American Philosophical Society

Florentine Popular Government (1343-1348)
Author(s): Marvin B. Becker

Source: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 106, No. 4 (Aug. 22, 1962), pp.
360-382
Published by: American Philosophical Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/985269
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FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT
(1343-1348)
MARVIN B. BECKER*
Department of History,Western Reserve University
LATE -in Julyof 1343 the Florentinesacted in be imbedded in the writingsof the Florentine
concertto overthrowthe despotismof Walter of humanists of the late Trecento and finds its
Brienne. An aristocraticSignoria was formed clearest expression in the letters of the most
whichprovedas unpopularas Brienne'styranny, eminent classical scholar of his age-Coluccio
and in late Septemberof that same year, a new Salutati, who speaks of Florence as being govgovernmentwas establishedwhich gave repre- erned by an aristocracyof deeds-the merchants
sentationto men from new familieswho were and artisans, rather than by an aristocracyof
matriculatedin boththe greaterand lesser guilds blood-the milites.3 Clearly,then,the tenureof
of the city. New men had filteredinto politics the regimefoundedin the autumn of 1343 debefore,but never had so many entered public serves to be studied in some detail. Perhaps
life en masse as in the fall of 1343. For the throughan examinationof the policies initiated
firsttime in communalhistory,one half of those by this popular Signoria it will be possible to
who held high officewere parvenus. These novi understandbettersome of the reasons for this
cives were characterizedas brazen upstartsby change in attitude. ThroughoutFlorentinehisand literarymen of the periodand torycertainmembersof the patriciatehad recogthe chroniclers
of interests
were judged to be incapableof governingthem- nized that therewas a compatability
based
newcomers
the
and
class
their
between
selves,let alone rulingothers.1
mutualownership
Florentinehistoriansof the 1340's were unani- upon commonguild affiliations,
mous in this verdictand when the greatestof of property,similarityof patrimonialendowment,
the ruin and joint business ventures. This bond had
theirnumber,GiovanniVillani,attributed
and
throughintermarriage
reinforced
of the state to the political ineptitudeof these beenfurther
organizareligious
and
social
in
such
membership
held
a
opinion.
widely
he
was
voicing
new men,
By the 1350's, however, this consensus had tions as the tower societiesand confraternities.4
broken down and, when Matteo Villani, the When the public officesof the popular governcontinuatorof his brother'schronicle,recorded ment (1343-1348) were divided almost equally
the events of Florentinehistory,the novi cives betweenthe novi cives and the patricians,these
were frequentlycast in a heroic role, while the two orderswere compelledto carrythe cooperaaristocratswere seen as the principalthreatto tion that characterizedcertainareas of theirprigood government.2This altered view came to vate lives into the arena of communalpolitics.
What policies was this combinationof orders to
* Research for this article was done while the author formulatein the realms of communal finance,
was a recipient of a grant from the American Philorelationsbetweenthe Signoria and the Church,
sophical Society.
1 For the background of the novi cives, see J. Plesner, state bureacracy,governmentof the contado,
and control
L'emigration de la campagne a la ville libre de Florence regulationof the businesscommunity,
au XIIIe siecle, 119 ff., Copenhagen, 1934. The tax
over the Florentinemagnati?
assessments of the novi cives reveal that they were affluent men and their holdings in the funded communal debt
of 1345 (the Monte) averaged the considerable sum of
fifty-sevenflorins. Cf. G. Brucker and M. Becker, The
Arti Minori in Florentine politics, 1342-1378, Mediaeval
Studies 18: 101, 1956. The prestanze and estirniof the
novi cives stood in a ratio of five to six and one-half in
comparison to those imposed upon the members of the
patriciate. This figureis based upon a study of surviving
tax records for the Trecento.
2 G. Villani, Cronica, ed. F. G. Dragomani 12: 43;
12: 72, Florence 1845; G. Boccaccio, Lettere Volgari,
12 Florence. 1834. For Matteo Villani's views, see G.
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY,
Brucker, The Ghibelline trial of Matteo Villani (1362,

Medievalia et Humanistica 13: 52-53, 1960. For the attitude of the literarymen of Dante's generationtoward the
newcomers,see C. T. Davis, Dante and the idea of Rome,
97 ff, Oxford, 1957; N. Rubinstein, The beginnings of
political thought in Florence, Jour. Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 5: 198-225, 1942.
3 E. Garin, I cancellieri umanisti della Repubblica
Fiorentina, Rivista Storica Italiana 71: 194-195, 1959.
4 Cf. M. Becker, An essay on the Novi Cives and
Florentine politics, to be published in Mediaeval Studies.
VOL.
106,NO. 4, AUGUST, 1962
360
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
361
republicwas deeplyin debt and could not honor

her domestic and foreigncommitments;shortterm loans were no longer being amortizedand
the Camera was unable to pay the salaries of her
officials.7In Augustand earlySeptemberof 1343
the treasurycollectedrevenuesfromonly a few
of the state's many indirect taxes (gabelles),
and the judicial authorityof the courtshad collapsed so that it was virtuallyimpossibleto enhad been in effect
forcethe law.8 A moratorium
on all governmentallong-termloans for almost
a year and thereappeared to be littlelikelihood
thattheSignoriawould be able to resumeinterest
paymentson these prestanze for some time to
come. Men who were willing to advance the
treasurymoneyon thebasis of anticipatedrevenue
had been in short supply for several years
and the announcementof the moratoriumonly
worsened the situation.9 Conditionshad never
I
seemed less hopefuland public confidencein the
The most serious difficultyconfrontingthe
of the guild patriciateto lead the comcapacity
popular Signoria was the alarmingdeterioration
mune
out
of thiseconomicwildernesswas further
of the republic'sfiscalposition. Based upon evishaken
when
many of the great Florentinecomdence from the Florentinetreasuryrecords, it
panies
publicly
acknowledgedthat theywere unwould appear that the twelve-monthinterval
able
to
repay
their
creditors. Leading firmssuch
which preceded the inaugurationof the new
regimemarked the nadir in communalfinance.6 as Acciaiuoli,Bardi, Frescobaldi,and Peruzzi had
Revenuesfrombothdirectand indirectlevieshad already compromisedthemselvesthrough their
fallen sharply,and this general decline of the close association with the tyrant,Walter of
city'sfiscalstrengthwas certainlya criticalfactor Brienne,while other great houses had damaged
in bringingon thetwo revolutionsthatculminated their political prestige by championingfoolish
Except for the work of Antonio Panella,
modernhistorianshave neglectedthe politicsof
this interludeof popular government. And yet
thiswas thefirsttimein theannals of the republic
that newcomersand patriciansjoined to conduct
public affairs.5 That the chroniclers,Matteo
Villani and Stefani,along with the leading civic
humanists,were to take a much more positive
view of the politicalcapacities of the new men
than did the previous generationsof Dante and
Giovanni Villani, suggests that this unorthodox
coalitionbetweenthe old and the new can hardly
be looked upon as a failure. But beforejudgments can be made as to the success of this
politicalexperiment,an effortmust be made to
describethe problemsfaced by the new Signoria
and the bold policiesformulatedto resolvethem.
with the foundingof the new government.The
7 The retainers of the Priors petitioned the Signoria

for unpaid wages dating back seven months. Provvisioni
5 For a discussion of A. Panella's thesis on the ecclesiDuplicati, 4, f. 7, 4 September, 1343. (Henceforth this
astical policies of the Florentine governmentfrom 1343 source will be abbreviated as P.D.)
See also the reto 1348, see M. Becker, Some economic implications of quests of Florentines who were serving as hostages in
the conflictbetween church and state in Trecento FlorVerona for expense money owed them. Ibid., 4, f. 9r,
ence, Mediaeval Studies 21: 2-5, 1959. Panella in his 16 September, 1343. Among these hostages were memPolitica ecclesiastica del comune fiorentino, Archivio bers of leading families such as the Alamanni, Antella,
Storico Italiano 2(IV) : 281-283, 1913, and N. Rodolico, Rossi, and Tornaquinci. For demands for reimburseI Ciompi, 53 ff., Florence, 1945, contend that the anti- ment of short-termloans, see ibid., 4, f. 10, 16 September,
clericalism of the popular governmentstemmed from the 1343.
participation of il populo minuto in the formulation of
8 The only condemnationsrecorded in the Camera were
governmentalpolicy. This class did not have representa- a handful of fines for gambling and roaming the city
tion in the regime, and, therefore,they played no part streets after curfew. The only source of revenue that
in the enactment of any of the measures taken against produced generously at this time was the gabelle on
the church.
pawnbrokers which increased over a hundred per cent;
6 The gabella portarumwas
collected at a monthlyrate this in itself is a pertinentcomment on the state of the
of 4,402 florinsbetween October of 1342 and September republic's economy at this time. C.C., 2.
9 Balie, 2, fols. 29-30, 20 November, 1342. This docuof 1343. Cf. Camera del Comune, 2-2 bis. (Henceforth
this source will be abbreviated as C.C. All documents ment is published in C. Paoli's, Della Signoria Gualtieri
cited in this article are to be found in the Archivio di Duca D'Atene in Firenze, 81-82, Florence, 1862, and the
Stato, Florence.) At its height, this gabelle produced economic motivation for this decree is considered by
florinsa month. This statistic is given by Gio- A. Sapori in La crisi delle compagnie mercantilidei Bardi
7,5162%3
vanni Villani in his Cronica 11: 92. The reliability of e dei Peruzzi, Florence, 1926. The Signoria found it
these statistics has been substantially confirmed by E.
extremely difficultto farm the taxes and the old buyers
Fiumi in: La demografia fiorentinanelle pagine di Gio- repeatedly repudiated their contracts with the governvanni Villani, Archivio Storico Italiano 108: 78-158, ment or petitionedfor sizable reductions. Balie, 2, fols.
1950. See also footnote14.
38-104, 8 December, 1342, to 6 March, 1343.
362
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
and costly militaryschemes for the capture of to the area of state finance,since the latter
neighboringLucca. Finally, in the summerof underwent a very different metamorphosis.
1343, the hard-wonFlorentineempirebegan to During the intervalfrom 1343 to 1348, when
disintegrateand cities, once under the proud many of the great Florentine companies were
republic's sway, humiliatedthe Florentinesby declaredbankrupt,sweepingadvanceswere taking
gainingtheirfreedom. Arezzo, Castiglione,Colle, place in the communalfisc.12 Giovanni Villani
Pistoia, San Gimigniano,and Volterra launched presentsextensivestatisticson state revenuesfor
successfulrevolutionsand caused Machiavelli,the the prosperous years 1336-1338, and recent
lover of paradoxes, to observe: "Thus Florence scholarshiphas confirmedhis data.13 The refoundherselfdeprivedof bothher tyrantand her public's income fromher single most important
dominionsat the same moment,and in recover- tax-a duty on imports and exports passing
ing her liberty,taught her subjects how they throughthe citygates-was 90,200 florinsa year.
By 1343 thisgabellaportarumhad fallento 68,000
mightbecome free."10
The success of the popular Signoria depended florins,onlyto riseagain two yearslaterto 75,000
upon a recoveryof state finances,for withoutan florins; just beforethe onslaughtof the Black
increase in her presentrevenues,the city could Death it totaled79,000 florins.14The republic's
not hope to carry out even the most elemental second most lucrativetax was the impost upon
or to win back even a small the sale of wine withinthe city walls and the
tasks of government,
measure of public confidence. The conditionof contado. It averaged 58,000 florinsforthe years
privatefinancewas intimatelybound to that of between1336 and 1338,buthad declinedto 36,000
44,000
the public treasurysince so many of the greater florinsin 1342; however,it was returning
guildsmenwere among the commune'sprincipal florins,and just prior to the Black Death it
The revenuefromthe
creditors. These men could remainsolventonly broughtin 45,000 florins.15
a similarfluctuation
shows
contracts
on
gabelle
Since
if the Camera honoredher commitments.
1315, the chiefsource of revenueat the disposal during these years; yielding20,000 florinsanof the Camera had been the yield fromindirect nually between 1336 and 1338, it fell to 7,322
taxation. Communalcouncils had always been florinsin 1342. It then rose to 17,137 florins
extremelyreluctantto impose directlevies upon in 1344, and withinthree years it had virtually
real estateand capital,and it is doubtfulwhether recoveredits originalvalue when it broughtin
the Signoria could have won over the necessary 18,500 florinsto the communaltreasury.16The
two-thirdsmajority required by law to enact gabelle on salt averaged 14,450 florinsin the
this dreaded formof taxation in the autumnof interimof 1336-1338. In 1342 it dropped to
1343.11 The Florentinesassociated this type of 4,697 florins,but by the autumnof 1343 it was
taxation(the estimo) withthe despisedtyrannies up to 10,03313florinsand it remainedconstant
of Charles of Calabria (1325-1328) and Walter for the next three years; but by 1346-1347 it
thewell-being had almost reached its earlier high when it reof Brienne(1342-1343); therefore,
of the state would have to be whollydependent
12 Tratte, 1155 contains the names of all bankrupts
upon the moniesfromindirectimposts.
from the letter "A" through "S," and was to be used for
While considerabledata have been collectedon the purpose of barring these "falliti" from communal
the privatesectorof the Florentineeconomy,the office. The Atti del Podesta and the Camera del Comune
study of fluctuationsin communalfinanceshas contain additional names. The total number of bankbeen overlooked. It would be a serious mistake rupts cited in the above sources is three hundredand one.
13 Cf. footnote 6 and A. Sapori, L'attendibilita di alto attemptto transpose the results of the recune testimonianze cronistiche dell' economia medievale,
searchesof Sapori in the fieldof businesshistory Archivio Storico Italiano 86: 19-30, 1929. For an extenNiccolo Machiavelli, History of Florence and of the
affairs of Italy, trans., F. Gilbert, 101, New York, 1960.
11The estimo had been suppressed in the city in 1315,
and, despite repeated effortsof the Signoria to have it
re-enacted, the communal councils regularly rejected it.
Cf. B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della repubblica fiorentina,
124-130, 207-208, 210-211, Florence, 1929. In 1341 the
governmentwent so far as to elect a commissionfor the
purpose of re-establishing this levy but the communal
councils would not assent to its imposition despite the
magnitudeof the economic crisis.
10
sive discussion of the figures presented by Villani, also

see Sapori's, L' eta della rinascita secoli XIII-XVI 132163, Milan, 1958.
14G. Villani, Cronica 11: 92; C.C., 5, f. 18; C.C., 6,
f. 47; C.C., 7, f. 115; C.C., 8, fols. 4-5, 16r, 18; C.C.,
12, f. 43; C.C., 14, f. 18; C.C., 18, f. 102; C.C., 25, f. 104r.
15 C.C.,
9, f. 39r; C.C., 10, f. 84; C.C., 11, f. 33r;
C.C., 25, f. 104r.
16 C.C.,
10, f. 108r; C.C., 11, f. 34; C.C., 14, f. 18;
C.C., 17, f. 6. For a discussion of this type of tax, see
B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 536-543.
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
363
is the
turned14,000 florins.17The communallevy on any typeof regime,but what is significant
pawnbrokerswas 3,000 florinsa year for the way in which the popular Signoria nurturedand
intervaldescribedby GiovanniVillani. In March husbanded this recovery. By making certain
of 1343 it broughtin only 1,950 florins,but by fundamentaldecisions, the Florentine Signoria
1346 it had climbedto 2,800 florins.8 The tax was able to relieve the economy of crushing
on cattle slaughteredin the contado averaged burdens.
4,400 florinsper year between 1336 and 1338;
In November of 1342 the despot, Walter of
this sum was reducedsubstantially
as a resultof Brienne,enacteda decree suspendingpaymentof
the politicalpressuresexerted by the influential interestto communal creditors. Formerly the
butcher'sguild and in 1344 it yieldedonly 1,475 revenuesfromcity tolls and the taxes on wine,
florins,but like all of the othergabelles,its yield salt, and contractshad been assigned for this
increased until it was bringingin 1,650 florins purpose. Now the incomefromthese levies was
by the year 1347. Comparablegains were regis- to revert to the communal treasury so that
teredby othercommunallevies between1343 and Florence mightbe able to pay the back wages
1348: thereturnson the impostson cattlemarkets of her mercenaries. GiovanniVillani tellsus that
in Florence and in the parish of San Giovanni, the outlayfortroopsaveraged 140,000florinsfor
outsidethe city,tripledduringthese years,while the years between 1336 and 1338. As a bitter
the gabelleon the hawkersof foodstuffs
increased afterthought,
he adds that this exorbitantsum
ten timesin yield duringthat same period.19 In did notincludethepay forthosemercenarieshired
part,this startlingrecoveryin state revenuescan by the republicto fightthe disastrouscampaigns
be attributedto the many administrative
reforms in Lombardy. At firstWalter of Brienne did
inauguratedby the popular Signoria during its littleto curtailtheseexpenditureswhichdevoured
tenure. The collection of indirect taxes was almost a half of the commune'sreturnfrominsystematizedand severe punishmentswere meted direct levies. But by November of 1342, the
out to the lax and corruptofficialsof the earlier situation was too critical to be ignored; the
regimes.20 The trend was towards a more im- treasuryhad a balanceofonly15,138florinswhich
partialand impersonalenforcement
of communal was barely enough to meet the day-to-day
law. However,no amountof loopholetightening exigencies of government.21It was at this
or efficiencycan account entirelyfor this re- momentthatBriennedecidedto issue his infamous
surgenceofpublicrevenues. It would appear that decree; now he could use the money from the
the principalfactor inducingthis recoverywas gabelles to pay his troops and functionariesinthe durabilityof the complexFlorentineeconomic steadof makingrestitution
to communalcreditors.
systemwhichcould sustaina seriesof severejolts In addition,he was compelledto resort to the
and still be in a positionto reassertitselfvigor- dreaded estimo and to numerousforced loans;
ously. Such a rally could have occurredunder but even thenhe was unable to resumepayment
of the publicdebt. In fact,thesedesperatemeas17 CC., 6, f. 45r; C.C., 9, f. 59r; C.C., 14, f. 77r.
ures only succeededin enlargingthe public debt,
18 C.C., 8, f. 3; C.C., 24, f. 47. For the brief ascent of
this gabelle during the late summer of 1343, see foot- since the recentforcedloans merelyadded to the
note 8.
total, and the returnsfrom indirectand direct
19 CC., 12, f. 41r; C.C., 11, f. 34; C.C., 23, f. 26;
levies were beingdispensedto mercenariesby the
C.C., 10, f. 107; C.C., 16, f. 102r; C.C., 10, f. 9.
Camera almost as soon as they were received.
20 The authority of the judicial officialsover gabelles
was extended and special officerswere appointed to re- Unless the popular governmentcould devise a
duce expenses. Among those selected were two novi seriesof remedies,it would be necessaryforcomcives,a dyer and a sword maker. Provvisioni,32, f. 59. munalcreditorsto relinquishboththe interestand
(Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as P.) Unprincipalon theirloans. An increasein returns
paid gabelles were collected and suits were initiated
against the heirs of those who were delinquent. C.C., 16- from indirectimposts could not be substantial
18. Dispensation for failure to pay gabelles was fre- enough to alleviate this increasedpressure if it
quently granted by the courts and the communal councils were not coupled with sizable reductionsin the
throughoutthe tenure of the oligarchical regime (1328communalbudget,for even if income fromthe
1342). Cf. Guidicedegli Appelli,122, parts II and III.
rose, it would only be consumed by
gabelles
For an attempt to differentiatebetween oligarchical and
expenditures.
popular regimes, see M. Becker, Some aspects of oli- mountinggovernmental
garchical, dictatorial and popular Signorie in Florence,
21C.C., 2 bis, f. 7. For a more detailedanalysisof
1282-1382, ComparativeStudies in Society and History
Brienne'srule,see M. Becker,op. cit.,434-439.
2: 425-434, 1960.
MARVIN B. BECKER
364
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
Both the novi cives and the patriciatewho sat outweighedthe commercialadvantages,since the
in theSignoriaafter1343 were holdersof govern- republicwas now beingcompelledto lay out huge
ment securities,and indeed the Florentinestate sums for the militarysupportof the overlyamcan be likened to a giant corporationin which bitious plans of their allies. The Bardi and
of the Florentine
the 8,000 most affluentmen in the community Frescobaldi,two of themightiest
were the principalshareholders. The program bankingfamilies,led an abortiverevoltdesigned
initiatedby thenewershareholdersnot onlysaved to reverse this policy and to liberate Florence
the equity of their social superiors,but it also from her crushing commitment. What these
demonstratedto the more experiencedpatriciate leadingfamilieswereunableto accomplishin 1340
the prudenceof the newcomersin fiscalmatters. was achievedthreeyears later when the popular
When the new Signoria renounced traditional Signoria proved unresponsiveto the lure of the
elimiFlorentineimperialismin favorof a policyof dis- city'sold Guelfties. The new government
engagementand isolation,it was moving in a natedtraditionalsubsidiesand reducedher budget
a solvent fisc. The by curtailingher obligationsabroad. Only in this
directionof reconstituting
popularSignoriaactedto curtailmilitaryexpendi- mannercould Florence effectsavings substantial
turesafter1343, and so successfulwas thispolicy enoughto makethe Camerasolventand thusavert
thatby 1345 the militarybudgethad been halved communalbankruptcy.
and the republicwas spendingonly75,000 florins
During the 1330's over seventyper cent of all
a year for this purpose.2 Florence was indeed the highcommunalofficeswere held by members
fortunateat this timenot to be menacedby any of Florence'sthreegreatestguilds; the Lana, the
adversariesof the statureof a CastruccioCastra- Cambio,and the Calinala. These industrialand
cane or an Uguccionedella Faggiuola. No neigh- bankingpatriciansadvocated that the commune
boringstatehad eitherthe leadershipor energies be financedthroughindirecttaxes that fell on
to begin again the terriblecontestfor dominion the consumer (gabelles) and by forced loans
over Tuscany. Therefore,except for the ubiqui- (prestanze) at high rates of interest. The result
tous maraudingcompanies,therewas no sustained of thisfiscalpolicywas to increasethe communal
threatto Florentinelibertain theyearsjust before debt untilit became a crushingburden. By the
the Black Death. The popularregimewas eager summerof 1343 it had mountedto 800,000 florins
thatmightinvolve -a sum roughlyequal to the total revenue of
to avoid foreignentanglements
her in the disputesof otherstates,and happy to the commune over a period of almost three
ambitionsthatmightincurthe years. Even as early as 1340 it was evident
renounceterritorial
enmityof her neighbors. This task was made to the Signoria that the republiccould not hope
easier duringthese years since Florence did not to repay its creditorsunless it made startling
have to contendwithmeddlingGermanemperors innovations in communal fiscal policy. The
and popes bent on the reconquestof the Patri- councilswere reluctantto permitthe government
mony. There were obstacles,however,and the to introduceneeded reformsdespitethe factthat
gravest of these was the republic's own Guelf the situationwas worseningday by day. The
legacy. The patricianelite of GiovanniVillani's Signoria firstsoughtto ease this mountingfiscal
generationwho guided the destiniesof the city's crisis by placing a hearthtax on the citizenry;
club-the pro-papalParte Guelfa it was calculatedto bring six hundredflorinsa
mostaristocratic
-had strong allegiances to the Guelf alliance day intothe communaltreasury. Then the interso much est rates on forced loans were slashed.24 Unsystemwhich,in thepast,had contributed
and prosperityof the city.
to the glory,strength,
and early fourteenth 23 The public debt was only 47,275 florinsin 1303, but
Throughoutthe thirteenth
1338 it totaled approximately 450,000 florins. Cf. E.
and great by
century,bankingtycoons,industrialists,
Fiumi, Fioritura e decadenza dell' economia fiorentina,
merchantshad received many concessionsfrom Archivio Storico Italiano 117: 455, 1959. Over the next
the papacy and the rulers of South Italy. As four years it almost doubled, reaching for those times,
astronomical figure of slightly more than 800,000
early as 1340, however,leading Florentinesbe- the
florins.
came convincedthat the numerousliabilitiesin24 B. Barbadoro, op. cit., 400-401; C. Paoli, op. cit.,
curredthroughties withAvignonand Naples far 65-66; P., 32, f. 48r. The treasurer of the hearth tax
of thestais basedupona comparison
22Thisfigure
by Villani and thosefoundin the
tisticspresented
Camera del Comune,Entra.tae Uscita.
was also camerarius of the forced loans "et aliarum

rarum," so that when paymentwas made into the Camera
del Comune, it included monies froma variety of sources.
Therefore, it is not possible to know whether or not the
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
365
fortunately,
these measures had a negligibleef- usury.26 The Franciscansand Dominicanswere
fect, for the returnsfrom the gabelles, which divided on this perplexing question, but the
still constitutedthe principal source of public Signoria remainedunperturbedand continuedto
revenue,were still not cominginto the treasury enact communallegislationwhichexpresseddeep
in thefundamental
of the
righteousness
since theyhad long ago been pledgedto amortize confidence
the prestanze. Walter Brienne'ssolutionto this institutionof the Monte. And there were few
dilemmahad been the infamousdeclarationof a among the Florentines who were tormented
enoughto refuseto accept the profferedinterest.
moratoriumon the communaldebt.
Althoughthe new regimecould look forwardto After1345 the jurisdictionof ecclesiasticalcourts
increasedreturnsfromindirecttaxationand sub- was severelylimitedin cases involvinga charge
to prosecutethose
stantial savings on the military budget, the of usury and it was difficult
problemof fundingthe communaldebt remained who had violated the prohibitionagainst taking
formidable. Tax returnswere not high enough interestfroman investmentwithoutrisk. The
to permitthe treasuryto amortizeover a half popular regimefloutedclericallibertieswith unmillionflorinsin communaldebts. The money precedentedzeal: the authorityof the Holy Office
clergywere now held liable for
saved by curtailingmilitaryexpenditureswas just was undermined,
to pay the75,000 florinsa year in carry- many communallevies and the jurisdictionof
sufficient
ing chargeson the debt. The Signoria began to secular courtsreached into mattersthat had forwork towards a solution to this problem in merlybeen the exclusivepreserveof ecclesiastical
Decemberof 1343, and by 1345 theyhad consoli- tribunals.
dated all the outstandingold loans undera single
II
orderlysystem. The varied items of public inThe innovationsmade by the popular Signoria
debtednesswere unifiedand lumped togetherin
what the Florentineswere to call the Monte, or in church-staterelationswere closely related to
mountain.25By partiallyabandoningthe redemp- the government'seffortsto amelioratethe probtive featureof public finance,the Signoria freed lems confrontingthe Florentinebusiness comthe republicfromthe obligationof repayingover munity. The new men and the patricianswho
a half millionflorinsof principal. This was ac- held high officeat this time were extremely
complishedby declaringthe public debt to be anxious about the welfareof the greatcompanies.
interestbearing,and statingthat credits in the Together they acted to create an environment
Monte werenegotiable. Interestrateson thedebt that would be congenial to the hard-pressed
Florentinebankersand industrialists. While it
were cut to five per cent and this marked a
to determinethe extentto which the
is difficult
substantialreduction,since most of the loans had policies of the new regime contributedto the
been made at rates rangingfromten to fifteen recoveryof these harassed companies,there is
per cent. The effectof this innovationwas to littledoubtthatthesepoliciesdid muchto alleviate
lower the amountof the carryingchargesfor the the impact of the economic crisis. Sweeping
publicdebtfrom75,000 florinsa year to approxi- legislationwas enacted to protectthe companies
fromthe insistentclaims of theircreditors,both
mately25,000 florins.
This reformwas made in the face of intense lay and ecclesiastical. In 1345, and again a year
ecclesiasticalopposition; clergy and laity alike later,petitionswere submittedby the captainsof
guilds aimed to preventcreditors
weretroubledbynaggingdoubtsas to whetherthe the twenty-one
from
initiating
suits for restitutionin non^omfundingof the republic's debt was contraryto
munal courts.27 When these petitionsbecame
the teachings of canon law on the subject of
gabella dei fumanti actually brought in six hundred
florinsa day. Notations in the treasury records suggest
that it probably did not. Cf. C.C., 2 bis, fols. 4r, 32, 219.
25 By taking this action the Signoria was able to scale
the communal debt down to 505,044 florins. A reduction
of over 300,000 florins in the public debt was not due
solely to the founding of the Monte, but was also a
resultant of the fact that the popular Signoria had succeeded in amortizing certain of the prestanze. Cf. B.
Barbadoro, op. cit., 629-687; C.C., 4-15.
26 For the debate on the legitimacy of the Monte, see

R. de Roover, Il trattatodi fra Santi Rucellai sul cambio,
il monte comune e il monte delle doti, Archivio Storico
Italiano 111: 3-34, 1953.
27 A. Panella, op. cit., 327-365; G. Villani, Cronica 11:
22. Stefani states that the captains of the guilds were
responsible for other importantmeasures including legislation against the "grandi" which were opposed unsuccessfully by the "buonomini." Marchionne di Coppo
Stefani, Cronica fiorentina, ed. N. Rodolico, Rerum
Italicarum Scriptores, new ed., 30: rub. 607, Citta di
366
MARVIN B. BECKER
law, they went so far in pressingthe claims of

secular jurisdictionthat theyconstituteda clear
violation of ecclesiasticalliberties. After their
enactment,prelatesand Neopolitanbarons could
bring suit only in Florentinecourts against the
teeteringcompanies, and these tribunals were
notoriouslyslow in takingaction. Cases of this
and,
type could and did drag on interminably
what these measuresactuallywon for
therefore,
thecompanieswas precioustime-years thatcould
be well used to liquidateassets. Since much of
theirwealth was in land, it was imperativethat
thisreal estatecould not be placed on the market
en bloc, for if it were, prices would plummet.
Prolonged litigationover bankruptcyprocedures
was also advantageousto the companiesin that
it gave them an opportunityto transfertitles
and conceal holdings. Delays and devious proceedingshelped to make bankruptciesmere episodes in the historyof many of the great companies of Florence. These houses were able to
salvage much of their wealth, and were soon
again to play a leading role in civic life.28 In
takingup the cudgel against churchcourts,the
captains of the twenty-oneguilds, of whom the
majoritywere new men,were actingin a manner
consistentwiththeirpast history. Whenevernew
men came intothe Signoria in large numbers,the
tendencywas to attack ecclesiasticaljurisdiction
and to extollthe authorityof the commune.29In
towardsincreasingstate
1345-1346thismovement
powerwas especiallyfelicitoussince it servedthe
mercantilepatriciate. The
needs of a floundering
popular governmentwas proving itselfto be a
guardianof the interestsof the
most sympathetic
greatcompanies.
about businessconditionsin
Any generalization
Florence under the aegis of the popular government must remain tentativesince few merchant
accountbooks surviveforthe period. In the two
Castello, 1903-1955. Later, in the 1370's, when the
twenty-oneguilds were to be again very active in affairs
of state, it was to be the "artes et populares" or the
"artifices et mercatores" or the "artifices et populares"
in whose name importantlegislation against the church
or against the great families was to be presented. Cf.
Consulte et Pratiche, 12, f. 13; P., 60, f. 143; P., 63, f.
70r.
28 The Acciaiuoli, Bardi, Del Bene, Frescobaldi, Mozzi,
and Peruzzi all sufferedbankruptcyduring the firsthalf
of the fourteenthcentury,and yet were to be ubiquitous
in Florentine politics during the latter part of the Tre-
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
instanceswhere we do have commercialrecords,

however,the firmsin questioncontinuedto make
profits. The Albizzi companypaid its partnersa
per cent on their
returnof nearly thirty-three
while the Albertifortunescontinued
investment,
to show an appreciableimprovement.30Both of
thesefirmsweresoon to enterthehighestechelons
of European financeand were to become great
internationalhouses by the second half of the
Trecento. Villani tells us thattherewas another
order of businessmenwho weatheredthe crisis
of the 1340's-"the most recent capitalists."
Chiefamongthesewas thehouse of Strozziwhose
ricordanzeshow thatthisaggressivefamilyseized
the opportunityto acquire real estate fromthe
hard-pressedcompanies during the years immediatelyprecedingthe Black Death. Like many
other membersof the Florentinebusiness community,this newish familyrealized substantial
profitsfrom these transactions. Shortlythereafter,the Strozzi enteredthe fieldof international
and by 1367 Carlo and
financewholeheartedly,
Pazzino had formed a company with a total
capitalizationalmost equal to that of the famous
pre-1343 firms.31 The Panciatichi, Petreboni,
Rinuccini,and Uzzano were but a few of the
many otherfamilieswho rose to fiscaleminence
duringthe middleyears of the Trecento. There
are few intervals in communal history more
repletewithinstancesof socio-economicmobility,
and this surge of new familiescontinuesuntil
the decade of the 1380's. It would appear then,
based upon the criterionof the foundingof new
fortunes,that a decline does not set in until the
late Trecento.
The industrymostvitalto the Florentineeconomy,and consequentlythe one that causes most
30 R. de Roover, The story of the Alberti Company of
Florence, 1302-1348, Business History Review 32: 38-39.
1958; I libri degli Alberti del Giudice, ed. A. Sapori.
Milan, 1952; A. Sapori, Studi di storia economico,secoli
XIII-XIV-XV, 3rd ed., 2: 975-1012,Florence. 1955.
Neither the Bardi nor the Peruzzi made substantial

business profits during the 1330's; the latter actually
suffereda very serious decrease in capital. A. Sapori.
La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei
Peruzzi, 105, Florence, 1926; R. Davidsohn, Geschichte
von Florenz 4: 208, Berlin, 1896-1927. For a record
of the holdings of the Albizzi in the Monte of 1345, see
Monte, S. Giovanni, fols. 21, 964r.
31 P.
Jones, Florentine families and Florentine diaries
in the fourteenthcentury,Papers of the British School at
cento. Cf. Consulteet Pratiche,1-10; Estimo,386,fols. Rome 24: 187-188, 1956. This company had a capital
of 53,600 florins and this was just a bit less than the
4 ff.; ibid., 391, fols. 12 ff.
company of Giotto de' Peruzzi that was revived in 1331.
29 M. Becker, The church and state in Florentine poliCf. A.Sapori, La crisi, 105.
tics, to be published in Speculum.
VOL.
106, NO. 4, 1962]
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
367
controversy
amongeconomichistorians,was wool communalcouncils passed legislationprohibiting
manufacturing
(Lana).32
During the 1330's the the export of this precious metal fromthe city
Lana had been the rock on which Florentine and contado. Two years later the government
prosperitywas founded,offering,as it did, em- devaluated the silver currency. This step was
ploymentto one-thirdof the citydwellers. Over- urgedby thelanaiuolisincetheyreceivedpayment
expansion and foreigncompetitionin the early for their cloth in gold while paying their emfortiesthreatenedthe well-beingof this industry ployeesin silvercoinage. The effectof thispolicy
and many leading firmswere compelledto close was to cause depreciationof silvercurrency,with
down. The problems of these wool manufac- the result that the gold florinrose in value in
turers were intensifiedwith the outbreak of terms of the silver money. According to the
workerunrestin 1342. The populargovernment statuteof the Podesta, only the mastersof the
was confronted
witha decliningArte della Lana greater guilds were permittedto use the gold
and its response was to exert every energy florinas the standardof value in theirbusiness
towardstheestablishment
ofan economicenviron- transactionsand to keep their books in this
mentthat would be favorableto the interestsof monetaryunit.
this guild. Despite the fact that many of the
The Lana was not the only major guild to
lanaiuoli were ineligiblefor communalofficebe- increase its representationduring the era of
cause theyhad been declaredbankrupt,this guild popular government. The silk guild more than
in the doubled its representation
succeeded in increasingits representation
in the Signoria: from
popularSignoriabetween1343 and 1348.3 From 1328 to 1342, 6.3 per cent of those electedto the
1328 to 1343 membersoftheLana held one-fourth prioratewere matriculatedin this arte, while in
of thehighposts in the republic;after1343,how- the fiveyears after1343 this figurerose to 14.5
ever, this figurerose to thirtyand a half per per cent. Like the lanaiuoli, these men were
cent. It would appear that the purportedeco- among the most affluent
in urban society,having
nomic decline of the Lana did not affectthe holdingsin the fundedcommunaldebt averaging
politicalprestigeof this guild and that the novi the substantial sum of one hundred forty-six
cives were anxious to cooperatewiththe lanaiuoli florins.36 Particularlyprominentamong their
to assistin theirrecovery. The Signoriafirsttook numberwere the many novi cives who entered
actionto annulthemanyprivilegesbestowedupon communalpolitics at this time. Families such
the wool workers by their self-appointedbene- as the Baldese, the Buoniuti,the Del Panchia,
factor,Walter of Brienne. Once again the day- the Pantalioni,and the Sanguigni were to conlaborers employedby the lanaiuoli were placed tinue to play a crucial role in Florentinecivic
under the jurisdictionof the guild courts and life over the next fivedecades. The phenomenal
policedbyan official
electedby theguildmasters.34 growthof silk manufacturing
in Florence during
The hand of the Lana was also muchin evidence the middle years of the Trecento certainlyconwhen the new governmentmet to formulate tributedto the political mobilityof these men
monetarypolicy. In 1345 therewas a dearthof fromthe Por Santa Maria. As a tributeto their
silvercoinageand this,accordingto thechronicler, growingeconomicimportance,
doubletmakersand
GiovanniVillani,caused "great discomfort
to the hosiersnow sat regularlyin the communalcounlanaiuoli."35 Therefore,the Signoria and the cils. Soon theywere to be joined by the master
whose skills
32 R. Davidsohn, Blilte und
niedergang der florentiner dyers and the soap manufacturers
tuchindustrie,Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissen- were also essentialto the textileindustry. Judgschaft 85: 225-255, 1928; A. Dorin, Die florentinerwoling fromthe frequencywith whichthe names of
lentuchindustrie,412 ff., Stuttgart, 1901. In his Studi thesemenappear on the listsof Priors
after1343,
di storia economica, Armando Sapori presents a more
it
is
difficult
to
argue
that
the
textile
manufaccautious view of the alleged decline of the Lana in
turerssufferedany appreciabledeclinein political
Florence. Cf. especially 1: 544 ff.
33The average Monte holdings of the lanaiuoli who influence.
served in the popular governmentwere 542 florins.
The guilds who lost representation
in the new
34 Cf. M. Becker, The republicancity-statein Florence:
government
were
the
Cambio
(bankers)
and the
an inquiry into its origin and survival (1280-1434),
Calimala (the finishersof importedcloth). The
Speculum 35: 46-48, 1960; Atti del Capitano, 17, f. 72.
35G. Villani, Cronica 12: 97; Statuti, 15, bk. 3, f. 16r;
G. Brucker and M. Becker, The Arti Minori in Florentine politics, 1342-1378, Mediaeval Studies 18: 98-99,
1956; R. de Roover, op. cit., 16; Capitoli, 18, fols. 93-94.
36 On the rise of the silk industry at this time, see

P. Pieri, Intorno alla storia dell' arte della seta in
Firenze, 117 ff.,Bologna, 1927.
368
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
men of the Cambio held 30 per cent of the posts of adjustmentand growth,ratherthan of proin the Signoria from 1328 to 1342; after 1343 tracted depression as has been traditionally
this figurefell to 15 per cent, while the repre- depicted.38 A question which yet remains unwas therebetween
sentationof the Calimala declinedfrom16.25 per answeredis: What relationship
centto 8.8 per cent. These statisticssuggestthat this partial recoveryin revenueand population,
politicalprestigeof theFlorenindustriesand professionsmore deeplyrootedin and thecontinuing
be sugthe domesticeconomysuch as the Lana and Seta tine textileindustry? It can tentatively
were less prone to sudden reversals in fortune gestedherethatincreasesin citypopulationwere,
whichwas dependentupon the to some extent,relatedto the persistentneeds of
than the Camnbio
moneymarket. As forthe Calimala, the Lana for manpower,and the cityfathersfelt
international
this guild had already reached its height,and this very stronglywhen they requestedthat the
its dominanceover the Signoria had come to an mastersof this guild put up moneyfor the purchase ofgrainin orderto takecare of thedestitute
end at the close of the Dugento.
Fortunately,reliable populationstatisticsexist newcomersduringthe famineof 1346.39
for the period under consideration. Modern
III
demographicalstudieshave not substantiallyimpaired the validityof the figurespresentedby
If the popularSignoria of 1343 was to achieve
GiovanniVillani in his Cronica of Florence: in a longer tenure than its two predecessors-ten
1338 therewere 90,000 inhabitantsliving within monthsand two monthsrespectively,then this
the city walls; the numberfell to 75,000 in the government
would have to gain a largermeasure
year 1340, only to rise again to 80,000 in early of public confidence.The questionof communal
1347.37 This incrementof 5,000 reverses the fiscal responsibility
was met almost immediately
trend that had been in effectsince 1300 when whenthe new Signoria assumedcompleteliability
the city's populationwas 105,000, and suggests forthemanyloans made by Briennein themonths
thatduringthefiveyearsbeforethe Black Death, of June and July of 1343. But an even more
therewas definiteurbangrowthforthe firsttime vexingproblemconcernedthe breakdownof comin almost half a century. It is also interesting munal fiscaland juridical authorityin the territo note thatthereis a remarkablecorrelationbe- toriesunderthe aegis of Florence. Not onlyhad
tweengate tollsand populationfigures. One can manyoutlyingcitiesled successfulrevoltsagainst
project the annual return from the gabella the republic,but communalpower over the reportarumso that its decline and rise coincides mainderof thecontadostoodin dangerof deteriowith the demographicalcurve. At its height,in rating. In the monthprecedingthe foundation
1338, it was 90,200 florins,averaging approxi- of the popularregime,no revenueswere received
matelyone florinper inhabitant;it fellas did the by the Camera from these territories.40Even
virtu- duringthe late 1330's, judgingfromfragmentary
population,and thenrose again maintaining
ally the same ratio-79,000 florinsin gate tolls treasuryrecords,ruralcommunesand popoliwere
fora populationof 80,000. It would appear then
38 For recent bibliography on this question, see W.
that the yield fromindirecttaxation,and hence
Recent trends in the economic historiography
Ferguson,
tied
was
closely
of
the
fisc,
recovery
the economic
of the Renaissance, Studies in the Renaissance 7: 7-26,
to the gains Florence made in populationin the 1960. For a cautious description of general economic
precedingthe Black Death. If tendencies in Trecento Europe, see R. Lopez, The trade
yearsimmediately
one were called upon to determinethe temporal of Medieval Europe: the south, in The Cambridge EcoCambridge, 1952.
locus of the Florentine"depression,"based on nomic History of Europe 2: 338-354,
in his Recherches sur les compagnies comRenouard
Y.
data offeredby this study,then he would have merciales et bancaires utilisees par les papes d'Avignon
to place the nadir somewherebetween1340 and avant le Grand schisme, Paris, 1942, depicts the middle
1342. For in the earlieryear,Florentinepopula- years of the Trecento as being a time of unmitigated
tion strucka new low, while, in the latter,tax economic decline for Florence and does not see a subrecovery until the 1360's.
returnsfell to new depths. These data indicate stantial
39 Lana, 41, f. 203, 13 September, 1346. It is stated
thatthe intervalafter1343 was, in fact,a period in the guild records that this money was paid "sponte"
E. Fiumi, La demografia fiorentina,op. cit., 78-158.
For a translation of the relevant chapter from Villani's
chronicle,see R. Lopez and I. Raymond, Medieval trade
in the Mediterranean world, 71-74, New York, 1955, and
the bibliographical comments on page 70, footnote85.
37
because of the number of "foreign persons who were

received into the city of Florence" at the behest of this
guild "and considering the amount of grain they consume. . . ."
40
C.C., 2, August,1343.
VOL. 106, NO. 4,1962]
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
369
fallingfar in arrears in their obligationsto the occupying vital positions in the countryside.44
republic. Not only were there unpaid levies, The Captain of Custodylevied heavy finesupon
reachingback as far as 1331, but therewere also syndicsand rectorsin the contadowho had failed
unfilledservicesowed the communesuch as castle to seize malefactorsor who had neglected to
guard and road maintenance.41Particularlydis- report on crimes committedin their bailiwick.
turbingto the new Signoria was the reluctance Rural communesand popoli were also condemned
of the rural communesto report crimes com- for harboringexiles or fugitivesfromcommunal
mitted in their territoriesto the tribunals in j ustice.45
Florence. Many of those condemnedas outlaws,
Particularlycriticalto a government
seekingto
or banished to foreignlands, continuedto live reconstitute
the fiscwithoutimposingnew forms
in the outer reaches of the contado. A comof taxation,was the promptpaymentof military
parison of communalpolicy on the contado,as subsidies and the regular collectionof imposts
it was formulated
by the oligarchicalregimefrom levied on the contado. When the officialsin
1328 to 1342, with that of the popular Signoria charge of the estimoin the contadobroughtsuit
suggeststhat the formerwas essentiallylaissez- againstrural communesand popoli fortax delinfaire,while the lattertended to enforcethe law quency,the Florentinemagistrateswere quick to
rigorously. The early volumes of records of convict.46By communaldecree,an appraisal of
inquestsby Florentinemagistratesfor the years propertywas to be made and then the Captains
immediately
after1343, are repletewith charges of the Leagues were enjoinedto collecta subsidy
againstthe syndicsand rectorsof ruralcommuni- of fourfoot-soldiers
for everyhundredof estimo
ties who,in one way or another,had transgressed (pro quolibetcentumestimi). When rural comthe law.42 Administrativereformswere intro- munitiesfailed to comply with this edict, they
ducedsimplifying
thetaskof thecommunalmagis- were subjectto heavyfines.47The city'scapacity
trates,but as the Trecentowore on, theirrole was to meet its militarybudget withoutadding to
taken over by a rapidlyburgeoningbureaucracy publicindebtedness,
dependedupon thevigorwith
which could operate with greaterefficiency
and whichher captainsand magistratesexacted these
at a lower cost. So effectivewas this new levies fromthe contado.
bureaucracy that within two generations,the
It is probablethatthe returnsfromthe estimo,
ministration
of justicein the contadocame to rest imposedon the contadoin late 1343, were being
mainlyin theirhands. Parallelingthis develop- paid directlyto communalcreditors.48Therefore,
mentwas the increaseduse of communalnotaries the Signoria was eager to increasereceiptsfrom
who were being sentout in ever greaternumbers this source, and the administrativereformsof
to handle manyproblemsof the contado.43
thatyear whichrearrangedthe boundariesof the
The question of the syndicationof communal various districtsoutside the city walls reflected
officialsin the countrysidelooms especiallylarge the regime'sdesire to make assessmentand colat this time, for the populace of the city was lection of taxes simpler. At best, however,attendedto be makeshift
particularlyincensed at certaingreat Florentine temptsat systematization
familieswho used highpublicofficefortheirown
44Schiata was fined320 lire, 15 soldi; Bartolomeo was
personal aggrandizement.The regimehad been fined 300 lire, and Giovanni 322 lire, 10 soldi. C.C., 7,
established,as had earlier popular Signorie, to fols. 140, 150, 14-23 August, 1344; C.C., 8, f. 18, 19
October, 1344.
initiatereforms,
and one of its firstmoves was to
45 Fines for this type of offensereached as high as 300
review the conductof those men who had for- lire; if payment was made within the allotted time, a
merlyheld highposts in rural Tuscany. Schiata twenty-fiveper cent reduction was allowed. C.C., 14, f.
C.C., 12 ,fols. 40r-58r, 18 November-12 December
Bartolo Cavalcanti, Bartolomeo Gherardo Adi- 22r;
1344.
46 On
mari, and Giovanni Piero Alberti were among
November 29, 1344, twenty-fivehamlets were
the firstof the great patriciansto be convicted fined a total of 1,600 lire on this charge. This figure
for malfeasance,negligence,and peculationwhile must be used with caution since "compositione" was made
with the treasury and the amount actually paid into
the
Camera could have been much less. C.C., 10, f. 94.
41C.C., 2 bis,fols.214r,227,250-257r,293.
47 C.C.,
15, fols. 65r ff.
42See especiallyC.C., 12, November-December,
1345;
48 Returns from this tax do not appear in the treasury
CC., 13, January-February,
1346; C.C., March-April, records until the early 1350's. In most instances, when
1346.
this occurred it signifiedthat the money had been pledged
43 Sindicatodel Podesta,1-2; C.C., 4, f. 81r.
for repaymentof prestanze.
370
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
to establishsound procedures tives, the impulse towards systematizationwas

and it was difficult
for reckoningand exacting communal imposts. indeedpresent.
Most troublesometo the tax assessors was the
IV
the ownershipof a parproblemof determining
and hencefixingresponticularpiece of property,
Communalpolicy towards the contado should
sibilityfortaxes. In 1346 the Signoriaappointed be seen withinthe contextof the total program
commission,composedof nine induced by the general economic crisis of the
an extra-ordinary
of Florenleadingnotaries,who were to draw up listsof the early fortiesand the democratization
namesof thosewho held real estatein the contado tinepolitics. The same impulsestowardsreform
and describethe properties. As a resultof this in ruralTuscanywere also presentwithinthe city
survey walls. In the past, popular Signorie had addirective,therefollowedan unprecedented
and evaluation of property; from this effort dressed themselvesto the problemof recovering
emerged "La tavola delle possessioni."49 This and then safeguardingcommunal rights and
was the first comprehensiveattempt by any properties.51 In the thirties,when Florentine
Florentineregimeto systematizetaxationin the governmentwas oligarchicaland revenueswere
Florentine territories. A major problem the at high levels, controlsover the "iura et buona
Signoriahopedto resolvethroughthe drawingup communis"were frequentlyineffectual. Moreof the"tavola" concernedthepreciseidentificationover, much state propertyhad been assigned to
of all rural rate-payerswith a notationof their magnatesand great popolani for nominalrents.
status. In the past, individualshad claimedthat In otherinstancesthesepotentessimplyappropriand thus returnsto
theywere inhabitantsof the city and, therefore, ated communalprerequisites,
not liable for countrylevies. Rural parishes, the Camera were minimal. The new regime,
tightand popolihad contended,on theother however,faced with imminentbankruptcy,
communes,
hand, that these men were denizens of the ened controlsover state propertyby appointing
indeedresponsibleforthe numerous officialsto supervise these valuable
contadoand, therefore,
impostin question. The rectorsand syndicsof assets. Amongtheirnumberwere suchnovi cives
these outlyingcommunitieswere liable for the as BenitendiTini, Piero Giafii, and Francesco
betweenwhat was assessed and what ser Gramaldi.52 Symptomaticof the tenor of
difference
are the manynew men who
was collected. These disagreements caused the new government
"scandala" among the citizenry,and the men of came to hold responsibleposts in a growing
the contado supplicatedthe Signoria to correct communal bureaucracy; dyers, bakers, spicers,
thisinequitablestateof affairs. It was also hoped hosiers,and butcherswere now to serve in the
thatthe "tavola" mightaid creditorsto locate the FlorentineCamera and notariesof modestorigins
holdingsof their debtors. After nine years of were to be appointedrepeatedlyto the officesof
intensiveeffort,this ambitiousplan had to be state auditorand assessor.53 Not so closelytied
to the upper
abandoned. Some claimedthat the objectivesof by marriageor politicalaffiliation
the "tavola" generatedtoo much dissension in echelons of Florentinesociety,these men could
Florence.50 Perhaps, too, the republiclacked an administerthe law witha zeal thatwas shocking
experiencedbureaucracyso necessaryfor the ac- to the adherentsof the patriciate.
In May of 1345 the Signoriaand the communal
of this project. Much later, and
complishment
on a vasterscale, the dreamof a "tavola" was to councils enacted sweepinglegislationto recover
be realizedwith the foundationof the Florentine communalproperty.54GiovanniVillani reserved
Catastoin 1427. The gropingeffortof the popu- his sharpestinvectivefor the new men whomhe
lar governmentto order communalfinancesand held responsiblefor passing this nefariousdeto constructa more rationalbase for Florentine 51Cf. N. Ottokar, II comune di Firenze alla fine del
start, dugento, 278 ff.,Florence, 1926; B. Barbadoro, op. cit.,
taxationdid represent,
however,a significant
and while the machineryof the young state was 62 ff.
52 C.C., 5, f. 10, 16 March, 1344.
these rational objecincapable of implementing
49
E. Fiumi, L' imposta diretta nei comuni medioevali
della Toscana, in Studi in onoredi ArmandoSapori 1:
341-342, Milan, 1957. For the names of the notaries,

see C. C., 21, f. 47r.
50M. Villani, Cronica 5: 74; Provvisioni Duplicati, 6,
f, 43r,
53 Sixty-five per cent of all notaries who held communal office,between 1343 and 1382 came from families
recentlymigrated to the city. The holdings of these men
in the funded communal debt averaged two hundred
florins.
54 P., 33, f. 43; Provvisioni Duplicate, 5, f. 64, 13 May,
1345.
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 19621
371
of il popolo,he reminded tice on the same count. This family,more than

cree.55 The ingratitude
his readers,knows no bounds, for had not the any other noble clan, had influencedthe course
plebes,even in thegoldendays of Rome, deprived of Florentinepoliticsduringthe precedingdecade
the great patriotheroes of their just rewards? and had used theirprestigeand powerto advance
The Signoria, sensitiveto this type of criticism, their private fortunes. Now they were being
sought to justifyits actions by contendingthat forcedto disgorgetheir gains; sixteen of these
the expensesof government
were "indeed heavy" Bardi paid the substantialfine of 3,000 florins
was
and if this step were not taken then it would be to the Camera on June10.59 The nobility
necessaryto impose new taxes. Therefore,cer- not the onlygroup to be affectedby the vigorous
tain state propertieswhich had fallen into the and impartial enforcementof communal law:
hands of the great magnatifamiliesof the Della manypopolaniwho had appropriatedstateproperTosa, Pazzi, and Rossi were to be restoredto ties were also condemnedand forced to make
the commune. Villani claimedthat much of this restitution.60
land had been conferred
Acting fromthe same set of imperatives,the
upon theseancienthouses
by the governmentin recognitionof the many popular Signoria made tax evasion much more
services they had performedfor their country. difficult
when it extendedthe power of the comJustor unjust,thismeasurewas partof an overall munal judiciary over the collectionof gabelles.
policy designed to raise revenue through the Proceedings were now initiated against those
recoveryof propertiesdeemed to be public,and formerbuyersof the gabelles who had failed to
each time laws of this type were enacted, the fulfilltheir financialcommitments
to the comSignoria offeredthe same justification:if we mune, and indirect taxes were collected with
don't resortto this, then we shall be compelled unaccustomedrigor. Steps were also taken to
56
to tax further"cives et districtuales."
preventtax farmers(buyersof thegabelles) from
fraudsand, in general,the policies of
The officers,vulgarly called "uffizialidella committing
torre" in formeryears, and who were known thisnew regimecan best be characterizedby their
now as "offitiales
super iuribuscommunis,"made deep concern for the assertion of state fiscal
theirfirstsizable paymentof 5,800 lire, 11 soldi, prerogatives.6'
This surge of public spiritednessis reflectedin
10 denari into the Florentinetreasuryon the
seventeenthof November, 1343, less than two the increasedcontrolexertedby theSignoria over
monthsafterthe new regimetook office.57Act- the republic's many judicial and administrative
ing in concertwith the "rationeriisuper iuribus officials. One of the most pronouncedfeatures
is the strictsyndicationof
communis"and speciallyelectedmagistrates,
these of populargovernment
"offitiales"broughtto trial many of the most communal magistrates. When the term of a
influential
of theFlorentinenobility,
amongwhom Podesta, Captain of the people, or Executor of
were certain of the Adimari, Bondelmonti, Justicewas served out, then the Signoria elected
Gherardini,Lupiciuni, Pulci, and Tigliamochi. special notaries,accountants,and lawyersto reAll of these great magnateswere judged to be view the actions taken by these re~ctorsduring
guiltyof usurpingpublicpropertyand condemned theirtenure. The firstconvictionoccurredon the
of June,1344, and involveda Captain
to heavyfines.58In Juneof 1344 themostpromi- nineteenth
nent of all the Florentinemagnati-the house of of the People who was foundguiltyof peculation
Bardi-was broughtbeforethe Executor of Jus- of communalfunds.62 Theoretically,it was extremelyeasy to punish such a magistrate,since
5Cronica 12: 54; P., 34, f. 37.
the communealways withheldpart of his salary
56ProvvisioniDuplicate,6, f. 29, 27 March, 1346; G. until his term was completed; however, conVillani,Cronica12: 44.
demnationsof this sort are rarelyfound in the
57 C., 3, November-December, 1343. See especially
judicial records. An explanationof this paradox
entryon folio36.
58 P., 33, fols. 2r-3r,2 June,133; ibid.,f. 6, 9 June, can be soughtthrough
an understanding
of power
1344;C.C., 17,f.16r,9 September,
1346. Theseconvictions politicsin fourteenth-century
Italy. The magissupportStefani'scontention
thatmagnatiwho held com- tracywas drawn fromotherareas of Italy and,
munal
officehad appropriated
much state propertyand
committednumerous extortions. Cf. Marchionnedi
59p., 33, f. 15.
60 CC., 6, f. 52; C.C., 7, f. 95.
Coppo Stefani,op. cit.,rub. 588. Afterthe fall of the
61 An
popular government,
frequentdispensationswere made
extra-ordinarycommission was created to proseto magnati who had been convictedon this charge. cute these violators. C.C., 6, f. 52r.
6, f. 62r.
Cf. especiallyC.C., 33-34,May-August,1349.
62C.C.,
372
MARVIN B. BECKER
therefore,if Florence condemneda judge from

an adjacent state for a shortagein his accounts,
she ran the risk of antagonizingher neighbor.
Many Florentinesserved abroad as judicial officialsand theymightfindthemselvesin an awkward position. Morever,therewas theunpleasant
prospect of reprisal; another state might feel
stronglyenoughto penalize Florentinemerchants
who were doing business within her confines.
the
During intervalsof oligarchicalgovernment,
Florentinecourts were reluctantto convictthe
republic'smagistratesfromabroad, but with the
adventof the popularSignoria,this trendtended
to be reversed. This regime demonstratedan
enthusiasmfor the strict enforcementof law
rarelydisplayedby any of its oligarchicalpredecessors. Nor was thiszeal confinedto theforeign
judiciary: it reachedout to encompassthe whole
of communal administrativepersonnel. Little
regard was evidenced for status-worthyindividuals, and more convictions resulted from
syndication during this five-year interval of
popular governmentthan were to occur in a
decade of oligarchicalhegemony.63As a matter
of fact, the regime that succeeded the popular
governmentregularly exempted communal officials from syndicationand did its utmost to
of this type. The elaborate
squash investigations
machineryused by the popular governmentto
check abuses and violationsof public trust fell
temporarilyinto disuse, and grants of judicial
dispensationfromthe verdictsof courtscame to
be commonplacein 1349 and 1350.64
The numerousfraudscommittedby those patricianswho had held officeduringthe 1330's and
early forties were prosecuted by the popular
Signoria. Particularlyprominentamong those
condemnedfor peculationand malfeasancein officewere the membersof the importantcommission of the "Twenty." These men, the elite of
had been givenextratheold governingpatriciate,
ordinaryauthorityin 1341 to wage war against
Pisa. Charges of corruptionand ineptitudeoccasioned a public scandal in the followingyear,
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
and criminalproceedingswere initiatedagainst

themby Walter of Brienne. The specificnessof
the accusations,and the additionalevidencefurnishedby GiovanniVillani's Cronica,have led the
modern Florentine historian,Armando Sapori,
to concludethatthe "Twenty"were indeedguilty.
They stoodtrialunderBriennein Januaryof 1343
but were not convicted;it was not untilthe new
governmentassumed officethat they were condemned.65 In additionto these high-bornoice
holders,manymagnatiwere broughtto justicefor
similar offenses; such actions were a regular
featureof popular rule throughoutthe thirteenth
and fourteenthcenturiesand stemmedin part
from the very forces that had encouraged the
genesis of revolutions. The failuresof the old
rulingpatriciatebecame increasinglyapparentto
il popolo and this realizationgave impetusto the
new reformingSignoria. The tendencywas to
indion prominent
blamecommunalmisadventure
of the city-statewas
viduals,forthe environment
intensely personal. After 1343 the Albizzi,
Visdomini,and otherswere singled
Bondelmonti,
out and charged with fraud and negligencein
of publictrust.66Upon conviction,
the fulfillment
however,the troublesof the state began,for frequentlythese men were tried in absentia and,
therefore,the courts were actuallypassing sentenceupon thosewho had put up securityforthe
culprits. The prudent Giovanni Villani never
tired of citing the Tuscan proverb that any
Signoria which threatenedone citizen,must in
the end threatenall. In this instancehis chatty
maximwas almostprophetic,since the conviction
of a Bondelmontimeantthata Rossi or a Frescobaldi going securityfor him was made liable for
of
the moneyfine.67Similarly,the condemnation
the
prerogatives
one errantBardi for exceeding
of his office,meant that assessmentscould be
65 A. Sapori, La crisi, 132-147; C. Paoli, op. cit., 103104; Libri Fabarum, 25, f. 16r; Capitoli, 18, f. 88, 11
December, 1344.
66 On 7 May, 1344, two novi cives, Agostino Cocchi, a
dyer, and Sandro Mancini seconded proposals designed
to punish formercastellani. Cf. Libri Fabarum, 23, fols.
63 Particularly interesting are the condemnations of
10-lOr. The Signoria consulted with the captains of the
rectors of rural popoli. C.C., 8, f. 18, 19 October, 1344;
city's twenty-oneguilds on the feasibility of punishing
C.C., 9, f. 30r, 13 November, 1344.
other communal officials. There was great opposition
64 C.C., 34, f. 124, 2 July, 1349. Frequently when an
to actions of this type, especially in the Council of the
the
in
a
as
magistrate
serve
to
elected
was
individual
its greatest reprecontado, it was stated that he was to be free from syndi- Podesta where the older patriciate had
f. 43,
cation. Cf. P., 38, f. 74r, 21 June, 1350, for such a pro- sentation. Cf. ibid., f. 10r, 8 May, 1345; P., 33,
vision concerning a member of the Tornaquinci family. 13 May, 1345.
67 A Bondelmontewas fined5,161 lire, 16 soldi; for the
Treasurers of balie were granted exemption from syndication. Cf. P., 39, f. 1, 17 August, 1351; P., 39, f. 15, names of those who were held liable for this condemnation, see P., 34, f. 3r; C.C., 6, f. 72r, 19 June, 1344.
20 August, 1351.
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
373
made againstthepropertyofhis relations.68Each

communal officeholder was required to have
fideiussoreswho would post bond for him and,
when the popular Signoria took action
therefore,
againsta singlecorruptofficial,
it posed a serious
threatto the manywho were responsibleforhim.
Any regimeembarkingon the treacherouswaters
of reformcould count upon incurringthe enmity
of the manyby movingagainstthe few.
hundredof theirkinsmenwhentherewas trouble.

Intimidationof witnesses was a commonplace;
streetfightsand blood feuds were an everyday
occurrence,and attacks upon communalofficials
who sought to execute the law were frequent.
In thefarreachesof the contadowherecommunal
writ scarcelyran, these familiescould be a law
untothemselves. Tower societiesin the city,and
rural fortifications
in the countrysidemade the
administrationof justice even more uncertain.
V
Feudal prerogativespersisted and ecclesiastical
One of the mosttroublesomeproblemsso little magnatescontinuedto employtheirauthorityand
investigatedby historiansof Trecento Florence status to frustratethe execution of Florentine
concernsthatclass of men designatedby custom, law.71 Gradation in dress, position in procespublic opinion,or law as magnati. Composed of sionals,choice seats at festivalsand solemncerejust under a hundredclans, with a membership monies lent distinctionto this class; service
with
of well over a thousand,the magnatihave a his- abroad in the greatcourtsand intermarriage
the
Italian
added
further
nobility
luster.
Finally,
torywhichyet remainsto be written. Certainly
by NorthernEuropean standards,these Floren- membershipin honorificinstitutionssuch as the
tines would hardlyqualifyas nobles. Many not Parte Guelfagave the Florentinemagnatia great
only failedto practicethe ancientand honorable sense of theirown worth. The Parte was closely
professionof arms, but what was even more tied to the Roman churchand a religiousaura
deplorable,at least one half of theirnumberen- surroundedthe Guelf captains. Magnati were
gaged in some formof business. The matriculae well representedin the high officesof the Parte
of the great guilds of the period disclose that as well as in theranksof theTuscan upperclergy.
magnati were regularlyinscribedas masters.69 The Bishopricsof Florenceand Fiesole had virtuFew of theirnumberwould have been welcomed ally becomethe preserveof this order.72 Thereas peers by the knightsof the North,and by the fore, any Signoria seeking to curb the more
same token, these magnati were suspect to il intractablemembers of the great clans would
popolo of Florence. Traditionalexplanationsof incur the hostilityof the great Florentineclergy
have emphasizedthe natural as well as the Parte. The new men deeply rethispopolanihostility
antipathybetweena commercialbourgeoisieand sented the fact that high officesin the church
a class of land-holdingmagnati. In the light of and the Parte were monopolizedby the magnati.
recentstudies,however,this interpretation
must Magnati clans fusedwiththe greatpopolanifamibe rejected,for both classes owned real estate in lies so subtlythat frequentlythe two were inpoliticalalliances,
the city and contado,and both engaged in com- distinguishable.Intermarriage,
And yet distinctions and business partnershipsthroughoutthe thirmerceand manufacturing.70
did exist betweenthe two orders; not the least teenthcenturyhad broughtthesetwo echelonsof
of theseinvolvedtheirstyleof life. The magnati communalsocietyso close togetherthat by the
centurythe mostpowertendedto take lightlythe laws of the commune, middleof the fourteenth
ful
magnati-the
Bardi-differed
littlefromleadfor afterall had theynot been enacted by their
social inferiors
? They were, therefore,more ing popolani such as the Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli.
prone to resortto violencein settlinggrievances Judgingfrom the historyof the rather newish
can be drawnthatthe
than were the commoners. Belonging to a Strozzifamily,theinference
new
popolani
were
anxious
to embracethe more
powerful consorteria,certain of these magnati
could count upon the supportof as many as a violent style of life extant among the magnati.
C.C., 6, f. 89, 30 June, 1344.
For a critique of the older conception of class divisions in Florentine economic life, see A. Sapori, La crisi,
118-120.
70 E.
Fiumi, Fioritura d decadenze dell' economia
fiorentina,Archivio Storico Italiano 115: 385-439, 1957;
M. Becker, Somes aspects of oligarchical, dictatorial and
popular signorie, op. cit., 421-425.
68
69
71Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub. 616; N.

Rodolico, I Ciompi, 42, Florence, 1945.
72 The then Bishop of Florence was Angelo Acciaiuoli,
and over the next generation the episcopal sees of Florence and Fiesole were occupied by such great families
as the Antella, Ricasoli, and Corsini. Cf. A. Panella,
La guerra degli Otto Santi e le vicende della legge contro
i vescovi, Archivio Storico Italiano 99: 36-49, 1941.
374
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
preceding
The desire to emulate these magnati led to a annulled,and in the years immediately
recourseto arms whenevera Strozzi suffereda the popular revolution,1341-1343, this practice
slight-real or imagined. This tone of brutal became chronic.76
Those who recordedthe events from 1343 to
egoismis fullydocumentedin theFlorentinecourt
hostile
recordsafter1343 whenwe findpopolanifamilies 1348 agreedthatil popolowereparticularly
such as the Strozzi engaged in avenging their to those magnates, lay and ecclesiastical,who
honor; only a generationago their fathershad employedtheirgreat power to oppress the poor
been busily engaged in engrossingpropertyand and the weak. According to the chronicler
lendingon pledges.73 The problemconfronting Stefani,il popolo were most incensed at those
a popular Signoria then involvedthe regulation grandi who used the inhabitantsof the contado
of lawless behaviornow rampantamong magnati cruelly. Giovanni Villani and an anonymous
as well as high popolani. In speakingof these prioristajoined Stefani in maintainingthat the
lawless men, contemporarydocumentsmade no animus of il popolo was also directed against
betweenthesetwo orders,but referred those high clergyfromgreat familieswho exerdistinction
cised their ecclesiastical authority for selfto themcollectivelyas potentes.74
The Florentine chronicler,Dino Compagni, aggrandizement.77It should be understoodat
whose view of politics was always temperedby the outset that the policies formulatedby the
when writingabout an earlier popularSignoria were aimed to checkthe chronic
moral imperatives,
intervalof popular rule, statedthat the Signoria abuses perpetuatedby the overmighty-whether
took pains to enjoin communalmagistratesto see theywere noble or commoner-andthatthisprothatjusticewas ministeredto all. Especiallywas gram was not generated by class antipathy
the judiciaryurged to preventthe great and the towards the nobility. Rather it was part of a
powerfulfromoppressingthe smalland the weak. resurgenceof feelingagainst those great families
While serving in the Signoria of Giano della who not only had been a law unto themselves,
Bella (1293-1295), Compagni had an oppor- butalso had made theSignoriatheirown personal
theprecedingdecade. Theretunityto assist in writinginto Florentinelegisla- preservethroughout
tion just such a provisiondesigned to curb the fore,we must considertwo types of legislation
abuses of the overmightyagainst the helpless.75 passed duringthe tenureof the popular governDespite repeatedeffortsby communalauthorities, ment: first,measuresdirectedagainst the crimimany of the magnaticontinuedto defythe law nous potentes,and then laws designedto reduce
withimpunity.During the decade of the 1330's, the inordinateinfluenceof the great families.
Two monthsafterthe new regimetook office,
tenAleis,fiveBardi,sevenCavalcanti,ten Frescobaldi, eight Giandonati,ten Norli, eleven Rossi, the Ordinances of Justice-so despised by the
five Squarcialupi, four Della Tosa, and three magnati-were re-enacted. More than any other
crimesrangingfromassault set of Florentinelaws, these"Felicita" ordinances
Tornabellicommitted
thepassion of themedievalcommunefor
with a deadly weapon to homicide. Forty-six reflected
magnatifamilieswere convictedof one hundred an end to violence. Throughthistypeof legislaseriousbreachesof communallaw; most tion the NorthernItalian citieshoped to win the
forty-six
of these convictionsstemmedfrom attacks by fruitsof a tranquiland orderlysocietyso necesmagnation popolani but there were more spec- sary for the prosperityof the artisanmerchants.
tacularchargessuch as arson,murder,devastation Much to thehorrorof the Florentines,the despot,
theseordinances
attackson communalfortifica- Walterof Brienne,had permitted
of churchproperty,
tions,highwayrobbery,and treason. Despite the to lapse. The short-livedaristocraticcoalition
verdictsof the courts,thesesentenceswere never whichruled Florencein the late summerof 1343
carried out because the magnati families were
76 There were ninety-eightmagnati families living in
able to secure judicial dispensation. Upon Florentine territoryat this time. For a list of the dispaymentof a small fine,the magnatiwere able pensations,see Guidice degli Appelli, 122 and C.C., 2 bis.
to have even the most severe of condemnations Very significant was the removal of condemnations
73 P. Jones, op. cit., 186-191.
74 Still extremelyuseful on this and a variety of other

questions concerning the Florentine nobility is Gaetano
Salvemini's, La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze, 22 ff.,Florence, 1896.
75P., 4, fols. 129-130.
against such Ghibelline magnati as the Amadori, Falconieri, and Pulci. Cf. C.C., 2 bis, f. 70, 23 December,
1342.
77 Cf. footnote71.
Stefani states: "Seguendo i cherici
molti soperchi in moti modi, ed infra quali erano molti
Grandi e popolani grassi, li quali battiano e oltraggiavano
li minuti,cognizione non era appo li secolari rettori."
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
375
took an even more radical and unpopular step Ordinancesof Justice.85Among the many other
familieswho feltthe full forceof these
when it annulledthese fundamentallaws. Now magncati
in November of that same year the popular laws were the Adimari, Aleis, Bordini, Della
Signoria decreed that the ordinanceswere once Tosa, Donati, Mancini,Pazzi, Rossi, and Tornaagain in effectand, therefore,all magnatimust belli.86
post securityfortheircontinuedgood behavior.78 The Cameradel ComunerecordsthemanypayThe penaltiesforcrimesof violencewere doubled ments made by the consorterieand the fideiusand tripledso that the magnatiwere now to be sores of thecriminousmagnatifrom1343 through
dealt with more severelythan otherclasses. In 1347. Unlike the earlierera of oligarchicalgovthe followingyear the new regimestrengthened ernment,the verdictsof communalcourts were
the provisions of these ancient ordinances by executed and not thwartedby grantsof judicial
extendingthe principleof collectiveresponsibility dispensation. It was only with the fall of the
so that magnatiwere to be held liable for the popular Signoria in 1347-1348 thatthe highborn
were once again permittedto purchaseabsolution
crimesof theirdistantkinsmen.79
The earliestinstancesof convictionsstemming fromthe decisionsof the courtsof the republic.87
from the now rigorouslyenforced Ordinances More thanany othersinglepractice,the granting
of Justiceoccurredonlya monthaftertheselaws of judicial dispensationserves to illustratean
were reactivated. Gerio Manetti Gherardini, essential differencebetween an oligarchicaland
"magnateset potentes,"was triedin absentiaand a popular regime. The latteris characterizedby
of
foundguiltyof the homicideof a "populares,"a its more impartialand impersonalenforcement
certain Francesco Lapuccio. Fifteen of Ghera- the law, while the formertends to be more perdini's consortswere compelledto pay the stiff missivetowardsmen of statusand influence.
fine of 3,000 lire for their kinsman's flagrant Not only was communal law enforcedwith
thetenureofthepopular
violationof the Ordinances.80 During the same greatervigorthroughout
month,Bernardinomesser Filippo, of the noble government,but the Florentinestatutesdisclose
house of Cavalcanti,was likewisecondemnedin that penaltiesfor crimes of violence were espeabsentiaon an identicalcharge,and his consorteria cially severe. In 1344 a provisionwas enacted
was required to pay a similar fine.8' Shortly decreeingthat any person fromFlorence or the
the Gherardiniagain ran afoul of the contado who offendeda citizen or a contadino
thereafter,
law and this timethe finereachedthe exorbitant "by violence studiosevel premeditate"would be
sum of 6,000 lire.82 The Janbernardi,
a branch dealt with harshly. If he committedthe same
of the noble house of AEdimari,had two members offensetwice,the finewas to be doubled and his
who were each fined500 lire for molestingthe name was to be inscribedin the book of "MaleFlorentineartisan,Master Jacapo, a popolano.83 abliati." The evil doer was not permittedto
Pierozzo BertolinoGiandonati,a magnate,paid escape with a mere fine, but was required to
300 lire in finesforassaultingthe eminentguilds- sufferthe loss of a hand. In additionto this,the
man and leading popolano, Matteo Zuccheri culpritwas to be barred fromcommunaloffice
Soderini.84 A few days later, Guerra messer forlife.88 The firstpersonto be convictedunder
Monte Bondelmonti,of the aristocraticclan of this law was the noble, Simone Boscoli who was
Bondelmonti,attackeda humblecontadinowitha condemnedby the Podesta in August of 1344 to
knife;forthishe paid 1,000 lire intothetreasury. 85Ibid., 5, fols. lr, 24, 3 March-3 April, 1344.
86Ibid., 5-17.
Early in 1344 his kinsman,Valore, son of the
87 See the reversals of the condemnationsagainst cerknight,Peppo Bondelmonti,was condemnedby tain of
the Bondelmontiwho were convicted of peculation
the Podesta for attackinga popolano and fined of communal funds in October of 1344. Fines of 2,000
3,000 lire in accord with the provisionsof the lire were cancelled in May of 1349, upon payment of
p., 32, f. 73, 14 November, 1343.
79P., 33, f. 2r, 2 June, 1344; ibid., f. lOOr.
78
C.C., 4, f. 57r. 14 January, 1344.

8l Ibid., fols. 60r-61, 20 January, 1344.
82 Payment was made into the Camera
by fifteenmembers of this house. Ibid., f. 66r, 28 January,1344.
83 Ibid., f. 65, 20 January, 1344.
84 Ibid., f. 67, 28 January, 1344.
80
87 lire. This practice was a commonplace during the

years immediatelyafter the Black Death. Cf. C.C., 33,
f. 99. It began late in 1347 when the authority of the
popular government was already much weakened. Cf.
ibid., 22, 68, 30 July, 1347, for grants of dispensation to
members of the Frescobaldi family who had been convicted of seizing church lands in July of 1344. By special
provision, sentences were to be commuted at the rate of
three denari per lira.
88 Statuti,15, bk. 3, rub. 78.
376
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
have his nameinscribedin thisbook forthehomi- of what constitutedblood relationship,and the

fromthose
cide of the popolano, Ser Francesco. He was acceptanceof petitionsby governments
bear
their
he
"forswore"
that
who
consorteriac,
be
noted
individuals
should
it
and
absentia.
in
tried
returnedto the city shortlyafterthe fall of the witnessto this fact. The more prosperousthe
popular governmentand boughtjudicial dispen- region,the greaterthe possibilitythatfamilyties
lire.89 Coupled with this would be modified. The extensionof capitalistic
sation for seventy-five
measure were the several provisionsincreasing methodsto agriculturetendedto break up large
thefinesagainstFlorentineswho carriedweapons. familyholdings,and land came to be subdivided,
at speeds sometimes
Even shortkniveswere prohibited;nor was any- while title was transferred
one to be permittedto bear arms unless he was borderingon the frantic. The urban economy
an authorizedofficialof the commune. Legisla- also playeda crucialrole in weakeningthe bonds
tion at this time specificallystatedthat this proof kinship. Some familieshad a memberon virscriptionwas to applyno matterwhat"the status, tuallyeverypointof the economicspectrum. The
office,or dignity"of the individual. The intent varietiesof metiersfollowedbya singleclan might
of these laws was not only directand obvious in run the gamut from pawnbrokerto butcherto
thattheyaimed to weaken the mightof the coni- internationalbanker,with the consequencesthat
sorterie,but also there was a subtlerand more one Strozzi,or Medici,or Bardi, or Donati might
devious purpose behindthem: churchdignitaries be thewealthiestmanin his quarter,whileanother
were not permittedto grantmagnatithe rightto fromthe same familymightbe inscribedamong
bear arms. Traditionally,the inquisitorhad li- the city'slarge roll of paupers. Even amongthe
his noblesof the contadowe mightfinda memberof
censed armed men to aid him in performing
duties. The Holy Officein Florencehad a small an ancient clan cultivatingland as a contadino,
armyof perhapsas manyas two hundredand fifty while his kinsmenlived the lordly, rustic life.
men to do its bidding. Now the Signoria denied Communalpoliticswas anotherfactorthat acted
thisrightto theinquisitorand wenta stepfarther to underminefamily solidarity: some magnati
when it refusedto lend this officialthe assistance associated themselveswith the parte popolare,
of the secular arm. These measures did much while their kinsmenretainedtraditionalaristoafter
to unsettlepopularrespectforthe Holy Officein craticallegiances. In the years immediately
cohethe
eroded
also
factionalism
political
1343,
this
time.90
Florenceat
The popularSignoria was movingtowardsim- sivenessof certaingreat commonerfamiliessuch
personalgovernmentand this encompassedmore as the Strozzi and Medici. The formerwere to
of communallaw. providea leader for a worker'srebellionand at
than the impartialenforcement
It also impliedthe attenuationof the privileged the same timehelp staffthe captaincyof theantistatus of the great familiesthroughthe shiftof popularParte Guelfa. CertainMedici were to be
powerfromthehandsof clergyand greatmagnati among the engineersof popular revolution,while
to communalrectors,and the extensionof repre- otherswere to align themselveswith those who
echelonsof society. soughtto preservethe status quo."
sentationto the upper-middle
This trend,long in evidence,was muchencourfor over two
in
been
had
process
This transition
centuriesand one of its clearest manifestationsaged by the policiesof the new government.As
was to be foundin the weakeningof the medieval the authorityof the state expanded, voluntary
ties of kinship. The same movementwas at work withdrawalfromthe kindredgroup likewise inthe European world in the later Mid- creased. In timespast, the individualhad been
throughout
dle Ages, and the tendencyto restrictthe right compelledto rely upon his consorteriafor prohe
ofvendetta,theintrusionof statejusticeintowhat tection;now thatthe statewas moreeffective,
proscription stood less in need of this protection. Therefore,
a clan matter,statutory
was formerly
we witnessa markedincrease in the numberof
89C.C., 34, f. 127, 2 July, 1349. On the same day,
petitionssubmittedto the Signoria by men who
Simone's kinsman, Nerio, paid 50 lire to have a condesired to live "peacefuland tranquillives" and
conbeen
had
He
canceled.
1344,
demnation of March,
victed for committing assault against a populano and believedthatthe way to achieve this goal was to
fined2,900 lire.
forsweartheirlawlessconsorts.Particularlynote90For the background of the conflict between the
who tookthisdrasinquisi- worthyare the manymagnati
communeand the church over the activities of the
tor in 1345 and 1346, see M. Becker, Florentine politics
and the diffusionof heresy in the Trecento, Speculum
34: 62-64, 1959.
91G. Brucker, The Medici in the fourteenthcentury,

Speculum 32: 7-10, 1957.
VOL.
106, NO. 4, 1962]
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
377
tic step and even went so far as to renounce attestedto withonlythe mostcasual of backward
and changetheirfamilynames. glances into communalhistory. The threeprintheircoats-of-arms
There were some who brokeup theirhouseholds cipal conspiraciesformedto overthrowthe govand movedto anotherquarterof the cityin order ernmentbetween 1323 and 1343 were led and
staffedmainlyby magnati.After1343,as Machiato disassociatethemselvesfromtheirkin.92
justly observed,there was never again to
velli
such
in
lived
magnati
Many of the Florentine
in the city. The
a manneras to win the admirationof the good be a major magnatiinsurrection
burghersof the city. Long ago theyhad shunned leadershipof the contendingfactionswas to pass
appeals to arms and evolved a style of life that into the hands of the great popolani familiesof
was to earnthecontemptofthegreatestof Floren- the Albizzi, Medici, Ricci, and Strozzi. In the
tine historians-Machiavelli. To their contem- 1370's whencertainof the magnatiwere outraged
poraries, however,the decline of martial spirit by the directionthat communalpolicytook,they
centurywas foundtheirspokesmenin the ranks of the popoamongthe magnatiof the fourteenth
Signoria lani.95 We cannot establishMachiavelli's grand
new
a blessing. In Octoberof 1343,the
rewarded five hundred and thirtyof the most thesis which seeks to correlate the decline of
law-abiding magnati by bestowing commoner militaryprowesswiththehumblingofthemagnati
status upon them. Almost one half of the city's class in the middle years of the Trecento. But
magnatiwere now liberatedfromthe harsh and this does not give us licenseto ignorehis incisive
repressivestipulationsof the Ordinancesof Jus- commentsconcerningthe changingstatus of the
tice.93 No longerwould theybe requiredto post magnati: ". . . it became necessary for them (the
securityfor their continuedgood behavior,nor magnati) not onlyto seem like the people,but to
would theybe held accountablefor the crimesof be like them in behavior, mind and mode of
their kinsmen. Moreover, they were declared living."96 So farhad theFlorentinesmovedfrom
that for the balance
whichhitherto their ancient commitments,
eligibleforcertaincommunaloffices
centurysuch chivalricrites as
had been closed to them; even the highestposi- of the fourteenth
tions in the communewere to be accessible to tournamentsand jousting appeared ludicrousto
years. Such measures the good burghersof the city. Yet it would be
them withintwenty-five
had been enactedby earlierpopularSignorieand an errorto assume that medievalknightlyritual
the solidarity had lost its appeal to the Florentinesforall time.
theyhad the effectof undermining
of this class, but never had an effortbeen made Again in the fifteenthcentury the trappings,
on so large a scale as in October of 1345. The pomp, and contestsof chivalrywere to entrance
consorteriaof certainhouses were shatteredand the citizenry; the Renaissance knight was in
duringthe remainingyears of the Trecento we flower. Similarly,we mustnot associate,as does
find an ever-increasingnumber of ex-magnati Machiavelli,generosityof feelingand concernfor
becominginvolved in the life of the commune. the precepts of honor with the magnati class
In this way the transferof loyaltiesfromprivate alone; these virtues also found a place in the
discordantethic of the burgherswhich lauded
to public concernswas encouraged.
and largesse. It is
Machiavelli drew his facts for the historyof benevolence,magniminity,
of feudal style by
decline
the
trace
thisperiodfromthechronicleof GiovanniVillani, simpler to
armorialbearings
of
disappearance
the
observing
but the inferenceshe made were disarmingly
the gradual
is
to
depict
it
than
titles
family
and
he
advanced
Florence
of
In
History
his
original.
a thesisthathas not been giventhe seriousatten- process by which the chivalriccode was grafted
tion it merits: "The ruin of the nobilitywas so on to the merchant'sfamilytree. It was a bourcentury,Leon Battista
complete,and depressedthemso much,thatthey geois of the earlyfifteenth
the cult of the clan
extoll
was
to
who
Alberti,
for
the
arms
take
to
afterward
ventured
never
recoveryoftheirpower,but soon becamehumbled and dedicate himselfto the propositionthat raand abjectin theextreme. And thusFlorencelost tional business conduct was indeed compatible
of her characterand her distinction with feudal conditions.97
the generosity
94
that
in arms." It was thispopulargovernment
95 For the opinions of this most obdurate of the arcitamed the old nobility,and theirlevelingcan be guelfi, the eminent canon lawyer and man of letters,
92P., 42, fols. 99-113.
93 G. Villani,Cronica 12: 22.
94
N. Machiavelli, op. cit., 107.
Lapo da Castiglionchio, see P. Jones, op. cit., 191-192.

96 N. Machiavelli, op. cit., 109.
97 See the pertinentcommentsof R. de Roover, op. cit.,
18-19.
378
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
fromoffice. This was accomplishedin October

of 1343 when the divietowas put into effect.100
The new Signoria of 1343 spoke for the many This ancientlegislationprohibitedmembersof the
artisans,merchants,and industrialistsof same familyfromholdinghigh officesimultaneaffluent
the city. These 3,500 or so guild masters,each ously,and fixedan intervalduringwhicha citizen
legallycon- was judged to be ineligibleforre-election;it also
in one of the twenty-one
matriculated
stitutedguilds, had initiatedan unprecedented barred the nobilityfrom occupyingcertain key
political experiment.98Never before had office positions. This type of enactmentlent an imbeen distributedso widely,and neverbeforehad personaltone to the conductof civic affairssince
so many newcomersbeen called to positionsof it restricted
the influenceof the large old families
publictrust. Dyers now servedin the communal and encouragedthe politicalmobilityof the newer
treasury,vintnershandled public money,bakers elements. GiovanniVillani and his brotherMatwere entrustedwith teo contendedthat it was the divietomore than
recruitedtroops,blacksmiths
the maintenanceof bridges and roads, mercers any otherformof legislationthatwas responsible
reviewedthe accountsof rectorsand audited the forthe rise of the mezzaniand the minori.101
The
balance of the Camtera,grocers and butchers lists of names of candidatesforofficeinscribedin
servedas high magistratesin rural districts,and the Tratte show that many patricianswere exdoublet makers held ambassadorial posts and cluded fromposts because of the effectiveness
of
staffedimportantdiplomaticmissions. This was the divieto. If one of the Strozzi sat in the
the "buono reggimento"favoredin the abstract priorate,thenfifty
of his kinsmenmightbe denied
by Tuscan Aristoteliansand Florentinechroni- entry;the largerthe clan,the less opportunity
for
was not only extended holdingoffice. But like so manyothercommunal
clers; for representation
to the prosperouspopolani and the nobility,but statutes,the divieto was frequentlyobservedin
also to the middlingand lesser guildsmen.99To the breachand such was the case beforethe comof 1343 whichafforded ing of the popularSignoria. From 1343 through
preservethis constitution
to the novi cives, 1347, however,few old familiesheld high posts
such extensiverepresentation
it would be necessaryto curb the politicalinflu- repeatedly,insteadpublic trustcame to be vested
ence and ambitionof the great familiesin order more in the hands of novi cives from families
to preventthe displacementof the new guildsmen recentlycome to prominencein the guilds of the
city. Now newcomersservedin all the important
98This statistic is based upon the fact that approxiofficeswith the exceptionof the captaincyof the
mately 3,500 men were matriculated in the guilds in the
Guelfa and the Court of the Merchants.
Parte
years immediatelypreceding the Black Death. Interestingly enough, it corresponds almost exactly with the It was not to be long beforethey were to win
figure,presentedby Villani in his Cronica, of 3,446 citi- representation
even in thesetwo august bodies.'02
zens who were considered for high officein 1343 (12:
were placed on patrician
restrictions
Further
22). To be eligible for consideration,one had to be a
were enactedprohibitlaws
when
1346
in
guild master; presumably then, since the numbers are power
from
foreignprinces,
marrying
the
grandi
ing
be
to
considered
were
all
masters
guild
virtually equal,
candidates for the Signoria. Cf. footnote 100.
lords, or barons and denyingthem the rightto
99Political theorists such as Ptolemy of Lucca accom- exercise any judicial or fiscal prerogatives.103
VI
modated St. Thomas's Aristotelianism to the Tuscan

communal experience. Ptolemy turned St. Thomas's
teachings so that they were no longer directed towards
thq support of monarchy as the ideal form; now the
Thomistic argumentswere used to buttressthe contention
that the republic was the best of all types of regimes.
This tendencyto identify"buon governo" with republican
and representativeSignorie is to be seen in the art of
Trecento Tuscany. Cf. N. Rubinstein, Political ideas in
Sienese art, Jour. Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 21:
178-207, 1958; H. Wieruszowski, Art and the commune
in the time of Dante, Speculum 19: 14-33, 1944. It is
also much in evidence in sermons and other ecclesiastical
writingsof the period. Cf. C. T. Davis, An early Florentine political theorist: Fra Remigio De' Girolami, Proc.
Amer. Philos. Soc. 104: 662-676, 1960. Giovanni Villani
criticizes the regime of 1340 because it did not bestow
representation upon the mezzani or the minori, as a
"buono reggimentodi comune" should (Cronica 11; 118).
100 G. Villani, Cronica, 12: 22. Only ten per cent of

the 3,446 citizens considered eligible for office were
found to possess all the necessary qualifications for the
highest communal posts-the priorate and the colleges.
This did not mean that they were excluded from lesser
positions, and the treasury records are replete with the
names of guild masters who served in a minor capacity.
101M. Villani, Cronica 8: 24; Donato Velluti, Cronica,
ed. I. del Lungo and G. Volpi, 241-249, Florence, 1914.
102 The new men who were declared eligible for admission into the capacity of the Parte in 1366 and for
entry into the Mercanzia six years later were masters
from the minor guilds. Cf. P., 54, fols. 81-83, 8 December, 1366; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub.
734; Capitoli 11: 27.
103 Provvisioni Duplicati, 6, fols. 144-147r. This measure was counselled by a bridle-maker. Statuto del
Capitano 5: f. 54, 1355.
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 19621
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
379
The oligarchical governmentof the thirties reformsrepresenteda victoryfor the elite of the
whichhad been directedby the scionsof the great lesser guilds whose tribunalswere now able to
houses was replacedby a Signoria of the twenty- try cases involvingamounts eight times higher
one guilds. It was the captains of these guilds than theirformerprerogativeshad allowed.
who met in October of 1343 to draw up lists of
The authorityof the masterbutchers,vintners,
candidatesfor office. If we comparethe statutes catrpenters,
and otherdomesticartificers
was furof the Podest'a of 1322-1325 with those enacted ther enhanced in August of 1344 when the
just thirtyyears later,then the singulargrowth Signoriaaccepteda petitionof thetwenty-one
arti
of the authorityof the twenty-one
guilds is strik- givingthe appropriateguilds jurisdictionover all
ing. The earliercode of laws declaredthat only those who followedtheirparticularmetier. This
the captainsof the twelvegreaterguilds would be enactmentis especially complex and never has
eligibleto serveon commissionsfortherevisionof been adequatelydiscribedby economichistorians;
communalstatutes,while the latterentrustedthis even now there are aspects of this legislation
vital task to the captains of all twenty-one whichcannot be readilyinterpreted.Essentially
guilds.'04 During the thirtiesonly the rectorsof the law was framedto force small retailersand
the greaterguilds were called in by the Signoria pettymanufacturers
intothe guild matrix.107 Not
to considerimportantpoliticalquestions,but dur- only were theyto be amenableto guild jurisdicing the subsequentdecades,the opinionsof repre- tion,but theywere also to be liable for all guild
sentativesfrombothmajor and minorguildswere imposts. This latterrequirement
was particularly
solicited. After1345 theconsulsfromthetwenty- troublesome since many petty tradesmen atone arti participatedin the electionof high com- temptedto avoid the incidenceof these levies by
munal magistratesand extra-ordinaryofficials refusingto inscribetheir names on guild rolls.
whose selectionhad hithertobeen the exclusive The advantages of resistingmatriculationwere
concernof the greaterguildmen. After 1343 it considerable,but now the forceof communallaw
was to be the captains of the greaterand lesser was on the side of the minorielite. In April of
guilds who would introducethe most important 1345 the treasurerand syndics of the bakers'
laws for consideration.105
guild petitionedthe Executorof Justiceto compel
Gains made by the lesser guilds were not lim- each personwho plied this tradeto pay all taxes,
itedto thearea of communalpoliticsbut extended condemnations,
and assessmentsleviedby theconto other mattersof vital interestto the guild suls of thisguild.'08In Julyof thatyear a similar
masters. Prior to 1343 severe limitationshad requestfromthe vintnerswas acted upon by the
been placed upon the juridical competenceof the same magistrate.109
Two yearslaterthe authority
lesser guilds; only the tribunalsof the firstfive of the twenty-one
guildswas furtherstrengthened
major guildswereempoweredto hear suitscalling when the Signoria acted to prohibitany appeals
forunlimiteddamages,the remainingsixteenarti fromtheverdictsof theconsulsofthearti. Herewere given jurisdictionover cases involvingonly tofore,it had been possible for dissidentguildssmall sums.'06 Now revisionswere made: the mentto call upon the Court Merchantto reverse
firstfive guilds still had unlimitedjurisdiction, the decisions of the tribunalsof the twenty-one
but the next seven were given authorityover liti- guilds.10
gationup to the sizable amountof threehundred
The tendencyto encouragethe fragmentization
lire, while the rest were permittedto try cases of the lesser guilds, so much in evidenceduring
involvingsums up to two hundredlire. These intervalswhen the oligarchsof the arti maggiori
dominatedthe Signoria, was now in process of
104 Compare the
Statuto del Podesta', bk. I, rub. 53,
being
reversed,and the consequencesfor Flor1322-1325, with Statuto del Podesta', bk I, rub. 264, 1355.
It should be noted that upon occasion the number of ence's domesticeconomywere to be considerable.
guilds legally definedas major arti was twelve, however, Beforeattempting
to deal withthe effectsof this
the usual procedure was to limit the arti maggiori to change,however,we must considerthe problem
seven.
of the relationshipbetweenthe elite of the lesser
105 See footnote27 and Provvisioni
Duplicati, 5, f. 54,
2 April, 1345; ibid., 6, f. 35r, 4 April, 1346 for laws
against the church. Now all arti participated in imborsation for officeand the consuls of the twenty-oneguilds
took part in the election of communal magistrates. Cf.
P., 34, f. 41, 21 April, 1346.
106 Mercanzia, 3, f. 115; Legnaiuoli, 3, f. 15; Statuto
del Podesta', bk. II, rub. 85, 1322-1325,
107
Statuto del Podesta', bk. II, rub. 84, 1355. This
rubricais a copy of the provisionenactedby the communalcouncilson August17, 1344.

108Atti del Esecutore, 29, fols. 196-197.
109Ibid., 40, f. 112.
110P., 34, f. 43, 11 April, 1346.
380
MARVIN B. BECKER
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
guilds and the great body of pettyartisansand legislation so that it no longer weakened the
gradations authority
of the rectorsof the lesserguilds.112
shopkeepers.There are manydifferent
from
ranging
arti
the
of
minori,
withinthe ranks
centuryFlorence,like
From the late thirteenth
the highestdegree of affluenceand social status so manyothermedievalcities,had been preoccuto the meanestof stationsin the artisan world. pied with the formulationand enforcementof
It was the former-the arti minori elite-who legislationagainst any guild practicesthat might
held high posts in the republicat this time and increase the price of goods and services to the
who dominatedguild machinery. These great consumer. Vague preceptsto this effectwere
guild includedin the ordinancesof the city,but they
soughtto compeltheirless fortunate
mninori
brethrento contributetowardthe expensesof the were stereotypedand innocuous and, therefore,
arte and to pay theirshare of communallevies. it is difficult
to draw inferencesabout the specific
of
It was this same minori elite who were anxious policies Florence followedin the enforcement
to extendguildcontroloverthemanyunorganized this type of legislation. Fortunately,however,
artisansand retailerswho pliedtheirtradeswithin there are data fromthe treasuryrecords which
the city. Especially was this elite eager to use permitus to examinethis matterin some detail.
the courtsof the lesserguilds to collectoutstand- During the 1330's many individual guildsmen
and merchants. were cited by communalrectorsand finedby the
ing debtsfromthe pettyartificers
But of much greater concern to these 1iinori courts for violations of the ordinancesagainst
leaderswere the policiesfavoredby certainof the monopoly."3 In each instancethe person congreaterguildsmenwhichhad theeffectof depress- victed was a minor guildsman selling food or
competition services; not a single condemnationwas against
by fostering
ing thepriceof foodstuffs
betweenindependentsellersand producerson the a major guildsman. The sevengreaterguildshad
one hand, and those who were inscribedin the autonomyin a varietyof economicmatters,while
subject
lesser arti on the other. Such competitionwas the fourteenlower guilds were frequently
artisansand tradesmen to government
regulation. It would appear then
encouragedby permitting
who were not matriculatedin any arte to sell thatordinanceswere enforcedin a discriminatory
their wares at prices far below those that pre- fashionand that the twenty-oneguilds were in
vailed among the guildsmen. This tactic could fact not equal beforethe communallaw. After
be especiallyeffectivewhen it was coupled with 1343 when the minorguilds were grantedreprelegis- sentation,the ordinanceson monopolywere interthe provisionsof communalanti-monopoly
lation whichforbadethe minori consuls fromin- preted very differently.Now accusations were
terferingwith the business dealing of the un- broughtagainstboththe consulsof the major and
Free tradeand fiercecompetition the minorguilds. Althoughindividualguildsmen
matriculated.111
stimulated
by allowingnonguildmem- were not involveddirectly,the entirebody of the
were thus
bers to sell in the marketplacewithoutbeingsub- twenty-oneguilds was cited by the communal
ject to the authorityof the guild consuls or courtson chargesof violatingordinancesagainst
amenableto the provisionsof the guild constitu- monopolisticpractices.114 No longerwere minori
tions. All those who desired to vend meat or relegatedto an inferiorposition;all the arti were
wine or wood could do so, and any effortby the now accorded equal treatmentand the city was
minori eliteto hamperthemwas deemedmonopo- well on theway to becominga guildrepublic.The
listicand to be punishableby heavyfine. There- sovereigntyof the Signoria and her courts exfore,when the great pork butchers,vintners,and
Florence,
wood corders wished to force the unorganized 112 A. Doren, Le arti fiorentine2: 17-18, La
esecufols. 41-44; M. Becker,
1,
Vanattieri,
1940;
vendersto matriculatein the appropriateguild, zione della legislatura contro le pratiche monopolistiche
they were attemptingto put an end to policies delle arti fiorentinealla meta del secolo quattordicesimo,
to the interestsof the upper echelons Archivio Storico Italiano 117: 8-28, 1959.
detrimental
113 M. Becker, op. cit., 11-12.
of the arti minori. Within less than a year the
114 Equality before the law, in this instance, resulted
minori elite won a singularvictory;in August of
the dismissal of the charges against the arti. With
in
were
1344,unorganizedproducersand distributors
the fall of the popular Signoria, the courts once again
and
broughtunderthe aegis of the minori consuls
interpretedthe law in a discriminatoryfashion and only
the courtshad begun to interpretanti-monopoly lesser guildsmen were convicted. Cf. A tti del Esecutore
211, 9 August-27 December, 1349. This volume contains
ordinamenP., 6, f. 24, 15 May, 1296; P., 9, f. 47r, 31 July, "inquisitiones contra artifices contrafacientes
tis comunis florenti(a)e."
1298.
11"
VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]
FLORENTINE
POPULAR GOVERNMENT
381
If we take the word "Puritanism"to mean the

tendedover all the guilds of the city; public law
of privateand public morality,and
had triumphedover those corporaterightswhich identification
statusand we suggestthat the men of 1343, drivenby cirhad soughtto preservethe differential
cumstanceand conviction,foundeda regimethat
treasuredimmunitiesof the arti.
was essentiallypuritanical,then we can come
VII
closer to sensingthe vitalitythatwas at the core
Other periods of reformin Florentinehistory of thispopularrevolution. This energyexpressed
of state fihad muchin commonwiththeintervalundercon- itselfin the remarkablereconstruction
sideration. To speak about the ethosfromwhich nances which culminatedwith that imaginative
of the Monte. But
thistypeof movementdraws its vitalityis to raise tourde force-the institution
questionsthatcan be treatedonly impressionisti- much more subtlewas the expressionof Florencally. The deeper significanceof the effortsof tine puritanismin other by-waysof communal
men to promotethe victoryof public law over life. Many politicalmovementscan be characterprivateor guild con- ized by theirvitalityand abidingfaithin the effimattersthat were formerly
cernsimpliesan interestin a moreunitarypoliti- cacy of public law and yet be far removedfrom
cal system. Underlying the genesis of this the ethos of puritanism. It is at the moment
politicalsystemis the presumptionthat through whenthereis a strenuousattemptto make private
the vehicle of communallaw the area of public moralityconformto thedictatesof publiclaw that
of a puritanicalFlormoral concern can be extended. Matters that we can speak legitimately
formerlywere dealt with by the church, the ence. This periodmostcloselyresemblesthe era
magnati,the Parte Guelfa,or the consorterianow of Savonarola with its enthusiasmfor legislated
are disposedof by electedofficials.The tendency morality. Like the Dominican a centuryand a
is to weaken the pluralisticcivic structureof the half later, the new Signoricainaugurateda proof jurisdictions gram of strictenforcement
communewithits conglomeration
of communalsumpand thento substitutein its stead tuarylaws; in October of 1343, all women were
and immunities
somethingmuchmorecohesivewhichcan best be required to registerthe various items of their
describedas a "territorialstate." The Signoria
gauidy apparel with the state notary,and the
of 1343 soughtto accomplishthis througha govthosewho conernmentof the twenty-oneguilds which disre- courtswere enjoinedto prosecute
vanities."
"such
themselves
with
garded certain traditionalclaims for differentialtinuedto adorn
and
thirties
late
treatment. Communalsocietywas democratized Gone were the easier days of the
convicted
been
had
who
and even early fortieswhen those
to theextentthattheclergy,themnagnati,
theartiwere broughtunderthe rule of communal of violationsof the sumptuarylaws were able to
law. The governmentbecame more impartial, purchase judicial dispensationfor a few lire."16
and impersonalcriteria tended to replace the Gone, too,was the moretolerantattitudetowards
ancient claims of status and family influence. the evils of prostitution;in the fall of 1343, comMoreover,the Signoria began to assume respon- munalbailiffswithwhips drove the womenfrom
sibilityfor the dispositionof various questions the brothelsonto the streets where they were
whichhithertohad been underecclesiasticaljurisridiculed and jeered at by the populace. The
of
diction. The prosecutionor non-prosecution
fines
or licensingof pawn- communalcourts continuedto exact heavy
heretics,and thepunishment
brokersare cases in point. State tribunalsand fromthose who persistedin theirancientprofescommunalcouncilsdealt withthesetwo problems sion and it was not until the collapse of the
and acted to extend the republic'sprerogatives popular governmentthat the easier moralityreuntilshe was the sole arbiterof manycontrover- 116
Guidice degli Appelli, 117, f. 1, states that action
sial issues.115 The extensionand regularization was to be taken against all who violated the sumptuary
of Florentineauthorityin the contadois another laws in accord with the communal ordinance of October
of this same trend.
manifestation
29, 1343. After this statementa list of 1,008 names of
One of the first steps of the oligarchical regime
that succeeded the popular Signoria in 1348 was to
acknowledge that the church had jurisdiction over cases
involvinga charge of usury. Cf. M. Becker, Three cases
concerning the restitution of usury in Florence, Jour.
Econ. Hist. 17: 449-450, 1957.
115
women follows and appended thereto are many of the

convictions. With almost no exceptions, the violators
were women of the patriciate. In contrast, when the
oligarchs exercised hegemony, many of the convictions
were levelled against wives and daughters of the novi
cives. Cf. Atti del Esecutore, 121, fols. 2-55, 9 August10 November, 1349.
382
MARVIN B. BECKER
turned."7 Convictionof adulterersbecame the

of sodomites
orderof the day and condemnations
becamea commonplace;houses wheretheseillicit
acts took place were burnedto the ground. This
was indeed a far cry fromthe laissez faire moralityof a fewyearspast.
The extentto whichthispuritanelan disturbed
outlook of Giotto's generathe proto-humanistic
tion has far-reachingimplications. The last of
Giotto's followers,Maso di Banco, disappeared
fromthescenein theearly1340's and theyounger
paintersturnedtowardsOrcagna and Nardo. It
would seem thatthe harshermoralityof the new
Signoriatnot only created an environmentunsympatheticto the growthof naturalismin art,
but thatthe politicalchangesin Florencebrought
to the fore a new audience whose tastes in art
were traditionalin thattheypreferredthe ritualistic to the newer narrativeforms. The novi
cives, accordingto Petrarch,were incapable of
appreciatinga narrativeartistsuch as Giottowho
[PROC. AMER. PHIL.
SOC.
paintedau naturale."8 The new Signoricasponsored such puritanicalAugustiniansas Fra Simone Fidati who exhortedthe artiststo repress
the naturalemotions,animation,and spontaneity
of theirfiguresin favorof formaland ritualistic
The artistsof themiddleyearsof
composition.119
the Trecentodid indeed create figureswho were
no longerdid theirsubaloof and self-contained;
jects seek to communicatetheir deep emotions,
but as Millard Meiss has pointed out, deeply
stirred feelings smoldered behind their rigid
masks.120Were these the emotionsthat were to
findexpressionin the puritanequalitarianismof
the Spiritual Franciscans, the religious fervor
of the War of the Eight Saints, and the democratic zeal of the Ciompi revolutionariesof
1378?121
118 For the appropriate quotation from Petrarch's will,

see M. Meiss, Painting in Florence and Siena after the
Black Death, 71, footnote 50, Princeton, 1951. Cf. also
Boccaccio's, The Decameron, 6: 5.
119Cf. M. Becker, Florentine politics and the diffusion
of heresy in the Trecento, op. cit., 68. This article fol117 Both before and after the tenure of the popular
lows F. Tocco's dating of the delivery of Simone's serregime,frequentdispensationswere granted to those who mons. For a discussion of the influenceof the Augushad been convicted of crimes against public morality. tinian's thought upon contemporaryFlorentine art, see
Upon payment of from two to three per cent of the M. Meiss, op. cit., 26.
120 Ibid., 15-16.
original condemnation,the sentence was canceled. The
121 In a subsequent study I shall treat the fall of the
fine for adultery was generally 500 lire and dispensation
was given upon receipt of 10 lire. Cf. Guidice degli popular Signoria and the founding of an oligarchical
governmentwhich assumed power in 1348-1349.
Appelli,122-123.

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Florentine Popular Government (1343-1348)

Author(s): Marvin B. Becker

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

Brucker, The Ghibelline trial of Matteo Villani (1362,

106,NO. 4, AUGUST, 1962

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

republicwas deeplyin debt and could not honor

with the foundingof the new government.The

7 The retainers of the Priors petitioned the Signoria

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sive discussion of the figures presented by Villani, also

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]

[PROC. AMER. PHIL.

was also camerarius of the forced loans "et aliarum

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

26 For the debate on the legitimacy of the Monte, see

law, they went so far in pressingthe claims of

[PROC. AMER. PHIL.

instanceswhere we do have commercialrecords,

XIII-XIV-XV, 3rd ed., 2: 975-1012,Florence. 1955.

Neither the Bardi nor the Peruzzi made substantial

106, NO. 4, 1962]

36 On the rise of the silk industry at this time, see

[PROC. AMER. PHIL.

because of the number of "foreign persons who were

VOL. 106, NO. 4,1962]

[PROC. AMER. PHIL.

to establishsound procedures tives, the impulse towards systematizationwas

E. Fiumi, L' imposta diretta nei comuni medioevali

della Toscana, in Studi in onoredi ArmandoSapori 1:

341-342, Milan, 1957. For the names of the notaries,

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 19621

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

of il popolo,he reminded tice on the same count. This family,more than

therefore,if Florence condemneda judge from

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and criminalproceedingswere initiatedagainst

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

made againstthepropertyofhis relations.68Each

hundredof theirkinsmenwhentherewas trouble.

71Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, op. cit., rub. 616; N.

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74 Still extremelyuseful on this and a variety of other

VOL. 106, NO. 4, 1962]

FLORENTINE POPULAR GOVERNMENT

C.C., 4, f. 57r. 14 January, 1344.

87 lire. This practice was a commonplace during the

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have his nameinscribedin thisbook forthehomi- of what constitutedblood relationship,and the

91G. Brucker, The Medici in the fourteenthcentury,

106, NO. 4, 1962]

N. Machiavelli, op. cit., 107.

Lapo da Castiglionchio, see P. Jones, op. cit., 191-192.

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