veteran nonetheless sought to steer American policy
towards a
more assertive position in Bosnia. It is only by considering his crucial role
that we
can obtain a clear picture of the transformation and formulation of US policy
towards Bosnia during the war. Senator Doles efforts to work across party
lines
were not always a politically expedient choice, yet his willingness to do so
shaped his
legacy, especially on the issue
of Bosnia. Indeed, as David Halberstam noted, Dole
was perhaps one of the last figures from the internationalist bipartisan
generation of
the past.