Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol.

6,

3/4, 1988, pp. 388-397

No

ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONALITY
DESCRIPTIONS BY SUBJECTS: INDIVIDUAL
AND BASE-RATE TRUTHFULNESS
RALPH S. IENNARELLA

Northwestern University Medical School

MARTIN F. KAPLAN

Northern Illinois University

the joint effects of individual target accuracy and population

the target's acceptance of personality assessment statements,
and (2) how targets combine responses to single statements into a unitary evaluation
of the statement set. Subjects received bogus feedback to personality tests, consisting
of four statement types: personally true/high base-rate, personally true/low base-rate,

This

study examined: (1 )

base-rate of accuracy

on

personally false/high base-rate,

and

personally false/low

base-rate.

Subjects

made

number of assessments of each interpretation and of the interpretations taken as a

set. The presence of both high base-rate and personal truth elicited greater acceptance
of interpretations than the presence of either factor alone, which in turn elicited
greater acceptance than the absence of both factors. Acceptance of even personally
inaccurate statements
in

an

authoritative

was

enhanced when

assessment.

they

were

of

high

base-rate and

Evaluations of interpretations

as

presented

set were most

related to the component interpretation judged poorest in accuracy, uniqueness, and

desirability, and seen as coming from the poorest test scoring system. In forming an
overall judgment of a set of personality descriptions, negative elements carried more
weight than positive ones.

An evaluation of clinical assessment cannot

ignore the reaction of the

of
the
assessment.
An
odd
target
phenomenon that has surfaced over
the past 35 years is that people will accept generalized personality state

ments that have

(Forer, 1949).

high

base-rate

as

both

Base-rate refers to the

personally and uniquely

prevalence of a characteristic

true

in

population.

This

experiment was reported at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association,

Chicago, May 1983. Requests for reprints should be sent to Martin F. Kaplan, Department
of Psychology, Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, IL 60115.

388

ACCEPTANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS

389

Two traditions have arisen in studies

studies

involving

base-rate. The first

information processes. The Bayesian model suggests

that one should rationally weigh both base-rate and
individuating in
formation in forming judgments of likelihood of an event (Tversky &

Bayesian

Kahneman, 1974). Here, base-rate refers

imputed level of incidence

example, subjects predict the occupations of a
small sample, based on brief personality sketches (individuating) and
given that the parent population includes 30% doctors and 70% lawyers.
The second tradition begins with an actual level of incidence and inves
tigates the acceptance of generalized interpretations as a function of base-

of

to

some

characteristic. For

rate and other variables. For

eralized

instance, the differential acceptance of gen

has been studied

interpretations
by comparing projective, ob
as
the
jective,
techniques
purported source of the statements
(Richards & Merrens, 1971; Weinberger & Bradley, 1980). Both traditions
converge in showing that subjects do not make optimal use of base-rate
information, but act in ignorance of imputed or actual incidence of a
characteristic. In the latter paradigm, this takes the form of assuming
uniqueness of a common characteristic (the Barnum Effect; Meehl, 1956),
and accepting a high base-rate statement as more personally true.
Research on generalized interpretations has largely studied situational
factors affecting acceptance, as well as the social desirability component
(see Snyder, Shenkel, & Lowery, 1977, for review). A point often over
looked, however, is that statements having a high base-rate of truthfulness
in the general population are also likely to be true for a given individual,
and therefore more likely to be accepted by the individual (see also
Layne, 1979; O'Dell, 1972; Snyder & Larson, 1972). Oddly, no published
study has covaried general truth (base-rate) and personal truth to test
the strength of base-rate when a priori personal truth is present or absent
for a statement. Does base-rate have any effect on perceived accuracy
and uniqueness beyond the usually associated likelihood of personal
truth? The personal truth hypothesis would predict that effects of baserate on judged accuracy and uniqueness would be lacking when personal
truth is controlled. If so, the Barnum Effect would be rather directly
explained by the coincidence of individual with general occurrence of a
characteristic. The relationship of personal accuracy and population baserate to the acceptance of personality assessment statements is the main
focus of this study.
A second thrust of this study arises from the question commonly
asked in research in social judgment: How do people integrate several
pieces of information in reaching a unitary judgment (Anderson, 1981)?
In clinical assessment, the client is given a series of interpretive statements,
some more acceptable than others. All may come from the same or
different diagnostic sources (tests), but all are associated with the same
and interview

390

IENNARELLA AND KAPLAN

assessment.
set

(of

the

a
unitary judgment of the total
integration of the statement com

Thus, the client may form

assessment), based

on an

unitary judgments of people based on a collection

acceptable (valid) than others. How the
are
an
components
integrated is
empirical question (Anderson, 1981).
Is the acceptance of an interpretive set most influenced by its best or
poorest interpretive instance? Negative information has been found to
carry more weight than positive in our judgments of people (Hamilton
& Zanna, 1972); will the same be true for evaluating acceptability of sets
of interpretive statements about oneself? Besides relating to the social
judgment literature, this question has obvious practical import, since
one would not want to risk
rejection of a set of interpretations by inserting
ponents, just

as we

of characteristics,

one

that is

form

some more

questionable.

METHOD

PERSONALITY STATEMENTS AND

SUBJECTS

Culled from several texts and

personality tests 122 statements were normatively

by
personal truth and desirability. Spe
cifically, each statement was rated on 21-point scales for its personal
truth ("How true is this of you?") and for desirability ("How desirable
a characteristic is this for a
person to have?"). Personality statements
were then chosen for either
high or low base-rate of truthfulness while
equating for social desirability. This produced 12 high base-rate statements
having a mean truth rating of 13.65, and nine low base-rate statements
with a mean rating of 6.24. Desirability ratings of high and low baserate statements were 10.84 and 10.24, respectively.
A second sample of 120 students, from which the experimental
subjects would be later chosen, was asked to indicate whether each of
the 21 test statements and 28 filler items was personally true for each
of them. Four statements were then selected for each subject according
to the base-rate designation in both samples and the personal truth for
that subject. For each subject, the four statements represented the following
types (one statement of each type): personally true/high base-rate, per
sonally true/low base-rate, personally false/high base-rate, and personally
rated

189 students for

false/low base-rate.

Subjects
pool

for whom all four types could be selected from the initial
were later recalled for the
experiment. Students

of 21 statements

in both

phases were volunteers from the introductory psychology

earning extra course credit for participation.

course

391

ACCEPTANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS

PROCEDURE

Thirty subjects appeared in the final experiment, described to them as

an evaluation of
computerized scoring methods of personality tests.
Subjects wrote their reactions to four inkblots and three thematic pictures
and returned 1 week later for their interpretations. At that time, they
were told that there were four
computerized scoring systems, with each
of
one
capable
generating
interpretation from the inkblot and thematic
picture responses. Hence, each subject received four personality inter
pretations, comprised of one statement of each of the four types given
above. Presentation order was randomized for each subject, and subjects
were instructed to read each
interpretation in turn, rating it on an attached
and
on
to
the
next
form,
interpretation. Each was rated on an ap
go
scale
for
propriate 21-point
accuracy ("To what degree is the personal
an accurate
ity interpretation
description of your personality?"), unique
ness, desirability, and adequacy of the scoring system from which it was
derived.

rating the interpretations singly, subjects were asked to imagine

only
scoring system had been used, and to rate the four statements
After

that
as a

one

combined

interpretive

unit

The 2x2 factorial

on

the above dimensions.

design
composed of within-subject variables
vs. low) and
population
(high
personal truthfulness (true
vs. false) of
Normative
desirability was systematically con
interpretations.
trolled across the four conditions. Though both males and females served
as subjects, sex was not considered as an independent variable since
previous studies have reported no differences in acceptance of general
personality interpretations due to subject sex (e.g., Forer, 1949; Snyder
of

&

was

base-rate

Shenkel, 1976).

RESULTS
SINGLE INTERPRETATIONS

Analyses of variance revealed that personally true interpretations yielded

significantly higher ratings than personally false statements for accuracy,
F (1, 29)
22.12, p < .001; uniqueness, F (1, 29)
13.17, p < .001; and
<
F
.001
16.28, p
(1, 29)
(see Table 1 for
scoring system adequacy,
mean ratings). Similarly, high base-rate statements elicited significantly
higher ratings than low base-rate statements for accuracy, F (1, 29)
8.31, p < .007; and scoring
10.25, p < .003; uniqueness, F (1, 29)
<
F
.01.
No interactions between
7.07,
(1, 29)
p
system adequacy,
=

truth and base-rate

were

found for the three

measures.

Thus increased

IENNARELLA AND KAPLAN

392

TABLE 1

Accuracy, Uniqueness, Adequacy,

and

Desirability Ratings

as a

Function of Personal

Truth and Base-Rate

BASE-RATE OF TRUTHFULNESS
LOW

HIGH

PERSONALLY

TRUE

PERSONALLY
FALSE

TRUE

PERSONALLY
FALSE

Accuracy

17.43

13.10

14.73

10.67

Uniqueness

16.87

13.33

15.45

12.10

Adequacy
Desirability

17.07

14.07

15.10

11.43

12.30

10.37

15.13

12.97

PERSONALLY

personal truth and base-rate

of truth both enhanced the

perceived accuracy
scoring systems that generated them,
and increased the appearance of uniqueness.
In spite of initial equation of the four types of interpretations for
social desirability on the basis of normative ratings, analysis of variance
of the desirability ratings revealed main effects for both base-rate and
13.72) were
personal truth. Whereas personally true statements (M
of individual statements and of the

5.29, p
as

<

more

desirable than false statements

(M
11.67), F (1, 29)
.03, curiously, low base-rate statements (M
14.05) were rated
desirable than high base-rate statements (M
11.34), F (1,

seen as more

.02. Differential desirability did not account for the effects

5.72, p
personal truthfulness and base-rate on accuracy, uniqueness, and
scoring system adequacy ratings. An analysis of covariance, with desir
ability ratings as the covariate, yielded essentially the same findings as
the univariate analyses.

29)

<

of

SETS OF INTERPRETATIONS
Correlations between the
and the

of the

ratings of each of the four interpretation types

interpretations as a unitary set were obtained for

ratings
dependent measures (see Table 2). For accuracy evaluations,
the rating of the interpretations as a set correlated significantly with
single ratings for personally true/low base-rate and personally false/low
base-rate interpretations. Thus when reflecting on the four interpretations
as a whole, subjects were most influenced
by their perceptions of accuracy
of the low base-rate interpretations, regardless of personal truthfulness.
Recall that subjects had judged these interpretations as being less accurate
and less unique than the high base-rate interpretations.
each of the

ACCEPTANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS

The correlations for the

393

uniqueness

showed that the

rating
interpretive
significantly
only personally true/
low base-rate interpretations. This indicates that subjects looked most
to the felt uniqueness of the type of interpretation, which, from a
diagnostic
standpoint, would be most discriminating. It will be recalled, however,
that subjects considered low base-rate interpretations to be less unique.
So, once again evaluation of the set was most influenced by its most
negative member.
Considering now the measure of scoring system adequacy, the inter
pretation set correlated significantly with the personally false/low baserate interpretation. From the subjects' perspective, this type implied the
least scoring system adequacy.
Finally, the correlations within the social desirability measure revealed
that the interpretation set was significantly correlated with personally
false/high-base rate and personally false/low base-rate interpretations.
Subjects were most influenced by their perceptions of the desirability
of the personally false interpretations, the less desirable type when rated
singly.
In all, evaluations of sets of interpretations were most related to
evaluations of single interpretations that had been evaluated negatively
on the particular evaluation dimension.
of the

measure

with

set correlated

DISCUSSION
EVALUATIONS OF SINGLE INTERPRETATIONS

Acceptance

personally true statements is not surprising; this merely

subjects were awake and acted in a rational manner. How-

of

suggests that

TABLE 2

Agreement

between Individual

for Each of the

True/high

Dependent

and

Interpretations

Taken

as a

Set

Measures

ACCURACY

UNIQUENESS

DESIRABILITY

.14

.15

.11

.34

.12

.52*

-.08

.55*

.62*

.23

-.07

.48*

.21

.60*

ADEQUACY

base-rate

with set

False/high

Interpretations

.23

base-rate

with set

True/low base-rate
with set
False/low base-rate
with set
p

<

.01.

.63*

394

IENNARELLA AND KAPLAN

high base-rate statements were also seen as more personally accurate

than low base-rate statements. We suggest that a subject's estimation
of personal truth is inferential, and truth for oneself is more readily
ever,

inferred if the

probability of incidence of a characteristic is higher in the

general population. If we are judging the likelihood that a person possesses
a certain attribute, we will be more certain of its
possession if it has a
in
well
when we assess our
base-rate
others.
This
be
true
as
high
may
attributes. If

own

source

of the

ask ourselves "do I have this characteristic?", one

people have it. The acceptance

we

answer

lies in whether most

personally inaccurate statements was enhanced when they were

high base-rate and presented in an authoritative assessment. This
suggests that both high base-rate and authoritative assessment are needed

of

even

of

to increase

prior

rate statements that

versus

inaccurate statements. Note that

acceptance of otherwise

research has not

when

psychological

they

the

compared
personally

are

are

embedded in

acceptance of low

false when
a

they

and

are

high basejudged singly

set of statements derived from

A note of caution is in order. Whereas the effect of base-rate

significant,

it

assessment.

was

and low base-rate

was

was

difference between accuracy of high

less than three scale units). Since personal truth

not robust

(the

originally determined by a dichotomous response, it may

be that the selection procedure masked slight differences between state
ments chosen as high and low base-rate within true and false categories.
These differences may have emerged with the use of the more sensitive
21-point scale in the experiment. In short, the high and low base-rate
statements may not have been precisely equated for personal truth in
initial selection. The possibility of artifact due to the difference between
a dichotomous and a
rating measure bears further study wherein personal
truth for individual subjects is determined by the same rating measure
as is
subsequent judgment. Arguing against an artifact interpretation,
or

falsity

was

however, is the fact that the base-rate effect

was

the

same

for statements

for false statements.

initially designated
personally
Following
the artifact interpretation, the artifact would had to have been present
to the same degree, and in the same direction for both true and false
true

as

statements. In other

as

words, the dichotomous response would have

miss the subtleties of truth

so

that the true statements

truer than false statements when both

of

were

to

not marked

high base-rate, and the

unlikely; when both
are of low base-rate the
that
should
be
missed
is that personally
subtlety
false statements are not marked as false as they should be (i.e., had a
21-point scale been used), compared to true statements.
The Barnum Effect was alive and well in this study; high baserate statements were judged to be more unique than low.
Subjects
same

when both

were

were

of low base-rate. The latter is

ACCEPTANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS

395

interpretations that were true of most people as being more de

scriptive of their own uniqueness. A self-enhancement motive may
be at work. By claiming generalized characteristics to be uniquely selfdescriptive, subjects were also conveying that the descriptions were
saw

true

of few others. In

a manner

self-enhancement; subjects

of

speaking,

feel

this

can

be construed

as

the most

by taking
prevalent characteristics and making them their own. Moreover, subjects
can feel
superior by making these initially generalized characteristics
to
themselves.
specific
Similar remarks can apply to the social desirability findings. At first
glance, it is odd that base-rate affected social desirability when statements
had been initially equated on this score. Note, however, that initial
ratings were for the desirability of that behavior per se, whereas later
ratings were for desirability of possessing the behavior oneself. Perhaps
what the subjects are saying when a behavior is attributed to them is
that behaviors that are unique and more likely true of oneself are also
more desirable.
Uniqueness enhances the desirability of a characteristic;
people like to think of their desirable behavior as unshared by others.
Conversely, it is interesting to conjecture that undesirable behaviors may
be thought of as widely shared (not unique). A similar approach has
been taken to the finding that individuals in group discussions shift to
more extreme
positions when they find that others share the same
views
the group polarization effect. The social comparisons explanation
(see Lamm & Myers, 1978; Pruitt, 1971) assumes that "people are motivated
to see and to present themselves as better embodiments of socially desired
abilities, traits, and attitudes than are most other members of their groups"
(Lamm & Myers, 1978, p. 176). Thus people shift to more extreme positions
in the same direction upon finding that their position is commonly shared
in order to maintain their uniqueness and enhance self-presentation.
This interpretation of group polarization fits with the notion that people
will distort the uniqueness of their own high base-rate attributes in order
to be "better embodiments" of socially desirable behaviors.
Post hoc tests revealed that the presence of both high base-rate and
personal truth was better at eliciting acceptance of interpretations and
scoring systems than the presence of either factor alone, and in turn,
the absence of both led to the greatest rejection. If one's goal is client
acceptance of clinical interpretations, conveying statements of high baserate can serve to hedge one's bets. If the statement is accurate, acceptance
will be enhanced by high base-rate. If the statement is inaccurate, some
acceptance will still be had. High base-rate/false statements were as
accepted as low base-rate/true statements. So, when one has doubt about
the correctness of an interpretation and has nerve enough to make it
anyhow, one should convince the target that it is of high base-rate. The
can

more secure

396

IENNARELLA AND KAPLAN

same

remark holds for

ascription

of

high

conveying

base-rate will

an

air of

help

uniqueness

in the assessments;

matters.

EVALUATIONS OF INTERPRETATION SETS

interpretations as a set were most related to the sub

jective judgment
poorest single interpretation. For accuracy eval
sets
were
uations,
judged largely on the basis of variations in their least
accurate and unique members (low base-rate/false statements). With
respect to uniqueness, although subjects incorrectly view the less in
formative high base-rate statements as unique when considered singly,
they are more affected by their responses to the most differentiating
statements (low base-rate/true when judging the uniqueness of the entire
set). Parenthetically, this latter finding is the first indication of subjects'
awareness of low base-rate as reflecting uniqueness. In judging the ad
equacy of the scoring system generating the interpretive set, subjects
looked at the adequacy of the least acceptable interpretation (the low
base-rate/incorrect statement). Lastly, the desirability of the interpreta
Evaluations of the

of its

tion set

was

(personally false
interpretations as

most related to the least desirable element

statements). Generally then, evaluation of the

set of

subjective judgment of the poorest com

prediction that in compound
ponent interpretation.
more weight than positive. That this
elements
carry
judgments, negative
prediction derived from research in social judgment suggests the continuity
of processes underlying evaluation of characteristics attributed to oneself
a

unit

was

most related to the

This confirms the

and evaluation of characteristics of others. Moreover, since clinical as

sessment is often delivered in sets of multiple interpretations, the study

of how responses to
uation has practical
has not been

single statements are integrated into a unitary eval

importance. It is odd that the integration question

previously

addressed.

In summary, when one is unsure of interpretive acceptability, ascribing

characteristic to others will improve acceptance, whether the characteristic

is desirable

considering acceptability of interpretation sets,

discrediting
the remaining statements. This "contaminating" effect argues for con
servatism and care in conveying interpretations to clients, lest one rotten
apple spoil the barrel.
a

or

not. When

statement that is untrue of both oneself and others risks

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