Eternalism (philosophy of time)

Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological

nature of time, which takes the view that all points in
time are equally real, as opposed to the presentist idea
that only the present is real[1] and the growing block universe theory of time in which the past and present are real
while the future is not. Modern advocates often take inspiration from the way time is modeled as a dimension in
the theory of relativity, giving time a similar ontology to
that of space (although the basic idea dates back at least
to McTaggarts B-Theory of time, rst published in The
Unreality of Time in 1908, only three years after the rst
paper on relativity). This would mean that time is just
another dimension, that future events are already there,
and that there is no objective ow of time. It is sometimes
referred to as the "block time" or "block universe" theory due to its description of space-time as an unchanging four-dimensional block,[2] as opposed to the view
of the world as a three-dimensional space modulated by
the passage of time.

is not universal: according to the relativity of simultaneity, observers in dierent frames of reference can have
dierent perceptions of whether a given pair of events
happened at the same time or at dierent times, with
there being no physical basis for preferring one frames
judgments over anothers (though in a case where one
event A happens in the past light cone of another event
B, all frames will agree that A happened in the past of
B). So, in special relativity there can be no physical basis
for picking out a unique set of events that are all happening simultaneously in the present.
Many philosophers have argued that relativity implies
eternalism.[3] Although he disagrees in a qualied sense,
philosopher of science, Dean Rickles, notes that the consensus among philosophers seems to be that special and
general relativity are incompatible with presentism.[4]
For example, Christian Wthrich writes:
Presentists have responded in a variety of
ways to the pressure exerted by the RietdijkPutnam argument... [A] presentist could deny
Naturalism. Such denial could take dierent
forms. One could, as does Jonathan Lowe,
claim that SR is not a theory about time but
about something else instead. Alternatively,
one could retort by accepting that SR speaks to
the geometry of space-time but reject that this
has any ontological import, as does Dean Zimmerman (2008). Second, a presentist might reject SR-Realism, simply asserting that SR is not
approximately true of the world. This could
occur simply on a priori grounds... Also, considerations from quantum mechanics can be
invoked in an attempt to establish that SR is
false or incomplete insofar as it lacks an absolute, privileged frame of reference. This response comes in dierent avours: (a) (nonrelativistic) collapse dynamics require a preferred frame in which the collapse occurs; (b)
Bohmian interpretations are incompatible with
SR; and (c) invoke Bells theorem to argue that
some tenets of SR must be given up...
[A] presentist might simply bite the bullet
and consequently relativize existence... since
what is present is relative to an inertial frame,
what exists becomes fragmented in that it depends on the choice of frame...
[Another] is to accept that SR oers a perfectly empirically adequate theory, but to insist that absolute simultaneity still exists. It is

Problems with the ow of time

Conventionally, time is divided into three distinct regions;

the "past", the present, and the "future". Using that representational model, the past is generally seen as being
immutably xed, and the future as undened and nebulous. As time passes, the moment that was once the
present becomes part of the past; and part of the future,
in turn, becomes the new present. In this way time is said
to pass, with a distinct present moment moving forward
into the future and leaving the past behind.
Within this intuitive understanding of time is the philosophy of presentism, which argues that only the present
exists. It does not travel forward through an environment
of time, moving from a real point in the past and toward
a real point in the future. Instead, the present simply
changes. The past and future do not exist and are only
concepts used to describe the real, isolated, and changing
present.
This conventional model presents a number of dicult
philosophical problems, and seems dicult to reconcile
with currently accepted scientic theories such as the
theory of relativity.

1.1

Simultaneity

Special relativity suggests that the concept of simultaneity

1

1
just that we cannot possibly detect the privileged frame of reference which determines
the present. In other words, absolute simultaneity is not empirically accessible... [The]
metaphysics fully relies on postulated extrastructure that can't even in principle be observed... It violates Ockhams razor so crassly
that the move cannot be justied by putting
some post-vericationist philosophy of science
on ones ag.[5]
Christian Wthrich, No Presentism in
Quantum Gravity in Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications
of Minkowskis Unication of Space and Time

However, there are some, such as Dean Zimmerman, who

have argued that it is possible to accept the physical predictions of relativity while adopting an alternative interpretation of the theory (For instance, see Lorentz ether
theory) in which there is a single privileged frame whose
judgments about length, time and simultaneity are the
true ones, even though there would be absolutely no empirical way to distinguish this frame from other frames,
and no real experience could identify it.[6]

[When] appealing to ndings from empirically well-grounded disciplines, philosophers

face a strong temptation to overstate their case
especially if their philosophical opponents
can be relied on to be relatively innocent of
new developments in the relevant science. I
fear that some B-theorists have succumbed
to the temptation, judging by the relish with
which they often pronounce a verdict based
on Relativity. They can practically hear the
crunch of the lowly metaphysicians armor
giving way, as they bring the full force of
incontrovertible physical fact down upon
our A-theoretically-addled heads. But what
actually hits us, and how hard is the blow?
SR is false; GRs future is highly uncertain;
and the presentists conict with either version
of Relativity is shallow, since the presentists
manifold can satisfy the same geometrical
description as a B-theorists manifold, and
aord explanations of all the same phenomena in precisely the same style. In these
circumstances, how could appeal to SR or GR
justify the frequent announcements that the
A-theoryB-theory dispute has been settled
by physics, not philosophy?[7]
Dean Zimmerman, Presentism and the
Space-Time Manifold in The Oxford Handbook of Time

PROBLEMS WITH THE FLOW OF TIME

1.2 Time as object or environment

While the present is intuitively understood as the object
that moves through the environment of time, it is common to also describe time as an object that moves, in the
same way that a passenger on a train perceives the environment passing by. This perception of the passage or
ow of time can be confused with the previous idea of
the present moving through time, leading to the misunderstanding that time is moving through time, i.e., that it
is moving through itself. This illogical premise can lead
to circular questions asking how fast time travels per unit
of time:
The concept of time passing can be considered to be
internally inconsistent, by asking how much time goes
by in an hour?" The question how fast does time pass
seems to have no satisfactory answer, in which answers
such as a second per second would be, as some would
argue, circular and thus false. In addition, even if we do
accept the above answer, then the statement a second per
second can be expressed as a fraction which is always
equal to one. But this one has no meaning beyond
being a number and is thus also the wrong kind of answer.
Therefore, the argument goes, the rate of the passage of
time is nonsensical.
There is a major problem though in that the question of
time is no dierent from space. One can similarly ask,
how much space is contained in a meter?" and face a
similar objection.
Time passing may be seen as a metaphor for the continuous human experience of some expected future events
becoming directly experienced qualia, while experienced
qualia becoming just objects of memory.

1.3 McTaggarts argument

In The Unreality of Time, J. M. E. McTaggart divided
time into an A-series and a B-series, with the A-series describing events in absolute tensed terms (past, present,
and future) and the B-series describing events in terms of
untensed temporal relations (before and after). He also
added the notion of a C-series, a series that has an order but with no notion of time, like a series of letters. He
went on to argue that the A-series was needed for anything deserving the name time,[8] since he argued that
only the A-series can allow for genuine change,[9] and he
considered change to be an essential part of any reasonable denition of time.[10] But, he argued, the A-series
was logically incoherent,[11] so he concluded that time
was unreal,[12] and since he also believed the B-series depended on the A-series,[13] he also concluded that only
the C-series could remain as a meaningful ordering.[14]
However, various philosophers (sometimes identied as
B theorists) have held that the remaining B-series qualies as a valid framework for a theory of time, sometimes
called the B-Theory of time.[15]

3.2

Apparent dierences between past, present and future

The Eternalist alternative

to see how the ow of time, whether it exists or not, could

make any subjective dierence: all conscious beings are
Eternalism addresses these various diculties by con- built to perceive time as a chain of events, whether or not
sidering all points in time to be equally valid frames of it occurs as such.
referenceor equally real, if one prefers. It does not do
away with the concept of past and future, but instead con3.2 Apparent dierences between past,
siders them directions rather than states of being; whether
present and future
some point in time is in the future or past is entirely dependent on which frame of reference you are using as a
Many of our common-sense attitudes treat the past,
basis for observing it.
present and future preferentially.
Since an observer at any given point in time can only remember events that are in the past relative to him, and not
1. We apparently fear death because we believe that we
events that are in the future relative to him, the subjective
will no longer exist after we die. However, if Eterillusion of the passage of time is maintained. The asymnalism is correct, death is just one of our temporal
metry of remembering past events but not future ones, as
borders, and the forms of the world with you alive
well as other irreversible events that progress in only one
in it would continue to exist even as one consciously
temporal direction (such as the increase in entropy) gives
moves forward through time toward dissolution.
rise to the arrow of time. In the view suggested by Eternalism, there is no passage of time; the ticking of a clock
2. You are about to go to the dentist, or you have almeasures durations between events much as the marks on
ready been. Commonsense says you should prefer
a measuring tape measures distances between places.
to have been. But if Eternalism is correct, then a
Eternalism has implications for the concept of free
will, in that it proposes that future events are as immutably xed and impossible to change as past events (see
determinism).

resemblance of you in the future is already feeling

better.
3. When some unpleasant experience is behind us, we
feel glad that it is over. But if the Eternalism is correct, there is no such property as being over or no
longer happening nowit continues to exist timelessly, alongside eternal, unchanging moments of
perfect contentedness.

Eternalism makes two assumptions, which are separable.

One is that time is a full-edged real dimension. The
other is immutability. The latter is not a necessary consequence of the rst. A universe in which changes are possible may be indistinguishable from the fully deterministic many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in
which there are multiple growing block universes.
3.3

Status of conscious observers

The comment summarizes the main objections. In more

detail, they are:

Eternalists often appeal to the idea that the ow of time is

a subjective illusion. However, Eternalism takes its inspiration from physics and needs to give a physical account
of observers. One could, for instance, portray conscious
observers as moving through the block universe, in some
physically inexplicable way, in order to account for the
subjective sense of a ow of time. But there is no need to
do so to explain the subjective ow of time. Their opponents claim that the time-ow itself, as an objective phenomenon, is physically inexplicable, and that physics is
simply misrepresenting time in treating it as a dimension.

3.1

3.4 Determinism and indeterminism

Philosophical objections

Philosophers such as John Lucas argue that The Block

universe gives a deeply inadequate view of time. It fails
to account for the passage of time, the pre-eminence of
the present, the directedness of time and the dierence
between the future and the past[16]

Subjective sense of ow

Whilst the idea that there is some objective sense in which

time is owing can be denied, the fact that conscious beings feel as though it is in some sense owing cannot.
However, if the ow of time didn't have an objective existence, then it is argued conscious beings would simultaneously experience all moments in their lives. A response is
that since the brain presumably perceives time through information processing of external stimuli, not by extrasensory perception, and obeys the laws of causality, it is hard

Previously, it was noted that people tend to have very

dierent attitudes towards the past and the future. This
might be explained by an underlying attitude that the
future is not xed, but can be changed, and is therefore worth worrying about. If that is correct, the ow
of time is perhaps less important to our intuitions than
an open, undetermined, future. In other words, a owof-time theory with a strictly determined future (which
nonetheless does not exist at the present) would not

satisfy common-sense intuitions about time. If indeterminism can be removed from ow-of-time theories,
can it be added to Eternalist theories? Regarding John
G. Cramers transactional interpretation, Kastner (2010)
proposed that in order to preserve the elegance and economy of the interpretation, it may be necessary to consider
oer and conrmation waves as propagating in a higher
space of possibilities.[17]
In his discussion with Albert Einstein, Karl Popper argued against determinism:
The main topic of our conversation was indeterminism. I tried to persuade him to give
up his determinism, which amounted to the
view that the world was a four-dimensional
Parmenidean block universe in which change
was a human illusion, or very nearly so. (He
agreed that this had been his view, and while
discussing it I called him Parmenides.) I argued that if men, or other organisms, could
experience change and genuine succession in
time, then this was real. It could not be explained away by a theory of the successive rising into our consciousness of time slices which
in some sense coexist; for this kind of rising
into consciousness would have precisely the
same character as that succession of changes
which the theory tries to explain away. I also
brought in the somewhat obvious biological arguments: that the evolution of life, and the way
organisms behave, especially higher animals,
cannot really be understood on the basis of any
theory which interprets time as if it were something like another (anisotropic) space coordinate. After all, we do not experience space coordinates. And this is because they are simply
nonexistent: we must beware of hypostatizing
them; they are constructions which are almost
wholly arbitrary. Why should we then experience the time coordinateto be sure, the one
appropriate to our inertial systemnot only as
real but also as absolute, that is, as unalterable
and independent of anything we can do (except
changing our state of motion)?
The reality of time and change seemed to
me the crux of realism. (I still so regard it,
and it has been so regarded by some idealistic opponents of realism, such as Schrdinger
and Gdel.)
When I visited Einstein, Schilpps Einstein
volume in The Library of Living Philosophers
had just been published; this volume contained a now famous contribution of Gdels
which employed, against the reality of time and
change, arguments from Einsteins two relativity theories. Einstein had come out in that
volume strongly in favour of realism. And
he clearly disagreed with Gdels idealism: he

RELATION TO PHYSICS

suggested in his reply that Gdels solutions of

the cosmological equations might have to be
excluded on physical grounds.
Now I tried to present to EinsteinParmenides as strongly as I could my conviction that a clear stand must be made against
any idealistic view of time. And I also tried to
show that, though the idealistic view was compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, a clear stand should be made in favour
of an open universeone in which the future was in no sense contained in the past or
the present, even though they do impose severe restrictions on it. I argued that we should
not be swayed by our theories to give up realism (for which the strongest arguments were
based on common sense), though I think that
he was ready to admit, as I was, that we might
be forced one day to give it up if very powerful arguments (of Gdels type, say) were to be
brought against it. I therefore argued that with
regard to time, and also to indeterminism (that
is, the incompleteness of physics), the situation
was precisely similar to the situation with regard to realism. Appealing to his own way of
expressing things in theological terms, I said:
if God had wanted to put everything into the
world from the beginning, He would have created a universe without change, without organisms and evolution, and without man and mans
experience of change. But He seems to have
thought that a live universe with events unexpected even by Himself would be more interesting than a dead one.[18]
Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography

4 Relation to physics
Eternalism takes its inspiration from physics, especially
the Rietdijk-Putnam argument, in which the relativity of
simultaneity is used to show that each point in the universe can have a dierent set of events that are in its
present moment. According to Presentism this is impossible because there is only one present moment that is
instantaneous and encompasses the entire universe.
Some philosophers also appeal to a specic theory which
is timeless in a more radical sense than the rest of
physics, the theory of quantum gravity. This theory
is used, for instance, in Julian Barbour's theory of
timelessness.[19] On the other hand, George Ellis argues
that time is absent in cosmological theories because of
the details they leave out.[20]

Relation to pre-McTaggart positions

Augustine of Hippo wrote that God is outside of time

that time exists only within the created universe. Thomas
Aquinas took the same view, and many theologians agree.
On this view, God would perceive something like a block
universe, while time might appear dierently to the nite
beings contained within it.[21]
The philosopher Katherin A. Rogers argued that Anselm
of Canterbury took an eternalist view of time,[22] although the philosopher Brian Leftow argued against
this interpretation,[23] suggesting that Anselm instead advocated for a type of presentism. Rogers responded
to this paper, defending her original interpretation.[24]
Rogers also discusses this issue in her book Anselm on
Freedom, using the term four-dimensionalism rather
than eternalism for the view that the present moment is not ontologically privileged, and commenting
that "Boethius and Augustine do sometimes sound rather
four-dimensionalist, but Anselm is apparently the rst
consistently and explicitly to embrace the position.[25]
Taneli Kukkonen argues in the Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy that what Augustines and Anselms
mix of eternalist and presentist, tenseless and tensed language tells is that medieval philosophers saw no need to
choose sides in the manner that modern philosophers
do.[26]
In Buddhism, a special term Dharmadhatu is translated as
'total eld of events and meanings or 'eld of all events
and meanings.' Here the 'Block Universe' seems to be encompassing not only every possible event in the physical
universe but also having a psychological component.

Eternalism also appears in the comic book series

Watchmen by Alan Moore. In one chapter, Dr. Manhattan explains how he perceives time. Since past, present,
and future events all occur at the same time for him, he
speaks about them all in the present tense. For example,
he says Forty years ago, cogs rain on Brooklyn referring
to an event in his youth when his father throws old watch
parts out a window. His last line of the series is Nothing
ends, Adrian. Nothing ever ends.
In his science fantasy novel The Number of the Beast,
Robert Heinlein has one of the novels protagonists, the
mathematician and geometer Dr. Jacob Burroughs invent a device which can navigate through time as one
scalar dimension in a six-dimensional universe. The
novel carries its main characters through time as well as
countless alternate universes, some of which are ctional
worlds, accessible by quantum-wise progression through
one of the six axes of the universe Burroughs invention
can access. In this novel, there is not only block time,
but a block plenum of many alternate universes, each a
quantum step along an axis of space-time.[28]

7 See also
Eternity of the world
Introduction to special relativity
Static interpretation of time
Philosophy of space and time

8 References

Dirck Vorenkamp, a professor of religious studies, argued in his paper B-Series Temporal Order in Dogens
Theory of Time[27] that the Zen Buddhist teacher Dgen Notes
presented views on time that contained all the main elements of McTaggarts B-series view of time (which [1] Kuipers, Theo A.F. (2007). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. North Holland. p. 326. ISBN 978-0denies any objective present), although he noted that
444-51548-3.
some of Dgen reasoning also contained A-Series notions, which Vorenkamp argued may indicate some in- [2] Block here refers to the idea of spacetime as something
consistency in Dgens thinking.
xed and unchanging, like a solid block, and not to the
actual geometric shape of space or spacetime.

In ction

Eternalism is a major theme in Kurt Vonneguts novel,

Slaughterhouse-Five. The Tralfamadorians, an alien
species in the novel, have a four-dimensional sight and
can therefore see all points in time simultaneously. They
explain that since all moments exist simultaneously, everyone is always alive. The hero, Billy Pilgrim, lives his
life out of sequence, which, among other things, means
that his point of death occurs at a random point in his life
rather than at the end of it.

[3] See footnote 1 of Thomas M. Crisp, Presentism, Eternalism, and Relativity Physics in Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (2007), edited by William Lane Craig
and Quentin Smith.
[4] Dean Rickles (2007). Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime
, p. 158.
[5] Wthrich, Christian (2010). No Presentism in Quantum
Gravity. In Vesselin Petkov. Space, Time, and Spacetime:
Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowskis
Unication of Space and Time. Fundamental Theories of
Physics. Springer. pp. 262264. ISBN 9783642135378.
LCCN 2010935080.

[6] see section 1.1.2 of philosopher Yuri Balashovs book Persistence and Spacetime (2010, Oxford University Press)
for a brief discussion. Balashov himself considers this
view to be misguided, but notes that some authors
have advocated it, citing the following sources:
Craig, William Lane (2001), Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity
Craig, William Lane and Smith, Quentin (2008),
Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity
forthcoming (at the time of Balashovs writing)
paper by Dean Zimmerman, 'Presentism and the
Space-Time Manifold' (see in particular the discussion starting on p. 90), to appear in Craig Callender
(ed.), Oxford Handbook of Time

EXTERNAL LINKS

[15] Loux, Michael (2006). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, Third Edition, p. 205
[16] John LucasThe Future p8
[17] The Quantum Liar Experiment Kastner,. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (=2).
[18] Popper, K.R. (2002). Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. Routledge Classics. Routledge. pp. 148
150. ISBN 9780415285896. LCCN 2002067996.
[19] Platonia, Julian Barbours time-skeptical website
[20] Ellis (2006). Physics in the Real Universe: Time
and Spacetime. Gen.Rel.Grav. 38 (12): 17971824.
arXiv:gr-qc/0605049. doi:10.1007/s10714-006-0332-z.

[7] Zimmerman, Dean (2011). Presentism and the SpaceTime Manifold. In C. Callender. The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Time (PDF). Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy. OUP Oxford. pp.163-244 (PDF p.119). ISBN
9780199298204. LCCN 2011283684.

[21] John Polkinghorne (2011). Science and Religion in Quest

of Truth, p. 64.

[8] Time, as we have seen, stands and falls with the A series

[23] Brian Leftow (2009). Anselmian Presentism. Faith and

Philosophy 26 (3):297-319.

[9] Changes must happen to the events of such a nature that

the occurrence of these changes does not hinder the events
from being events, and the same events, both before and
after the change. Now what characteristics of an event are
there which can change and yet leave the event the same
event? (I use the word characteristic as a general term to
include both the qualities which the event possesses, and
the relations of which it is a term -- or rather the fact that
the event is a term of these relations.) It seems to me that
there is only one class of such characteristics -- namely,
the determination of the event in question by the terms of
the A series.
[10] It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change
[11] My main thesis is that the existence of any A series involves a contradiction.
[12] We have come then to the conclusion that the application
of the A series to reality involves a contradiction, and that
consequently the A series cannot be true of reality. And,
since time involves the A series, it follows that time cannot
be true of reality. "
[13] The B series, on the other hand, is not ultimate. For, given
a C series of permanent relations of terms, which is not in
itself temporal, and therefore is not a B series, and given
the further fact that the terms of this C series also form
an A series, and it results that the terms of the C series
become a B series, those which are placed rst, in the direction from past to future, being earlier than those whose
places are further in the direction of the future.
[14] Our conclusion, then, is that neither time as a whole, nor
the A series and B series, really exist. But this leaves it
possible that the C series does really exist. The A series
was rejected for its inconsistency. And its rejection involved the rejection of the B series. But we have found no
such contradiction in the C series, and its invalidity does
not follow from the invalidity of the A series.

[22] Katherin A. Rogers (2007). Anselmian Eternalism.

Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):3-27.

[24] Katherin Rogers (2009). Back to Eternalism. Faith and

Philosophy 26 (3):320-338.
[25] Rogers, Katherin (2008). Anselm on Freedom. Oxford
University Press. p. 159. ISBN 9780199231676.
[26] From Kukkonens chapter on Eternity in The Oxford
Handbook of Medieval Philosophy edited by John Marenbon (2012), p. 529.
[27] Vorenkamp, Dirck (1995). B-Series Temporal Order in
Dogens Theory of Time. Philosophy East and West, Volume 45, Number 3, 1995 July, P.387-408.
[28] Heinlein, Robert (1986). The Number of the Beast. New
York: Fawcett Publications. pp. 512 pp. ISBN 9780449130704.

Bibliography
Smart, Jack. River of Time. In Anthony Kenny.
Essays in Conceptual Analysis. pp. 214215.
van Inwagen, Peter (2008). Metaphysics. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

9 External links
Biswas; Shaw; Modak (1999). Time in Quantum
Gravity. Int.J.Mod.Phys. D 10 (4): 595. arXiv:grqc/9906010. doi:10.1142/S0218271801001384.
Davies, Paul (September 2002). That Mysterious Flow. Scientic American 287 (3): 4045.
doi:10.1038/scienticamerican0902-40.
Dorato,Mauro - Kant, Godel and Relativity

7
Markosian, Ned (2002). Time: 8. The 3D/4D
Controversy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retrieved 2006-12-20.
Nikolic, Hrvoje. Block time: Why many physicists
still don't accept it?" (PDF).
Petkov, Vesselin (2005). Is There an Alternative to
the Block Universe View?" (PDF). PhilSci Archive.
Retrieved 2006-12-20.
Duda, J (2009). Four-dimensional understanding
of quantum mechanics. arXiv:0910.2724.
Wthrich, Christian (2011). The fate of presentism
in modern physics.

10

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10.2

Images

File:MontreGousset001.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/MontreGousset001.jpg License: CC-BYSA-3.0 Contributors: Self-published work by ZA Original artist: Isabelle Grosjean ZA
File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:Wooden_hourglass_3.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/Wooden_hourglass_3.jpg License: CCBY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: User:S Sepp

10.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0