Durham E-Theses: The End of German Classical Philosophy An Interpretation of The Doctrines of Hegel and Marx

Durham E-Theses
The end of German classical philosophy an

interpretation of the doctrines of Hegel and Marx
Williams, Howard
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The end of German classical philosophy an interpretation of the doctrines of

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Williams, Howard (1974)
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THE END OF GERMAN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY
AN INTERPRETATION OF THF DOCTRINES
OF HEGEL AND MARX.
BY
HOWARD
WILLIAMS
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author

No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged
A dissertation
f o r t h e degree o f D o c t o r o f P h i l o s o p h y a t
the
University
o f Durham.
O c t o b e r 197-
ABSTRACT.
In
t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n I t r a c e the f a t e of a
traditional
p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem, ' t h e problem o f knowledge' m

i n g s o f H e g e l and Marx.
that
their ultimate
i n particular,
My
a i m has
of
to
effect,
t o b r i n g out the p o s i t i v e aspects

The
and
ology are
In its
H e g e l and
Marx t r a n s f o r m
Rather,
of t h e i r
g i v e n an
of
is
Marx's c r i t i c i s m s
f a r from being i d e n t i c a l .
for this
philosophers.
the
inadequate
of previous
H e g e l , on t h e one
particularly
b l u n t w i t h the
episten-
hand,
of his
forerunner
Empiricist
M a r x , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , c o n c e r n s h i m s e l f more w i t h
philosophy
experience.
Idealist
which
treses,
Mar::
itself
is
che
and
and,
particular,,
therefore,that
v
Kegel e a r y
epistemologv c o n s t i t u t e s
philosophy
that
i s German
of Hegel.
the d i f f e r e n c e s m
out the i r c r i t i c i s m
t h e End
In
obstacle to a correct notion
Bi.it w h a t M a r x means by
philosophy
f u r t h e r my
in
is
a b s t r a c t n e s s o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach i n g e n e r a l .
h i s view
of
reason
criticism
experience.
d i r e c t s h i s c r i t i c i s m s at the s c e p t i c a l a t t i t u d e
He
I have
p l a c e t h e y o f f e r what I b e l i e v e
important accounts
Furthermore,
the
theme o f t n e i r c r i t i c i s m
p r e v i o u s t h e o r i e s o f k n o w l e d g e had
be new
negated
n o t been t o deny t h a t H e g ^ l and
account of experience.
epistemclogy.
previous episternology.
that
without
t h e t h e s i s o f Habermas
p r o b l e m o f k n o w l e d g e :n t h e i r w r i t i n g s .
attempted
writ-
been t o r e f u t e t h e t h e s i s
r e j e c t i n g the problem they, m
achievements of previous
the
a i m has
r e j e c t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m was
p o s i t i v e outcome and,
that
My
the
I t is
t h e manner
of
traditional
o f German C l a s s i c a i
Philosophy.
CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER ONE
HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

E p i s t e m o l o g y and E x p e r i e n c e
The C r i t i q u e o f D e s c a r t e s ,
and L e i b n i z
Spinoza
Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f Empiricism:
t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f L o c k e and Hume.
CHAPTER TWO
HEGEL AND GERMAN IDEALISM

The
Critique
The C r i t i q u e
Philosophy
o f Kant
o fFichte's
Theoretical
Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f S c h e l l i n g s
Philosophy
CHAPTER THREE
THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND ( 1 )
A g e n e r a l view o f Hegel's
system
The Phenomenology a n d t h e H i s t o r y o f
Philosophy
U n d e r s t a n d i n g and Reason, o r t h e
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l method
A Contradiction m
Experience
CHAPTER FOUR
Hegel's account o f
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

Epistemology
The
(ii)
and E x p e r i e n c e
PhenomenaIicy
o f Knowledge
S e n s e - C e r t a i n t y and P e r c e p t o n
L
The D i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e ' t h i n g ' o f

Percept i o n
Contd.
Page
CHAPTER FIVE
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL's

PHENOMENOLOGY
Two ' C o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' m
Phenomenology
CHAPTER S I X
CHAPTER SEVEN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hegel's
290
Marx's N o t i o n o f O b j e c t i v i t y
309
Philosophy
324
and R e s i g n a t i o n
THE THESES ON FEUERBACH:

E p i s t e m o l o g y and E x p e r i e n c e ( 1 1 )
331
Marx and T r a d i t i o n a l M a t e r i a l i s m
337
Marx and t h e Problem o f Knowledge
356
377
THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

The P r e m i s s e s o f t h e t h e o r y Real I n d i v i d u a l s
381
H i c c o r y as a Measure o f I d e o l o g y
397
The C h a r a c t e r
409
o f Marx's Theory
I d e o l o g y and S o c i a l i s t
CONCLUSION
284
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY?
Revolution
420
426
431
PREFACE
I have o u t l i n e d
There I s l i t t l e
here.
the nam
argument m
need, t h e r e f o r e ,
However, I s h o u l d
like
the f i r s t
f o r ine t o e l a b o r a t e on i t
t o make a few b r i e f
a b o u t t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e w o r k and,
about the approach t h a t I take t o Hegel's
This study broadly f a i l s
opening
chapters
of
Mind.
in particular,
philosophy.
into three parts.
I n the
T h i s I c a l l his C r i t i q u e o f Modern
t h e f o l l o w i n g two
Experience.
remarks
I discuss the p h i l o s o p h i c a l background
Hegel's system.
In
Chapter,
For
c h a p t e r s I dea]
these
I n the f i n a l
two
chapters
Philosophy
I draw on t h e
three chapters
I deal w i t h the
I concentrate
developon
the opening
most f r u i t f u l
chapters
one.
of t h i s
my
that
is,
through a
a c c o u n t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l and
literary
iate
contemporaries.
that
t h e s t u d y o f h i s e a r l y w o r k s has
I t i s o f course
foothold
does so s i m p l y b e c a u s e i t
in this
is,
either
through
latter
an
context
become i m p o r t a n t .
the Hegelian
w o r k s o f h i s immed-
approaches, I b e l i e v e , run the r i s k
w i t h o u t a secure
view,
consideration
o r many o f h i s m a j o r w o r k s , o r i n d i r e c t l y ,
both these
general
s t u d y 1 have a d o p t e d
I n g e n e r a l , H e g e l ' s s y s t e m has
been a p p r o a c h e d d i r e c t l y ,
one
his
position.
an a p p r o a c h t o H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y w h i c n i s ,
of
of
Phenomenolog
e a r l i e r w o r k s b e c a u s e i t i s t h e r e t h a t he w o r k s o u t h i s
In
to
w i t h Hegel's concept
ment o f M a r x ' s c o n c e p t o f E x p e r i e n c e .
theoretical
two
But
o f l e a v i n g us
system.
pemaps, too d i r e c t .
The
first
Hegel's
11.
philosophy
i s n o t o r i o u s l y o b s c u r e ; so t h e r e : s f o r t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n which i s couched m
terms o f the system
the ever-present
danger thac
i t s e l f may
t h e system.
t h e o t h e r hand, t h e second a p p r o a c h ,
On
contemporary l i t e r a t u r e
at
such a g e n e r a l
and
it
philosophy,
l e v e l t h a t we
The
may
prohibit
d e a l i n g w i t h the c e n t r a l tenets of the
be
By
ourselves
get
t o the h e a r t o f h i s
not
a l w a y s r e q u i r e us
On
as
through
pitched
from
system.
>n my
view,
i n t r o d u c i n g Hegel's philosophy
a s s e s s m e n t o f h i s v i e w s on
opaque, t e r m s .
obscure
h a v e t o be
a p p r o a c h t h a t I have a d o p t e d a v o i d s ,
difficulties.
as
itself
these
througn
t h e m a j o r Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s
an
we
s y s t e m , b u t i n a manner w h i c h d o e s
t o d e a l w i t h the system m
t h e one
t h e demand o f t h e s t u d e n t ,
its
own,
hand t h i s a p p r o a c h w i l l
t h a t he
be
satisfy
i n t r o d u c e d t o Hegel's
m a j o r d o c t r i n e s by an a n a l y s i s o f l e s s c o m p l e x i d e a s
(and
who
can
Locke,
for
i n s t a n c e , a r e l e s s d i f f i c u l t ) , and.
will
d o u b t t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f D e s c a r t e s and
satisfy
on
the other, i t
t h e demand o f t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r
H e g e l ' s i d e a s be
f i r s t t e s t e d against tnose
of other
I h a v e u s e d t h e T h e o r i e VJerkausgabe e d i t i o n
Werke p u b l i s h e d by t h e Suhrkamp V e r l a g ,
and
that
philosophers.
of Hegel's
f o r Marx's w r i t i n g s
I h a v e u s e d t h e D i e t z V e r l a g e d i t i o n o f t h e M a r x - E n g e l s Werke.
All
translations
I am
grateful
ment i n w r i t i n g
thank
f r o m t h e German a r e my
own.
t o H e n r y T u d o r f o r h i s h e l p and
t h i s work.
This, also, is
the S o c i a l Science Research C o u n c i l
encourage-
the place
to
f o r f i n a n c i n g my
Ill
s t u d i e s o v e r t h e p a s t t h r e e y e a r s , and t h e
'Deutscher
A k a d e m i s c h e r A u s t a u s c h d i e n s t ' lor t h e s c h o l a r s h i p w h i c h
a l l o w e d me t o s t u d y a t H e i d e l b e r g U n i v e r s i t y
last
summer.
Durham, O c t o b e r ,
19?
CHAPTER ONE
HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Epistemology
and E x p e r i e n c e
M a r x a n d H e g e l a r e most r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
their
f o r e r u n n e r s i n p h i l o s o p h y by t h e i r
r e j e c t i o n o f what A y e r w o u l d
call
This r e j e c t i o n entailed
'The P r o b l e m o f K n o w l e d g e ' .
they, unlike
a search
us/
o t h e r modern p h i l o s o p h e r s , were p r e p a r e d
f o r an a b s o l u t e c r i t e r i o n
t h i s was, u n t i l
Philosophy.
t o forgo
As Haberrnas
then, a major preoccupation
Descartes,
concentrate e n t i r e l y
of truth.
that
tells
o f Modern
L o c k e a n d Hume, f o r i n s t a n c e a p p e a r t o
on t h e p r o b l e m .
Critical
Philosophy
r e c e i v e s i t s name, we a r e t o assume, f r o m t h e c r i t i c i s m
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l premisses o f previous metaphysics.
of the
Moreover,
it
i s clear that
in
t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f t h e ,^reat s y s t e m - b u i l d e r s , S p i n o z a and
Leibniz.
Habermas i s
t h e p r o b l e m does n o t r e c e d e i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d
To t h e a d m i r e r s
t o be c o u n t e d ,
of that
amongst v/nom
Marx and H e g e l ' s abandonment o f
'The P r o b l e m o f K n o w l e d g e ' m
loss t o philosophy.
tradition,
t h e i r e n q u i r i e s r e p r e s e n t s a sad
They assume t h a t
philosophy
is
t h e poorer
' I f i t was r e q u i r e d t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
d i s c u s s i o n on t h e modern p e r i o d m t h e f o r m o f a j u d i c i a l
h e a r i n g i t w o u l d be c a l l e d t o d e c i d e t h e one q u e s t i o n : how i s
d e p e n d a b l e ( z u v e r l a s s i g e ) k n o w l e d g e p o s s i b l e ' . J i i r g e n Habermas
E r k e n n t n i s u n d I n t e r e s s e , Suhrkamp V e r l a g , F r a n k f u r t am M a m ,
1958, p. 11.
I n s a y i n g t h : s Habermas p r o b a b l y h a s i n m i n d t h e m o n u m e n t a l
w o r k o f E r n s t C a s s i r e r : Das E r k e n n t n i s p r o b l e m m d e r P h i l o s o p h i e
und W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r n e u e r e n Z e i t w h i c h i s an a t t e m p t , j.n
s e v e r a l volumes, t o t r a c e t h e development o f t h e problem o f
k n o w l e d g e m Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
The v o l u m e s f i r s t a p p e a r e d
i n V e r l a g Brune C a s s i r e r , B e r l i n .
f o r n o t knowing a p r i o r i
the n a t u r e o f knowledge.
The
c r i t i c i s m s " o f Habermas i s t h a t o w i n g t o M a r x and H e g e l
specific
philosophy
2
no l o n g e r has a s e r i o u s g r a s p o f s c i e n c e .
last
It
I n h i s view, the
p e r s o n t o a c h i e v e s u c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s c i e n c e was
i s because
Kant.
t h e y n e g l e c t e d t h i s a c h i e v e m e n t o f K a n t ' s Habermas
b e l i e v e s t h a t M a r x and H e g e l s q u a n d e r e d t h e g a i n s o f c l a s s i c a l
episternology.
Marx i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
o f c l a s s i c a l German p h i l o s o p h y ,
rather than being the
mherito
'had c o m p l e t e d t h e d e m o l i t i o n
( A b b a u ) o f epD s t e m o l o g y ' .
~-*
I do n o t i n t e n d t o deny t h a t M a r x and H e g e l i n t h e i r
transform c l a s s i c a l epistemology.
^ i s t h a t t h i s was
our knowledge
the
What I w i s h t o d e n y ,
merely a work o f ' d e m o l i t i o n ' .
The
works
however,
claim
that
s u f f e r e d a g r e a t l o s s t h r o u g h t h e abandonment o f
'Problem o f Knowledge ' s u g g e s t s , I b e l i e v e , an i g n o r a n c e o f
t h e g r o u n d s on w h i c h M a r x and H e g e l abandoned
t n e r e i s t h e added
on t h e c o n t r a r y ,
abandon
t h e problem;and
i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t no s u c h g r o u n d s e x i s t .
t h e y d o , s i n c e M a r x and H e g e l do n o t
the quest f o r c e r t a i n t y
i n knowledge.
g i v e n up o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a c r i t i c a l
philosophical tradition
what Habermas i m p l i e s ,
The
But*
prefunctorily
quest i s
e n q u i r y i n t o t h e whole
surrounding the problem.
Contrary t o
sentence i s n o t passed w i t h o u t
trial.
2.
J.Habermas.
op. c i t p . 12.
3-
J.Habermas.
o p . c i t . , p . 14.
He d i d so, Habermas a r g u e s ,
b e c a u s e 'he had m i s u n d e r s t o o d h i s own c o n c e p t ' , ( i b i d )
This
i s a s t r a n g e argument.
I t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e was no-one
more e m i n e n t l y w e l l p l a c e d t o u n d e r s t a n d h i s own c o n c e p t s
t h a n Marx.
3.
Hegel deals
at l e n g t h w i t h the t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f
predecessors.
As
cursorily
i s t h e case w i t h Hegel h i s r e j e c t i o n
1
ledge :
ledge
of
M a r x a l s o does n o t
the
criticism
reject
of the
h i s Weltanschauung.
I t i s my
grounds of t h a t mutual c r i t i c i s m
the
question.
' P r o b l e m o f Know-
of the search f o r c e r t a i n t y
o f our knowledge, i s a l e a d i n g motive
his
t h e know-
i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n
b e l i e f t h a t the study
o f M a r x and
Hegel w i l l
of
not
show H a b e r m a s ' a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i m p a c t o f i t s r e s u l t s t o
conclusions
only
be
f a l s e but w i l l
also provide
E r k e n n t n i s and
I n t e r e s s e o r what I have chosen t o c a l l Epi s t c m o i o g y
and
significant
the
concerning
E x p e r i ence.
My
t h e s i s i s , then, t h a t the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t
classical
e p i s t e m o l o g y u n d e r g o e s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f M a r x and H e g e l
not
This
o n l y a work o f d e m o l i t i o n but
c o n s t r u c t i o n must c l e a r l y
criticism.
The
e p i s t e r n o l o g i e s had
Their task, then,
experience
a l s o one
of c o n s t r u c t i o n .
f o l l o w the l i n e s of
theme o f t h i s c r i t i c i s m
is
that
g i v e n an i n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f
their
previous
experience.
i s t o c o n s t r u c t a more a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t
w i t h i n the context of epistemology.
of
Similar
i n t e n t i o n s do n o t , h o w e v e r , i m p l y
s i m i l a r achievements.
So
that
the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s
i t i s f u r t h e r my
thesis that
t h e manner i n w h i c h t h i s t a s k i s c a r r i e d o u t by b o t h H e g e l
M a r x c o n s t i t u t e s t h e end
informed
by d i f f e r e n t
manner a l i e n t o H e g e l and
into
o f German C l a s s i c a l P h i l o s o p h y .
presuppositions
it
is
transforms
( t o borrow a phrase o f Marcuse's) s o c i a l

It
is
logical
t o begin
and
Marx
sets about the t a s k
t h a t which
is
in a
philosophy
theory.
the account o f t h i s whole process,
fron
4.
H e g e l t o Marx, w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f H e g e l ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e
e p i s t e n r o l o g i e s o f t h e p r i n c i p a l Modern p h i l o s o p h e r s .
source
Our m a m
must be t h e L e c t u r e s on t n e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y .
This
can be s u p p l e m e n t e d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e by H e g e l ' s m a j o r p u b l i s h e d
w o r k s , The Phenomenology o f M i n d , The S c i e n c e o f L o g i c , and
The E n c y c l o p e d i a ,
conclusions.
the
o r d e r t h a t we may
For reasons t h a t w i l l
thesis i t s e l f
Modern P h i l o s o p h y
interpret
f u r t h e r support our
become more e v i d e n t
in
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e o f
will
p l a c e us m
an e x c e l l e n t p o s i t i o n t o
t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d .
That work
represents
H e g e l ' s most d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e and
experience;
and i t i s a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e
built
profound understanding
and e x p e r i e n c e
o f Modern p h i l o s o p h y .
on a
The
Critique
o f D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a and L e i b n i z
I s h a l l a n a l y s e HegeJ 's c r i t i q u e
three stages.
This f i r s t
stage,
as i s e v i d e n t , w i l l
Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s
Leibniz;
t h e second w i l l
philosophy,
i.e.
attempt
tohiscritical
examination
ofEmpiricist
of the philos-
of the theories of
k n o w l e d g e o f D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a and L e i b n i z c o n j o i n t l y
I n advance o f t h e f u l l
w h i c h c a n o n l y come i n t h e a n a l y s i s i t s e l f ,
For
o u r purposes these
three philosophies
b e c a u s e o f t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e y
w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge.
consider
tion.
regard
I n one way o r a n o t h e r ,
God as t h e a b s o l u t e
f i g u r e s markedly l i t t l e
and
Hume.
the third
I might say t h i s .
form
one d i s t i n c t
sectior
seek t o i n t e g r a t e t h e o l o g y
The p h i l o s o p h i e s I i n t e n d t o
D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a and L e i b n i z ,
ground o f knowledge.
m
I n contrast,
o f o u r s e c t i o n s , f i r s t l y w i t h Kant and F i c h t e b u t
n o t o f k n o w l e d g e and s e c o n d l y ,
c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e b u t as a c o n c e p t a l o n e .
a concept alone
philosophies
all
t h e t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f Locke
S c h e l l i n g and H e g e l h i m s e l f , b u t n o t a g a i n
explanation
The c o n c e p t d o e s a d m i t t e d l y g a m g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e
as an o b j e c t o f b e l i e f ,
is
probably
i n t h e o t h e r t w o s e c t i o n s do n o t a i m a t s u c h an i n t e g r a -
God
in
Kant, F i c h t e and S c h e l D i n g .
t o analyse Hegel's c r i t i q u e
r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n .
with
o f L o c k e and Hume; f i n a l l y
o p h i e s o f h i s f e l l o w German I d e a l i s t s ,
The
deal
o f D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a and
deal w i t h Hegel's c r i t i q u e
the philosophies
s h a l l devote a chapter
o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y
God does r e t a i n a p r i m a r y
with
as an o b j e c t o f
I t i s t r u e t h a t as
significance in the
o f S c h e l l m g and H e g e l b u t I s h a l l a r g u e t h a t
a sense s u c h t h a t
t h e break w i t h theology
is
this
absolute.
Nobody c a n o r i s
supposed
t o b e l i e v e i n t h e God o f t h e
p h i l o s o p h i e s o f S c h e l l m g and H e g e l n o r , on t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
do t h e y r e g a r d Him as t h e a b s o l u t e g r o u n d o f a l l k n o w l e d g e .
L e t u s now make a b e g i n n i n g w i t h H e g e l ' s
Descartes.
discussions of
I have s u g g e s t e d , c o n c e r n i n g D e s c a r t e s , t h a t f o r
h i m God i s t h e a b s o l u t e g r o u n d o f a l l k n o w l e d g e .
to contradict the i n i t i a l ,
up i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n .
'subjectivity'
f o r Hegel
historical
There
p o i n t t h a t Hegel
appears
brings
he a p p l a u d s D e s c a r t e s f o r t h e
of his philosophy.
t h e famous p r i n c i p l e
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t w i t h t h i s
This
This s u b j e c t i v i t y
is
embodied
o f D e s c a r t e s c o g o a t o e r g o sum.
p r i n c i p l e Descartes s e t aside
4
forever the authority
I n h i s view, t h e whole
vitiated
true.
o f t h e Church
philosophical
o f philosophy prior
matters.
t o D e s c a r t e s had been
b y t h e c o n s t a n t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g as b e i n g
T h e r e f o r e t h e m e r i t o f D e s c a r t e s , he s a y s , i s t o i n s i s t
c h a t we s h o u l d h o l d n o t h i n g t o be t r u e w h i c h d o e s n o t p o s s e s s
an i n w a r d e v i d e n c e m
our thought.
A t l e a s t , t h i s i s how H e g e l
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e c o g n u t o , I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e I am.
t o mean t h a t a l l c e r t a i n t y
i n o u r knowledge
from t h e I t h i n k o r t h e I .
that
Descartes:
is the h i s t o r i c a l
I t i s t h e same p r i n c i p l e ,
juncture that
it
i s t o be d e r i v e d
reappears i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s contemporary
But i t
4.
He t a k e s
is
he adds,
Fichte.
significant
'Thus p h i l o s o p h y r e g a i n e d i t s own g r o u n d m
with
that
G.W.F.Hegel. Werke 20 V o r l e s u n g e n u b e r d i e G e s c h i c h t e d e r
Philosophie I I I .
Suhrkamp V e r i a g , F r a n K f u r t am Mam, 1971J
p. 126.
7.
thought begins
itself,
f r o m t h o u g h t as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h
not from something
from a u t h o r i t y ,
external,
i s certain in
something
but s i m p l y from t h i s freedom
given; not
which
i s contained
5
in
I
the I t h i n k .
think
God
I f thought begins from the c e r t a i n t y o f the
then i t appears
i s an
improbability
Descartes
i n Descartes' p h i l o s o p h y .
comes t o r e l y on t h e p o s t u l a t e o f God
t o o u r knowledge,^* and
in
t h a t an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d e p e n d e n c e
to give certaint;
constitutes
Hegel's c r i t i q u e
of
epistemology.
It
i s f r o m t h e c o g p - i t o e r g o sum
philosophy
- that Descartes
o f knowledge.
No
deny t h a t I t h i n k .
that
Nevertheless,
i t i s the a n a l y s i s o f t h i s development
Descartes' philosophy that
his
on
d e r i v e s the s u b j e c t i v e
m a t t e r how"
Now,
- the corner-stone: o f
sceptical
I am,
he
certainty
says,
cannot
i t i s the c e r t a i n t y o f t h i s knowledge
s u p p l i e s t h e c e r t a i n t y as a m o d e l t o a l l o u r o t h e r know-
ledge.
osition
We
have i n t h e c o g n i t o , Descartes
t h a t we
a criterion
h a v e t o do
know t o be t r u e .
believes,
I n o r d e r t h a t we
one
may
propobtain
f o r c e r t a i n t y i n a l l o u r o t h e r k n o w l e d g e a l l we
i s t o examine t h e grounds
original
case.
What he
t h i s way
i s well*known:
proposition I think
concludes
of certainty i n that
on e x a m i n i n g
. 'Observing t h a t
t h e r e f o r e I am,
the cognito
there i s nothing m
t o assure
me
that
m
th
am
5-
Ibid.
p.135.
6.
R.Descartes.
Medj t a t i o n s , P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s : D e s c a r t e s .
D i s c o u r s e on MethodTT96Q, n." 160.
H e r e he a r g u e s t h a t " w e
know o u r i d e a s emanate f r o m m a t e r i a l t h i n g s h e c a u s e God
d o e s n o t d e c e i v e i n m a k i n g us t h i n k t h i s .
See b e l o w p. 9-
8.
speaking the t r u t h ,
distinctly
that,
concluded t h a t
in
except that
I see v e r y c l e a r l y and
order to think,
c n e must e x i s t ,
I c o u l d t a k e as a g e n e r a l r u l e
t h a t we c o n c e i v e v e r y c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y
true,
but that
t h e r e i s some d i f f i c u l t y
y
ment o f d i s t i n c t
is
required
assurance
propositions.
f o rthe certainty
that
that
the things
a r e a l l o f them
the proper discern-
I n o t h e r words,
o f o u r knowledge i s
i n i t t h i n g s are conceived
a l l that
the personal
' v e r y c l e a r l y and
distinctly'.
Ideas are true
and
o r , s i m p l y , b e c a u s e we know t h e m t o be
distinctly
There
b e c a u s e we c o n c e i v e them
n e e d be no e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e .
difficulty.
H i s aim i s t o e s t a b l i s h
And h e r e
true.
lies
a mathematical
clearly
Descartes
certamtj
8
in
the realm
this
of philosophy,
b u t i t i s Hegel's
thai
a i m c a n o n l y be p u r s u e d a t t h e c o s t o f t h e n e g l e c t o f t h e
content
o f philosophy.
P h i l o s o p h y , i n h i s o p i n i o n , has t o
c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h k n o w l e d g e as a w h o l e
of
belief
i t , s u c h as c e r t a i n t y .
The a i m o f p h i l o s o p h y , he b e l i e v e s ,
i s not simply t o a t t a i n a certainty

g a i n a mastery
a n d n o t w i t h a moment
f o r o u r knowledge b u t t o
f o r t h o u g h t over t h e whole
of objective
reality.
What i s more, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e one a s p e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y ,

establishing
a certainty
f o r o u r i d e a s , has i t s
D i s c o u r s e on M e t h o d , P e n g u i n
own
inherent
7.
R.Descartes.
C l a s s i c s , p. 62.
8.
A.Wollaston.
I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Descartes ( o p . c i t ) Penguin
Classics.
He s a y s : 'The a i m o f De~scartes . . tfas . . t o compos
philosophy m t h e l i k e n e s s o f mathematics, t o e x h i b i t a l l
v a r i e t i e s o f k n o w l e d g e as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f a s e t o f
u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e s o f f i n a l s i m p l i c i t y w h i c h w o u l d be
u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t e d l i k e m a t h e m a t i c a l axioms. p.8.
1
defect,
and t h i s d e f e c t , he a r g u e s ,
Descartes
for
becomes a p p a r e n t
turns his a t t e n t i o n t o acquiring a concrete
our ideas.
to
s o l e l y knows i t s e l f
extend
things m
content
H e g e l b a s e s h i s argument on t h i s q u o t a t i o n
from Descartes' P r i n c i p l e s o f Philosophy:'

which
when
consciousness
t o be c e r t a i n s e e k s now,
i t s k n o w l e d g e and f i n d s t h a t
which
The
conceptions
it
however,
has c o n c e p t i o n s
i t does n o t d e c e i v e
as i t does n o t a s s e r t o r deny t h a t s o m e t h i n g
itself
o f many
so l o n g
similar outside
,Q
corresponds
t o them..
c e r t a i n t y alone
The c o n s e q u e n c e o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g on
i s t h a t a c l e f t i s i n t r o d u c e d between o u r
c o n c e p t i o n s and t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,
since i t i s
only thought that
itself.
possibility
which
may
now
i s e s t a b l i s h e d t o be c e r t a i n
objects.
Descartes
of
being able t o assert that
in
its
apply those
It
therefore
finds himself i n the position
t h e m i n d does n o t d e c e i v e
ideas but also o f having t o assert that

lay itself
will
seeks
threat of deception, to
e s t a b l i s h e d between o u r
and t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s t h a t D e s c a r t e s
he c l a i m s ,
'does n o t d e c e i v e ,
t h a t he does n o t send me
9.
t h e mind
open t o d e c e p t i o n as s o o n as i t
against t h i s
overcome t h e d i c h o t o m y
creature m
itself
ideas t o the e x t e r n a l world.
i s t o guard
'But God',
ideas
as t r u e as l o n g as t h e y a r e n o t p r e d i c a t e d
of
to
The
e x i s t s t h a t we c a n have c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t
be r e g a r d e d
immediately
whom t h e i r
G.W.F.Hegel.
these
invokes
and so i t
ideas d i r e c t l y
reality is
conceptions
God.
is
manifest
o r t h r o u g h some
only v i r t u a l l y contained.
Suhrkamp Werke 20,p. 1^6.
10.
For He has g i v e n me no means o f knowing t h a t t h i s i s so, but

on the c o n t r a r y , a g r e a t p r o p e n s i t y t o b e l i e v e t h a t these
ideas
emanate from m a t e r i a l t h i n g s , and i t would be d i f f i c u l t not t o

1
t h i n k t h a t He had deceived us i f they came from any o t h e r source
Our i d e a s t h e r e f o r e , emanate from m a t e r i a l t h i n g s ' because 'God
does n o t deceiveJ c o n v e r s e l y , m a t e r i a l t h i n g s e x i s t because
their
God.
i d e a s as b e i n g such t h i n g s are u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e d from

I n b o t h cases the dichotomy
between c o n c e p t i o n s
and
t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s i s evaded o n l y by t h e assurance t h a t
'God does n o t d e c e i v e ' .
sufficient
But even t h i s , Hegel c l a i m s , i s n o t
f o r the dichotomy
t o be f u l l y overcome.
I n Hegel's
view t h a t would o n l y be t h e case when, as I have i n d i c a t e d ,

t h o u g h t g a m s a mastery
It
over the whole o f o b j e c t i v e
reality.
i s o n l y when we know e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h o u g h t
and r e a l i t y i s surmounted.
There s t i l l e n t e r s an impediment
t o t h i s i n D e s c a r t e s ' p h i l o s o p h y a l t h o u g h 'God
do?s n o t d e c e i v e '
That i s because those m a t e r i a l t h i n g s are p r i i r n r i l y known t o

us t h r o u g h our senses and what we p e r c e i v e t h r o u g h our senses,
a c c o r d i n g t o Descartes,
It
' i s n o t a b l y obscure
f o l l o w s f o r him t h a t i t i s o n l y what we p e r c e i v e c l e a r l y
distinctly
T h i s i s why
because m
i n our t h o u g h t t h a t has a b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v e
p h i l o s o p h y must aim a t a m a t h e m a t i c a l
the mathematical
real.
because t h e y d e a l w i t h t h o u g h t a l o n e .
10.
R.Descartes, o p . c i t . , M e d i t a t i o n s , p .
11.
Ibid.
160
and
reality.
certainty
sciences we are g i v e n the best
example o f what i s a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t l y
and confused'.' "' '
That i s
11.
T n i s , t h e n , i s Hegel's case a g a i n s t D e s c a r t e s .
God,
he b e l i e v e s , has t o he I n v o k e d I n D e s c a r t e s ' e p i s t e m o l o g y
because 'we have t h i s o p p o s i t i o n : s u b j e c t i v e knowing and r e a l i t y
Where t h e y a r e regarded
s e n s a t i o n and t h o u g h t ,
as d i f f e r e n t , as i n t h e c o n t r a s t between
1
' t h e r e e n t e r s t h e need t o mediate t h e m .
T h i s need t o mediate s u b j e c t i v e knowing and r e a l i t y a r i s e s from

Descartes'
f a i l u r e t o conceive
thought m
t h e form o f s e n s a t i o n ^
C o n s e q u e n t l y , what i s t r u e f o r D e s c a r t e s i s always an o b j e c t o f
t h o u g h t , an u n i v e r s a l m
Hegel's terms.
I n not conceiving
t h o u g h t as s e n s a t i o n he has no human l i n k between t h o u g h t and

m a t e r i a l t h i n g s and, l i k e w i s e , between m a t e r i a l t h i n g s and
thought.
He has t h e r e f o r e t o r e l y on t h e d i v i n e .
This c r i t i c i s m o f Descartes'
two-edged.
t h e o r y o f knowledge i s c l e a r l y
On t h e one hand, Hegel i s p l e a d i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
of sensation m
knowledge, t h e p o s i t i o n o f a m a t e r i a l i s t , and on
t h e o t h e r , he i s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i t o n l y be t a k e n as a form o f
t h o u g h t , t h e p o s i t i o n o f an i d e a l i s t .
one
T h i s , I would argue, is
o f t h e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n s o f Hegel's j d e a l i s m , indeed
one o f t h e
reasons he l i k e s t o c a l l h i s i d e a l i s m o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m .
it
And
i s from t h i s p o i n t o f view t h a t he argues t h a t D e s c a r t e s i s
wrong m
c o n c e i v i n g s e n s a t i o n merely as a n u l l i t y .
Sensation
becomes a n u l l i t y
f o r D e s c a r t e s because he i s unable t o r e g a r d wh
we s e n s e - p e r c e i v e
as b e i n g i n any way t r u e .
he c l a i m s , t h i n g s a r e c o n t i n u a l l y changing.
I n our sensation,
There a r e t h e r e f o r e
12.
Hegel.
Suhrkarrp Worke 20,pp. 144 - 145.
l."5.
IbDd.p. 1 5 5 : ' i n t h e sharp o p p o s i t i o n between t h o u g h t and

e x t e n s i o n , t h e former i s not c o n s i d e r e d as s e n s a r i o r (Sr.pfi
dung), so t h a t t h e l a t t e r can i s o l a t e i t s e l f . '
no f i x e d p r o p e r t i e s t h a t we can a t t r i b u t e t o t h i n g s t h a t
in sensation.
arxse
Appearance, s m e l l s , t a s t e s , sounds, e t c . , cannot
be p r e d i c a t e d t o t h i n g s because they do n o t i n h e r e i n those
thing
D e s c a r t e s even seeks t o demonstrate t h a t s o l i d i t y and hardness

w h l c h we sense-perceive
are n o t e s s e n t i a l t o m a t t e r .
He
b e l i e v e s t h a t a l l thai: can w i t h c e r t a i n t y be p r e d i c a t e d t o m a t t e r
i s extension.
of
T h i s i s t h e case, he argues, because a l l t h i n g s
m a t t e r ( e . g . t h e wax i n t h e M e d i t a t i o n s ) g i v e way under
pressure
without losing t h e i r nature.
Nov; i t i s a t t h i s p o i n t
14
t h a t Hegel r a i s e s h i s o b j e c t i o n .
I t may be, he says, t h a t
t h i n g s g i v e way under p r e s s u r e b u t t h i s does n o t e n t a i l

t h e y w i l l l o s e a l l t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s a p a r t from
that
extension.
S o l i d i t y and hardness w i l l remain a t t r i b u t e s o f t h o s e t h i n g s .

Under p r e s s u r e
t h e r e s i s t e n c e t h a t those t h i n g s o f f e r may
become q u a n t i t a t i v e l y l e s s b u t n o t n o n - e x i s t e n t .
t h a t Hegel i s here w e a r i n g h i s m a t e r i a l i s t h a t .
I t i s clear
We have r.ow
t o a n a l y s e h i s c r i t i c i s m o f D e s c a r t e s t o see why Hegel's o b j e c t i v e idealism allows t h i s empiricism.

has^ a l s o t o be c o n s i d e r e d
Hegel argues t h a t
i n t h e form o f s e n s a t i o n .
thought
Descartes,
however, wants t h o u g h t a l o n e ; t h o u g h t opposed t o s e n s a t i o n .

He f a i l s
t o g r a s p t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t i e s we d e t e c t i n
o b j e c t s w i t h o u r senses a r e , as soon as they a r e e x p r e s s e d ,

themselves t h o u g h t s .
Hegel t h e r e f o r e i s p r e p a r e d
t h e m a t e r i a l i s t t h a t thought
o b j e c t s opposed t o i t .
considered
t o grant t o
as s e n s a t i o n does have
These, f u r t h e r m o r e , a r e n o t i m m e d i a t e l y
r e d u c i b l e t o t h o u g h t . But this i n no
way e s t a b l i s h e s f o r K e g e l
t h a t t h i n g s e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
Ik.
I b i d . , pp. 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 .
These
15.
t h i n g s are t o Hegel n o t h i n g b u t s e J f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s m t h e
form o f s e n s a t i o n .
At t h i s p o i n t he t a k e s o f f h i s m a t e r i a l i s t
hat.
D e s c a r t e s makes t h e e r r o r , i n Kegel's e s t i m a t i o n , o f n o t
r e g a r d i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f o b j e c t s sensed as a d e a l .
The
sum
o f Hegel's c r i t i c i s m o f D e s c a r t e s would, I t h i n k ,
be t h a t he i s a m e t a p h y s i c i a n .
Metaphysics Hegel u n d e r s t a n d s ,
i n t h e sense o f Kant, as the r e a c h i n g a f t e r Substance.

p o i n t o f view o f m e t a p h y s i c s , he argues, presupposes
The
an
o p p o s i t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o r , i n more modern

terms, t h e i n d i v i d u a l
metaphysics,
and r e a l i t y , and s t r i v e s f o r t h e i r u n i t y .
'one t h o u g h t , one u n i t y i s T a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t i d e a l i s m
j u s t as w i t h t h e A n c i e n t s - B e i n g . '
w i t h h i s philosophy to unite
individual
The m e t a p h y s i c i a n seeits
and Substance.
becomes t h e m e d i a t o r between t h e two terms.

where t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y are i n i t i a l l y
Thought
B a t , Hegel c l a i m s ,
c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g
d i f f e r e n t they are never s u c c e s s f u l l y u n i t e d .
The a t t e m p t t o
u n i t e i n d i v i d u a l and substance i s , as i n D e s c a r t e s ' ca'be, a

c o n f e s s i o n t h a t t h e y are i r r e v o c a b l y d i v i d e d .
to
perform the t a s k of a r t i f i c i a l
is substantial
union.
God,
therefore,
has
'My i n d i v i d u a l t h o u g h t
o r r e a l w i t h D e s c a r t e s because God does not d e c e i v e
me.
Now,
as I have a l r e a d y suggested, t h e n o t i o n o f God does p l a y
a r o l e i n Hegel's own
d e s c r i p t i o n o f God
15-
I b i d . , p.
122.
p h i l o s o p h y b u t he b e l i e v e s t h a t D e s c a r t e s '
as t h e p h y s i c a l g u a r a n t o r o f our knowledge
14.
misrepresents that r o l e .
I t i s , he t h i n k s
'the form
that
i s somewhat m i s t a k e n e x p r e s s i n g above a l l o n l y t h e o p p o s i t i o n
which s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s has t o t h e consciousness
of the o b j e c t i v e ;
of i t s other,
and i t ( i . e . God) has t o do w i t h t h e u n i t y o f
b o t h , - whether t h a t which i s i n t h o u g h t a l s o has o b j e c t i v i t y .

Now
this unity lies m
God, o r i s God h i m s e l f . ' ^
r i g h t l y t o be u n d e r s t o o d
and b e i n g .
correct.
philosophy
God
is
as t h e u n i t y o f t h o u g h t
To t h i s e x t e n t D e s c a r t e s ' d e p i c t i o n - o f h i s r o l e i s
F o r Hegel, however, he i s n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d
the m e d i a t o r o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y and Substance.
T h i s would
t h a t God were a t h i r d term b r i n g i n g about t h a t u n i t y .

God i s f o r Hegel t h a t u n i t y i t s e l f .
as
imply
Rather,
God 3s a r e l a t i o n s h i p
that
f a l l s e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y , a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n
37
which t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y as overcome.
Because D e s c a r t e s
does n o t conceive God i n t h i s way, h i s
p h i l o s o p h y remains f o r Hegel a t t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f b e i n g and

thought.
We can see t ^ i s d u a l i s m most s h a r p l y expressed, Hegel
t h i n k s , i n D e s c a r t e s ' a b s o l u t e s e p a r a t i o n o f e x t e n s i o n and
thought.
Descartes
recognises
'no more t h a n two s p e c i e s o f
16.
I b i d . , p. 1 3 7 .
17.
He d e s c r i b e s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p more t e c h n i c a l l y i n t h e
L o g i c as t h e t r a n s i t i o n o f t n e N o t i o n ( B e g r i f f ) i n t o
O b j e c t i v i t y and adds t h a t i t was D e s c a r t e s V ' s u b l i m e s t
t h o u g h t , t h a t God i s t h a t whose n o t i o n I n c l u d e s w i t h i n
i t s e l f i t s being .
He c l a i m s t h e r e as w e l l t h a t D e s c a i t e
d i d n o t comprenend h i s p r i n c i p l e m i t s f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e .
I n h i s view he degraded t h e p r i n c i p l e by p r e s e n t i n g i t as
an o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f o f God's e x i s t e n c e .
Hegel. SuhrKWip
Werke 6 , ( W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r L o g i k T e i l I I ) p . 402.
1
15.
t h i n g s : namely t h e one i s t h e s p e c i e s
and
of thinking things
t h e o t h e r t h e s p e c i e s o f t h i n g s t h a t r e l a t e t o what i s
extended. l 8
Thought and e x t e n s i o n a r e d i s t i n c t ' f o r D e s c a r t e s
because, a p a r t f r o m God, t h e y a r e t h e o n l y two s u b s t a n c e s

i n t h e u n i v e r s e Which a r e t o t a l i r e s i n t h e m s e l v e s .
The one
s u b s t a n c e , he would a r g u e , may be c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y

ceived without the other.
however t h a t ,
con-
T h i s o n t o l o g y i m p l i e s f o r Hegel
'thought, t h e n o t i o n , t h e s p i r i t u a l ,
i s that
w h i c h i s a t home w i t h i t s e l f and has i t s o p p o s i t e i n n o t b e i n g

119
a t home w i t h o n e s e l f , e x t e n s i o n , t h e u n f r e e .
argues t h a t t h e essence o f t h o u g h t
of objects i s extension.
way
Descartes
i s t h o u g h t and t h e essence
I t appears t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e r e i s no
i n w h i c h t h e y can be immanently u n i t e d , t h e one i s opposed
t o t h e o t h e r as freedom t o n e c e s s i t y .
c r e a t o r t h a t t h e y a r e one.
I t i s o n l y i n God t h e i r
H e g e l , however, f i n d s a g r e a t d e a l
that i s a r t i f i c i a l i n t h i s ontology.
T h i s i s because i t i s an
o n t o l o g y t h a t m a i n t a i n s :.n u n r e a s o n a b l e b i f u r c a t i o n
between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and r e a l i t y .
T h i s i s a b i f u r c a t i o n whichil
t h e o b j e c t o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y t o overcome.
S. Werke 2 0 i p.
(Plntzweiung)
Descartes'
148
18.
Hegel.
19.
Ibid.
20.
T h a t t h i s i s t h e o b j e c t o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y r e q u i r e s
l i t t l e p r o o f from me.
The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e n o t i o n
E n t z w e i u n g m H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y was p o i n t e d o u t by H e r b e r t
Marcuse as e a r l y as 1933' m h i s book K e g e l s O n t o l o g i e und
d i e T h e o r i e d e r G e s c h : c h t l i c h k e i t ( V i t t o n o Klostermann3
F r a n k f u r t am M a m ) pp. 9 - 2 3 .
More r e c e n t l y R. P l a n t
( H e g e l , A l i e n & Unwm, 1 9 7 3 ) and G.Rohrmoser ( S u b j e k t i v : t a t
und V e r d i n g l i c h u r t r . T h e o i o g i e und G e s e l l s c h a f t i>n Denken jdos
jungen Hege LS 190-O h a a r g u e d the~same case most c o n v m c T r i
-
16.
o n t o l o g y suggests
t o Hegel t h a t t h e r e a r e m
two t h i n g s , thought and body ( e x t e n s i o n ) .

makes an appearance t o r e c o n c i l e them.
' o u t s i d e b o t h ' as t h e i r C r e a t o r ,
t h e two elements themselves,
achieve i t .
"
the beginning
Subsequently
God
But because he i s
'not t h e n o t i o n o f u n i t y and
n o t t h e n o t i o n , ' he i s unable t o
B i f u r c a t i o n t h e r e f o r e as n o t overcome.
In
o r d e r t h a t t h i s may be achieved, Hegel c l a i m s , God has t o be

p r o p e r l y conceived.
As we a l r e a d y know, t h a t c o r r e c t c o n c e p t i o n
o f God i s as t h e immanent u n i t y o f thought and b e i n g .

It
i s t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Spinoza t h a t , m Hegel's view, t a k e s
an i m p o r t a n t s t e p towards
It
t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h i s n o t i o n o f God.
i s , he c l a i m s , Spinoza's n o t i o n o f Substance t h a t achieves
this.
T h i s Substance Hegel d e s c r i b e s as b e i n g t h e ' a b s t r a c t u n i t y ' o f

e x t e n s i o n and t h o u g h t , o r body and s o u l .
I n his opinion, therefore
t h i s n o t i o n bears a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r i n c i p a l ideas o f
Descartes'
system.
Indeed
t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Descartes
'the p h i l o s o p h y o f Spinoza r e l a t e s t o
as a c o n s i s t e n t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f
?2
the l a t t e r ' s p r i n c i p l e . '
I n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Descartes
we have
the o p p o s i t i o n o f e x t e n s i o n and t h o u g h t w i t h a t h i r d term, God,

p o s i t e d as u n i t i n g them.
implemented D e s c a r t e s '
Hegel understands
principle m
t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f Substance
draws t o g e t h e r e x t e n s i o n and thought m

t h a n D e s c a r t e s ' n o t i o n o f God.
21.
Hegel.
22.
Ibid.
Spinoza t o have
a more s a t i s f a c t o r y way
Spinoza's Substance i s t h e essence
Suhrkanp Werke 20 p. 157
b o t h o f mind and m a t t e r .
I t is
'that whicn i s m
2^5
and i s conceived
,
through i t s e l f ' .
I t consists of ' i n f i n i t e
24
attributes ;
nothing l i e s outside of i t .
God, 'the cause o f a l l t h i n g s ' . ^

m
itself
everything.
Therefore, i t i s
I n short, i t is everything
I t i s the world, or simply r e a l i t y
God o r r e a l i t y , which embraces b o t h e x t e n s i o n
itself.
and t h o u g h t ,
mind and m a t t e r .
I n short, Hegel f i n d s Spinoza's n o t i o n o f one Substance t o
be a r a d i c a l
improvement on t h e d u a l i s m o f D e s c a r t e s ' p h i l o s o p h y ,
b u t t h a t i s n o t a l l he has t o say i n p r a i s e o f t h e i d e a .
He
v;ould argue t h a t as an a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e , Spinoza's Substance

has t o be t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f a l l thought t h a t c l a i m s t o be
philosophy.
'That t h o u g h t ' , he says, 'has p l a c e d i t s e l f a t t h e
s t a n d p o i n t o f Spinozism i s t h e e s s e n t i a l b e g i n n i n g o f a l l p h i l o sophising. '
Everyone has f i r s t o f a l l t o be a S p i n o z i s t
he wishes t o be a b l e t o p h i l o s o p h i s e .
if
He 'must bathe' h i s s o u l
' i n t h e e t h e r o f t h e one Substance i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g t h a t
is
26
h e l d t o be t r u e p e r i s h e s .
T h i s one Substance i s , t h e n , f o r
Hegel t h e n e g a t i o n o f a l l t h a t i s p a r t i c u l a r .
We a r e , he c l a i m s ,
w i t h Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y a t once a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e u n i v e r s a l .
What Hegel means by t h i s i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r .
I t i s , how-
ever, c l e a r what he t h i n k s i t i m p l i e s f o r t h e problem o f knowledge.

23.
B.Spinoza.
Ethic, Part I , D e f i n i t i o n 3 .
24.
Ibid.
Proposition X I .
25.
Ibid.
Proposition XVIII
26.
Hegel.
Suhrkamp Uerke 20 p. 1 6 5 .
See a l s o L u c i o C o l l e t i :
Marxism and Hegel "(New L e f t Books, 197:?) P- 2 8 .

18.
The s t a n d p o i n t o f Spinoza, he c l a i m s , r a i s e s us above such

mundane problems as those c o n c e r n i n g
thought.
Prom t h a t s t a n d p o i n t i t
the c e r t a i n t y o f our
i s the content o f a philosophy
t h a t i s o f prime i n t e r e s t .
It
i s w o r t h t r y i n g t o understand
what H e g e l means by t h i s .
He appears t o be s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h i s one Substance o f Spinoza

as e v e r y t h i n g i n e v e r y t h i n g i s a n o t i o n t h a t i s i n t e n d e d t o
p r o v i d e more t h a n c e r t a i n t y t o o u r t h o u g h t .
Spinoza i s n o t
s i m p l y concerned t h a t o u r t h o u g h t s h o u l d c o r r e s p o n d
extension.
with
On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h o u g h t i n t h e one Substance i s
n o t o n l y s u b j e c t , i t i s o b j e c t as w e l l .
o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n .
t h e p o i n t c l e a r e r i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way.
as I have a l r e a d y s a i d , i s God.
I t j s a case, t h e r e f o r e ,
Perhaps I can maks
Spinoza's Substance,
Now God f o r h i m o n l y has two

27
a t t r i b u t e s , t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n .
So t h a t w h a t e v e r i s s a i d
o r t h o u g h t i s s a i d o f God o r Substance and w h a t e v e r as s a i d o f

e x t e n s i o n i s e q u a l l y s a i d o f God o r Substance.
Since,
then,
w h a t e v e r i s s a i d o f Substance i s s a i d o f b o t h i t s a t t r i b u t e s ,
extensions
and t h o u g h t , p r e d i c a t e s o f t h e one a r e , a t one and t h e
same t i m e , p r e d i c a t e s o f t h e o t h e r .
Or, as Spinoza p u t s
it,
'The o r d e r and c o n n e c t i o n o f i d e a s i s t h e same as t h e o r d e r and

?8
connection o f t h i n g s ' . "
He g i v e s t h i s example i n t h e C o r o l l a r y
t o t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n : 'the c i r c l e e x i s t i n g i n n a t u r e and t h e i d e

t h a t i s i n God a r e one and t h e same t h i n g w h i c h i s m a n i f e s t e d
through d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s ' .
The one Substance as t h e a t t r i b u t e
27.
Spinoza.
E t h i c P a r t I I P r o p o s i t i o n s I and I I .
28.
Ibid.
Part I I , P r o p o s i t i o n V I I .
o f t h o u g h t , t h e c i r c l e as an i d e a , i s t h e same as t h e one
Substance as t h e a t t r i b u t e
reality m
It
nature.
o f e x t e n s i o n , t h e c i r c l e as a
Both express
t n e same 'essence o f God'.
i s now more than e v i d e n t t h a t m
a c o n t e x t such as t h i s ,
problems c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t t o e x t e n s i o n , o r
s u b j e c t t o o b j e c t become s i m p l y i r r e l e v a n t .
o b j e c t a r e enveloped
their relation
Both s u b j e c t and
t h e one Substance o r God.
As I i n d i c a t e d ,
i s one o f immediate i d e n t i t y ; and i t
is for this
reason t h a t Hegel regards Spinoza's Substance as t h e t r u e b e g i n n i n g

of
philosophy.
I f t h i s i s so, Hegel would l i k e t o add t h i s one Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,
namely, t h a t Spinoza's Substance expresses t h e i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t

and o b j e c t m
too abstract a fashion,~^
c r i t i c i s m he l e v e l l e d
Schelling.
Here Hegel r e v i v e s a
a t t h e philosophy of h i s e r s t w h i l e
friend
I n h i s view S c h e i l m g , t o o , expresses t h e i d e n t i t y
i n h i s n o t i o n o f A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y i n t o o a b s t r a c t a manner.
T h i s i s because b o t h he and Spinoza do n o t p r e s e n t t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between thought and e x t e n s i o n as r e s i d i n g i n t h e two d i f f e r e n t
attributes
themselves.
Their difference i s ,
as a s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f God o r Substance.
w i s h t o deny t h e p r i n c i p l e
have
29.
Hegel.
But he b e l i e v e s
' a h i g h e r t o n e ' i n demanding t h a t they
demonstrated
demonstration
Hegel would noc
o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Spinoza and
S c h e l l i n g : t h e i d e n t i t y o f n a t u r e and mind.
t h a t he t a k e s
rather, depicted
that principle
of that principle,
op.cit.
p. 1 6 6 .
differently.
he argues,
should
I n the proper
i t has t o be p r e -
20.
supposed t h a t b o t h n a t u r e and mind are r a t i o n a l .
We a r e n o t ,
however, t o s t o p a t t h i s a s s e r t i o n , as t h o u g h t h e mere
of t h e i d e n t i t y
o f rnlnd and n a t u r e e n t a i l e d i t s
possibility
reality.
We
have t o show t h e a s s e r t i o n t o be t r u e , t h a t i t i s 'the t o t a l i t y

which i s developing i t s e l f
within i t s e l f ' that i s that
identity.-^'
A t no s t a g e w i l l i t do s i m p l y t o pronounce t h e i d e n t i t y o f mind
and n a t u r e .
H e g e l w o u l d perhaps say t h a t n a t u r e and mind a r e
u n i t e d as Reason.
B u t Reason f o r him c o n s i s t s , i n t h i s i n s t a n c e ,
i n n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e r e a s o n i n g p r o c e s s t h a t shows n a t u r e and
mind t o be i d e n t i c a l .
his
is
He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , by
r e a s o n i n g , has t o show t h a t n a t u r e embodies Reason and t h a t

inherently rational.
mm
Because Spinoza and S c h o l U n g do n e t do
t h i s i n t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s o f i d e n t i t y t h e y have t o d e p i c t t h e
d i f f e r e n c e between n a t u r e and mind as a s e l f - u i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f
God.
Their notion of identity

We have now
i s therefore abstract.
t o consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s
objection
t o S p i n o z a ' s n o t i o n o f Substance f o r t h e e p i s t e r o l o g i c a l
embodied
i n Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y .
principles
I n t h i s respect Hegel's
own
assessment i s t h a t by d e p i c t i n g t h e u n i t y D f - t h o u g h t and b e i n g
as he does, S p i n o z a i n t r o d u c e s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o h i s t h e o r y
o f knowledge.
T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t h a t a t t h e one t i m e we
be a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n o f t h e t r u t h o f o u r c o n c e p t i o n s
w h i l e a t a n o t h e r , we can be a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t
congruence.
way:
50.
Ibid.
about r e a l i t y
as t o t h e i r
Spinoza i n d i c a t e s t h e a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y m
'Whatever happens
p.
177.
can
this
the o b j e c t o f the idea c o n s t i t u t i n g the
21 .
human mind rnuct be p e r c e i v e d by t h e human mind.

to
Thai" i s
say, i f t h e o b j e c t o f t h e i d e a c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e human mind
be a body, n o t h i n g can happen m

by t h e mind.'-^
t h a t body w h i c h i s n o t p e r c e i v e d
The knowledge o f e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h happens i n
t h e o b j e c t o f any i d e a n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s i n God, f o r he i s f o r
S p i n o z a b o t h extended and t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e .
I n so f a r as t h a t
i d e a i s an i d e a o f a t h i n k i n g t h i n g , and s i n c e God i s a l l t h o u g h t ,
t h e i d e a i s n e c e s s a r i l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f God.
correct.
I t i s consequently
On t h e o t h e r hand Spinoza i n d i c a t e s what H e g e l
ells
t h e a b s o l u t e i n d i f f e r e n c e o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y i n t h i s way:
'The human mind does n o t know t h e human body i t s e l f , n o r does
know t h a t t h e body e x i s t s , except
w h i c h t h e body i s a f f e c t e d . ' - ^
at,
it
t h r o u g h i d e a s o f a f f e c t i o n s by
What H e g e l appears t o be g e t t i n g
t h e n , i s t h a t i n Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y knowledge does n o t apper-
as an outcome o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e human mind i n r e l a t i o n s n i p

to
31.
things.
I s i s s i m p l y an a t t r i b u t e $of God.
T h i s appeaiancc
E t h i c . P a r t I I , P r o p o s i t i o n X I I j S t u a r t Hampshire (S p i 110 7 a.
P e l i c a n O r i g i n a l , 1 9 7 0 * pp. 65 - 6 6 ) s a y s o f t h i
c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e u n i q u e Substance and i t s a t t r i n u t e s ,
S p i n o z a i s d e d u c i n g t n a t t h e system o f i d e a s wnieh c o n s t i t u i
God, as c o n c e i v e d u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f t h o u g h t , mast n o t
o n l y correspond t o , but c o i n c i d e w i t h , t h e o b j e c t s o f these
i d e a s j he i s showing t h a t , i f God i s r i g h t l y c o n c e i v e d as
the u n i q u e Substance, t h e problem w h i c h c o n f r o n t e d D e s c a r t e s
how can we be c e r t a i n t h a t o u r c l e a r and d i s t i n c t i d e a s
c o r r e s p o n d t o r e a l i t y ? - cannot even a r i s e ; t h e r e can be no
q u e s t i o n o f t h e c_o r- re s pond en c e between t h e o r d e r o f t h o u g h t
o r i d e a s and t n e o r d e r o f t i l i n g s , because t n e r e a r e r e t tv, o
orders t o correspond.'
This i s remarkably I I K C Hegel's
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S c i n o z a ' s Substance, see e s p e c i a l l y p. 18
I 9 above.
T
32.
Spinoza.
E t h i c P a r t I I , Prop. X I X .
i s m a i n t a i n e d . Hegel would c l a i m ,
because j u s t as w i t h t h e
e p i s t e m o l o g y o f Descartes t h e d i r e c t l i n k between t h e human

mind and t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ( s e n s a t i o n ) i s , so t o speak, severed.
D e s c a r t e s and Spinoza sever t h a t l i n k on t h e grounds t h a t what
the i n d i v i d u a l person senses d i r e c t l y i s n o t so much t h e l i m i t ations
o f an o b j e c t
as h i m s e l f l i m i t e d by t n e o b j e c t .
argument i s a f a m i l i a r one.
The
I t i s , as Spinoza p u t s i t ,
that
'the i d e a s we have o f e x t e r n a l bodies i n d i c a t e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n

o f o u r own body r a t h e r t h a n t h e n a t u r e o f e x t e r n a l
bodies. ' ^
The ' i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t we as i n d i v i d u a l s a r e n o t t h e source o f

adequate knowledge.
the u n i v e r s a l
God.
t h o u g h t w h i c h i s an a t t r i b u t e o f t n e one Substance,
This, we know, i s an a b s o l u t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f Spinoza's
philosophy.
Spinoza, c o n s e q u e n t l y , i s n o t so much concerned
with discerning
leading
and
I n Spinoza's case a l l knowledge p e r t a i n s t o
the i n d i v i d u a l properties
them back t o t h e o i e Substance
of objects
as w i t h
The concern i s always,
t h i s i s Hegel's c a ^ , w i t h t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e one SUD-
stance as opposed t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g .
T h i s , he says, i s t h e source o f t h e c o x i t r a d i c t i o n i n Spinoza'
t h e o r y o f knowledge.
object i s i m p l i c i t m
The a b s o l u t e i n d i f f e r e n c e o f t h o u g h t and
their identity.
Substance t h a t i s i n c o m p l e t e .
are n o t i n i t i a l l y a f f i r m e d
The
I t i s the notion
I n that notion
of
t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y
t o be independent oT s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t e
consequence o f n o t d e p i c t i n g
them i n t h a t way i s thai", i t
a m a t t e r o f i n d i f f e r e n c e what t h e one s i g n i f i e s t o t h e o t h e r .
33-
Ibid.
P a r t I I , Prop. X V I . C o r o l l a r y
2.
is
It
i s of l i t t l e
consequence how t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s t h o u g h t
r e l a t e s t o o b j e c t s , i f a l l t h o u g h t and a l l o b j e c t s a r e a
p r i o r i divine.
The whole o f Spinoza's
p h i l o s o p h y , Hegel
would argue, i s c o l o u r e d by t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n .
I t i s the
u n i t y o f t h o u g h t and b e i n g t h a t i s alone s i g n i f i c a n t , he says,

the One.
God. ^
Knowledge f o r Spinoza i s b u t t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f
T h i s i s o f c o u r s e , h i s E t h i c as w e l l .
7
The good
life,
Spinoza, argues, i s t h e one spent i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f God.

Hegel i s c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h i s p o i n t r e p r e s e n t s t h e extreme
l i m i t o f Spinoza's system.-'
explained f o r i t s e l f ,
i t J S l e d back t o God.
has no p l a c e i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y .
not
Instead o f everything being

Individuation
By i n d i v i d u a t i o n Hegel means
only the i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r existence o f objects but
a l s o t h e freedom o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l .
He t h i n k s , t h e n , t n a t
in
Spinoza's system t h e i n d i v i d u a l , i n b o t h t h e s e senses, appears

only
as what he c a l l s a ' v a n i s h i n g moment'.
The i n d i v i d u a l
e x i s t s o n l y as an embodiment o r mode o f one o f t h e two a t t r j b u t

o f Substance, as t h o u g h t o r as e x t e n s i o n .
claims,
I n t h i s f a s h i o n , He
' A l l d i f f e r e n c e s and d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h i n g s a r e si.npl
r e t u r n e d t o t h e one Substance; so, one can say, i n Spinoza's

system a l l t h i n g s a r e merely t n r o w n down i n t o t h i s abyss o f
Hegel. Werke 20, p. 177': F o r Spinoza 'God a l o n e i s , a l l

w o r l d l i n e s s has no t r u t h ' .
~5k.
35.
I b i d . , p. 3 9 0 .
36.
I b i d . , p. ] 8 2 .
24.
annihilation'.
emerges.
And from t h i s abyss o f a n n i h i l a t i o n n o t h i n g
Botn t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an i n d i v i d u a l
p a r t i c u l a r and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an independent
existing
individual
consciousness are o b l i t e r a t e d .
It
i s the implications
that t h i s lack of individuation
might have f o r human t h o u g h t and a c t i o n

Human consciousness i s o n l y conceived
stance.
t h a t a r e most
remarkable.
as a mode o f t h e One Sub-
I t i s b u t a mode o f t h e a t t r i b u t e t h o u g h t .
independent
c a p a b i l i t i e s are t h e r e f o r e
I t s own
severly l i m i t e d .
As we
have seen, t h e mode human consciousness cannot a t t a i n knowledge

t h r o u g h i t s own p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d .
I t can o n l y know
r e a l i t y t h r o u g h i t s c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f God.
C o r r e c t thought and
right action,
as I have i n d i c a t e d ,
t h i s c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f God.
can o n l y be achieved
For n e i t h e r
can t h e body
tarough
determine
the mind d i r e c t l y t o movement o r r e s t n o r t h e mind t h e body t o

^8
movement o r rest.-"
t h e i r common ground n o
C o r r e c t thought and r i g h t a c c i o n then have

f
i n t h e one i n d i v i d u a l b u t i n God.
Acting
as w e l l as knowing have t o be mediated by t h e one Substance.

Hegel contends t h a t t h i s i s t h e case because i n Spinoza's
E t h i c as m
significance
the philosophy o f Descartes'

of the universal,
t h o u g h t has o n l y t h e
not of self-consciousness .
37*
I b i d . p . 1 6 6 . Hegel f i n d s i t i n t e r e s t i n g t o s p e c u l a t e a t t h i s
p o i n t whether Spinoza's death o f consumption was i t s e l f an
i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e ' a l l - c o n s u m i n g ' n a t u r e o f h i s own p r i n c i p l
Hegel ma.kes a b e t t e r pun i n German s i n c e consumption
(Schwmdsucht) means l i t e r a l l y ' f a d i n g away s i c k n e s s ' . p . l 6 7
38.
I b i d p. 1 8 3 - 1 8 4 .
39-
I b i d p. 1 8 5 .
25-
Q u i t e s i m p l y , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s has
f o r Hegel t o be
as b e i n g an a t t r i b u t e o f t h e one Substance n o t merely
understood
as a mode.
T h i s , e v i d e n t l y , i s n o t the p o s i t i o n m
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y .
Thus Spinoza proceeds i n a manner which
i s a l i e n t o Hegel.
p h i l o s o p h y descends from the u n i v e r s a l , Substance t o t h e

u l a r , t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n and
mode.
Substance.
The
t h a n t h e One.
the
'loss' of
r e s u l t i s t h a t t h e mode appears l e s s e s s e n t i a l
Or,
viewed from t h e o p p o s i t e
s i m p l y disappea.r i n t h e one Substance.

complains,
partic-
f i n a l l y t o the i n d i v i d u a l ,
T h i s descent he r e g a r d s as a p r o g r e s s i v e
His
d i r e c t i o n , t h e modes
They are n o t , Hegel
r a i s e d t o the n o t i o n .
The
independence o f s e l f -
eonsciousness i s e x t i n g u i s h e d i n the one S u b s t a r c e ,
This
i m p l i c a t i o n o f Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y i s , H e g e l b e l i e v e s , t h e reason
why
Spinoza's system arouses so much i n d i g n a t i o n s i n c e t h e

i
l d u a l s being f o r h i m s e l f i s denied.
p h i l o s o p h y we
4l
I n such a system o f
cannot be at home w i t h o u r s e l v e s , we
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y d e p i c t s o n l y
not yet s p i r i t ' .
The
'a r i g i d
free.
( s t a r r e ) Substance,
t o be remedied, t h e n , by
c o n c e i v i n g t h e one Substance n o t merely

(Geist).
See
are n o t
l a c k o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , the lacK o f
freedom i n Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y has
mind o r s p i r i t
mdiv-
as substance b u t
as
T h i s remedy t h a t Hegel proposes f o r
40.
Ibid.
also C o l l e t t i .
41.
Ib:M .
H a m p s h i r e o p . c i t , p . l 4 9 draws our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
same t h i n g : ' i t was S p i n o z a ' s 'hideous h y p o t h e s i s ' , and t h e
o n l y p a r t o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y became genera l l y famous, t h a t t h i s c r i t e r i o n o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g human
b e i n g s as e x e r c i s i n g r a t i o n a l w i l l and c h o i c e i s mere
superstition.
42.
Hegel-Werke 20, p.
166
o p . c a t . p. j50.
7
26.
the E t h i c
i s n e c e s s a r y n o t s i m p l y because Spinoza has mis-
interpreted
the prevailing religion,
Spinoza's n o t i o n o f Substance
fails
Christianity,
b u t because
t o correspond w i t h
reality.
This i s t h e source o f Hegel's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n t o

Spinoza's philosophy.
His notion of r e a l i t y
is
different.
R e a l i t y , he a r g u e s i n The S c i e n c e o f L o g i c , h a s t o be seen as
4 "3
the r e a l i s a t i o n o f freedom, o f t h e N o t i o n .
the analysis o f r e a l i t y
It
is this analysis that
logic
is
the c r i t i q u e
system
For t h i s
o f Spinoza's
forms t h e t r a n s i t i o n
t o the subjective logic.
to entai]
s u b j e c t i v e freedom.
Reality
Reality
icance o f the I .
Substance.
from t h e o b j e c t i v e
itself
h a s t o be shown
or the correct
( o n e and t h e same t h i n g t o H e g e l ) h a s t o have

t
reason
philosophic
'the s i g n i f -
44
R e a l i t y , he w i s h e s t o a r g u e i s n o t o n l y
Substance b u t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
H e g e l now a r g u e s t h a t
I s i s a l s o m_y r e a l i t y ,
t h e p r i n c i p a l d e f e c t o f Spinoza's
p h i l o s o p h y , t h e l a c k o f what he d e s c r i b e s as i n d i v i d u a t i o n ,
made good m
the philosophy
of Leibniz.
is
I n d e e d , he c l a i m s ,
as f a r as e x t e r n a l a s p e c t s a r e c o n c e r n e d , L e i b n i z ' p r i n c i p l e o f
43.
H e g e l . Suhrkamp Werke 6 p. 2 4 0 .
The a n a l y s i s o f t h e
r e l a t i o n o f S u b s t a n c e ^ r e a l i t y ) r e c i p r o c i t y l e a d s t o one
c o n c l u s i o n '- T h i s i s t h e N o t i o n , t h e k i n g d o m o f s u b j e c t i v i t y o f Freedom'.
This very phrase concludes t n e O b j e c t i v e
L o g i c and i s t h e r e f o r e t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c
or the 'Doctrine o f the Notion'.
44.
V/erke 20., p. 1 8 9 .
A l s o t h e c h a p t e r t h a t opens up t h e
S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c 'The N o t : o n i n g e n e r a l ' ( t f e r k e 6, p. 2 4 5 )
g i v e s an a c c o u n t o f what H e g e l t a k e s t o be t h e a c t u a l s i g n i f icance o f t h e 1 m philosophy.
See e s p e c i a l l y p. 23"5 - 2 5 6 .
45.
Hegel-V/erke 6, p. 1 9 8 .
27-
individuation
completes
Spinoza's system o f p h i l o s o p h y .
L e i b n i z ' M o n a d o l o g y . t h e monads a r e t h e s i m p l e
t h a t make u p t h e u n i v e r s e .
fluid
and w o r k a b l e .
S u b s t a n c e as r i g i d
i s that
As we know, he r e g a r d s
and t h e r e f o r e u n w o r k a b l e
themselves
every
and u n c h a n g i n g :
from themselves.
created thing,
Spinoza's
(starre).
i n this
and c o n s e q u e n t l y
s u b j e c t t o change and i n d e e d
in
each'.^
Hegel suggests
The
fashion.
they continue t o develop
L e i b n i z takes i t
is
over
t h e y a r e more
monads o f L e i b n i z a r e n o t , h o w e v e r , l i m i t e d
They a r e n o t f i x e d
substances
The a d v a n t a g e t h e y h a v e
Spinoza's Substance, Hegel claims,
In
that
t h e c r e a t e d monad
this
therefore
as S p i n o z a ' s S u b s t a n c e s h a t t e r e d i n t o
'as g r a n t e d
change i s
tnat
also,
continual
t h a t vie c a n r e g a r d tner>
fragments:
'in opposit-
i o n t o t h e simple u n i v e r s a l Substance o f Spinoza L e i b n i z t a k e s

as h i s b a s i s
absolute m u l t i p l i c i t y ,
the individual
T h e s e monads a r e n o t m a t e r i a l nor e x t e n d e d ,
a l s o t h e y dc n o t
o r i g i n a t e n o r do t h e y p a s s away i n a n a t u r a l
r a t h e r s u b s t a n t i a ] forms
fashion;... they
47
are
substance...
E a c h monad i s u n i v e r s a l ,
s u b s t a n t i a l b u t a t t h e same t i m e i n d i v i d u a l .
E a c h i n d i v i d u a l monad i s , t h e n , a w o r l d o f i t s cwn.
'They
, 48
h a v e no w i n d o w s , by w h i c h
a n y t h i n g c o u l d come m
B e c a u s e i t h a s n o w i n d o w s t h e monad c a n n o t
outside.
46.
or out .
be d e t e r m i n e d
from
The monads a r e t h u s n o t c a s u a l l y r e l a t e d n o r i s t h e i r
L e i b n i z - Monadology i n L e i b n i z :
(Everyman'TJibTaly )" P-3
-
47.
Hege 1- Werke 20, p . 2 5 8 - 2 ^ 9 .
48.
L e i b n i z . c p . c i t . . p.
3.
PhilosophicalWritings
~
(Hegel's
empnasis).
28.
relation
one o f a s s i s t a n c e .
They a r e h a r d ,
w h i c h a l l o w o f one r e l a t i o n o n l y ,
harmony.
I n order that
it
implanted
repelling
a t the: r
may p a r t i c i p a t e
of
selves
of
preserved.
i n this
fashion.
represent
Consequently,
t h e main d i s t i n c t i o n s
The t*vo a t t r i b u t e s ,
in Leibniz'
not
o f God o n l y .
The monads a r e b o t h
thought
Everything
extent
s y s t e m one
i s radically
and e x t e n s i o n , a r e
possesses t h a t
distinc-
e x t e n d e d and i n t e l l e c t u a l .
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f God a r e s i m p l y
forms o f t h e perception t h a t
intel]
t h e m s e l v e s t o them
o f Spinoza's philosophy
transformed.
tion.
of representation
E a c h monad i s t o t h a t
E v e n t h e monads o f m a t t e r
attributes
this
By means o f t h i s p e r c e p t i o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y
t h e monad i s
ectual.
creation:
properly m
harmony e a c h monad i s endowed w i t h t h e f a c u l t y

or perception.
unities
Our
higher
i s an a t t r i b u t e o f each monad.
liq
Self-consciousness i s merely apperception.
The
this
important methodological
s y s t e m : s,
f o r Heg^l,
that
'.
principle
jncorporated
in
of self-differentiation:
t h e iron
SO
develops i t s e l f
of
from
'monads come f r o m
itself.
N o t o n l y do t h e n a t u r a l
an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e '
change
b u t ' t h e r e must oe
SI
differentiation
within
that
which changes'. "
Each t h i n g
is
49-
Ibid.p.5.
50.
The i m p o r t a n c e o f L e i b n i z ' p h i l o s o p h y f o r H e g e l ' l i e s

m
t h e p r i n c i p l e s , m t h e p r i n c i p l e s c f i n d i v i d u a l i t y and t h e
proposition
of undifferent2 a b i l i t y (Ununterschiedbarkeit)'.
J.C.Horn, Monade and B e g r i f f : P e r Weg v o n L e i b n i z z u H e g e l
g , c Wien
und
Munchen,1970.)
L(eOjl.dbennibzu.rop.
i t . p.
4
51.
indeed
limited
limits
itself
hand, t h i n g s
in
itself,
but
accordingly.
are
it
i s so
externally."
simply
l i m i t e d , or
i n Hegel's terms,
finite
modes o f
infinite
if
t h e y are
stood
as
ha\re t o
in
the
t o be
SpinozistJc
and
I have i n d i c a t e d ,
our
understanding of
ient
categorj zation,
c i r c u m s p e c t way,
selves .
basis of
our
that
terminology.
any
description
has
t o be
i s not
but
it
essentially
way
it
defends i t s e l f
52.
o n l y we
set
things
The
way
can
be
and
The
He
is
more t h a n a
about t h i n g s
are
s e e n by
the
e x a m p l e he
preserves
a n i m a l by
that
more
them-
h a v e t o be
object
in
conven-
different m
that
way.
is,
argiung
the
itself
argu-
point
of
the
we
admixture
q u a l i f y an
that differentiate
differentiates
the
we
a limitation
That t h i s i s Hegel's p o i n t
'it
nature.
inherent differences
categorization.
under-
What H e g e l means
t o be
have t o
recognising that
I t i s those
modes,
This
significant.
o b j e c t s has
we
the
themselves
limited.
f o l l o w because o f
methodological m
that
They a r e
Indeed Kegel argues t h a t
to
Leibnizian
other
are
h a v e , h o w e v e r , t o be
t h o u g h i s , I t h i n k , b o t h s i m p l e and
as
They
L e i b m z i a n monads, l i m i t i n g
thai; i s d i f f i c u l t
the
These f i n i t e
manner i n w h i c h t n e y a p p e a r t o be
ment i s one
of
known p r o p e r l y ,
them as
finite.
Substance.
self-differentiating.
regard
that i t
I n S p i n o z a ' s s y s t e m , on
only distinguished
an
constituted
the
object
itself.
its
gives:
claws,
In
tnat
itself.
Kegel-V.'erke ?0, p. ? 4 l .
I t seems t o me t h a t t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e i s i m p o r t a n t t o M a r x as w e l l .
I think
w o u l d e l ~ n n t h a t ^ r a c was s i g n i f i c a n t a b o u t h i s c o n c e p t o f
c a p i t a l i s m " a5 t h a t i t was n o t s i m p l y one way o f see.in<f h i s
s o c j e i y b u t t h a o i t ;as now t h a t s o c i e t y was o r g a n i s e d J .a
itself.
r
30.
H e g e l makes t m s
principle
own t h a t he f e e l s a b l e
implemented
in
its
T h i s he b e l i e v e s
out,
of individuation
to regret that
most t e l l i n g
is
the l i v e s
passive
within
itself.
from
i s n o t present
as I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , h a r d
none i s r e p e l l e d .
outside.
although
As H e g e l
m
itself
Each monad
puts
directly.
I t cannot d i r e c t l y
would imply
that
it
i t , the
t h e i d e a o f t h e monad.
Their
e a c h one r e p e l s t h e o t h e r
A l l a r e a c t i v e , none a r e p a s s i v e .
p a r t o f a monad i t
pointed
repelling unities.
e x a m p l e , o u r t h i n k i n g may know t h e s e h a r d
being
philosophy.^
I t c a n n o t be i n f l u e n c e d by
o f any o f i t s f e l l o w - m o n a d s .
peculiar property i s that
his
i s not
t o be so b e c a u s e , as I h a v e a l r e a d y
moment o f b e i n g
They a r e ,
the principle
sense i n L e i b n i z
t h e monads c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d
encloses a l l l i f e
so much
repelling u n i t i e s but
does n o t p e r c e i v e
perceive
anything,
were p a s s i v e l y r e l a t e d
For
these
monads
because
t o an o b j e c t
that
outside
itself.
There i s ,
philosophy,
thing,
then, Hegal suggests, t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n m
that
in our thinking
we know t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,
t h e monad, b u t n o t as i t p r i m a r i l y
iousness,
t h e sense o f b e i n g
53-
particular
a p p e a r s t o human
consc-
as t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t o f o u r s e n s e - i r r p r e s s i o n s .
L e i b n i z ' n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n he c l a i m s
other'.
Leibniz's
So t h a t
the excluding
the perception
t h e r e f o r e , 'has o n l y
one, n o t e n c r o a c h i n g
on t h e
o f t h e monad i s n o t t h e p e r c e p t i o n
Hegel.Werke 6 , p . 200
Horn ( o p . c i t . p . 1 3 6 ) misses t h e p o i n t
m s u g g e s t i n g t h a t H e g e l s i m p l y f i n d s L e i b n i z ' p r i n c i p l e 0/
i n d i v i d u a t i o n t o oe u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .
H e g e l meets L e i b n i z
on h i s own g r o u n d .
31-
of
t h e o r d i n a r y human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
of
something t h a t i s d i s t i n c t
perception
ceived
puts
o n l y be c o n c e i v e d
or t h e a p p e r c e p t i o n
' c a n n o t be c o n -
as i t s
R a t h e r , t h e monad s
self-perception.
I tperceives
implanted
truths.
I ti s therefore the important
of e t e r n a l t r u t h s
, ^ but m
placed
knowledge i s ,
then,
o f these e t e r n a l t r u t h s .
would claim, o f thought
distinction
capable
which are
o f man as
h i s manner o f r e c e i v i n g t h a t knowas t h e s i m p l e s t
according
o f monads.
t o Leibniz not of objects
I t i s again
not being
an i n s t a n c e ,
considered
system does n o t a l l o w o f such a r e l a t i o n .

t o provide
as e t e r n a l
'of t h e knowledge
Kegel
i n t h e form o f
I n d e e d , as o u g h t t o be c l e a r a l r e a d y ,
h i s attempt
perception
o n l y what i s
These p e r c e p t i o n s
o f monads t h a t he i s
l e d g e he i s as b a d l y
sensation.
The
t h e human c o n s c i o u s n e s s L e i b n i z d e s c r i b e s
of the world
Our
perception
o f t h e human c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s , t h e r e f o r e ,
i n i t a.t i t s c r e a t i o n .
in
The
implanted
DUG
it,
itself.
54
of objects external to i t s e l f .
part
from
as an a c t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t on t h e p e r c i p i e n t , s i n c e
substances never i n t e r a c t
not
or different
o f t h e monad, as R u s s e l l
can
I tis not tne perception
Leibniz'
Leibniz, therefore,
c e r t a i n knowledge does n o t advance, i n
H e g e l ' s e s t i m a t i o n , b e y o n d t h e p o s i t i o n o f S p i n o z a and D e s c a r t e s .
54.
Betrand Russell.
A C r i t i c a l Exposition of Leibniz'
Philosophy.
a l i e n & Unwin ( 1 9 3 7 3 " ? 1 3 2 . " H e g e l ' s c l a i m
c o n c e r n i n g L e i o n i z n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n i s t o be f o u n d
on p. 2 5 0 V/erke 20.
55
Leibniz.op.cit.jp.
32.
Indeed,
there i s l i t t l e
t o be s a i d
view.
We must e i t h e r a c c e p t
t r u t h s o r r e j e c t bus system
from L e i b n i z '
point of
a l l o u r k n o w l e d g e as e t e r n a l
altogether.
Extension
and t h o u g h t ,
56
just
as w i t h D e s c a r t e s
Their relation
one
of
o f p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony.
d i s c u s s i n g how t h e y m i g h t
of
relation
own m a k i n g ; i t
an e x t r e m e l y
A prime
be r e l a t e d
i s one e s t a b l i s h e d by God.
artificial
connection
what i s
To
this
principle
Tins, Hegel
t h a t e x i s t s between thought
and t h i s
at i t s creation.'
conceptions
And
and e x t e n s i o n .
Leibniz' philosophy.
'parallel with this
58.
Ibid.,
within
series of varying
connection
t o one a n o t h e r ' .
^
pp 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 .
I t a p p e a r s , Therefore,
between t h e two.
t h e s o u l i s programmed a t b i r t h w i t h
Ibid.
placed
'Both a r e e s s e n t i a l moments o f
p- q
b u t ' t h e y have i n d i f f e r e n c e
57.
'The
t h e r e r u n s a s e r i e s o f movements o f t h e body o r o f
Theiê i s no d i r e c t
though
form:
whicn a r e developed
series i s originally
what e x i s t s o u t s i d e t h e s o u l ' .
reality'
things.
r e l a t i o n he a r g u e s i s t h e
t n e same, body and s o u l ) m
itself
claims,
account o f t h e r e l a t i o n between
c o n n e c t i o n , H e g e l c l a i m s , t a k e s on t h e f o l l o w i n g
from w i t h i n
as
themselves.
among t h e monads i s n o t , t h e n , one o f t h e i r
s o u l has t h e r e f o r e a s e r i e s o f c o n c e p t i o n s
it
t h e n , no q u e s t i o n
H e g e l ' s v i e w , f o r s a k e s h i s own
example o f t h i s a r t i f i c i a l
circuitous
(or,
There i s ,
themselves:
individuation.
The
is
connection.
i s t h e same as t h a t among t h e monads
extent Leibniz, m
Tne
and S p i n o z a , h a v e no d i r e c t
conceptions
f25o
tnat
correspond t o a l l possible
corporeal
very
programmed w i t h a l l t h o s e
same t i m e t h e body i s
corporeal
is
occurrences.
i n God.
that
That i s t h e i r o n l y l i n k ,
since
o f themselves.
i n actual l i f e
side without
that
the place
artificial
the other.
Just
So
as i n
n e i t h e r can t h e body d e t e r m i n e t h e s o u l t o
is
Their
sole d i r e c t
relation
t h e i r p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony i n God.
pre-established
harmony w h i c h m
Hegel's
view
o f a n r o p e r l y developed n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n .
T h i s i s t h e r e a s o n why L e i b n i z abandons h i s own p r i n c i p l e

'those a b s o l u t e
link
t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f body and s o u l a r e n o t
t h e one d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g
Leibniz' philosophy
takes
and t h a t
t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f m i n d a n d body r u n s i d e b y
a c t n o r t h e s o u l t h e body.
is
possible
Indeed such a r e l a t i o n i s p r e c l u d e d .
Spinoza's philosophy,
It
and a t t h e
B u t t h i s , H e g e l a r g u e s , i s an e x t r e m e l y
account o f the matter

linked
occurrences
barriers
the m
itself
since
o f Monads a r e n o t
60
present
The
i n and f o r t h e m s e l v e s , b u t d i s a p p e a r m
s e l f - d i f f e r e n t a t i o n o f t h e monads i s a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
implanted
dog
the Absolute.'
gets
b y God.
a beating
But Hegel claims,
it
i s as t h o u g h
'when a
t h e p a i n develops i t s e ] f w i t h i n him,
similarly
59-
J.C.Horn. O p . c i t . , g i v e s us t h i s e x a m p l e :
'The i n d i v i d u a l
concept o f A l e x a n d e r o r Caesar c o n t a i n s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n
i t s e l f t h a t he w i l l a c t u a l l y r u n a c r o s s ' and c o n c l u d e s 'so
t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s t h e c o n c e p t o f Adam c o n t a i n s
t h e w h o l e human r a c e ' .
p. 3 5 See a l s o i b i d . p. 5 0 .
60.
H e g e l . Werke 6,
Wissenschaft der Logik I I ,
p. 2 2 5 .
the b e a t i n g develops
itself',,
himself within himself,
just
as t h e b e a t e r
t h e i r determinations a l l correspond
t o one a n o t h e r - b u t e a c h i s i n d e p e n d e n t
their objective
derisory
relation'.^
- thus not through
I n d i v i d u a t i o n t a k e s on t h i s
f o r m w i t h L e i b n i z b e c a u s e t h e r e i s no
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e monads t h e m s e l v e s .
t h e i r own b e h e s t
b u t a t t h a t o f God.
objective
They i n t e r a c t n o t a t
None c a n be c a u s e d t o
a c t by a n o t h e r monad; none c a n c o o r d i n a t e i t s
of another.
activity
They a r e n o t t h e r e f o r e i n d i v i d u a l
s i n c e an i n d i v i d u a l
develops
this
genuinely s e l f -determined
particular
sense b e a r s a r e l a t i o n
Their differences u l t i m a t e l y disappear m
God.
with
that
things
t o other things
They a r e n o t
s i n c e t h e y a r e d e t e r m i n e d by God t o
give the best possible o f a l l worlds.
So H e g e l c o n c l u d e s
that
w i t h L e i b n i z as w i t h h i s f e l l o w m e t a p h y s i c i a n s S p i n o z a and
Descartes
flow'.
God
Since
'is the d r a m
individuation
(Gosse) i n t o which a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
i s n o t properly conceived,
God t h a t h a s t o t a k e o r t h e b u r d e n
world.
61.
H e g e l .Werke 2 0 , p .
251.
it
is
o f the contradictions of the
35-
HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICISM: THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LOCKE

AND HUME
As I i n d i c a t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g
o f t h i s enquiry the
t h e o r i e s o f k n o w l e d g e o f L o c k e a n d Hume p r e s e n t
to those
m
we have j u s t d i s c u s s e d .
t h e i r philosophies.
a marked
God f i g u r e s l i t t l e ,
contrast
I f at all,
I n t h e i r accounts o f the o r i g i n s o f
o u r k n o w l e d g e , L o c k e a n d Hume p l a c e g r e a t e m p h a s i s on i t s
our knowledge conveyed m
Rationalist
philosophers
ourthought.
who t e n d e d
being
Thus, i n c o n t r a s t t o 'the
to treat
thought
as a d i s -
e m b o d i e d u n i v e r s a l opposed t o e x t e n s i o n , t h e ' t h o u g h t ' w i t h

they deal i s always t h e thought
q u e n t l y t h e problems t h a t
lonally
Conse-
a r i s e f o r them i n e x a m i n i n g k n o w l e d g e
are o f a k i n d w h o l l y d i f f e r e n t
S p i n o z a and L e i b n i z .
o f a human i n d i v i d u a l .
which
They
from
those
encountered
by D e s c a r t e
a r e t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t a r e more
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 'Problem o f K n o w l e d g e ' ;
concern the r e l a t i o n o f o u r t h i n k i n g t o i t s
that
object.
tradit
i s they
And H e g e l ,
d e s p i t e Habermas' s t r i c t u r e s , h a s a g r e a t d e a l t o s a y on t h e
matter.
John Locke m
h i s Essay c o n c e r n i n g
t a c k l e s t h e problem o f knowledge m
t o t h e f o u r books o f t h e Essay.
refute
the notion that
or another
(We have
correspond
just
I n one way
the philosophies
seen how, f o r e x a m p l e ,
o f L e i b n i z : as e t e r n a l t r u t h s
u s b y God a t o u r c r e a t i o n . )
satisfaction
which
I n Book One he e n d e a v o u r s t o
t h e r e c a n be i n n a t e i d e a s .
f i g u r e s i nthe philosophy
m
Understanding
f o u r stages,
t h i s n o t i o n h a s been i m p l i c i t
of the R a t i o n a l i s t s .
Human
Locke, h a v i n g
it
implanted
t o h i s own
r e f u t e d t h i s n o t i o n , i s then faced w i t h the task o f
36.
describing
the true o r i g i n
o f ideas.
f o r m s t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e second
It
is m
that the significance
well-known,
book o f t h e Essay:
d e l i b e r a t i n g on o u r i d e a s ,
origin,
Tins,as i s
then
'Of I d e a s ' .
c o m b i n a t i o n and
their
o f language, o f o u r use o f words
62
i s b r o u g h t home t o h i m .
o r Language m
ression
Book T h r e e
general'.
And i t i s
t h a t Locke r e t u r n s
d i s c o v e r what knowledge
makes o f o u r i d e a s .
to his
therefore
deals with
a f t e r t h a t necessary
'Words
dig-
p r i n c i p a l concern which i s t o
we h a v e b y t h e u s e w h i c h t h e u n d e i s t a n d i n g
Book F o u r o f t h e E s s a y i s
therefore
'of
K n o w l e d g e and O p i n i o n .
Hegel
thinks
t h a t Lccke w i t h t h i s
t h e Essay o f t h e o r i g i n
a c c o u n t t h a t he g i v e s i n
and s i g n i f i c a n c e
o f c u r .ideas
0
t o s a t i s f y a genuine need o f p h i l o s o p h y ' . ^

credit
t h a t D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a and L e i b n i z d i s p e n s e w i t h
f o r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e i s t h a t we h a v e t o a c c e p t
as t r u e
t h e fundamental i d o a s o f t h e i r systems.
therefore
appear
I tis
Substance,
it.
immediate];/
propositions
i n t h i s way t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h t e r m s as
mode, e x t e n s i o n and t h e Monad a r e f i x e d - w i t h o u t t h e
p r o c e d u r e t o be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
object
s u c h an
Tnese i d e a s
as u n e n b i t a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s , a x i o m s ,
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s b e i n g argued.
this
tried
I tis not to their
account
etc.
'had
s i n c e , he c l a i m s ,
o f a p h i l o s o p h y t o prove i t s t r u t h ,
I ti s therefore
Hegel
it
finds
is the
not simply t o assert
n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f such
62.
John Locke.
An E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g . C o l l i e r
B o o k s , New Y o r k - L o n d o n 1 9 o 5 . ~ E d . M . C r a n s t o n , p . 2 2 3 .
63.
H e g e l Wertce 2 0 ,
p. 2 0 9 .
1)1.
i d e a s as S u b s t a n c e
indication
given.
and Monad s h o u l d be e x p l a i n e d and
as t o how
t h e y may
be v e r i f i e d
I t i s Locke's m e r i t , Hegel
attertion
to this necessity.
should also
claims,
From now
some
be
t o have drawn
on, he
therefore
a r g u e s , t h e m a m i d e a s o f p h i l o s o p h y have t o be d e r i v e d
and
64
not
oracularly
It
point
is
pronounced.
for this
reason t h a t Hegel
i n e p i s t e m o l o g y t o be t h e c o r r e c t
rightly
one.
starting-
LocRe, he
argues,
b e g i n s w i t h what i s 'immediate t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , '
which Hegel
b e g i n n i n g i n t h i s way
is,
I t is
w i t h our sense-impressions t h a t
c o n c e p t s s u ^ h as S u b s t a n c e ,
This s t a r t i n g
be d e r i v e d .
to
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f each i n d i v i d u a l ;
able to v e r i f y
p o i n t Hegel
i n d i v i d u a l ' s experience the immediate,
consciousness
since i t
is
everybody
The
from wholly
universal
always a r e s u l t .
knows t h i s
p.
65.
Ibid
p. ?C<9.
P23-
thinks
corresponds
each t h e r e f o r e w i l l
Because i n
I n d e e d , Hegel
be
the
che s e n s e - d ^ t a ,
alwaye
to
than the
c a n n o t t h e r e f o r e be
i s t h e case,
i s e s t h a t d a t a i n t o knowledge.
Ibid
and mode) h a v e
the species l a t e r
presupposed
suggests
t h a t he b e g i n s m
c o n c r e t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and
64.
universale
'Space, f o r e x a m p l e , comes l a t e r
than the s p a t i a l ,
J
individual..'
attribute
the concepts f o r h i m s e l f .
the u n i v e r s a l :
by
from the content o f experience
to
precedes
by
means t h a t L o c k e b e g i n s f r o m t h e d a t a s u p p l i e d
our sense-impressions.
(that
f i n d s Locke's
that
his
thinking
only subsequently organ-
Hence p h i l o s o p h y has
to
proceed
38.
i n t h a t manner n o t o n l y b e c a u s e i t
i s t h e manner m
o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g proceeds, b u t also m
t h i n k e r may a t t e s t t o i t s
which
order that the ordinary
truth.
I n a d o p t i n g t h i s course
h i s p h i l o s o p h y Locke
Hegel's view completely c o r r e c t .
is m
However he f a l l s down
66
H e g e l ' s e s t i m a t i o n by n o t p u r s u i n g i t d i a l e c t i c a l l y .
Start-
ing with individual
s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e L o c k e s e e k s t o show t h a t
all
i n sense-impressions,
ideas o r i g i n a t e
i n w h i c h he s e t s a b o u t
undialectical.
and i t
i s t h e manner
doing t h i s , Hegel claims, t h a t i t
According
t o Locke i d e a s a r e e i t h e r
is
arrived
a t t h r o u g h t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e body's
sensations
or through the individual's r e f l e c t i o n
activity
aroused
by those
sensations.
to the stimulus of sensation.

about
by 'the i m p r e s s i o n s
s e n s e s ' I t
on h i s m e n t a l
T h e r e i s no m e n t a l
A l l thinking therefore is
prior
brougn
t h a t o u t w a r d o b j e c t s make on o u r
i s i n t h i s way, H e g e l s a y s ,
that
i d e a s ' a r e shown by L o c k e
'to arise subjectively
Instead
dialectically
o f h i s proceeding
activity
'universal
from
objects'.
f r o m t h e o b j e c t and t h e
s u b j e c t t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e I and t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f
t h e o b j e c t , Locke remains a t t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t :
individual,
contingent sense-perception.
therefore,
Hegel argues,
I n his philosophy
we have a l w a y s t o do w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l
p e r c e p c i o n , n e v e r w i t h o b j e c t s as o b j e c t s o f t h o u g h t
sense-
or with
66.
Tbid'So t h e c o u r s e w h i c h LOCKC a d o p t e d i s q u i t e c o r r e c t
But i t i s n o t d i a l e c t i C a l l y (adopted) r a t h e r t h e u n i v e r s a l
i s analysed from t h e e m p i r i c a l c o n c r e t e ' .
67.
L o c k e . Essay c o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g
68.
H e g e l . W e r k e 20,p. 205.
( o p . c i t ) p . 68.
39.
t h o u g h t as s h a r e d
( u n i v e r s a l ) thought.
I t is
g r o u n d s t h a t H e g e l t h i n k s K a n t was r i g h t
by a r g u i n g t h a t
'it
on t h e s e
to criticize
i s n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l who i s
prepared
t o grant that
i d e a s may o r i g i n a t e
t h e source
69
of u n i v e r s a l conceptions but the understanding
Locke
. ^
Hegel
individual
is
sense-
p e r c e p t i o n b u t they a r e n o t i n h i s o p i n i o n w h o l l y formed o r ,
I n d e e d , t o be v e r i f i e d
ogical criticism
there.
This i s Hegel's major
methodol-
o f L o c k e : t h a t he p l a c e s t o o h i g h a v a l u e on
s e n s a t i o n i n o u r knowledge.
This overestimation o f the s i g n i f -
i c a n c e o f s e n s e - d a t a a r i s e s because Locke does n o t c o n c e i v e

starting-point dialectically.
manner, H e g e l b e l i e v e s , he w o u l d
Had he c o n c e i v e d
it
this
that
have f o u n d t h a t w i t h t h e
advance o f t h e argument o u r c o n c e p t i o n o f i t s
beginning
is
continually modified.
As I have a l r e a d y r e m a r k e d , L o c k e b e g i n s h i s E s s a y OP The
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g
ideas.
He i s
They a r e t h a t
with a refutation o f the notion o f innate
opposed t o t h e i d e a on p e r f e c t l y
' i f we w i l l
we s h a l l have l i t t l e
reason
i n t o t h e w o r l d w i t h them.
o f h u n g e r and t h i r s t ,
ance o f any s e t t l e d
answering
that
attentively
c o n s i d e r new-born
ideas a t a l l m
p. 206.
70.
Locke-op.cit.
p.52.
ideas
F o r , b a t i n g perha.ps some f a i n t
therriy e s p e c i a l l y
ideas
appear-
o f ideas
make u p t h o s e u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s
0
Unfortunately,
t o t h e m a t t e r i s more a m b i g u o u s .
Ibid
children,
t o t h i n k t h a t t h e y b r i n g many
a r e e s t e e m e d as i n n a t e p r i n c i p l e s . ' ' '
69.
grounds.
and w a r m t h . . . t h e r e i s n o t t h e l e a s t
t h e terms which
Hegel's a t t i t u d e
clear
He i s
neither
40.
fully
able t o accept
Locke) t o r e j e c t
the
it
t h e n o t i o n o f innate ideas n o r ( l i k e
completely.
He i s n o t p r e p a r e d
n o t i o n s i n c e he t h i n k s L o c k e ' s r e j e c t i o n
t o discard
of the notion t o
71
be
tied
and
up w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n
he i s n o t a b l e t o a c c e p t
that
attributable
t o t h e mind a l o n e .
t h e mind which
from
sense-experience.
the criticism
is
principal
For t h i s
a t a b u l a rasa r e c e i v e s a l l i t s
Hegel grants t h a t
there is
ideas
t o be t r u e .
should
ithing external'.
reaction;
some s t r e n g t h
As we
be r e g a r d e d
already
their
t r u t h s had evaded t h e t a s k
What i s more, H e g e l t h i n k s
t h a t Locke had e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t
ideas
claims:
content
philosophers through presenting
i d e a s as i n n a t e o r e t e r n a l
p r o v i n g those
i s what Locke
o f the n o t i o n o f innate ideas.
know, he b e l i e v e s t h a t
that
conception
t h e r e f o r e t h e r e i s no p a r t o f an i d e a t h a t i s
that
of
the implication of t h i s
t h e mind r e c e i v e s a l l i t s c o n t e n t t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l s t i m u l -
a t i o n and t h a t
to
o f t h e m i n d as a t a b u l a r a s a ,
as f i r s t
in
b e i n g caused
'The a c t i v i t y
o f mind', he argues,
o n l y i n t h i s way w i l l
i t become c o n s c i o u s
philosophy
'through
'is
sotc-
fj.rst
of i t s
72
essence'.
regarded
Accordingly, i t is not sufficient

s i m p l y as b e i n g e x i s t e n t
stand
them, f o l l o w i n g t h e p r e c e d e n t
first
being
t h e mind.
however, H e g e l does want t o argue t h a t
71 72.
Hegel. ibid.,p211.
I b i d . p. 2 1 1
i d e a s be
We h a v e t o u n d e r -
e s t a b l i s h e d by L o c k e , as
c a u s e d by o u r e n v i r o n m e n t .
i d e a s has a s i g n i f i c a n c e .
that
Against
this
background,
the notion of innate
They do e x i s t
in
t h e m i n d :'n a
41.
certain
sense f o r hxm b u t , maybe, n o t i n t h e sense
i n t e n d e d by t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who had f i r s t
tence.
initially
argued t h e i r
He w o u l d r a t h e r r e g a r d them as ' p r o p e r t i e s o f a germ
( K e i m ) , t h a t do n o t y e t e x i s t ' , ^ n o t as c o m p l e t e l y
ideas.
of
i n b o r n b u t as ' i m p l i c i t '
t h e n , as f a r as i t
innate ideas.
a r e n o t t o be r e g a r d e d
i n t h e human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
goes i s H e g e l ' s a t t i t u d e
I ti s clearly
Firstly,
Hegel, should
i t is
one l e v e l ,
strange
that the idealist
argue t h a t t h e f i r s t
mind.
he a d m i t s
receives i t s
Locke prepared
t o regard
agree w i t h Hegel t h a t
content
t h e human m i n d .
of
interest
suggests, t h a t
prepared
is
pro-
certainly
from
t o admit
that the
o u t s i d e , Le i s n o t l i k e
t h e m i n d as a b l a n k .
We c a n p e r h a p s
t h e mind i s n o t a b l a n k b u t t h i s
o f ideas.
f o r Hegel t o i n s i s t
philosopher,
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a w o r l d e x t e r n a l ~o
us n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e o r i g i n
sufficient
appears t o
stimulus t o thought
Secondly, although Hegel i s
mind f i r s t
Tms,
a p e c u l i a r response t o t h e prob-
v i d e d by t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , f o r t h i s
at
as
to the notion of
and I b e l i e v e t h e r e a r e t w o r e a s o n s why t h i s
so.
aspects
So he m o d i f i e s t h e n o t i o n t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e i d e a s
be
developed
I n t h i s sense he b e l i e v e s thern t o be e s s e n t i a l
t h e t h i n k i n g process.
lem,
exis-
Peculiarly,
t h a t those
ideas
telis
i t is
are ' i m p l i c i t '
'The q u e s t i o n whence t h e y came' i s
devoid
74
But
f o r him.
i t is precisely that
73-
Ibid.
74.
Ibid.
question that
is of interest to
K2.
Locke, so t h a t w i l l y - n i l l y Hegel has t o engage m

c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e o r i g i n o f our i d e a s .
i d e a s t o have t h e i r o r i g i n i n e x p e r i e n c e .
i s so s i n c e i f we
'suppose the mind t o be, as we
t o be f u r n i s h e d ?
say. w h i t e
i d e a s : How
comes
Whence comes i t by t h a t v a s t s t o r e w h i c h
t h e busy and boundless
f a n c y o f man
almost endless v a r i e t y ?
reason and knowledge.
has p a i n t e d on i t w i t h
an
Whence has i t a l l t h e m a t e r i a l s c f
To t h i s I answer, frorr EXPERIENCE.
t h a t a l l our knowledge i s founded

derives i t s e l f .
Locke t a k e s a l l
He b e l i e v e s t h i s
paper., d e v o i d o f a l l c h a r a c t e r s . w i t h o u t any
it
the d i s -
In
and from t h a t i t u l t i m a t e l y
Our o b s e r v a t i o n s employed e i t h e r ,
about
e x t e r n a l s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s , o r about the i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s o f
o u r minds p e r c e i v e d and r e f l e c t e d on by o u r s e l v e s , i s t h a t
s u p p l i e s our u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a l l t h e m a t e r i a l s o f our
ing .
Hegel does n o t w i s h t o d i s a g r e e w i t h t h i s .
however, t h a t t h e i m p o r t a r t q u e s t i o n i s
7
experience'.
'what one
which
thmk-
He b e l i e v e
understands
by
ft
Locke as, we
can see, u n d e r s t a n d s
by
experience
'our o b e s e r v a t i o n s employed e i t h e r , about e x t e r n a l s e n s i b l e

o b j e c t s , o r about t h e i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s o f our minds' awakened
by e x t e r n a l s t i m u l a t i o n .
Experience
is,
f o r Locke, the experJen
o f t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e w o r l d makes on o u r s e l v e s , ana i t t a k e s
its origin m
the senses.
The
senses convey t o the mind,
'Several d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h i n g s , a c c o r d i n g t o those
77
v a r i o u s ways w h e r e i n those o b j e c t s do a f f e c t them'.
75-
Locke.
Essay o p . c i t . . p. 6 l .
(Locke's
76.
Hegel.
Suhrkwamp V e r i a g Werke 20,
77-
Locke, i b i d . p. 21J.
emphasis.)
p. 215
43-
Once i n t h e mind these ideas are o p e r a t e d on by our ' i n t e r n a l

sense' and t h r o u g h t h i s i n t e r n a l sense o b s e r v i n g i t s own
we have the ideas o f r e f l e c t i o n .
activity
Thus b o t h t h e ideas o f sensa-
t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n are d e r i v e d from e x p e r i e n c e conceived

t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t s o f our senses.
as
T h i s account
of
e x p e r i e n c e Hegel r e g a r d s as t h e ' n a t u r a l ' e p i s t e m o i o g y o f n a t u r a l

science.
The
However, he says, i t
i s n o t f o r t h a t reason
true.
t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e ^ m h i s view , has t o be more t h a n a
r e f l e c t i o n on t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s .
I n t h e q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e , t h e p r o p e r account o f e x p e r i e n c e ,
Hegel agrees w i t h Locke t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s e x p e r i e n c e d .
Every-
t h i n g , he a d m i t s , has t o be i n our e x p e r i e n c e b e f o r e i t
i s known.
I t would be absurd
f o r one t o b e l i e v e t h a t one can know what i s
not
But i t
experienced.
i s what i s u n d e r s t o o d by
t h a t has, m Hegel's view, t o be c l a r i f i e d .
experience
When Locke t a l k s
o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e mind, what he means i s i t s r e f l e c t i o n on

what i s e x t e r n a l
nature.
him
to j t ,
what, t h e r e f o r e ,
does not p e r t a i r . t o : t s
But t h i s i s n o t how Hegel understands
experience.
For
' I must have t h a t m y s e l f , be t h a t m y s e l f , what I have and
am
i ft
i s experience'.
I n h i s view e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t s i m p l y what we
sense, b u t what d e t e r m i n e s and moves my mind.

the n o t i o n
o f r e f l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f s e n s a t i o n we s t i l l
have an adequate account,

t h a t i s simply e x t e r n a l
p a r t o f my
78.
Even i f we
do n o t
s i n c e e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t o f something
t o me;
t h a t something
i d e n t i t y o r be something
Hegel.3 b i d , p . 213.
add
must e i t h e r
t h a t T possess.
be
For example,
44.
' I am a man, have a c t i v i t y , w i l l ,
a consciousness
of that
which
! 7
I am and o t h e r s a r e , and so t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y e x p e r i e n c e .
So e x p e r i e n c e , Hegel appears t o be a r g u i n g , i s always
and a c t i v e i n n a t u r e .
not
I t presupposes a w i l l .
personal
Equally i t
is
o n l y t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f m y s e l f qua i n d i v i d u a l o r s i m p l y o f
o b j e c t s o f my p e r c e p t i o n , b u t o f o t h e r s .
Thus e x p e r i e n c e ,
Hegel suggests, i s i m m e d i a t e l y s o c i a l ; c e r t a i n l y i t
i s never
blank.
It
i s i m m e d i a t e l y apparent t h a t e x p e r i e n c e conceived
t h i s f a s h i o n i s n o t c o n f i n e d t o o b s e r v a t i o n as w i t h t h e e m p i r i c ist
philosophers.
and s o c i a l .
empiricist
And i t
A c c o r d i n g t o Hegel i t
i s both p r a c t i c a l
i s h i s o p i n i o n t h a t t n e problems o f t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r s , who r e s t t h e i r arguments on a narrow
c o n c e p t i o n o f experience, recede i n t o t h e background
i f we
u n d e r s t a n d e x p e r i e n c e as he suggests.
F o r example, t h a t I
know man from e x p e r i e n c e i m p l i e s t h a t
' a l l a r e men, I do n o t
need t o have seen them a l l '

a consciousness
t o be sure o f t h a t .
Tbac ' I have
o f m y s e l f and what o t h e r s a r e ' i m p l i e s t h a t I

, gQ
know what men i n g e n e r a l a r e .

c e i v e d i s p e r se u n i v e r s a l .
My e x p e r i e n c e c o r r e c t l y
By which Hegel means we do n o t
have t o search o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s f o r a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h ;
is
contained m
It
experience
con-
it
itself.
seems we have now come near t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g what Hegel
means by e x p e r i e n c e ; i t does n o t appeal' a l l t h a t d i f f e r e n t

79-
Ibid.
80.
Ibid.
from
45-
what i s n o r m a l l y u n d e r s t o o d
by e x p e r i e n c e .
But t h e appearance
i s d e c e p t i v e , e x p e r i e n c e , as we n o r m a l l y use i t
a t e r m f o r Hegel's purposes.
p r e c i s e meaning.
i s f a r t o o vague
I n h i s v o c a b u l a r y i t has a more
A c c o r d i n g t o him ' i t
i s n o t h i n g more t h a n
t h e form o f o b j e c t i v i t y ; t h a t t h e r e i s something
ness means t h a t i t has
t h e same, i t
in c o n s c i o u s -
an o b j e c t i v e form f o r i t o r , i t e x p e r i e n c e s
l o o k s on i t as something
o b j e c t i v e , - immediate
8l
knowledge, p e r c e p t i o n ' .
E v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e r e i s t o be known
must, i n h i s view, t a k e on t h i s form, i t has

consciousness.
way
The
or another.
t o be something
o b j e c t must'be seen, heard
I t has
- sensed m
t o be an appearance m
one
the world.
e s s e n t i a l component o f Hegel's n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e
p a r a d o x i c a l l y the e m p i r i c i s t ' s d e p i c t i o n of i t .
i n Empiricism t h i s great p r i n c i p l e
for
is,
An
then,
S?nce ' t h e r e i s
t h a t what i s t r u e must be
in
82
r e a l i t y and must be t h e r e f o r p e r c e p t i o n . '
he s u g g e s t s ,
reality.
is f i r s t l y
I t i s t h i s l i n k t h a t is n o t developed
since
s i d e r e d as s e n s a t i o n ' . But as we have now

t
experience,
t h e c o n n e c t i o n t h a t t n e u g h t nas
i e s o f L e i b n i z , S p i n o z a and D e s c a r t e s
f o r Hegel
So o u r
with
i n the p n i l o s o p r -
'thought as n o t con-
been l e d t o expect, t h a t ,
i s not a l l t h a t there i s to experience.
I t has,
he
says, "to be d i f f e r e n t : a t e d from t h e s i m p l e i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n

of i n d i v i d u a l facts.
-"
The
f a c t t h a t something
has t a k e n or
an o b j e c t i v e form f o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n i t s sense-experience
n o t exhaust
experience.
does
J u s t as e s s e n t i a l t o t h e n o t i o n o f
e x p e r i e n c e , i n Hegel's v i e w , i s t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e appearance
81.
T>id p. 215.
82.
Hegel- Suhrkanp Weê 8 En/.yklor-ad" e d e r p h 1 osoph 1 schen
Wissenschaicen I , o . L08.
85.
Ibid.p. I I I .
46.
( W e l t e g c h e i n u n g ) what i t i s ' m
a complex argument; b u t i t
itself .
accounts
This i s ,
admittedly,
f o r the u n i v e r s a l and
personal
n a t u r e o f Hegel's view o f e x p e r i e n c e .
What i s as e s s e n t i a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e i s , he argues,
t h a t i t s h o u l d a l s o be
seen as
'the overcoming (Aufheben) o f t h e semblance o f
otherness
and t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f the t h i n g t h r o u g h
The
o t h e r e s s e n t i a l aspect o f e x p e r i e n c e
know what i s e x p e r i e n c e d
(Wissenschaft).
the
b e i n g e x t e r n a l t o me
has t o become something
something
i s t h e n t h a t we
itself'.
should
That i s t h e t a s k o f s c i e n c e
I n s c i e n c e Hege] t h i n k s t h a t t h e semblance o f
'in i t s e l f '
empiricist m
'in i t s e l f ' .
The o b j e c t
f o r me as w e l l as b e i n g o b j e c t i v e as the
h i s account
f o r me,
i s overcome.
of experience claims.
I t becomes
Hegel b e l i e v e s , i n b e i n g known.
I n science,
t h e n , he argues, e x p e r i e n c e i s b o t h p e r s o n a l and uiin versa 1.

i s t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s genuine
We
of
I t
experience.
have a l r e a d y e n c o r n t e r e d t h e i d e a t h a t t h e l a c k o f u n i t y
b e i n g and consciousness
i m p l i e s an
'otherness' t o Kegel.
e n t e r s i n t o h i s c r i t i c i s m o f both Descartes
and Spinoza.
I t
As
we
have seen, he b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s the purpose o f p h i l o s o p h y , t o

come t h i s o t h e r n e s s .
I t i s , as ought now
i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Locke.
I t is m
over
t o be c l e a r , a l e i t m o t i ' ,
the e m p i r i c i s t s ' n o t i o n of
e x p e r i e n c e t h a t t h i s o t h e r n e s s t a k e s on i t s s h a r p e s t
form.
C e r t a i n l y , Hegel b e l i e v e s Locke's p h i l o s o p h y wakens i n t h e modern

e r a 'the b i f u r c a t i o n ' o f thoughc and b e i n g , o f t h e I and
84.
Wer-ke 20 p. 215-
85.
I b i d . p . 21C.
w i t h need and
That b i f u r c a t i o n he d e p i c t s as
pain.
reality".
identical
hi,
Locke m
r e g a r d i n g e x p e r i e n c e merely as i n d i v i d u a l and p a s s i v e
had p l a c e d r e a l i t y on t h e one s i d e and t h o u g h t on t h e o t h e r i n

such a manner t h a t i t was
fully.
success-
But e x p e r i e n c e p r o p e r l y conceived i s t h e overcoming o f
that bifurcation.
the
i m p o s s i b l e t c mediate t h e two
Experience i s , Hegel has argued, n o t o n l y
form o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l but i s a l s o t h e consciousness
o f what I am o r have.
since i t
E x p e r i e n c e i s t h e overcoming o f b i f u r c a t i o n
i s t h e process o f t h e o b j e c t i v e
becoming my
world being i n t e r n a l i s e d ,
own.
I s h a l l n o t d i s c u s s here the m e r i t s o f t h i s , Hegel's

o f e x p e r i e n c e as t h e process o f overcoming o b j e c t i v i t y .
i t w i l l be more a p p r o p r i a t e t o d i s c u s s
account
I
i t when we come t o Manx's
c r i t i c i s m o f t h e Phenomenology o f Mind, f o r i t
i s there t n a t the
whole d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g e x t e r n a l i s a t J o n and a l i e n a t i o n
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y a r i s e s .
think
in
What concerns us here i s t h e s t r e n g t h
D f Hegel's c r i t i c i s m o f Locke's t h e o r y o f knowledge.

think lies m
h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e narrowness
experience.
E x p e r i e n c e , as Locke understands i t ,
exclusively
confined t o the i n d i v i d u a l ' s sensation.
That I
o f Locke's Ldea o f
i s almost
What,
a c c o r d i n g t o him, we are t o suppose when we examine e x p e r i e n c e i s

t h a t t h e mind i s , a s he says, a w h i t e paper, v o i d o f a l l c h a r a c t e r s ,
w i t h o u t any
i d e a o f i t s own.
impresses i t s e l f
Experience
i s what s u b s e q u e n t l y
on t h e mind t h r o u g h t h e organs o f sense.
Ex-
p e r i e n c e , chen, i s c o n f i n e d t o t a s t i n g , s e e i n g , h e a r i n g , f e e l i n g
and s m e l l i n g .
K e g e l , however, argues t h a t t h i s i s b u t t h e m a t t e r
of thought not t h i n k i n g i t s e l f .
For t h a t reason, he suggests,
Locke's n o t i o n c f e x p e r i e n c e l a c k s u n i v e r s a l i t y .
Now
what Hegel
48.
appears t o mean by t h i s i s t h a t what we e x p e r i e n c e

t o Locke's account o f i t
it
i s d e f i c i e n t i n two r e s p e c t s .
l a c k s u n i v e r s a l i t y because i t
it
i s the experience
Firstly,
i s t h e sense-experience
i n d i v i d u a l ; and who, Hegel would argue,

o t h e r than s u b j e c t i v e l y ?
according
o f an
can convey a f e e l i n g
Secondly, i t l a c k s u n i v e r s a l i t y because
o f an i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l n o t , as 1 i n d i c a t e d
e a r l i e r , a shared e x p e r i e n c e .
Experience
conceived
i n t h i s way
cannot f u r n i s h knowledge, c e r t a i n o r o t h e r w i s e .
Hegel seeks t o ground t h i s c r i t i c i s m more f i r m l y by examining
Locke's account o f t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f complex i d e a s .
Now, a c c o r d i n g
t o LocRe such complex i d e a s as t h e n o t i o n s o f cause and e f f e c t

are d e r i v e d from e x p e r i e n c e
i n t h i s way: ' i n t h e n o t i c e
that our
senses t a k e o f t h e c o n s t a n t v i c i s s i t u d e s o f t h i n g s , we cannot b u t
observe t h a t s e v e r a l p a r t i c u l a r , b o t h q u a l i t i e s and substances,
b e g i n t o e x i s t ; and t h a t they r e c e i v e t h i s t h e i r e x i s t e n c e from
the due a p p l i c a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n o f some o t h e r bei.ig.
From
, 86
t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n we g e t o u r ideas o f cause and e t f e c t
account o f t h e o r i g i n o f o u r complex i d e a s , Hegel argues,

tautologous m nature.
This
is
I t appears t h a t Locke i s c l a i m i n g t h a t we
v
>)
o b t a i n t h e n o t i o n s o f cause and e f f e c t s i m p l y be o b s e r v i n g t h e
'constant v i c i s s i t u d e ? o f t h i n g s ' .
By o b s e r v i n g t h a t
constant
v i c i s s i t u d e o f t h i n g s we p e r c e i v e t h a t some t h i n g s b e g i n t o e x i s t ,
and we a t t r i b u t e t h a t e x i s t e n c e t o t h e a c t i o n o f a n o t h e r
existent
thing.
We c a l l t h e t h i n g coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e ' e f f e c t ' and t h e
t h i n g t h a t i s a l r e a d y e x i s t e n t 'cause'.
Locke seems t h e n t o be
86.
L o c k e . o p . c i t . , p . 188
49.
s a y i n g t h a t the complex ideas cause and e f f e c t are
simply
l a b e l s we a t t a c h t o two d i s t i n c t but connected o b s e r v a t i o n s .

What has happened m Hegel's o p i n i o n i s t h a t we have been asiced
t o take note o f two o b j e c t s i n our sense-experience t h a t a l r e a d y
87
stand i n
a c o n c r e t e r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t n e r .
From the
p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e o f t h i s r e l a t i o n we are asked t o pass immedi a t e l y t o t h e u n i v e r s a l : the c a t e g o r i e s o r t h e complex ideas o f

cause and e f f e c t .
determinate
Tt i s , Hegel argues,
'a t r a n s l a t i o n from t h e
i n t o t h e form o f u n i v e r s a l i t y , wherein
the same l i e s
^8
a t i t s basis..'."
The
t a u t o l o g y , Hegel would c l a i m , c o n s i s t s
t h e r e f o r e i n the c a t e g o r i e s b e i n g d e r i v e d from what i s a3 ready

known t o be a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e o f t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y .
Fo^.
a t t h e b a s i s o f the o b s e r v a t i o n which i s employed t o d e r i v e t h e

c a t e g o r i e s I J e the c a t e g o r i e s themselves.
Hegel's p o i n t appears
t o be simply t h a t we cannot p o i n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e o f t h e
a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f the ideas cause and e f f e c t w i t h o u t our
possessing
those
beforehand
ideas.
T h i s , t h e n , i s what Hegel b e l i e v e s t o be the d e f e c t o f Locke's

d e r i v a t i o n o f complex i d e a s from sense-experience.
course, does n o t i m m e d i a t e l y
Locke, o f
proceed t o t h i s d e r i v a t i o n m
Essay on the Human Understanding.
I t comes a t the end o f a
l e n g t h y account o f t h e g e n e r a l process o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t
place m
our t h i n k i n g .
his
cakes
I t i s the n a t u r e o f t h i s g e n e r a l process
o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t f o r him c a s t s doubts on t h e c e r t a i n t y o f our

knowledge.
He b e g i n s , as Hegel n o t e s , by making a d i s t i n c t i o n
87.
Hegel. Subrkamp V e r l a g Werl e 20, p. 219'One could say,'
he adds, 'that t h e r e i s n o t h i n g more s u p e r f i c i a l than t h i s
deduction of ideas.'
88.
Ibid.
50.
s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f Descartes
and Spinoza between ideas
'as t h e y
are i d e a s o r p e r c e p t i o n s i n our minds, and as t h e y are m o d i f i c ations of matter m
the bodies t h a t cause such p e r c e p t i o n s
, 89
us .
I t is m
t h e b a s i s o f t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t Locke makes
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i t e s o f an o b j e c t : the

modifications of matter m
the bodies and i t s secondary q u a l i t i e s :
ideas o r p e r c e p t i o n s i n our minds.
The
p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s are
'such as are u t t e r l y i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e body, an what s t a t e

1
90
soever i t be
- He
suggests
t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l examples o f
such p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s are s o l i d i t y , e x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e ,
and r e s t .
'which m
motion
Secondary q u a l i t i e s are on the o t h e r hand those

the o b j e c t s themselves
but powers
t o produce v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s i n us by t h e i r p r i m a r y
qualities!"
It
t r u t h are n o t h i n g m
f o l l o w s f o r Locke char, sample ideas d e r i v e d from sense-impress-
i o n s do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y resemble the o b j e c t s which are

e f f e c t i v e cause.
sense-ideas,
by themselves
He appears, t h e n , t o be c l a i m i n g t h a t
simple
such as t h ^ t o f c o l o u r , are n o t d e r i v e d from t h i n g s

but r a t h e r from our manner o f s e n s i n g
Thus simple ideas
things.
'whatever r e a l i t y we by mistake a t t r i b u t e t o
them' a r e , he r e p e a t s , ' n o t h i n g m
the o b j e c t s themselves
powers t o produce v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s i n u s ' S i m p l e

sensation m
their
but
ideas o f
h i s e s t i m a t i o n f a l l s h o r t o f g i v i n g an a c c u r a t e
d e s c r i p t i o n o f the o b j e c t which induces them.

as Hegel p o i n t s o u t , i s one made by Descartes
This d i s t i n c t i o n ,
and Spmoza.
i*e
might remember, however, t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n t a k e s on a s l i g h t l y

89-
Locke, op. c i t . . p.
90.
ibid.p.
83.
91.
92.
Ibid.
Ibid-p.
85.
82.
51
d i f f e r e n t form i n t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s s i n c e t h e y are prepared

t o admit o n l y one p r i m a r y q u a l i t y o f o b j e c t s : e x t e n s i o n .
They
t h e r e f o r e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Knowledge i m p a r t e d by o u r senses i s
more r e s t r i c t e d than Locke suggests.
They a r e , however, a t one
though w i t h Locke m s t r e s s i n g t h e d e c e p t i v e n a t u r e o f t h e i d e a s
i m p a r t e d by o u r sense-experience.
Hegel i s o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h i s emphasis on t h e d e c e p t i v e
n a t u r e o f o u r sense-experience r e p r e s e n t s , m
knowledge, a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
i n t h i s way.
He accounts
Locke's t h e o r y o f
f o r the c o n t r a d i c t i o n
T r u t h , Locke a s s e r t s , ' i s t h e agreement o f o u r

i
93
ideas w i t h the r e a l i t y o f t h i n g s
This, obviously, i s a
correspondence n o t i o n o f t r u t h a c c o r d i n g t o which we
establish
the t r u e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s by o b s e r v i n g 'the p r o d u c t o f t h i n g s
o p e r a t i n g on t h e mind i t h a t i s , by examining our sense-ideas. 94
The t o u c h s t o n e
o f knowledge i s , t h e n , o u r o b s e r v a t i o n s o f e x t e r n a ]
sensible objects.
The c o n t r a d i c t i o n a r i s e s , Hegel c l a i m s ,
t h a t t h i s touchstone,
i n t h e course
o f Locke's d i s t i n g u i s n i n g
p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s
f u r n i s h u n r e l i a b l e knowledge.
So, Hegel, suggests,
objects, i s i t s e l f
t h e o r y o f knowledge t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h i s i t s e l f
Hegel expresses t h i s m
that, m
in
shown t o
m
Locke's
untrue.
a somewhat complex manner by c l a i m i n g
Locke's e p i s t e m o l o g y ,
i s e x p l a i n e d t o be i n e s s e n t i a l
'the moment o f b e i n g f o r a n o t h e r
' and n o n e t h e l e s s
' a l l t r u t h i n being f o r a n o t h e r ' . ^
93-
I b i d . , p . 325-
94.
I bid.,p.
95
Hegel. WerKe 20, p. 21*5

aware o f t n i s problem.
(Locke)
sees
By which I t a k e him t o mean.
320.
He t h i n g s t h a t LccKe h i m s e l f i s
52.
as I a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , t h a t on t h e one hand Locke s t r e s s e s

the d e c e p t i v e n a t u r e o f sense-impressions
for
( t h e moment o f b e i n g
a n o t h e r i s e x p l a i n e d t o be e s s e n t i a l ) and on t h e o t h e r he t a k
as t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h t h a t v e r y same sense-experience
a l l t r u t h i n being f o r another).
undermines his own
(he sees
Hence t h e c l a i m i s t h a t Locke
t h e o r y o f knowledge by a r g u i n g t h a t t h e
simple
i d e a s o f s e n s a t i o n are d e c e p t i v e .
It
i s n e v e r t h e l e s s t h r o u g h t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f these
vanous
i m p r e c i s e s i m p l e i d e a s t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o Locke, vie are a b l e

c o n s t r u c t those complex i d e a s w i t h which
It
i s more t h a n e v i d e n t t h a t
to perceive
lo
substances.
'such a complex i d e a cannot be
the
r e a l essence o f any substance f o r then t h e p r o p e r t i e s i n
that
body would depend on t h a t complex i d e a , and be d e d u c i b l e
from
196
it,
and t h e i r necessary c o n n e c t i o n be known.
Locke argues
t h a t t h e ideas making up a complex i d e a ought t o be d e r i v e d f r c n

t h e substance i t s e l f .
However, what o u r senses secure
o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e substance i t s e l f
from
the
( a t l e a s t i n t h e case o f t h e
i d e a s o f the secondary q u a l i t i e s o f t h a t s u b s t a n c e ) i s u n r e l i a b l e
knowledge.
So the o n l y way
be congruent
w i t h t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e substance by i t s e l f i s
'that the p r o p e r t i e s i n
idea.
t h a t our complex i d e a s can p o s s i b l y
t h a t body would depend on t h a t complex
But t h i s i s c l e a r l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the s t a n d a r d
t r u t h which i s t h e o b j e c t as i t i s by i t s e l f .
a l l c u r complex i d e a s are i m p e r f e c t and
I t follows that
inadequate.
we d i d have an e x a c t c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l t h e secondary
o f a substance m
96.
our complex i d e a , we
L o c k e . i b i d .p.
215.
of
Since,
if
qualities
s h o u l d n o t have an
idea
53-
o f t h e essence o f t h a t t h i n g .
know what a substance
I n Locke's view, we
cannot
is in itself.
Locke conceives t h e problem more f u l l y under t n e n o t i o n

o f co-existence.
T h i s i s a s i m p l e enough n o t i o n .
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no c e r t a i n t y t h a t what we
to
c o - e x i s t i $ one s u b j e c t m
a s . f a r as Locke i s concerned,
I t follows that i t
understand
o u r i d e a s does so i n r e a l i t y .
it
what p r o p e r t i e s have a necessary

another.
I ti s his
So,
i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us t o know
u n i o n o r i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h one
i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us t o know how
we s h o u l d p r o p e r l y demarcate substances
with our ideas.
He
c l a i m s t h a t t h i s i s so because f i r s t l y ,
i t i s most p r o b a b l e
t h a t t h e r e a r e i n s e n s i b l e pares o f o b j e c t s w h i c h e q u a l l y coe x i s t w i t h t h e causes o f o u r o t h e r i d e a s i n t h e o b j e c t and.,

s e c o n d l y , because i t may be t h a t t h e v"ery same o b j e c t w i l l be
found elsewhere
i n nature w i t h y e t another p r o p e r t y c o - e x i s t i n g
98
in i t .
I n b o t h these i n s t a n c e s we would be p r e v e n t e d
demarcating
an o b j e c t p r o p e r l y .
We a r e , t h e n , on these grounds
a g a i n n o t a b l e t o c l a i m adequate knowledge o f substances

such knowledge would
from
since
c o n s i s t i n knowing what a l l t h e p r o p e r t i e s
o f an o b j e c t a r e 'by i t s e l f ' .
Hegel concludes
from a l l t h i s t h a t ' t h e u n i v e r s a l as such
i s a c c o r d i n g t o Locke t h e pi oduct o f o u r mind; I t i s n o t o b j e e t i ' /

b u t o n l y r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o t h e o b j e c t ' . S i n c e we do a f t e r a l l
have complex i d e a s o f substances
9798.
99-
I b i d . p. 220.
Ibid.p.
310.
Hegel .Werke, p. 220.
it
appears t o Hegel t h a t Locke
54.
i s o b l i g e d t o argue t h a t those ideas are something we f o r m u l a t e

f o r o u r s u b j e c t i v e purposes o n l y .
The l a s t t h i n g he can argue
i s t h a t they a r e o b j e c t i v e o r t r u e .
T h i s n o t i o n o f a complex
i d e a Hegel equates w i t h h i s n o t i o n o f a s p e c i e s - i d e a
sbegriff).
(Gattung-
So he t a k e s Locke's r e a s o n i n g t o i m p l y t h a t 'the
s p e c i e s indeed expresses something t h a t i s i n t h e o b j e c t s ; they

do n o t exhaust t h e o b j e c t s h o w e v e r . '
r e a s o n i n g accounts
r e a l and nominal
nominal
1 0 0
I n h i s view,
this
f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Locke makes between
essences.
The species ideas a r e n e c e s s a r i l y
essences r a t h e r than r e a l essences because they do n o t
exhaust t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r o b j e c t s .
F o r example, m
speaking
o f man o r g o l d o r any o t h e r species which we suppose t o c o n s i s t

o f a p r e c i s e essence i m p a r t e d t o t h e o b j e c t s by n a t u i e , we cann o t be c e r t a i n , Locke t h i n k s , o f t h e t r u t h o f any a f f i r m a t i o n
1
made about i t . " '
0 1
We are indeed, i n h i s view, q u i t e o u t o f
o" r way when we t h i n k t h a t t h i n g s c o n t a i n w i t h i n themselves t h e

q u a l i t i e s they appear t o possess.
T h e r e f o r e Locke i s , as Hegel n o t e s , q u i t e m
comes t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g n a t u r e .
awe when i t
A c c o r d i n g t o him we have b u t
little
i n s i g h t i n t o i t s essence.
Things, however a b s o l u t e and
100.
Ibid.
101..
Locke, i b i d - p . 332.
102.
'To suppose t h a t t h e species o f t h i n g s a r e a n y t h i n g b u t

the s o r t i n g o f them under g e n e r a l names, a c c o r d i n g as they
agree t o s e v e r a l a b s t r a c t ideas o f which we make those names
t h e s i g n s , i s t o confound t r u t h , and i n t r o d u c e u n c e r t a i n t y
i n t o a l l t h e g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t can be made about
them.' i b i d .
55.
e n t i r e they nay seem i n themselves, 'are D u t r e t a i n e r s Z^

o t h e r p a r t s o f n a t u r e f o r t h a t which they are most t a k e n n o t i c e
of
by us'.
Those o f t h e i r q u a l i t i e s chat we observe,
any o f t h e i r a c t i o n s and powers, are

them'.' ^
There i s n o t one
i s n o t i n t h i s way
including
'owing t o something w i t h o u t
p a r t o f n a t u r e , he would c l a i m , t h a t
dependent on something b e y o n ^ our
apprehension
Because o f t h i s dependence o f our knowledge on our l i m i t e d experience
'a s c i e n c e o f n a t u r e and the c o r p o r e a l w o r l d i s ' , f o r
Locke, ' i m p o s s i b l e ; what remains t o us are more o r l e s s p r o b a b l e

104
i n t i m a t i o n s which t h r o u g h each new
What n a t u r e i s m
beyond our
f a c t can be
i t s e l f i s , then, m
overthrown'.
Locke's view f o r e v e r
ken.
Hegel suggests
t h a t t h i s i s so because Locke never achieved
a f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e o f t h e t h i n g i n i t s e l f
We
have a l r e a d y had some i n d i c a t i o n o f t h i s argument m Hegel 's
account o f e x p e r i e n c e .
i s i t s concept,
by our senses.
For Hegel, wnat a t h i n g
t h a t i s , t h e t h i n g as i t
as Locke would have i t ,
t h e t h i n g as i t
'apparent
'm i t s e l f '
i s understood
have t h i s view o f the m
itself
i s passively perceived
i n our u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
o t h e r n e s s ' i s overcome.
is
and n o t ,
Hegel would c l a i m t h e r e f o r e t n a t t h e t h i n g
i t s e l f i s o n l y p r o p e r l y experienced
its
(Ansich
m
There-
Because Locke dees n o t
( A n s i c h ) Hegel t h i n k s h i s epister-,
ology i s shallow.
O b v i o u s l y , t h e r e i s an element o f Hegel's
103.
Locke, i b i d . , p. j?39104.
E r n s t C a s s i r e ^ , o p . c i t . , V o ] . 2. p. 209. Hegel t h i n k s t h i s
o b j e c t i o n t o the c e r t a i n t y o f n a t u r a l science t o oe t h e o l
o l d l i t a n y : ' i n s i n n e r e der N a t u r d r m g t k e m e r s c n a f f e n e r
G e i s t ' . Werke 20, p. 220.
56.
antipathy t o a l l materialism contained m

the
this criticism.
None
l e s s we might agree w i t h Hegel when he argues t h a t Locke's
e p i s t e m o l o g y remains a t t h e l e v e l o f appearance.
Since,
after
a l l , Locke i s concerned w i t h how t h i n g s appear t o o u r senses

Hegel seems t o be r i g h t m
a s s e r t i n g t h a t a l l Locke has t o o f f e r
knowledge o f phenomena o r ' t h a t which i s and n o t what i s
true.'^"
is
1
Be t h a t as i t may, he b e l i e v e s t h a t Locke t h r o u g h h i s shallowness

has m i s c o n s t r u e d
t h e purpose o f p h i l o s o p h y .
I n Hegel's view
it
has as i t s purpose t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e
for
i t s truth.
I t i s c e r t a i n l y n o t i t s aim t o l i m i t
as t h e e m p i r i c i s t s do.
it
experience
W i t h Locke, he adds, t h e t r u t h
(unless
i s merely v e r b a l t r u t h ) s i m p l y s i g n i f i e s t h e harmony o f o u r
ideas w i t h e x t e r n a l t h i n g s .
A l l t h a t then a r i s e s i n h i s
philos-
ophy i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t t o i t s o b j e c t .
( T h i s i s what we have i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r as t h e problem o f knowledge .)
of
The r e s u l t o f t l i s ,
attempting t o discover the l i m i t s
o u r knowledge, Hegel m a i n t a i n s , i s t h a t t h e c o n t e n t o f t h o u g h t
i t s e l f i s l e f t t o one s i d e .
But where on t h e o t h e r hand
'thought
i s from t h e b e g i n n i n g c o n c r e t e , t h o u g h t and t h e u n i v e r s a l i d e n t i c a l
w i t h e x t e n s i o n , t h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e two
i s incomprehensible,
without interest'.
T h i s we might
regard
as one o f t h e f o r m a l grounds f o r Hegel's r e j e c t i o n o f t h e problem

of knowledge.
He reasons t h a t i t cannot r e p r e s e n t a problem t o
105.
Hegel i b i d . , p. 214.
The g e n e r a l o b j e c t i o n i s t o t h e
p o s i t i v i t y o f t h e approach.
106.
The o p p o s i t e o f t h i s i s , o f coarse, b i f u r c a t e d
See Werke 20 p. 210.
thinking.
57-
genuine p h i l o s o p h y which i s i m m e d i a t e l y
of
i t o b j e c t ( o f the A n s i c h ) .
is f a i r l y
simple.
t h e c o n c r e t e knowledge
I n e f f e c t , what he i s
saying
He i s s a y i n g t h a t where p h i l o s o p h y i s know-
ledge t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n as t o whether i t might be.

I f t h a t i s one o f t h e f o r m a l grounds f o r Hegel's r e j e c t i o n
of
t h e problem o f knowledge, we might l e a r n more o f t h e substan-
t i a l grounds m
examining
h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o the philosophy o f
D a v i d Hume, f o r m Hume's p h i l o s o p h y t h e problem takes on i t s

most v e x i n g form.
scepticism.
experience
Now Hume, Hegel t h i n k s , t o o k Locke's p r i n c i p l e o f

as h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t
3
consistently'. ^
perception
I t l e a d s , as we s h a l l see, t o a s p e c i e s o f
our senses.
'but f o l l o w e d i t t h r o u g h more
Hume t o o k e x p e r i e n c e
t o mean 'immediate
or, what he c a l l s t h e i m p r e s s i o n s made by o b j e c t s on

As w i t h Locke immediate
p e r c e p t i o n ( o r these
i m p r e s s i o n s ) i s t h e o n l y source o f o u r i d e a s .
Idea -, a c c o r d i n g
t o Hume, a r e t h e n e i t h e r d e r i v e d from sense i m p r e s s i o n s o r t h e

impressions o f r e f l e c t i o n i . e . , our feelings concerning t h e
o b j e c t s about us o r o u r f e e l i n g s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a c t i v i t y o f
our mind.
Prom t h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , Hegel e x p l a i n s , Hume procee
to undermine i n a c o n s i s t e n t f a s h i o n t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f a l l o u r
ideas:
'he abrogated
t h e o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e b e i n g i n and f o r i t s e l f
108
of
the determinations o f thought.'
107.
I b i d p. 2 8 l .
108.
Ibid.
Hegel does n o t s i m p l y r e g a r d t h e achievement o f
Hume's n e g a t i v e l y .
T h i s i s i n d i c a t e d by h i s use o f t h e
term aufheben f o r a b r o g a t e .
Aufheben can a l s o mean o v e r come.
Read i n t h i s " sense i t i m p l i e s t h a t Hume's a c h i e v e ment was t o c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a h i g h e r form o f
philosophy.
T h i s m Hegel's view i s h i s mam achievement
He s e t s t h e scene f o r Kant.
See below p.64.
58.
A c c o r d i n g t o K e g e l , hune d e v e l o p e d
in
h i s i d e a s most
clearly
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e c a t e g o r i e s , c a u s e and e f f e c t .
we w o u l d
agree, a r e o r d i n a r i l y used t o s i g n i f y
e c t i o n between two o b j e c t s o r e v e n t s .
o r d i n a r y usage b e t o k e n s
1 0
of our senses'. ^
immediately arouses
reason
a necessary
Hume t h i n k s t h a t
a conclusion going
For that
The terms,,
reality
thenotion o f causation
his sceptical distrust.
must c o r r e s p o n d
Their reality,
As he a r g u e s
in
t o have
going
an a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e a l i t y .
h i s v i e w a l l t h a t we c o u l d p o s s i b l y g a i n b y t h a t w o u l d
uncertainty.
Since,
'As l o n g as we c o n f i n e o u r s p e c u l a t i o n s t o
concerning t
safe from a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s
question'.
That
into
e i r r e a l n a t u r e a n d o p e r a t i o n s , we a r e
a n d c a n n e v e r be e m b a r r a s s e d b y a n y
i s because
'the appearance o f o b j e c t s t o o u r
s e n s e s a r e a l l c o n s i s t e n t ; and no d i f f i c u l t i e s
but from t h e o b s c u r i t y
In
be f u r t h e r
t h e appearances o f o b j e c t s t o o u r senses, w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g
disquisitions
we
t o t h e appearance o f
We a r e t h e r e f o r e n o t j u s t i f i e d
beyond appearance m
it,
t o t h e impressions o f o u r senses.
he b e l i e v e s , must be o w i n g
an o b j e c t o r e v e n t .
this
'beyond t h e i m p r e s s i o n s
h a v e i n o u r m i n d s t h e c a t e g o r i e s cause a n d e f f e c t w h i c h ,
any
conn-
can e v e r
1
arise,
o f t h e t e r m s we make u s e of.'" "" "^
The
i d e a s t h e n o f cause and e f f e c t must be c o n t a i n e d i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e ,

in
' t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f o b j e c t s t o o u r s e n s e s ' t o have an o b j e c t i v e
reality
f o r Hume.
so c o n c e i v e d ,
B u t a l l t h a t may be i n d u c e d
as Hume r i g h t l y
from
points out, JS t h a t
10'9.
D a v i d Hume.
A T r e a t i s e c f Human N a t u r e
P h i l o s o p h y L i b r a r y I 9 o 2 , p. 120.
110.
Ibid.
pp. 109 - 110 f o o t n o t e .
experience
t h e two o b j e c t s
Book One.
Fontanr
59.
o r e v e n t s t h a t we d e s i g n a t e c a u s e and e f f e c t
.success]ye,
that
they
Added t o t h a t ,
a r e found
we may c o n c l u d e
of this
or event
as c a u s e and a n o t h e r as e f f e c t .
evidence
Hume's c l a i m i s t h a t
description
that
t h e coarse
s a m e * . B u t
I t i s on t h e
Now., t h e s u b s t a n c e
t h e grounds o f which
t o be t r u e
are 'that
we w o u l d
hold
i n s t a n c e s o f which
o f which
o f nature continues always una'formily t h e

i n these
P r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e we h a v e n o t y e t o b s e r v e d
experience
o r , w h a t i s t h e same t h i n g ,
opinion,
Therefore
that
t h e new
a l l instances of the
h a v e n o t y e t a p p e a r e d , we do n o t , i n Hume's
know w i t h
certainty
that
i t i s only a probable
the ideas describe.
one i s t h e c a u s e o f t h e o t h e r .
and n o t a n e c e s s a r y
conjunction
Where t h e y a r e t a k e n t o d e s c r i b e a
necessary
c o n j u n c t i o n o f two o b j e c t s ,
inference
only.
on
that
we h a v e h a d e x p e r i e n c e ,
t h e r e i s i n h i s v i e w no l e g i t i m a c y
o r event
of
we h a v e n o
grounds.
object
experience
t h a t we a r e l e d t o d e s c r i b e one o b j e c t
e x p e r i e n c e , must r e s e m b l e t h o s e
and
from past
i n constant conjunction.
strength
a r e c o n t i g u o u s and
As h e s a y s ,
t h a t , Hunc a r g u e s ,
'the necessary
connection
t h e i n f e r e n c e , i n s t e a d o f t h e i n f e r e n c e ' s depending
i s our
depends
on t h e
112
necessary
connection.'
mean, i s n o t t o be f o u n d
into
The n e c e s s i t y , H e g e l t a k e s Hume t o
i n experience
b u t r a t h e r we c a r r y
it
e x p e r i e n c e ; we make t h e c o n n e c t j o n i n a c o n t i n g e n t , s u b j e c t -
115
l v e manner.
111.
Ibid.p.
135.
112.
113.
Weri-e 20, p. 2?8. L . X o l a k o w s k i (Posa t a v i s t Phi l o s o p h v , Pengo

B o o k s J972) e x p l a i n s Hume's p o i n t i n t h i s Vva7T Thc g r o u n d o
c o n j u n c t i o n o e t w e e n e v e n t s i s n o t r e p e a l e d an e x p e r i e n c e , z
t h a t we p e r c e i v e i s t h e c o n j u n c t i o n i t s e l f .
This explains
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y why we b e l i e v e t h e c a u s a ] n e x u s i s n e e c s s a ?
i t i s a habit rooted m a s s o c i a t i o n - but f o r that very
reason r e f u t e s t h e b e l i e f .
T h e ' n e c e s s a t y ' i s an o u r m i n d s
o n l y , n e t m t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . ' p. VJ.
Ibid.
p. 135.
T
6o.
Hume d e v e l o p s
this
c l a i m more f u J l y
by a n a l y s i n g t h e
r e a s o n s f o r o u r h o l d i n g an i d e a t o be t r u e .
thought
t o be t r u e
we a r e s a i d
nature of b e l i e f that
the
When we h o l d a
to believe i t .
interests
him.
I t is
So i t
is the
In this
analysis of
n a t u r e o f b e l i e f t h a t Hume comes t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
idea that
we t a k e t o be t r u e
i s n o t h i n g otner than
an
a lively
idea
1114
related
t o a present
impression.
I t i s the strength of the
i m p r e s s i o n made on o u r m i n d s by t h o s e
c a u s e s them t o be b e l i e v e d .
different
from a f i c t i c i o u s
t o u s : and t h i s d i f f e r e n t
calling
it
lively
F o r 'an i d e a a s s e n t e d
idea that
t h a t , he s a y s ,
t o feels
t h e fancy alone
According
or solidity,
b e c a u s e we f e e l i t t o be t r u e .
vinced o f a p r i n c i p l e ,
strongly
u p o n me.
above a n o t h e r ,
the
superiority
that
i t is
When I g i v e p r e f e r e n c e
I do n o t h i n g b u t d e c i d e
of their influence.'
1 1
by t h e mind, w h i c h
strikes
more
t o one s e t o f a r g u m e n t s
f r o m my i e e i m g
^
t o be so
'When I am c o n -
o n l y an i d e a w h i c h
' i n p h i l o s o p h y , we c a n go n o f u r t h e r
something f e l t
o r firmness
t o Hume, t h e n , we h o l d a n i d e a
t o be t r u e , n o i b e c a u s e we h a v e r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e i t
but u l t i m a t e l y
presents
f e e l i n g I endeavour t o e x p l a i n by
a superior force or vivacity,
or steadiness.
ideas
concerning
I t f o l l o w s f o r Hume
than assert, that
tnen
it i s
d i s t i n g u i s h e s the ideas o f judge17

1
ment f r o m t h e f i c t i o n s o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n .
Therefore
philosophy has t o o f f e r a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h i t can only

ately
suggest t h a t
reasoning
in
i t be a n a e s t h e t i c o n e .
i s n o t h i n g but a species
p o e t r y a n d m u s i c we mast
114.
Hume, o p . c i t . ,
115-
I b i d . , p. 145
116.
H7.
Jbid..p. 152.
I b a d " P- 1^5.
follow
p. 14 6.
Since
o f sensation.
our taste
if
legitim-
' a l l probable
Iz i s n o t s o l e l y
and s e n t i m e n t b u t
61.
likewise
philosophy.'""
I n Hume's v i e w ,
objective
all
n o t even p h i l o s o p h y
criterion of truth.
we b e l i e v e c o n c e r n i n g
conviction.
I t o b l i g e s us t o conclude
the external world rests
So t h e k i n d
on a s u b j e c t i v e
t h e n o t i o n s o f cause
effect is purely subjective in nature.
Hume i s c o n c e r n e d
that
o f n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n we a t t r i b u t e t o t h
r e l a t i o n s between two o b j e c t s o r events

and
t h e n c a n o f f e r an
O b j e c t s ' , as f a r a s
'have n o d i s c o v e r a b l e c o n n e c t i o n s
together; nor
i s i t f r o m a n y o t h e r p r i n c i p l e b u t c u s t o m o p e r a t i n g on t h e i m a g i n ation,
t h a t we c a n draw a n y i n f e r e n c e f r o m t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f one t o
119
the
existence o f a n o t h e r
Hence any n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n we
attribute
t o o b j e c t s c a n n o t be o b j e c t i v e .
attribute
t h e necessary connection
m a t t e r o f custom.
proceeds from a past
Just
'as we c a l l
'that a l l t h e b e l i e f , which
e v e r y t h i n g custom
as a c e r t a i n t r u t h , ' Hume c l a i m s
f o l l o w s upon any p r e s e n t
120
from t h a t o r i g i n .
impression,
The n a t u r e o f t h a t
c u s t o m a r y b e l i e f i n t h e i n s t a n c e o f cause and e f f e c t i s
i n f e r from o u r past o b s e r v a t i o n s o f t h e constant
o b j e c t s o r events
tion
that
thefuture.
b e l i e f , Hume s u g g e s t s ,
might
they w i l l
be f o u n d
The c o n s t a n t
m
claim
r e p e t i t i o n , w i t h o u t any new r e a s o n : r i g o r
c o n c l u s i o n , we may e s t a b l i s h i t
is derived solely
t o t h e o b j e c t s s i m p l y as a
And H e g e l t a k e s t h i s t o be t h e c e n t r a l
o f Hume's w h o l e p h i l o s o p h y .
which
Hume a r g u e s t h a t we
t h a t we
c o n j u n c t i o n o f two
t o be m
constant
c o n j u n c t i o n which
causes
some c a s e s may be so f a m i l i a r t h a t
conjuncthis
it
n o t p a s s t h r o u g h o u r m m d s t h a t we a r e a s s u m i n g o r i n f e r r i n g
118.
T h i d . , p . 135-
120.
Ibid.,p.
151.
119.
Ibid.,p.
152.
62.
a casual
closely
with
relation.
F o r example, t h e idea o f s i n k i n g
connected w i t h
sinking
that o f water,
i s so
and t h e i d e a o f s u f f o c a t i n g
' t h a t t h e m i n d makes t h e t r a n s i t i o n ' f r o m
t h e cne ido,
121
to t h e o t h e r
connection
'without t h e assistance
between
sinking
o f memory,'
and s u f f o c a t i n g
The n e c e s s a r y
i s one t h a t we i n f e r
s i m p l y as a m a t t e r o f h a b i t .
We w i l l n o t be s u r p r i s e d t o f i n d
conclusion.
necessarily
t h a t Hegel disputes
He d o e s h o w e v e r b e l i e v e t h a t
follows
such a c o n c l u s i o n
f r o m Hume's a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e .
v i e w Hume's c o n c l u s i o n s
serve
nature
Indeed
o f empiricism.
this
I n his
t o emphasise t h e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y
he s u g g e s t s t h a t we m i g h t
regard
ourselves
as engaged i n t h e c r i t i q u e o f e m p i r i c i s m s i m p l y i n
following
t h r o u g h Hume's r e a s o n i n g .
I ti si nthis
respect,
H e g e l c l a i m s , t h a t Hume a d h e r e s t o a n d i m p l e m e n t s L o c k e ' s p r i n c i p l e
of experience
more c o n s i s t e n t l y .
By d o i n g t h i s ,
a l l t h a t he h a s
d o n e i s make e v i d e n t t h e t a u t o l o g o u s n a t u r e o f L o c k e ' s
of complex i d e a s .
Hegel indeed
derivation
agrees t h a t complex ideas
a s c a u s e a n d e f f e c t c a n n o t be d e r i v e d f r o m o u r e x p e r i e n c e
s t o o d s i m p l y as s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n .
validity
121.
122.
under-
To t h i s e x t e n t h e c o n c e d e s t h e
o f Hume's a n a l y s i s o f c a u s a l i t y .
sense-perception
such
Since
c o n t a i n s no n e c e s s i t y , no c a s u a l
'experience
as
c
relation.'~
I b i d . , p. 152.
H e g e l . W e r k e 20,p.277 A l s o ' C o n s e q u e n t l y w h a t c a n r e a l l y be
a s s e r t e d beyond a l l d o u b t i s l i m i t e d t o i n d i v i d u a l
of immediate o b s e r v a t i o n s ; assumptions c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e
of t h e w o r l d ' g i v e n ' m those o b s e r v a t i o n s , w h e t h e r t o u c h i n g
i t s r e a l i t y o r t h e n a t u r e o f t n e o b s e r v i n g s u b j e c t , a r e excluded.
I t i s e a s y t o see t h a t m t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f K n o w l e d g e , t h a t w h i c h we t r u ] / know i s u t t e r l y b a r r e n a n d u n p r o d
u c t i v e , whereas t h a t w h i c h h e l p s us t o l i v e , t o c r e a t e a
s c i e n c e and e n r i c h o u r s t o r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n g e n e r a l l y i s no
l o n g e r k n o w l e d g e i n ""he p r o p e r s e n s e 6 f t h e t e r - n . ' Kolakov/?
op. c i t . , pp. 51-52 . HJ-& g e n e r a l a s s e s s m e n t o f Hume's p h i l o s o c
i s close t o t h a t o f Hegel, e s p e c i a l l y Hegel's b e l i e f t h a t
Hume's p h i l o s o p h y s e r v e s t o s h e ; u p t h e i n h e r e n t l y c o n c r c d _ ^
t o r y n a t u r e o f e m p i r i c i s m : X o l a k o w s k i s o y s , 'Hume c a r r i e d
e m p i r i c i s m i n t o i t s r r d i c a l l a t t e r - a a y p h a s e , r i s k i n g uô o f
c r i t e r i a e l a b o r a t e d oy a n t i - e m p i m e a l s y s t e m s he r>rc u g h t -o:>
the s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n o f t n e e m p i r i c a l doct r m e . ' J b i d . p p 5 5 - o
O
63.
If
we w e r e t o u n d e r s t a n d
Hegel suggests,
disconnected
this out.
experience merely
a l l we w o u l d h a v e as i t s c o n t e n t
impressions.
the
i sa series of
I t i s Hume's m e r i t t o h a v e
f r o m mere s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .
example t o i l l u s t r a t e
pressure
o f t h ewater
h i s point.
i s t h e cause o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f a
the Lockean s e n s e . W e r e
observed merely
two occurrences:
experience'
t h ewater
out, there i s nothing contained
themselves which
i s we t h a t
implies that
be d e s t r o y e d
that
i n those
the observer;
o f t h e water
a statement
a n d Hume a r g u e s ,
such i n f e r e n c e s s i m p l y
As Hume
'pure
against
rightly
I t
experience'.
caused t h e house t o
o f f a c t b u t an i n f e r e n c e
a s we h a v e s e e n , t h a t we make
out o f h a b i t .
Hume's i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s a c c o u n t o f c a u s a l i t y
o f amazement t o H e g e l .
i sa
source
T h i s , more t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e , I s w h a t
l e a d s h i m i n t o d i s p u t e w i t h Hume.
descend lower
have
two i m p r e s s i o n s
they are n e c e s s a r i l y l i n k e d .
t h e pressure
i sn o t merely
we w o u l d
forcing i t s e l f
take t h e idea o f causation i n t o that
The s t a t e m e n t ,
of
i t a 'pure
experience' i n
s i d e o f t h e house and t h e house c o l l a p s i n g .
points
Hegel
When we s a y t h a t
h o u s e d u r i n g a f l o o d w h a t we h a v e i s n o t 'a p u r e
the
pointed
Hume makes i t c l e a r t h a t we c a n n o t d e r i v e a n y i d e a
t h a t has u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y
gives t h i s
as s e n s e - - p e r c e p t i o n ,
i n thinking
He b e l i e v e s t h a t
than t o imply that
'one c a n n o t
a l l u n i v e r s a l and
124
necessary
reasoning
i sarbitary.
He s u g g e s t s
unsavoury
c o n t r a s t i n Hume's p h i l o s o p h y
t o remain
t h e b a s i s o f what s h o u l d
count
t h a t we h a v e a n
f o r ' p e r c e p t i o n i s supposed
as t r u t h ' ,
sality
and n e c e s s i t y a p p e a r as s o m e t h i n g u n j u s t i f i e d ,
12>.
Hegel-ibid.,p.
12k.
I b i d . ^ p.
279.
278.
and s o u n i v e r as s u b j e c t i v e
64.
contingency,
a pure
c u s t o m whose c o n t e n t may be so c o n s t i t u t e d
(beschaffen) or not.
ces
B u t s i m p l y b e c a u s e we make
our o b s e r v a t i o n s which
go b e y o n d e x p e r i e n c e ,
as p e r c e p t i o n , does n o t i m p l y t o H e g e l t h a t t h o s e
are c d n t i n g e n t .
I n h i s view,
observations
role
is
r e a d i l y u n d e r s t o o d , he a r g u e s ,
a more c o m p r e h e n s i v e way, n o t s i m p l y as e x t e r n a l
first
we r e g a r d
I t i s K a n t who m
takes philosophy m
m e r i t , Hegel says,
if
this direction.
therefore,
that
constituting
knowledge t h a n e m p i r i c i s m cares t o a l l o w .
b u t as my_ e x p e r i e n c e .
understood
we h a v e r a t h e r t o a c c e p t
t h e s u b j e c t p l a y s a more s i g n i f i c a n t
scientific
inferen-
This
experience
experience,
Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n
Hume's g r e a t e s t
rounding o f f h i s r a t h e r
summary j u d g e m e n t o f h i m , i s t h a t h i s s c e p t i c i s m g i v e s K a n t
his
125.
starting-point.
Hegel.
Werke 8, p. 1 1 1 .
65-
CHAPTER TWO
HEGEL AND GERMAN IDEALJ SM.
The
C r i t i q u e o f Kant.
In
d i s c u s s i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f K a n t we e n t e r , a c c o r d i n g t o
H e g e l , a new e p o c h m
is
the philosophy
the h i s t o r y
of the I , t h e
o f thought.
Kant's
' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' , o r what
Hegel c a l l s the'freedom o f self-consciousness'.
I t is
ophy w h i c h more t h a n any o t h e r b r i n g s nome t o u s t h e

of the s u b j e c t , o f the I m
links
with
(m
the general h i s t o r i c a l events
t o associate with
the general
a thing is
(ib.)
The demand o f t h a t
implication
And H e g e l , r i g h t l y
of this utilitarian
'm i t s e l f ' m a y be i g n o r e d .
o r wrongly,
i s 'in i t s e l f ' i s
it
other i s ,
o f course,
declared
A l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d o f r e a l i t y was t h a t
y i e l d t o t h e demands o f t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i n d i v i d u a l .
cause i t
Hegel
1.
takes
I t s c o n c e r n , he s a y s ,
man.
t o be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
practice
v i e r t o be t h a t wnt
that
C o n s e q u e n t l y what r e a l i t y
prac-
' s h o a l d be
i s w i t h what t h i n g s a r e ' f o r a n o t h e r ' ,

(ib.)
Marx)
The p h i l o s o p h y o f
'everything, a l l existence, a l l a c t i v i t y '
something u s e f u l ' ,
significance
i s t h et h e o r e t i c a l consciousness o f the
o f the French Revolutionaries." "

that
the philos-
This development Hegel
o f the time.
tice
was
knowledge.
a manner we have s i n c e l e a r n t
K a n t , he s u g g e s t s ,
philosophy
t a k e s up t h i s p o s i t i o n ,
t h e philosophy
t h e ' A u f k l a r u n g ' reducfced t o m e t h o d .
Be-
o f Kant i s f o r
The p a r a l l e l i s
clear.
'The c o n s c i o u s n e s s c f t h i s p r a c t i c e -an a b s t r a c t way - i s t h e

Kantian philosophy'.
H e g e l . Werke, Suhrkamp V e r l a g , V o l . 2 0 ,
p. 332.
66.
Kant m a i n t a i n s
what t h e t h i n g
'm i t s e l f '
is
true.
objectively
the
h i s t h e o r y c f k n o w l e d g e t h a t we c a n n o t know
is.
I t follows
We o n l y know a p p e a r a n c e s , o r , r a t h e r ,
phenomenon as i t i s o b s e r v e d
self-consciousness.
that
is essential
Althougn
epoch i n
lies
Therefore,
falls within
Hegel t h i n k s
the history
by t h e i n d i v i d u a l , c o n t i n g e n t
as w i t h U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , ' a l l
self-consciousness.'
that
o f p h i l o s o p h y he r e g a r d s
L o c k e and Hume.
Introduction
'For I t h o u g h t
I n h i s early
inquiries
a survey
the f i r s t
the following
step towards
o f o u r own u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
satisfying
they are adapted'.
o f Pure Reason b e c a u s e t h a t w o r k t i e s
things.
philosophy
is,
of thought
t o things
2.
was t o t a k e
t o t h e same
his
Cr111que
f a c u l t i e s w i t h t h e aim o f
t o t h e comprehension o f
i n t e r e s t o f the t h e o r e t i c a l part
as w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l
Critique
'namely, t h e e x a m m -
Kant m
'how c u r powers a r e a d a p t e d '
The p r i m e
several
zo K a n t ' s
philosophy
understanding'.
e x a m i n e s , as d i d L o c k e , o u r c o g n i t i v e
discovering
from
T h i s he b e l i e v e s T i g h t
r e v e a l e d i n Locke's Essay,
of the f i n i t e
which
e x a m i n e o u r own p o w e r s , and
j u s t as w e l l h a v e come f r o m t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n
p u r p o s e as t h a t
that
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g :
t h e m i n d o f man was v e r y a p t t o r u n i n t o ,
t o see w h a t t h i n g s
ation
the question
e s s a y on ' F a i t h and
t o L o c k e ' s Essay C o n c e r n i n g
that
a new
t o be t h e same as t h a t
K n o w l e d g e ' ( G l a u b e n u n d W i s s e n ) he q u o t e s
the
(ib.)
i n t h i s way K a n t b e g i n s
a t t h e h e a r t o f Kant's philosophy
preoccupied
we c a n n o t know w h a t
o f Kant's
philosophers, the r e l a t i o n
outside ourselves.
But m
considering
this
67-
p r o b l e m , K a n t p r o d u c e s new r e s u l t s ,
r e s u l t s which Hegel b e l i e v e s
t o be e x t r e m e l y s i g n i f i c a n t ,
vitiated
the problem
The
though
posed.
starting-point
o f Kant's c r i t i c a l
w e l l known, t h e s c e p t i c i s m o f D a v i d Hume.
ought
connexions
These c o n c l u s i o n s a r e d e r i v e d f r o m an e m p i r -
view o f experience.
and K a n t a c c e p t s
faculties:
A view o f experience
t h i s v i e w as a p r e m i s s
'There i s
i n d e e d ' he s a y s ,
he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n
that
regards a l l
t h e 'impressions' o f o u r senses,
knowledge begins w i t h e x p e r i e n c e ' .
For
necessary
t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d t o be based on c u s t o m , n o t on
o u r k n o w l e d g e t o have a r i s e n m
it
as i s
T h i s s c e p t i c i s m , as
regarding a l l assertions concerning
c e r t a i n knowledge.
'if,
philosophy i s ,
t o be c l e a r f r o m o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f H e g e l ' s c r i t i c i s m o f
Hume, c o n s i s t e d m
ical
by t h e l i m i t s o f
examining
'no d o u b t
that
our cognitive
a l l our
However, w i t h i n t h a t
premiss
t h a t he t h i n k s was m i s s e d by t h e E m p i r i c i s t s
however, a l l o u r knowledge b e g i n s w i t h o u r e x p e r i e n c e ,
does n o t f o r t h a t
it
reason
a l l simply originate
stjll,
experience.
c o u l d i n d e e d be t h a t t h e k n o w l e d g e we h a v e f r o m
experience
( E r f a h r u n g s e r k e n n t n i s ) was a compound o f what we r e c e i v e t h r o u g h

o u r i m p r e s s i o n s a n d what o u r f a c u l t y
of cognition
(occasioned
s o l e l y by sense i m p r e s s i o n s ) s u p p l i e s f r o m i t s e l f ,
we do n o t d i s t m g u i s n
m
t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e same.'
wishes
.3.
from t h e basic m a t e r i a l u n t i l
t o argue
that
(ib.)
which
long
add:tion
practice.,
So, as we c a n see,
Kant
i n a l l o u r e m p i r i c a l knowledge t h e r e i s an
Inrnanuel Kant.
K r i t i k d e r P e i n e n V e r n u n f t , Werke (SuhrKamp
V e r l a g ) E d i t e d by WilheL'n We 1 schede 1. Vo 1 . 2. p. 45 . ~
68.
element t h a t p e r t a i n s t o o u r understanding
he c a l l s k n o w l e d g e a p r i o r i .
part o f experience since
never without
constituent
we r e c e i v e
such.
This
T h i s knowledge c o n s t i t u t e s a
t h e 'common u n d e r s t a n d i n g
Is
Instead
of i t
being
Itself
t h e one e l e m e n t - w h a t
our sense-impressions - i t
Is,
Kant
made u p o f t w o e l e m e n t s , s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s and i d e a s
Kant wants t o c l a i m n o t o n l y
always c o n t a i n s
element
E x p e r i e n c e , t h e n , he d i v i d e s i n t o t w o
parts.
from
only.
knowledge a p r i o r i
that the ordinary
believes,
a priori.
understanding
but also that the t h e o r e t i c a l
5
sciences are c o n s t i t u t e d m
t h e same way.
T h i s c l a i m r e s t s on t
d i s t i n c t i o n he makes b e t w e e n s y n t i i e t i c and a n a l y t i c j u d g e m e n t s .
Analytic
judgements a r e o f t h e general
form
such t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t
B b e l o n g s t o t h e s u b j e c t A i n a manner t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e B i s
already
gives:
contained
A.
As a n e x a m p l e o f s u c h a j u d g e m e n t he
' a l lbodies are extended'.
judgement t h e n o t i o n o f e x t e n s i o n
body.
Synthetic
example o f t h i s
is
contained
that m
m
this
the notion of
judgements a r e , c o n t r a r i w i s e , judgements
which the predicate B l i e s wholly

an
He b e l i e v e s
form
outside
t h e s u b j e c t A.
o f j u d g e m e n t he g i v e s :
heavy'.
He a r g u e s t h a t m
the notion
contained
the notion o f weight.
m
As
' A l l bodies are
'body' t h e r e
So t h e e x t r a n e o u s
is not
element
4.
Kant, i b i d . ,
p. 46.
5-
'in a l l t h e o r e t i c a l sciences o f reason there are contained

s y n t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t s a p r i o r i as p r i n c i p l e s . ' K a n t , i b i d . ,
P- 55-
6.
' . . t h e p r e d i c a t e i s s o m e t h i n g t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o what 1
t h i n k a t a l l i n t h e mere c o n c e p t o f a b o d y . ' i b i d . , p. 53.
69-
i s w h a t makes i t
a s y n t h e t x c judgement.
argues t h a t
a l l our
are
synthetic
of t h i s
judgements of experience
n a t u r e because m
knowledge i s not
only
content,
What he
(lb.)
ments a r e
the
employed
clarified
m e r e l y an
12
i s contained m
we
may
as
we
now
the
we
such judgements
t h e o r e t i c a l sciences.
notion
such
at
the
But
the
12
that
as
without
to
notion
Kant argues
their addition
notion
example,
appear
I t appears t h a t
p l u s 5>
new
judge-
For
i n m a t h e m a t i c s may
and 5 and
w i l l never get
cur
e x t e n d e d t o embrace a
a n a l y t i c a l judgement.
the
he
(Erfahrungsurteile)
contends then i s t h a t
analyse the n o t i o n s 7
will,
but
7 + 5 = 12
simple proposition
be
Furthermore,
much
appealing
7
to experience.
an
unity
of
A l l t h a t we
the
two
one
c o v e r what the
number i s
concludes t h a t
the
To
d i s c o v e r the
h a v e t o go
have m
number 12
notion
i s not
We
that of
five
7 + 5
We
itself.
contained
r e p r e s e n t s the
beyond t h a t n o t i o n .
t o s u c h p e r c e p t i o n s as
notion
number i s r e q u i r e d .
from the
number t h a t
the
sum
Kant
that
notion.
experier:?:-,
I n adding to
s i m i l a r u n i t s we
osition.
it
t h a t Kant concluded the
from t h i s
therefore
have t o r e f t r t o our
fingers.
dis-
o f 7 and 5 we
perception of 7
is
that
cannot
p e r c e p t i o n the
And
is
derive
our
1
that
prop-
anthmet-
ical
proposition
i s at a l l times s y n t h e t i c .
experience-knowledge
that
pertains
proposition
to the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
a synthetic
such
ail
judgements.
7.
Kant, i b i d . ,
p.
36.
8.
f\ant. l b i d . ,
pp.
56 -
57.
our
element
arithmetical
judgement a p r i o r i .
a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t t o show t h a t a l l t h e
contain
as
( E r f a h r u n g s e r k e n n t n i s ) c o n t a i n s an
a priori
must be
For
Kant
ocher t h e o r e t i c a l
employs
sciences
70,
Kant
ascribes t h e parlous s t a t e o f metaphysics t o t h e

J,
fact
that
r>
11 f a i l s to d i s t i n g u i s h
t h e t w o f o r m s o f judgement:.'
Hume, i n K a n t ' s e s t i m a t i o n , h a d come n e a r e s t t o m a k i n g t h e

distinction.
He had made t h e p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g w i t h
a n a l y s i s o f c a u s e and e f f e c t ,
He h a d f a i l e d ,
universality
K a n t adds,
proposition a priori
was o n l y a b e g i n n i n g .
t o conceive t h e problem m
and s i g n i f i c a n c e ,
t e d on t h e one s y n t h e t i c
but i t
(lb.)
p r o p o s i t i o n t o prove t h a t
was i m p o s s i b l e .
metaphysics t o nonsense.
f r o m mere c u s t o m .
However,
full
such a
The c o n c l u s i o n s o f
A l l t h e necessary
m e t a p h y s i c s had d i s c o v e r e d appeared
its
He h a d r a t h e r c o n c e n t r a -
t h i s a n a l y s i s had t h r e a t e n e d t o reduce t h e whole
ity
his
content of
relations
that
now t o d e r i v e t h e i r
'he w o u l d n e v e r h a v e
necess-
arrived
a t s u c h a c l a i m w h i c h d e s t r o y s a l l p u r e p h i l o s o p h y i f he h a d
b e f o r e h i s eyes o u r t a s k m
have seen t h a t
a l lits
universality,
a c c o r d i n g t o h i s argument
no p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s . '
(ib.)
f o r he w o u l d
t h e r e c o u l d a l s o be
H i s good s e n s e , K^ i t h o p e s ,
would
h a v e s a v e d h i m f r o m s u c h an a s s e r t i o n .
Hume, t h e n , h a d p r e j u d i c e d a l l p u r e p h i l o s o p h y b e c a u s e he h a d
failed
t o see t h a t t h e same t y p e o f p r o p o s i t i o n whose
he w i s h e d t o r e j e c t
ated
objectivity
t h e a n a l y s i s o f cause and e f f e c t was i m p l i c -
i n a l l m a t h e m a t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c
knowledge.
The n e c e s s i t y
t h a t we p r e d i c a t e t o t h e r e l a t i o n s o f t w o o b j e c t s o r e v e n t s
t h e n o t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n i s t h e same as t h e n e c e s s i t y we
in
ascribe
to t h e basic p r o p o s i t i o n s o f mathematics.
Both are s y n t h e t i c
9I n d e e d , he s a v s , t h i s f a i l u r e i s s o l e l y ( l e d i g l i c h ) t o blame
f o r t h e i n s e c u r e p o s i t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c s . See x b i d . , p. 59.
71.
propositions a p r i o r i .
According
question o f philosophy
is therefore:
9
ments a p r i o r i
possible ' (ib.)
problem depends, Kant argues,

reason
t o Kant, t h e c r u c i a l
'How a r e s y n t h e t i c j u d g e -
For the s o l u t i o n o f t h i s
the possibility
o f t h e use o f
t h e f o u n d i n g o f m a t h e m a t i c s and n a t u r a l
Kant b e l i e v e s t h a t
placing t h i s question a t the centre of
h i s p h i l o s o p h y he i s b r i n g i n g a b o u t a r a d i c a l
methodology o f t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge.
change i n t h e
This
change amounts,he" s u g g e s t . t o a r e v e r s a l o f i t s
ities:
'Hitherto i t
should
accomodate i t s e l f t o o b j e c t s .
made u n d e r t h a t
w i t h concepts
h a s been assumed t h a t
in
methodological
former
prior-
a l l our c o g n i t i o n
However, a l l a t t e m p t s
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t o make a n y t h i n g o f o b j e c t s
a priori
through which
e x t e n d e d h a v e come t o n o t h i n g .
be made t h i s
science.
o u r k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be
The a t t e m p t w i l l t h e r e f o r e
once t o see w h e t h e r we w o u l d n o t advance
t h e tasks o f metaphysics m
better
t h a t we assume t h a t o b j e c t s m^st
accombdate t h e m s e l v e s t o our c o g n i t i o n . ' " " '
This r e v e r s a l i s
a n a l o g o u s t o a change t h a t h a d t o t a k e p l a c e
natural
science
before i t
could progress
as C o p e r n i c u s c o u l d make no p r o g r e s s
t a t o r t o be f i x e d
and t h e h e a v e n l y
t h e method o f
properly.
For just
w h i l e he assumed t h e s p e c -
bodies
t o be m
motion,
o s o p h y i n K a n t ' s o p i n i o n , w o u l d a d v a n c e no f u r t h e r u n l e s s
inverted
10.
its
'universe'.
philit
I f we make t h e a s s u m p t i o n i n D h i l o s -
K a n t , i b i d . , p. 25.
C. L u k a c s i n h i s H i s t o r y and C l a s s
C o n s c i o u s n e s s (Englsh Ed., M e r l i n P r e s s , 1971) m i s t a k e n l y
I t h i n k , r e g a r d s t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n as t h e p r o
lem t h a t d o m i n a t e s Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
F o r t h i s , and othe
m i s c e l l a n e o u s r e m a r k s on t h e p r o b l e m , see pp. I l l - 112.
(Merlin ed.).
72.
ophy t h a t o b j e c t s a r e c o n s t r u c t e d a c c o r d i n g
c o g n i t i o n o f them, t h e n p h i l o s o p h y
had
lost
objects.
trying
t o o u r mode o f
may r e g a i n t h e g r o u n d
it
t o make o u r t h i n k i n g accomodate i t s e l f t o
T h i s g r o u n d w o u l d be r e g a i n e d
in
that the structure
o f t h e o b j e c t c o u l d now be assumed t o be i d e n t i c a l w i t h o u r
mode o f c o g n i t i o n o f i t .
we c o u l d s a y a p r i o r i
of the ' I
think'
Thus t h e r e w o u l d be a g r e a t
deal
a b o u t o b j e c t s as t h e y w e r e t h e p r o d u c t
or the I
itself.
T h i s e m p h a s i s on t h e r o l e o f t h e I i n t h e c o g n i t i o n o f
objects is
i n Hegel's view t h e e s s e n t i a l aspect
philosophy
and f o l l o w s l o g i c a l l y
from
levels a t the sceptical empiricism

t o Hume's p h i l o s o p h y
not allow v a l i d i t y
ositions a priori
is,
the objection that
o f Hume.
as we h a v e a l r e a d y
t o , n o r even r e c o g n i s e ,
contained
o f Kant's
Kant
This o b j e c t i o n
s e e n , t h a t Hume does
the synthetic
prop-
i n a l l our e m p i r i c a l knowledge.
He had t a k e n
t h i s v i e w because i n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e n o t i o n s o f
universality
and n e c e s s i t y w e r e n o t t o be f o u n d
understood
But
as t h e s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s we r e c e i v e o f an o b j e c t .
K a n t , H e g e l c l a i m s , does n o t w i s h t o c o n f i n e e x p e r i e n c e
t h i s way.
As w e l l as t h e s e n s e - m a t e r i a l
Kant argues, t h e r e are a l s o i n c l u d e d m

relations
11.
in our experience,
(allgememen Beziehungen).
1 1
(smnlichen
experience
Stoffes),
universal
These a r e t h e s y n t h e t i c
Hegel.
Werke 6, ( E n z y . I ) , p. 112.
Hegel adds, ' - t h e
thought-determinations o r concepts o f t h e understanding
make u p t h e o b i e c t i v i t y o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e - k n o w l e d g e . ' i b i d . ,
p. 113.
73-
propositions a p r i o r i
o f the- u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
t h e n , was n o t t o h a v e seen f r o m
was
made up o f t h e s e
that
Hume's
the beginning
two e l e m e n t s .
that
error,
experience
Kant i s prepared
t o grant
t h e s e n s e - d a t a h a v e i n t h e m s e l v e s no n e c e s s a r y
they merely
necessity
form
indeed
a sensuous m a n i f o l d .
come f r o m
s u b j e c t o f knowledge.
the s y n t h e t i c
connection:
The u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d
elsewhere, namely, from
the I ,
H i s answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n :
propositions a priori
arise '
is
the
'Where do
therefore,
'in
1^
the t h i n k i n g
'The
be
stood
subject himself.' ^
'universe'
on i t s
o f t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge has, t h e n , t o
head b e c a u s e t h e n o t i o n s
necessity which are absolute
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r our knowledge a r c
n o t , K a n t b e l i e v e s , ô be f o u n d
themselves.
in
the objects of
These n o t i o n s a r e o n l y t o be f o u n d
w h a t he c a l l s t h e ' u n i t y
of apperception'
tion).
unity
Opposed t o t h a t
element o f experience
der Anschauung).
experience
o f u n i v e r s a l i t y and
Now, a c c o r d i n g
apperception.
(Tiannigfaltige
t o Kant, i n order
that
of intuition
o f the understanding
This suggestion,
stands t h e o t h e r
of intuition'
objects at a l l , this manifold
reduced by t h e c a t e g o r i e s
xn t h e i , o r
( E i n h e i t d e r Apperzeo-
o f apperception
tne 'manifold
experience
we may
h a s t o be
to the unity of
Hegel b e l i e v e s , i s
the principal
1^5
achievement o f t h e Kantian
12.
13-
philosophy.
F o r here Kant has n o t
Because .. n e c e s s i t y a n d u n i v e r s a l i t y i s n o t m e x t e x ^ n a l
t h i n g s , t h e y must be a p r i o r i , i . e . l i e m Reason i t s e l f , m
Reason as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s Rea~son. ' H e g e l . Werke 20. p. 336.
'And t h i s u n i t y o f t h e m a n i f o l d p o s i t e d t h r o u g h my s p o n t a n e i t y
t h i s i s thought i n general, the synthesxsmg o f t h e manifold.
T h i s i s a g r e a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s , an i m p o r t a n t i n s i g h t (Erker.nt n i s ) . ' i b i d . , p. 3 4 ^ .
74.
o n l y made i t
clear that
the I posculates t h e necessary
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n experience but also that

that experience.
the
Our s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s
content o f experience, but the I ,
ception supplies i t s
of
form.
constitutes
may w e l l
theunity
supply
o f apper-
What makes t h e c o n t e n t an o b j e c t
our experience a t a l l i s
the unity
m a n i f o l d by t h e ' I t h i n k ' .
r e l a t i o n ' , Hegel claims,
:t
brought about
And t h e d i s t i n c t
'are t h e pure
m the
manner o f t h i s
concepts
o f t h e under-
s t a n d i n g : t h e categories'." "^
Hegel,
h o w e v e r , p l a c e s an e v e n g r e a t e r s i g n i f y c a n c e on t n e
'spontaneity o f the I
t h a n Kant has i n d i c a t e d h e r e .
Whereas
K a n t h a s no d e s i r e t o d i s p r o v e Hume's t h e s i s c o m p l e t e l y , H e g e l
clearly
believes that
the idea o f the 'unity o f apperception'
i s a w h o l l y s u c c e s s f u l a n s w e r t o t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t b e s e t Hume's
15
empiricism.
T h i s i s because i t
notion o f experience.
he
claims, recognised
p r o v i d e s a more
workable
I n Kant's n o t i o n o f experience
that
What c o u n t s as e x p e r i e n c e
it
is,
perception i s n o t y e t experience.
f o r Kant i s
the synthesis o f the
c o n t e n t , o f t h e m a n i f o l d o f appearance i n
the unity
o f appercep
14.
Hegel.
Werke 8, p. 116.
15-
T h i s o p i n i o n H e g e l p r o b a b l y s h a r e d w i t h a l l e d u c a t e d Germans
of h i s time.
C e r t a i n l y i t i s one s h a r e d by F i c h t e and
Schellmg.
I t i s r e m a r k a b l e t o n o t e how t h e s h i f t i n g o f t n e
g r o u n d o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i s seen as t n e r e f u t a t i o n o f t h e o l d system.
16.
Hegel.
Werke, V o l . 2 0 . , p.
'^YJ.
75.
tion.
the
W i t h i n the n o t i o n
contained
idea of the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the sense-data:
under
of
o f e x p e r i e n c e i s now
the c a t e g o r i e s of the understanding.
the sense-data
i s an a c t i v i t y
i t s subsumption
This
organisation
t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o Kant
s u b j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e must u n d e r t a k e m
order that there
be an o b j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e a t a l l : 'The s y n t h e t i c u n i t y
consciousness
is
t h e r e f o r e an o b j e c t i v e
l e d g e , n o t s i m p l y one
t h a t I may
under w h i c h each i n t u i t i o n
an o b j e c t
the
may
of the
c o n d i t i o n o f a l l know-
r e q u i r e t o know an o b j e c t
must s t a n d m
but
o r d e r t h a t r c become
f o r me, . . '
This c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h the idea of experience of the

e m p i r i c i s t s and,
tent
indeed, of the R a t i o n a l i s t s ,
o f e x p e r i e n c e now
becomes s u b j e c t i v e .
' c o n s c i o u s n e s s becomes one,

n o t i o n of experience
it
' I am now
becomes my
i',
in that
the
As H e g e l
says,
content'.
not something
con-
In
Kant's
external
to
18
uyself.
The
w i t h Kant t h a t
It
has
fact
that
i t has
t o become my
something
may
be e x p e r i e n c e d
t o be subsumed by t h e u n i t y o f t h e
c o n t e n t and n o t r e m a i n
something
t h a n m y s e l f w h i c h I have t o a s s i m m i l a t e p a s s i v e l y .
states i n his
now
implies
criticism
o f Locke's m a t e r i a l i s m ,
t o be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e
T.
other
As
Hegel
experience
' c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f what I h a v e
is
or
17-
Kant.
K r i t i k d e r F e m e n V e r n u n f t , o p . c i t . , p. 140.
As
K t i r n e r ( K a n t : P e n g u i n O r i g i n a l , p. 63) s a y s : ' . . t n e mere
p e r c e p t i o n o f a d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t , i . e . none w h i c h i s n o t
b u t c o u l d be j u d g e d t o be t h e b e a r e r o f c o n c e p t s ,
presupposes
t h e s y n t h e t i c u n i t y o f t h e o b j e c t , and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e u n i t y
of pure a p p e r c e p t i o n . '
l8.
Hegel.
Werke 20,
p.
'jh^.
76.
am' and
not merely
h a v e t o be
the
unity
for
Hegel.
as t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f w h a t i s .
active i n relation
of apperception
to the o b j e c t .
The
of Kant's philosophy
I t implies that a l l that
n o t i o n of
expresses
' I t o u c h must be
this
itself
20
constrained into
ready
of
form o f u n i t y ' .
i n t i m a t e d , i s a much b r o a d e r
apperception'
an e x p r e s s i o n
m
this
T h i s , as I h a v e a l -
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
than t h a t o f Kant.
For Hegel the idea
of correct idealism.
genuine philosophy
'unity
becomes
I t i n d i c a t e s t o him
a l l otherness, a l l o b j e c t i v i t y
is
that
over-
come .
It
is
this
in his thinking.
his
own
principle
not present
is
it
sense t n a t H e g e l t h i n k s K a n t t o be
Kant,
m
its
'unfortunately',
full
objective
faxlc
deficient
t o comprehend
significance.
as t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m .
lie does
Rather,
c o n t e n t t o a l l o w L o c k e and Hume t h e i r s p h e r e w i t h i n
K a n t i s a b l e t o do
t h i s b e c a u s e he
osophy as t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .
attempt
to apply i t s
By
conclusions
l e d g e , t o what i s e x t e r n a l t o us,
Kttrner says,
philosophy
regards n s t h e o r e t i c a l
t h i s he means t h a t
t o the concrete
the
it
is
phil-
does n o t
o b j e c t o f know-
'object out t h e r e ' .
transcendental philosophy
he
'concerned n o t
As
co
much w i t h o b j e c t s , as w i t h t h e manner o f o u r c o g n i t i o n o f objects m
so f a r as i t
is a priori
a b o v e , C h a p t e r One
possible'. "
19.
See
20.
21.
S. K o r n e r . o p . c i t . , p. 35He c o n t i n u e s 'more p r e c i s e l y , a
a p i e c e o f k n o w l e d g e i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i f i t i s a p r i o r i an
i f by i t we u n d e r s t a n d " t h a t and why c e r t a x n p r e s e n t a t i o n s
( p e r c e p t i o n s o r concepts) are o n l y a p r i o r i apt l i e d o r
possible'' . '
~
p.
pp.42.-
Transcendental
44.
344.
77.
philosophy
i s t o be
distinguished
specifically
from a
cendent p h i l o s o p h y which would a t t e m p t t o apply the

of the
the
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f our
dent philosophy
say
that
follows
our
that
the
that
pertain
to
in that
Although i t
makes p o s s i b l e o u r
w i t h the
attempts
his
its
I t
significance.
'thing m
it
the
cannot
itself'
' t h i s human f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n
i
Hume and
to
transcendental
knowledge o f t h i n g s
knowledge of the
Thus f r o m
differentiates
transcen-
w h o l e l o g i c a l a p p a r a t u s t h a t makes p o s s i b l e
remains f o r him s u b j e c t i v e
sich).
points
whereas
it
Trans-
'things themselves'.
knowledge,, t h a t w h i c h K a n t e x a m i n e s m
p r o v i d e us
it
knowing o b j e c t s
is wholly incorrect
such c o n d i t i o n s
philosophy,
an
categories
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o areas l y i n g beyond e x p e r i e n c e ,
cendental philosophy remains c o r r e c t

out
trans-
m-itself,
the
thing
(Ding
Kant
22
itself.'
Locke r e t a i n t h e n t h e i r sphere m
Kant's
philos-
ophy b e c a u s e , H e g e l a r g u e s , K a n t a d m i t s a.s a c o n s t i t u e n t
of a l l knowledge the
manifold of sense-experience.
It
the
empiricists
t h a t had
was
'm i t s e l f '
was
our
s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s w h i c h , t h e y c l a i m e d , w e r e jast as
affections
affections.
22.
us
as
I t was
shown t h a t w h a t t h i s
unknowable.
I t was
qualities m
therefore
part
was
senuous m a n i f o l d
o n l y known t o us
objects giving
rise
through
much
to
K a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t we
these
could
H e g e l . Werke 20, p. 338.

What Goldmannhas t o say on t h i s
p o i n t i s i n s t r u c t i v e : 'Knowledge o f t h i n g s i n t n e m s e l v e s
w o u l d o n l y be p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h a n o t h e r k i n d o f i n t u i t i o n
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of given e m p i r i c a l
man.
The u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l f a c u l t y , t i e d co
e x p e r i e n c e , c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e w n e t h e r s u c h an i n t u i t u on e x i s t s
or i s even p o s s i b l e . '
K a n t , NLB, p.
135.
78.
o n l y advance
i n metaphysics i f
an o b j e c t o f e x p e r i e n c e
we assumed t h a t what
constituted
was o u r mode o f c o g n i t i o n .
the
o b j e c t was c o n s t i t u e d
ion
d i d n o t , as we know, i m p l y t h a t we knew t h e o b j e c t a p a r t
from i t s
experience.
i tis this,
view i t
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h o u r mode o f c o g n i t -
V/hat i t
f o r e v e r beyond o u r ken.
And
But that
o f course,
m a t e r i a l l y was ' m
itself'
T h i s Kant concedes t o t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s .
t h a t H e g e l cannot concede.
I n his
i s because K a n t i a n i d e a l i s m concedes t h i s t h a t
mains e s s e n t i a l l y
was
it re-
a t t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f L o c k e and Hume, a t t h e i r
'problem o f knowledge'.
Kant's philosophy i s c r i t i c a l
f o r e because, H e g e l c l a i m s , i t
h a s as i t s
premiss
this
thereempiricist
v i e w p o i n t t h a t w h a t i s t r u e c a n o n l y be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e m a t e r i a l
2^
thing itself.
ing
'
This remains t h e standard o f t r u t h ,
o u r mode o f c o g n i t i o n t h e ' t h i n g m
Kant does, however, u n d e r t a k e
nitive
faculties
is
examination
examin-
the touchstone.
o f t h e cog-
a manner t h a t m e e t s w i t h H e g e l ' s a p p r o v a l .
He s e t s t o w o r k i n a h i s t o r i c a l
modes o f t h e o r e t i c a l
this
itself'
in
fashion going
consciousness.
'through t h e main
The f i r s t
faculty or
23.
'The c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n i s j u s t t h i s : n o t t o know o b j e c t s
but t h e c o g n i t i o n and t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f r e a s o n , i t s l i m i t s
and i t s e x t e n t , m o r d e r t h a t i t n o t become t r a n s c e n d e n t
( t i b e r f l i e g e n d ) . ' H e g e l Werke 20, p. 339.
Also, from t h e
e a r l y e s s a y on ' F a i t h and K n o w l e d g e ' : '.. t h e w h o l e t a s k and
c o n t e n t o f t h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t t h e knowledge o f t h e A b s o l ute b u t t h e knowledge o f t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y o r a c r i t i q u e o f
the f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n . ' Werke 2, p. 303.
24.
H e g e l . Werke 2 0 , p. 339'Kant was t h e f i r s t g r e a t m o d e r n

p h i l o s o p h e r t o make t h e t h r e e f o l d d i v i s i o n : s e n s i b i l i t y ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r e a s o n ' .
See L u c i e n Goldmann o o . c i t . ,
p. 159-
79.
mode e x a m i n e d
the t h i r d ,
of
is
intuition,
Reason.
Beginning
t h e m a t t e r o f t h e same' f r o m
m a n i f o l d o f a p p e a r a n c e may
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between
tered
ance'.
smell,
'corresponds t o
that through which the

2
be o r d e r e d ,
'the form o f appearance'. '
f o r m and m a t t e r we n a v e a l r e a d y
Now, m
the Transcendental
the content
encoun-
c o l o u r , hardness e t c .
that which gives
K a n t ' s i d e a l i s m now
or s t r u c t u r e
it
this
( G e m l i t ) ) we
ordinary matter
o f sens-
or structure (Gestalc).
saying
t o what a p p e a r s t o u s :
being outside ourselves
as
However, j u s t as d i d D e s c a r t e s
extension,
consists m
p r o p e r t y o f o u r mind
A e s t h e t i c what c o r r e s p o n d s t o
o f s e n s a t i o n w o u l d be s u c h q u a l i t i e s
and L o c k e , K a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s f r o m
(a
o r appear-
our d i s c u s s i o n o f Kant's n o t i o n o f the ' u n i t y o f appear-
the matter,
ation
with intuition
( A n s c h a u u n g ) ^ K a n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s what
sensation,
and
(The e x t e r n a l schema o f t h e Phenomenology
Mind i s e v i d e n t h e r e . )
ance
t h e second, t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h a t we
provide that
form
'By means o f e x t e r n a l sense

represent
t o ourselves
o b j e c t s and a l c o g e t h e r .-15 b e i n g
as
space.
25.
The t r a n s l a t i o n o f K a n t ' s t e r m A n s c h a u u n g r e p r e s e n t s sonet h m g o f a prooiem.

I t i s a l s o a t e r m t h a t i s o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e i n our enquiry.
I t i s n o r m a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as
'intuition'.
I n some i n s t a n c e s , h o w e v e r , t n i s t r a n s l a t i o n
m i s s e s t h e p o i n t and t e r m s s u c h as ' a p p e a r a n c e ' and ' p e r c e p t i o n ' a r e n e a r e r t h e mark.
I t i s a l w a y s as w e l l t o k e e p m
m i n d t h e l i t e r a l German sense o f t h e t e r m ' l o o k on a t ' when
dealing with i t .
26.
Kant.
27.
I b i d . , p. 7 1 .
He c o n t i n u e s : ' T h e r e i n t h e i r f o r m , s i z e and
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o each o t h e r i s d e t e r m i n e d o r d e t e r m i n a b l e , '
Kritik
d e r R e i n e n V e r n u n f t , Suhrkamp Werke
p.
69
80.
Space i s
in
t h i s way
( r e m e Anschauung),
sensation m
tuition;
it
c o n s i d e r e d by K a n t t o be a p u r e i n t u i t i o n
s o m e t h i n g w h i c h we
our consciousness.
i s t h e manner m
itions
f o r e a c h t h i n g we
is
We
intuit.
therefore wholly d i s t i n c t
example
Similarly,
w h i c h we
s e l v e s w i t h o u r i n n e r sense.
supply t o the matter o f
represent objects t o our-
provide these u n i v e r s a l
Intuition
from s e n s a t i o n
t h a t Hegel gives i s :
Time i s a p u r e i n -
(Anschauung) i s
(Errpfindung).
h a r d n e s s i s my
d e r i v e a ] 1 knowledge
all
space.
We
intuition
the hardness
f r o m o u t s i d e m y s e l f and, even more,

fundamentally
t h e ' o u t s i d e m y s e l f ' i s my
own
restrict
miscon-
intuition.
w o u l d e x p e c t t h a t H e g e l w o u l d be w h o l l y s a t i s f i e d
t h i s a c c o u n t w h i c h a p p e a r s t o be a r e f u t a t i o n
certainly
as
The m a t e r i a l i s t s ' a t t e m p t t o
e x p e r i e n c e t o t h e same, i s t h e r e f o r e
c e i v e d because
An
sensation;
t h a t I sense s o m e t h i n g h a r d , t h a t I p r o j e c t
being outside myself m
cond-
o f t h e m a t e r i a l ! - m o f Locke.
with
of materialism,
However, he a r g u e s
that
K a n t h a s m i s s e d t h e p o i n t i n r e g a r d i n g space and t i m e as f o r m s
28
of
'sensuous i n t u i t i o n ' .
He
agrees t h a t
they a r e a b s t r a c t i o n s
t h a t do n o t p e r t a i n t o s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f .
tion
But the a b s t r a c -
s p a c e , f o r one, does n o t make t h e o b j e c t a p p e a r o u t s i d e
selves.
Kant g i v e s t h i s
as sensuous
intuitions.
i m p r e s s i o n by r e g a r d i n g space and
A c c o r d i n g t o Hegel Kant argues
' t h e r e a r e t h i n g s o u t s i d e b u t w i t h o u t space o r t i m e .
c o n s c i o u s n e s s comes and has w i t h i n i t s e l f
ppssibilities
of experience, j u s t
as i n
28.
Hegel.
We rice 9
order t o eat i t
(Die N a t u r p h i l o s o p n i e ) ,
29.
Hegel.
Werke 20, p. 3 4 1 .
time
that
Nov;
t i m e and space
and t e e t h as t h e c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r e a t i n g . '
our-
as
has a
mouth
I n genuine
k
pp. l
- 42.
8l.
i d e a l i s m , however, Hegel c l a i m s ,
on
this defective
idealism
they
subjective
are
form.
r e g a r d e d as
This requires
space and
I n genuine,
idealist
the
t h e m a t t e r o f our knowledge.-^
the m a t t e r o f our
f o r m by
our
So
view w i t h
nal universals',
t o Hume's e x a m p l e , t h e
epistemology simply
experience, they
of t h e i r objects.
it
is s t i l l ,
Space and
it
the
time are
categories
provide
which are,
o n l y be
discerned
external universais m
he
by
abstractions,
question
now
a r i s e s : w h e r e t h e n does t h e
To
says,
Hegel, a f t e r a l l ,
thought
the t h i n g s
we
cannot
themselves.
Of
'true'
a p p e a r s co be
Hegel.
external world.
are
ordered.
Werke 8,
p.
119.
They a r e
However, he
t h e way
although
conclude
course,
taking
identical
argues,
stretches
is
but
idealism
concepts w h i c h are
nature
of
tnemselves.
sense t h a t
external universals,
Hegel's
determinations
t i m e , he
things
of
return
then m
c o n c e p t s space and
of the
'exter-
the matter
The
features
the
time are
our
the
pertain to things
stand.
have seen,
Hegel i s prepared t o admit t h a t i t
know them as
place?
both
f o r the o b j e c t s
not
materialist
30.
who
as
sensation,
e f f e c t are not
bhat we
(ib.)
we
ourselves.
do
take i t s
are
our
i n n i s view, a r e l a t i o n s h i p of
i s o n l y we
t h a t they
As
v i e w t h a t space and
cause and
a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t may
by
things outside
ideas
are
his objective idealism
by
(ib.)
have t o c o n c l u d e , i f H e g e l w i s h e s
the
that m
knowledge i s p r o v i d e d
we
objective,
the Subject provides
knowledge i s p r o v i d e d
thought:.
t o oppose t h i s
f a r as
take
Hegel r e g a r d s Kant
a subjective
f o r m and
not
'external universals'.
some e x p l a n a t i o n .
i n so
t i m e do
with
wnich
this
3?.
a r g u m e n t t o mean t h a t
of
these
the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ,
Space i s t h e o r d e r m
it
i s not merely
concepts
are
or t h a t they are
which t h i n g s are
the f e a t u r e s
the order of n a t u r e .
nature;
'however
an e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r e x t e r n -
al
ality
itself.
regarded
The
So
the a b s t r a c t i o n ,
Hegel's o b j e c t i v e
concept,
and
this
i d e a l i s m as t h e o r d e r
i s extremely
Hegel's i d e a l i s m , i s the r e a l i t y
he
suggests,
b e c a u s e he
failed
considered
Lockean c o n t e x t .
were, Hegel says,
are they m
to attain
this
He
themselves.
space f o r i t s e l f ,
we
'objective'
understanding
view of
Kant,
things
space w i t h i n
occupied
had
the
himself with
Had
lie e x a m i n e d t h e n o t i o n o f
a r e t o presume f r o m H e g e l ' s a c c o u n t ,
that
i t was
or
never sought t o d i s c o v e r
not
just
of extension but t h a t extension
From K a n t ' s a c c o u n t o f i n t u i t i o n ,
standing.
itself.
t h e y s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l t o t h e mind
what they were m
ibility
is
of the e x t e r n a l world.
q u e s t i o n s he had
the mind alone?
w o u l d have d i s c o v e r e d
important m
t h e n o t i o n s t i m e and
The
Are
t h e c o n c e p t space
the s u b j e c t i v e
he
poss-
itself.
we
move on
to the
under-
The
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o Kant i s the c a p a b i l 32
i t y of producing conceptions,'
the s p o n t a n e i t y o f c o g n i t i o n .
31.
H e g e l . Werke 9, p. 43I t i s t h i s conception of idealism
t h a t makes p o s s i b l e t h e much d e b a t e d ( a n d d e b a t a b l e ) t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e L o g i c t o t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Ha c u r e .
The I d e a
we a r e t o l d , ( i b i d . , p. 2 4 ) p a s s e s i n t o N a t u r e t h r o u g h i t s
seif-externalisation.
I t becomes t h e o t h e r o f i t s e l f as
space.
Space i s b o t h I d e a ( L o g i c ) and ' e x t e r n a l i t y i t self' (Nature),
See a l s o : G.R~. G.Mure. The P h i l o s o p h y
o f H e g e l . O x f o r a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965. pp. i'H - 1331
32.
Kant.
K r i t i k d e r R e m e n V e r n u n f t , o o . c i t . , '.. t h e
c a p a b i l i t y of producing representations (Vorsteilungen)
themselves, o f t h e s p o n t a n e i t y o r c o g n i t i o n i s t h e unders t a n d i n g . ' p. 97
83-
The
c a t e g o r i e s p r o d u o e o i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as I have
a l r e a d y s a i d , are the form m

data of i n t u i t i o n
is
to a unity.
of the I m
I have t r i e d
the
mg'
(begleiten)
of experience
i s t e m p e r e d by
a l l my
s i d e as t h o u g h
consequently
conceptions
be
it
that
were i t s e l f
the
empty.
that
s t a n d t o one
of self-consciousness,
arrived
t h e n ' , he
at?'
asks,
Now,
than that
provided
h i s v i e w t h a t t n e manner
1
accompany-
is deficient.
'l
think'
The
side of i t .
Hegel
of the I .
stands
activity
to
if
i s w h o l l y a b s t r a c t and
fully
unde-
'are t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h e I
o f Kant these
way.
empirically given i n ordinary
v a r i o u s forms o f the judgement.

p.
the
'the I , t h e
are discovered
the
one
of the I
' I think' with

But
i n the philosophy
find
by
f o r Kant's n o t i o n
g o r i e s o f the understanding
' F o r t u n a t e l y we
As
as p r o v i d i n g a
' b a r b a r i c ' d e p i c t i o n of the a c t i v i t y
it
the
have t h e r e f o r e
c o n s i s t s ^.n u n i t i n g t h i s e ^ p t y
t e r m i n e d how
and
o f a p p e r c e p t i o n a.s
conceptions
g i v e s him t h e i m p r e s s i o n
unity
Hegel regards
Kant d e p i c t s the u n i t y
even f i n d s i t
We
However, t h i s e n t h u s i a s m
the understanding
i n which
to
apperception
Kant's n o t i o n o f the understanding.
t o demonstrate,
Empiricists.
sense-
o r g a n i s i n g the m a n i f o l d o f appearance
more a d e q u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n
It
u n i t y of
commensurate w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
already encountered
of
The
the I reduces the
thus simply tne synthesis of the understanding,
activity
is
which
a very
cate-
convenient
logic
Because K a n t d e p i c t s
the
33-
Ibid.,
136.
34.
H e g e l . Werke 8. p. 117. H e g e l adds t h a t i t was, on t h e o t h e r

h a n d , the~ p r o f o u n d s e r v i c e ' o f t h e F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y t o
have p o i n t e d o u t t h a t ' t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h o u g h t ' a r e
' e s s e n t i a l l y t o be d e r i v e d ' .
See b e l o ^ _ , p 02.
r
84.
unity
o f apperception
as a c c o m p a n y i n g ' my c o n c e p t i o n s
i s able t o d e r i v e those
conceptions
he
( t h e c a t e g o r i e s ) and t h e
f o r m s o f t h e i r u s e s i m p l y by t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f
ordinary
regards
logic
t o h i s Transcendental
as a w h o l l y u n w a r r a n t e d
Logic.
This Hegel
procedure.
I n simply
aligh-
t i n g on t h e c a t e g o r i e s i n o r d i n a r y l o g i c K a n t h a s , m h i s
opinion,
of
evaded t h e n e c e s s i t y o f d e d u c i n g
the understanding
introduced m
apperception
itself.
them f r o m t h e n o t i o n
The c a t e g o r i e s a r e t o be p r o p e r l y
p h i l o s o p h y by t h e i r d e d u c t i o n
itself,
o r what H e g e l c a l l s ,
from t h e u n i t y o f
the Logic, the
'notion'.^
It
is,
as we h a v e s e e n , f o r i t s
implicit
a t t a c k on -Mie^
e m p i r i c i s m t h a t H e g e l r a t e s most h i g h l y K a n t ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e
understanding.
I n h i s view, i t s e t t l e s
p r o b l e m s o f e m p i r i c i s m by s h o w i n g t h a t
than s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n .
Indeed,
t i o n of the understanding,
once and f o r a l l t h e
the 'notion'
according t o Kant's
is
mgner
interpreta-
t h e m a t t e r t h a t o u r senses
provide
"56
i s n o t e v e n an o b j e c t , i t i s m e r e l y
becomes o b j e c t i v e
Thus i t
solely
a sensuous m a n i f o l d .
I t
through the synthesis o f apperception.
appears t o Hegel t h a t t h e p r i o r i t i e s
o f empiricism are
35
Ibid.
That Hegel c o n s i d e r s t h e two, t h e u n i t y o f apperc e p t i o n ( t h e I ) and t h e n o t i o n , t o be more o r l e s s t n e same
may be seen f r o m t h i s quo c a t i o n f r o m t h e S c i e n c e ot" l o g i c :
'The n o t i o n m so f a r as i t h a s been e x t e n d e d i t s e l f t o
s u c h an e x i s t e n c e win ch i s i t s e l f f r e e i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
the
I o f t h e pure s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . '
Werke 6, p. 253-
36.
An ' o b j e c t i s ' o n l y ' t h a t i n whose c o n c e p t t h e m a n i f o l d o f

a g i v e n i n t u i t i o n i s urn ted.
' K r i t i k d e r Remen V e r n u n f t ,
o p . c i t . , p, 139"
85.
reversed.
t h a t which
S e n s e - p e r e e n t i o n , he
says,
i s a c t u a l l y d e p e n d e n t and
thoughts are i n
contrast
and
primitive.
can
consider the science
ist
immediately
of p o s i t i o n
By
t h a t which
way
secondary
is
o f astronomy.
Our
it
suggests,
A l l that
of the s t a r s .
arise
movements.
f o r him t h a t genuine
In this
experience.
experience
case i t
'what i s e x p e r i e n c e
This is
laws
o f the heavens
as we
t h e laws
Rather,
t o be
not
would
expect,
o f t h e heavens
i t is
i s much h i g h e r t h a n
shows i t s e l f
subsumed u n d e r l a w s .
time.'^
o f the
sense-perception
Hegel,
with this that
do n o t h a v e t h e i r o r i g i n m
experience
The
sense-impressions.
does n o t w i s h t o suggest
all
these
the content of
he
intuition
from the understanding o f the astronomist
from h i s i s o l a t e d
ience.
astronom-
I t i s o n l y when
is possible to explain
to bring
we
s e n s e s a r e t h e changes o f
r e l a t i o n through the categories.
clearly
that
the
knowledge o f t h e heavens d e r i v e s from t h e a b i l i t y
human u n d e r s t a n d i n g
into
fact
independent
b r i n g s h i s t h i n k i n g t o b e a r on t h i s m a t t e r o f
(Anschauung) t h a t
m
and
truly
o f an e x a m p l e , he
perceives with his
on t h e p a r t
' i s now
evidence
sense-exper-
t h e c o n t e n t o f sense-
Implicit m
s h o u l d be u n i v e r s a l ,
this,
then,
snould
count
is
for
evidently
of the understanding.
not Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the

Kant,
as I h a v e a l r e a d y
said,
powers
regarded
yj .
' i n t h i s sense K a n t c a l l e d t h a t w h i c h c o n f o r m e d w i t h
o b j e c t i v e and i n d e e d w i t h f u l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' , H e g e l
inues.
"/Jerke 8, p. J15.
38.
K e g e l . Werke 20. . p. i 47.
thought
cont-
86.
the
apparatus
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as
knowledge which
pertained
was
inherently
p r o v i d i n g us
subjective.
The
t o t h e mode o f c o g n i t i o n o n l y , i t
orientation m
the world.
Hegel suggests
' t i m i d ' o n t h i s p o i n t b e c a u s e , j u s t as d i d
an i n d i v i d u a l ,
standing.
I i n the Kantian philosophy
sed w i t h i n
which
to
itself',
contains i s i t s e l f
t h a t Kant regards
p o i n t of the a b s t r a c t i o n of the
This l a s t
39-
is
is,
he
So
under-
says,
thac of the
enclo-
as
t h i s general
he
such,
approach
empumcist
H e g e l ' s o p i n i o n , n e v e r t h i n k s t o ask w h e t h e r wnat
as e v e r ,
weight.
our
t h a t Kant
the i n d i v i d u a l self-consciousness
t h e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , i s t h e same as
understanding
is,
merely
c o n t i n g e n t p e r c e p t i o n and
i s opposed t o t h e u n i v e r s a l ' . ^
Kant, m
knowledge
the e m p i r i c i s t s ,
only considered
The
was
with
The
true.
Hence h i s
our knowledge n o t
'thing in
accusatxon
from the
view-
itself'.
argument o f Hegel's appears t o c a r r y v e r y

grounds o f h i s c r i t i c i s m
the
iirtle
seem t o be mere --'ssertions
K a n t h i m s e l f s u g g e s t s t h i s a n a l o g y i n n i s e s s a y 'what d o e s
i t mean: t o o r i e n t a t e y o u r s e l f m t h i n k i n g ' (Was h e i s s t :
s i c h 1m
Denken o r i e n t i e r e n ) . Werke 5 ( S c h r i f t e n z u r
M e t a p h y s i k und L o g i k ) pp. 267 - 283.
The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t
o f t h e e s s a y i s t h a t we o r i e n t a t e o u r s e l v e s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y
and l o g i c a l l y by means o f 'a s u b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n c f d i f f erence' (durch e m e n ^ u b j e k t i v e n Unterscheidungsgrund).
See i b i d . , p p . 269 - 270.
9
40.
H e g e l . Werke 20, p. 349.

Goldmann's t h e s i s ( o p . c i t . )
is i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t .
He a r g u e s t h a t t h e w h o l e
o f K a n t ' s p h i l o s o p h y d e p i c t s t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f man
in
present-day bourgeois s o c i e t y .
He even c l a i m s t h a t , i n
some ways, 'Kant l a y s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r a
most p e n e t r a t i n g c r i t i q u e o f D o u r g e o i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t s c c i e t
i b i d . , p. 110.
T h i s l i m i t a t i o n t h a t Hegel d i s c o v e r s m
t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant w o u l d be seen t h e n by Goldmann as
a l i m i t a t i o n i n bourgeois thmKing m general.
To
i l l u m i n a t e t h e g r o u n d s we
of Kant's d e p i c t i o n of the
argument d e r i v e s i t s
one
nave t o r e t u r n
'unity of apperception
ity
'.
The
s u b s t a n c e from what H e g e l r e g a r d s
objective
knowledge i s
to
of the I alone.
Thus we
t o be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e
can
appealing t o the understanding.

i n common w i t h ,
ophers.
It
at the very l e a s t ,
be
had
discovered
This understanding
have
something t h a t
'contingent'.
and
reason
as b e i n g p u r e l y
of t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y
l a y beyond e x p e r i e n c e :
by
philos-
t o Hegel t h a t Kant,
the idea of the understanding
the standard
we
o t h e r s c i e n t i s t s and
seems a c o n t r a d i c t i o n
even more, t h a t
activtrue
a t t h e same t i m e r e g a r d t h e i r p r o d u c t s
and,
the
o n l y d i s c o v e r what i s
i s not therefore ' i n d i v i d u a l ' or
Consequently, i t
the t h i n g m
who
should
suojectiv
should
itself,
be
or
noumenon.
T h i s b r i n g s us
o f Reason.
is
assessment
o f t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s o f K a n t ' s p h i l o s o p h y :
proof that
the
to his
t o the t h i r d
Reason m
t h e f a c u l t y t h a t has
infinite.^
Since
we
and
the Kantian
as i t s
last facility,
the
faculty
philosophy, ?egei t e l l s
object the unconditioned,
know f r o m K a n t t h a t we
'can make
us,
or the
no
42
adequate e m p i r i c a l use'
from p u r e
Reason we
may
of the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t are d e r i v e d
assume t h a t , i f
a t a l l , i t i s t h e noumenon.
has
as i t s
I f this
o b j e c t something which
41.
Hegel.
42.
Kant.
Werke 8,
Kritik
p.
it
is
can
Reason has
an o b j e c t
t h e c a s e , t h e n Reason
never a t t a i n .
121.
d o r Rexiieri V e r n u n f t , p. J! 8.
In
this
88,
respect
and
it
would stand below t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
t h i s again
However,
I s w h a t H e g e l f i n d s c o n t r a d i c t o r y , as o p p o s e d
to the s t r i v i n g
o f Reason f o r t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d ,
-the knowledge whicn t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
- t h e noumenon.
f u r n i s h e s Kant
regards
4
as
limited,
it
is
' e x p l a i n e d t o be u n t r u e , t o be o n l y
Reason s t a n d s
above t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
beneath i t m
its
Although
it
Reason h a s as i t s a i m t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i n f i n i t e
reasons f o r t h i s ,
it.
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e a r e two
Firstly,
a r e no o b j e c t s m
he t a k e s K a n t t o mean t h a t
our sense-experience that
But t h i s , Hegel suggests,
of experience.
w h e t h e r one d i s c o v e r s Reason m
.
it
stands,
regarded
observation
standing thera."
experience
Kant s p h i l o s o p h y ,
as w h a t I i n t u i t
argue, i t i s
as
'experience,
b a s i s an e m p i r i c a l v i e w o f e x p e r i e n c e .
regarded
to
t o Kant n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h a t
i s a c a n d l e s t i c k h e r e and a s n u f f - b o x
looks a t the world
correspond
there
implies a peculiar notion
I t would appear t h a t
of the world, s i g n i f i e s
its
i n i t s aim b u t a p p a r e n t l y
content.
i s unable t o a t t a i n
Reason.
appearance'.
there
Clearly,
'depends on how one

h o w e v e r , h a s as
Experience
is
h e r e and now; n e v e r , H e g e l w o u l d
i n its
full
has g r e a t m e r i t .
universality.
This
However, w h e n e v e r m
point,
HegeL's
43-
H e g e l . Werke 8, p. 1 2 1 . 'But w h i l e t h e s u b j e c t i v e c l a i m o f
t h e u n i t y o f p u r e a p p e r c e p t i o n was shown t o be r i g h t f u l ,
K a n t means t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e c l a i m o f
t h i s s o - c a l l e d fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f reason i s t h e source
o f a n t i m o n i e s and o t h e r f a l l a c i e s . . ' K o r n e r , c p . c i t . ,
pp. 110 - 119.
44.
H e g e l . Werke 20, p. 3^2.
89.
p h i l o s o p h y we
He
have
i s prepared
'universality',
t o concede t o K a n t t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y
Reason does n o t e x i s t
sense.
The
Infinite,
t h i n g t h a n can be
or,
t h e o l o g y i s n o t f a r away.
even w o r s e ,
the world considered
'spirit
is
I t is
for spirit
t h a t we
comprehend t h e w o r l d r a t i o n a l l y
] f we
' a c a n d l e s t i c k here
r a t h e r , he
seems t o be
ing-experience
his
and
ience
then the world w i l l
A r i s t o t l e i a n manner, t h e I d e a l ,
The
that
the l i l e
On
itself
the I n f i n i t e
o f Reason i s
t o o low a v a l u e
p r e t s Kant's account of experience

necessarily
subjective.
we
by K a n t , may
45.
to
only
ought,
as
think-
t h e o t h e r hana,
we
consider
be
exper-
infinite.
I t
f o r Hegel m
itself.
Tne
an
cont
life.
second e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t Hegel g i v e s t h e n f o r K a n t i a n
i s t h a t Kant places
are t o l d
The
be
may
',.der
c a t e g o r i e s of the
and
ist
life,
He
inter-
t o mean t h a t o u r i d e a s
n u r f u r den
are
understanding,
are, l e g i t i m a t e l y applied
have o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e
Geist
the divine
on o u r t h o u g h t .
o r d e r i n g of our sense-perceptions.
t h a t we
We
the d i v i n e
Reason b e i n g u n a b l e t o a t t a i n t h e I n f i n i t e ,
the
secular
experience
if
rums
experience
then, that thinking-experience i s
emplative l i f e ,
Hegel
His
conceive
saying, to considei
somealone
w i l l n o t be a b l e
i n v o l v i n g memory as w e l l .
i n t h i s way
seems a g a i n ,
alone'.^
a snuff-box there.'
t h e o l o g i c a l p o m ^ a p p e a r s t o be
i s not
f o r thought
t a k i n g t o the heavens.
p o i n t , h o w e v e r , a p p e a r s t o be
as
an e m p i r i c a l
or absolute u n i v e r s a l i t y ,
sense-perceived.
h i s a r g u m e n t f o r us by
of
in
This i s a c o n d i t i o n
at a l l .
But
G e i s t . ' Werke 20,
this
p.
order
353.
90.
m g , we a r e r e m i n d e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f Reason, i s o u r
own, n o t t h a t
of the thing i n i t s e l f .
Thus i n
these c a t e g o r i e s t o a t t a i n the I n f i n i t e
dent.
I t becomes t r a n s c e n d e n t
do i n f a c t c o r r e s p o n d
this
employing
Reason becomes
by s u g g e s t i n g t h a t
t o aspects
Transcen-
the categories
of the real world.
I t is
t h a t H e g e l i n t e r p r e t s as an u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f o u r t h i n k i n g ,
t h a t Reason i n s e e k i n g t o e x t e n d o u r i d e a s t o c o v e r a l l p o s s i b l e
experience
falls
into
contradictions:
f a l s e conclusions: Paralogisms.
Reason's own D i a l e c t i c .
t o draw i n t o
T h i s a c c o r d i n g t o Kant
I t i n e v i t a b l y but,
falsely,
of conditions that
limited.
Kant acknowledges t h a t
it
inquire
a f t e r t h e knoweldge o f f i n a l
is
condition
is
attempts
an u n i t y t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
seeking the t o t a l i t y
means a t i t s
t h e Ancisnpriues and makes
in
something
t h e n a t u r e o f Reason t o
causes, b u t because t h e
disposal, the categories of the understanding,
are i n h e r e n t l y
deficient,
.t can n e v e r
a t t a i n t h a t end.
The s o l u t i o n o f t l . j a n t i flojfiies of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
into
which
46
Reason i s n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d i s , H e g e l n o t e s ,
J u s t as i t
very
simple.
i s t h e n a t u r e o f Reason t o s e e k t h e t o t a l i t y
of a l l
conditions underlying a contingent object of the understanding

it
i s e q u a l l y i t s n a t u r e t h a t what i t s e e k s c a n n o t
pertain
itself',
is
46.
t o experience.
that
appearance.
is
possibly
Reason s e e k s t o know t h e w o r l d
i t s nature, but a l l that

Reason f a l s e l y a r g u e s ,
i s g i v e n , Kant
'jn
asserts,
t h e n , from appearance t o
The s o l u t i o n H e g e l c l a i m s i s as ' t r i v i a l ' as t h e m s i g n t

i n t o the c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature o f experience i s 'profound'.
Werke S, p. 1 2 6 .
91
reality.
(i.e.
is
simply
t h e a n t i f t o p r i i e s ) does n o t f a l l
itself
we
So t h e s o l u t i o n
theobject m
b u t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o t h e knowing Reason.
would expect,
understanding
this
contradictions,
discovers, arenot arbitary.

effort
Kant
ictions to thefaculty
ience i t s e l f
As
Reason
m the
o f c o n d i t i o n s l i m i t i n g an
o f Reason i t s e l f
h i s philosophy.
as b e i n g i n h e r e n t l y
t a k e on t h e b u r d e n .
mis-
rightly
t h eantimonies that
However, t h e f a c t t h a t K a n t r e f e r r e d
severe l i m i t a t i o n
(ib.)
They n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e
t o discover thet o t a l i t y
object.
and f o r
t o Hegel represents a fundamental
of contradiction or Dialectic.
pointed out that
to
'that the c o n t r a d i c t i o n
a l l these
represents f o r Hegel a
Rather than regard
Kant.
Hegel i s
The t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t , t h e I , i s
s u p p o s e d t o have r e m a r k e d m
01 t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y :
'As i t
t o o k up a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s m
himself,
ness ' .
exper-
c o n t r a d i c t o r y Reason h a s i t s e l f
responsible f o r b r i n g i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o experience
to
contrad-
his
itself
according
Lectures
was God p r e v i o u s l y who

so now i t
J u s t as vn t h t h e R a t i o n a l i s t s
it
i s self-conscious-
was God w h i c h wa.s

48
the
d r a i n i n t o which
a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s flowed
so now w i t h
K a n t i t i s t h e I t h a t h a s t o t a k e on t h e ' n e g a t i v i t y '
world.
of the
K a n t , H e g e l b e l i e v e s , shows t o o much t e n d e r n e s s t o
worldly things' m this, his D i a l e c t i c . ^

47.
H e g e l . Werke 2 0 , p . 3 5 9 -
jt
i s these
'worldly
48.
See a b o v e , p. 3^7- ( C h a p t e r
49.
H e g e l . Werke 2 0 , p . 3 5 9 - See a l s o , W e r k e 8 , p . 1 2 6 .
Contradi c t i o n and" ' n e g a t i v i t y ' a r e t h e n a c c o r d i n g t o ^-egel f e a t u r e s
of t h e r e a l w o r l d .
However, t h i s i s n o t i n t h e s e n s e ( o f
M a r x ) t h a t t h e y become i n t o l e r a b l e and w e h a v e t o g e t u p a n a
change t h e w o r l d .
B u t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t o u r t h i n k i n g icnows
t h e w o r l d a s i n h e r e n t l y a n e g a t i v e one and i n t h i s k n o w l e d g e
r a i s e s i t s e l f above t h a t n e g a t i v i t y .
R e a s o n J.S t h e r e f o r e
n o t t h e demand t o o v e r t h r o w t h o s e n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , o -"
the rose m t h e c r o s s o f t h e p r e s e n t .
l).
92.
things',
in
the content of experience,
as he a r g u e s a t l e n g t h
t h e Pnenomenoiogy o f M i n d and t h e L o g i c ,
contradictory.
I t is
are
inherently
i n d e e d t h e t a s k o f Reason t o d i s c o v e r
that D i a l e c t i c but also to hold fast t o i t ,

b u t as t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e w o r l d .
contradiction
that
I t has t o r a i s e
t o the contemplation of i t s
t h a t the Idea, D i a l e c t i c , i s
n o t as i t s
own,
itself
above
own I d e a by k n o w i n g
t h e essence o f t h e w o r l d .
(ii)
The
Critique
of Fichte's Theoretical
Philosophy
K a n t ' s a c c o u n t o f D i a l e c t i c was, j u s t
as
a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e , m a r r e d f o r H e g e l by
ance he
why
had
K a n t had
within the
the
world that
own
was
accord i n t o
inherently
antimonies m
Not
surprisingly, therefore,
becomes t h e
but
i d e a of the
it
world m
Kant's claim
can
have o b j e c t i v e
knowledge o n l y of t h i n g s
our
sense p e r c e p t i o n s .
it
As
the
t o e x i s t a t a l l , w o u l d be
as
prevented
this
we
way
sich).
f o r êgel
'timidity'
d i n g experience.
strayed
( D i n g an
idea that
i n comprehen
have seen, t h a t
we
that originate
mark o f a t h i n g i n i t s e l f ,
that
it
d i d not
ledge of i t .
know o n l y phenomena n e v e r noumena.
dialectic
o f Reason, as
necessarily
seeks knowledge beyond t h e
k n o w l e d g e o f how
a knowledge i t
things
as
it
its
are
to the
i s Hegel's o p i n i o n
point
objective
previously,
themselves
of d e p a r t u r e the
knowThe
it
( o f noumena) w h i c h
T h i s b r i n g s us
t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy of
t h a t the
our
is that
phenomenal w o r l d ,
cannot of n e c e s s i t y a t t a i n .
Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s
For
I have e x p l a i n e d
were
cannot p o s s i b l y
can
have an
originate
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s , we
We
not
experience
What had
general i n d i c a t i o n of Kant's
was,
the
itself'
is this
fall
I t was
faculty,
that
the
'thing in
toler-
understand
contradictory.
dialectical.
the
excessive
I t was, H e g e l w o u l d
supreme c o g n i t i v e
was
general
paralogisms to
world.
contradiction
Kant from s i t u a t i n g the
the
his
Hegel cannot
a n t i m o n i e s and
s o u g h t t o comprehend was
limiting
things'.
t h a t w i t h i n the
case t h a t Reason, o u r
of i t s
it
'worldly
preferred
I rather
argue, the
the
shown t o
was
to
B'ichle.
philosophy cf Fichte
K a n t i a n d i a l e c t i c , and
is
takes
particul
9*.
the
apparently insurmountable c o n t r a p o s i t i o n o f the
to
t h e 'the t h i n g m
It
it
here,
is
merely
is
t h e Ego
the I .
think'
itself'.
i s commonly known t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l c a t e g o r y
philosophy
Fichte's
(das I c h ) o r s i m p l y , what I s h a l l
Hegel suggests
that Fichte's notion of the I
a modification of the notion of the unity
c e p t i o n o f Kant's philosophy.
w o u l d seem t o be t h i s .
call
The d r i f t
According
of his
o f apper-
argument
t o Kant, the u n i t y
o f apper-
c e p t i o n i s w h a t makes p o s s i b l e any o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e .
I t
is
'l
o n l y t h r o u g h o u r p e r c e p t i o n s b e i n g a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e
think'
c o u l d we p e r c e i v e o b j e c t s a t a l l .
mean, H e g e l a d d s , t h a t
T h i s may be t a k e n
a c e r t a i n manner t h e I , o r t h e u n i t y
of
apperception,
of
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n b e i n g s u p p l i e d by o u r
the
constructs the objects o f experience
of apperception.
r e m a i n s an e l e m e n t w h i c h
those
rise
Now,
- t h e matce^
sense-impressions,
f o r m by t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
by t h e u n i t y
and ' t h e l a b o t r '
Kant's philosopny
of
things external t o ourselves

t o our sense-impressions.
argues t h a t even those

the I .
itself
If
there
i s n o t s u p p l i e d by one I i t s e l f . ,
( D i n g e an s i c h ) t h a t
namely,
give
F i c h t e , h o w e v e r , and t h i s i s
w h e r e he m o d i f i e s K a n t ' s n o t i o n o f t h e I , t a k e s one s t e p
and
to
t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s a r e an
I n the jargon of his philosophy
further
attribute
t h e y a r e what t h e
posits.
t h i s account o f Hegel's i s c o r r e c t i t
appears
that
F i c h t e nas e x t e n d e d K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e i n t o an o n t o l o g y .
It
is evident that
does n o t o f i t s e l f
i n Kant's d e s c r i p t i o n o f experience
c o n s t i t u t e being.
The u n i t y
the I
of apperception
does i n d e e d c o n s t i t u t e o u r
experience but
reason c o n s t i t u t e a l l t h a t i s .
as
we
I.
know, a g i v e n
interpreted
not
construct
has
being.
it
I t appears, then,
ontology
Fichte
t o be
construct
distinguished
i n c l u d i n g the
kind
of solipsism.
ity
follow that there
the
object
50.
his
doubt.
is
of knowledge.
His
I f this
has
t o mean
but
His
We
can
view t h a t the
shall
aim
self
however, a
see,
i s not
i s , rathe^,
i s h i s aim
p e r h a p s see
i f , as
philosophy
as
a Kantian
possibility
derives
is
the
complex
concerned
to give i t
i t must o f necess-
the
s e l f which
i s complex, then,
w h i c h , h o w e v e r , must h a v e
this
the
which
dogmatism
'non-ego', f r o m t h e I .
solipsism
a knowable world
self.
e s p e c i a l l y from
s o m e t h i n g more t h a n
to assert
explain is
world
I t is,
F i c h t e , as we
knowledge m
asserts
the
existing thing.
an u n s h a k e a b l e c e r t a i n t y .
regard
that Fichte
i s that philosophy
k n o w a b l e and
the
my
itself
I t
only
Fichte
equates w i t h genuine i d e a l i s m .
i s , of course, s o l i p s i s m ,
for
The
that
This
ground i n
itself
also
claims,
the whole of experience,
t h a t he
given
the
physically.
i n his opinion
place
for that
there i s ,
the n o t i o n o f the u n i t y of apperception
G e n u i n e i d e a l i s m , he
to
the
or m o d i f i c a t i o n of the I .
that 1 conceptually
only
This
to
I n his philosophy
I n contrast, i n Fichte's philosophy,
constitutes a l l
does nor
substratum which remains e x t e r n a l t o
becomes a p r o p e r t y ,
it
how
it
becomes
I have a l r e a d y
ontology.
of deducing the
w h a t we
in
its
possible
suggested,
So
is
we
have
e x t e r n a l 'world
P.Adanson. F i c h t e , B l a c k w o o d P h i l o s o p h i c a l
Fn p, 1 : sh Re a d e r s . v . 1 2 c .
Classics
for
96.
from t h e K a n t i a n u n i t y
is
this unity
of apperception.
Now, as we know,
t h a t accompanies o u r p e r c e p t i o n s which,
makes p o s s i b l e an o b j e c t o f e x p e r i e n c e .
do
f o r Kant,
What F i c h t e a p p e a r s t o
I s t o move f r o m t h i s n o c i o n o f t h e I as t h e c o g n i t i v e
ility
o f experience
experience.
I fm
our experience
the
I has p o s i t e d i t
Any o t h e r a r g u m e n t
the
nature o f experience
Undeterred
as s u c h .
leads m
( o r so we must b e l i e v e ) by t h i s
expect
According
'Everything
t h r o u g h my p o s i t i n g :
t h a t I p u t them o n ' .
is
concerning
cha.rge o f d o g -
the idealism of Fichte.
t h e s o l i p s i s m o f F i c h t e ' s i d e a l i s m does n o t
escape h i s n o t i c e .
argument i s t h a t
argue,
h i s view t o dogmatism.
m a t i s m H e g e l f i n d s much t o c r i t i c i s e m
As we w o u l d
his
we know
i s because, F i c h t e would
It
of
Thus t h e d e d u c t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l w o r l d w i t h i n
t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d t h i s
suggests,
possib-
t o a n o t i o n o f t h e I as t h e r e a l g r o u n d
s o l i p s i s m p r e s e n t s no p r o b l e m .
has
it
t o him, t h e f o r c e o f F i c h t e ' s
determinate
that
the I has,
I maKe a c o a t and b o o t s m y s e l f
The s o u r c e
i s t h e manner m
which
in
o f t h i s confusion, Hegel
F i c h t e expresses
'the form o f p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t
i t
this
doctrine.
is uncomfortable; I posit,
so t h a t I a l w a y s h a v e t h e I b e f o r e my eyes'-?^
What
immediately
comes t o m i n d i n F i c h t e ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i d e a l i s m i s n o t i t s
rationale,
activity
the Kantian unity of apperception, the synthetic
o f t h e I t h a t matces t h e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e p o s s i b l e ,
but the i n d i v i d u a l e m p i r i c a l I .
51.
Hegel.
Werke 2 0 , p. 404.
52.
Hegel, i b i d . ,
p. ^ 0 5 .
When F i c n t e s a y s t h a t t h e I
97-
posits a world external t o i t s e l f

s u g g e s t s , we i m m e d i a t e l y
s u c h as b o o t s
In
ourselves producing
t h e most g e n u i n e o f i d e a l i s m , h o w e v e r , t h e I as
admit
the Kantian
organises
aspect
superfluous.
case t h a t
experience
of this
it
Thus H e g e l i s
prepared t o
that
idea i s n o t f o r Hegel t h e o r g a n i s i n g a c t i v i t y
s u b j e c t i v e side o f Kant's idea o f t h e
o f apperception.
he
takes
of
the understanding
H e g e l h i m s e l f p r e f e r s t o s t r e s s what
t o be t h e o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t
that,
t h a t u n i t y o f apper-
F i c h t e , H e g e l c l a i m s , c o n c e n t r a t e s on
less significant
He s u g g e s t s
understood
i s my t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y
t h e I b u t t h e mode o r manner i n w h i c h
unity
things
i n t o an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d b u t t h e e s s e n t i a l
ception i s attained.
the
as H e g e l
a n d c o a t s b y o u r mere a c t o f t h i n k i n g o f thern.
by F i c h t e becomes
of
imagine
as t h e n o t - 1 ,
which
if
o f the idea:
b r i n g about t h e u n i t y
we c o n c e n t r a t e
on t h e s e
n e c e s s i t y , we t h e n h a v e g e n u i n e i d e a l i s m .
the categories
o f apperception.
concepts
and t h e i r
T h i s i s o f course
53
the
view
o f i d e a l i s e presented
Fichte,
the
i n h i s Science o f Logic.
I have a r g u e d , d e r i v e s t h e whole o f e x p e r i e n c e
Ego o r t h e I .
He s e t s a b o u t t h i s
i n t r i g u i n g deduction
from
an
ti
a Cartesian
fashion.
I n h i s essay Uber don B e g r i f f d e r Wissen-
s c h a f t s l e h r e he i n f o r m s u s t h a t
osophy i s t h e search
53.
the principal
for a principle
problem of
phil-
t h a t w o u l d be t h e a b s o l u t e
We m i g h t t h e r e f o r e see H e g e l ' s i d e a l i s m i n t h i s way.

Whereas K a n t h a d r e g a r d e d t n e c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as
s u b j e c t i v e Pieans t h r o u g n w h i c h we o r i e n t a t e o u r s e l v e s m t h e
w o i I d , H e g e l r e g a r d s t h e c a t e g o r i e s as b o t h o u r c o m p r e h e n s i o n
o f t h e w o r l d and t h e w o r l d i t s e l f .
T h i s i s t h e c o n c e p t i o n one
g e t s o f H e g e l ' s i d e a l i s r , vhen r e a d i n g t h e L o g i c, e s p e c i a l l y t h e
C h a p t e r on t n e ' N o t i o n ' (Werke 6 , pp. 2 i 3 - 2 o 9 j w h e r e he c o n e s
to g r i n s w i t h t h e Kantian icea o f t h e u n i t y o f apperception.
;
98.
first
it
p r i n c i p l e o f a l l human k n o w l e d g e .
i s o n l y by d i s c o v e r i n g s u c n a p r i n c i p l e t h a t
become a s c i e n c e .
principle
that
it
As
that
o f knowledge i t
w o u l d n o t be
t o induce
o n l y be
by i t s e l f .
proved
p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be
w o u l d have as i t s
open t o p r o o f .
p r o o f w o u l d be
To
I t follows,
takes t h i s
can
absolute
characteristic
subject to
could
F i c h t e ' s view,
or derived.
He
that
under-
t a s k i n n i s C-rundlage d e r W i s s e n s c h a f t s i e h r e .
procedure
What i s i t
the
make i t
that
philosophy
a c i r c u l a r argument s i n c e i t
t h a t p r i n c i p l e rray o n l y be d i s c o v e r e d
The
H i s view i s
he
adopts m
i n the simple
t h a t w o r k i s t o pose t h e
proposition
problem.
A=Â t h a t makes i t
self-
55
evidently
true?"
certainty.
of
The
and
then t o d e r i v e the grounds f o r i t s
procedure
consists m
deriving
c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e t h e c e r t a i n t y o f Knowled^t
i s t h e same t a s k t h a t D e s c a r t e s
f r o m one
m
piece
general.
s e t s h i m s e l f on d e d u c i n g
I t
the
56
c e r t a i n t y of the cognito.
in nature
it
Since
then the problem i s
receives not s u r p r i s i n g l y
a Cartesian reply.
claims that the c e r t a i n t y or self-evident

derived
from the I i t s e l f .
identical with itself

t h e I am.
and
54.
We
may
by a n a l o g y
accept
56.
Fichte
n a t u r e o f knowledge
reasons t h a t A i s taken t o
with
the simple
the self- i d e n t i t y
identity
o f A as b e i n g
is
be
of
certain
t r u e from the o r i g i n a l c o n t i n u i t y of the I i n experience.

F i c h t e . S a m t l i c h e Werke E r s t e r Band, L e i p z i g , M a y e r and
M t i l l e r , p. 4? .
The s c i e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e ( W i s s e n s c n a f t s l e n r e
he says, i s i t s e l f a s c i e n c e . l t must, h o w e v e r , b e f o r e a l l e l s e
have a f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e , w m c h c a n n o t be e v i d e n c e d oy
i t s e l f b u t musr f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f i t s p o s s i b i l i t y as a
s c i e n c e be p r e s u p p o s e d . '
I b i d . , pp. 9 2 - 9 3 .
r
55-
He
Cartesian
See
above , p.6
99-
Even i n
the
certainty
and
of a l l the
all
case o f a t a u t o l o g y
truth.
the I i s
the
I t follows for Fichte
f a c t s of the
p o s i t i n g i n the
I,
ground of
that
'the
the
grounds
e m p i r i c a l consciousness' i s t h a t
the
I has
itself
previously
'before
been p o s i t e d
W i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o w h a t a l l t h i s m i g h t mean f o r F i c h t e ,
we
see
the
that
the
I is implicit
the
c e r t a i n t y of that
e s s e n t i a l s of h i s p o i n t of view.
m
the
He
is
p o s i t i n g of the world
and
the H i s t o r y
three
as
of Philosophy
The
three
principles
i s t h a t of i d e n t i t y
philosophy
Ich
(i)
osition
the
certainty that lies
is
= Ich.
Hence, what i s c l a i m e d
is
is
from the
f o r Hegel
is
non-being but
with
this
that
t h a t the
I itself.
object
is
equal
three
terms of
Fichte's
thai- t h i s
empirical
object
excernal
to
F i c h t e . Grundlage der
op.cit.,
p~9b-
58.
H e g e l . Werke 2 0 ,
&
ourselves
c o n t i n u i t y , which i s i t s
what t h i s
t o me.
principle
expresses
dead i d e n c i t y ,
He
is
I i s not
in
not
sympathy
simply
g sammten Vv'issenscha f t s l e b r e
j?95
prop-
assertion.
What i s , I t h i n k , meant by
57
of
principle,
any
suggests t h a t the
objective.
first
first
behind
its
Now
which i s
p.
The
i n the
'self-consciousness i s not
view because i t
enclosed but
or,
I .
Lectures
recognisable
All
I t i s Fichte' s claim
what i t i s because i t d e r i v e s
identity,
immediately
of the
the
subjective
opens h i s G r u n d l a g e .
involve modifications
Hegel suggests,
therefore
i s the
develops h i s
p r i n c i p l e s are
those w i t h which F i c h t e
in
suggests t h a t t h i s
p r i n c i p l e s from which F i c h t e
idealism.
is
can
world.
H e g e l i n h i s summary o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y
on
arguing
this
selfis
Werko,
100.
that Fichte m
d e p i c t i n g t h e I as t h e g r o u n d o f t h e
o f a l l k n o w l e d g e had
t h e r e f o r e come t o r e g a r d t h e I , n o t
as a s u b j e c t i v e power b u t as m
itself
Hegel c o n t r a s t s t h i s w i t h the p o s i t i o n
the u n i t y
certainty
of apperception
(the ' l
a c r i t e r i o n of
m
think'
objectivity
Kant's philosophy
the terms t h a t Hegel employs, i s the source
o r d i n g t o Kant, i t
It
source
i s an i d e n t i t y
that
ained m
t h a t he
a p p e a r a n c e and
of that
i s what t h e f i r s t
f o r Hegel.
the I i s
its
only the I
Acc-
furmsnes.
Fichte's merit
cont-
a b s o l u t e ground i n the I .
This
basic p r i n c i p l e
of Fichte's pmloscphy
expresse
I t i m p l i e s the view t h a t the c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y
f o r Hegel t h a t i t
objective.
into I m
of
I t follows
i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n e p i s t e m o l o g y t h a t wnat
'De t r a n s f o r m e d
is,
i s both
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s u b j e c t i v e and
objective
of
identity.
reasons t h a t the i d e n t i t y
has
or., i n
of the i d e n t i t y
does n o t p e r t a i n t o t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s .
i n Hegel's view,
where
t h a t accompanies a l l
our p e r c e p t i o n s ) c o n s t r u c t s the o b j e c t s of experience
o b j e c t s b u t i s n o t an o b j e c t i v e
only
is
o r d e r t h a t I have o n l y
my
i 59
determination in
it.
This p r i n c i p l e ,
suffers
though
formally
correct m
Hegel's view,
from a d e f i c i e n c y , namely i t s l a c k of a c o n c r e t e
' T h e r e f o r e ' , he
another
says,
'it
i s necessary f o r F i c h t e t o
basic p r i n c i p l e ' . ^
And
it
p r o d u c e s w h a t Hegel c a l l s d i f f e r e n c e
o t h e r words, i t
59-
Ibid.,
60.
Ibid.
p.
a c t s as t h e s o u r c e
395-
is
content.
posit
this principle
i n F i c h t e ' s system.
o f an a c t u a l c o n t e n t
that
In
f o r the
101.
formal
i d e n t i t y of the
of Fichte's
by
philosophy
an n o n - I .
world
I t 13
is derived
'other'
system.
is
t h a t the I p o s i t s i t s e l f
Fitche's
we
philosophy
subject.
ive
idealism:'..all
are
So
the
a p p e a r s as
I n t h i s we can
reality
no
reality
reality
external
at a l l m
see
Hegel would stop

As
we
saw
by
considers
p o i n t s out
that reality
synthesis
third
basic
of the
two
philositself.
world
a f f i r m a t i o n of
subject-
i n the I , the non-I

is posited
and
even m
thac i t
has
first
i t has
has
no
principle
is
it
of Fichte's
p r e c e d i n g ones.
the
therefore
an
reality.
regarded
t o be
is
reality.
account of e x t e r n a l
Only t h e n
establishing
o f a l l t o be
of
in his
h i s account o f Locke's p h i l o s o p h y ,
external or o b j e c t i v e .
The
For
the
things
the p o s i t i n g
a negative
pure n e g a t i o n ;
s h o r t a t s u c h an
earlier m
of
most c l e a r l y F i c h t e ' s
itself'.^
r e a l i t y Fichte
external
talking
concrete
is posited
at a l l but
opposed
bv t h e I
however opposed t o t h e I ; c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e
l a t t e r no
as
the terms of F i c h t e ' s
established
the I .
paradoxically
the
that i s established
h i s view, a l l e x t e r n a l s
( n i c h t I c h ) by
Therefore m
are,
ophy, t a l k i n g o f a w o r l d
t h a t the
principle
p h i l s o p h y o r what H e g e l c a l l s
of self-consciousness.
a non-I
the second b a s i c
from t h i s p r i n c i p l e
e x t e r n a l to ourselves
In
So
he
as
shown t o be
philsophy
is
I t i s what H e g e l
ideal.
a
calls
62
the
p r o p o s i t i o n of ground.
two
p r i n c i p l e s are
is
postulated
As
mutually
g r o u n d , he
determining
as d e t e r m i n i n g
me
will
be
6l.
F i c h t e . S a m t l i c h e Werke, o p . c i t . ,
6 2.
H e g e l . WerKe 20,
p.
397.
so
says, the
t h a t the non-I
m e d i a t e d by
p.
first
132.
the
that
self-
1C2.
identity(ich
the non-I,
T will
know t h e o p p o s i t e ,
o n l y as my own p o s i t e d o p p o s i t i o n s . E q u a l l y ,
the T f i n d s
objective
- ich) of the I .
itself
determined
or non-I.
by t h e n o n - I
Hegel then
the p r i n c i p l e o f ground i s ,
such t h a t
seems r i g h t m
short,
however,
the I
saying
is
that
' I am l i m i t e d by t h e
6 "3
non-I
and t h e n o n - I
is
l i m i t e d by t h e I . '
p r i n c i p l e , Hegel argues, t h a t
advance o v e r K a n t .
the understanding
I tis
represents
this
Fichte's logical
For i n s t e a d o f f i n d i n g the r<ategcries o f

conveniently
t o hand m
formal logic
as d i d
K a n t , F i c h t e s e t s a b o u t d e d u c i n g them f r o m
reciprocal
Also
t h e m a n i f o l d and
6^
o f t h e I and t h e n o n - I .
relations
F i c h t e s u g g e s t s t h a t , d e p e n d i n g on how t h e s e
mutual
f o r m s o f l i m i t a t i o n a r e v i e w e d , we have e i t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l o r
practical
philosophy.
I am o b j e c t ,
that
this
I am l i m i t e d by t h e n o n - I .
i s not simply
Fichte's philosophy
one.
The t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n
I n the t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy
regarded
as n e g a t i o n
is
intended
that
principle of
this
r e l a t i o n as a
the n c t - I
i s n o t merely
it
should
that
theoretical relation.
c o n t r a s t wxth the e m p i r i c i s t ' s
a c c o u n t o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
t h e r e l a t i o n i s n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d
s u b j e c t am m e r e l y p a s s i v e
We may see i t
6j5.
64.
reciprocal
b u t as t h e I ' s own l i m i t a t i o n o f i t s e l f .
As H e g e l w o u l d s a y , I r e m a i n I m
It
that
B u t we h a v e t o remember
t h e second b a s i c
s i n c e he r e g a r d s
A'ould be
t h i s way.
as one m
w h i c h I as
b u t one i n w h i c h I am a l s o
I tis
Ibid.
H e g e l . Werke 20, p. J>93,
that
So t h e
thinking
active.
an a c c o u n t o f t h e
3 03.
p e r c e p t i o n o f an
object,
I by
the o b j e c t which
I who
perceive that
fore, that
F i c h t e emphasises but a l s o t h a t
I limit
non--I.
But
i s that
t h i s a g a i n we
of the f i r s t
of
the non-I.
According
s i m p l y be
arbitary.
I will.
This again
fore
in
it
I cannot determine
reciprocally
the f i r s t
limit
i n the
philosophy.
independent
independent
nature
practical
the
same d i f f i c u l t y
the
difficulty
the non-I
are
that
might
founder
accounts,
on
There-
causality
philosophy
see
it
relation
not
relation
as
causality.
Such
philosophy.
of
theoretical
t h e same p r o b l e m .
I t is
i n H e g e l ' s v i e w mars t h e K a n t i a n
thus a f f e c t i n g
the t h e o r e t i c a l
in
i t .
o f the p r a c t i c a l
b u t as a r e l a t i v e
o f k n o w i n g and
In
by
a reciprocal
as
I n deter-
of Fichte's
i s F i c h t e ' s system o f
philosophy,
sich).
cannot
simply
I t i s causality
world;- t h u s we
outline,
and
the n o n - I
I n Hegel's o p i n i o n both these
I and
the
to understand
determined
t o be b o r n e i n m i n d .
i n rough
( D i n g an
the o t h e r hand,
t h e I as h a v i n g an a b s o l u t e
genuine absolute c a u s a l i t y
then,
theoretical
i s a dialectical relationship.
does, the r e c i p r o c a l
d e s c r i b e d has
to another
the
t o h i m t h e 1's p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y
understand
t h e w o r l d , as
suggests
A l l , there-
t h e s u b j e c t were a b s o l u t e l y
t h e n o n - I , I am
when we
way.
of Fichte's
the
i t is
t h e n o n - I i s o b j e c t and
have n o t
of
T h i s i s n o t the i m p r e s s i o n F i c h t e hopes t o
convey.
mining
On
That would imply t h a t
i n that
out i s t h a t
i s a d i a l e c t i c a l one.
practical proposition
spirit
the object
F i c h t e seems t o be p o i n t i n g
relationship
the
i t i s not only the l i m i t a t i o n
the t h i n g
philosophy
although
dialectic
itself
the
r e l a t i o n and, moreover, i t
104 .
is
t h e I who
that
first
establishes that
i t posits c t i ] 1
Kantian
D i n g an
relation,
remains a beyond t o e x p e r i e n c e .
sicn. Hegel asserts, i s
proposition that
t h e non-T
s e t s up
contained
an e x t e r n a l w o r l d
t h e I p o s i t s t h e n o n - I as b e i n g
in itself
The
the
very
f o r the I , since
independent
from
65
the I .
I f the non-I
o f t h e I that
p o s i t e d as b e i n g w h o l l y
element o f i t ,
f o r consciousness.
the I .
is
a t t h e l e a s t , must r e m a i n an
Otherwise i t
Hegel argues
the n o n - I p o s i t e d by
would not
therefore that
Fichtc
independent
that
it
i t is
be
the negation
the
remain i n
very nature
an
Consequently although
as
the q u a l i t i e s
o b j e c t are
I
i n the I there
c a n n o t master..
philosophy,
always
i n the
r e m a i n s an
of
T h i s much, c o n c e r n i n g
the
known t o h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t
' d e p e n d e n t on
theoretical
c o u l d n o t be
overcome.
i n h i s view, t h i s
the dualism
I t was
be
which
the
acknowledge.
t n e I as
intelligence
that
therefore
o f s u b j e c t and
i n the p r a c t i c a l
o p p o s i t i o n should
(just
theoretical
an u n d e t e r m i n e d n o n - I ' ^
philosophy
of
the e x t e r n a l
element o f i t
Hegel b e l i e v e s F i c h t e h i m s e l f would
Fox F i c h t e was
was
philsophy)all
of
intractable-
o p p o s i t i o n t o what p o s i t s i t .
i n the Kantian
'other'
object
philosophy
surmounted.
It
that
is i t s
i n t e n t i o n t h a t I s n o u l d m a s t e r my d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e n o t - I o r ,
65.
P l a n t ( H e g e l , A l l e n & U n w m ) s u g g e s t s t h a t 'because o f
h i s r e j e c t i o n o f the K a n t i a i notion of t h i n g s m t h e m s e l v e s . H e g e l
r e g a r d e d t h e v c r k o f F i c h t e as a c o n s i d e r a b l e a d v a n c e on
t h a t o f Kant.' (pp. 8 l - 82).
My v i e w i s d i f f e r e n t .
Hegel, w i t h o u t doubt, approved of F i c h t e ' s e l f o r t s t o t r a n s
c e n d t h e K a n t i a n t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s b u t , as I h a v e m d i c a
he d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t F i c h t e had w h o l l y a c h i e v e d t h i s .
In
o t h e r words, F i c h t e ' s philosophy d i d not r e p i e s e n t a conr id
e r a b l e advance o v e r K a n t ' s m t h i s r e s p e c t .
66.
HegeJ . Werke 20, p.

o p . c i t . , p. - 48.
-i 04. The
quotation is
from
the
Gr^ndl^r,
105.
Hegel's terms,
the t h e o r e t i c a l
non-I
In
that T should
philosophy
to determine
the p r a c t i c a l
intelligence
should
be
is
me
an
however,
simply
w h i c h he has
an
But,
' t h i s b a r r i e r of
as we
order that
absolute
even i n
find
calls
the
a o s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y he
So
has
the
have
to
posit
actua.1
the non-I
would
t h e I w i t h o u t t h e w o r l d w i t h i n w h i c h t o have
causality.
The
an u n d e f i n e d
alone
t h e s u b j e c t may
i n d e p e n d e n t e l e m e n t opposed t o h i m s e l f .
fact
the I
the
have seen, i n
t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e I and
jn
the
know t h e w o r l d .
broken through,
one .^
In
to Fichte, I allow
o r d e r t h a t I may
s u p p o s e d t o be
Fichtean philosophy
at noroe w i t h m y s e l f .
according
philosophy
the a c t i v e
a world m
be
philosophy
impediment
the i n f i n i t e
I t h e n , and
i s Hegel's
point,
must have opposed t o
itself
t o i t s own
impediment
this
an
activity.
This Fichte
(unendliche Anstoss).
And
it
68
is this
t h a t Hegel equates w i t h
For
existence
its
as much as
it
implies that
care there will

}
t h e K a n t i a n D i n g an
t h e I may
extend
. ts
jich.
activity
a l w a y s r e m a i n a. b a r r i e r t o
freedom.
Thus f o r F i c h t e m o r a l
67.
H e g e l , i b i d . , p. 4 0 6 .
activity
i s always a
its
striving.
68.
Ibid.,
69.
H e g e l . Werke 2 , ( D i f f e r e n z s c h n f t ) .
I n Fichê's philosophy,
Hegel claims,
o u g n t t o n e g a t e t h e o b j e c t i v e 'world.
I
s h o u l d nave a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y i n t h e n o n - I ; t m s i s f o u n d
t o be c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r a t one and t h e same t i m e t h e n o n - I
w o u l d be overcome and t h e p o s i t i n g o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n o r t h e
p o s i t i n g of a non-I i s absolute.
T h i s r e l a t i o n o f pure
a c t i v i t y t o an o b j e c t can o n l y be p o s i t e d as s t r i v i n g . '
p. 6 8 ( H e g e l ' s e m p h a s i s ) .
I t is I think legitimate to
t a k e t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n o f H e g e l ' s m a t u r e p o s i t i o n on
Fichte.
As H e l m u t G i r n d t i n h i s book, D i e D i f f e r e n t des
F i c h t e s c h e n und H e g e l s o n e n Systems i n d e r liege J s e r e T J I f f e r e n u s c h n f t . (BonrT,"Bouvi er,T965~,Tnt r o d u c t : 67~-'Q~i^y s H e g e l
never revised t h
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t he p r e s e n t s o f t h e
philosophy of F i c h t e i n the D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t . . '
p.
404.
105-
m Hegel's terms, t h a t I should be a t home w i t h myself.
In
the t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a c c o r d i n g t o F i c h t e , I a l l o w t h e
n o n - I t o determine me m
o r d e r t h a t I may know t h e w o r l d .
I n t h e p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y however, ' t h i s b a r r i e r o f t h e
i n t e l l i g e n c e i s supposed t o be broken
should be t h e a c t i v e o n e ' . ^
t h r o u g h , t h e I alone
B u t , as we have seen, m t h e
F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y s i m p l y i n o r d e r t h a t t h e s u b j e c t may have
a world m
which he has an a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y he has t o p o s i t
an Independent element opposed t o h i m s e l f .

transcendence
So t h e a c t u a l
o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e I and t h e n o n - I would
I n f a c t f i n d t h e I w i t h o u t t h e w o r l d w i t h i n which t o have an
absolute c a u s a l i t y .
The I t h e n , and t h i s i s Kege]'s p o i n t ,
even i n t h e p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y must have opposed t o i t s e l f

an u n d e f i n e d impediment
t o i t s own a c t i v i t y .
This Fichte
c a l l s t h e i n f i n i t e impediment ( u n e n d l i c h e A n s t o s s ) .
And
it
68
i s t h i s t h a t Hegel equates v i t h t h e K a n t i a n D i n g an s i eh.

For i t s e x i s t e n c e i m p l i e s t h a t t h e I may extend i t s a c t i v i t y
as much as i t care t h e r e w i l l always remain a b a r r i e r t o i t s
freedom.
Thus f o r F i c h t e moral a c t i v i t y i s always a s t r i v i n g .
67.
Hegel, i b i d . , p. 406.
68.
I b i d . , p. 404.
69.
Hegel. Werke 2, ( D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t ) .
I n Fichte's philosophy,
Hegel c l a i m s ^ T ought t o negate t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d .
I
should have a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y m t h e n o n - I ; t h i s i s found
t o be c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r a t one and t h e same time t h e n o n - I
would be overcome and t h e p o s i t i n g o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n o r t h e
p o s i t i n g o f a non-I i s aosolute.
T h i s r e l a t i o n o f pure
a c t i v i t y t o an o b j e c t can o n l y be p o s i t e d as s t r i v i n g . '
p. 68 (Hegel's emphasis).
I t is I think legitimate to
take t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n o f Hegel's mature p o s i t i o n on
F i c h t e . As Helmut G i r n d t 111 h i s book, Die D i f f e r e n z des
F-LChtescnen und Hegel soner Systems m d e r Heg^lsche "'In f f e r ~
e n z s c h r i f t ' ."(Bona, 3 ovvTevTl 965, I n t T o d u c t i o n ic J "say c ,
ge 1
never r e v i s e d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t he p r e s e n t s o f t h e
philosophy o f Fichte m the D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t . ,
106.
It
i s a s t r i v i n g t o overcome t h e o p p o s i t i o n between t h e J and
t h a t which i s n o t - I .
That s t r i v i n g becomes an e t e r n a ]
as t h a t o p p o s i t i o n i s i t s e l f a p a r t o f e x i s t e n c e .
u n e n d l i c h e Anstoss.
effort
I t I s an
This idea o f s t r i v i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y the
same n o t i o n , Hegel b e l i e v e s , as t h e ought (das S o l l e n ) o f t h e

70
Kantian philosophy.
I t i s t h a t ought t h a t i s embodied i n t h e
Kantian categorical imperative.
Likewise m
p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e i s an element m
o u r s e l v e s which i s beyond
our c o n t r o l .
Kant's moral
T h i s i s man c o n s i d e r e d as phenomenon where he
i s s u b j e c t t o t h e same k i n d o f n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s as o t h e r
phenomena..
Our e f f o r t as noumenal beings i s t o overcome t h i s
l i m i t a t i o n of ourselves but i t
i s i n h e r e n t l y impossible
that
we do s i n c e we are b o t h noumenal and phenomenal beings.
Hegel
suggests t h e n t h a t t h ^ same k i n d o f i n f i n i t e impediment t o

freedom i s p r e s e n t m
Kant's p h i l o s o p h y .
F o r t h a t reason he,
l i k e F i c h t e , can o n l y p o i n t t o f a i t h as t h e element m
which
t h i s d u a l i t y or b i f u r c a t i o n between t h e I and t h e w o r l d may be

overcome.
Hegel f i n d s t h i s account o f experience
unsatisfactory
because i t does n o t answer t h e need o r r e q u i r e m e n t
o f philosophy.
I n h i s Jena essay on t h e ' D i f f e r e n c e o f t h e F i c h t e a n and S c h e l l 1
i n g i a n Systems o f P h i l o s o p h y , Hegel argues t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t

of philosophy i s that
'the o p p o s i t i o n o f r i g i d s u b j e c t i v i t y and
71
objectivity
be overcome'.'
There i s i n each and every
epoch,
he says, a necessary b i f u r c a t i o n between t h e u n i t y o f mind and

the
broken harmony o f i c s b e i n g o r o u r e x i s t e n c e .
I tis
70.Hegel. Werke 20, p. 407. See P l a n t , o p . c i t . , p 8 2 - 8 2 ,

?'l.
Hegel, werke 2, p. 2 2 .
from
107.
t h i s necessary b i f u r c a t i o n t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f
A c c o r d i n g l y , Hegel suggests,
'it
arises.
i s the s o l e i n t e r e s t o f Reason
7?
t o overcome such r i g i d
o p p o s i t i o n s ' t h a t appear t o ma'-re im-
p o s s i b l e any harmony between mind and e x i s t e n c e .
Reason o r
p h i l o s o p h y , he adds, does n o t have t h i s i n t e r e s t m the sense

t h a t i t s t r i v e s t o overcome o p p o s i t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n per se,
'since necessary b i f u r c a t i o n i s a f a c t o r o f l i f e ' . ^
i t has
this interest m
division i t
Now
Rather
t h e sense t h a t out o f t h i s extreme
seeks t o c r e a t e the h i g h e s t u n i t y o f p h i l o s o p h y .
m Hegel's view, F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y does n o t
attain
t h i s h i g h e s t u n i t y which p h i l o s o p h y might achieve because, he

c l a i m s , i t i s a s u b j e c t i v e u n i t y o f thought and r e a l i t y .
The
u n i t y , we are t o l d , takes on the form o f a p o s i t i n g a c t i v i t y

of the I alone.
to understand,
I n the F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y , we are
t h e u n i t y o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y does n o t l i e
3n t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f ,
beyond i n and
further
so t h a t t h e o b j e c t remains f o r e v e r a
to experience.
T h e r e f o r e m experience
as F i c h t
d e p i c t s i t t h e r e i s always an element o f the n o n - I which
is
unknowable because, t h e I p o s i t s the o b j e c t as something

d i s t i n c t from i t s e l f m the c r u d e s t sense - m a t e r i a l l y .
have seen, t h e r e always remains something o t h e r t o man
As
himself
m F i c h t e ' s d e r i v a t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e , q u i t e s i m p l y what he
the
non-I.
We might r e g a r d t h i s as a note o f
72.
I b i d . , p. 2 1 .
73-
Ibid.
call
intellectual
s o b r i e t y i n F i c h t e ' s o t h e r w i s e e x t r a v a g a n t system.
ever, l o o k s on t h i s
we
'beyond' m F i c h t e ' s n o t i o n o f
Hegel, how
experience
108.
as a f a i l u r e on F i c h t e ' s p a r t t o p h i l o s o p h i s e c o r r e c t l y .
Experience
cated.
F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l account i s s t i l l
As Kegel h i m s e l f would p u t i t ,
e x p e r i e n c e , I am n o t a t home w i t h
bifur-
i n F i c h t e ' s account o f
myself.
Hegel does indeed i n t e r p r e t F i c h t e ' s system as an a t t e m p t

t o overcome t h e b i f u r c a t i o n o f t h e I and t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ,
But he i n t e r p r e t s i t as an a t t e m p t t h a t f a i l e d .
Fichte's
e r r o r he argues i n t h e ' D i f f e r e n z s c h n f t ' was t h a t he sought

t o overcome i n e v i t a b l e Entzweiung by p o s t u l a t i n g on t n e one s i d
of the equation o f existence, Subject = Object, the I o r the
s u b j e c t as a b s o l u t e .
I n the Fichtean philosophy the I ,
as
we have seen* possesses a preponderance over t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d .

We might
say t h a t , i n a sense, i t
subsumes i t .
insists,
'the o p p o s i t i o n remains m
i s p o s i t e d as a b s o l u t e i s determined
same f a s h i o n as i t
remains,
t h i s way because t h a t
which
t h r o u g h a n o t h e r , so i n t h e
t h e o t h e r remains as w e l l
order that the b i f u r c a t i o n m

( b o t h transcended
B u t , Hegel
In
e x i s t e n c e be g e n u i n e l y aufgehoben
and preserved)Hegel
asserts tnat
'both t h e
o p p o s i t e s , s u b j e c t and o b j e c t must be overcome (aufgehoben)

i n t h a t t h e y a r e p o s i t e d as i d e n t i c a l . ' ^
Hegel's t h e s i s i s t h a t m
i d e a l i s m ) independent
transcended.
true philosophy
We s h a l l see t h a t
(which i s , o f course,
substance and t h e independent
I are both
True p h i l o s o p h y i s f o r him b o t h Substance and
Subject.
74.
I b i d . , p. 95.
75-
Ibid.
10Q.
So Hegel understands F i c h t e as h a v i n g c o n s t r u c t e d a
philosophy
which l i k e a l l o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i e s aims a t r e s t o r i n g the
'shat-
76
t e r e d harmony' o f temporal
'Differenzschrift
existence.
But a c c o r d i n g t o h i s
the dissonance between t h e s u b j e c t and
the
e x t e r n a l w o r l d can o n l y be overcome where b o t h the I and

w o r l d l o s e t h e i r independent v a l u e .
regarded
as b e i n g s u b j e c t i v e and
or concrete.
S u b j e c t has
equal t o s u b j e c t .
Where t h e w o r l d
the ego
the
is
as b e i n g o b j e c t i v e
t o be equal t o o b j e c t and
object
T h i s does not happen i n F i c h t e ' s
philosophy.
Indeed t h e o n l y manner i n which t h i s i s t o be a c h i e v e d , H^gel

would a s s e r t , i s t h r o u g h t h e s u b j e c t t h i n k i n g o b j e c t i v e l y
or
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y such t h a t the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d i s shown t o conform

t o my t h i n k i n g .
atic
T h i s , t h e r e f o r e , i s why
s c i e n t i f i c o r system-
t h i n k i n g p l a y s such an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n Hegel's
philosophy,
f o r i t a l o n e , m Hegel's view, i s t h e overcoming o f the

able b i f u r c a t i o n of existence.
of
I t alone meets the
inevit-
requirement
philosophy.
Fichte's philosophy,
atic
still
f o r Hegel.
t h e r e f o r e , i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y
I n h i s philosophy
opposed.
system-
Substance and S u b j e c t
T h i s i s so s i n c e h i s p h i l o s o p h y
i o n e d by the K a n t i a n n o t i o n o f the D i n g an s i c h .
t h e r e i s m Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n much m F i c h t e ' s
are -
remains c o n d i t None t h e l e s s
philosophy
t h a t adds up t o ^ s e n s i b l e e p i s t e m o l o g y .
f o r i n s t a n c e , F i c h t e does i n s i s t t h a t the
I n c o n t r a s t t o Kant,
'Ego
i s not t o be
77
regarded as s u b j e c t merely, but a t once s u b j e c t and

76.
I b i d . , p. 20.
77'
R.Adamson, o p . c i t . , p.
12b.
object'.
110.
Kant had regarded t h e r o l e o f t h e u n i t y of a p p e r c e p t i o n as

merely a s u b j e c t i v e one.
But F i c h t e , as I have suggested,
i n t e r p r e t s t h e concept o f t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n f a r more
comprehensively.
orientation m
itself.
e x p e r i e n c e and w i t h t h e m a t t e r o f t h a t e x p e r i e n c e
He makes an e f f o r t t o have done w i t h t h e K a n t i a n D i n g
an s i c h .
to
For him t h e I b o t h p r o v i d e s as w i t h an
A l t h o u g h Hegel judges
t h e outcome o f t h i s
effort
be u n s u c c e s s f u l t h e e f f o r t i t s e l f meets w i t h h i s a p p r o v a l .
We may t h e n be f a i r l y
the
c e r t a i n t h a t Hegel would be a t one "with
c r i t i c i s m t h a t F i c h t e , a c c o r d i n g t o Adamson, has t o make
of Kant t h a t Kant had never a t t a i n e d genuine i d e a l i s m because

he had 'regarded consciousness as merely so much t o be known,
- as a s e r i e s o f s t a t e s , from which n o t h i n g can p o s s i b l y be
extracted.'
He had 'not c o n s i d e r e d how consciousness comes
t o be, what c o n d i t i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d i n i t s
exis-
78
tence what a r e t h e laws u n d i r which i t
acts.
To do this, m Fichte's view, p h i l o s o p h y has t o become t h e r e f l e c t i v e

consciousness o f t h e t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y o f t h e I .
become t h e consciousness o f consciousness i t s e l f ,
I t has t o
o r what Hegel
a p t l y d e s c r i b e s as t h e ' a r t i f i c i a l consciousness' ( n u n s t l i c h e s
Bewusstsem).^
We need h a r d l y say t h a t t h i s n o t i o n o f p h i l o s -
ophy a l s o p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e make-up o f Hegel's

Phenomenology o f Mind.
Hegel suggests t h a t we can see t h e
beginning of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of philosophy m
C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason.
Kant's
I t was Kant who b r o u g h t o u t t h e s i g n i f -
i c a n c e o f t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h , as he p u t i t ,
the
I think.
I t was he, t h e n , who
78.
I b i d . , p. 127.
79-
Hegel. Werke 20, p. 593.
accompanies
t a u g h t us t o t h i n k about
III.
the
'I
tlink'.
J u t what d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e a r t i f i c i a l
consciousness
he recon-nends f o r p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h a t recommended by F i c h t e
t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d n o t so much as a r e f l e c t i o n on
i t s e l f as a r e f l e c t i o n on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
philosophy i s ,
is
after a l l ,
is
consciousness
o f knowledge.
His
i n t e n d e d t o be t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .
I t
t h e manner o f o u r c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s w h i c h c o n c e r n s
it.
Q u i t e s i m p l y , as H e g e l s a y s , t h e c o n t e x t o f K a n t ' s p h i l o s o p h y i s
still
t h a t o f the problem o f knowledge,
w h o l l y concerned w i t h t h a t problem.
He
F i c h t e , however, i s not
i s , as I have
emphasised,
a l s o c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f what c o n s t i t u t e s an
account o f r e a l i t y .
a p p e r c e p t i o n ) was
Kant's
interest
i n the I (the u n i t y
a r o u s e d by h i s need t o e x p l a i n t h e
it
I t is m
t h i s way
t h a t he h i t upon L o g i c .
of
synthetic
p r o p o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i he t h o u g h t t o be p r e s e n t j.n a l l
ge.
adequate
our
knowled-
A c c o r d i n g t o him
s u p p l i e d the categories through which the understanding
reduced the n a m f i d
o f appearance
into a world of objects.
d o i n g t h i s , H e g e l s a y s , K a n t had g i v e n t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t
v/ere n o t a b l e t o i n v e s t i g a t e
consciousness.
consciousness the n o t i o n o f causality
ance i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
we
the o r i g i n o f the content o f
./e can, f o r e x a m p l e ,
there i s another r a t t e r .
In
a c c o r d i n g t o Kant
o u t how
it
find i n
cones t o be
/e c a n n o t p e n e t r a t e b e h i n d i t s
appear-
F i c h t e however (whose v i e w i s t h a t
the I
c o n s t i t u t e s b e i n g ) t a k e s t h e c a t e g o r i e s as t h e o b j e c t s o f a g e n e t ic
investigation.
T h i s he can do s i n c e t h e g e n e s i s o f t h e
c a t e g o r i e s f r o m t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e I and
non-I i s f o r
112.
him one and t h e same t h i n g as t h e g e n e s i s o f r e a l i t y .

In
c o n t r a s t t o Kant, t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e ' I think'becomes h i s
object.
And i t
i s t h i s t h a t Hegel d e p i c t s as t h e c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f consciousness o r t h e a r t i f i c i a l consciousness.

It
i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel m a i n t a i n s t h a t ,
with
F i c h t e , p h i l o s o p h y d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f d e c i s i v e l y from
o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g . I n h i s view F i c h t e was t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
who had ' f i r s t b r o u g h t t o consciousness t h e knowledge o f
8l
knowledge'.
What Hegel means by o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g i s n o t
s i m p l y t h e r e a s o n i n g o f everyday l i f e o r e l s e he and F i c h t e
would be merely c l a i m i n g t n e commonplace m
from p h i l o s o p h y .
distinguishing
O r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g i s indeed s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d
knowledge
o f o b j e c t s and p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s .
knowledge
t h a t i s bound up w i t h something t h a t j s
to
consciousness.
it
But i t i s
external
I t i s t h e r e f o r e knowledge which 'does n o t

82
make i t s e l f i t s consciousness i n t o t h e o b j e c t ' .
Ordinary
t h o u g h t i s always about something o t h e r t h a n t h o u g h t i t s e l f .

The t h i n k e r does n o t nave h i s t h i n k i n g as h i s o b j e c t and (and
t h i s i s t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t f o r H e g e l ) t h e t h i n k e r does
80.
The 'employment' o f t h e c a t e g o r i e s ceases t o be a problem
f o r him ( F i c h t e ) . . . T h e i m a g i n a t i o n n o t o n l y produces t h e
schema o f t h e forms o f t h o u g h t , as Kant has t a u g h t , n o t
o n l y space, time and t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l c b j e c c s , as Maimun
wanted, hot a l s o produces e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s as such.'
R.Kroner.
Von Kant b i s Hegel, Mohr V e r l a g , p. ^89.
81.
82.
I b i d , 'not make i t s e l f ' i s a d m i t t e d l y an awkwari r e n d e r i n

but n o t e t h e use Hegel makes o f t h i s phrase.
113.
n o t make t h e o b j e c t
In ordinary
ness.
i n t o h i s consciousness.
t h i n k i n g the object
i s not r e t r a c t e d i n t o conscious-
O r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g i s t h e n f o r Hegel t h i n k i n g t h a t has
as i t s o b j e c t
an ' o t h e r ' t o i t s e l f .
I t i s what we can r e g a r d
q u i t e s i m p l y as b e i n g m a t e r i a l i s t t h i n k i n g .
which i n s i s t s t h a t i t
i s t o an e x t e r n a l
Hegel i s o f t h e o p i n i o n ,
I t is
reality i t
thinking
refers.
as we have seen, t h a t i t i s t h e r e q u i r e
ment o f p h i l o s o p h y t h a t such b i f u r c a t e d
t h i n k i n g be overcome.
F i c h t e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y as t h e a r t i f i c i a l
conscieusnes
does, i n Hegel's view, go some way toward a c h i e v i n g t h i s .

s t a n d i n g 'behind my o r d i n a r y
consciousness' - , Hegel argues,
I am i n a p o s i t i o n t o r a i s e m y s e l f above b i f u r c a t e d
As I have a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d ,
an i m p o r t a n t r o l e m
o f Mind.
In
this notion
the construction
thinking.
o f philosophy plays
o f Hegel's Fhenomeno]ogy
We may now approach t h a t work by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the p h i l o s o p h y o f Hegel's one-time i n t e l l e c t u a l
of
companion~S beli
c
84
mg.
83.
Ibid.
84.
F o r a s h o r t w h i l e a t Jena when they were c o - e d i t o r s o f

the C r i t i c a l J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y they d i d n o t d: s t m g u i s
t h e i r w r i t i n g s . " See C a i r o , Hegel, Blackwood, p. 4 8 .
114.
Hegel's C r i t i q u e
o f S c h e l l m g ' s Philosophy
I have suggested t h a t F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y

Hegel's o p i n i o n s i n c e i t
f a l l s down i n
f a i l s t o overcome t h e b i f u r c a t i o n
t h a t Hegd b e l i e v e s t o be i n h e r e n t i n e x p e r i e n c e .
As I have
suggested, Hegel r e g a r d s i t as t h e t a s k o f p h i l o s o p h y
come t h i s b i f u r c a t i o n .
that
Philosophy,
t o over-
i n h i s view, has t o a t t a i n
' h i g h e s t u n i t y ' i n which . a l l o p p o s i t i o n and d i v i s i o n i s
extinguished.
F i c h t e , Hegel m a i n t a i n e d ,
failed to attain
t h i s h i g h e s t u n i t y because h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y
postulated
o n l y a s u b j e c t i v e u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o r t h o u g h t and
reality.
'The s u b j e c t =
object therefore,
he c l a i m s ,
'becomes
a s u b j e c t i v e one, and i t does n o t succeed i n overcoming t h i s

85
s u b j e c t i v i t y and p o s i t i n g
the p r o p e r c o n c e p t i o n
iteself objectively.'
o f philosophy
I n comparison
i s , according
more f u l l y worked o u t i n S c h e l l i n g ' s system.
t o Hegel,
T h i s i s so, Hegel
argues, because 'the p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y i s t h e a b s o l u t e

p r i n c i p l e o f t h e whole S c h e l l m g i a n system; p h i l o s o p h y
f a l l together; the i d e n t i t y i s not l o s t i n the parts,
in the r e s u l t ' . ^
Hegel c l a i m s
that m Fichte's
and system
even l e s s
philosophy
t h a t t h e i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t was o n l y an o r i g i n a l
identity.
B o t h s u b j e c t and o b j e c t d i d i n d e e d have t h e i r g e n e s i s
m the 1 but m
t h e system i t s e l f
(say when F i c h t e i s
dealing
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r object l i k e law), the p a r t i c u l a r f a l l s

side t h a t i d e n t i t y .
On Hegel's r e a d i n g ,
85.
86.
Ibid.
out-
the p a r t i c u l a r i n
115.
F i c h t e ' s system i s s i m p l y
u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and
affecting i t .
We
o b j e c t ( f a l l i n g o u t s i d e the supposed
o b j e c t ) a t h i n g o u t s i d e the s u b j e c t , merely
can
see
t h i s , Hegel argues, m
t h a t the
parts
o f the system are d e r i v e d from the v a r i o u s aspects o f l a c k o f

identity.
For i n s t a n c e , he c l a i m s , the t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y
i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the precedence which the I takes o v e r the

non-I.
I n c o n t r a s t S c h e l l m g makes the p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y
permeate the whole o f h i s system.
I n the D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t
Hegel argues t h a t S c h e l l m g understands whet has

the h i g h e s t
i d e n t i t y of philosophy
he sees t h a t 'the s u b j e c t and
t o be done f o r
t o be a t t a i n e d .
o b j e c t ' have 'both
In particular,
( t o be)
posited
87
as s u b j e c t - o b j e c t ' .
I n t h a t h i g h e s t u n i t y we nave t o
not o n l y the I as s u b j e c t - o b j e c t but a l s o the o b j e c t

The
e r r o r of F i c h t e ,
t h e n , was
t o regard
regard
itself.
the I as the
only
r e a l i t y , t o t h i n k o f o b j e c t i v i t y , s o l e l y as the n e g a t i o n
or
l i m i t a t i o n o f che I .
S h e l l m g e x p l a i n s n i s p o s i t i o n c o n c i s e l y , and
c
a mariner which i s adequate f o r our purpose, m
' D e p i c t i o n o f my
certainly
the essay
System o f P h i l o s o p h y ' ( D a r s t e l l u n g memes

88
Systems der P h i l o s o p h i e ) .
we
Here he t a k e s the view t h a t
if
are t o u n d e r s t a n d the i d e a l i s m o f F i c h t e as c l a i m i n g t h a t
the I i s e v e r y t h i n g , we may
u n d e r s t a n d h i s i d e a l i s m as
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s the I .
S c h e l l m g , t h e n , wishes t o s t r e s s
87.
Ibid.
88.
Scnellmg.
p. 5-
claiming
Werke ( J u b i l a u m s d r u c k ) , K u n c f i . V o l . 5.
116.
the
order m
which the s u b j e c t i s s a i d t o be e q u i v a l e n t
with reality.
I n P i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , he f e e l s , the emphasis
i s wrongly p l a c e d on the s u b j e c t i v e s i d e o f the e q u a t i o n .

the
He,
c o n t r a r y , wishes t o place the emphasis on the o b j e c t i v e
aspect: t h a t r e a l i t y i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t i v e .
By s e t t i n g out
from the o b j e c t i v e pole o f the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t e q u a t i o n he hopes

t o prove t h a t o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t i v e .
He
t h e r e f o r e presupposes a s e p a r a t i o n o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o r ,
m Hegel's terms, an Entzweiung m
experience.
And
from t h i s p o i n t o f view t h a t t h e i r u n i t y i s t o be
i t is
achieved.
For S c h e l l m g t h i s u n i t y can be achieved because e v e r y t h i n g i s

89
t h i s i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o r t h e A b s o l u t e
Identity.
For S c h e l l m g and Hegel t h i s A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y t a k e s the

place o f the o r d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s c o n c e p t i o n o f God.
I say
'takes the p l a c e ' a l t h o u g h t h i s i s not the manner i n w h i c h

Hegel i n t e r p r e t s t h e i d e n t i f y o f the A b s o l u t e w i t h God.
sees no break w i t h r e l i g i o n .
comprehension o f God,
indicated.
the
He
I t i s i n h i s view the p r o p e r
as h i s c r i t i c i s m s o f Descartes w i l l have
There he argued
t h a t God,
p r o p e r l y conceived,
n o t i o n o f t h e u n i t y o f t h o u g h t and b e i n g .
was
I t is for this
reason t h a t he t h i n k s o f S c h e l l m g ' s system as the knowledge o f

God.
God,
Hegel a s s e r t e d i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Descartes,
shoul
be d e p i c t e d n o t as a t h i r d term m e d i a t i n g between s u b j e c t and

o b j e c t but as t h e i r A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y .
God
i s where r e a l i t y
meets t h o u g h t and t h o u g h t r e a l i t y , n o t an e n t i t y
of e i t h e r .
89.
Now
t i s d i f f i c u l t
I b i d . , p. 15-
t o see how,
independent
i f t h i s i s the
117.
proper n o t i o n o f God, how i t may be r e l a t e d i n any way a t a l l t o

t h e o r d i n a r y t h e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f God.
A t t h e minimum,
the n o t i o n o f God must i n v o l v e t h e n o t i o n o f a b e i n g t h a t

e x t e r n a l t o o u r own s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
the H e g e l i a n
is
And i t i s c l e a r t h a t
God f a l l s w i t h i n s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
I t seems
d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , as I suggested a t t h e
o u t s e t , t h e break w i t h t h e o l o g y i s a b s o l u t e w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s
o f S c h e l l m g and Hegel.
Hegel might say m h i s defence t h a t t h e
n o t i o n o f t h e a b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i s t h e
r a t i o n a l content o f the r e l i g i o u s experience.
agree w i t h t h i s .
However t h i s bears l i t t l e
the r e l i g i o u s person a c t u a l l y t h i n k s he i s
We might
r e l a t i o n t o what
about.
Be t h a t as i t may, t h e n o t i o n o f t h e A b s o l u t e
o f A b s o l u t e Knowledge, A b s o l u t e
p l a y s a"n i m p o r t a n t r o l e m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
t h i s i s that i t
Idea and t h e A b s o l u t e
one o f i t s most c o n f u s i n g n o t i o n s .
the guise
Spirit,
I t i s also
One o f t h e reasons f o r
e n t e r s i n t o h i s p h i l o s o p h y as one o f i t s
s u p p o s i t i o n s , b u t t h a t m some way i t
What we make o f t h i s i d e a when i t
even
pre-
a l s o forms i t s g o a l .
f i r s t enters the vocabulary
o f p h i l o s o p h y might t h e n h e l p t o c l e a r some o f ,the c o n f u s i o n .

There are v a r i o u s f o r m u l a t i o n s o f t h i s i d e a o f S c h e l l m g ' s , a l l
o f which r e q u i r e some e x p l a n a t i o n .
t h a t we r e g a r d t h e A b s o l u t e
F i r s t l y , S c h e l l m g suggests
as f o l l o w s :
'Absolute
identity
90
s i m p l y i s and i s as c e r t a i n as t h e p r o p o s i t i o n A ~ A.
H i s p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e here seems t o be t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f F i c h t e .
The c e r t a i n t y o f t n e A b s o l u t e
90.
I b i d . , p. Ik.
i d e n t i t y , S c h e i l i n g appears t o
118.
imply, i s the c e r t a i n t y of a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of
such as t h a t which F i c h t e sought.
t h a t p r i n c i p l e was
m g , however, i t
J u s t as w i t h F i c h t e ,
not i t s e l f subject t o proof.
With S c h e l l -
i s n o t even open t o d e r i v a t i o n s i n c e i t
f u r t h e r s u g g e s t i o n o f S c h e l l m g t h a t we
the A b s o l u t e
philosophy
i d e n t i t y ' as
l o o k on
is a
'the b e i n g o f
'an e t e r n a l t r u t h ' . ^
Schelling
b e l i e v e s an e n q u i r y i n t o the grounds o f t h e c e r t a i n t y o f t h e
Absolute
It
i s unnecessary because i t i s an e v e r - p r e s e n t
truth.
can, he i n s i s t s , o n l y be i n t u i t e d as b e i n g t r u e .
more we are t o understand

sense but a l s o m
Futher-
i t as b e i n g t r u e not o n l y an a f o r m a l
a c o n c r e t e sense.
Taken m
a formal
sense i t would merely i m p l y t h a t o b j e c t s , when p r o p e r l y known

were
t h i s absolute i d e n t i t y .
more.
S c h e l l i n g wishes i t
to imply
I n h i s view, and t h i s i s t h e l a s t o f h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s
t h a t we s h a l l
identity
consider,
, op
itself.
being i s m
'Everything t h a t i s ,
i s the
S c h e l l i n g b e l i e v e s t h a t the whole o f
itself
the . d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
as I have s a i d , i t
themselves A b s o l u t e .
i n t o an
It
not i t
So,
i s n o t s i m p l y t h a t when t h i n g s are known t h a t
t h e y are t h i s A b s o l u t e b u t , S c h e l l i n g suggests,
a t h e o r y t h a t has
Absolute
they are
S c h e l l i n g , j u s t as d i d F i c h t e , extends
i t s rationale m
the t h e o r y o f knowledge
ontology.
i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y does
seems t o me,
ophy assumes what i t

91.
Ibid.
92.
I b i d . , p.
15.
r e s t on sound l o g i c a l
ought t o prove.
grounds.
His p h i l o s -
N o t h i n g i s more m
need
119-
of p r o o f t h a n t h e n o t i o n o f r e a l i t y as A b s o l u t e
identity.
Hegel, I t h i n k , s h a r e s t h i s view o f S c h e l i m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y .

I n h i s l a t e r y e a r s he 'would n o t , I b e l i e v e , have defended
S c h e l l m g ' s system on t h e grounds o f i t s l o g i c a l
consistency.
He would have defended i t more on t h e grounds t h a t he g i v e s

m h i s L e c t u r e s on the H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y , namely, t h a t
Schellmg's n o t i o n of Absolute I d e n t i t y
ment o f contemporary p h i l o s o p h y .
met- a need o r r e q u i r e -
Such a view would n o t , o f
course, be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s e a r l i e r w h o l e - h e a r t e d defence
of S c h e l l m g ' s system a g a i n s t t h a t o f F i c h t e i n the D i f f e r e n z schrift .
For, as we have seen, t h e p o i n t o f view from w h i c h
S c h e l l m g i s defended here i s t h a t o f t h e need o r r e q u i r e m e n t

9^
of
philosophy.
Hegel's view, t h e n , i s t h a t S c h e l l m g ' s o n t o l o g y
n e c e s s i t a t e d by t h e i n t e r n a l
was
development o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
The e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s runs back t o C a r t e s i a n d u a l i s m .
I t
was D e s c a r t e s , Hegel s u g g e s t s , who had f i r s t seer e x t e n s i o n and

94
t h o u g h t as two d i s t i n c t elements o r s i d e s
f i r s t awakened the need t o mediate the two.
and so, p a r a d o x i c a l
Hegel t h i n k s ,
as
we have seen, t h a t D e s c a r t e s had o n l y achieved t h i s m e d i a t i o n

in
a v e r y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y manner.
He had a t t a i n e d t h e u n i t y
o f t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n by t h e e x p e d i e n t o f i n v o k i n g God
the
creator of both.
as
I t was Spinoza, Hegel argues, t h a t
u n d e r t o o k t o u n i t e these two i d e a s o f e x t e n s i o n and t h o u g h t m

93-
See P l a n t , o p . c i t . , p . 8 6 f o r a view o f Hegel's

v.i s - a - v i s S c h e l l i n g m the D_L f f e r e n z s c h r i f t .
94.
Hegel, werke 20, p. k2.?.
position
120.
a more s y s t e m a t i c way.
He had done t h i s by c o n c e i v i n g God
as Substance, as t h e one Substance w i t h t h e two a t t r i b u t e s o f

t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n .
and
At l e a s t , m
r e a l i t y we can see t h a t God was immanent even though as
'motionless Substance .
was
t n i s mediation o f thought
However, t h i s , as we have seen,
n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r Hegel o r , more p r e c i s e l y , f o r what
Hegel c a l l s t h e development o f p h i l o s o p h y .
Opposed t o t h e
m o t i o n l e s s Substance o f Spinoza t h e r e developed,

m
t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant and p a r t i a l l y m
partially
the natural
an awareness o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f form ( i b . ) .
sciences
The c a t e g o r i e s
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g came t o be r e c o g n i s e d as i m p o r t a n t i n
comprehending e x p e r i e n c e .
T h i s emphasis on form, Hegel
reaches i t s h i g h e s t p o i n t m
h i s p h i l o s o p h y , Hegel says,
the philosophy o f Fiehte.
suggests
in
'form was f o r i t s e l f as s u b j e c t i v i t y '
From t h e f o r m a l I ' a l l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s were supposed t o develop

, 96
themselves .
I t was fro-n t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e F i c h t e a n
system t h a t t h e contemporary need o f p h i l o s o p h y , o f which Hegel

t a l k s , flowed.
I t was
b i a s f o r Form ' m
t h a t p h i l o s o p h y be d e l i v e r e d
order that i t
and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . '
be u n i t e d w i t h
from
its
objectivity
Hegel a l s o taices t h i s t o mean t h a t
'the Substance o f Spinoza should n o t be conceived as t h e unmoved,

but t h e i n t e l l i g e n t , as a form which i s i n i t s e l f a c t i v e .
must be conceived
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n e c e s s i t y o f i t s form, so
t h a t i t i s t h e c r e a t i n g o f Nature b u t even so knowledge and

95-
Ibid.
96.
Ibid.
I t
121.
cognition'.
'Philosophy ,, Hegel adds,
do w i t h t h i s
p o i n t o f view.'
'as e s s e n t i a l l y t o
The A b s o l u t e
identity
then, o f
S c h e l l m g ' s system i m p l i e s f o r him n o t t h e a b s t r a c t u n i t y o f

Spinoza's Substance, n o r t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y '
Fichte s philosophy, but
But
ute
is
and
i t is s t i l l
means t o h i m .
totality
with infinite
as
form.
n o t e v i d e n t what t h e n o t i o n o f t h e A b s o l We a r e p e r h a p s c l e a r on t h e p o i n t t h a t
simultaneously t h e contemporary requirement

what p h i l o s o p h y
rest of his cryptic
is
'essentially'
of philosophy
a l l about.
comments c o n c e r n i n g
However, t h e
t h e i d e a as i t
appears
in Schellmg's philosophy
r e q u a r e some r e f o r m u l a t i o n i f
a r e t o mean much t o u s .
T h i s need n o t be a d i f f i c u l t
s i n c e we h a v e c o v e r e d
derives i t s
significance
Hegel's understanding
Norfj i t
much o f t n e g r o u n d
seems t h a t
f o r Hegel.
o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Modern
is a unity
and b e i n g .
o f thought
differentiation
Tbid.
98.
Ibid.
o f course
Philosophy.
t h e need
is derived.
i s merely
an a b s t r a c t
As we h a v e s e e n h i m c l a i m
represents i n f i n i t e
without unity
earlier,
a l l o w s no s e l f -
or individuation within either.
self-differentiation
97-
task
the? i d s a
from which
and e x t e n s i o n w h i c h
hand, F i c h t e ' s system merely

describes
poles
identity
Spinoza's philosophy, Hegel suggests,
it
they
t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f S p i n o z a and F i c h t e
f o r Schelling's n o t i o n o f Absolute
o f thought
from which
This ground i s
r e p r e s e n t f o r Hegel t h e two opposing
unity
it
On t h e o t h e r
form.
I t
or a totality.
122.
The
requirement
mediated.
lstic
This e n t a i l s
p h i l o s o p h y has
o f form.
In talking
H e g e l has
He
is
of philosophy
i n mind.
is
that this opposition
Hegel's o p i n i o n t h a t the
of form
this
reality
as a r i s i n g
icular.,
t o Kant's view thac i t
which
the u n i t y
the o b j e c t s of experience.
was
philosophy.
Kant d e p i c t e d
phenomenal
the understanding
part-
supplying
( A n c h a u u n g ) , t h a c gave
This implies,
then, t h a t
itself
the o r i g i n
Subject.
and
one
a subject that
sees
o f i t s w o r l d , a t e n s i o n between S^bstance
I f this is
so we
can
see
that
it
enteils
an
amendment t o t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y
it
is
that
p h i l o s o p h y , as H e g e l p o i n t s o u t , t h a t
d o c t r i n e o f f o r m i s g i v e n i t s most s u b j e c t i v e m
It
entails that that
world
that originates
us
Hegel
t h e c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w t o be
o f t e n s i o n b e t w e e n an impevsena 1 r e a l i t y
and
know what
o f a p p e r c e p t i o n , and, m
the form t o the matter of i n t u i t : o n
in
i n s t a n c e we
the form o f the K a n t i a n
r e f e r r i n g t o t h e manner m
considers
Spinoz-
t o take i n t o account the s i g m f i c a n c e
I t is
in
be
p h i l o s o p h y be
since
he K a n t i a n
orpreâtion.
amended t o a l l o w f o r a
independently
of the I .
However, there-
i s more t o H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w ( t h e a b s o l u t e
point of view) than t h i s .
allow the i n e v i t a b l e
and
independent
comes i n .
t o be m e d i a t e d ,
we
know, he
to persist.
F i c h t e a n I and
Thit
plays t i n s
important role
philosophy
is
conception
i s where
to
subject
Scheilnng
t h e S p m o z : s t i e Substance have
not simply confronted.
i s not content
t e n s i o n between the independent
reality
The
As
I t is Scliellmg
the h i s t o r y
the u n i t y
of philosophy.
o f S u b s t a n c e and
that
His
Subject.
125.
It
i s t h e ' S u b s t a n c e o f S p i n o z a . . . c o n c e i v e d as t h e i n t e l l i g e n t ' - ^
It
i s therefore,
unity
f o r H e g e l , as we n o t e d
o f S u b j e c t and O b j e c t .
earlier,
This i s ,
the objective
I suggest,
the o r i g i n
of the Hegelian Absolute: Schellmg's conviction that everything

is
the Absolute
The
Identity
manner m
which
o f S u b j e c t and O b j e c t .
this
is
r e a s o n e d by S c n e l l m g i n
philosophy i s n o t without p l a u s i b i l i t y .
presupposition that
his
He b e g i n s w i t h t h e
' a l l k n o w l e d g e r e s t s on t h e harmony o f an
100
objective with a subjective.'"
t h e name
and
'Nature'
t h e name
He t h e n p r o p o s e s t h a t we gave
to the t o t a l i t y
'intelligence'
content o f experience.
The
i s because I n t e l l i g e n c e
Now, m
subjective
I t i s n o r m a l l y assumed, he c o n t i n u e s ,
two, I n t e l l i g e n c e
being conscious
objective
(intelligenz) to the entire
t h a t these
reason
of a l l that is
and N a t u r e
and N a t u r e ,
form
two o p p o s i t e
is originally
as n o t b e i n g c o n s c i o u s
t h o u g h t o f as
(Bewusstlose).
any k n o w l e d g e , S c h e l l i n g c l a i m s , t h e r e i s a r r ^ e t m g o f
b o t h , o f t h a t w h i c h he d e s c r i b e s as c o n s c i o u s
anc o f t h a t
he d e s c r i b e s as n o t b e i n g c o n s c i o u s .
At t h i s
makes an u n w a r r a n t e d
o f Nature
jump; t h e m e e t i n g
i n k n o w l e d g e i m p l i e s , he s u g g e s t s ,
that
point
the other.
Both,
he i n s i s t s ,
and I n t e l l i g e n c e
they are not simply
are e q u a l l y necessary.
over
I n what
i s knowledge n e i t h e r t h e t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t n o r t h e t h o u g h t
100.
which
Schelling
o p p o s i t e s b e c a u s e where t h e y meet n e i t h e r t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e
99-
poles.
Ibid.
S c h e l l i n g . Werke V o l ?., System d e s T r a n s z e n d e n t a l e n
I d e a l i s i n u s . p. 339
obj^ct
124.
takes p r i o r i t y .
There are
can
They a r e
simply
two ways i n w h i c h ,
set about e x p l a i n i n g t h i s
procedures
has
t o be
from the o b j e c t i v e
identical.
according to Schellmg,
identity.
The
t h e same h o w e v e r .
pole to i l l u s t r a t e
We
how
aim o f
may
In
s c h e l l i n g ' s view, i t i s the s t r u c t u r e
has
two
poles which
the
m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e and
r e q u i r e one
fundamental
to begin
one
pole w i t h o u t being d r i v e n t o the
science
sciences
that
would
begins
p h i l o s o p h y wh:ch i s
pole.
of
be
the science
the science
begins
what S c n e l l m g
n a t u r e n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d s us
i o n s o f k n o w l e d g e and
result,
seems t o be
Transcendental
We
can
deduces,
readily
readily
pole of nature.
that his
I t is
p h i i o s o p n y has
that the
study
of the p r i o r
and
condit-
natural
the
same
object.
a c c e p t ) how
Schellmg
philosophy
a deduction of
i n common w i t h t h a t
Ibid.,
J02.
For the productJve lmagination'creates i t s

Worke 2 , p
i, 2 6.
1
the
from the s u b j e c t i v e
101.
p.
is
Transcendental
E p i s t e m o l o g y and
( i f not
1 0
other.' "
from the s u b j e c t i v e pole o f Transcendental
objective
existence
see
impossible
philosophy n e c e s s a r i l y
s u g g e s t i n g , h a v e one
namely, the i d e n t i t y
the
claims is
t o the study
to the study of nature.
s c i e n c e , he
the
that
must be
another...
o f nature, which
p o l e and
Consequently,
l e a d s us
it
a . the objective
that
itself
a l l knowledge
two
Those t w o
and
'if
t h e r e m u s t be
from
same.
o f knowledge
approaches since
sciences
begin
i t n e c e s s a r i l y leads
the o t h e r o r from the s u b j e c t i v e pole t o prove
allows the a l t e r n a t i v e
both
either
to
which
we
natural
of
Fichte. ^
JAO.
object.
Hegel.
Nature
i s d e r i v e d from the s u b j e c t i v e pole through being p o s i t e d
by t h e I .
As we a r e a w a r e , i t
is
seen as a n o n - I w h i c h
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e s u b j e c t h i m s e l f .
of
some s i g n i f i c a n c e
is
t h e manner m
from Nature.
to
be
which
The
What i s new,
however,
S c h e l l m g s e t s about
argument t h a t
forms
deducing
Intelligence
the deduction i s
i l l u s t r a t i v e r a t h e r than persuasive
s i n c e , as we
i l l u s t r a t e s his point
t h i s way.
t a k e s as t h e a i m o f n a t u r a l
n a t u r e by
philosophy
isation
It
process
is
would
the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the
s c i e n c e as t n e
of nature
be n o n s e n s e t o s u p p o s e , he
n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s was
object
t h a t govern
is
t h e outcome o f s c i e n c e
fully
The
disappear,
and
kind.
103.
says,
So
t h a t we
aim
ibid.,
I t s aim
of
of
and
laws
S c h e l l a n g takes at t h a t
are g i v e n not concrete
it
phenomen
I n t h e most consummate
' t h e phenomena ( t h e m a t e r i a l ) have t o
o n l y t h e laws
with idealism.
Schellmg.
tl";
I t i s t o discover the
(the f o r m a l ) remain.'
most consummate f o r m o f s c i e n c e he
one
vergeistagt).
suggests, t h a t
thought-explanation.
f o r m o f s c i e n c e , he
at
those appearances.
but simply t h e i r
he
s i m p l y t o p r o v i d e us w i t h a p i c t u r e
is intellectual
reason-
intellectual-
(Natur i s t
n a t u r a l o b j e c t s as t h e y a p p e a r t o o u r s e n s e s .
facts
Less
c r u c i a l t o h i s argument,
of natural
of s p i r i t u a l i s a t i o n
object.
R e a s o n a b l y enough., he
s u b s u m i n g them u n d e r g e n e r a ] l a w s .
a b l y , b u t i n a mariner t h a t
describes t h i s
science
intended
already
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g n a t u r e , i s b o t h s u b j e c t and
of
and
understanding Hegel's o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m ,
know, a t i s an a b s o l u t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f S c h e l l i n g ' s
He
is
Science
p. 3^0.
implies is
i s what u n i t e s t h e
its
result
conscious
126.
s u b j e c t i v e pole o f knowledge t o t h e unconscious

pole.
I tis
intelligence;,
t h e manner m
objective
which nature r a i s e s i t s e l f t o
i n t h a t man who i s h i m s e l f p a r t o f n a t u r e
comes
104
to
know i t
as t h o u g h t .
We a l r e a d y know f r o m o u r d i s c u s s i o n s ' o f H e g e l ' s o b j e c t i o n s

105
to
t h e e p i s t e m o l o g y o f Locke
t h a t H e g e l r e g a r d s i t as t h e
t a s k o f s c i e n c e t o know w h a t i s e x p e r i e n c e d
is
t h i s way t h a t s c i e n c e i s
of
o t h e r n e s s and g e n u i n e
certainly not the picture
itself'.
T h i s view o f science
that natural
I t has i t s
f o r Hegel claims, i t
origin
in the philosophy
to
have b r o u g h t o u t t h e s p e c u l a t i v e s i d e o f n a t u r a l
speculative side o f n a t u r a l
means t h a t a s p e c t
of i t s
with his idealism.
is
themselves
Schelling,
to
is
scientists
of
By t h i s
I t
f c r Hegel both t h e overcoming
idealism.
have o f t h e i r r e s e a r c h e s .
the great merit of S c h e l l m
science Kegel,
science.
o f course,
explanation of the world that coincides
T h i s 13 m
c o n t r a s t , as I have
indicated,
t h e s c i e n t i s t ' s own a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s w o r k , and H e g e l
acknowledges t h i s .
says,
' i t is
For i n
that
'system o f N a t u r e ' ,
forgotten that nature i s
something
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s $g#0h w h i c h n a t u r e r e c e i v e s i n
Hegel
known: t h e i d e a l
science are a t the
] 06
same t i m e immanent m
thinks,
itself.'
view the w o r l d which
r e a l i t y which
believes i t
Natural scientists.
they intend
i s e x t e r n a l t o themselves.
t o e x p l a i n as a m a t e r i a l
In this,
and H e g e l
i s S c h e l l i n g ' s m e r i t t o have p o i n t e d t h i s
104.
Ibid.,
105.
See b e l o w , p. 4 6.
106.
Hegel.
p.
341.
Werke 2,
("Chape. ) .
p. 100.
Hegel
o u t , they
127.
overlook
t h a t what t h e y
Hegel c a l l s
The
are
essentially dealing
'ideal determinations'
ualised.
i s that nature
something e x t e r n a l
f o r S c h e l l m g and
as
o p p o s e d t o an
we
h a v e s e e n , who
on
the
external world.
had
p h i l o s o p h y t h e n has
e x t e r n a l t o our
idealism.
As
i t s own
we
L o c k e and
The
the
as he
thought
as
shared
its
Schellmg's
displaying i t s
theories
adopted
o f knowledge
of
Hume.
thesis that s c i e n t i f i c
t h e s i s again i n the
thinking is inherently
philosophy.
Phenomenology o f M i n d .
a content
w i t h what i s
Schelling
s c i e n c e had
ledge to the
t r u e and
elaborating
contributed
on
the
that is
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e b a t e and,
p.
^53.
has
side'
' the
t o do
with
1
concretely.' ^
of n a t u r a l
concrete nature
at the
it,
fruitful
argues
conceived
'speculative
a view of the
it
encounter
H e g e l sees
p r o b l e m o f k n o w l e d g e , b e c a u s e he
main t h i n g i n S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a r
idealist
We s h a l l
does t h e w h o l e o f S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y , as
response t o the
107.
least
f o r Hegel of t a c k l i n g
g r o u n d and
t h e n becomes a p a r t o f H e g e l ' s own

this
therefore
have seen, Hegel h i m s e l f
procedure i n c r i t i c i s i n g
scientist
o f knowledge based
thought.
the a d d i t i o n a l merit
spirit-
the e m p i r i c i s t s ,
advocated a theory
e m p i r i c i s t t h e s i s on
this
have seen
I t is his
I t was
objects.
becomes, a t
t o him.
method o f t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s and
inherent
we
becomes known o r
to himself,
Hegel, i n t e r n a l
assumption of a world
the
and
I n t h u s b e c o m i n g known, N a t u r e , w h i c h t h e
c o n c e i v e s as
what
r a t h e r than e x t e r n a l
r e s u l t of t h e i r e f f o r t s Hegel b e l i e v e s ,
S c h e l l m g argue t h i s ,
w i t h are
o f know-
same t i m e ,
Hegel
128.
t h i n k s , he h a d r e t u r n e d p h i l o s o p h y
principal
In
concern,
the concern
contrast to this,
had
merely
its
object.
t o w h a t s h o u l d be i t s
w i t h the content of
t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s
been c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n
The
r e s u l t had
thought.
preceding
him
of thought
been t h a t p h i l o s o p h y
had
to
neither
d e p i c t e d t h e t r u e n a t u r e o f k n o w l e d g e n o r come up w i t n
concrete
concent f o r i t s e l f .
right
Schellmg's philosophy
philosophy
had
not, m
was
it
t h e o b j e c t i v e and
k n o w l e d g e were a l t e r n a t e l y
f o r preceding
Philosophy
t h e two
and
S c h e l l m g had
philosophy,
epistemclogy
opposing
of i d e n t i t y .
stressed.
Preceding
overcome t h i s
truth
subjective sides
T r u t h , Hegel
either Intelligence
p a r t i c u l a r had
p o l e s o f m a t e r i a l i s m and
e s s e n c e o f n a t u r e was
i s put-
h i s v i e w , been a b l e t o a t t a i n
o r a c o n t e n t because m
of
T h i s , Hegel t h i n k s ,
or
suggests,
Subject.
revolved
around
subjective idealism.
o p p o s i t i o n by a r g u i n g t h a t
i n t e l l i g e n c e , he had
the
shown tha we
may-
pass f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e p o l e o f k n o w l e d g e f o i t s s u b j e c t i v e
pole.
falls
the
I n Schellmg's philosophy n e i t h e r subject nor object

t o one
s i d e t h r o u g h t h e one
being g i v e n precedence
o t h e r , because i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y
concrete
' conceives
w o r l d b u t as an
itself
'thought i s . ,
in
as w o r l d , b u t n o t as an
i n t e l l e c t u a l - r e a l world'."
The
identity.
This, I t h i n k ,
'problem o f knowledge'.
of
Absolute
it
is,
enology
108.
I d e n t i t y he
I think,
o f Mind,
Ibid.
itself
intellectual
dualism
previous philosophy, Hegel claims, i s e x t i n g u i s h e d i n

Absolute
the s t a t u s of t h i s
d i f f e r s markedly from S c h e l l m g ;
this difference
that
l e d him t o w r i t e
of
this
i s H e g e l ' s answer t o
However, m
ever
the
prmcipl
and
t h e Phenom-
129.
We may c a r r y t h i s
parallel
that
t h e Phenomenology.
as a n i n d i c a t i o n
System o f T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
purpose o f t h a t
' i n t o what i t
t o undertake
will,
That p a r a l l e l
a t the l e a s t
should
be, namely
concerns
Schelling'
Transcendental
into
Idealism
a system o f t h e
The W i s s e n s c h a f t s l e h r e o f F i c h t e
this.
The s y s t e m o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
was
Idealism
the subjective deduction of the world not
general but i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r s .
advance o v e r F i c h t e ' s i d e a l s i m
t h e a u t h o r has sought
T h i s was i n t e n d e d
since
t o present
Idealism m
i t s whole
t h e whole o f philosophy
as w h a t i t i s ,
o f self-consciousness, f o r which
in
which
extent
continuity
n a m e l y as an
that
LO be an
'the means..through
i s t h a t he h a s d e p i c t e d t h e p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y
history
which
S c h e l l i n g conceived t h e
s y s t e m t o be t o e x t e n d
really
t o be h i s g u i d e
It
Idealism.
whole o f knowledge.
and
of the philosophical context m
t h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y was w r i t t e n .
had
f u r t h e r by d r a w i n g
between t h e method o f S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y and
o f Hegel m
serve
suggestion
deposited
ongoing
in
3 1C
experience
serves
o n l y a s , as i t
To t h o s e
who a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h
may w e l l
a p p e a r as a d e s c r i p t i o n
As we s h a l l
s e e , he t h i n k s
a continuity
w e r e , d o c u m e n t a n d monument.'
t h e Phenomenology o f Mind
o f H e g e l ' s method m
of the parts o f philosophy
and, i n t h e Phenomenology m
particular,
this
that
work.
as f o r m i n g
presents
-i
philosophy
as
'the ongoing
history
of self-consciousness.'"
T
x
109.
Schellmg.
110.
Ibid.,
111.
B o t h K r o n e r ( o p . c i t . ) and W e r n e r Me r x . K e g e l s r i i m o i leno 1 o;> i

d e s Go i s teg,, K l c s i e n i a n n , F r a n k f u r t ) p o i n T xT6~~ml3~~ph r a T i c "
b e t w e e n t h e p m l o t - o p n y o f S c h e l l i n g and HegeT. They a l s o
t r a c e t h e v i e w o f p h i l o s o o n y b a c k t o F i c h t e . See K r o n e r pp
372 - 373, ( Z w e i t e r B a n d ) and Marx. pp. 14 - 15.
p.
op.cit.,
p.
330.
331.
130.
S c h e l l i n g t r a c e s t h e development o f t h e u n i t y
(the
I of Fichte's philosophy)
idealism
to
t h i s way, t h r o u g h
where i t
reaches i t s
Schelling
in
of
of i n t u i t i o n '
stages
presenting
apperception
s y s t e m of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
t h e v a r i o u s forms o f i n t u i t i o n
highest
potency.
What
motivates
'transcendental philosophy'
is
the i d e n t i t y
t h i n k s e x i s t s between n a t u r e
from n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y ,
intuition
in his
of
that,
w h i c h a r e t o be f o u n d
'series
as we h a v e s e e n , he
and i n t e l l i g e n c e .
he s a y s ,
as t h i s
I tis
apparent
' t h a t t h e same p o t e n c i e s o f
t h e I can, t o a c e r t a i n
extent,
112
be
pointed out m
as
should
meet.
The h i g h e s t
To a t t a i n
this
end, S c h e l l m g
self-consciousness
how t h e one n e c e s s a r i l y
All
this
is
reminiscent
h o w e v e r , one s i g n i f i c a n t
regards
potency w i l l
a l r e a d y be e v i d e n t , w h e r e i n t e l l i g e n c e
must f o l l o w
ing
nature.'
the highest
suggests,
through
its
and n a t u r e
the philosopher
v a r i o u s epochs d e p i c t -
f o l l o w s fôrn t h e o t h e r .
o f t h e Phenomenology.
difference.
pot-îcy
be,
There
Schelling, unlLke
(the highest
identity
is
Hegel,
of subject
11 "5
and
o b j e c t ) as A r t .
spirit
This is
fully
o f Schelling's philosophy
Absolute
and
keeping
with
s i n c e he t h i n k s o f t h e
I d e n t i t y n o t o n l y as a p o i n t o f e q u i v a l e n c e
o b j e c t b u t e q u a l l y as a p o i n t o f i n d i f f e r e n c e .
b e c a u s e n e i t h e r , as we know, t a k e s
The h i g h e s t u n i t y
of subject
This
is
precedence over t h e o t h e r .
o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t must t h e r e f o r e be a
u n i t y without preference
merit of A r t is
trie
that
unites the i n t u i t i o n
it
given
meets w i t h t h i s
Schelling, op.cit.
113-
Ibid.
p. 3 3 1 .
The s p e c i a l
requirement.
o f t h e s u b j e c t and h i s
112.
p. 634.
t o e i t h e r pole.
product
I t
in
t h e most
131.
concrete
manner.
of i n t u i t i o n
I n A r t the object of the subjective act
c a n be o b s e r v e d t c e x i s t .
S c h e l l m g t h i n k s , concrete
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
conscious o f i t s e l f
of a r t i s ,
lcation
I tis
therefore,
evidence o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f
I n one and t h e same i n t u i t i o n

and n o t - c o n s c i o u s .
as H e g e l s a y s ,
'the h i g h e s t
the I is
F o r S c h e l l i n g t h e work
manner o f t h e o b j e e t i f -
o f Reason b e c a u s e t h e r e s e n s u o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
is
1114
united with
It
m
this
intellectuality.
i s b e c a u s e Reason i s g i v e n
a 'sensuous
existence'
f a s h i o n t h a t H e g e l o b j e c t s t o t h e d e p i c t i o n o f A r t as
the h i g h e s t
u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
I n taking this
attirude
11
H e g e l shows h i m s e l f t o be more o f an i d e a l i s t
than
Schellm^.
114.
H e g e l . WerKe 20,
115-
H e g e l h a s a l s o a sound m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n ( w h i c h i .
n o t u n r e l a t e d t o h i s i d e a l i s m ) t o t h e d e p i c t i o n o f A r t as
t h e h i g h e s t i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
In regarding
A r t as t h e h i g h e s t f o r m o f Reason S c h e l l i n g , m H e g e ] ' s
v i e w , j u s t i f i e d h i s own s t a n d m r e s p e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y :
t h a t i t was a l s o a fo-rm o f A r t .
T h e r e f o r e w n a t was m
S c h e l l i n g ' s o p i n i o n r e q u i r e d t o be a p h i l o s o p h e r was n o t
the a b i l i t y t o t h i n k s y s t e m a t i c a l l y bat r a t h e r t h e g i f t o f
genius.
I t was o n l y s u c h g e n i u s t h a t made t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
capable o f i n t u i t i n g t h e Absolute I d e n t i t y i n h e r e n t
m
things.
T h i s , H e g e l s u g g e s t s , i s why S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h
t a k e s on i t s o r a c u l a r f o r m .
As we know, t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f
i d e n t i t y r e q u i r e s no p r o o f , i t s i m p l y i s , and i s e v e r y w h e r e
S c h e l l i n g can a v o i d t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f s i n c e t h e m t u i t i o
o f t h i s A b s o l u t e i s a work o f genius.
So H e g e l a r g u e s t h a
h i s o n l y r e s p o n s e t o an o b j e c t i o n t o t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s o f h i
p h i l o s o p h y w o u l d be t o s a y ' t h a t
y o u have n o t t h e m t e l l
e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n ' t h a t w o u l d p e r m i t y o u t o see i t s t r u t h .
Werke 20, p. 43^) Thus w i t h S c h e l l i n g , H e g e l t h i n k s , ' p h i l osophy a p p e a r s as a t a l e n t f o r A r t , g e n i u s , as t h o u g h o n l y
Sunday's c h i l d had i t . ' ( i b i d . , p. 4 2 8 . )
p. k~5J>.
c
He b e l i e v e s S c h e l l m g t o have demeaned S p i r i t
i t s h i g h e s t potency
of
Kant, i s
as A r t .
Spirit,
f o rS p i r i t alone.
No
of
thought
thought.
to
w i t h thought
its
his
a l o n e . T h e
result
it
the
116.
is
identity
i s n o t t o be an
t o be o b j e c t i v e - r e a l b u t h a s m
Thought has
t h e end t o show
reality.
itself
A r t as t h e h i g h e s t
o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t h i s w o u l d be H e g e l ' s o p i n i o n ,
comes n o w h e r e n e a r t o b a n i s h i n g t h e a l i e n o b j e c t f r o m
of
criticism
S p i r i t , he i n s i s t s ,
t h o u g h t has t o have t h e u p p e r hand.
be h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o b j e c t i v e
potency
as he s a i d m
and o b j e c t h a s f o r h i m t o come down i n f a v o u r o f

I n o t h e r words, m
identity;
indeed
of identity
depicting
'sensuous e x i s t e n c e ' , H e g e l
would say i s adequate t o i t s n a t u r e .

only capable
in
philosophy.
the purview
T h i s t a s k , we a r e t o presume, r e m a i n s f o r
Phenomenology o f M m d . t o
accomplish.
C a i r d , o p . c i t . , s a y s o f S c h e l l m g ' s i d e n t i t y : 'His u n i t y
..as H e g e l . . s a i d , was a u n i t y o f ' s u b s t a n c e ' r a t h e r t h a n
of s p i r i t
and p o i n t s t o t h e n o t i o n o f _Ge 1 s t as t h e p o i n t
o f b r e a k b e t w e e n H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y and t h a t o f S c h e l l i n g .
P. 551
133.
CHAPTER THREE
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND:
( 1 ) A g e n e r a l v i e w o f H e g e l ' s System
In this
of view
ought
e s s a y I am c o n c e r n e d
primarily
concerning Hegel's philosophy.
That
point
a point
o f view,as
t o be c l e a r b y now, i s t h a t h i s p h i l o s o p h y p r e s e n t s a
n o v e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e problem
o c c u p i e d Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
consists,
o f knowledge t h a t had p r e -
The n o v e l t y
I have a l r e a d y a r g u e d ,
of his
i t s account
So f a r we h a v e c o n s i d e r e d H e g e l ' s n o t i o n
in
t o defend
interpretation
o f experience.
o f experience
solely
r e l a t i o n t o h i s c r i t i c i s m o f what I h a v e c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l
epistemology.
We s h o u l d now be m
Hegel's s y s t e m a t i c account
sive
account
a position
o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e most
o f w h i c h we s h a l l f i n d
o f v i e w on an a s p e c t
comprehen-
A l t h o u g h I am p r i n c i p a l l y c o n c e r n e d
o f my p o i n t
t o v e n t u r e on
with this:
t h e defence
o f H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y , I must
n e v e r t h e l e s s g i v e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y as a
whole,
b e c a u s e t o argue t h a t H e g e l p r e s e n t s a c e r t a i n v i e w o f
experience
i s a t t h e same t i m e t o a r g u e
c e r t a i n view o f philosophy.
connected
t h e two concepts
We h a v e a l r e a d y seen how c l o s e l y
o f p h i l o s o p h y and e x p e r i e n c e
our review o f Hegel's h i s t o r y

we f o u n d t h a t
t h a t he p r e s e n t s a
o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
are m
Indeed
t h e view o f experience a p h i l o s o p h e r adopted
was, J.
g e n e r a l , a t one w i t h h i s a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e scope and a i m s o f

philosophy.
limited
F o r - i n s t a n c e we o b s e r v e d
t h a t Hume a n d L o c k e
p h i l o s o p h y t o t h e knowledge o f t h e appearance o f t h i n g s
t o o u r s e n s e s as t h e y w e r e o f t h e b e l i e f t h a t
d i d n o t e x t e n d beyona t h a t
our experience
appearance o f t h i n g s .
Similarly,
r$4.
we
found
t h a t Kant l i m i t e d
phenomena b e c a u s e he
a priori
i d e a s and
can be no d o u b t
p h i l o s o p h y t o the knowledge o f
thought experience
t o be
sense i m p r e s s i o n s .
that
And, c e r t a i n l y , t h e r e
there is a s i g n i f i c a n t
between t h e n o t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e
and
a compound o f
connection
philosophy m
Hegel's
system.
When d e a l i n g w i t h t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d i t
i o n a l to attempt
some k i n d
the e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n
some t r a d i t i o n s ,
do
it
of commentary.
in this
I shall
i n s t a n c e because,
a similar,
a r g u e m e n t s o f t h e P r e f a c e and
but b r i e f e r ,
Chapters o f the work.
interpretation
regarded
as e v i d e n c e
of the author.
follow
unlike
Introduction
of the f i r s t
This might
f o r a. l a c k o f o r i g i n a l i t y
it
three
on t h e
is already partly
t h e r e i s a s t r o n g e r charge than t h i s
and
proceed
by some be
I n so f a r as t h i s c h a r g e m e r e l y
f o l l o w i n g the usual practice
shall
purposes,
I n e a c h case t h e a r g u m e n t ' w i l l
w i t h close reference to the t e x t .
tradit-
What 1
i s n o t w i t h o u t good c a u s e .
i s t o a t t e m p t an e x p o s i t i o n o f w h a t , f o r my
are the major
But
is
part
concerns
my
answered.
i m p l i e d , namely,
that
t h e p r a c t i c e o f p r e s e n t i n g a commentary t o t h e Phenomenology
o f Mind i s
an e v a s i o n
of the o b l i g a t i o n
t o s u p p l y an
e s t i m a t i o n of Hegel's philosophy.
But
c f H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y has
t h a t has
1.
t o be
one
an
independent
independent
estimation
come t o t e r m s
with
F i n d l a y ( H e g e l : A R e - e x a m i n a t i o n ) , S t a c e (The P h i l o s o p h y o f
H e g e l ) , M a r c u s e (Reason"and P e v o i u t i o n ) , Mure (Tne Ph 1 1 e s o pnv
o f H e g e l ) , W.Becker [Hegel" s P h a n o r r e n o l c g i e des Geis'ces) and,
o f c o u r s e , H y p p o l i t e ("Genese e t S t r u c t u r e de 1 a P h a n o m e n o l o g i e
de 1 ' E s p r i t de H e g e l ) a l l do " t h i s " .
1
it.
or
This, I believe,
commentary l i e s .
i s where t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e e x p o s i t i o n
For
such i s t h e n a t u r e o f Hegel's
osophy t h a t a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n an a t t e m p t
at
phil-
systematic
commentary i s an e v a s i o n o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o u n d e r s t a n d
it
properly.
and
in
T h i s i s n o t s i m p l y because m
t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d j s amongst t h e most d i f f i c u l t

this
and
r e s p e c t - t h e argument i s always e x t r e m e l y
o f t e n obscure.
I t i s beoause ( a n d t h i s
emphasis) h i s philosophy
systematic exposition.
that
i s t o be u n d e r s t o o d
i s n o t t o be
to
me
therefore that
t r r m s w i t h such a
found
do w e l l
An
claim.
o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y ,
Mind.
suggest
of
The
we
p l a c e us
view Hegel's account
ophy e n t e r s i n t o
It
is
judgement
view.
of
I t seems
come t o
our review
including his
of
fellow
an e x c e l l e n t p o s i t i o n
Me
must now
to
support
of the h i s t o r y of
it
does so i s
begin our e x p l a n a t i o n of i t
by
Hegel's remarks c o n c e r n i n g the h i s t o r y

'The
history
thi
philos-
complex
-^nd I
c o n s i d e r i n g one
of philosophy
of philosophy presents m
v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i e s t h a t appear p a r t l y
2.
simple
t h e v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e Phenomenology o f
manner i n w h i c h
h i s Enzyklopad l e :
view
philosophy.
I n my
its
o n l y a s u s t a i n e d commentary can
German I d e a l i s t s w o u l d
understand
is his
independent
A t t h e o u t s e t I made t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t
Hegel's c r i t i q u e
only i n
in a
to respect t h i s
condensed
Hegel's
or axiomatic statements.
r a t h e r a s u s t a i n e d argument.
philosophy might
is
I n o t h e r words, i t
philosophical truth
series of d e f i n i t i o n a l
his
Hegel's work -
t h e one
philosophy
the
at
H e g e l . P h a n o m e n o l o g i e des G e i s t e s , K e r k e 3J> PP 1 1 - I T . T h i s o
c o u r s e , i s ho*; H e g e l e x p l a i n s h i s r e t i c e n c e wh^n g i v r n g a p r
l i m i n a r y view o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y m h i s Prefaces.
See a l s o
W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r h o g i k , WerKe j, p. ^6.
IjSb.
v a r i o u s stages
principles,
of i t s
f o r m a t i o n and p a r t l y
that
be t a k e n as a p p l y i n g t o h i s own
philosophy
all
that
preceding
principles
the
H e g e l adds - and
philosophy
comes l a s t i n o r d e r o f t i m e i s
of a l l ; i t
is
therefore,
most d e v e l o p e d , t h e r i c h e s t
the h i s t o r y
if
i tis
and t h e most
philosophy,
of philosophy, but that
of
philosophy,
concrete.
For, not
development
t h i s development
The
is
development
a c c o r d i n g t o H e g e l , r e f l e c t s n e t so much t h e
p u r p o s e s o f each and e v e r y
transcends
indeed
there i s a progressive
t e l e o l o g i c a l and, i n some s e n s e , c u m u l a t i v e .
that
the r e s u l t
is a s t a r t l i n g assertion.
only i s Hegel c l a i m i n g t h a t
of
- 'The
p h i l o s o p h i e s and must t h e r e f o r e c o n t a i n t h e
T h i s , t o say t h e l e a s t ,
particular
w h i c h o n l y have one s y s t e m as t h e i r b a s i s , a r e
o n l y b r a n c h e s o f one and t h e same w h o l e . '

t h i s may
the
them a l l .
individual
p h i l o s o p h e r as a p u r p o s e
I t i s a c c o r d i n g l y n o t the development
o f a v a r i e d number o f d i f f e r i n g s y s t e m s b u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f
one and t h e same s y s t e m .
that
contributing
w e r e , i f we
that
As we n o t e d ,
those
when he c l a i m e d
3.
of pmlosophy.
that
H e g e l . Werke 8.
We
particular
conception
nay remember t h e i n s t a n c e
the d e f i c i e n c i e s o f Descartes'and
p.58
and
philosophers
c r i t i c i s e d n o t f r o m what he w o u l d t a k e t o be a
the h i s t o r y
There
at h i s contemporaries
standpoint but from the viewpoint o f a systematic

of
understand
t h a t Hegel h e l d such a view
he l e v e l l e d
o t h e r Modern P h i l s c p h e r s .
were
to
t o t h e w r i t i n g o f , one p h i l o s o p h y .
recall, indications
the c r i t i c i s m s
the
are presumably
somehow a l l t h e g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s were w r i t i n g , o r a t
least
We
.Spinoza's
137.
p h i l o s o p h i e s were made up by t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f t h e i r
immediate f o l l o w e r s
Locke
i n the History
o f P h i l o s o p h y , L e i b n i z and
There was an i m p l i c a t i o n here t n a t t n e development
was t e l e o l o g i c a l .
S i m i l a r l y we found t h a t Hegel
criticised
F i c h t e n o t from a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t o f view b u t from t h e p o i n t

o f view o f p h i l o s o p h y as a whole.
H i s c r i t i c i s m s were m o t i v -
a t e d by what he t h o u g h t t o be t h e contemporary need o r r e q u i r e ment o f p h i l o s o p h y .
The i m p l i c a t i o n t h e r e a g a i n was t h a t
p h i l o s o p h y had an aim t h a t was independent o f t h e aims o f

the p h i l o s o p h e r h i m s e l f .
that m
Indeed ^ e g e l ' s s u g g e s t i o n i s
r e v i e w i n g t h e h i s t o r y o f p n i l o s o p h y we a r e r e v i e w i n g
a c o n s i s t e n t whole.
T h i s means t h a t t h e v a r i o u s
philosophical
systems i n so f a r as t h e y a r e t r u e a r e branches o f one and

the same system.
T h i s b r i n g s us t o Hegel's p n i l o s o p h y .
I t would appear-
t h a t Hegel would have t o l e s i g n h i m s e l f t o an i n e v i t a b l e

partiality m
d e v e l o p i n g h i s own system o f p h i l o s o o n y .
But
t h i s i s n o t t h e case, f o r Hegel g r a n t s t h e most r e c e n t p h i l o s o p i

i n the h i s t o r y of philosophy a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n .
it
is the l a s t , i t
most c o n c r e t e ' .
is
'the most developed, t h e r i c h e s t and
And i t i s a l l t h i s , Hegel c l a i m s , because i t
contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the correct

It
Because
p r i n c i p l e s of a l l the others
i s t h i s i d e a t h a t l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f Kegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
I n h i s p h i l o s o p h y then Hegel a t t e m p t s t o s y n t h e s i s c t h e
t r u t h of a l ] previous philosophy.
Hegel s p h i l o s o p h y unique.
It
i s t h i s t h a t makes
' No p h i l o s o p h e r p r i o r t o Hegel.
h. To b e sure, i t i s well-known t n a t t h i s i s a n aspect o f Kegel

p h i l o s o p h y b u t m m y v i e w f a r t o o l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has b e e n
paid t o the f a c t .
I t i s n o t , as we s h a l l s e e , simply an
t r i i c l a i m t n a t Hegel m a K e s b a t one t n a t h e a t t e m p t s t o c a r
out.
138.
o r s i n c e , has c o n s c i o u s l y s e t h i m s e l f t h a t t a s k .
I must
add, however, t h a t Hegel h i m s e l f does n o t h o l d t h i s view.

He does n o t r e g a r d i t
as a p e c u l i a r i t y o f h i s own
philosophy
t h a t i t i s an a t t e m p t t o s y n t h e s i s e what i s t r u e m
philosophies.
If,
One
l i k e Hegel, we
reason
for his believing
previous
t h i s i s evident.
see a l l p h i l o s o p h i e s as making a c o n t r i b u t -
i o n t o the p r o g r e s s i v e development o f the one
philosophical
system, t h e n we must r e g a r d the l a s t as b e i n g t h e s y n t h e s i s

o f what i s t r u e i n p h i l o s o p h i e s p r i o r t o i t .
We
would have
t o admit t h a t r e g a r d l e s s o f a t what stage t h e c h a i n o f d e v e l opment o f p h i l o s o p h y i s broken o f f , t h a t stage
represents
the d i s t i l l a t i o n o f a l l the t r u t h s o f p r e v i o u s
philosophy.
T h i s , t h e n , i s one
reason why Hegel does n o t r e g a r d i t as a
p e c u l i a r i t y of h i s philosophy that i t
seeks oo i n c o r p o r a t e
t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e whole h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y .
His claim
i s t h a t t h i s happens anyway i f a body o f t h e o r y i s

philosophy.
indeed
I t i s t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h i s occurrence i n
Hegel's mind t h a t g i v e s us the second reason
for his
that i t i s nothing p e c u l i a r t o his philosophy.
thinking
This synthesis
i s i n e v i t a b l e m Hegel's view because a l l p h i l o s o p h y i s the

work o f one
spirit.
He
says m
h i s Enzyklopadle again:
'The
a r c h i t e c t o f t h i s work o f thousands o f y e a r s ' which i s the

work embodied m
the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y ' i s t h e one
s p i r i t whose_thinking nature i t
consciousness.
it
is to
s y n t h e s i s then i s n o t Hegel's because
i s brought about by the a c t i v i t y o f t h e one
t h a t transcends
5-
The
i s i s t o b r i n g what i t
living
spirit
any p a r t i c u l a r system o f p h i l o s o p h y .
Hegel. Werke 8, p.58.
The
empbaas i s Hegel's.
(Geiso)
Hegel
139.
b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s o n l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g m
that
activity.
We might say t h a t he sees h i m s e l f as t h e s e r v a n t o f s p i r i t

i n the matter of philosophy.
have t o take t h i s view.
be unique
But we, o f course, do n o t
We may r e g a r d h i s p h i l o s o p h y t o
i n these two r e s p e c t s : t h a t i t
i s consciously
regarded as t h e r e s u l t o f a l l p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y and t h a t
therefore i t
regards t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y as t h e d e v e l -
opment o f t h i s one p o i n t o f view.
I t i s , I maintain, a
p e c u l i a r i t y o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , and a view t h a t l i e s a t

i t s heart, that i t
i s seen as t h e embodiment
i n s i g h t s of a l l previous philosophy.
o f the c o r r e c t
1"0.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

We a r e now b e t t e r placed t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
of what I have c a l l e d Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y
in
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Hegel's f i r s t major work t h e Phenomen-
o l o g y o f Mind.
Hegel sees h i s t a s k i n p h i l o s o p h y as b e i n g
t o u n d e r t a k e t h e work o f s p i r i t :
t o synthesise previous
p h i l o s o p h y and t o b r i n g i t t o i t s p r o p e r c o n c l u s i o n .
knowledge o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y as Hegel u n d e r s t a n d s
i t does, t h e n , go a l o n g way towards u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e o r i g i n
and c o n t e n t o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y .
Indeed I would go so f a r
as t o suggest t h a t t h i s h i s t o r i c a l approach t o h i s p h i l o s o p h y
i s t h e most f r u i t f u l .
Of course, t o do f u l l j u s t i c e t o sucn
an approach we would have t o examine t h e whole o f Hegel's

account o f the H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . ^
comfort m
But we might t a k e
t h e f a c t , t h a t on Hegel's own account, t h e most
xecent p h i l o s o p h i e s c o n t a i n w i t i u n themselves t h e t r u t h s 0 1
a l l those p r e c e d i n g .
We a r e , i n any case, concerned wi t h t h e f a t e o f Modern
Philosophy m
t h e w r i t i n g s o f Hegel and Marx.
As I have
a l r e a d y sand. Modern P h i l o s o p h y was preoccupxed w i t h .:he

Problem o f Knowledge
o r , m Hegel's terms, t h e r e l a t i o n o f
thought t o i t s o b j e c t .
We have examined Hegel's c r i t i q u e
of Modern P h i l o s o p h y t o e l u c i d a t e h i s approach t o t h e problem.

One o f t h e c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t we have sought t o r e f u t e i s
o f Habermas: t h a t Marx and Hege.l
epistemology.
that
'demolished' t r a d i t i o n a l
I t ought t o be c l e a i b ; row t h a t Hegel's
6. Tne worxs o f M.Foster fThe P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h i e s o f P l a t o and

H e g e l ) and Mure ( I n t r o d u c t a o'rT'co HegcT^, f ~ r i n s t a n c e , Thcw~ioV
v a l u a b l e i s t h e comparison w i t h " t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f P l a t o and
Aristotle.
141.
account o f c h e r e l a t i o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y , and mdeea o f a l l

p h i l o s o p h y , t o the h i s t o r y
o f p h i l o s o p h y goes some way t o -
wards meeting Habermas' c r i t i c i s m .

task of philosophy m
For, i f Hegel sees the
g e n e r a l as the conscious
l i n k i t s e l f t o and b u i l d
e f f o r t to
on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , t h e
a c c u s a t i o n t h a t he s i m p l y negates o r i g n o r e s an achievement
o f p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y seems, on the face o f i t ,
t o be
i m p l a u s i b l e ; and our d i s c u s s i o n o f the r e l a t i o n between the

H i s t o r y o f Philosophy
make i t
and the Phenomenology o f Mind should
seem even more so.
In the c o n c l u s i o n o f the s h o r t essay e n t i t l e d
'Result'
w i t h which he ends h i s L e c t u r e s on the H i s c o r y c f P h i l o s o p h y ,

Hegel says ' A c c o r d i n g l y ( i . e . a c c o r d i n g t o the
the H i s t o r y o f Philosophy-H.W.) our s t a n d p o i n t i s now

r e c o g n i t i o n of the Idea.
L3
A b s o l u t e S p i r i t which
cf
Outcome
the
The knowledge o f the I d e a as

i s thus
t o t h e f i n i t e ; and the p r i n c i p l e
opposed
t o
Spirat
another s p i r i t
o f this spirit
t o know, so t h a t A b s o l u t e S p i r i t i s f o r i t .
( o r mind) i s
I have t r i e d
t o develop and b r i n g b e f o r e y o u r t h o u g h t s t h i s t r a i n o f s p i r i t
u a l forms ( G e s t a l t u n g e n ) o f p h i l o s o p h y m
a t the same time i n d i c a t i n g
t h e i r connection.
i s the t r u e realm o f s p i r i t s ,
t h e r e i s - a s e r i e s which
t h e i r progression
This s e r i e s
the o n l y realm o f s p i r i t s t h a t
i s not a d i v e r s i t y ,
n c r does i t
remain a s e r i e s merely as a s u c c e s s i o n , b a t a s e r i e s j u s t
as i t s s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n i n t o moments o f t h e one
makes i t s e l f i n t o one and
the
same
present-day
spirit
which
spimt.
And
t h i s l o n g t r a i n o f s p i r i t s are t h e only p u l s e s which i t
ases
142.
up i n i t s l i f e ;
they are t h e organist,i o f o u r Substance.
We
have t o g i v e e a r t o i t s urgency - when t h e mole w i t h i n burrows

on - and g i v e i t
reality.
Those s p i r i t s a r e s i m p l y a
necessary p r o g r e s s i o n which express n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e

nature of s p i r i t
i t s e l f and l i v e i n us a l l .
the s p i r i t
I hope t h a t
this
may c o n t a i n f o r you t h e demand t o grasp
o f o u r time which i s m
us n a t u r a l l y , t o draw
out o f i t s n a t u r a l n e s s i . e . i t s t a c i t u r n i t y ,
it
lifelessness to
the l i g h t o f day and - each i n h i s p l a c e - c o n s c i o u s l y b r i n g

it
The
to light'.'
T h i s i s a remarkable,
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t
As I have i n d i c a t e d , i t
appears t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s n o t
And t o add t o t h e c o n f u s i o n
S p i r i t seems t o be p l a y i n g two r o l e s m
S p i r i t and f i n i t e s p i r i t .
that conclusion:
Absolute
Hegel's s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t a t t h e
outcome o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y
they bear a s r g n i f i e a n t
,r
We a r e t o IOOK on one i as b e i n g
opposed t o each o t h e r b u t because i t
i s the nature of f i n i t e
s p i r i t t o know, 'Absolute S p i r i t i s f o r i t ' .

we t o make o f t h i s ?
conclusion.
i s o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e t o o u r e n q u i r y .
o n l y Hegel's b u t S p i r i t ' s as w e l l .
r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r .
i f obscure,
What sense a r e
I t seems t h a t A b s o l u t e S p i r i t i s
hand f o r t h e r e s u l t o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y .
short-
I t would,
t h e r e f o r e , be t h e most h i g h l y developed form o f p h i l o s o p h y o f

the day.
I f we were t o couch t h i s c l a i m m
r e l i g i o u s terms
i t would be t h a t God i s t h e development o f p h i l o s o p h y and

i n any one epoch i s t c be found i n t h e most advanced p h i l o s o p h y .
Strange
though t h i s c o n c l u s i o n may seem, i t
believes.
7-
i s what Hegel
He speaks o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y as t h e
Hegel. Werke 2 0 , pp. 4 6 l - 2.
143-
t r u e t h e o d i c y and, i n t h e same essay, as
'the
revelation
of
God
as he knows h i m s e l f ' .
* A g a i n , as we have seen,
Hegel t h i n k s o f t h e p r o g r e s s i v e development
the
it
only realm o f s p i r i t
there i s .
i s t h e o n l y heaven t h e r e i s .
We
o f p h i l o s o p h y as
must conclude t h a t
I t i s a peculiar
heaven,
however, s i n c e i t has an e x i s t e n c e h e r e on e a r t h .
of
The r e a l m
s p i n us o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , a c c o r d i n g t o H e g e l ,
'makes i t s e l f i n t o one and t h e same p r e s e n t - d a y

They a t t a i n t n i s happy s t a t e o f a f f a i r s by
nition'
i n t o moments o f t h e one whole.
spirit.'
their'self-recog-
I t is this
t h a t i s t h e t r u e t h e o d i c y and c u l m i n a t e s w i t h f i n i t e
knowing i t
process
mind
as such.
There i s much we c o u l d c o n c l u d e f r o m t h i s a n a l y s i s about

Hegel's views i n g e n e r a l .
the
of
view o f r e l i g i o n i t
history it. implied.
concern us h e r e .
F o r example,
we c o u l d
pursue
I m p l i e d o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h e view
However t h e s e t o p i c s do n o t g r e a t l y
What i n t e r e s t s us i s the view o f p h i l o s o p h y
it
i m p l i e s and e s p e c i a l l y what v i e w does i t p r e s e n t us w i t h
of
t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y t o Hegel's
phil-
osophy .
I n p u r s u i n g t h a t a s p e c t we must emohasize t h a t ,
whatever
VJXW
Hegel may
have o f t h e m a t t e r , t h e t h o u g h t s o f
dead p h i l o s o p h e r s are n o t t h e k i n d o f t h i n g s t h a t o r g a n i s e
themselves i n t o a whole o r are even capable o f s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n ,
i n t o o r w i t h i n t h e one s p i r i t .
But Hegel t h i n k s - t h e y a r e .
I n h i s view t h i s i s wr.at d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e account t h a t t h e

History
8.
^__?hJ.l_oscphv g i v e s from an account which woula preceii*
I b i d . , p. 457-
144.
a mere d i v e r s i t y of modes o f tnought and t h i n k e r s .
Its
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o r g a n i s e s i t s e l f i n t o a complete whole.
He w r i t e s t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , t h e r e f o r e , as though
s p i r i t had w i l l e d i t a l l from t h e b e g i n n i n g .
t h e r e i s no such s p i r i t .
But, c l e a r l y ,
Hegel admits t h i s h i m s e l f , i n
e f f e c t , when he makes che f u r t h e r s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i s

succession
'organism
the
of spirits'
'long
o f the h i s t o r y o f philosophy i s the
o f o u r Substance'.
S e t t i n g a s i d e f o r t h e moment
q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r e c i s e meaning o f t h e n o t i o n o f Substance
i n Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y
( f o r o u r p r e s e n t purpose we might
simply
t a k e t h e term t o mean ' l i f e ' ) we can see t h a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n

of
saying t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s c f previous philosophy are
o r g a n i c moments m
the s p i r i t
o f t h e present i s t h a t t h e y are
n o t c o n s c i o u s l y elements o f o u r l i f e .
consciously present m
I f they are n o t
o u r l i f e Hegel has t o admit t h a t n e i t h e r
i s t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t o a ' s p i r i t u a l whole* past o r present,

ready a t hand.
As he h i m s e l f says, they have t o be brought
t o t h e l i g h t o f day and o n l y t h e n , we must assume, i s i t

i b l e f o r them t o be k n i t i n t o a s y s t e m a t i c whole.
This the
p h i l o s o p h e r must do because t h e ' s p i r i t o f t h e t i m e '

i s i n us ' n a t u r a l l y ' does n o t possess t h a t o r d e r .
and t h i s i s supposed t o be t h e demand c o n t a i n e d m
own account o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y ,
That o r d e r ,
Hegel's
forms.
leaves us f a r from c l e a r on what J.S t h e o u t -
come o f Hegel's H i s t o r y o f Philosophy.

paragraph
which
i s o n l y t o be a t t a i n e d by
d r a w i n g o u t from t h e i r n a t u r a l n e s s those s p i r i t u a l
This s t i l l
poss-
1 quoted
The a m b i g u i t y o f t h e
i s , I t h i n k , t y p i c a l o f the general complexity
145.
of Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
He makes a number o f assumptions t h a t
are s i m p l y n o t argued and o f t e n appears t o move i l l e g i t i m a t e l y

from one area o f d i s c o u r s e t o a n o t h e r .
c e r t a i n t o be c o n f u s i o n because m
Hegel invokes t h e " s p i r i t
At present t h e r e i s
one and t h e same c o n t e x t
o f t h e t i m e " and t h e " r e s u l t o f
the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y " .
Prima f a c i e t h e r e appears t o
be no d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n between t h e two.
however.
role m
H i s assumption i s , and t h i s p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t
h i s account o f experience
t h e Phenomenology, t h a t
'the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e innermost
history,
Not so f o r Hegel,
(soul) of world
- t h i s work o f t h e mind o f nan m h i s i n n e r t h o u g h t
i s p a r a l l e l w i t h a l l t h e stages o f r e a l i t y .
can go beyond i t s own t i m e . ^
Ko p h i l o s o p h y
F o r Hegel, t h e n , t h e a b s t r a c t -
i o n s o f p h i l o s o p h y c:e a b s t r a c t i o n s from t h e s p i r i t o f t h e
epoch.
That i s t h e i r d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n .
i s n o t t o be understood
T h i s , he suggests,
i n t h e sense t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s
a dependent r e l a t i o n t o t h e s p i r i t o f t h e t i m e .
i t s essence.
I t is
m
rather
I n h i s t o r i c a l terms t h i s means t h a t t h e h i s t o r y
of the world i s d i s t i l l e d i n t o the h i s t o r y o f philosophy.

The
r e l a t i o n between n i s t o r i c a l development and t h e development
of t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s f o r Hegel t h e r e l a t i o n between
an o u t e r c o n t i n g e n t l i f e and i t s innermost
soul.
This i s
how t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y comes t o be found n a t u r a l l y

the
spirit
o f the time.
Armed w i t h t h i s i n s i g h t we a r e now able t o say w i t h much

more c e r t a i n t y whac t h e r e s u l t o f t h e h i s t o r y
i s f o r Hegel.
9-
of philosophy
As we have seen, F e g e l suggests
I b i d . , p. ^ 5 6 .
that our
146.
r e a d i n g o f h i s H i s t o r y o f Philosophy
the
might move us t o grasp
s p i r i t o f o u r epoch i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l manner.
This
is
p o t e n t i a l l y p o s s i b l e because past p h i l o s o p h i e s a r e ' n a t u r a l l y '

present m
t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e day.
We may f i n d t h i s
improb-
a b l e , b u t m Hegel's view, those past p h i l o s o p h i e s are t h e

p u l s e - b e a t s o f 'the s p i r i t o f t h e t i m e ' .
of
Grasping
the s p i r i t
time i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l manner i m p l i e s t h e n t h a t we draw
out those p u l s e - b e a t s o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a s .
So t h e argument
would appear t o be t h i s : I n any one epoch t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f

t h a t epoch r e p r e s e n t s i t s s e l f consciousness o r , more s t r o n g l y ,
the
essence o f t h a t epoch.
Now, what happens m h i s t o r y ( o f
the
e x o t e r i c k i n d ) i s a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel t h a t one epoch
succeeds a n o t h e r w i t h no apparent
them.
l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between
The c u l t u r a l outcome i s t h a t t h e s p i r i t o f t h e preced-
ing
epoch i s i n h e r i t e d m
a contingent o r n a t u r a l f a s h i o n by
the
s o c i e t y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g epoch and m
t h i s way forms a
p a r t o f t h e o r d i n a r y m^n's s e l f - a w a r e n e s s m
t h e new epoch.
So t h a t t h e events o f h i s t o r y themselves appear t o g i v e no

sign of philosophical rigour.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Hegel c l a i m s ,
beneath t h e s u r f a c e t h e r e l i e s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r d e r .
His
s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t b o t h t h e o r d i n a r y man's consciousness and

p h i l o s o p h y a r e something more than what they appear t o be.
That something more i s m
b o t n cases s u p p l i e d by h i s t o r y
(of
Hegel's view i s t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y
the e s o t e r i c k i n d ) .
consciousness i s n o t o n l y t h e n a t u r a l consciousness o f i t s
t i m e b u t c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t ( i m p l i c i t l y ) t h e consciousness
of
the
p r e c e d i n g epochs.
s p i r i t o f the past.
The s p i r i t o f t h e p r e s e n t i s a l s o
S i m i l a r l y Hegel c l a i m s t h ? t t n e
147.
p h i l o s o p h y o f an epoch has w i t h i n i t s e l f , as moments, t h e

p h i l o s o p h i e s o f past epochs.
esoteric
Both from t h e v i e w p o i n t o f
h i s t o r y have an immanent o r d e r .
However t h e
h i s t o r y i n which p h i l o s o p h y p a r t i c i p a t e s i s o i the p r i v i l eged k i n d .
U n l i k e t h e n a t u r a l consciousness o f an epoch
knows the r e a l i t y o f t h a t epoch - i t i s i t s

Philosophy
It
participates m
self-consciousness.
the h i s t o r y o f u l t i m a t e
i s the e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y o f man-kind.
it
reality.
Because i t
i s the
r e a l i t y o f h i s t o r y the study o f the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y

brings with i t
way
the demand t h a t we
- as i m p l i c i t l y
understand
our l i f e
that
philosophical.
We
What *m may/, now
conclude
L e c t u r e s on the H i s t o r y
Mmd
about the r e l a t i o n o f Hegel s
o f P h i l o s o p h y t o t h e Phenomenology o f
We have t o decide what the outcome o f the
t o do w i t h the i d e a o f a phenomenology o f rnind.
has
fornier
Those
who
are f a m i l i a r w i t h the Phenomenology o f Mind w i l l a l r e a d y have

an i n t i m a t i o n o f what I have t o say on t h i s .
o f t h e one
f o r the other, m
Tne
significance
my view, l i e s i n t r e account t h a t
Hegel g i v e s i n the L e c t u r e s o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y t o
the c u l t u r e o f t i m e .
For Hegel, as we have seen, p h i l o s o p h y
i s t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h a t c u l t u r e o r i t s essence,
and
i t i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e merely n a t u r a l consciousness

of a c u l t u r e .
P h i l o s o p h y , he suggests, i s the s y s t e m a t i c under10. I have t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e here between the two aspects o f Kegel's
view o f H i s t o r y .
Hegel cannot have i t b o t h ways. H i s t o r y seen
as a c o n t i n g e n t s e r i e s o f events (what I have c a l l e d e x o t e r i c
h i s t o r y ) i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from h i s t o r y " seen as an immanent l y o r d e r e d s e r i e s o f events ( e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y ) . D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
the two c e r t a i n l y makes more sense o f Hegel's c l a i m s about t h e
n a t u r a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness.
Whether t h e d i s t i n c t i o n would a p p l y t o Hege]'s p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y as a whole i s
another matter,
Marx, whose concepts these a r e , appears t o
t h i n k so.
See K i i t i k des Hegels^hen S t a a t s r e c h t s , Mar^-Sngej_s
Werke, D i e t z VerJag, B e r l i n p. 2 0 b .
143.
s t a n d i n g and s y n t h e s i s o f t n e n a t u r a l consciousness.
f i n d t h a t t h e same d i s t i n c t i o n i s made m
Mind, m
the
We
shall
t h e Phenomenology o f
t h a t t h e phenomenology o f mind i s i n t e n d e d t o d e p i c t
path o f n a t u r a l consciousness t o s c i e n c e .
Hegel, i t seems,
has taken h i s own m j u c t i o n s e r i o u s l y ' t o grasp t h e s p i r i t o f

our time which i s m
ness'."'""'"
of
the
us n a t u r a l l y ' and 'draw i t
of i t s
natural-
From o u r r e a d i n g o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o Hegel's h i s t o r y
p h i l o s o p h y we a l r e a d y have some i d e a o f what i s i n v o l v e d i n

n a t u r a l consciousness t a k i n g t h a t p a t h .
The stages o f t h e
p a t h t o s c i e n c e a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, a l r e a d y t o be found
the
n a t u r a l consciousness,
f o r these stages a r e past p h i l o s o p h i e s
which have been superceded and a r e incorporated m

of
the time.
it
t h r o u g h t h e 'realm o f s p i r i t s '
the
the culture
So t h e path o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness takes
are c o n t e m p o r a r i l y p r e s e n t .
of
in
t h e H i s t o r y o f Philosophy
Phenomenology.
so f a r
these
'spirits'
I n one way, t h e n , Hegel's account

provides the subject-matter of
I t i s t h e 'long t r a m o f s p i r i t s '
which
12
'lives m
the
us a l l '
which has t o be c r i t i c a l l y
reviewed
n a t u r a l consciousness can a t t a i n t o s c i e n c e .
before
However, t h e
i s n o t p e r s_e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e H e g e l i a n
n a t u r a l consciousness b u t i s , I b e l i e v e , i t s c o n t e n t as something
dead and p a s t .
ophy i t s e l f ,
is this:
the
I t would n o t
do
simply t o lepeat, m
the h i s t o r y o f philosophy.
philos-
Rather Hegel's p o s i t i o n
'The same development o f thought which i s p o r t r a y e d i n
h i s t o r y o f philosophy i s presented m
the philosophy i t s e l f but
f r e e d from t h a t h i s t o r i c a l e x t e r n a l i t y , p u r e l y m
1
thought'. ^
1 1 . Hegel. Werke 2 0 , p. 4 62.
12. I b i d .
1 3 . Hegel. Werke 8, p. 5 9 .
t n e element o f
14 9.
T h i s view stands a t t h e c e n t r e o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .

It
i s n o t one t h a t i s s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y however.
Indeed
we
have y e t t o examine what would be t h e n a t u r e o f such an account

t h a t aimed a t b r i n g i n g out t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f v a r i o u s
o f superceded p h i l o s o p h y f o r p r e s e n t p h i l o s o p h y .
forms
What we a r e
concerned w i t h p a r t i c u l a r l y i s t h e r o l e t h a t such a view p l a y s

m
Hegel's t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e The Phenomenology o f Mind.
And
it
i s t o t h i s we now t u r n .
Hegel undertakes
I n t h e Phenomenology o f Mmd,
t h e t a s k o f r a i s i n g p h i l o s o p h y t o a s c i e n c e oy
t r a c i n g t h e p a t h o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness
H i s aim i s ,
side
t o A b s o l u t e Knowledge.
as he says, t h a t p h i l o s o p h y be a b l e t o s e t t o one
'the name o f b e i n g t h e l o v e o f knowledge' and 'be r e a l
knowledge'.
T h i s aim i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what I have
i s Hegel's g e n e r a l view o f p h i l o s o p h y .
suggested
Hegel's i n t e n t i o n
t h e Phenomenology i s t o t r a n s f o r m past and contemporary p h i l o s o p h y

employing h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b o t h as h i s p o i n t o f o r i e n t a t i o n .
I n what he has t o say t h e r e i s , however, one t h i n g we might n o t
have expected.
achieve h i s aim.
He suggests
t h a t he i s w o r k i n g w i t h o t h e r s t o
T h i s i s unexpected because we have, by now,
a f i r m p i c t u r e o f Hegel as a p h i l o s o p h e r who i s e x t r e m e l y
of the e f f o r t s o f others.
critical
But as ne p u t s i t h i m s e l f : 'To show
t h a t t h e t i m e has now come f o r p n i l o s o p h y t o be r a i s e d t o a s c i e n c e t h i s would be t h e o n l y t r u e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e a t t e m p t s

have t h i s purpose', ( i b . )
I n Hegel's view t h e n , o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s -
and we must assume t h a t these are t h e ones i m m e d i a t e l y

him, Kant, F i c h t e and S c r o l l i n g - had a l l but r a i s e d
14.
which
Hegel. Weike_3, p. \A.
preceding
philosophy
150.
t o science.
What Hegel has t o do i s s i m p l y t o b r i n g t h e process
t o a s u c c e s s f u l end.
I t appears t h e n t h a t Hegel t h i n k s o f h i s
Pheaorneno 1 ogy as b e i n g i n a c r i t i c a l
contemporary p h i l o s o p h y .
c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past and
What i s more, and i s perhaps more
s t r i k i n g , Hegel t h i n k s o f t h e Phenomenology as i t s e l f
history.
making
The time has come, he c l a i m s , f o r science t o come
on t h e scene.
The sense o f h i s t o r i c a l o c c a s i o n which
d e t e c t s i n t h e whole o f German I d e a l i s t Philosophy
Kroner
i s nowhere
more e v i d e n t t h a n m Hegel's Phenomenology, and i t i s i n t h e

P r e f a c e , as i s t h e case w i t h a l l h i s P r e f a c e s , t h a t t h i s sense
o f h i s t o r y comes p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e f o r e .
atmosphere o f i n n o v a t i o n
Kroner compares t h i s
w i t h that surrounding the founding of
the C h r i s t i a n Church and suggests

aspirations
t h a t t h e same eschatolcg.i c a l
15
a r e t o be found among t h e German I d e a l i s t s .
Whether t h i s i s t r u e o r n o t we have t o admit t h a t Hegel's

p h i l o s o p h y summons up t h e same s o r t o f sense o f o c c a s i o n .
Philosophy
i s f o r him p a r t and p a r c e l
o f the h i s t o r i c a l world.
I n w r i t i n g t h e Phenomenology o f Mind, t h e n , Hegel addresses

h i m s e l f b o t h t o t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e t i m e and t o t h e h i s t o r y o f
philosophy, especially
i t s most r e c e n t h i s t o r y .
that explains his twofold
I t is
this
i n t e n t i o n i n w r i t i n g t h e work.
I t
i s h i s i n t e n t i o n , as we have seen, t o r a i s e p h i l o s o p h y t o a
science and t o show t h a t i t i s t h e demand o f S p i r i t i n h i s
time.
I t i s the l a t t e r that involves
temporary
culture.
makes a t w o f o l d
developing m
t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f con-
Along w i t h t h i s t w o f o l d
assumption.
i n t e n t i o n Hegel
He assumes t h a t p h i l o s o p h y
is
t h e d i r e c t i o n o f s c i e n c e and t h e assumption t h a t
che contemporary c u l t u r e has t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r such a d e v e l o p 15- R.Kroner. Von Kant b i s Heftel, p. 1 'Something o f t h ; n r o f
e s e b a t o l o g i c a i hones 0 1 t h e c i n e o f t h e b i r t h o i C h r i s t i a n i t y
W ^ f f e a i ? ^ e m^Siil^
e
to b r^?
f t afigt {
&
h l
151.
merit.
Since
culture
is
nothing
without
its
p a r t i c i p a n t s t h e assumption t h a t he has t o make i n t h e

second i n s t a n c e i s t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y
person's consciousness
of the p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r e i s i m p l i c i t l y s c i e n t i f i c .
He
argues t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o s c i e n c e t h a t t h e Phenomenology
demands i s overdue: 'For t h e r e s t ' , he says, ' i t i s n o t d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t o u r times are a time o f b i r t h and t r a n s i t i o n ing
a new p e r i o d .
S p i r i t has broken w i t h t h e h i t h e r t o
e x i s t i n g w o r l d o f i t s b e i n g and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
and
it
(Vorstellens)
i s i n t h e process o f t h e work o f t r a n s f o r m i n g i t
sink i n t o the past.'
and
The Phenomenology r e q u i r e s
lettm
no more
o f us t h a n t h a t we become aware o f what was a l r e a d y i n p r o g r e s s

i n our c u l t u r e .
We have examined a t some l e n g t h
the r e l a t i o n o f the
h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y t o the Phenomenology fôm the v i e w p o i n t

o f Hegel's d e p i c t i o n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y .
As I
have s a i d , what now i n t e r e s t s us i s t h e r o l e t h e r e l a t i o n

p l a y s i n t h e Phenomenology i t s e l f .
complex.
This i s again extremely
I t means t h a t we have t o u n r a v e l what Hegel i n t e n d s
by t h e n o t i o n
of S p i r i t .
many c o n s t i t u e n t
We have t o break i t up i n t o t h e
p a i t s t h a t i t has i n t h e Phenomenology,
We might b e g i n w i t h t h e ' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s i n S p i r i t '

Hegel h i m s e l f p o s i t s m
the Preface.
that
We have j u s t seen t h a t
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t , m h i s t i m e , S p i r i t i s on t h e p o i n t o f
l e t t i n g t h e h i t h e r t o e x i t i n g w o r l d o f i t s b e i n g s i n k i n t o the
past and i s i n v o l v e d
t h e work o f t r a n s f o r m i n g i t .
The
' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of s p i r i t ' begins w i t h r e f i n i n g t h i s idea.

S p i r i t , Hegel argues, has n o t f o r t h i s reason a t t a i n e d i t s
f a l l rea.lity.
16.
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t d e s i r e s has oeen
Hegel. Werke 3 >
p.l8.
152.
achieved
has no
i n concept alone and t h i s

1
' f u l l reality'."'"'' '
Nov/,
' l i k e a new-born c h i l d '
i n saying t h i s of S p i r i t ,
it
i s c l e a r t h a t Hegel i s t a l k i n g about s p i r i t as
philosophy
since i t
is
can o n l y be i n p h i l o s o p h y t h a t s p i r i t
realised
'm concept a l o n e , and t h i s i s o n l y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the

r e a l i s a t i o n of s p i r i t .
But, he adds, we must remember
' t h a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the new
spirit
i s the p r o d u c t o f a
f a r - r e a c h i n g r e v o l u t i o n o f numerous forms o f c u l t u r e
(Bildung)
and the p r i z e o f a very t o r t u o u s p a t h and e q u a l l y g r e a t
strain
l8
and e f f o r t . '
philosophy
I n o t h e r words, Hegel misses i n e x i s t i n g

an
awareness t h a t s p i r i t
but a l s o has a c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y .
i s n o t merely
S p i r i t i s also, m
i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s , c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l r e a l i t y .
may
be t h a t s p i r i t
conceptual
one
of
I t
IA i t s c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y appeared o v e r n i g h t
( I t h i n k t h a t Hegel has i n mind here the Frencn R e v o l u t i o n )

but he a s s e r t s , p h i l o s o p h y must n o t u n d e r e s t i m a t e
f o r m a t i o n o f c u l t u r e t h a t had prepared
the
the ground.
I t was
f a i l u r e o f contemporary p h i l o s o p h y t o t a k e t h i s p o i n t t h a t ,
i n Hegel's view, accounts
f o r t h e f a c t t h a t I t bears w i t n e s s
o n l y t o the 'simple concept'

The
the t r a n s -
of the great t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .
r e a l i t y o f t h e p r e v a i l i n g p h i l o s o p h y however was
not
t h a t mere concept but the ' f a r - r e a c h i n g r e v o l u t i o n o f numerous

forms o f c u l t u r e ' o f which i t
i s t h e r e f o r e one
'prize'.
'the r e a l i t y o f t h i s simple "whole con-
t h i s , t n a t those forms w h i c h have become moments
develop t h e n s e l v e s anew i n t h e i r r e c e i v e d sense and

I b i d . , p. 1 9 .
17.
18.
Ibid .
It
o f the p r i n c i p a l aims o f the Phenomenology
of Mind t o prove t h a t
sists m
r e p r e s e n t e d the
give
153-
,1 9
themselves
It
form but i n t h e i r new
element.
seems t h e n t n a t one o f the p r i n c i p a l aims o f the
Phenomenology i s t h a t contemporary
p h i l o s o p h y be made conscious
of
i t s inheritance.
Hegel recommends t h a t i t
should l o o k back
at
p r e c e d i n g forms o f p h i l o s o p h y from the s t a n d p o i n t o f i t s
p r e s e n t achievement and work a g a i n on i t s r e c e i v e d ideas t o

r a i s e them a l l t o the p r e s e n t l e v e l o f s p e c u l a t i o n .
This
one manner i n which s p i r i t might a t t a i n i t s f u l l r e a l i t y .

would be t h r o u g h what Hegel c a l l s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s s p i r i t
the
full
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f i t s ' s i m p l e concept'.
1 have a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , has a n o t h e r "aspect.
is
This
knowing
However s p i r i t ,
as
Hegel r e f e r s t o
20
i t here as consciousness.
consciousness
to
caught up m
I t i s t h e e x o t e r i c aspects o f
s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , t h a t
say, t h e n a t u r a l o r o r d i n a r y consciousness
Kegel says t h a t m
spirit:
t h e n a t u r a l consciousness
o f the t i m e .
is
How
( m contrast to self-
conscious s p i r i t ) ' t h e w e a l t h o f p r e c e d i n g b e i n g i s s t i l l
present
21
as r e c o l l e c t i o n ' .
the
of
new
form o f p h i l o s o p h y the ' e x t e n s i o n and
particularisation
c o n t e n t ' and most o f a l l the s y s t e m a t i s a t i o n o f such a c o n t e n t ,
(ib.)
What i t
world.
So,
of
A c c o r d i n g l y , Hegel suggests, : t misses i n
misses,
above a l l , i s a form o r s t r u c t u r e t o i t s
from t h i s p o i n t o f view, one o f the p r i n c i p a l aims
t h e Phenomenology i s t o g i v e a s t r u c t u r e t o the w o r l d o f the
19- I b i d .
20. There would appear t o be l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e m t h e uses t h a t
Hegel makes o f the terms Consciousness, t h e n a t u r a l c o n s c i o u s ness and t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness.
I f t h e r e i s any d i f f e r e n c e
at a l l i t would be t h a t Consciousness has a s l i g h t l y more cecnn i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l meaning t h a n t h e o t h e r two b e i n g e x c l u s i v e l y
c o n f i n e d t o the stages o f mind o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y , p e r c e p t i o n
and U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
Here, however,Hegel uses the term m a
manner which would make i t synonymous w i t h the o t h e r two so t h a t
even t h a t t e c h n i c a l meaning h a s , i t a p p e a r s , t o be understood m
the l o o s e sense.
21.
154.
n a t u r a l consciousness.
ness a p a t h t o t h e f u l l
I n i t Hegel i n t e n d s t o g i v e c o n s c i o u r e a l i t y o f t h e new w o r l d I n mind.
What he has t o say o f t h e ' r e a l i t y o f t h i s s i m p l e whole'

a l s o means t h a t p h i l o s o p h y must'develop anew' f o r c o n s c i o u s ness t h e 'numerous forms o f past c u l t u r e ' which have'become
moments' i n t h e e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e .
What i s more, i t means
t h a t t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s o f past forms m p r e s e n t
c u l t u r e i s t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness.
I t
i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel's meaning i s l e s s t h a n c l e a r :

because t h e f u l l
r e a l i t y o f s p i r i t t h a t t h e Phenomenology us
supposed t o a t t a i n a p p l i e s t o b o t h s e l f - c o n s c i o u s
spirit
and s p i r i t as consciousness.
There i s one p o s s i b l e c o n f u s i o n w h i c h vte must be
to avoid.
We
careful
r e c a l l t h a t , a t the end o f h i s H i s t o r y o f
P h i l o s o p h y Hegel spoke o f s p i r i t d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g i t s e l f
f i n i t e s p i r i t and A b s o l u t e s p i r i t .
We
into
also r e c a l l t h a t the
p r i n c i p l e o f t h e f i n i t e s p i r i t was t o know and t h e p r i n c i p l e

of
the Absolute s p i r i t
t h a t i t be known as I d e a .
I t seems
t h e n t h a t what f i n i t e s p i r i t has t o a c h i e v e i s p a r a l l e l
with
what t h e n a t u r a l consciousness o f t h e Phenomenology has t o

a c h i e v e : s c i e n c e o r s y s t e m a t i c knowledge.
ence between t h e two, however.
There i s a d i f f e r -
The d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t
finite
s p i r i t i s a b l e t o know the A b s o l u t e whereas t h e n a t u r a l
consc-
iousness has t o be l e d t o t h a t g o a l .
finite
As we have seen,
s p i r i t does n o t have t o be l e d t o t h a t g o a l because i t
is
a l r e a d y t h e r e and t h e r e f o r e i n a p o s i t i o n t o 'grasp the s p i r i t

of
the time'.
that
the
I t i s , as we know capable o f knowing t h e s p i m
'dwells i n us a l l ' whereas the n a t u r a l consciousness miss

s y s t e m a t i s a t i o a t h a t such knowledge would p r o v i d e .
155short, f i n i t e s p i r i t i s already self-conscious.

I t is selfconscious
s p i r i t o r , q u i t e s i m p l y , t h e consciousness of a
philosopher.
I t i s t h e r e f o r e a t one w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f
i t s time.
I t i s t h i s that defines self-conscious s p i r i t
f o r us.
What s p i r i t as consciousness o r n a t u r a l c o n s c i o u s ness J.s, f o l l o w s from t h i s .
I t i s s p i r i t which i s n o t a t
one w i t h the r e a l i t y o f i t s t i m e .
I n the n a t u r a l consciousness t h e r e as s t i l l a b i f u r c a t i o n (Entzweiung) between i t s e l f
and the w o r l d .
I t i s not s e l f - c o n s c i o u s so t h a t the 'wealth
of p r e c e d i n g b e i n g ' i s o n l y p r e s e n t i n i t as r e c o l l e c t i o n .
Tn o t h e r words, what Hegel c a l l s 'the s p i r i t t h a t d w e l l s m
us a l l ' i s o n l y p r e s e n t m i t u n s e l f - e o n s c i o u s l y .
T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t c o n c l u s i o n because the t a s k t h a t
Hegel s e t s h i m s e l f m
the Phenomenology of Mind i s t o b r i n g
t h i s s p i r i t t o consciousness i n the n a t u r a l o r ordina.ry

consciousness.
At t h e same time he hopes t o prove t o s e l f -
conscious
or p h i l o s o p h y t h a t such i s the f u l l
spirit
reality
2
of
i t s simple concept.
As we have seen, he h i m s e l f appears
n o t t o d i s t i n g u i s h h i s account o f the p a t h o f the n a t u r a l

consciousness t o science from the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o o f o f t h e
c o r r e c t n e s s o f h i s p o s i t i o n and,
t h e r e f o r e , cannot h o l d t h a t
t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness i s a l l t h a t f a r
removed from p h i l o s o p h y .
Now
it
can be seen what was
meant
when I argued e a r l i e r t h a t the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t

per se the c o n t e n t o f the H e g e l i a n n a t u r a l consciousness but
i t s c o n t e n t as something dead and p a s t .
The
c o n t e n t o f the
n a t u r a l consciousness t h a t Kegel analyses
i n t h e Phenomenology
i s indeed past p h i l o s o p h y but past p h i l o s o p h y i n i t s
present
significance.
I t i s past p h i l o s o p h y as i t i s t o be found m
22.Hegel sees h i s way o f s e t t i n g about: the business o f p h i l o s o p h
m the Phenomeno]ogv as b e i n g t h e most c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f o f t n
e r r o r s o f S c h e l l i r i g ' s o r a c u l a r , m t u i t i o n i s t approach. See b
p.20 and above, Chapter 3, f o o t n o t e 115.
156.
the
contemporary mind.
way
t o science.
osophies
And t h a t contemporary mind I s on i t s
I t goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h e n t h a t past
a r e n o t unearthed
phil-
t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y but
as t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e development o f A b s o l u t e knowledge
in
t h e n a t u r a l consciousness,
element':
I t i s t h i s t h a t i s t h e i r 'new
t h e element o f t h e A b s o l u t e .
As we Know, Hegel
b e l i e v e s t h a t p h i l o s o p h y had reached t h i s stage w i t h t h e

philosophy o f S c h e l l m g .
So what he t h i n k s o f h i m s e l f as
doing i s g i v i n g Schelling's p r i n c i p l e i t s ' f u l l

In
reality'.
t h e Phenomenology p h i l o s o p h y reaches i t s g o a l a t t n e same
time t h a t t h e n a t u r a l consciousness reaches i t s g o a l . "

So t h e Phenomenology o f Mind p r e s e n t s what Hegel c a l l s
the
becoming o f science i n g e n e r a l o r o f knowledge .
Its
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , he suggests, i s t h i n k i n g i n i+~s irninediacy o r

simply self-consciousness,
I n o r d e r t h a t t h i s uneducated,
n a i v e t h i n k i n g become s c i e n c e , a l o n g p a t h has t o be t r a v e r s e d .
In
23.
24.
h i s own a d v e r t i s e m e n t
t o t h e book (which appeared m
Hegel ends t h e Phenomenology on t h i s n o t e : ( a m i s q u o t a t i o n

from a poem o f S c h i l l e r j n u r - ' a u s dem Kelche d i e s e s G e i s t e r r e i c h e s ( o n l y o u t o f t h e cup'of t h i s realm o f s p i r i t foams
f o r t h t o i t i t s i n f i n i t y ) schaumt lhm seine U n e n d l i c h k e i t ' .
P o e t r y a s i d e , t h e f o r c e o f what Hegel has t o say here i s
t h a t t h e A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y o f S p i r i t i s o n l y t o be achieved
t h r o u g h d e p i c t i n g t h e 'realm o f s p i r i t s ' m i t s f u l l r e a l i t y
The p o i n t , as I have i n d i c a t e d , i s b e i n g made a g a i n s t
Schelling.
S c h e l l m g , i n Kegel's view, merely d e c l a r e s t h e
Absolute or I n f i n i t y t o e x i s t .
The p o i n t i s thougn, Hegel
c l a i m s , t o prove m an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e 'realm o f s p i r i t s '
t h a t i t does e x i s t .
Hegel. V/erke 3, p. 33.
157-
l i t e r a r y j o u r n a l :n Jena October 1807)

process
the
m t h i s way.
( t h e Phenomenology - H.W.) composes
v a r i o u s snapes ( G e s t a l t e n ) o f irund as s t a t i o n s on the
t h r o u g n whicn i t
so t h a t
the
'it
Hegel d e s c r i b e s t h e
becomes pure knowledge o r A b s o l u t e
way
Spirit,'
'what a t f i r s t glance p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as a chaos -
w e a l t h o f the appearance o f s p i r i t
s c i e n t i f i c order.
- i s brought i n t o a
T h i s p r e s e n t s them a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r
n e c e s s i t y i n which the i m p e r f e c t d i s s o l v e themselves and
pass
i n t o h i g h e r appearances of s p i r i t which c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r n e x t
truth.
The
final
t r u t h they f i n d f i r s t
of a l l m r e l i g i o n
25
and t h e n m science as the r e s u l t o f t h e whole'.
There-
f o r e what t h e p h i l o s o p n e r does i n t r a v e r s i n g the v a r i o u s

modes o f consciousness l e a d i n g t o science i s n o t s i m p l y t o
d e s c r i b e what i s ready a t hand i n h i s s o c i e t y .
the
n a t u r a l consciousness i n i t s n a t u r a l n e s s t h a t concerns
Hegel f o r what l i e s ready a t hand i s a chaos.

have are t h e mere appearances o f s p i r i t .
the
I t i s net
A13
that
we
I t i s the task of
p h i l o s o p h e r t o b r i n g o r d e r t o those appearances.
He
has
t o b r i n g out t h e i r necessary r e l a t L o n , o r the superceded

osophies
t h a t are p r e s e n t m
those appearances.
T h i s i s tfhy
Hegel's u n d e r t a k i n g i s a phenomenology c f s p i r i t .
o n l y a phenomenology o f s p i r i t
phil-
I t is
that in his opinion w i l l
show
t h a t t h e r e are necessary c o n n e c t i o n s among the contemporary

spheres o f mind.
H i s s u g g e s t i o n i s even more r a d i c a l
than
t h i s , however; a c c o r d i n g t o him those spheres o r appearances

of
spirit
d i s s o l v e one
i n t o the other u n t i l
a b s o l u t e knowledge i s brought
25.
about.
I b i d . , p. 593 under E d i t o r ' s Notes.
their
progress
]58.
Past p h i l o s o p h i e s , then, e n t e r i n t o the make-up c f the

Phenomenology o f Mind i n two ways.
i n the contemporary appearance
F i r s t l y , they are p r e s e n t
o f Mind t h a t Hegel
as a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view o f i n d i v i d u a l s .
l i v i n g v i e w p o i n t s and, m
examines
They s u r v i v e as
t h e case o f some, as l i v i n g
For example, t h e Unhappy Consciousness
ideologies.
i s n o t o n l y an unconscious
element m contemporary ' s p i r i t ' taut a l s o a conscious elementi n , say, a s t r o n g l y r e l i g i o u s person.

ophies would appear t o be p r e s e n t m
Secondly, past p h i l o s contemporary c u l t u r e as
superceded forms o f c u l t u r a l shapes o r G e s t a l t e n , as Hegel

c a l l s them, which have c o n t r i b u t e d t o and are superceded
elements m t h e e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e .
F o r example, t h e s t o i c a l
frame o f mind i s u n l i k e l y t o have dominated t h e consciousness

of
any one i n d i v i d u a l m Hegel's t i m e b u t i t
i s s t i l l a stage
i n t h e development o f t h e consciousness o f t h e s p e c i e s and

t h e r e f o r e , Hegel c l a i m s , p r e s e n t m
it.
T h i s as a n o t h e r
reason why t h e r e can be two i n d i v i d u a l approaches t o t h e

of
There can be e i t h e r t n e approach
the uneducated person o f h i s t i m e - t h i s i s o f course
s p i r i t as consciousness o r t h e n a t u r a l consciousness - o r
the approach o f t h e ' u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l ' who has t o r e g a r d
'self-conscious s p i r i t
i n i t s f o r m a t i o n and e d u c a t i o n (Bildung)'."~
T h i s , o f course, i s the approach o f s p i r i t as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s

or
t h e approach o f the p h i l o s o p h e r .
Tt i s o n l y he t h a t i s
a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e v a r i o u s elements o f t h e e x i s t i n g
_
26.
I b i d . , p. 31.
culture
159-
i n t h e i r necessary c o n n e c t i o n .
The n a t u r a l consciousness
b e i n g caught up j n what Hege] c a l l s t h e 'organism o f our

Substance' must approach t h e Phenomenology from t h e p o i n t
o f view o f one o f t h e modes o f consciousness which i t
possesses.
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two approaches makes t h e

s t r u c t u r e o f t h e Phenomenology most complex.
Hegel h i m s e l f
devotes a l o n g s e c t i o n o f t h e Preface t o e x p l a i n i n g and

orating i t .
The p a r t i c u l a r , uneducated i n d i v i d u a l
he argues, 'incomplete s p i r i t ' a c o n c r e t e
elab-
is,
configuration,
27
whose whole b e i n g one d e t e r m i n a t i o n governs'.
The
in
other
appearances o f mind, he c l a i m s , e x i s t i n i t o n l y as obscured

traces.
The p r e v a l e n c e o f a h i g h e r uode o f
consciousness
HI t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l expunges t h e l o w e r modes.
The l a t t e r becomes a moment o n l y i n the new p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t
o f view.
Vie might u n d e r s t a n d b e t t e r what Hegel has t o say
here i f we c o n s i d e r two such p a r t i c u l a r modes o f consciousness:

P r o t e s t a n t i s m and C a t n o l i c i s m .
Protestantism originated m
Now
t h e r e i s nc doubt t h a t
C a t h o l i c i s m ; but m
a particular
consciousness t h a t i s P r o t e s t a n t t h e element o f C a t h o l i c i s m
i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r consciousness, Hegel would argue, has
disappeared.
Protestant m
The p a r t i c u l a r consciousness t h i n k s i t
so f a r as i t
i s not C a t h o l i c .
is
Tn o t h e r words,
t h e P r o t e s t a n t l i k e s t o stand above t h e l e v e l o f t h i n k i n g
i s t h e o r i g i n o f h i s own o u t l o o k .
view and contemptuous
generalises t h i s
He i s v a i n about his own
about t h e C a t h o l i c view.
t o say t h a t He,
I o i d . , p. 32.
Now
Hegel
the p a r t i c u l a r or m d i v i d u a l
consciousness, l i k e s t o stand above h i s own

27.
that
intellectual
160.
historv.
He l i k e s t o t h i n k o f i t as something l e f t b e h i n d .
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l approaches t h e
v a r i o u s modes o f consciousness w i t h o u t t h i s v a n i t y .
every stage as necessary so t h a t each m
the
same v a l u e as t h e o t h e r .
For i t ,
i t s mind
I t sees
possesses
each mode o f c o n s c i o u s -
28
ness i s
' i t s e l f an i n d i v i d u a l whole c o n f i g u r a t i o n ' .
we have seen, i t s t a s k i s t o b r i n g t o mind eacn

mode o f consciousness - each one m
As
particular
i t s p l a c e - and, as Hegel
p u t s i t h e r e , survey t h e whole as i t s element.
This i s not
t o say t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r consciousness does

not
participate
precede i t .
a l l t h e shapes o f consciousness t h a t
They are a l r e a d y p a r t o f i t s consciousness
"because t h i s past e x i s t e n c e i s p r o p e r t y t h a t has a l r e a d y

been a c q u i r e d by t h e 1 m v e r s a l s p i r i t
Substance o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' . ^
t h a t makes up t h e
T h e r e f o r e as one p a r t i c u l a r
consciousness, say f o r i n s t a n c e t h a t o f M o r a l i t y ,
the individual
w i l l not o n l y p a r t i c i p a t e m t h e w o r l d o f e t h i c a l
thinking
and t h e forms o f e t h i c a l consciousness t h a t have i m m e d i a t e l y

preceded i t b u t a l s o , t h r o u g h t h e g e n e r a l c u l t u r e
of his
epoch, he w i l l be p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e g e n e r a l process o f
S p i r i t t h a t Hegel d e p i c t s i n t h e Phenomenology'of Mind.
This
does n o t however amount t o t h e same l e v e l o f i n v o l v e m e n t as

t h a t o f t h e u n i v e r s a l o r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s mind.
g e n e r a l process o n l y
'appears e x t e r n a l l y '
Since t h e
t o the i n d i v i d u a l
as t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e g e n e r a l consciousness c f t h e t i m e .
So i t merely fon^f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l
28.
29.
I b i d . , p. 33.
I b i d . , p. 32.
backdrop c f h i s e x i s t e n c e
161.
or,
Hegel suggests, h j s ' i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e ' .
I n Hegel's
view, t h e n , we may d e p i c t t h e two approaches t o t h e Phenomenology

an t h i s way: ' i t c o n s i s t s , seen from the s i d e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,
i n t h i s , t h a t i t a c q u i r e s what i s a t hand, draws i n t o
i t s o r g a n i c n a t u r e and t a k e s possession
of i t f o r himself.
T h i s from t h e s i d e o f t h e u n i v e r s a l s p i r i t
ether than i t give
bring
the
itself
consists m nothing
t h i s i t s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s and
"51
o u t i n i t s e l f i t s becoming and r e f l e c t i o n .
What
i n d i v i d u a l o r n a t u r a l consciousness has t o do t h e r e f o r e
i s t o r e a p p r o p r i a t e i t s own i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e .
t o be c o r r e c t here when he suggests
the
itself
B a i l l i e seems
i n his rendering of
phrase t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l has t o make h i s
inorganic nature organic t o h i m s e l f . ^
This i s c e r t a i n l y
what Hegel i m p l i e s : t h a t t h e n a t u r a l consciousness become

t h o r o u g h l y a c q u a i n t e d w i t h a l l t h a t i t has t a k e n t o make up
i t s own consciousness and so make t h e g e n e r a l consciousness
of
t h e t i m e h i s own.
Hegel adds t h a t t h i s process from t h e
p o i n t o f view o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l i s s i m p l y t h e process
of
i t s coming t o i t s e l f .
I t becomes e x p l i c i t l y wnat
i m p l i c i t l y i s , t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f Suostance.
approach t o t h e Phenomenology can i t
to
This
i s c l e a r o n l y be open
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r who has a l r e a d y a t t a i n e d t h e l e v e l o f
'self-consciousness' o f s p i r i t .
it
it
Or, as Hegel suggests
here,
i s o n l y open t o those who know t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e i n o r g a n i c
nature o f the general s p i r i t
o f 1 he t i m e .
The c o n t e n t o f
t h a t i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e i s whai Hegel c a l l s t h e p r i o r 'laoour

30.
Ibid.
31.
I b i d . , P-33 32.
J . B . B a i l l t e . T r a n s l a t i o n o f The Phenomenology o f Mir-d
( A l i e n & Unwm) p. 90.
1
162.
o f w o r l d s p i r i t ' whose essence,as we know, i s t h e h i s t o r y

of philosophy.
I t f o l l o w s then t h a t t h i s approach can o n l y
be taken by t h e p h i l o s o p h e r who knows, as Hegel c l a i m s he

does, t h e outcome o f t h e H i s t o r y o f Philosophy.
I ti s
o n l y such a p h i l o s o p h e r who can p o s s i b l y p r e s e n t t h e Phenomeno l o g y o f Mind.
163.
UNDERSTANDING AND REASON, OR THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD
In
of
o r d e r t o e l a b o r a t e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Hegel's view
philosophy,
we s h a l l now t a k e a l o o k a t how he d e s c r i b e s
the process o f t n e Phenomenology.

a clue t o the understanding
This d e s c r i p t i o n gives
o f many o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t
concepts o f Hegel's system: 'science', he says,
'presents
not o n l y t h i s e d u c a t i o n a l process m i t s f u l l n e s s and necessity
b u t a l s o t n a t which m i t s f o r m a t i o n has a l r e a d y
i n t o a moment and p r o p e r t y o f mind.'"^
sunk
So what t h e n a t u r a l
consciousness undergoes i n i t s course c o n s t i t u t e s t h e educati o n a l process o f t h e Phenomenology.
And i s , as we can see,
the Phenomenology 'viewed from t h e s i d e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' .

It
i s t h e r e f o r e t h e s e r i e s o f changes t h a t leads t o t h e i n -
o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness becoming o r g a n i c
to
i t s e l f . - I t i s t h i s s e r i e s o f changes t h a t , Hegel suggests,
r e v i v e s i n b o t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l and p h i l o s o p h y
sunk i n t o a moment and p r o p e r t y o f mind.'
leads Hegel t o e x p l a i n how i t
b r i n g s about t h i s change.
'the w o r l d s p i r i t
these forms m
Saying t h i s n a t u r a l
i s that the educational
process
I n h i s view i t does so because
has a l r e a d y
'had t h e p a t i e n c e t o go t h r o u g h
t h e l o n g expanse o f t i m e ' and were t h e r e f o r e
d e p o s i t s m i t s present
t h i s suggestion
what 'has a l r e a d y
form.
o f Hegel.
We a r e by now f a m i l i a r w i t h
What more he has t o say, however,
b r i n g s us on t o l e s s f a m i l i a r t e r r i t o r y .
He t e l l s us t h a t ,
i n t h a t substance, t h e past p h i l o s o p h i e s a r e b u t a b b r e v i a t i o n s ;
33
H e g e l . Werke 3JP J53

Ioid.,
p, 34.
164
i n o t h e r words, t h a t those past p h i l o s o p h e r s as they a r e

found i n contemporary
possibilities'.'"'
c u l t u r e are ' r e a l i t i e s extinguished i n t o
For t h i s reason Hegel t h i n k s
t h o u g h t s which have no s u b s t a n t i a l
hold.
they a r e
They a r e t h o u g h t s
o f which me might say t h a t t h e y have had t h e i r day.
This
i s what Hegel means when he says t h a t t h e y a r e p r e s e n t as

' r e c o l l e c t i o n ' only.
The past forms o f consciousness
that
he i s a n a l y s i n g a r e n o t , he c l a i m s , p r e s e n t as 'being m
selves' ( e r m n e r t e Ansich).
importance
precisely
This point
because t h e process
then-
i s o f some c o n s i d e r a b l
o f t h e Phenomenology c o n s i s t s
i n i n v e r t i n g these remembered 'm themselves'
into
36
the
form o f ' f o r themselves'
l i g h t o f t h i s account
the
(Fursichsems).
t n a t we ought
I t i s m the
t o complete
r o l e o f the h i s t o r y o f philosophy ir
our p i c t u r e o f
t h e Phenomenolo gy o f
Mind.
I t appears now t h a t t h e PhenomenoIogy us n o t s i m p l y a
process
o f making past forms o f consciousness
contemporaneous
but o f making contemporaneous p a s t forms o f consciousness

The
Phenomenology i s t h e r e f o r e
ness b u t t h e consciousness
consciousness.
the
consciousness
So i t
known
n o t t h e h i s t o r y o f corse2 out-
o f t h e h i s t o r y o f consciousness
in
i s not the h i s t o r y o f philosophy but
o f the h i s t o r y o f philosophy m
the present
stage o f p h i l o s o p h y .
35-
Ibid.
J;6.
I b i d . 'Already something thought t h e c o n t e n t i s t h e proce

o f Substance; i t i s n o r l o n g e r ( r e q u i r e d J t o i n v e r t e x i s t
i n t o t h e form o f b e i n g m i t s e l f b u t o n l y t o i n v e r t t h a t
which i s n e i t h e r no l o n g e r merely o r i g i n a l n o r sunk m
e x i s t e n c e , r a t h e r a l r e a d y remetaooJ cd m 1 c s e l f i n t o t h e
form o f b e i n g f o r i t s e l f ' .
'
165-
We s h a l l now see how Hegel e x p l a i n s t h e process o f t h e

Phenomenology t o see whether i t
accords w i t h o u r view.
d i s t i n c t i o n ne f e e l s we mast make b e f o r e we can u n d e r s t a n d

t h i s process i s t h a t between what we might c a l l
i a r w i t h something' and knowing i t .
here t h e German i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e ) :
Since he argues (and

'Das Bekannte
i s t darum, w e i l es bekannt i s t , n i c h t e r k a n n t ' .

bekannt s e m can mean t o know m
German b u t m
being acquainted w i t n or being f a m i l i a r w i t h .

a Bekannte
i s an a c q u a i n t a n c e .
s h i n g genuine knowing
'being f a m i l -
uberhaupt
Now.
t h e sense o f
F o r example,
So when Hegel i s d i s t i n g u i -
(erkennen) from bekannt s e i n , as he i s
i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , he i s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g knowledge w i t h which
we a r e merely a c q u a i n t e d o r knowledge
which i s l e g a r d e d as
well-known f a c t w i t h knowledge we r e a l l y do know w e i l .

f o r c e o f Hegel's epigram i s t h e n t h a t
because i t
'the well-known
i s well-known i s n o t known'.
The
just
The adequacy o f
t h i s r e n d e r i n g however doeo depend on o u r remembering t h a t

well-known i s only i n t e n d e d m
w i t h o r being acquainted w i t h .
It
i s o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e
t h e sense o f b e m ^ f a m i l i a r
T h i s i s n o t a minor p o i n t .
t h a t we know p r e c i s e l y what Hegel's
epigram means because Hegel t h i n k s o f t h e process o f t h e

Phenomenology as t h e overcoming o f o u r B e k a n n t s c h a i t , o r
the well-known n a t u r e , o f t h e forms o f consciousness t h a t
make up t h e contemporary spectrum o f mind.
we as h a v i n g o n l y an o r d i n a r y
I n Hegel's
view,
consciousness o f o u r epoch show
a v a n i t y towards t h e forms o f consciousness t h a t are 'well-know
37-
I b i d . , p. _?5'
166.
but have been h i s t o r i c a l l y superceded.
An i n d i v i d u a l
particular
consciousness, such as we have, i s thus i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e

past forms t h a t make up i t s i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e so t h a t
'tnis
p r o p e r t y i t has a c q u i r e d s t i l l has t h e same c h a r a c t e r o f

u n c o n c e p t u a l i s e d ( u n b e g r i f f e n e r ) immediacy, unmoved i n d i f f e r e n c e . .
Therefore
t h e p a r t i c u l a r consciousness o f t h e day, Hegel
c l a i m s , sees t h e superceded forms as s i m p l y something

w i t h which i t i s f i n i s h e d
'wherein t h e r e f o r e i t s
and thus i t s i n t e r e s t no l o n g e r i s
activity
Hegel suggests t h a t
t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l , o r we might
say t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , i s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h i s
The
simply
indifference.
t a s k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r i s t o s u b v e r t o u r mere
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e superceded forms o f t h i n k i n g t h a t
make up t h e i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f o u r n a t u r a l consciousness.
As we have seen, these forms o f t h i n k i n g are merely remembered
i n themselves (An s i c h ) f o r us.
they are remembered m
More p r e c i s e l y , Hegel says,
t h e form o f V o r s t e ] l u n g e n .
The t r a n -
s l a t i o n o f t h i s H e g e l i a n term a l s o p r e s e n t s p e c u l i a r d i f f i c u l ties.
V o r s t e l l u n g - i s a compound word made up of t h e prep-
o s i t i o n von which means s i m p l y i n f r o n t o f o r b e f o r e , and t n e

noun S t e l l u n g which means p o s i t i o n o r placement.
Hegel w i l l
n o t have been i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e l i t e r a l meaning o f V o r s t e l l u n g

when employing i t
so t h a t m
t h a t he i n t e n d s an admixture
i t s use o f i t we would
of i t s abstract connotation -
i d e a o r c o n c e p t i o n and t h i s i t s l i t e r a l
m
front of.
expect
connotation - p o s i t i o n
V o r s t e l l u n g , we see, Hegel employs t o d e s c r i b e
t h e ideas t h a t t h e n a t u r a l consciousness has o f i t s i n o r g a n i c
38.
I b i d . , pp. J>k- 33-
39.
I b i d , , p. 35.
167.
n a t u r e o r i t s Substance.
The
s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t such an
i d e a takes en the form of u n c o n c e p t u a l i s e d immediacy.

seems t o r e l y h e a v i l y
on the l i t e r a l meaning o f V o r s t e l l u n g .
For Hegel appears t o be
c l a i m i n g t h a t Vo r s t e l l u n g e n are
of something chat i s p o s i t i o n e d
and
are
This
b e f o r e me
f o r t h a t reason i m p r e c i s e i d e a s .
i d e a s t h a t t a k e on t h e i r form e x t e r n a l
ideas
( i . e . immediate t o
They are, he
t o my
claims,
thinking.
We
I t h i n k , understand t h i s c r i t i c i s m of Vorstellungen m
In
the f i r s t p l a c e i t
that consists
Bifurcated
seems t n a t Hegel a s s o c i a t e s the
t h i n k i n g , as we
unable t o r e s t o r e
P h i l o s o p h y , we
harmony and
a l s o saw
is therefore
bifurcated.
can,
two
ways.
thinking
merely o f such i d e a s w i t h b i f u r c a t i o n ( E n t z w e i u n g ) .
saw
e a r l i e r , Kegel h o l d s t o
t h i n k i n g t h a t i s always bound up w i t h o t h e r n e s s and

therefore
me)
One
the s h a t t e r e d
Hegel c l a i m ,
directed
be
that
Harmony o f
is
existence.
aims a t r e s t o r i n g
that
against t h i n k i n g that i s
aspect t n e n o f the c r i t i c i s m of V o r s t e l l u n g e n
i s that bifurcated
t h i n k i n g expresses i t s e l f i n that form.
V o r s t e l l e n i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h a t mode o f t h i n k i n g because
it
i s t h i n k i n g t h a t assumes t h a t i t s i d e a s always r e f l e c t
object
external
to i t s e l f .
The
c r i t i c i s m , as I have
has
a n o t h e r and
are
ideas t n a t the n a t u r a l consciousness has
nature.
As we
more s i g n i f i c a n t aspect.
know, t h a t i n o r g a n i c
o f c u l t u r e t h a t are
are
inorganic
an
indicated,
Here the V o r s t e l l u n g e n
of i t s
inorganic
n a t u r e i s the past forms
superceded i n the e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e .
They
t o the n a t u r a l consciousness because t h e y o n l y
become p a r t o f i t s consciousness t h r o u g h the g e n e r a l i d e o l o g y

of the t i m e .
The
natural
consciousness simpl;, r e c e i v e s ideas
o f those past forn.^ as p a r t and
parcel
of l i v i n g m
tnat
age.
168.
So m t h a t sense a l s o they a r e ideas which a r e e x t e r n a ] t o

their thinker.
in
Hegel's c r i t i c i s m o f V o r s t e l l u n g e n i s t h e n ,
t h e second p l a c e , t h a t they r e f l e c t t o o r e a d i l y t h e preconcep-
t i o n s o f t h e age.
They t e n d - m t h i s sense-to be i d e o l o g i c a l .
T h i s does n o t mean t h a t V o r s t e l l u n g e n are merely p r e j u d i c e s .

Hegel i n s i s t s t h a t they a r e i d e a s t h a t take on an o b j e c t i v e form f o r t h e i r t h i n k e r .
I f we were t o employ a term which
is
p r o b a b l y n e a r e s t t o t h e o r i g i n a l , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , we might say
t h a t V o r s t e l l u n g e n a r e t h e ideas m w m c h t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s ness r e p r e s e n t s t h e w o r l d t o i t s e l f .
I t i s t h e w o r l d as i t
40
t r u ] y imagines
i t t o be.
40. Malcolm C l a r k e m h i s Logic and System ( N i j h o f f , The Hague,

1971) d e a l s a t l e n g t h w i t h He g e l ' s n o t i o n Vo rsjte IJjing He
i s concerned (as t h e s u b - t i t l e t o t h e worn: i n d i c a t e s ) wicii
'the Study o f t h e T r a n s i t i o n f r o m " V o r s t e l ung''to Thougnt m
the P h i l o s o p h y o f Hegel .
Many o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s I have
drawn a r e s i m i l a r t o h i s e.g.
l ) ' l n t r a n s l a t i n g t h e term V o r s t e l ] u n g we must, he says, n o t
f a i l t o convey t h e l i t e r a l sense o f t h e German (''secting
b e f o r e " ) ' o p . c i t . , p.27.
l i ) 'The stage o f V o r s t e J l u n g i s t h e r e f o r e t h e f i r s i a t winch
one may speak o f o b j e c t i v i t y . . . V o r s t e l l r r g i s t h u s d e s c r i b e d
as n e i t h e r a merely i n n e r image ( B i l d ) n o r a merely o u t e r
e x i s t e n c e ( D a s e i n ) , b u t a s y n t h e s i s o f t h e two which i s
t h e r e b y s e t b e f o r e t h e o b j e c t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f che i n t e l l ect . . V o r s t e l l u n g must be seen b o t h as t h o u g h t and t h e ''other"
of t h o u g h t . ' i b i d . , p. 28.
111) ' V o r s t e l l u n g i s a ''gememsames Memen" (common meaning-II.W. ) .
I t i s t h e way i n which t r u t h may be o f f e r e d t o a l l men.
Hence t h e t r a n s i t i o n from V o r s t e l l o n g t o t h o u g h t i s from
s u b j e c t i v e t o o b j e c t i v e and from a mass t o a p e r s o n a l e x i s t ence .' i b i d . , p. 32.
I V ) T h a t i s , when we speak o f V o r s t e l l u n g , we a r e r e f e r r i n g t o
t h a t e f f o r t o f t h o u g h t t o r i s e from e x p r e s s i o n o f i t s e l f ,
which i s t h e u n i t i n g o f an a b s t r a c t s i g n i f i c a t i o n (merely
i n n e r "image'') and an e x p e r i e n c e (Dasein) which i s deepened
( e r m n e r t ) as t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n seeko i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n m
it.
But t h e u n i o n remains a "Synthese", a p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r
from w i t h o u t .
The s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s n o t f u l l v v e r i f i e d m
the e x p e r i e n c e , i t remains a b s t r a c t l y o u t s i d e . ' i b i d . , p.60.
1
169.
The process o f t h e Phenomeno]ogy as Hegel d e s c r i b e s i t ,

i s aimed a t overcoming these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t are found
i n the n a t u r a l consciousness.
As I have a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d ,
t h e o b j e c t i s t o t r a n s f o r m them from b e i n g remembered

themselves
(An s i c h ) i n t o ideas t h a t are known f o r themselves
( i n t o t h e form o f F u r s i c h s e m s ) .
i s shown how
t h a t i t may
The n a t u r a l
consciousness
t o r e - a p p r o p r i a t e those e x t e r n a l i d e a s i n o r d e r
be a t home w i t h them.
The Phenomenology has,
t h e n , n o t o n l y t o b r i n g t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness out o f
i t s n a t u r a l n e s s b u t a l s o t o overcome i t s b i f u r c a t i o n .
first
The
stage o f t h i s process i s t h e a n a l y s i s o f V o r s t e l l u n g e n .
As might be guessed, what Hegel means by a n a l y s i s in t h i s

c o n t e x t i s complex.
I n h i s view t h i s a c t i v i t y i s the
t i n g u i s h i n g mark o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
I t involves
dis-
'brâk:ng
down a c o n c e p t i o n i n t o i t s o r i g i n a l elements' and t h e r e b y

' r e v o k i n g t h e form o f i t s b e i n g f a m i l i a r o r well-known
1
Bekanntseins) . ^
(jnres
Hegel acknowledges t h a t the ^6.eas t h a t
we have as a r e s u l t o f t h e a n a l y s i s are 'indeed'

' f i x e d ' and t h e r e f o r e n o t w h o l l y a p p r o p r i a t e ro
themselves
overcoming
the n a t u r a l consciousness' f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e V e r s t e t l u n g
but they do have the advantage
of b r i n g i n g uneertamity t o
t h e f i x e d w o r l d o f t h a t consciousness.
Through
separating
and s i f t i n g out the i d e a s o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness t n e

a c t i v i t y o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g makes i t s w o r l d u n r e a l .
In
Hegel's view t h i s power o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s "che 'most

amazing and g r e a t e s t o f powers C P r a t h e r the a b s o l u t e power .
Ve are a l r e a d y aware c f t h e r e s p e c t t h a t Hegel has f o r t h e
Hi.
Hegel. Werke ~), p.
h2.
I b i d . , p. 36.
^.
170.
Understanding.
As we know, he regards .it as t h e p a r t i c u l a r
d i s c o v e r y o f Kant.
H i s r e s p e c t , I t h i n k , i s f o r i t s power
t o r e g a r d t h e w o r l d e m p i r j c a l l y and t h e r e f o r e as
e x t e r n a l and opposed t o t h e mind.
p a r t i c u l a r l y has m
something
The d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Hegel
mind i s t h e one t h a t Kant makes between
phenomena and ncumena ( t h e An s i c h ) .
So t h a t i n t h e Under-
s t a n d i n g r e a l i t y i s not f i n i s h e d and done w i t h as i t

Hegel b e l i e v e s , m
is.
a s e l f - e n c l o s e d system o f p h i l o s o p h y saeh
as t h a t o f Spinoza.
I t i s n o t , he reasons, subsumed under
an a b s t r a c t schema.
Rather t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g 'looks t h e
4 "3
negative m
it
the face, stays w i t h i t . '
I n Hegel's view
.LS t h e power o f w o r k i n g w i t h the data o f e x p e r i e n c e
its full
c o m p l e x i t y and r i c h n e s s , t h e r e f o r e c f opposing
t h i n k i n g t o an ex.ternal r e a l i t y and m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t
It
i s t h i s t h a t Hegel means m
our
division.
c l a i m i n g here t h a t t h e Under-
s t a n d i n g s t a y s w i t h t h e n e g a t i v e ( b e i ihm v e r w e i l t ) ,
Hegel t h e n e g a t i v e i s e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y .
And
it
ute power' o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g which d i v i d e s m
EDJL:
i s the
this
'absol-
way.
There i s however, a n o t h e r aspect t o the U n d e r s t a n d i n g as

Hegel p r e s e n t s i t here m
the Phenomenology.
We are a g a i n
c o n v e r s a n t w i t h t h i s view o f Hegel's from our r e v i e w o f h i s

C r i t i q u e o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
Understanding
T h i s aspect i s t h a t t h e
'only g a m s i t o t r u t h i n t h a t i t
finds
itself
44
m
that absolute d i v i s i o n
r e c a l l , i t was Kant who,

was
that i t
itself
posits.
making t h e assumption t h a t e x p e r i e n c e
splxt i n t o a p r i o r i ideas and
impressions of a world
d^3>.
e r i v e dI b ai d n. o t i o n o f the U n d e r s t a n d i n g as the u n i f y i n g
44.
Ibid.
I f we
'witheu
activity
171.
of
t h e s u b j e c t o r , what Hegel and F i c h t e s i m p l y c a l l . ,
The
i m p o r t o f t h a t d e r i v a t i o n i n Hegel's view, we may a g a i n
remember, was t h a t t h e w o r l d
tive.
it
the I .
' w i t h o u t ' was shown t o be s u b j e c -
He has t h e same here t o say o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
finds i t s e l f m
c l u d e d , proved
that absolute d i v i s i o n ' .
'that
Kant, Hegel con-
t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e world that t h e Understanding
d e s c r i b e s w i t h t h e C a t e g o r i e s i s a w o r l d t h a t i s o r g a n i s e d by
the
I i t s e l f , o r t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n as Kant h i m s e l f c a l l s
it.'
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel here assumes t h a t t h e o u t -
come o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
is that
'das V o r g e s t e l l t e
Eigentum des r e i n e n Seibstbewusstsems w i r d ' , t n a t t h e r e c e i v e d

and a p p a r e n t l y e x t e r n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f che o r d i n a r y c o n s c i c u s ness becomes t h e p r o p e r t y o f a pure
T h i s though
sejf-consciousness.
i s n o t t h e end o f t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology.
N e i t h e r would we expect so from what we have l e a r n t from o u r

d i s c u s s i o n o f Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f Modern Philosophy
Hegel regards t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
ophy, he does n o t r e g a r d i t
The
as v i t a l l y
For a l t n o j g h
significant f o r philos-
as t h e h i g h e s t form o f t h i n k i n g .
t a s k Hegel s e t s h i m s e l f m
t h e Phenomenology o f Mind i s t o
a t t a i n t h e l e v e l o f science f o r p h i l o s o p h y .
That g o a l cannot
be a t t a i n e d s i m p l y t h r o u g h t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s r e v o c a t i o n o f
the
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l ideas o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness.
Understanding
has t o be superceded by Reason.
i l l u m i n a t e t h i s stage i n t h e process
Hegel seeks t o
o f t h e Phenorneno 1 cgy by
c o n t r a s t i n g t h e form o f ( p h i l o s o p h n c a l ) study m
t h a t p r a c t i c e d i n A n c i e n t Greece.
modern tj.rnes w i t h
I n a n c i e n t t i m e s , Hegel sugg-
e s t s t h e problem was co educate t h o r o u g h l y t h e n a t u r a l

ness.
45.
I n o r d e r t h a t t h i s might be achieved
Ibid.
Patner
conscious-
t h e n a t u r a l con&ciojc.
172.
ness was encouraged t o r e f l e c t on i t s own a c t i v i t i e s and indeed

a l l e l s e t h a t might crop up m
its life.
(Hegel appears t o
have t n e S o c r a t i c method v e r y much i n m n d h e r e . )

handj Hegel t h i n k s t h a t m
On t h e o t n e r
modern times t h e ' i n d i v i d u a l
the a b s t r a c t form a l r e a d y prepared'.

t o make i t h i s own, t o understand
finds
The i n d i v i d u a l ' s
it,
effort
i s t h e r e f o r e n o t an e f f o r t
t o r a i s e h i m s e l f from t h e c o n c r e t e and m a n i f o l d t o t h e a b s t r a c t
but make known what i s a l r e a d y i n t e r n a l t o h i m s e l f , i n o t n e r
words, t o make h i s a b s t r a c t ideas c o n c r e t e .
What has happened
w i t h t h e g e n e r a l development o f c u l t u r e i n Hegel's view i s
that
the o r d i n a r y consciousness o f t h e t i m e i s n o t so much sunk i n

i t s own p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e as unaware o f uhe e x i s t e n c e o f t h e
g e n e r a l l e v e l o f consciousness i n i t s e l f .
'Therefore t h e worK
we have t o do now is not so much t o p u r i f y t h e i n d i v i d u a l from t h e

immediate sensuous manner and t o make him i n t o t h o u g h t and t h i n k i n g Substance as much more t h e o p p o s i t e : t h r o u g h overcoming
fixed,
determinate
universal,
t h o u g h t s we have t o g i v e r e a l i t y t o the
, 2(.v
,
infuse i t with s p i r i t .
o r d i n a r y consciousness m
'
I n Hegel s o p i n i o n t h e
t h e Modern w o r l d a l r e a d y has a s o p h i s -
t i c a t e d view o f t h e w o r l d .
that contains w i t h i n i t s e l f ,
I t i s , as we have seen, a consciuusnes

as i t s i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e , a l l
previous
forms o f c u l t u r e .
We have a l s o seen Hegel suggest t h a t
past forms e x i s t m
t h a t consciousness as remembered i n themselves
Wnat he has t o suggest here i s t h a t i t

understanding
analyse
t o be rendered
^6.
Ibid.,
4?.
Ibid.
these
i s not s u f f i c i e n t that the
r e c e i v e d forms b u t t h a t t h e y have a l s o
f l u i d or infused with s p i r i t .
p. J7
these
T h i s i s t n e r o l e or
175.
Peason.
The
a t t a i n m e n t o f i t s g o a l i s , however, a f a r more
d i f f i c u l t t a s k than what Hegel c a l l s e d u c a t i o n from sensuous

immediacy because the a c t i v i t y o f the U n d e r s t a n d i n g
t o be superceded;and i t i s m
Understanding,
itself
has
t h i s , the t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y o f the
t h a t t h e I has i t s c e r t a i n t y .
T h i s i s an o b s t a c l e
t o Reason because the T has a v a n i t y towards the p a r t i c u l a r conceptions that i t holds.
I n Hegel's view, the n a t u r a l
conscious-
ness o f t h e modern epoch w i l l have no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e e d u c a t i o n a l 1

process o f t h e Phenomenology m
the
so f a r as i t merely p o i n t s out
c o n t e n t o f i t s e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h r e v i v i n g and a n a l y s i n g t h e
past forms t h a t p r o v i d e i t s background.

s h o r t a t t h e p o i n t where i t s own
where the contemporary
However i t w i l l
f i x e d thougnts are
stop
abrogated,
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f i t s i d e a s are not o n l y
q u e s t i o n e d but a l s o d e n i e d , because i t
a g a i n p o i n t s out, t h a t i t
is m
those ideas,Hegel
finds i t s c e r t a i n t y .
Reason, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
has t o overcome t h i s dogmatism o f the U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
This
is
achieved, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, where t h i n k i n g a b s t r a c t s i t s e l f

from mere c e r t a i n t y .
What i s asked i s not t h a t
set
t o one s i d e 1cs S e l f m
the
whole s p i r i t
thinking.
o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p n y .
T h i s would
consciousness
be c o n t r a r y t o
(As we know, r e a l i t y
has t o have the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the I f o r H e g e l ) .
Rather what i s
asked i s t h a t the s u b j e c t 'give up the f i x i t y o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f

p o s i t i n g i t s e l f ' j u s t as much as i t ' g i v e s up the f i x i t y o f the
pure c o n c r e t e ' . ^
What Hegel i s demanding, and t h i s i t s e l f
is
p a r t o f t h e process o f the Phenomenology, i s t h a t t h e s u b j e c t ,

t o t r a n s e n d mere U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
of
^8.
g i v e up tne stance o r
the a b s o l u t e d i v i s i o n c f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
Ibid.
It
JS
assumption
this
174.
assumption o f a f i x e d s u b j e c t and a f i x e d w o r l d w h i c h , a l t h o u g h
essential m
The
stance
the process
o f knowing, Reason has t o t r a n s c e n d .
'which i s I i t s e l f m
opposition to a d i f f e r e n t
149
content
i s necessary
Hegel s view when we embark on
science
but i n the course o f science i t s e l f the stance i s shown t o be

inadequate.
I n Reason, t h e n , t h e n o t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l w o r l d
i s s e t a s i d e and m
the
s e t t i n g aside t h i s n o t i o n the v a n i t y of
I i s overcome o r , m
itself.
fully
Hegel's words, i t s f i x i t y m
positing
T h i s has the r e s u l t t h a t the s u b j e c t ' s i d e a s become
fluid,
because i t s w o r l d has become f u l l y
t h r o u g h t h i s movement', Hegel s a y s , t h a t the

'pure t h o u g h t s become concepts
fluid.
'It
is
Understanding's
and are f o r the f i r s t
time <vhac
t h e y are i n t r u t h , self-movements, c i r c l e s , t h a t whicn t h e i r

50
Substance i s ,
spiritual essentialities'."
Hegel's
suggestion
appears t o be t h e n t h a t t h e w o r l d o f Reason i s s i m p l y a w o r l d o f
i d e a s and n o t o f d i f f e r e n c e between t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n , su'cjeet
and o b j e c t .
For t h a t reason t h e r a t i o n a l s u b j e c t has no d e s i r e
t o s e t t l e a t any p a r t i c u l a r t h o u g h t such as mere c e r t a i n t y

i t s e l f o r i t s w o r l d oecause i t
i s the t h o u g h t o f thought
of
or
self-consciousness.
I t might w e l l be f o r us t o r e c a p i t u l a t e wnat we have concluded t h i s f a r about the process
o f the Phenomenology, i f
t o r e g a i n the c r i t i c a l d i s t a n c e which
49.
Ibid.
50.
only
i s e s s e n t i a l i n assessing
I b i d . B e g n f f e ( c o n c e p t s ) t h e r e f o r e 'comprise Hegel's
h i g h e s t g r o u t o f l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s , which a e f m e n o t h i n g
l e s s c o n c r e t e than s e l f - c o n s c i o u s spi r i l . The N o t i o n ^b'egrii f
i s t h e r e f o r e Reason and n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
I t 13 thought
e y p l i c i r i y a r t i c u l a t i n g the u n i t y o f thought and b e i n g , the
movement o f s p i r i t ' s s e l f - n e g a t i o n and s e J f - r e c c n c i l i d t i c n o r
r e t u r n upon s e l f . '
G.P.O.Sure. The Philosophy 0 1 Hegel,p.21.
175.
such an i m a g i n a t i v e and a m b i t i o u s a t h i n k e r as Hegel.
The
g o a l t h a t Hegel s e t s h i m s e l f i n the Phenomenology i s , as

know, t o r a i s e p h i l o s o p h y t o a s c i e n c e .
c l e a r e r as t o wnat t h i s e n t a i l s .
the
proof of the s c i e n t i f i c
By now
we
we should
be
At t h e same time as b e i n g
nature of philosophy i t
i s the
r a i s i n g o f consciousness o r the n a t u r a l consciousness t o s c i e n c e .

Why
i s i t t h a t the two are compatible?
towards d i s c o v e r i n g the reason f o r t h i s .
We have gone some way

They are
compatible
because the n a t u r a l consciousness has w i t h i n i t s e l f as

t i o n ' the ' l a b o u r o f w o r l d s p i r i t . '
The
'recollec-
path o f the n a t u r a l
consciousness t o science i s t h e r e f o r e one and t h e same as t h e

p r o o f o f the s c i e n t i f i c
n a t u r e o f p h i l o s o p h y s i nee the
former
ok
process consists i n systemtising the oast forms o f consciousness t h a t

f
form the i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e contemporary consciousness whose
s y s t e m a t i c form i s p h i l o s o p h y , o r , more p r e c i s e l y , the system-a t i s a t i o n of previous philosophical outlooks.
The
aim o f r a i s i n g
p h i l o s o p h y t o a science means t h a t past forms o f p h i l o s o p n y have

to be r e c a l l e d as they ~ x i s t i m p e r f e c t l y m
the contemporary
mind and o r g a n i s e d by means o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g superceded by

reason.
As we have seen, i t
i s the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t Hegel
regards as the 'absolute power'in t h i s .
I t becomes the means o f
raising consciousness t o science t h r o u g h i t s power o f n e g a t i n g

our f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the superceded forms o f t h i n k i n g t h a t
m
our c u l t u r e .
I t teaches us, Hegel c l a i m s , t h a t
because a t h i n g i s w e l l known i t
exist
precisely
i s n o t p r o p e r l y known.
I t
d e s t r o y s t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t we have about our w o r l d ;
it
t h e r e f o r e negates the form o f t h i n k i n g which Hegel c a l l s V o r s t e l l

I t does t n a t t h r o u g h b r e a k i n g up t h e idea 0 1 V o r s t e l l u n g i n t o
constituent parts.
Now
Hegel b e l i e v e s t n a t m
the course
its
of tna
176.
a n a l y s i s t h e s u b j e c t d i s c o v e r s h i m s e l f ; he d i s c o v e r s t h a t what
he took t o be o b j e c t i v e and e x t e r n a l t o h i m s e l f was
own
activity.
simply
Hegel's s u g g e s t i o n i s , t h e n , t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s
o f t h e c o n t e n t o f the o r d i n a r y consciousness has the

t h a t the c o n t e n t analysed
ness.
his
result
becomes the p r o p e r t y o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -
T h i s corresponds w i t h the t r a n s i t ] o n from V o r s t e l l e n t o
c o n c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g , o r from the U n d e r s t a n d i n g
t o Reason.
The
Understanding
t h a t b r i n g s about t h i s r e s u l t has t o be
superceded
as a means m
the Fhenomenology o f Mind because what f o l l o w s i s
p l a i n l y n o t w i t h i n i t s p r o v i n c e o r , what Kegel c a l l s , i t s
t h e d i v i s i o n of s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
the r e s u l t s of i t s own
Reason.
I t cannot f o l l o w
prmcipl
through
a n a l y s i s f o r t h a t i s the p r o v i n c e o f
Reason, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, broons no f i x i t y o f s u b j e c t
nor o b j e c t .
conceptual
Both,
it
thinking.
seems, have t o s u b o r d i n a t e themselves t o

And
conceptual
thinking is thinking
that
i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y
hob
but i s t h a t o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y .
I t i s t h i n k i n g which d o e s ( a l i o w
a r e s i d u e , such as the l ^ n g an S i oh o f Kant and F i c h t e .

t h i n k i n g which m
I t is
Hegel's view i s the essence o f i t s o b j e c t .
i s t h i s t h a t i s t h e g o a l o f the Phenomenology.
The
I t
outcome then
o f r a i s i n g p h i l o s o p h y t o a science i s t h a t the n o t i o n o f a s u b j e c t
as a c o n t i n g e n t , s e l f - s e e k i n g , v a i n , l i m i t e d and
individual
opposed t o an i m p e r s o n a l ,
egocentric
external, natural,
negative
o b j e c t i s shown t o be f a l s e over the whole range of apparent
opp-
o s i t i o n m t h e contemporary mind. Science i s t h i s , Hegel says,

'pure s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n i n a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s ' ; i t i s t h i s ' e t h e r
SI
as such'
rthich
i s n e i t h e r subject nor o b j e c t , I nor nature,
but the c o n c e p t u a l knowledge o f them.

51.
Hegel. Werke ) , p.
2y.
177.
As I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , Hegel r e g a r d s t h e phenomeno l o g i c a l process t h a t b r i n g s us t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n as merely
the
beginning of science.
Tt i s so. Hegel says, because
always i n c l u d e s the 'element o f immediate presence

1
baren D a s e i n s ) . ^
it
ary
(unmittel-
What Hegel means by t n i s i s t h a t s p i r i t
forms t h e o b j e c t o f Phenomenology i s ( a ) s p i r i t as
t o mind.
Both are s p i r i t
contempor-
i n i t s immediate presence.
ought by now t o be c l e a r t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e phenomenological
process d e a l s w i t h s p i r i t
a t each o f i t s stages m
t h i s form
t h a t , i t s aim i s the overcoming o f t h a t immediacy.

the
as
s p i r i t , and ( b ) s p i r i t as t h e consciousness o f a r e a l i t y
opposed
It
it
Hegel r e g a r d s
g e n e r a l r e s u l t o f t h i s process o f overcoming the element o f
immediate presence i n s p i r i t
as e x p e n e n c e .
As e would expect.
he i s aware t h a t t h i s use o f t h e n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e runs counter
t o t h e accepted p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t ;
but
he employs i t because the accepted p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n n o t a t i o n s

r
t h e word form p a r t o f h i s meaning.
He t h e r e f o r e g r a n t s one
c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning,
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e E m p i r i c i s t
w h i c h denotes mind m
its
' r e c e p t i v i t y only'.
t h e r e are ''two moments', o f knowledge

i s t h e n e g a t i v e o f knowledge'.
i n s t a n c e , as Hdgel sayq m
the
form o f o b j e c t i v i t y
I n consciousness,
and t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y which
So e x p e r i e n c e i s m
h i s C r i t i q u e o f Locke,
philosopners,
For indeed
' n o t h i n g but
consciousness knows ana
comprehends n o t h i n g which i s n o t i n i t s e x p e r i e n c e . ^
52.
535-^.
55-
I b i d . , p. 38.
Ibid.
Hegel. ^(_rk_e_20, p.
Hegel.
the f i r s t
215.
Phanomenolog1e, We rue 3, p. 38.
However
178.
i n Hegel's view t h e r e i s much more t o experience

Experience, m
than
that.
f a c t , i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the whole process
o f t h e Phenomenology o f Mind, t h a t l e a d s t h r o u g h the Understandi n g and Reason t o A b s o l u t e Knowledge.

The
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s are p r o f o u n d .
c o m p l e t e l y new
view o f e x p e r i e n c e .
t h a t Hegel h i m s e l f was
i m p o r t a n t aspects
I t g i v e s us a
I t i s n o t t o be doubted
aware t h a t t h i s was
one
o f t h e most
o f h i s Phenomenology o f Mind.
As Fulda
and
H e m r i c h have p o i n t e d out ne o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d t o e n t i t l e t h e
56
work The
Science o f the Experience
o f Consciousness.
I would argue t h a t the Phenomeno]ogy was
indeed
i n t e n d e d as a comprehen-
s i v e r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e .
t h i s i s t r u e i t "would appear t n a t we have a l r e a d y examined
aspects
of that reformulation.
Firstly, m
examining
came t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hegel regards h i s Phenomenology

m
Thus i f Hegel wants t o r e g a r d t h i s
philosophic
we
prob-
a n a l y s i n g t h e process o f t n e Phenomenology
came t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l consciousness had
t o undergo two t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o e f o r e i t
At t h e hand o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g
56.
t o be
f o r b o t h h i s t o r y and whac Hegel
c a l l s s c i e n c e . ' Secondly (and t h e J r e p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s are

a b l y more complex) m
as
conscious-
u n d e r t a k i n g as the necessary c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e , room has

made i n the n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e
we
~s much as
t h e y are p a r t o f the i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f the p a r t i c u l a r

ness o f h i s t i m e .
two
tne
r e l a t i o n o f t h e Phenomenology t o t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y
the s y s t e m a t i s a t i o n o f past forms o f p h i l o s o p h y
I f
could a t t a i n
science.
i t nas t o s u f f e r the break-up o f
H.F. F u l d a und D. H e i n r i e h .
M a t t , j i a l i e n zu Kegels PhMnoêno l o g i e df_^_ Ce isie_3, fuhrkamp Veflog". FrarikfaYc, ]Y7 3,Tat~oo~
u c t i u n " p. " l ! . ~
]79.
i t s own p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s and s u b s e q u e n t l y , a t t h e hand

o f Reason, i t had t o s u f f e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e f i x i t y o r
o b j e c t i v i t y of i t s world.
A l l t h i s , we now know, forms
We would do w e ] 1 then t o r e c o n s i d e r
o f e x p e r i e n c e f o r Hegel.
our c o n c l u s i o n s m
part
this
light.
F i r s t , we ought t o c o n s i d e r what r o l e h i s t o r y and science

play m
Hegel's account
o f experience.
e n t e r s i n t o t h e Phenomenology m
exoteric
sense.
We have seen t h a t
two senses: m
sense as
o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r who u n f o l d s t h e
phenomenological process.
The p h i l o s o p h e r , as we have seen,
through h i s understanding of the History

pates i n t h e h i s t o r y o f u l t i m a t e
m
an e s o t e r i c and
I t comes on t h e scene i n i t s e s o t e r i c
p a r t o f t h e consciousness
history
of Philosophy
reality.
partici-
The e x o t e r i c
sense
which h i s t o r y makes i t s appearance i s as t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e
natural
consciousness.
I t can o n l y be e x o t e r i c
history
that
f u r n i s h e s t h e i n o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness.
I t would appear then t h a t e x p e r i e n c e xs h i s t o r i c a l , f o r Hegel,
m
these two senses.
individual's
I t i s h i s t o r i c a l because each and every
consciousness
i s h i s t o r i c a l i n the exoteric
and because t h e p h i l o s o p h e r m
consciousness
ing.
er's
o r d e r t o understand
sense
the o r d m s r y
must possess t h e a p p r o p r i a t e h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d -
This i s not s u f f i c i e n t m
account
of experience, m
i t s e l f , however.
The p h i l o s o p h -
order that i t get at the heart o f
e x p e r i e n c e , has t o be s c i e n t i f i c as w e l l .
The p h i l o s o p h e r must
n o t simply be c o n t e n t t o ennumerate past forms o f t h i n k i n g buc

must o r d e r them s y s t e m a t i c a l l y as w e l l .
He has t o show t h a t
those past and present modes o f t h i n k i n g form an i n t e r c o n n e c t e d

whole which i s t h e path o f t h e n a t u r a l
corsciousness t o science.
i8o.
That i s how
s c i e n c e e n t e r s Hegel's
b o t h means and end.
account o f e x p e r i e n c e as
I t i s means as the manner m
which t h e
p h i l o s o p h e r e x h i b i t s the p r o p e r c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e and
as t h e g o a l t h a t the p h i l o s o p h e r has m
end
mind f o r the e x p e r i e n c i n g
consciousness.
We must now
p l a y m Hegel's
c o n s i d e r what r o l e Reason and U n d e r s t a n d i n g

account o f e x p e r i e n c e .
As we know t h e stages
o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g and Reason form p a r t o f the process o f t h e

Phenomenology.
They do so as methods o f a n a l y s i s .
have t o be regarded as the c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e .

a r i s e s here.
These methods
A complexity
I t i s that, these methods are t h e c o n t e n t o f exp-
e r i e n c e n o t o n l y as the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s awareness o f t h e necessary

development
o f a p a r t i c u l a r Weltanschauung,
but a l s o as what
a c t u a l l y occurs i n t h o e x p e r i e n c e o f the o r d i n a r y
This i s ,
trie
o f course, t h e f o r c e o f Hegel's
' l i f e of the object'.
consciousness.
c l a i m t h a t Reason i s
Not o n l y i s Reason t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness
but i t
i s a l s o t h e person's a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e .
I n i t s simplest
form t h e c o m p l e x i t y i s a r e s u l t o f the Phenomenology h a v i n g

two s u b j e c t s : t h e o r d i n a r y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l
The o r d i n a r y consciousness
i s only i m p l i c i t l y
consciousness.
Understanding
and Reason w h e r e a s the p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness i s

so.
I t appears
angles.
explicitly
then t h a t we can l o o k a t e x p e r i e n c e from two
F i r s t o f a l l , we can see i t
as t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f
the o r d i n a r y consciousness and from t h i s p o i n t o f view experience c o u l d be seen as the process of overcoming
t o Reason and U n d e r s t a n d i n g , as, m
cess.
I n the second
the objections
s h o r t , an e d u c a t i v e p r o -
p l a c e , we can see i t
as t h e e x p e r i e n c e
o f t h e p i i L l o s o p h e r t h a t b o t h observes and b r i n g s about
this
181.
e d u c a t i o n a l process-
Prom t h i s p o i n t o f view, e x p e r i e n c e
i s t h e process o f w o r k i n g out t h e f u l l
U n d e r s t a n d i n g and Reason.
implications of
On t h e one hand we appear t o
have t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l b i o g r a p h y o f the o r d i n a r y
and on the o t h e r ,
consciousness
a p l a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument.
n o t , however, d i s t i n c t m Hegel's mind.
Experience
They are
from
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge o f the e x p e r i e n c e t h e o r d i n a r y
ness undergoes.
Hence when t h e o r d i n a r y
e x p e r i e n c e d t h e phenomenology o f mind i t
same as i t s mentor:
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l
conscious
consciousness
i s or.p and t h e
consciousness.
has
182.
A CONTRADICTION IN HEGEL'8 ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE

T h i s , c l e a r l y , g i v e s us a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t view o f
e x p e r i e n c e from t h a t o f Locke.
Where, f o r Locke e x p e r i e n c e
was what I sense-perceive and my r e f l e c t i o n s on t h a t p e r c e p t i o n ,

Hegel c l a i m s t h a t what I e x p e r i e n c e as o r d i n a r y
consciousness
i s b o t h a w o r l d o f i d e a s ( V o r s t e l l u n g e n ) and a h i s t o r i c a l w o r l d .
I t i s a h i s t o r i c a l w o r l d because I ,
the ordinary
consciousness,
am t h e r e s u l t o f a complex and l e n g t h y development - t h e development o f my c u l t u r e .
And i t
i s a w o r l d o f ideas because t h a t
the o n l y way I can i n h e r i t t h a t c u l t u r e .
is
Hegel even makes t h e
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t experience i s i m p l i c i t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l .
For
h i s c l a i m i s , as we know, t h a t t h r o u g h s y s t e m a t i s m g t h e w o r l d
o f i d e a s o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness
we can a t t a i n s c i e n c e .
Thus whereas Locke's view i s t h a t experience begins w i t h a tabv1a

rasa, Hegel's view i s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e raw sense i s
h i s t o r i c a l and p o t e n t i a l l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l .
social,
What I may experience-
as p h i l o s o p h e r draws o u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s c l a i m .
As
p h i l o s o p h e r , m Hegel's view, I am able t o have s y s t e m a t i c knowledge o f t h e h i s t o r y and o f t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n

ness.
I n t h i s way I
o f conscious-
am a b l e t o show t h a t each mode o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness t h a t has appeared
forms p a r t o f an i n t e r c o n n e c t e d whole.
I n sum, t h e n , e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e phenomenology of mind: a knowledge

o f t h e phenomenon o f consciousness
complexity.^7
in a l l i t s
contemporary
57 I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t ~ K r o h e r s a y s i n h i s Von Kant b i s He

P.37^,Book 2:'Das Pioblem des Erkennens v e r t i e f t und erwerer~
s i c h b e i lhm zum Problem des E r l e b e n s . Zwar f m d e t s i c h sond
b a r e r w e i s e weder b e i Hegel fooch bei emem s e i n e r Vorganger
( s o w e i t i c h s e h e ) d i ^ s e s V/ort :dennoch d a r f man das, was Hegel
m d e r Phanomenologie E>f ahrung nennt,auch a l s E r l e b e n oezsci
nen. ' Kroner's p o i n t i s that'the experience rhat consciousness ^ r e s
not limited to the experience o f the senses' even oi t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b
expresses i t s e l f i n t h e whole o f ' ' l i f e " . ' i b i d . p. 375.
-
183.
We must s t r e s s t h a t , a l t h o u g h experience i s b o t h t h e pnenomenon

and t h e r e a l i t y , b o t n the appearance o f mind and t h e know
ledge o f t h a t appearance, t h e apperanee o f mind m

process
the
o f t h e Phenomenology i s n o t t h e t r u e r e a l i t y
experience.
of
I t s t r u e r e a l i t y i s o n l y t o be found a t t h e
end o f t h e Phenomenology o f Mind i n A b s o l u t e Knowledge.

HegeJ argues t h e n t h a t , m
comparison w i t h t h i s r e s u l t ,
p r e c e d i n g development o f consciousness
i s somehow by t h e way.
the
from s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y
I t i s , Hegel assures us, m e r e l y
t h e appearance of e x p e r i e n c e .
B e f o r e we
l o o k a t t h e problems t h a t are a t t a c h e d t o
t h i s view o f Hegel's about t h e outcome o f the Phenomenology

we m i g h t remind o u r s e l v e s o f an i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f t h a t work,
namely, t h a t outcome of the pnenomonological process
is
by b o t h s u b j e c t s o f the p r o c e s s .
ness and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s s p i r i t ,
shared
B o t h the o r d i n a r y c o n b C i o u -
or the philosopher,
t h a t t h e c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e o f mind i f not i t s
learn
reality.
They, as we a l r e a d y know, are t h e two aspects o f s p i r i t

it
presents i t s e l f m
So Hege
t o d e p i c t t h e outcome o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s way.
firstly,
'for i t
he says, t h e process i n which
as
i s able
I t is
s p i r i t - becomes o o j e c t
i s t h i s movement o f i t s e l f becoming an other
i.e.
,58
o b j e c t o f J I s e l f and of overcoming t i n s o t h e r b e i n g . '
here our d i f f i c u l t i e s b e g i n 6 g a m .
r e s u l t of experience
what Hegel would
call
I t appears t h a t
LS the i d e a l i s m o f s p i r i t
genuine
idealism.
the
or simply
T h i s genuine
ideal-
ism, as we d i s c o v e r e d from .Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f Pi cht e , i s the

a t t e m p t t o o ^ e ^ c >e th b i f u r c a t i o n
58.
Hegel. Werice 3,
p.
38.
(iiit r w e i u n g ) t h a i
is
184.
i n e v i t a b l e m human e x p e r i e n c e .
Since t h a t b i f u r c a t i o n
i s i n e v i t a b l y an aspect o f experience
the philosopher i n
Hegel's view must r e c o g n i s e i t and even more must s t a y

w i t h the 'negative'.
T h i s much i s a l r e a d y c l e a r t o us.
P h i l o s o p h y has, however, t h e o t h e r s i d e t o i t a c c o r d i n g t o
Hegel t h a t w h i l s t d w e l l i n g m
alien objectivity i t
.
59
to restore
totality
i t s highest v i t a l i t y
i d e a l i s m , we are t o take i t ,
harmony o f e x i s t e n c e .
i s able
. ^
Genuine
i s a b l e t o r e s t o r e t h e broken
T h i s then i s t h e experience
whose u n d e r s t a n d i n g t r o u b l e s us.
I t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel,
a process o f s p i r i t e s t a b l i s h i n g
itself m
a l i e n e x i s t e n c e and subsequently
re-establishing
an e x t e r n a l and
its
s e l f w i t h i n t h a t a l i e n a t i o n so t h a t i t s freedom i s
and t h e a l i e n a t i o n overcome.
a l i e n a t i o n i s a necessary
of s p i r i t
own
restored
We have t o understand
that
aspect o f t h e l i f e o f s p i r i t
but we have a l s o t o understand
t h a t the h i g h e r n e c e s s i t y i s
the a b r o g a t i o n o f t h i s a l i e n a t i o n m
the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of
spirit.
Thus 'experience i s s i m p l y t h e name f o r t h i s movement
i n which t h e immediate,
be i t
t h e unexperienced,
i . e . the a b s t r a c t -
o f sensuous b e i n g o r o f t h e merely t h o u g h t
simple
(das E m f a c h e ) ~ a l i e n a t e s i t s e l f and then from t h i s

r e t u r n s t o i t s e l f and then o n l y f o r the f i r s t t i m e i s
r e a l i t y and t r u t h d e p i c t e d , as a l s o t n a t i t
alienation
its
i s the property
60
o f consciousness.'
As t h i s passage suggests,
the diverse
e f f e c t s t h a t bodies s u r r o u n d i n g us nave on our f a c u l t i e s

have t n e i r place m Heeel's account
59.
Hegel. Werke_2, p75T7
60,
Hegel. Werê 3, p.39-
o f experience b u t merely
185.
as a s t a r t i n g
point.
ienced element
They a r e , i t
e x p e r i e n c e n o t , as L o c k e
claim, experience i t s e l f .
experienced m
of
the I .
appears, t h e unexper-
Hegel's
and Hume w o u l d
The ' i m m e d i a t e ' becomes g e n u i n e l y
o p i n i o n when i t
We c a n , I t h i n k ,
regard t h i s
becomes t h e p r o p e r t y
c o n c l u s i o n as
p a r a l l e l w i t h one t h a t H e g e l d r a w s i n t h e L e c t u r e s on t h e
History o f Philosophy.
This i s
theconclusion that i t
is
only w i t h Kant's n o t i o n o f t h e r o l e
o f t h e I i n knowledge
(as
the content o f experience
the unity
of apperception) that
was p r o p e r l y d e p i c t e d .
t h a t what
Hegel's
opinion
we t h o u g h t o f as m e r e l y s u p p l i e d by e x t e r n a l
objects
was t h e a c t i v i t y
t h i s proves t h a t
I t was t h e n known, m
o f consciousness i t s e l f .
I n Hegel's mind
t h e i m m e d i a t e o r t h e u n e x p e r i e n c e d comes
about t h r o u g h consciousness a l i e n a t i n g
i t s e l f , or, m
t e c h n i c a l terms, that
p o s i t e d by consciousness
and e x p e r i e n c e i s
t h e immediate i s
t h e r e f o r e t h e p r o c e s s whereby
form o f consciousness r e t u r n s t o i t s e l f
This again
we m i g h t see as e q u i v a l e n t
thinks takes place m

the
the history
from i t s
the abstract
own a l i e n a t i o
t o a process t h a t
Prior t o Fichte,
c l a i m s , e x p e r i e n c e was a n o t i o n t h a t , d e s c r i b e d
the direct
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s .
I t
the context o f t h i s notion
things
'by t h e m s e l v e s ' , and K a n t o f t h e D i n g an s i c h , as
to
raw c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e . .
show t h a t
such D m p e an s i c h ,
as Hege] c a l l s
it
t h a t Locke
with
Hegel
was i n
the
Hegel
o f philsophy, t h i s time
advent o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y .
r e l a t i o n between
more
came t o t a l k o f
F i c h t e , however,
( o r the abstract,
attempted
immediate
Here) were t h e m s e l v e s p o s i t e d by t h e I .
186.
F i c h t e ceased t o r e g a r d
e x p e r i e n c e as a f i x e d
and d i r e c t
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e o b j e c t and came t o

regard
it
two.
This i s ,
by
as a c o m p l e x d i a l e c t i c a l
the subject,
for
o f course., a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t i s
so i t
maintains
Hegel o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
him e x p e r i e n c e i s b o t h
one
wills
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e
the other v i t a l
established
ingredient
o f overcoming otherness.
concrete
- historical
and s o c i a l ,
if
- and y e t u l t i m a t e l y i d e a l .
As I h a v e s u g g e s t e d p r e v i o u s l y , we may r e a d i l y
stand
For
t h i s as p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m .
points out,
I t is,
as C o l l e t t i
' t h e p o i n t o f v i e w t h a t d e n i e s t h a t t h i n g s , and
1
the f i n i t e
under-
w o r l d have t r u e r e a l i t y . ^
I ti s
c l e a r enough
t h a t Hegel would w i s h t o defend such a p o i n t o f view.

is
more d i f f i c u l t
t o comprehend i s
with thesis of materialism

it
n o t only
but
also
for maintaining
for
there
time
is,
t o e s t a b l i s h that tnere
i s an e x t e r n a l
o t h e r words, i d e n t i f i e s
itself
is
concerned
it
could
i s an a l i e n e x t e r n a l
L.Colletti.
world.
should
be s o .
about t h e
I n d e e d , as f a r as t h e t h e s i s
just
as w e l l be h e a v e n as h a l l .
i f H e g e l ' s v i e w were c o r r e c t i t
par e x c e l l e n c e ,
phil-
i n H e g e l ' s v i e w , a t t h e same
says n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y
of the external world.
reality
To e s t a b l i s h t h a t
o f c o u r s e , no r e a s o n a t a l l why t h i s
nature
61.
criticises
view which i m p l i e s t h e a l i e n -
materialism with alienation.
Philosophical materialism
But
h i s philosophy
Hegel, m
i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d
There i s ,
t h a t H e g e l , when d e a l i n g
that there
maintaining
a t i o n o f t h e mind.
osophical
What
were t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
would f o l l o w t h a t Locke,
ot a l i e n a t i o n .
M a r x i s m and H e g e l , NLB, 1973* P 7-
He,
187.
h i s a p p a r e n t l y innocuous
a t t e m p t t o p h i l o s o p h i s e on t n e
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , w o u l d h a v e d e p i c t e d tni n d m
alienation.
that
And t h i s
the Understanding
which
indeed i s what Hegel

represents that
why s h o u l d he see t h e a c t i v i t y
way?
I t h i n k we w o u l d
believes,
level
corresponds w i t h tne b i f u r c a t i o n
its
o f thought
o f experience.
o f the Understanding
search m
or c e r t a i n l y h i s episternology,
vain m
his
f o r t h e reason
But
this
philosophy,
f o r this.
I t
62
is,
as L u l o c s a n d Marcuse h a v e a r g u e d ,
s i m p l y an a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t he t a k e s w i t h h i m t o p h i l o s o p h y .
the everyday
standing,
which
The e x p e r i e n c e o f
world, the experience of the ordinary
i s , H e g e l c l a i m s , an a l i e n , h o s t i l e
experience
i s n o t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e demands o f human
Reason t h e r e f o r e , H e g e l c o n c l u d e s ,
itself
as t h o u g h t .
reality
that
I tis
i s adequate
under-
reason.
i s o n l y a t home w i t h
o n l y t h e r a t i o n a l knowledge o f
to it.
I tis,
therefore,
oat the
6 "5
1
'rose m
reality
the cross o f the p r e s e n t ,

as i t
stands.
to
rise
unable
tc t r a n s f o r m
Hegel's philosophy i s
resignation before the p r a c t i c a l

osophy i s
impotence
shaped oy t h i s
o f Reason.
Phil-
f o r him tne s u s t a i n e d a t t e m p t - i n t h o u g h t alone above t h e n e g a t i v i t y
o f existence.
What h a p p e n s t h e r e f o r e a t t h e end o f t h e Phenomenology

is
t h a t t h e whole o f e x p e r i e n c e i s absorbed
So t h a t
it
appears
into the Self.
that the d e p i c t i o n o f a concrete
objective
e x p e r i e n c e , e x p e r i e n c e o f a n o t h e r opposed t o m i n d , i s
gratuit-
ous.
Hegel, o f course, would r e j e c t t h e view which i m p l i e s
t h a t t h e outcome o f t h e p h e n o m e n o J o g i c a l p r o c e s s i s s o l e l y
62. What t h e y have a r g u e d m p_er Junge H e g e l a n d Reason nnd R e v o l
u t i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y , i s t h a t i t i s an a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i t d e r j
from Hegel's view o f nascent c a p i t a l i s m .
63. H e g e l . Werke 7, p. 2b
188.
negative.
He a r g u e s t h a t
conception
of the nature of t r u t h
l e a r n i n g what e x p e r i e n c e
But
it
s u c h a v i e w i s b a s e d on a m i s -
i s not this
that
that is jn dispute.
There i s
the negation
By
us n o t we a l s o l e a r n w h a t i t
w h e t h e r an a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e
come a t a l l .
and f a l s e h o o d .
What s m
dispute
s h o u ] d have a n e g a t i v e
is also positive
is
assumed t h a t
otherness
prove
is
in
he d e p i c t s t h e e x p e r i e n c e
the l i f e
summoned
with
forth
merely
itself'
t o show t h e ' s e r e n e
that
But i f
T h e r e he a r g u e s t h a t
tne ro]e
between r e a l i t y
t h e breach
answer t h a t
exists
t h e breach
philosopher
ness.
that
e q u a l i t y and
even i n
is
aroused
inherent in
i n the f i r s t
of philosopny
human
i s t o heal the
place?
already
so t h e r e J s c l e a r l y
making,
t h e r e an t h e n a t u r a l
reality
is
no room f o r t h e ' o t h e r '
65.
well
that
conscious-
'with w h a t e l s e he
chat a ] 1
w h a t j. c i n t e n d s
H e g e l . W e r k e 3, p. 40.
Ibid.
assume
Hegel might
i s not o f philosophy's
finds i t
in itself
m the
and m i n d , why does p h i l o s o p h y
t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness.
is already
the role
of philosophy
w a n t s t o c l a i m a b o u t Mand, n a m e l y
6k.
66.
is
B u t t h i s 'would n o t be c o m p a t i b l e
this
I t
experience
o f M m d . ^ The same s u s p a c j o n i s
t o overcome t h e b i f u r c a t i o n
breach
If
concrete
u s by t h e a c c o u n t t h a t H e g e l g i v e s o f p h i l o s o p h y
existence.
the
o f mind.
o f rnmd b r o o k s no o p p o s i t i o n , n o
I t appears t h a t an o b j e c t i v e
Differenzschnft.
is
pnncippi
^ buc t h e v e r y o b j e c t o f t h e Phe.io.renelogy a s t o
this.
unity
out-
but Hegel
c a n n o t .in t h i s way e s c a p e t h e a c c u s a t i o n o f p e m t i o
t h e manner w h i c h
is
I n d e e d much t o be s a i d f o r t h e c l a i m
o f the negation
in
j s.
mind.
o f mand,
P h i l c s o p n y , w^th Hegel,
lo achieve
Ibid.,
or, in
p. 24.
other
189.
w o r d s , assumes w h a t i t
has
t o prove.
t h e r e i s an a l i e n e x i s t e n c e m e r e l y
can
of
transcend
it.
this
experience
can
is a contradiction m
it
see
is,
f o r r e a s o n s we
m
his
as we
Hegel's account
have s u g g e s t e d ,
h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y .
t h a t t h i s must be
Mind which,
account
have a r g u e d ,
system t a k e s i t s
of Logic.
this
just
as
Again
we
i s Hegel's account
experience,
t o t h e s y s t e m and
place immediately
I t i s worth following
of
preceding the
Science
out the i m p l i c a t i o n s
of
i n some d e t a i l .
In
the Preface
view, which
t o t h e Phenomenology H e g e l
must o n l y be
of the system i t s e l f ,
it
justified
can be
sure t h a t
a l l depends on c o n c e i v i n g and
We
his Lectures
is
claiming,
has
The
starting-point
t o be b o t h S u b s t a n c e
t h a t S u b s t a n c e must f o r m p a r t
of
and
h a v e a l r e a d y seen H e g e l make t h e s u g g e s t i o n
of philosophy.
' a l l bathe
as much as s u b j e c t ' . '
o f n i s most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s
r e f e r e n c e the p h i l o s o p h y of Spinoza.
Subject.
express-
n e x p r e s s i n g t h i s v i e w o f h i s s y s t e m in-
g e n e r a l H e g e l t a k e s as one
o f p h i l o s o p h y , he
writes:'in
through the p r e s e n t a t i o n
i n g t h e t r u t h n o t as S u b s t a n c e b u t j u s t
point
of
so b e c a u s e t n e Phenomenology o f
intended t o form the i n t r o d u c t i o n
that
We
philosophy
This i s the contradiction m
much a c o n t r a d i c t i o n
my
order that
that
experience.
If
is
H e g e l assumes
As
we
saw,
he
t h e e t h e r o f t h e one
of the
insisted
starting-
t h a t we
Substance m
must
which
every-
68
thing that
6?.
Ibid.,
i s h e l d t o be
pp.22-23.
true
68.
perishes.'
See
Even i f
above. Chapter
this
One
p.17.
190.
were n o t s u f f i c i e n t
proof that
have S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y
beyond d o u b t m
in
this
i n s t a n c e Hegel
i n mind t h e q u e s t i o n i s
t h e passage t h a t
immediately
r e p e a t s a c r i t i c i s m he made o f S p i n o z a m
It
t h a t S p i n o z a made a m i s t a k e
as a medium i n w h i c h
has
to
i n p r e s e n t i n g Substance
The p r o p e r v i e w , as H e g e l
and i n t h e L e c t u r e s ,
t o have t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
be c o n c e i v e d
the Lectures.
'self-consciousness perishes only,
i s not preserved.
b o t h here
and expressed
is that
reality
of the I .
Subject
and
claims
T r u t h , he s a y s , h a s
as ' j u s t as much
subject'.
intends
o r t h e I from o u r review o f h i s c r i t i q u e
F i c h t e we a r e w e l l p l a c e d
summary o f h i s
system.
t o present
As w i l l
it
o r Substance
As we a l s o have a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f what HegeJ

by
settled
f o l l o w s where
Hegel
is
does
o f Kant
o u r v i e w s on H e g e l ' s
become e v i d e n t , t h e y
will
h a v e a n i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g on o u r a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e c o n t r a d i c tion,
if
i t is
Since
role
indeed
a contradiction,
Hegel's
system.
S p i n o z a ' s n o t i o n o f S u b s t a n c e p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t
t h e a c c o u n t t h a t H e g e l g i v e s o f h i s s y s t e m he c a n n o t
w h o l l y e s c a p e t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t he c o m p r o m i s e d w i t h
Nor
w o u l d H e g e l w i s h t o do s o .
we h a v e r e m a r k e d , God.
he
fore,
of
Spinoza's Substance i s ,
S p i n o z a does i n d e e d
i s g i v i n g an a c c o u n t o f r e a l i t y
Substance w i t h
its
religion.
believe
when he i s
a t t r i b u t e s a n d modes.
as
that
depicting
I n h i s view, t h e r e -
t h e a c c o u n t t h a t he g i v e s o f God i s a l s o t h e a c c o u n t
how t h i n g s a r e .
This, I believe, is
the attraction of
h i s n o t i o n o f God f o r H e g e l s i n c e w i t h o u t , g i v i n g up t h e
obligation
69.
t o e x p l a i n t h e 'world i t
H e g e l . Werke 3. p. 23.
presents
j t as a u n i f i e d
191.
whole.
of
Indeed
Hegel m
its
Spinoza's view o f t h i n g s accords w i t h

detail.
Spinoza regards
t h i n g s o f e x i s t e n c e as f i n i t e
H e g e l w o u l d u s e , as f i n i t e s
that
tne determinate
infinites.
I n terms
whose v e r y b e i n g
is
that
that
they
70
should
this
become t h e o p p o s i t e o f t h e m s e l v e s .
I tis f o r
reason t h a t Hegel would n o t r e p u d i a t e t n e l i n k
religion.
The t a s k o f p h i l o s o p h y ,
as much as t h a t
ity.
of religion
Philosophy,
not
t o accept
Its
task, m
finite
is
he w o u l d m a i n t a i n ,
t o c o n s t r u c t an i n f i n i t e
a finite
material reality
real-
external to i t s e l f .
H e g e l ' s v i e w , i s t o subsume w i t h i n
i t s e l f the
and e x t e r n a l .
on t h e ' s u b s t a n t i a l '
H e g e l ' s t h e s i s t h a t S u b s t a n c e be c o n c e i v e d
Subject.
B u t as I have a l r e a d y
just
miicated,
we c a n d i s c o v e r t h e f u l l
significance
S u b j e c t , t h e o t h e r aspect
of his thesis,
aspect
of
as much as
order
that
o f Hegel's n o t i o n of
we have t o t u r n t o
a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f K a n t and F i c h t e .
Kant
and F i c h t e , we w i l l
I as m
world.
some way h a v i n g
W i t h Kant t h i s
recall,
a hand m
is
regard
the Subject
sense.
I n the Kantian
intended
in
or the
the epistemological
the ontological
view t n e o b j e c t s o f experience are
c o n s t r u c t e d by b r i n g i n g t o b e a r w i t h t h e ' I
the undifferentiated
Both
the construction of our
sense and w i t n F i c h t e , as we have s e e n , m
in
just
as H e g e l b e l i e v e s S p i n o z a shows u s , h a s
T h i s s h e d s some l i g h t
his
with
data
think
o f sense-experience.
an u n i t y
K a n t , as
we have s e e n , c a l l s t h a t u n i t y t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n .
70. As C o l l e t t i s a y s : ' T h e f 1 m t e ' , f o r H e g e 1 , ' i s s i m p l y t h a t w h i c h
must become i n f i n i t e by i t s e l f as a conseq_uenee o f i t s v e r y
nature,
"The i n f i n i t e i s i t s a f f i r m a t i v e d e t e r m n a t i o n , m a t
which i t t r u l y i s m i t s e l f .
Thus t h e f i n i t e h a s vani.-hed i n
t h e i n f i n i t e and w h a t i s , i s o n l y j-n t h e i n f i n i t e " , ' o p . o i t . p . 1 6
192.
We know t h a t H e g e l r e g a r d s
Kant's;
and now i n
system.
an amended f o r m he c a r r i e s
He amenas i t
course,
accords
Philosophy.
of view t h a t
t h i s as a g r e a t i n s i g h t o f
a Fichtean
it
fashion.
mto
his
This, of
with h i s interpretation of the history of
Tt i s w h o l l y a p p r o p r i a t e from Hegel's p o i n t
in his
philosophy
the Kantian philosophy
be
m e d i a t e d by t h e F i c h t e a n s i n c e b o t h F i c h t e a n d K a n t a,re
seen as c o n t r i b u t i n g
one
as
t o t h e p r o g r e s s i v e development o f t h e
system o f p h i l o s o p h y .
centring
external
What F i c h t e d o e s i s
on t h e i n d i v i d u a l I so t h a t
t o m y s e l f i n my e x p e r i e n c e
is
an o r i g i n a l a c t o f p o s i t i n g by t h e I .
a w o r l d because t h e s u b j e c t d e c i d e s
theoretical
us.
activity.
w h a t I may
reality
find
t h e r e as a r e s u l t o f
Tn s h o r t , t h e r e
t o create i t
T h i s by now i s
Critique
It
is
clear,
o f Fichte's philosophy
from
t h e extreme s u b j e c t i v i s t
view
of the world.
So, i n
this
however,
appear.
Hegel's
himself
o f the Fichtean
as we know, t h a t
wnich f o l l o w
the l i g h t
a l l pievious
i n h i s system.
of Schellmg's
w h a t we know f r o m H e g e l ' s C r i t i q u e
order m
in
i n s t a n c e , t h e r o l e o f F i c h t e ' s system i n h i s
o s o p h y h a s t o be s e e n m
Sehelling is
froi
interpretations
p h i l o s o p h i e s a r e m e d i a t e d by t h o s e
his
f a m i l i a r ground f o r
t h a t Hegel distc'iccs
His claim i s ,
is
through
Nov;, some o f t h i s s o l i p s i s m , as we know, s u r v i v e s
Hegel's philosophy.
Now,
t o see
that
which
some i m p o r t a n c e
Subject
and O b j e c t ,
F i c h t e a n T i n Hegel's system,
philosophy.
o f the philosophy
h a s t o be p l a c e d
o r Subject
T h i s has an i m p o r t a n t b e a n r g
phil-
of
on t h e
and S u o s t a n c e ,
on t h e r o l e o f t h e
b e ' ^ s e S u b s t a n c e , as we s e e .
193-
must p r e c e d e S u b j e c t .
This i s
t o show t h a t H e g e l ' s
o s o p h y d e p i c t s an o b j e c t i v e
identity
and
For i t
not a subjective
one.
Hegel acknowledges m
his
which i s n o t merely that
ness.
Not o n l y would
from t h a t
this
believes,
to think
we t o r-hink o f i t
the
Materialists
appropriate
world
that
of the world
only
I t is
This i s
only
The m e i e a s s e r t i o n
o n l y t h e system i t s e l f
that
r e a s o n he p l a c e s a g i e a t
reality
is
of that
we aê t o
unuil
must
justify
ho? ever, i s n o t
As he s a y s
1
it'. '
( w h a t we m i g h t c a l l ) ,
is
its
thinking
obje^tive-
I n Die Pêjrom^Mjlogy, f c r example
observed
Similarly,
'it
For t h i s
d e a l o f e m p h a s i s or. t h i s
derived.
consciousness i s
of this,
validity.
of
c h o s e t o summar-
a t t h e end o f t n e a n a l y s i s o f t r i e
consciousness.
71.
the
t h r o u g , h as S u b j e c t .
system.
that
subject.
t h e essence o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t
i n h i s view t h e proof o f i t s
world
As
out m
then that
ise his
only
-.ct.
carried
A t t h e same t i m e i t i s how he w o u l d
is
world.
t o thank o f that
view.
subjectivity
Hegel
terms o f
f a s h i o n b y Spanoza, we h a v e t o t h i n k
become F i c h t e a n s a n d t h r n k i t
it
Hegel's
objective
as a s u b j e c t i v e
i n s i s t , yet is
eonsciou-
such a c o n c r e t e
essentially
as d o e s F i c h t e ,
as g i v e n o r d a t u m .
through
substantial
o f view,
o f an e x t e r n a l ,
e x i s t s , are
positing
that
o f B e r k e l e y as w e l l .
p h i l o s o p h i c a l point
subsequent t o a d m i t t i n g
object
sense
of the i n d i v i d u a l
Only t h e n ,
initial
this
there i s
but that
initially
T h e r e f o r e we h a v e n o t ,
in
and
o f course d i s t i n g u i s h
of Fichte
We h a v e f r o m t h e c o r r e c t
is
system t h a t
reality
idealism
of subject
phil-
t o recognise
Understanding
itself
i n The S c i e n c e o f L o g i c
H e g e l . Werke 3, p . 23.
as
self-
t h e sub-
194.
jectivity
o f t h e O b j e c t i v e L o g i c , o f b e i n g and
s i m p l y assumed.
There i s
an e x t r e m e l y
d e r i v a t i o n of the s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c
which Hegel claims
from
essence i s
i n v o l v e d and
not
complex
the o b j e c t i v e l o g i c
i s t h e immanent c r i t i q u e
o f Spinoza's
72
n o t i o n of Substance.
Indeed
in that
what, i n e f f e c t , Hegel argues i s

reality
effort
is
the Subject
t o prove t h a t
distinguishes
o r freedom.
it
s u b j e c t and
object, that,
Hegel's view, h i s
itself
from
he
assumes t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s an
object.
The
identity
f a r from appearing
t o be
t h a t gives out i t s Absolute
of
of
object is
of the
the n i g h t m
defect
identity
in
philosopher.
Schelling's
o f Substance i s
t o be
identity
from
t h i s , Hegel argues,
presentation of the s u b j e c t i v i t y
this
a shot
intuition
of
philosophy
The
claims, i s that l i k e
Schellmg's opinion,a privileged

But
so t h e
that of S c h e l l m g .
Logic
reality
I t is precisely m
is
simply
s u b j e c t and
the highest
reality
Schellmg's philosophy,
pistol
that
s e c t i o n of the
'a k n o w l e d g e . .
w n i c h a l l cows
7 3
are b l a c k ' .
The
system p r e s e n t s
kind
is
one
of subject ooject
that
identity
Hegel's view i s
Schelling's
indifferent
the object which i s
studied.
The
be b o t h
o b j e c t as
t h o u g h there were n o t h i n g m
s u b j e c t and
i c u l a r to
as
its
approach: t h a t Substance i s
u n l i k e Schelling's philosophy,
the Absolute
advance d e c l a r e d
to
part-
i s Subject.
aim t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
just
it
as mucii S u b j e c t .
C e n t r a l t o such a p r o o f m
pure simple
negativity',
he
72.
I b i d . Werke 6, pp. 250-2.51.
73-
H e g e l . Werxe 3,p.22.
s a y s , has
Ik.
of
For,
d o e s n o t m e r e l y assume
v i e w i s t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l , a l i e n
'as
to
discuss.
H e g e l ' s s y s t e m t h e n has
its
object is m
tnat
that
Hegel's
reality.
Suostance
n o t m e r e l y t o be
Ibid.,
p. 23-
195-
hypothesis but a given m

acknowledges
experience.
To t h i s e x t e n t H e g e l
the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n .
Difference
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , he a d m i t s , i s i n h e r e n t m
between
experience.
H e g e l b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s b e i n g a b s o l u t e l y s i n c e r e m
this.
B u t we a r e i n c l i n e d
material-
ist
premiss i f
disregard
it
as t h e r e s u l t o f p h i l o s o p h y we
it.
I f , as so h a p p e n s ,
a t any p o i n t
need i t .
t o d o u b t t h e genuineness of H e g e l ' s
t h e argument
are able t o
we a r e a b l e t o d i s c a r d
t h e n , q u i t e s i m p l y , we do n o t
T h i s , o f c o u r s e , makes H e g e l ' s a r g u m e n t
he i s e s t a b l i s h i n g s o m e t h i n g w h i c h he has a l r e a d y
be t h e c a s e .
m
T h i s , as I have p o i n t e d o u t , i s
Hegel's philosophy.
circle
The c i r c u l a r i t y
h i s argument
The
s y s t e m , he s a y s ,
which presupposes i t s
he
The
busin-
' i s the becoming o f i t s e l f ,
the
end as i t s p u r p o s e ana has i t as
through i t s being c a r r i t d
end i s r e a l . ' ^ ^
We
t h a t t h e outcome
o f a system w i l l
T h i s i s because
that
he c l a i m s , t h e c r e a t i o n o f a s e i f - e n c l o s e d
i t s b e g i n n i n g , and o n l y
o u t and
a r e n o t i n e r r o r , he b e l i e v e s ,
its
assuming
be t h e same as i t s p u r p o s e .
r e a l i t y , which the system i s ,
'What has been s a i d ' , he s a y s ,

way:
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n
w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s o f p h i l o s o p n y as s u c h .
ess o f p h i l o s o p h y i s ,
system.
assumed t o
I t i s not though a e o n t r a d i c t i o n
H e g e l s o u g h t t o evade.
identifies
circuiar,
is
itself
t e l e o l o g j eal
'can a l s o be e x p r e s s e d m
t h a t Reason i s p u r p o s e f u l a c t i v i t y .
..The r e s u l t
is
this
there-
75- See above C h a p t e r One, pAO ,'"The a c t i v i t y o f m i n d " , H e g e l

a r g u e s i s " f i r s t r e a c t i o n ; o n l y i n t h i s way w i l ] i t become
conscious o f i t s essence".' e t c .
76. H e g e l . W e r k e _ 5 , p. 23. As C l a r k e says : ' T h e " c i r c u l a n t y " w h i c h Hegel
f r e q u e n t l y e m p h a s i s e d as t h e f o r m o f h i s t h o u g h t a t once s u p p l i e s h i m w i t h a r e a d y escape f r o m c r i t i c i s m and l e a v e s h i m p e c u l i a r l y open t o i t . ' I t s u p p l i e s h i m w i t h a r e a d y escape f r o m
c r i t i c i s m b e c a u s e ' i t become?, i m p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e f r o m h i s
w h o l e s y s t e m any p a r t o f i t , and t o s u b m i t t h i s co a norm o f
" v e r i f i c a t i o n " w h i c h a p p e a r s f rom"out s i o e " . ' op. c i t . . p. 19'l
Cla.rke s a y s l i t t l e a b o u t why Hege! 's c i r c u l a r i t y l e a v e s h i m
p e c u l i a r l y open t o c r i t i c i s m .
Tne r e a s o n i s p l a i n t o see, r,o,\ever.
I f H e g e l ' s s y s t e m i s c i r c u l a r i t c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t
p r o v e d i t t o be t r u e .
A l l ne i s e s t a b l i s h i n g :s what he c l a i m s
t o be t r u e a l r e a d y .
19b.
f o r e o n l y t h e same as t h e b e g i n n i n g b e c a u s e t h e b e g i n n i n g i s
purpose; - or the r e a l
the
i m m e d i a t e has
in
i s o n l y t h e same as
itself
as
its
concept because
i t s purpose the s e l f
or
77
pure
reality.'''
Hegel
t h e n b e l i e v e s he
h i s a s s u m p t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y ,
overcome m
that that
is
the philosophy
is
itself,
into
which
t h e S e l f a t t h e end
i s how
things are.
ience
of i t s
own
he
suggests,
Hence t h e s y s t e m i s
circular.
stance
It
tion
i n Hegel's system.
i t o u g h t t o be
have t n o u g h t
My
this.
as t h e r e s u l t
ideal
exper-
experience.
describes
because S u b s t a n c e
h i s view i s
is
Subic
to depict
purpose t o defend
Since
I regard i t
clear that I believe i t

purpose i s
this
circul-
as a c o n t r a d i c t o be
ultimately
r a t h e r t o e x p l a i n wiiy he
might
I have a r g u e d t h a t H e g e l sees h i s
o f a c o m p l e x and
h i s t o r y of philosophy.
tion
Concrete
reality.
f a r f r o m b e i n g my
indefensible.
immediate
c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach regards
A l l h i s s y s t e m does m
is
convinced
Phenomenology
c i r c u l a r because what i t
t e l e o l o g i c a l nature of
arity
accord
as S u b j e c t , H e g e l w o u l d say,
Subject.
the
The
The
of the
however
is
itself.
b e c a u s e , somehow, t h a t
is,
is
b e c a u s e he
the purpose o f r e a l i t y
retracted
is sincere
e x t e n s i v e development
I have c l a i m e d
of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy
that his
system
in
the
mterpfeta-
e n t e r s i n t o h i s system
two ways, f i r s t l y , as t h e s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h H e g e l
begins
h i s e n q u i r i e s a n d , s e c o n d l y , as t h e c o n t e n t o f much o f
his
philosophy.
the
I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h how
content of his
philosophy
r o l e of past p h i l o s o o h i e s m
c o n c l u s i o n was
7?
we
discussed
became
at length
that Hegel thought
H e g e l . Werke Z>, p.26.
exactly i t
Our
of his philosophy
Hegel's emphasis.
the
as
general
oeiag
197.
in a critical
c o n t i n u i t y w i t h p a s t and c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s -
ophy.
o f c o u r s e , e x p l a i n s why he c h o o s e s t o d e p i c t
his
This,
s y s t e m as one m
believe,
it
which Substance i s S u b j e c t .
goes some way
Also,
towards e x p l a i n i n g Hegel's
q u e s t i o n i n g acceptance of the t r u t h
un-
of his thesis.
In his
view t h i s
- t h a t Substance i s Subject - i s n o t o n l y the
principal
thesis of his philosophy i t
history
of philosophy.
He
thanks i t
c o n c l u s i o n about- t h e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y
p h i l o s o p h y has r a i s e d
of the
t o be n o t o n l y
but the l e v e l
his
t o which
S p i n o z a , he
i e v e d , had shown t h a t t h e d u a l i t y b e t w e e n
e x t e n s i o n and
o n l y be overcome
stance.
by
i s the r e s u l t
h i s time.
could
itself
regarding r e a l i t y
as t h e one
L e i b n i z and t h e E m p i r i c i s t s , we have
a r g u e , had p r e j u d i c e d
this holist
was n e c e s s a r i l y an i n d i v i d u a l ,
Consequently, the task f o i
seen H e g e l
v i e w by s h o w i n g t h a t
there
t h e German I d e a l i s t s :
m
Kant,
Hegel's words, t o r e s t o r e
What H e g e i t h i n k s t h e y d i d
show t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ,
s u b j e c t i v e v i e w c f r e a l i t y was
pletely
compatible w i t h a h c l i s t
view.
crucial
figure
last
philosophy p r i o r t o his
it
w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e
individual,
itself
particular
itself
constituted
this
own.
is to
com-
K a n t i s t h e most
stage m
the development
A f t e r K a n t , he
tnmks,
f o r p h i l o s o p h y t o c o n c e i v e o f an
reality
t h e p r o d u c t o f mind.
K a n t had c o n c l u s i v e l y
thought
Sub-
u n i t y out o f d i f f e r e n c e .
cf
bel-
p a r t i c u l a r aspect t o r e a l i t y .
F i c h t e and S c h e l l m g i v i been,
f o r Hegel i n
opposed
This i s
shown t h a t
by t h e s u b j e c t
t o m i n d w h i c h was n o t
so i n h i s v i e w
because
e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e was
( o r the u n i t y
of apperception).
198.
It
is this conviction that
forming the opinion
i s most c r u c i a l
wh3 en,
subject.
Kegel's
as we c a n s e e , becomes t h e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y ,
itself
that
reality
F o r g o t t e n i n t h i s o f course
is
is that
Kant
regarded
h i m s e l f as e x p l a i n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f a phenomenal
reality,
t h a t t h e r e f o r e f o r K a n t , p h i l o s o p h y was n o t c i r c u l a r .
In
h i s v i e w t h e r e was a ( n o u m e n a l ) r e a l i t y w h i c h
be
a b s o r b e d by m i n d .
this
point.
As we know, H e g e l d o e s n o t a g r e e on
I n this
respect i t
is
clear that
H e g e l sees
K a n t t h r o u g h t h e eyes o f F i c h t e s i n c e he s h a r e s
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e D i n g an s i c h i s
himself.
Kantian
Kantian philosophy
a postulate of the subject
t n e way i s made c l e a r f o r t h e w h o l e
t o be made i n t o an o n t o l o g y .
a p o i n t o f view Being
Le s u b j e c t .
philosophy
regard
Fichte's
By r e m o v i n g t h e n o t i o n o f D i n g an s i c n f r o m t h e
epistemology
The
could n o t
( o r indeed
Hegel c a r r i e s t h i s
as a r e s u l t
From s u c h
S u b s t a n c e ) c a n be seen t o
presupposition into
his
o f t h e H i s t o r y o f Philosophy.
I , o r t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u b j e c t , t h e r e f o r e can
'what a p p e a r s t o be g o i n g on o u t s i d e i t s e l f ,
an
78
activity
this
opposed t o i t s e l f '
i s t h e stage
that
as ' i t s own d o i n g ' .
p h i l o s o p h y has reached w i c h t h e
i d e a l i s m o f K a n t , F i c h t e and S c h e l l m g .
B u t H e g e l , as we
know, n o t o n l y r e g a r d s h i m s e l f as c a r r y i n g i n
the
that
result
result
required
78.
o f previous
is
Ibid.,
this
p.39-
to his
philosophy
p h i l o s o p n y b u t a l s o as c a r r y i n g
his philosophy,
that
For
result
So w h a t , he s a y s ,
be shewn t o be t r u e
out
i s now
f o r t h e whole
199-
cf
objective
that
own
of
reality.
Phenomenology has t o p r o v e
'what a p p e a r s t o be g o i n g on o u t s i d e ' raxnd i s

d o i n g ' and
mind.
has
The
f c r t h e whole
I t follows that
t o be t h a t
stantial
this
contemporary
'its
appearance
t h e outcome o f t h e Phenomenology
'Being i s a b s o l u t e l y m e d i a t e d ; - i t
c o n t e n t w h i c h i s even so t h e i m m e d i a t e
is a
SUD-
property
7Q
of
the I , i t i s
It
is
this
of Hegel's
to
self-ish
( s e l b s t i s c h ) or the concept.'
c o n c l u s i o n , w h i c h because o f t h e c i r c u l a r
nature
s y s t e m was
transition
the Logic.
The
never i n doubt, t h a t
forms the
t a s k o f epistemology Hegel
says m
P r e f a c e t o t n e Phenomenology i s new a c c o m p l i s h e d ,
of
knowledge
i s prepared.
contemporary appearance
full
The
For the f u l l
o f mind,
Hegel
account o f the n a t u r e o f knowing.

experience o f a r e a l i t y which i s
w h i c h becomes t h r o u g h t h a t
o n e s e l f as o n e s e l f .
The
The
form o f s i m p l i c i t y
left
of
self.
t o know an o t h e r o f
object,
do n o t
o r knowof
their
c l a i m s , t h e n t a k e on t h e
They a r e , i n h i s v i e w , seen
phenomenology o f m i n d .
the
world
They a r e what
The
i79s n o t I b it dh .e a p p r o p r i a t e
results
from
shows
B u t t h e Phenomenology
f o r m f o r t80.
h e i r oIrbgiadn.i s a t i o n .
emphasis.
as
Phenomenology o f F i n d
t o be m e r e l y a w o r l d o f i d e a s .
Hegel's
itself
i s s i m p l y t h e knowledge
they are, ideas merely.
Ibid.
8l
the
8l.
is
This i s experience.
forms o f mind, Hegel
what
is
believes,
f o r m s o f m i n d , as a r e s u l t ,
have t h e c h a r a c t e r o f d i v i s i o n
l e d g e and t r u t h , what
'the element
the negative of
is
the
account of the
experience the property
The n a t u r e o f k n o w i n g t'ien f o r H e g e l
process.
Rather
200.
' t h e i r movement w h i c h
organises
them i n t o
their speculative
82
whole i s Logic
or speculative philosophy.
In defending
a view of Kegel's philosophy
I h a v e been p r i m a r i l y
Mind.
As
indication
a brief
the understanding
o f how
t h i s might
be
look at the conception
Science of Logic.
this
Chapter
c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e Phenomenology o f
a view of h i s philosophy
significance
We
can
it
m u s t , h o w e v e r , be
of a l l h i s works.
so I s h o u l d
that
lies
like
As
a t t h e back o f
t a k e as o u r s t a r t i n g - p o i n t
of
Phenomenology t o t h e L o g i c .
transition
is
tne stage
in
I t appears t h a t
the experience
M i n d o r S p i r i t becomes known as a
these
purely essentialities,
the
this
the
world of ideas.
stand wholly l o g i c a l .
Bimply t o ennumerate those
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and
l a n g u a g e and
philosophy.
formal logic
as t h e y s u r f a c e m
t h e same o p p o s i t i o n o f t h o u g h t
of
consciousness d e p i c t e d i n
same p r o c e s s
The
Logic
t h e i r opposition
the process
82.
Ibid.
h i s view,
they
will
not
the o r d i n a r y
in ordinary
permeated
r e a l i t y as t h e modes
t h e PhenomenoJ ogy.
Reason has
ha.s t o p u r i f y
t o show t h a t
Notion or Subject.
is
and
found
as
Therefore
o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f t h e Under-
standing to d i a l e c t i c a l
as w e l l .
tney are
they are, m
by
the
Hegel's view, i t
As
which
become t h e
They a r e n o t , t h o u g n ,
do
point
I t is
subject-matter of the Logic.

Again,
from
o f mind a t
Kegel claims, that
an
t o take
a b b r e v i a t e d a c c o u n t I have j u s t g i v e n o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n
the
of
This,
the
Logic
the forms o f thought
Being
seated i n
of the Logic.
Again Hegel's
t o take place m
I t ,
emphasis.
i t s Essence i s
the b r i e f e s t
like
of
form
the
possible
t n e Pheno.nen.o2 ogy
20]
i n v o l v e s r a i s i n g o u r t h i n k i n g from t h e l e v e l o f V o r s t e l l e n
t o the l e v e l o f Vernunft or conceptual t h i n k i n g .
Tne
course o f t h a t t r a n s i t i o n i s from
10
Subjective Logic.
O b j e c t i v e Logic
I would t h e r e f o r e argue t h a t t h e concept
o f p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i n f o r m s t h e Phenomenology remains a t
t h e b a s i s o f what was t o be t h e c r o w n i n g g l o r y o f Hegel's
system: t h e L o g i c .
that is inherent m
work as w e l l .
The e f f o r t t o overcome the o t h e r n e s s

experience
i s c l e a r l y sustained i n
That e f f o r t , does, a d m i t t e d l y , take cn a
d i f f e r e n t form i n t h e Science o f L o g i c s i n c e i t
a t t h e manner m
that
Is directed
whicn o p p o s i t i o n , and u l t i m a t e l y
alienation,
has permeated o u r language and t h e r e f o r e f o r m a l l o g i c .
None
t h e l e s s 3 t I s t h e same b a s i c concern t h a t l i e s a t t h e Lock

o f Hegel's view o f L o g i c ,
F o r t h i s reason I b e l i e v e t h a t
t h e Science o f Logic may be seen as a phenomenology o f i d e a s .

T h i s , J t h i n k , i s t n e view t h a t Hegel h i m s e l f i m p l i e s when
he says m
that
t h e Preface
t o t h e second e d i t i o n o f the Logi_c
'the l o f t i e r business
o f l o g i c i s t o p u r i f y the s e e a t e -
g o r i e s . . . w h i c h a r e f i r s t brought
spirit m
and
i n t o t h e consciousness o f
an i s o l a t e d f a s h i o n and t h e r e f o r e a r e changeable
c o n f u s i n g and so o n l y a f f o r d i t
r e a l i t y , and c o n s e q u e n t l y
84
and t r u t h ,
Hegel argues
an i s o l a t e d and u n c e r t a i n
them r a i s e s p i r i t t o i t s freedom
t h a t ideas as they appear
the o r d i n a r y language and A r i s t o t l e i a n l o g i c do n o t a d e q u a t e l y

depict the nature of r e a l i t y .
They have t o oe p u r i f i e d
so t h a t mind can be r a i s e d t o i t s freedom.

And t h e realm
85- 'The O b j e c t i v e Logic seems t o be so termed becruso i t t r a c e s ,
a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e L o g i c , tne p a t h o f Phe?iQinenol j g v from a
t h i n k i n g t h a t is''me r e l y " o b j e c t i v e ("aoout " e x p e r i e n c e ) , t h i n k i n g which i s a t t h e same l e v e l o f V o r s t e l l e n t o 'a t h o u g n t - - . ^ t
i s t r u l y o b j e c t i v e , m t h e sense t h a t i t i s f i n a l l y c o n s t i t utive of experience'.Clarke,op.cit.,p.73.
1
202.
o f freedom, he argues i n t h e body o f t h e work, i s

when Substance
i s shown t o be S u b j e c t .
attained
The L o g i c c o n s e q u e n t l y
i s t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology w i t h i n t h o u g h t i t s e l f ,
w i t h o u t , as Hegel says, t h e element o f immediate
(unmittelbares Dasein).
presence
The phenomenology o f ideas ( t h e
L o g i c ) d i f f e r s t h e n from t h e phenomenology o f mind m

the
l a t t e r i s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e appearance
that
o f an e x t e r n a l
r e a l i t y i n consciousness and t h e f o r m e r a t t h e v o c a b u l a r y
t h a t makes such a c o n c e p t i o n p o s s i b l e .
are
Both phenomenologies
t h e r e f o r e intended t o e s t a b l i s h the t h e s i s o f idealism.
Both t h e r e f o r e , I w i s h t o c l a i m , e x h i b i t t h e same t y p e o f
circularity.
The d i a l e c t i c
i s Subject i s that
84.
t h a t i s t o show t h a t
Substance
already.
Hegel. Werke_5, p. 2 7 .
K r o n e r o p . c i t . , , Book two,
appears t o have come t o t h e same c o n c l u s i o n : 'To t h i s
e x t e n t t h e method o f L o g i c i s t h e r e f o r e phenomenoxogical,
j u s t as on the' o t h e r hand t h e method o f t h e Phenomenology
w a s ^ l o g i c a l : b o t h are d i a l e c t i c a l . ' p. 422.
Hy" ppoXi t e
Genese e t S t r u c t u r e de l a Pheriome'nologie de L ' E s p r i t de
H e g e l ) goes so f a r as t o say t h a t '"there i s a p e r f e c t
correspondence between the Phenomenology o f Mind and t h e
L o g i c ' , s i n c e ' i t i s always t h e same c o n t e n t , t h e sa_me
d e t e r m i n e t i o n s t h a t p r e s e n t themselves m t h e Phenomeno1ugy
under t h e aspect o f forms o f consciousness, i n t h e LogTcT'"
under t h e aspect c f d e t e r m i n a t e concepts, p. 565.
20^.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND
(li)
E p i s t e m o l o g y and Experience
I n h i s seminal work Von Kant b i s Hegel R i c h a r d K r o n e r

argues t h a t Hegel's
Phenomenology o f Mind r e p r e s e n t s a
''return t o t h e problem o f knowledge'. ^
H i s reasons f o r
making t h i s c l a i m are not i m m e d i a t e l y e v i d e n t but a l l o f

them, i t seems concern what Hegel has t o say which i s new'.
?
Kroner's
Geist'.
In
view t h i s may be 'compressed i n the n o t i o n o f

I t i s worth f o l l o w i n g h i s reasoning m
detail.
B e f o r e we dc so. however, we might note t h a t Chapter Two

ended i n a s i m i l a r v e i n .
There we a l s o
suggested
that
the n o t i o n o f G e i s t played an i m p o r t a n t r o l e m
distinguishing
Hegel's system from t h a t o f o t h e r p h i l s c p h e r s .
We p a r t i c u l a r
emphasised t h e r o l e i t
played m
ophy from t h a t o f S c h e l l m g .
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Hegel's p h i l o s
And, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , we
came t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hegel o b j e c t e d t o S c h e l l m g d e p i c c

i n g A r t as t h e h i g h e s t u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t because
was
an u n i t y which was n o t adequate t o G e i s t .
it
G e i s t , Hegel
c l a i m e d , was h i g h e r than any sensuous e x i s t e n c e , and t h e r e f o r e

h i g h e r than any mere work o f A r t .
We were t h e r e f o r e a b l e
t o share C a i r d ' s o p i n i o n t h a t i t i s Hegel's n o t i o n o f G e i s t

t h a t takes him beyond S c h e l l ^ n g .
behind Kroner's
The r e a s o n i n g t h a t lies
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t the Phenomenology r e p r e s e n t s
a r e t u r n t o t h e problem o f knowledge r.as t o do w i t h the same

point.
Kroner
sees the Phenomeaology as a r e t u r n t o the
p r e - S c h e l l m g i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f German I d e a l i s m i n which
1.
2.
3.
R.Kroner.
Vor Kent b i s hegel ; p. 362, Book 2.
Ibid.
See above, Chapter
Footnote 116.
the
204.
S u b j e c t has precedence
over t h e o b j e c t .
p l a c e , Kroner adds, m
the more o b j e c t i v e form o f G e i s t .
T h i s i s so because Hegel o n l y
s u b j e c t i v i t y ' by r a i s i n g
ism
But t h i s t a k e s
'revives the Kantian-Fichtean
' i t t o the l e v e l of absolute i d e a l -
a t t a i n e d by S c h e l l m g .
T h i s r e t u r n t o the K a n t i a n -
F i c h t e a n s t a n d p o i n t e n t a i l s a r e t u r n t o the problem o f
knowledge
(and t h i s i s where Kroner an u n c l e a r ) because
m that p h i l o s o p h y makes t h e I ,
consciousness i n t o i t s
'only
pivotal
p o i n t can i t a v o i d t h e c l i f f s o f Spmozism on which S o h e l l i n g

foundered and s e t f o r t h t h e t r u t h o f Spinozism i t s e l f . ' ^
I t
i s n o t , o f course, i m m e d i a t e l y e v i d e n t t h a t Hegel, m a d o p t i n g
such a p o s i t i o n , would as a consequence have t o r e t u r n t o t h e
problem o f knowledge.
I t would o f course though be e v i d e n t
i f l i k e K i o n e r we assumed t h a t t h e F : c h t e a n - K a n t i a n s t a n d p o i n t
of
S u b j e c t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e problem o f
knowledge.
It
i s t h i s p o i n t t h a t i s t h e c l u e t u u n d e r s t a n d i n g Kroner's
reasoning.
Kroner i d e n t i f i e s t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f S u b j e c t w i t h
the
s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e o r d i n a r y o r n a t u r a l consciousness o f
the
the
n a t u r a l consciousness i n t o h i s o b j e c t i n the Phenomenology
so t h a t he can l e a d i t
As we have seen, Kegel makes
t o science.
Now
Kroner b e l i e v e s t h a t
t h i s i n v o l v e s t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e problem o f
because m
knowledge
o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g t h e same p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s made
t h a t l i e s a t t h e base o f t h a t problem, namely, t h a t t h e r e

a s e p a r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e o p p o s i t i o n between s u b j e c t and
4.
Kroner, o p . c i t . , p. y<oh.
is
205.
object.
Simply m
s e t t i n g out t o prove t h a t e v e r y t h i n g
i s an A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y , m
c o n t r a s t t o S c h e l l m g who
merely
assumes t h a t i s so, Hegel, Kroner c l a i m s , has t o r e t u r n t o

the
s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e problem o f knowledge,
o r as Hegel
would put i t , a s t a n d p o i n t t h a t concerns i t s e l f w i t h t n e

r e l a t i o n of thought t o i t s o b j e c t .
We
can now
see why
it
i s t h a t Kroner t h i n k s t h i s a v o i d s t h e p i t - f a l l s o f Spmozism.
Hegel wishes t_o prove t o t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t h a t a] 1
r e a l i t y i s an i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
a t r u t h t h a t i s revealed to the i n d i v i d u a l .
m
I t i s not simply
I t i s r a t h e r one
which t h e s u b j e c t has h i s p l a c e and t h e r e f o r e , Hegel
p r e s e r v e s h i s freedom.
As we know, Hegel c l a i m s t h a t t h e
u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t has t o be one m

independence
believes
i s not extinguished.
the
problem o f knowledge
his
c e r t a i n t y and c e r t a i n knowledge
w m c h the i n d i v i c L j a
Hegel t h e r e f o r e
revives
o r d e r t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l can
m
philosophy.
find
This,
t h e n , - i s what Kroner concludes on behaLf of Hegel: 'Philosophy

has t o b e g i n w i t h the t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e , i t has t o prove
the
c e r t a i n t y o f knowledge;
only through c e r t a i n t y
by e x a m i n a t i o n i s t h e t r u t h o f knowledge
hardened
J
guaranteed. '~
We began t h i s e n q u i r y w i t h a t h e s i s o f Haoermas' which,

i f we r e c a l l , d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f K r o n e r ' s .
That t h e s i s was t h a t Hegel and Marx had demolished
the
(abgebaut)
e n t e r p r i s e o f the t h e o r y o f knoxvledge and t h a t v e r y
little
t h a t was p o s i t i v e emerged from t h e i r r e j e c t i o n o f t h e problem

of knowledge.
I suggested, a t t h e t i m e , t h a t Habermas'
judgement was t o o b l e a k a view o f t h e m a t t e r , c l a i m i n g t h a t

5-
I b i d . , p. >6j5.
206.
the
problem o f knowledge
reflection
i s n o t superceded w i t h o u t deep
i n t h e H e g e l i a n and M a r x i s t accounts o f e x p e r i e n c e .
I have s i n c e t r i e d t o show how comprehensively and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y Hegel d e a l s w i t h t h e problem as i t o c c u r s m t h e

H i s t o r y o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
T h i s account s h o u l d be
s u f f i c i e n t t o demonstrate t h a t t h e problem i s n o t r e j e c t e d
out
o f hand by Hegel.
Now we have t h i s c l a i m o f K r o n e r
t h a t Hegel's f i r s t major p h i l o s o p h i c a l work, one view o f

which we have a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d , r e p r e s e n t s a r e c u r r e n c e o f
the
emphasis on t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge
o f German I d e a l i s m .
w i t h i n tjae h i s t o r y
I t i s t h i s view o f t h e Phenomenology
thau I wish t o explore m
t h i s Chapter.
I n e x p l o r i n g t h i s view t h e r e i s an i m p o r t a n t
conclusion
o f Hegel's t h a t we nave t o bear i n mmd: h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t

knowledge i s n o t about r e a l i t y b u t i s r e a l i t y .
We have
a l r e a d y encountered t h i s as t h e view t h a t i n genuine p h i l o s o p h y

or i d e a l i s m a l l o t h e r n e s s i s overcome.
T h i s view b r i n g s us
t o t h e same c o n c l u s i o n because o f t h e manner m

argues h i s i d e a l i s m .
which Hegel
As I have p o i n t e d o u t , he p r i d e s h i m s e l f
on t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f h i s i d e a l i s m and t h e r e f o r e r e l i e s on
tne
t e n d e n c i e s w i t h i n s c i e n c e i t s e l f t o b o l s t e r up h i s c l a i m .
What he, l i k e S c h e l l i n g , s i n g l e s o u t m
science t o support
h i s c l a i m i s i t s tendency t o ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i s e ' n a t u r e , f o r ,

m
s c i e n c e , he c l a i m s , n a t u r e t u r n s out t o be n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n t n e s c i e n t i f i c lav/ we f o r m u l a t e aoout i t .
Scientific
knowledge, he concludes, i s n o t about t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d
207.
but i s t h a t w o r l d .
that m
I n g e n e r a l , t h e n , Hege] presupposes
knowledge t h e o p p o s i t i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t
i s transcended.
Since t h i s i s such an i m p o r t a n t aspect o f
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i t
i s now t i m e t h a t we have a more f o r m a l
view o f t h e m a t t e r .
And ' f o r m a l l y ' , Hegel c l a i m s ,
'what has
been s a i d may be expressed i n t h i s way, t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

judgement o r p r o p o s i t i o n i n g e n e r a l w h i c h i n c l u d e s w i t h i n
i t s e l f t h e d i f f e r e n c e o f s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e i s
by t h e s p e c u l a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n . . ' . ^
I n Hegel's o p i n i o n , t n e n ,
knowledge i s t h e ' d e s t r u c t i v e u n i t y o f t h e concept'

which thought
destroyed
(lb.) m
'loses j u s t as much i t s f i x e d o b j e c t i v e b a s i s
which i t had m
t h e S u b j e c t as i t
i s thrown back on t o t h e
p r e d i c a t e s o f t h e same and, i n t h i s , r e t u r n s n o t t o i t s e l f b u t
i n t o the subject o f the content'.
i n denying
There i s l i t t l e p o i n t
t h a t these a r e obscure p o i n t s .
Hegel may have
washed t o make h i s system a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e o r i d m a r y
consciou-
ness o f h i s time b u t he can h a r d l y hope t o have succeeded w i t h

such an i n s c r u t a b l e s t y l e .
i s under f i r e m
However, i t
i s c l e a r t h a t what
these passages i s t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i d e a o f
tne r e l a t i o n o f s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e m
An example from Hegel's L o g i c w i l l ,
a true proposition.
I t n i n k , h e l p us here.
I n e x p l a i n i n g t h e l o g i c a l form which he b e l i e v e s i s a p p r o p r i a t e
to
convey t h e t r u t h he draws o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e p o s i t i v e
judgement 'the rose i s r e d ' .

course,
to
A p o s i t i v e judgement i s , o f
o f t h e form t h e i n d i v i d u a l
i s t h e u n i v e r s a l , and s e r v s
i n d i c a t e f o r Hegel t h e inadequacy o f t h e form o f judgement
i n g e n e r a l f o r t n e ta.sk o f i m p a r t i n g t r u t h .
Hegel argues
6.
Hegel, Ph^nomenologie des G e i s t e s , Werke 3, p. 59
7.
I b i d . , p. 60.
208.
t h a t t h a t p o s i t i v e judgement i s inadequate t o convey t r u t h

s i n c e such a p r e p o s i t i o n does n o t e n t a i l t h a t
corresponds w i t h i t s o b j e c t .
thought
For when I judge t h a t a rose
i s r e d I have s i m p l y p o s t u l a t e d t h a t a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s
between an o b j e c t and
an i d e a .
ment', as Mure p o i n t s o u t ,
'A mere q u a l i t a t i v e
judge-
' l i k e "the rose i s r e d " may
be
, Q
c o r r e c t , but i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y n e i t h e r t r u e n o r f a l s e .
It
i s n e i t h e r t r u e n o r f a l s e because i t does n o t show t h a t
t h e r e i s a necessary r e l a t i o n between the s u b j e c t and

predicate.
any
Hegel t h i n k s t h a t the same i s the case w i t h
judgement or p r o p o s i t i o n .
s u b j e c t and
its
I n any
judgement, he
suggests,
p r e d i c a t e are l i n k e d i n an a b s t r a c t way.
would o n l y be l i n k e d i n a c o n c r e t e ,
were the p r e d i c a t e .
But
it
t r u e way
judgement o n l y a l l o w s us t o a t t r i b u t e one
A p r o p o s i t i o n or
predicate at a
For i n s t a n c e , i t may
t h a t t h e rose i s red but i t
subject
i s p r e c i s e l y the s t r u o c u r e 01
the judgement t h a t makes t h i s i m p o s s i b l e .
time t o the s u b j e c t .
i f the
They
be c o r r e c t t o ssy
i s a l s o vaguely c i r c u l a r m
shape,
p a r t o f a p l a n t , e t c . a l l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t the judgement might

c o n t a i n but none o f which are the s u b j e c t o f the judgement
in its totality.
Mure puts i t i n t h i s way:
i s r e d " . . . S ( s u b j e c t ) has
' i n " T h i s rose
o t h e r q u a l i t i e s beside r e d ,
and
P ( p r e d i c a t e ) q u a l i f i e s o t h e r s u b j e c t s b e s i d e s the rose:
o u t f l a n k eacn o c h e r ' . ^
they
N e i t h e r the p r e d i c a t e i s adequate
t o t h e s u b j e c t nor the s u b j e c t adequate t o the p r e d i c a t e .

That i s why
the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement has
to destroy
the
' d i f f e r e n c e o f s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e . '

8.
Hegel. Wissenschaf t der Log a k, \'erx:e 6, p. 263.
9.
G.R.G.Mure.
The_ Philosophy o f Hegel, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P
p. 2 1 .
"
30. I b i d . , p. -j>K.
209-
The n o t i o n o f t r u t h t h a t Hegel i s d e f e n d i n g , and which

l i e s a t t h e back o f h i s a t t i t u d e t o t h e problem o f knowledge
i s t h a t i t i s the c o n c r e t e o b j e c t o f knowledge i t s e l f .
T h i s i s why t r u t h , as he views i t , cannot be conveyed m
a s i n g l e p r o p o s i t i o n o r judgement. " "
The s u b j e c t o f t h e
judgement i s o f course s a i d t o be t h e p r e d i c a t e b u t i t i s
n o t , m Hegel's o p i n i o n , commensurate w i t h i t .
Truth f o r
Hegel, i s t h e whole.
T h e r e f o r e , i n any judgement, t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e i s incommensurate w i t h the s u b j e c t makes
the judgement u n t r u e .
For a judgement t o be t r u e t h e predi c a t e would have t o be t h e s u b j e c t .
T h i s b r i n g s us a g a i n
t o Hegel's " s p e c u l a t i v e judgement".
For i n t h e s p e c u l a t i v e
judgment, Hegel c l a i m s , t h e s u b j e c t passes i n t o the p r e d i c a t e .
F o r pass Hegel employs t h e verb vergehen whose i m p l i c a t i o n s
are b r o a d e r s i n c e i t can a l s o mean fade away i n t o o r even
disappear i n t o .
'what, I t h i n k , Hegel wishes t o convey by
u s i n g t h i s term i s t h e sense t h a t m t h e course o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y our concept o f i t s s u b j e c t undergoes a r a d i c a l
transformation.
And i t does so i n a remarkable senê: t h r o u g h
becoming i t s p r e d i c a t e s .
I n becoming i t s p r e d i c a t e s t h e
s u b j e c t o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l enquiry loses i t s i n i t i a l i d e n t i t y
and gains a n o t h e r .
T h i s new i d e n t i t y , Hegel s u g g e s t s , i s t h e
i d e n t i t y of i t s concrete r e a l i t y .
A n o t h e r l o o k a t t h e process
o f t h e Phenomenology might h e l p t o c l a r i f y t h e m a t t e r .
The
s u b j e c t t h a t formed t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t was, we e s t a b l i s h e d ,
the o r d i n a r y consciousness o f Hegel's t i m e .
That o r d i n a r y
consciousness was a t t h e o u t s e t merely an a b s t r a c t concept
f o r us.
We were aware t h a t i t had s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s
1
( o r , more g e n e r a l l y , p r e d i c a t e s ) but v\e were n o t , Hegel would_

11.
See Werke 3, p. ^ 7 , where lie maKes t h i s , by now,
famous c l a i m .
210.
c l a i m , aware o f i t s f u l l
reality.
r e a l i t y , could m
be a t t a i n e d by s i m p l y l i s t i n g
p r e d i c a t e s e.g.
M o r a l i t y and
no way
I t s t r u t h or
concrete
its
t h e Unhappy Consciousness, O b s e r v i n g Reason,
Religion.
We
can o n l y know the o r d i n a r y con-
sciousness o f the t i m e , Hegel c o n c l u d e s t h r o u g h knowing
it
as each o f i t s p r e d i c a t e s .
The
s u b j e c t , t h e o r d i n a r y con-
s c i o u s n e s s , must become i t s p r e d i c a t e s f o r us.

t h i s reason t h a t we might even say,
the s u b j e c t has
I t is for
as Hegel suggests, t h a t
t o d i s a p p e a r i n the p r e d i c a t e .
I t would
however be f a l s e t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s i m p l i e d t h a t t h e
subject
were somehow ] o s t w i t h o u t t r a c e .
preserved
as t h e s u b j e c t o f i t s
We
may
now
I t i s , o f course,
predicates.
see why
Hegel's view o f t r u t h i s t h a t i t i s
t h o u g h t which 'loses j u s t as much i t s f i x e d

w h i c h i t had
the s u b j e c t as i t
p r e d i c a t e s o f the same and,
i s thrown back on t o the
t h i s , returns not t o
but i n t o the s u b j e c t o f the c o n t e n t '

t h i s that i s involved m
making our Knowledge r e a l .
about an o o j e c t o r a c t i v i t y t h r o u g h
for itself.
what Hegel has
different
one
t o suggest h e r e .
But
process o f c o g n i t i o n we who
presuppositions
m
t h a t i s uncommon
Hegel
describes
As a r e s u l t o f the
are the knowers, a c c o r d i n g
H e g e l , f i n d our t h i n k i n g t o be the s u b j e c t i n i t s
reality.
is
the s t o r y i s a
take a c l o s e l o o k at how
the outcome f o r the knower h i m s e l f .
is
Real
l e a r n i n g wnat i t
There appears t o be l i t t l e
i f we
itself
(above),-because i t
knowing i s a process i n which we g i v e up our
and
objective b a s i s
to
concrete
Even t h i s appears t o be an innocuous c i a j m i f WP
211.
do n o t examine i t
closely.
What Hegel i s c l a i m i n g , though,
i s t h a t I f we know an o b j e c t our t h o u g h t i s the o b j e c t .

T h i s i s how
the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement d e s t r o y s
the g u l f t h a t
12
s e p a r a t e s t h i n k e r and
As we
know, Hegel would argue t h a t Modern P h i l o s o p h y i s
characterised
and
object.
reality.
by t h i s d u a l i s m , t h i s o i f u r c a t i o n o f t h o u g h t
We
have seen Hegel c l a i m t h a t D e s c a r t e s
established this b i f u r c a t i o n m
Modern P h i l o s o p h y by p o s t u l -
a t i n g t h a t t h e r e were two d i s t i n c t
thought.
Following
first
t h a t , i t was
substances: e x t e n s i o n
Spinoza who
had
and
established
an a b s t r a c t i d e n t i t y
o f the two by p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t t h e r e
was
but One
His
had
Substance.
neglected
since
i t was
abstract,
what Hegel b e l i e v e s t o be an e s s e n t i a l aspect o f
reality: individuation.
p o i n t e d out t h i s
did
identity,
Locke and
L e i b n i z , however,
had
omission i n Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y .
so by s h a r p e n i n g the b i f u r c a t i o n between t h o u g n t
Locke
and
12. H e r b e r t Marcuse i n h i s Reason and R e v o l u t i o n a l s o s i n g l e s out

Hegel's n o t i o n o f the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement as b e i n g o f p a r t i c
u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e m the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
H i s view i s t h a t the n o t i o n ' s t r i k e s the d e c i s i v e blow a g a i n s t
t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m a l l o g i c . ' ( p . 1 0 2 ) T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y n o t the
case m the broad sense but i t i s , p l a u s i b l y , Hegel's view o f
the matter.
C e r t a i n l y what Hegel i n t e n d s w i t h t h e s p e c u l a t i v e
judgement i s , as Marcuse s u g g e s t s , t h a t t h e ' l o c u s o f t r u t h ' be
snown t o be 'the dynamic system o f s p e c u l a t i v e judgements i n
w h i c h every s i n g l e judgement must be ' s u b l a t e d ' by a n o t h e r , so
t h a t o n l y the whole process r e p r e s e n t s the t r u t h . ( i b i d . ) And,
as I have argued, the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement i s i n t e n d e d t o
c o n t r a s t w i t h 'the l o g i c o f common sense which t r e a t s proposi t i o n s as c o n s i s t i n g o f a s u b j e c t , which serves as a f i x e d
and s t a b l e base and a p r e d i c a t e a t t a c h e d t o i t . ' ( p . 1 0 1 ) .
The
one p o i n t t h a t Marcuse misses i n making t h i s c o n t r a s t i s t h a t
Hegel's s p e c u l a t i v e judgement i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f h i s i d e a l
ism.
Or e l s e he would n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s ' p r o t e s t a g a i n s t
d i v o r c i n g t r u t n and i t s forms from c o n c r e t e processes' was a l s
'a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t s e v e r i n g t r u t h from any d i r e c t g u i d i n g
i n f l u e n c e on r e a l i t y . ' (p. 1 0 2 ) .
1
212.
r e a l i t y i n h i s empiricism.
remedying
But L e i b n i z went some way toward
t m s d e f e c t t h r o u g h p r e s e n t i n g a system o f i n t e l l -
e c t u a l i n d i v i d u a t i o n m h i s p h i l o s o p h y , the w o r l d o f monads.
T h i s d i d n o t , however, meet t h e f u l l
requirement o f philosophy,
as Hegel understood t h a t r e q u i r e m e n t , s i n c e i t
develop a l o n g d u a l i s t l i n e s .
continued t o
B e r k e l e y and Hume s e t t o work
on t h e r e v i s i o n o f Locke's m a t e r i a l i s m , t h e one from an i d e a l ist

It
p o i n t o f view, t h e o t h e r from a
sceptical
p o i n t o f view.
i s Hume's s c e p t i c a l e m p i r i c i s m t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e most
extreme consequence o f t h e d u a l i s m o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y f o r

Hegel.
P h i l o s o p h y , he argued,
does i n Hume's system.

philosophy i s that i t
m a t t e r o f custom.
cannot descend lower t h a n
it
What i r k s Hegel most about Hume's

reduces a l l problems o f t r u t h t o a
K a n t , as we know, takes h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t
from t h i s s c e p t i c i s m o f Hume s e e k i n g t o p o i n t o u t t h a t knowlodge does indeed have a r e a l i t y .
But because t h i s i s d e p i c t e d
as merely a phenomenal r e a l i t y t h e b i f u r c a t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e
i s n o t overcome.
F o r t h a t reason Hegel
b e l i e v e s t h a t Kant
remains a t t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f Locke and Hume.
I t i s only w i t h
S c h e l l m g and F i c h t e t h a t t h e p r o p e r a t t e m p t t o overcome t h e
d u a l i s m o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y i s begun.
view, f a i l m
t h i s task.
wrong s t a r t i n g p o i n t m
not
But b o t h , m
Hegel's
F i c h t e f a i l s , because he has t h e
t h e I and S c h e l l m g because he does
a t t a i n a l o g i c a l view o f t h i n g s ,
he f a i l s t o prove h i s p o i n t o f view.
i n o t h e r words, because
The whole h i s t o r y o f
Modern P h i l o s o p h y i s from t h j s H e g e l i a n s t a n d p o i n t a h i s t o r y
o f t h e g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r o f the c o n c e p t u a l equipment t o overcome d u a l i s m m
t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge b u t o f t h e f a i l u r e
to
213-
put
it
t o i t s p r o p e r use.
attribute
t o a r a d i c a l m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f knowledge t h a t
implicit m
was
T h i s f a i l u r e , I t h i n k , Hegel would
much o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
was
This misconception
fundamental t o the p o s i n g o f the problem of knowledge,
Hegel's s p e c u l a t i v e judgement i s , I b e l i e v e , d i r e c t e d a t t h i s
mi s c o n c e p t i o n .
The m i s c o n c e p t i o n i s t h i s : knowledge had been seen as
an i n s t r u m e n t (Werkzeug) o r a means ( M i t t e l ) w i t h which
we
1"^
might a t t a i n
the t r u t h . "
I t was
therefore natural to
suppose t h a t b e f o r e we e n t e r 'on the t h i n g i t s e l f ,

the
namely
r e a l knowledge o f t h a t which i s i n t r u t h ' i n p h i l o s o p h y
t h a t we ought t o examine the i n s t r u m e n t o r means w i c h which

"i 4
we were a b l e t o possess i t .
I n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the
Phenomenology Hegel suggests t h a t t h i s apprehension

t o be c o r r e c t f o r two reasons.
appears
I n the f i r s t p l a c e we
suppose t h a t t h e r e are v a r i o u s t y p e s o f c o g n i t i o n and
mighc
there-
f o r e t h a t one mode might be more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r our purposes

than another.
I n the second p l a c e we might suppose m
that
c o g n i t i o n i s a c a p a b i l i t y of a ^ e r t a m k i n d and scope t h a t w i t h out
t h e more a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f i t s n a t u r e and
the
c l o u d s o f e r r o r w i l l be t a k e n h o l d o f i n s t e a d o f the heavens
of t r u t h . ' " ^
limits
I t i s the second s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t i s most
a l l y made by t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s and, o f course,

them w i t h the problem o f knowledge.
The
typic-
presents
representative of
t h a t t r a d i t i o n Hegel i s most l i k e l y t o have m

l^.
Hegel. Werke ~5, p. 68.
14.
Ibid.
15.
Ibid.
mind i s
Kant.
214.
A l t h o u g h we cannot be c e r t a i n o f t h i s , i t
Is
instructive
t o n o t i c e the terms m w h i c h Hegel s t a t e s h i s p o i n t .

i s Kant, o f course, who
r e g a r d s our p r i n c i p a l
I t
cognitive
f a c u l t y , Reason, as a c a p a b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e terms h i s

whole e n q u i r y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .
H i s aim i n t h a t e n q u i r y i s
c o n s e q u e n t l y t o concern h i m s e l f 'not so much w i t h o b j e c t s as

1
w i t h our mode o f c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s . ' ^
So, as we know,
i t s use from t h e p o i n t o f view o f s p e c u l a t i o n would
only
be n e g a t i v e ; i t would s e r v e , as Hegel suggests h e r e ,

to
'not
extend but o n l y t o p u r i f y our reason and p r e s e r v e i t
from
17
errors'.
Indeed, the whole d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Kant makes
between t r a n s c e n d e n t a l and t r a n s c e n d e n t p h i l o s o p h y i s i n t e n d e d
to
p r e v e n t Reason from becoming enveloped
calls
'the c l o u d s o f e r r o r ' .
For Kant,
i n what Hegel a p t l y
'the more a c c u r a t e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' o f t h e n a t u r e and l i m i t s o f c o g n i t i o n
p r e v e n t our knowledge from o v e r - r e a c h i n g i t s e l f .
however, t h a t t h i s apprehension
the
Hegel c l a i m s ,
e a s i l y transforms i t s e l f
conviction that i t is f u t i l e
into
t o hope t h a t t h r o u g h c o g n i t i o n
we can l e a r n what t h e t h i n g i s i n i t s e l f .
develops
would
i n t h e mind o f t h e t h i n k e r , now
There t h e r e f o r e
turned sceptic,
an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e b a r r i e r between t r u t h and our knowledge.

'For g i v e n t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s an i n s t r u m e n t w i t h which
to
take p o s s e s s i o n o f the a b s o l u t e essence i t i m m e d i a t e l y occurs

t o one t h a t t h i s employment o f an i n s t r u m e n t on a t h i n g n o t
so much l e a v e s the t h i n g as i t
is in itself,
but r a t h e r
l8
e f f e c t s a change i n i t
16
L7
and a f o r m i n g o f i c '
What we nave
Kant. K r 1 t i k _ dev Rei.nen Vernunf t , o p . c i t . , p. 6j?

Thiri
1 8
Hegel. Werke_j), p. 68.
215-
taken
to
oe
the
supposition
that
Kant
Hegel c l a i m s , leads n a t u r a l l y t o s c e p t i c a l
makes,
conclusions.
Simply because knowledge i s conceived as an i n s t r u m e n t w i t h

which t o a t t a i n r e a l i t y t h e r e a r i s e s
may m
t h e event f a l l s h o r t
some way m
the p o s s i b i l i t y that
it
of that r e a l i t y or a l t e r i t i n
being applied.
I t i s , as we have seen, such
apprehensions t h a t l e a d Kant t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e t h i n g

in i t s e l f
(Ding an s i c h ) which would be t h e t h i n g as i t
u n a f f e c t e d by t h e human c o g n i t i v e
remains
f a c u l t i e s , and t h e o b j e c t
o r phenomenon which i s t h e t h i n g as i t i s formed by t h e human

cognitive
f a c u l t i e s , p r i n c i p a l l y the Understanding.
Kant r e g a r d s o u r c o g n i t i v e
f a c u l t i e s as, a t b e s t ,
Since
providing
us w j t h an o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d he deems t h e phenomenon
o n l y t o be knowable.
The phenomenon may indeed be a l l t h a t
we can know; however, i t
i s a l s o Kant's c l a i m
aim
i t s e l f o r t h e nournenon.
t o Know t h e t h i n g m
t h a t we always
Kegel suggests, w i t h such a view o f knowledge

o f e r ^ o r ' can n e v e r be f a r away.
trie
Thus as
'clouds
I f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n i s corvee
i t would seem t h a t t h e a n t i m o n i e s o f Reason which Kant
outlines
i n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a r i s e from the o v e r a m b i t i o u s
use
o f o u r i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge.
We might on t h e o t h e r hand t a k e t h e view, Hegel suggests,
that cognition
should n o t be seen as a t o o l b u t r a t h e r as a
p a s s i v e medium.
an a c t i v e r o l e
We no l o n g e r d e c i d e t o see i t as p l a y i n g
in o u r a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e t r u t h .
The view
o f knowledge t h a t I t h i n k Hegel nas i n mind here i s t h a t o f

the E m p i r i c i s t s .
We r e c a l l
t h a t Locke and Hume t h o u g n t o f
216.
knowledge as che agreement
o f c u r ideas w i t h t h e appearance
of
T h i s i s no more c l e a r t h a n i n
t h i n g s t o o u r senses.
Hume's i n s i s t e n c e on t h a t
'as l o n g as we c o n f i n e o u r s p e c u l -
a t i o n s t o t h e appearance o f o b j e c t s t o o u r senses, w i t h o u t
e n t e r i n g i n t o d i s q u i s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r r e a l n a t u r e and
o p e r a t i o n s , we a r e safe from a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
i 19
and can n e v e r
be embarrassed by any q u e s t i o n . ^
Only
i f we c a r r y o u r
i n q u i r y beyond t h e appearance o f o b j e c t s t o t h e senses'
will
'most o f o u r c o n c l u s i o n s . . b e f u l l o f s c e p t i c i s m and u n c e r t a i n t y ' .

T r u t h , t h e n , i s conveyed t o us by o u r s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .
All
that i s required i n our using i t
as a means i s t h a t we
do n o t i n t e r v e n e i n any way i n i t s o p e r a t i o n .
"We a r e r e q u i r e d
to
remain p a s s i v e o r merely r e c e p t i v e .
of
knowledge, t h e n , t h a t I t a k e Hegel t o be r e f e r r i n g
h i s n o t i o n o f i t as a p a s s i v e medium.
I t i s t o t h i s model
with
The problem 'with such
a n o t i o n , Hegel argues, i s t h a t a c c o r d i n g t c i t we r e c e i v e
knowledge
'not as i t
t h i s medium'.
1-> m
itself,
b u t as i t
is m
F o r example, Locke and Hume suppose
and t h r o u g h
that
knowledge i s conveyed t o us v i a t h e senses b u t s i n c e sensep e r c e p t i o n i s o n l y t h e medium t h r o u g h which we a t t a i n knowledge t h e y have t c conclude t h a t what we s e n s e - p e r c e i v e i s
not
n e c e s s a r i l y a l l t r u e and t h a t our f a c u l t i e s
itself)
the
o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n a r e n o t w h o l l y adequate t o convey
truth.
As Hegel says, t h e p o i n t i s t h a t what
we would r e c e i v e would o n l y be 'through and m

If it
( t h e medium
knowledge
t h i s medium'.
d e c e i v e d t h e r e would be no knowing how i t d i d so as
a l s o t h e r e would be no way o f knowing i f t h e r e was any knowD.Hume. A T r e a t i s e o f Human N a t u r e I , o p . c a t . , p.110.

1920.
Ibid.
217.
ledge
outside that
medium.
W h i c h e v e r p o s i t i o n we h o l d , t h e K a n t i a n one,
cognition
i s an i n s t r u m e n t t h r o u g h w h i c h we
l e d g e , o r t h e L o c k e a n one,
through which
that
'the l i g h t
that
cognition
that
achieve
know-
i s a passive
medium
o f t r u t h reaches us', Hegel b e l i e v e s
' i n b o t h i n s t a n c e s we
e m p l o y a means t h a t
immediately
21
induces
the opposite of i t s i n t e n t i o n
seems t o be
us
rather
(Zwecks)'.
a harsh conclusion.
t o t h i n k t h a t Hegel adopts
Indeed
a procedure
which
This
it
may
lead
i s not
irnman-
22
ent.
For
this
c r i t i c i s m a p p e a r s t o t a k e no
K a n t and
L o c k e ' s own
theories
o f knowledge.
appreciation
w h i c h we
doubt
that
to
merely
orientate
ourselves m
a r e t o have any
take a c r i t i c a l
ially
as t h e m e n t a l
if
we
apparatus
Indeed
Reason.
p e r c e p t i o n s as t r u e .
21.
Hegel.
22.
cast
he
conclude
nave
f a c u l t i e s , espec-
Locke, e q u a l l y ,
I n d e e d , he
have n o t t o a c c e p t
tries
is
well
a l l t h i s Hegel acknowledges m
Werke 3, p.
the
a l l sense-
to differentiate
more d e p e n d a b l e modes o f s e n s i n g f r o m t h o s e w h i c h
But
through
r e g a r d k n o w l e d g e as b e i n g i m p a r t e d by
p a s s i v e medium o f t h e s e n s e s we
so.
that
d e p e n d a o l e k n o w l e d g e t h e n we
a t t i t u d e t o our c o g n i t i v e
o u r p r i n c i p a l one,
aware t h a t
'well aware
t h e w o r l d we
on t h e c e r t a i n t y o f o u r k n o w l e d g e .
i f we
of
o f the drawbacks o f t h e i r
Kant i s o f course
by c o n c e i v i n g o u r c o g n i t i o n
account
are
the
less
h i s L e c t u r e s on
tne
68.
Habermas.
E r k e n n t n n s und I r t e r e s s e , o p . c i t . p . 2 1 .
He
s u g g e s t s t h i s i s so b e c a u s e H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e o f c l a s s i c a l
e p i s t e m o l o g y presupposes e x a c t l y what t h e l a t t e r p u t s m
q u e s t i o n : a b s o l u t e knowledge.
218.
History
now
of Philosophy.
So
we
would not
adopt a procedure which i s not
t h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s t h a t L o c k e and
knowledge.
in
this
And,
as
we
immanent by
H e g e l now
t i o n s t o the
s u g g e s t s t h a t we
will
are,
its
initial
I t h i n k , of the
t h a t K a n t has
about our
d i f f i c u l t y posed by
failings,
same k i n d
as
the
ledge the
himself'
Critique
previously
free
d e p i c t i n g the
the
out
emenda-
account
t h e s e emendreservations
world
objectively.
of the
initial
set
Dialectic
t a s k o f l e a r n i n g how
t h a t knowledge, Hegel
says,
Kant adopts a s i m i l a r
o f Pure Reason m
had
tnat
He
position
'he
flatters
'rret w i t h . . a l ]
reason at v a r i a n c e w i t h
. ^
the
a b l e t o p u r i f y w h a t e v e r know-
t h a t w o r k he
of experience
be
believes that
through
makes i t
possible to
i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge from the
illusion
thst
thus p r o v i d e us
know.
The
with a clearer
motive of h i s C r i t i q u e
23.
Kant.
Kritik
2h.
Ibid,,
p.
63.
der
Re m e n
Vemunft,
it
view o f what
is,
op.cit.
error
itself in
o f Reason he
a b o u t and
can
with
s h o u l d be
to think that
w h i c h had
the
For
instrument procures.
u n d e r t a k i n g the
use
disappointed
i n s t r u m e n t model o f k n o w l e d g e may
instrument operates.
w o u l d seem t h a t we
and
a b i l i t y t o know t h e
found t h r o u g h s e t t i n g o u r s e l v e s the
its
be
m i g h t make a few
H e g e l s u g g e s t s f o r i n s t a n c e t h a t a way
in
not
our
I n s t r u m e n t m o d e l o f k n o w l e d g e Co t a k e
o f what a p p e a r t o be
it
ignoring
K a n t have a b o u t
s h a l l see, we
he
expectation.
For
ations
expect t h a t
free
brought
we
short,
o. 13.
to
2] 9-
s e p a r a t e t h e wheat from t h e c h a f f w i t h i n o u r
cognition.
We
a l r e a d y know what t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f K a n t ' s
In
the f i r s t
legitimately
therefore,
the
p l a c e he
concludes t h a t the Understanding
I n t h e second
place,
m o n i e s o f Reason.
H e g e l , as we
be a s i g n o f t i m i d i t y
on K a n t ' s
t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t Reason
o b j e c t i o n he has
conception that
Hegel's
He
in
the
t h e Phenomenology
is,
philosophy.
can p u r i f y
In
cognitive
and w h a t p e r t a i n s t o t h e o b j e c t
began;
this
i n s t r u m e n t has done t o i t
'if,
he
of
h i s view,
our i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge
o n l y p u t us b a c k where we
from a formed t h i n g '
our
crit-
c o g n i t i o n , what p e r t a i n s t o
t h o u g h t i s c o m p l e t e l y m i s g u i d e d , because, m
supposed improvement
con-
But
i s opposed t o t h e whole
o p i n i o n t h e n o t i o n t h a t we
our t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y
Reason i t s e l f .
l i e s behind Kant's
f a c u l t i e s through separating,
believes i t to
p a r t t h a t he l o c a t e s t h e
procedure
I t h i n k , more f u n d a m e n t a l .
nothing
These a r e t h e A n t i -
h a v e seen,
observes
t o Kant's
And
t h a t Reason makes demands on
content o f our experience which corresponds w i t h
ical
may
c l a i m t o know phenomena b u t n o t noumena.
i n the t h i n g s of experience themselves.
the
e n q u i r y were.
s a y s , we
che
would
t a k e away
i n s t a n c e our knowledge,'
what
'our k n o w l e d g e s t a n d s m
exactl
25
the
same p o s i t i o n as b e f o r e we had
begun t h e e x e r c i s e .
S i n c e t h i s a r g u m e n t depends on an a n a l o g y we
it
w i t h an example o f i t s w o r k i n g .
removed
(if
might best
I f ,f o r instance,
t h a t were p o s s i b l e ) f r o m a c o m p l e t e d
t h e e f f e c t s b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e use
25Hegel . w e r k e ~j, p. 69.
clan
we
building
of a l l the tools
220.
constructing
materials
it
we w o u l d s i m p l y be l e f t
w i t h t h e raw
t n a t went i n t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
c o u r s e , have no b u i l d i n g a t a l l .
We w o u l d , o f
S i m i l a r l y H e g e l sees K a n t
as a t t e r n t p i n g t o remove f r o m a ' f o r m e d ' body o f k n o w l e d g e a l l

t h a t we d i d
forming i t .
What r e s u l t s , i n K e g e l ' s v i e w ,
is
t h a t we a r e l e f t
without a 'building'
It
i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t H e g e l b e l i e v e s t h a t o u r Knowledge
i s n o t a d v a n c e d one b i t b y a c r i t i q u e
o f knowledge a t a l l .
of Reason.^
I h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t H e g e l h a s i n mind t h e E m p i r i c i s t
v i e w o f k n o w l e d g e when he e m p l o y s t h e a n a l o g y w i t h t h e
p a s s i v e medium.
We w o u l d e x p e c t , t h e n ,
chat m
t o s a y a b o u t t h i s model o f k n o w l e d g e t h a i o f L o c k e and Hume's a t t e m p t s t o c l a r i f y

ledge.
the
u
What e s p e c i a l l y
w h a t he h a s
he a l s o taice n o t e
t h e i r v^w o f know-
comes t o m i n d m
this
e n d e a v o u r s o f L o c k e a n d Hume t o e s t a b l i s h
respect are
what comes t o
t h r o u g h t h e medium o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n i m m e d i a r e l y
the
object
self.
a n d what e l e m e n t s b e l o n g s o l e l y
We may r e c a l l how L o c k e s o u g h t
'as t h e y a r e i d e a s o r p e r c e p t i o n s m
are
modifications of matter m
from
t o t h e medium
to distinguish
it-
ideas
o u r m i n d s ; a n d as t h e y
t h e bodies t h a t
cause s u c h
. 27
perceptions in
uish
us',
and a l s o Hume's a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g -
b e t w e e n what; we a c t u a l l y
o b s e r v e f r o m w h a t we
i n f e r when we a r e l e d t o say t h a t
two t h i n g s
usually
o r events are
28
causally related.
I n d e e d we f o u n d m Hume's case t h a t s u c h
26.
I l a b e r m a s . op. c i r . pp. 19-20, e s p e c i a l l y N o t e 6.
27.
J . L o c k e . An Essay C o n c e r n i n g t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
o p . c i t . , p.~o 3Locke h i m s e l f empnasies a i l b u t t h e
'and *.
r
28.
See a b o v e .
C h a p t e r One, p. 59.
221.
was h i s c r i t i c a l
the
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e problems i n v o l v e d
model o f knowledge t h a t
scepticism.
tures,
that
it
l e d him i n t o
a species o f
H e g e l s u g g e s t s h e r e , as he does i n
this
i s an i n e v i t a b l e
result
if
Hume, m
Hegel's view, d i d
t o recognise
i sitself
no more t h a n c a r r y t h i s
standpoint
to its
logical
same p o i n t
'introduction'
his
perception,
conclusion.
And he makes t h e
t o t h e Phenomenology
t h e Lockean model i s ,
c e r t a i n t o end i n f a i l u r e .
F o r even
k n o w l e d g e w h i c h we r e p r e s e n t
t o o u r s e l v e s as a medium
point
removing i t
refraction
'if
just
divergence o f the ray out the ray i t s e l f
the
truth
then, the idea
us.'-^
' w h i c h gave t h e f i r s t
very
satisfying
apt t o run into'
rise'
standing,
examine
several inquiries
is
acquaint
as much
little
through
which
I n Kegel's view,
C o n c e r n i n g t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , n a m e l y ,
step toward
he a r g u e s ,
f o r knowledge i s n o t
the
contact with
Any
the examination o f
there i s
from t h e r e s u l t ,
comes i n t o
untrue.
Lockean
attempt t o improve o r modify
us w i t h t h e l a w o f i t s
rig-
I n the
L e c t u r e s , he p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Locke i s o b l i g e d
of truth,
t h e Lec-
one h o l d s
o r o u s l y t o t h e E m p i r i c i s t model o f knowledge.
t h a t h i s own c r i t e r i o n
t o Locke's
Essay
'that t h e f i r s t
t h e m i n d o f man was
' t o t a k e a s u r v e y o f o u r own u n d e r -
o u r own p o w e r s , a n d see t o what t h i n g s
they
31
were a d a p t e d , ' ^
that
a l s o gave
Philosophy.
because
i s erroneous.
rise
I t i s o f course t h i s
t o t h e problem o f knowledge m
I t i s an e r r o n e o u s i d e a m
even i f
we d i d
as i t
Hegel's
Modern
opinion
recommended and l e a r n t
29.
See a b o v e .
C h a p t e r One, p p . 31 - 52.
3031.
H e g e l , w e r k e 3, p. 69.
1ocke o p . c i t . , I n t r o d u c t i o n .
idea
how o u r
222.
powers d i s t o r t e d o u r k n o w l e d g e we w o u l d n o t know w h a t
k n o w i n g was b e c a u s e k n o w i n g i s n o t t h e k n o w l e d g e o f how we
distort
k n o w l e d g e b u t how we know t n a t we have done s o .
o t h e r w o r d s , we w i l l
'our
In
n o t l e a r n w h a t k n o w l e d g e i s by e x a m i n i n g
own p o w e r s , and see t o w h a t t h i n g s t h e y ' a r e ' a d a p t e d '
s i n c e i t JLS t h a t v e r y a d a p t i o n o f o u r p o w e r s .
point
The s i m p l e
t h a t H e g e l i s m a k i n g i s t h a t we w i l l n o t know w h a t
knowledge i s
through learning
its
scope and l i m i t a t i o n s .
It
i s o n l y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g wnat i t i s t h a t we can know w h a t
it
is.
I ti s f o rthis
absolute c r i t e r i o n
reason t h a t H e g e l f o r g o e s t h e s e a r c h f o r an
o f t r u t h i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y and w i t h
that,
o f c o u r s e , abandons t h e p r o b l e m o f k n o w l e d g e .
It
m i g h t be o b j e c t e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h we do n o t ( a s H e g e l
s u g g e s t s ) , know a l l t h e r e i s
cognition
.it t h a t
t o know a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s o f
t h r o u g h k n o w i n g i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , we m i g h t
coveted p o s i t i o n through simple inference.
we e s t a b l i s h
what o u r c o g n i t i v e
ones d i s c o v e r w h a t t h e y can d o .
a n d i n g was i n c a p a b l e o f k n o w i n g t h i n g s m
positive
the underst-
themselves t h a t
was p e r f e c t l y c a p a b l e o f k n o w i n g phenomena.
ledge through Determining i t s
if
Kant d i d something l i k e
t h i s when he i n f e r r e d f r o m h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
might i n f e r innumerable p o s i t i v e
For
f a c u l t i e s c a n n o t do we c a n
m e r e l y by i n v e r t i n g t h e s e n e g a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s _mto
is
arrive
Similarly,
it
we
p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t o u r know-
scope and l i m i t a t i o n s .
This
where t h e c l a s s i c a l a p p r o a c h t o e p i s t e r n o l o g y d e r i v e s i t s
strength:
I tis
felt
that i f
we know b e f o r e h a n d o u r c a p a b i l i t y
223.
t o know t h e n we may a v o i d e r r o r .
what i s o f t e n c a l l e d
have c a l l e d
expresses
T h i s i s what l e a d s t o
t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h o f what I
the classical epistemolcgists.
t h e i r h o p e s b e s t when he s a y s :
only expedient,
'Here t h e n i s t h e
f r o m w h i c h we c a n hope f o r s u c c e s s i n o u r
p h i l o s o p h i c a l researches,
method, w h i c h
Hume p e r h a p s
t o leave t h e tedious
we h a v e h i t h e r t o
f o l l o w e d and i n s t e a d o f
t a k i n g now and t h e n a c a s t l e o r v i l l a g e
march up d i r e c t l y
lingering
on t h e f r o n t i e r , t o
t o t h e c a p i t a l o r c e n t r e o f these
t o human n a t u r e i t s e l f ;
which
sciences,
b e i n g once m a s t e r s o f , we may
32
e v e r y w h e r e e l s e hope f o r an easy v i c t o r y ' .

is,
t h a t b y t h e e x a m i n a t i o n s of cur i n t e l l e c t u a l
s t r e n g t h e n and secure
of course
powers we may
o u r c l a i m s t o knowledge.
Hegel
is
aware o f t h i s a p p r o a c h t o e p i s t e m o l o g y , b u t he
believes i t
ative.
The b e l i e f
t o be an a p p r o a c h t h a t
Indeed
he c h a r a c t e r i s e s i t
is
a l l e s s e n t i a l s neg-
as an a p p r o a c h w h i c h
e r r o r i n human t h i n k i n g a n d a r o u s e s a m i s t r u s t
'm
fears
science
w h i c h w i t h o u t t h e same d o u b t f u l n e s s s e t s t o w o r k and r e a l l y
knows'.^
To e s t a b l i s h t h i s c l a i m H e g e l c o u l d w e l l
point
t o a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he comes t o i n h i s L e c t u r e s o r t h e H i s t o r y
,
of Philosophy
r e v i e w i n g Locke's p h i l o s o p h y .
T h e r e he
p o i n t s o u t , as we h a v e s e e n , t h a t L o c k e ' s a p p r e n e n s i o n
the l i m i t a t i o n s
t o doubt
of
our
intellectual
faculties
t h e r e s u l t s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ; and i t
p o i n t t h a t Hegel i s making here:

i s necessary
t o science
32.
Hume. o p . c i t . ,
33-
Hegel.
that
about
leads him
i s t h e same
t o think a propadertic
i s t o presuppose t h a t t h e knowledge
p.41.
Werke 3.- P< 69.
224.
t h a t we a l r e a d y h a v e i n s c i e n c e
very approach i t s e l f
part
creates t h a t doubt.
legitimate
the findings
established
that
on t h e i r
r i g h t t o arouse
o f science Hegel b e l i e v e s I t
'that inversely
t
The
But i f
t h o s e who f a v o u r such an a p p r o a c h t h i n k i t
distrust
tal
i s open t o d o u b t .
a mistrust
is
just
as
t h i s m i s t r u s t . . . be
34
.
F u r t h e r m o r e , he c l a i m s , i t c o u l d w e l l
'this fear
to e r ris
itself
error'.
be
The T r a n s c e n d e n -
p h i l o s o p h e r demands t h a t we must know t h e scope o f t h e
faculty of cognition
b e f o r e we may know c o r r e c t l y .
Hegel says,
the Lectures,
again m
it
is
B u t as
the o l d problem o f
36,
the
c h i l d who w i l l n o t go i n t o t h e w a t e r u n t i l
What t h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
'examination
of the faculty of cognition
so t h a t u l t i m a t e l y
which
it
itself
i t has n o t examined.
.'here t o l i m i t
fore
remain
that
i t is
objects,
true
The p o i n t
A Transcendental
to its
itself
d e e d , as we d i s c o v e r e d
Modern P h i l o s o p h y ,
i s simply tnat
it
t h e n one t h a t
philosophy
t o know
cannot
there-
as i t may
o u r manner o f c o g n i t i o n
a manner o f c o g n i t i o n
of
of objects.
In-
i n our review o f Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f

i s a manner o f c o g n i t i o n
a great deal o f respect.
The p i c t u r e
f o r which
o f Kant
Hegel
ransacking
t o g e t a proper view o f knowledge
is not without i t s
irony
f o r Hegel.
H e g e l ' s v i e w many o f t h e i d e a s t h a t l a y b e h i n d
34.
Ibid.
35.
Ibid.
36.
cognising'
o f knowledge
p r i n c i p l e because, c l a i m
our f a c u l t i e s o f c o g n i t i o n
is
itself
r e l i e s on a n o t i o n
o n l y concerned w i t h
i t is
is
i _> t h a t t n e
Knowledge a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t we know
what knowledge i s .
has
philosopher overlooks
he c a n swim.
H e g e l . Werke 20.,p. 334
that
In
quest
225.
were a l r e a d y t r u e :
already
t o be f o u n d
so t h a t much o f w h a t was sought, was

:n t h e s e e k i n g .
H e g e l compares
t o t h e p l i g h t o f t h e Jews a f t e r t h e c o m i n g o f C h r i s t
spirit
not'.
37-
it
'the
p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h e m i d s t o f them and t h e y knew i t

5 7
Ibid.
226.
THE PHENOXEI\ALITY OF KNOV/LEDGE

I n Hegel's o p i n i o n ,
approach t o philosophy
therefore, the transcendental
i s inadequate.
How t h e n does he r e p l a c e i t "
I t h a s t o be r e p l a c e d .
I n o t h e r words, what i s Hegel's
a n s w e r t o t h e p r o o l e m o f Knowledge?
come t o t h e c o r e
f o r w a r d enough.
any
other.
reality
o f o u r problem.
We h a v e , o f c o u r s e ,
Hegel's answer i s
straight-
I n h i s v i e w k n o w l e d g e i s a phenomenon l i k e
There i s n o t f o r Hegel t h e doubt c o n c e r n i n g t h e
o f o u r k n o w l e d g e n o r t h e need t o e s t a b l i s h
i t s n a t u r e and e x t e n t b e c a u s e f o r hirn i t
experience
now
t h a t knowledge o r science
is
beforehand
simply a fact
of
( W i s s e n s c h a f t ) has
38
appeared.
reality
to
To use i t , as does K a n t , t o d o u b t i t s
or to set limits
on i t s r e a l i t y
be t h e h e i g h t o f f o l l y .
Furthermore,
own
seems t n e n t o H e g e l
that Kantian
assumes i t t o be a means, a t o o l o r i n s t r u m e n t
that
b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t and o b j e c t t o u n i t e them.
He
Critique
comes
supposes,
H e g e l w o u l d c l a i m , t h a t on t h e one s i d e t n e r e i s k n o w l e d g e
and
on t n e o t h e r i t s
Critique
goal.
From t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e
i s t h e a n a l y s i s and t e s t i n g o f t h e e f f i c i c a e y o f
t h e human c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s
is
i s also, according
its
s t a r t i n g p o i n t and, i t
the point o f departure

it
k n o w l e d g e i s a phenomenon l i k e
It
38.
will
t h e two.
wi]I
t o Hegel,
But, Hegel suggests,
have a c h i e v e d
p. 7--
if
any o t h e r , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h
its
goal
a l r e a d y be t h e k n o w l e d g e o f an o b j e c t .
H e g e l . Werke j ) ,
This
o f t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s when
d e l i b e r a t e s about Knowledge.
a l r e a d y a t hand, i t
mediating
already.
I n other
is
227.
words, i t
of
will
a l r e a d y have m e d i a t e d t n e two o p p o s i n g p o l e s
k n o w l e d g e : s u b j e c t and o b j e c t .
implies, w i l l
w h e t h e r we
we
find
conceive i t
that
We
as a t o o l o r a medium.
cannot, Hegel concludes*fcrce i t
something i n order t h a t
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w:th i t s
does n o t e x i s t
its
it
away
from
m i g h t a c t as a g e n e r a l means
because
object.
i t i s what i t
Knowledge
us as a c a p a b i l i t y w h i c h i s
is
therefore
indifferent to
s u p p o s e d o b j e c t so t h a t we a r e a b l e t o t e s t
that object.
In
I twill al-
already the true conception of
w i t h which t o a t t a i n the t r u t h ,
only
therefore
k n o w l e d g e w h i c h i s m e r e l y a means,
r e a d y be an end i n i t s e l f ,
something.
Nowhere, H e g e l
it
against
I t i s not a c a p a b i l i t y but a state of a f f a i r s ,
which the object i s
already
implicated.
However, k n o w l e d g e o r s c i e n c e , we ha/e seen

s u g g e s t , has a l r e a d y a p p e a r e d , and t h i s
to
t h e p r o b l e m o f k n o w l e d g e becomes l e s s t h a n
F o r he now
goes on t o a r g u e t h a t
ance i n h i s t i m e i t
answer
straightforward
s i n c e k n o w l e d g e i s an a p p e a r
i s not only a h i s t o r i c a l
whose p o t e n t i a l has y e t t o be f u l l y
is
i s where h i s
Hegel
fact
realised.
out a
fact
What H e g e l
p o i n t i n g t o h e r e i s o f c o u r s e t h e two s e n s e s i n w h i c h we
use t h e w o r d a p p e a r a n c e : m
the f i r s t
place t o s i g n i f y
that
s o m e t h i n g h a s come on t h e s c e n e , a n d , i n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e t o
signify
It
e x t e r n a l a p p e a r a n c e as opposed
to reality
i s t h e s e c o n d sense t h a t he 'wishes t o s t r e s s .
he s a y s , I n t.nat i t i s w i t n us
'is i t s e l f
arrival'
does n o t mean t h a t
has y e t been
expanded
mcc i t s
39-
Ibid.,p.71.
truth'.^
it
The
task
or t r u t h .
Knowledge,
an a p p e a r a n c e ;
its
' i m p l e m e n t e d and
of philosophy
then,
228.
as H e g e l sees i t ,
o f knowledge
is that
' that
it
it
free
turn i t s e l f
appearance i n t o a r e a l i t y . ( i b . )
o f k n o w l e d g e has t o a c h i e v e m
o f t h e m e r e l y phenomenal
own, e x i s t s
against i t '
and make
our culture.
t h e i l e a tnat lies a t t h e h e a r t
i s that a l l philosophy, including

c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e whole
I have t r i e d
t o show t h a t
Who
his
history
t h i s assumption
We s h a l l f i n d
o f k n o w l e d g e i s no e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s .
has a l r e a d y a p p e a r e d .
that
Hegel's view i s t n e subversion
dominates h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y .
sible
semblance
e x i s t e n c e o f knowledge m
in a critical
of philosopny.
from t h i s
C o n s e q u e n t l y what t h e t h e o r y
I have s u g g e s t e d e a r l i e r t h a t
of Hegel's philosophy
itself
that his
view
Knowledge, he c l a i m s ,
t h e n a r e we t o suppose
i s respon-
f o r t h i s appearance?
I n t h e ' I n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e Pben-
o m e n o l o g y H e g e l s u g g e s t s t h a t we c a n l o o k a t t h i s a p p e a r a n c e
i n t w o ways: e i t h e r as t h e ' u n t r u e k n o w l e d g e ' r e p r e s e n t e d
those p h i l o s o p h i e s t h a t
that
philosophy
r e g a r d k n o w l e d g e as a means o r , as
which possesses t h e t r u e
conception
l e d g e b u t m e r e l y 'appears b e s i d e t h e o t h e r ' . ^
then, m
these
knowledge.
two ways i s
I n detail,
knowledge appears b u t n o t m
this
strife
appearance.
seen t o have
^0.
ibid.
as t r e
t h a t wc
context i n which
a straightforward
w i t h i n philosophy.
t h a t Hegel apportions the r o l e s

in
Philosophy,
what H e g e l i s s u g g e s t i n g i s
a p p e a r s as a s t r i f e
o f know-
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e appearance o f
can r e g a r d t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y
ledge
by
of the various
s e n s e : knowI t appears
philosophers
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e two a s p e c t s o f r h e n o t i o n
Knowledge,
of
he seems t o be s u g g e s t i n g , may be
a p p e a r e d as an e x t e r n a l
appearance m
che
phil-
229-
o s o p h i e s o f t h e E m p i r i c i s t s , K a n t and F i o h t e .
t h e y were t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s t h a t h a d i n s i s t e d
the k n o w l e d g e o f an ' i n i t s e l f '
t h e human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
I n his
view
t h a t t r u t h was
ultimately inaccessible t o
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , H e g e l s u g g e s t s ,
k n o w l e d g e may be seen as c o m i n g on t h e scene f o r t h e f i r s t

time m
the philosophy
of Schellmg.
resents the true reality

tion
Neither faction
o f k n o w l e d g e because
rep-
the former
fac-
l a c k s t h e t r u e c o n c e p t i o n o f knowledge w h i l e t h e l a t t e r
faction
lacks m
its
background f o r t h a t
conception o f philosophy the proper

conception.
That p r o p e r background can
o n l y be a c q u i r e d , a c c o r d i n g t o H e g e l , by u n c o v e r i n g t h e r e a l i t y
o f k n o w l e d g e as i t
appears m
1st philosophers.
t h e u n t r u e knowledge o f t n e d u a l -
So, i n g e t t i n g a t t h e r e a l i t y
n o t o n l y do t h e d e f e c t s o f t h e d u a l i s t
o f Knowledge,
p h i l o s o p h e r s have t o
be made up b y S c h e l l m g ' s n o t i o n o f I d e n t i t y b u t a l s o t n e
d e f e c t s o f t h e l a t t e r b y t le p o s i t i - - = c o n t e n t o f t h e d u a l i s t
philosophies.
i n both i t s
m
tne
The a p p e a r a n c e o f k n o w l e d g e h a s t o be
aspects.
I tis this
Phenomenology
o f knowledge.
Thus i t
and i s ,
overcome
t h a t h a s t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d
i n Hegel's view, t h e t r u e
appears t h a t Hegel's answer t o t h e
p r o b l e m o f k n o w l e d g e i s t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e Phenomenology
Mind.
reality
T h i s p r o c e s s we d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h m
H e g e l must make h i s s t a n d on i t .
The f u l l
of
t h e l a s t Chapter.
account o f t h e
p h e n o m e n a l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e i s h i s o n l y r e p l y t o t h o s e who a s k
how t h o u g h t i s
It
related
i s , however,
to reply d i r e c t l y
to its
object.
a peculiar reply.
H e g e l does n e t
attempt
t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed by L o c k e , Hume. K a n t
2^0.
o r , come t o t h a t ,
There
S c h e l l m g about the n a t u r e o f
i s no a t t e m p t t o d i s c u s s a p r i o r i
thought t o i t s
object.
To
this
as does Habermas, t h a t H e g e l
l e d g e , and m
the
be
it
i s t r u e t o say,
t o t h e Phenomenology,
f o r doing
those past philosophies i n
this.
so f a r as t h e y a r e t o
found i n tne o r d i n a r y consciousness o f the time.
the contemporary
culture.
So w h a t we
the
problem
t h o u g h t t o an An
p r o b l e m posed
that
is
generated
s i c h o r mind
knowledge'
by b i f u r c a t e i t h i n k i n g .
He
part
suggests
I t i s a g a i n The
r
V hat H e g e l
as much t o t h e
argues
'problem
is
of
o f p h i l o s o p h y as t o t h e t h i n k i n g o f t h e n a t u r a l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f h i s epoch.
the n a t u r a l
definitive
knowledge
by t h i n k i n g w h i c h o p p o s e s
to reality.
t h i s problem p e r t a i n s j u s t
of
sees as
parcel of the general outlook of the time.
that
They
m i g h t choose t o
see as a p r o b l e m p e c u l i a r t o p h i l o s o p h y H e g e l
and
as
t h e body o f t h e Phenomenology,
a r e subsumed u n d e r t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e a p p e a r a n c e
m
of
abandons t h e p r o b l e m o f know-
s t r o n g reasons
What H e g e l does t a k e up m
however, i s
the r e l a t i o n
extent
'introduction'
we h a v e s e e n , he p r o d u c e s
knowledge.
Thus t h e p r o c e s s o f l e a d i n g
consciousness t o science i s also i n h i s view the

answer, i f
ing the r e l a t i o n
one
is
required,
t o the problem
of thought to i t s object.
We
concern-
have y e t a n o t h e r
r e a s o n t h e n why
t h e r e s h o u l d be two s u b j e c t s t o t h e P h e n o n e n o i o g y .
There
know, t h e o r d i n a r y
is,
w h i c h has
as we
t o be l e d f r o m p a r t i a l
particular
knowledge
p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h has now
consciousness
t o s c i e n c e and
the
a l s o t o be c o n v i n c e d
231.
o f t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge.
h i s many o t h e r a i m s , H e g e l w a n t s
ers t h a t h i s epistemology i s
course o b j e c t t o t h i s ,
teaching the natural

very l i t t l e
from
t o convince o t h e r
right.
arguing that
t o be p u r s u e d s e p a r a t e l y .
apart
philosoph-
P h i l o s o p h e r s may
it
i s an a i m t h a t
After all,
they would
ought
claim,
consciousness t o t h i n k properly
t o do w i t h
of
has
r e f u t i n g the epistemologies of the
p r i n c i p a l Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s .
Hegel
c o u l d , however,
say
t h a t h i s education o f the o r d i n a r y consciousness m
t h e Phen-
omenology i n v o l v e d
knowledge
r e v i v i n g those past t h e o r i e s o f
i n s u c h a manner t h a t
He
t h e i r most t e l l i n g
m i g h t even c l a i m t h a t
them m
arguments
had
t o be
t h e manner i n "which he d e a l s w i t h
t h e Phenomenology makes t h e s e a r g u m e n t s
appear
more
c o n v i n c i n g s i n c e t h e y a r e d e a l t w i t h as v i e w L o f t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y man
at f i r s t
Hegel's
and n o t o f a p a s t p h i l o s o p h e r .
g l a n c e , a p l a u s i b l e one.
g e n e r a l defence o f h i s
r e s e r v e judgement
come t o s u c h a s e c t i o n
v i e w - on w h i c h
ought a p t l y
argument
now
said
to apply.
shall
stay w i t h
t a k e s an i n t e r e s t i n g t u r n .
Hegel
like
e ought t o
We
shall
Hegel's
t h e ' i n t r o d u c t i o n ' t o t h e Phenomenology.
t h a t t o a l l i n t e n t s and
o f knowledge
,T
later.
F o r t h e moment, h o w e v e r , we
m
I t i s h o w e v e r ne
i s not,
u n t i l we h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a s e c t i o n o f t h e
Phenomeno1ogy t o w h i c h i t
argument
This claim
p u r p o s e s he w i l l
confesses t h a t
f o r the apprehension f e l t
there
After
For the
admitting
abandon t h e p r o b l e m
i s s o m e t h i n g t o be
by t h e M o d e r r P h i l o s o p h e r s
a b o u t e n t e r i n g on p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t a c r i t e r i o n o f
truth.
met.
2^2.
I n d e e d , he
says, h i s e n q u i r y
'seems u n a b l e t o t a k e p l a c e
w i t h o u t some p r e s u p p o s i t i o n w h i c h can be l a i d
41
as a s t a n d a r d
If
to test the r e a l i t y
a s t a n d a r d was
clarify
we
i t i s t o be an e n q u i r y w h i c h
o f knowledge
essential.
Hegel
it
e x a m i n e what we n o r n a l l y
f a c t t h a t we
N o r m a l l y we
purports
that
such
might
apprehension of ours
suppose t h a t w h a t i s
object
continues, t h i s
differentiate
basis
if
suppose t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e
a b o u t an o b j e c t i s w h a t t h a t
experience, Hegel
would appear
s u g g e s t s t h a t we
our ideas about t h i s n a t u r a l
process o f knowing.
as i t s
is
in itself.
true
I n our
a s s u m p t i o n amounts t o t h e
something from ourselves t o which
we
also r e l a t e .
We
t h i n k i n g of i t
as s o m e t h i n g known, b u t e q u a l l y we r e g a r d
it
as s o m e t h i n g m
known.
Hegel
knowing
Now,
f o r us and
may
itself
i n order that
s o m e t h i n g may
be
takes t h i s l a t t e r aspect of the process o f
t o i m p l y t h a t t h e o b j e c t assumes t h e f o r m o f b e i n g
f o r us.
is
r e g a r d "Che o b j e c t as s o m e t h i n g f o r us
Hegel
is
p o i n t s o u t t h a t b o t h t h e o b j e c t as
in itself
d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two m
member t h a t
s o m e t h i n g t h a t we
As
it
posit.
We
o u r e x p e r i e n c e b u t we h a v e t o r e -
i t i s a l l o u r e x p e r i e n c e and t h a t
i s a l l our doing.
in i t s e l f
is
it
therefore i t
i s a l l our d o i n g , Hegel
says, 'the
o f t h e same., w o u l d much more so be i t s
being f o r
t 42
us
I t w o u l d t h e n be w r o n g t o suppose t h a t
o f t r u t h were s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l
c e r t a i n l y , Hegel
41.
Ibid.
42.
ibid.,
to ourselves.
claims, i n t e r n a l to ourselves.
, p.75p. J6.
the standard
I t is
By
most
acceptm
233-
this
v i e w , h o w e v e r , we
would
land ourselves with
apparently
insoluble
problem
would
that w i t h which i t
and
fall
us and
have t o r e c o g n i s e
we had
t o do w i t h
The
was
t h e An
truth
that
compared
necess-
p r o b l e m w o u l d be
(what t h e t h i n g i s
that
m
itself)
o u r s need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e a n y t h i n g
the nature of the t h i n g .
posit
one
43
it
s h o u l d be
should decide would n o t
s e t up a s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h
w h i c h because i t
sich i t
appears
Because i t
as t h o u g h we
i s not objective.
We
would
i s we
who
have a s t a n d a r d o f
s i m p l y be
comparing
thought with another.

It
i s Hegel's
view t h a t
e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s have t h e i r
iction
t h e n o t i o n o f knowledge i t s e l f ,
aole knowledge.
ology .
the d i f f i c u l t i e s
But
a d v a n c e any
t h e same a p p e a r s
'However,' H e g e l
of the c l a s s i c a l
f o u n d a t i o n i n an a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d -
w h i c h seemed t o r u l e o u t m
we
' t h a t t h e essence o r s t a n d a r d
over which the comparison
arily
the
argues,
contradiction
possibility
to hold
o f depend-
f o r t h e Phenomen-
'the n a t u r e o f t h e
are i n v e s t i g a t i n g transcends t h i s d i v i s i o n or t h i s
object
sernblence
, 44
o f d i v i s i o n and
is
presupposition
investigating m
ness.
The
The
t h e Phenomeno]ogy i s ,
object
belong
since the object a t s e l f i s
t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n what i t i s
in itself
appear
then, the scandard
t o be.
43-
Ibid.
4^1.
Ibid.
In this
instance,
Hegel
of course, conscious-
s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h does n o t t h e r e f o r e
merely t o the i n v e s t i g a t o r
that
able
and w h a t i t
of
may
truth
is
one
t h a t b e l o n g s t o t h e o b j e e c as w e l l .
can i t s e l f
test
consciousness,
the t r u t h
o f what i s
'Hegel a r g u e s ,
said
Consciousness
of i t .
'For
' i s c n t h e one hand c o n s c i o u s -
n e s s o f t h e o b j e c t , on t h e o t h e r h a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
self:
consciousness of t h a t which t o i t i s the t r u t h
consciousness o f i t s knowledge
of i t
and
Therefore m
c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f d e c l a r e s t o be t r u e we have o u r
standard of t r u t h .
s t o r e by t h i s
evasion of the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n
of i t
R a t h e r w h a t he s h o u l d l i k e
to a l l the sciences.
in
can see, be no
We
t h e n o t i o n o f knowledge.
t h a t Hegel's
aim m
As we h a v e seen, he w i s h e s
the
t o see
as
immanent
I f that extension
t o o k p l a c e t h e r e w o u l d , as we
at this point
what
objective
i s an e x t e n s i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' own
standard of t r u t h
the
However H e g e l h i m s e l f does n o t s e t g r e a t
n o t i o n o f knowledge.
a result
it-
contradiction
w o u l d do w e l l t o
recall
t h e Phenomenology i s
t o prove t h a t
the
idealist.
'substantial'
46
nature of r e a l i t y is that
ogy
is
which
therefore
falls
it
becomes S e l f .
intended to establish
outside consciousness.
So
'.'he P h e n o m e n o l -
that
it
t h e r e i s no
is precisely
w h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f d e c l a r e s t o be t r u e t h a t we
our o b j e c t i v e
all
standard of t r u t h
the sciences.
iction
is
calls
the
itself
thought, t r u t h
is
now
thought.
have
therefore
The
'semblance o f d i v i s i o n
t h e n o t i o n o f knowledge
s i n c e what r e a l i t y i s
there is
b e i n g and
A l l Being i s consciousness.
o r what Hegel
presupposition'
for,all
reality
falls
contradand
away
Since a l l t h a t
can o n l y be a s c e r t a i n e d
chrough
the
comparison
o f one
This, then,
thought w i t h another.
i s the view t h a t Hegel
have r e s e r v a t i o n s about knowledge.

ed, i s v e r y p l a i n l y i d e a l i s t .
that
i t i s t o o s u b j e c t i v e and
ariness m
the sciences.
view than t h a t .
of which Hegel
We
isolated,
ular
that
that
consciousness
I t is
consciousness.
is
within
The
itself
arbit-
consciousness
an
Indeed the
we w i l l
standard of
is
particrecall
truth
consequently,
a shared standard.
truth
suppose
Hegel's
therefore not
consciousness.
stress-
i s the conscious-
i s led to science i s ,
carries
'what t o i t
the
his notion of truth
even a t i t s l o w e r l e v e l s ,
ness o f
might t h e r e f o r e a l s o
h a v e t o remember t h a t
merely a r b i t a r y
a particular social
v i e w , as I h a v e
i s h o w e v e r more t o
of the time.
consciousness
The
t h u s l i k e l y t o encourage
There
speaks m
ness o f t h e s p i r i t
We
recommends t o t h o s e who
The
conscious-
b e a r s t h e marks o f w h a t
truth
47
is
to others.
'
This i s especially
o f A b s o l u t e K n o w l e d g e , Lhe l a s t
o f mind, which i s
itself
modes o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
the
reality
Thus p a r t
c l a i m i s t h a t w h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s h o l d s t o be
shows a r e s p e c t f o r w h a t o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s
47.
consciousness
s t a g e i n t h e phenomenology
supposed t o c o n t a i n w i t h i n
of a l l the superceded
Hegel's
so f o r t h e
hold
t o be
of
true
true.
P l a n t ( H e g e l , o p . c i t . , p. 87) w o u l d a p p e a r t o h a v e t h e same
p o i n t m m i n d when he s a y s : 'Whereas f o r S h e l l m g t h e A b s o l u t e w h i c h s e c u r e d t h e harmony b e t w e e n man and t h e w o r l d was
b e y o n d Knowledge and amenable o n l y t o a p r i v a t e f o r m o f i n t u i t i o n , f o r Hegel S p i r i t , t h e s t r u c t u r i n g p r i n c i p l e o f the
w o r l d , s h o w i n g i t s e l f b o t n i n n a t u r e and i n human l ^ f e and
c u l t u r e , can b^ known by r e a s o n - an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e f a c u l t y .
(My e m p h a s i s ) .
c
2j6.
The
consciousness of Absolute
K n o w l e d g e does nob
d i s c a r d t h e t h i n k i n g d i s p l a y e d by
ness; i t
indeed
seeks t o r a i s e
of
t h i n k i n g but
of
t h o s e modes o f t h i n k i n g .
mtersubjective
standard
In
idealist,
conscious-
o t h e r nodes
the e s s e n t i a l s
H e g e l t h e n has
o f truth., though
against which
above t h o s e
preserves
of t r u t h .
standard
The
itself
a manner w h i c h
t o espouse
an
I n t h i s sense t h e
Hegelian
i s not a r b i t a r i l y s u b j e c t i v e
i s e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f an
e c t u a l community.
the
t h e o t h e r modes o f
criterion
his view,truth
simply
Although
of t r u t h
that
c o m m u n i t y does n o t
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l
he d e c i d e s
t r u t h - t e s t he
on s u c h a
expects
it
mtell
establish
forms the background
standard.
t o take p l a c e i n each
individ-
u a l ' s m i n d when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a h y p o t h e s i s
a b o u t t h e w o r l d iz
of
some i m p o r t a n c e
phenomenology
of
mind.
^s t h a t
As
h a v e seen,what Hegel t h i n k s t a k e s p l a c e
t h e i n d i v i d u a l d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e o b j e c t t o be
in
two
we
intuit
the
we
t o Hegel's account of the
s i g n i f i c a n t ways.
i t as
s o m e t h i n g f o r us
o b j e c t as we
a r e t o know i t ,
In
the f i r s t
in
t h e second p a s s i v e .
r e l a t i o n we
normaLly takes t h i s
Now,as we h a v e j a s t
to test
what i t
for itself
therefore,
as i t
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t
relation
aspects
is
of t r u t h
the
t o be
itself.
as
tnere i s
is in
itself.
and
individual
the
truth.
an t h e s c i e n c e
fall
together m
Consciousnpss i s able t o
in
known
object
t o know; s e c o n d l y
second p a s s i v e
two
che
are a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel a c t i v e
object - consciojsness.
uish f o r i t s e l f
there is
seen, K e g e l c l a i m s t h a t
consciousness these
one
Firstly,
initially
I t is
of
the
disting-
t h e r e f o r e aole
whether the t h e o r y o f consciousness d e p i c t s
c o n s c i o u s n e s s as i t
w i t h concepts
(the
is
itself.
( t h e ' f o r us') and i s
'm i t s e l f ' ) i t
is,
Hegel's
Since i t
is
conversant
the object of the theory

words, a b l e t o t e s t
whether
48
the
concept corresponds t o t h e o b j e c t .
where t h a t t h e o r y
is
I tfollows
f o u n d t o be i n a d e q u a t e i t
altered
t o correspond w i t h i t s
claims,
'm t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s
itself
i n fact
changes,
tially
a knowledge
itself
becomes a n o t h e r f o r i t
object.
that
h a s t o be
'However', H e g e l
knowledge
the object
f o r t h e e x i s t i n g knowledge
was
o f t h e o b j e c t ; w i t h t h e knowledge
essen-
it
e s s e n t i a l l y belonged t o t h i s
. 4Q
knowledge
. -
T h i s i s an odd c l a i m .
We a r e f i r s t
told
t h a t where t h e t h e o r y w r o n g l y d e p i c t s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t ' o u g h t
to
be c h a n g e d , b u t we a r e t h e n t o l d
that
this
correction
e n t a i l s t h a t what c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s b o t h f o r i t s e l f
itself
have
now t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t what c o n s c i o u s n e s s d i s t i n g u i s h e s
from
subject
What a r e we t o make o f t h i s
We
itself
has changed.
and i n
t h e _an s i c h t h a t
t o change.
s e r v e s as t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , i s
I t changes a p p a r e n t l y
consciousness i s
revised.
an s i c h i f
t o be t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h ,
unchanged.
it
is
that
What H e g e l a p n e a r s
49-
seem t h a t t h e
should remain
t o be t h e f i x e d
t o be s a y i n g howeve
i n t h e course o f t h e study o f consciousness t h e t r u t h
about consciousness a l c e r s .
4 8.
would
I t o u g h t , we m i g h t s u p p o s e ,
goal of the enquiry.

is
But i t
as t h e t h e o r y o f
This is
the force of his
claim
238.
t h a t ' m the u r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s k n o w l e d g e t h e o b j e c t
in
fact
changes'.
may be, o b j e c t s
result
itself
But, whatever Hegel's view o f t h e matter
a r e n o t t h e k i n d o f t h i n g s t h a t a l t e r as a
o f a change
i n o u r knowledge.
c a s e , as H e g e l c l a i m s ,
I t may w e l l be t h e
t h a t as a r e s u l t
of t e s t i n g the theory
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o u r v i e w o f what o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s and
therefore our consciousness w i l l
is
Phenomenology, c o n s c i o u s n e s s m
Because
its
o f Hegel's enquiry
readers.
just
Even l e - s w i l l
that represents
theory
itself,
w h a t h a s changed as a r e s u l t
tne object
it
theory
has t o a w a i t
cannot i t s e l f
only
o f new k n o w l e d g e i s n o t
b u t m e r e l y t h e t h i n k i n g o f one o f
it
do f o r H e g e l t o c l a i m
a reader before
a misleading
when i t
will
reading
g i v e us a new c o n c r e t e
because i t
'object i t s e l f
ibid.
t h a t consciousness
so
important
I tis
p. 73 - 79-
claim,
even
as
objects;
t h e Phenomen-
out'
5 0
operates
t o Hegel precis-
a new o b j e c t a p p e a r s .
t e s t i n g t h e Irneory o f i t s e l f
does n o t h o l d
Tnere-
object.
has t h a t i m p r o b a b l e r e s u l t :
Consciousness m
50.
object.
implied i s that t h i n k i n g through
t h e Phencrneao 1 ogy i s
changes
object.
r e s t s on t h e more g e n e r a l
Indeed, the t r u t h - t e s t
ely
object
does w i t h H e g e l , t h a t k n o w l e d g e somehow a l t e r s
ology
in
its
I f
sense t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f
c o n s c i o u s n e s s can be s a i d t o cnange i t s
because what i s
that
p r e c i s e l y f o r e s a w ohe change.
be s a i d t o have changed i t s
m
more m i s l e a d i n g
has changed.
a transformation i n the object of his
because t h e t h e o r y
fore i t is
it
None o f t h i s
t o say h o w e v e r t h a t w h a t i s s u p p o s e d t o be t h e o b j e c t o f
the
the
be a l t e r e d .
finds that the
because i t
discovers
239-
t h a t what : t
thought i t
was m
I t s o I f was n o t c o r r e c t .
We
have a l r e a d y p r o t e s t e d , however, t h a t o b j e c t s a r e n o t t h e
kinds of things that
knowledge.
a r e t r a n s f o r m e d by a change m
our
I t may w e l l be t h a t we c a n say t h a t my c o n s c i o u s -
ness has a l t e r e d
as an o b j e c t
as a r e s u l t o f a change m
i t has n o t a l t e r e d
w h a t I know, b u t
the least
s i n c e one o f
SI
its
We
p r o p e r t i e s as an o b j e c t i s t h a t
s h a l l have t o b e a r w i t h Hegel
w h a t he h a s t o say a b o u t i t
interest.
Hegel's
is
it
i s s u b j e c t t o change.-"
on t h i s p o i n t ,
is of centra]
Our i n t e r e s t i s ,
importance t o our
o f course, i n
the relation of
epistemology t o h i s theory o f experience.
And i t
t h e p r o c e s s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s g a i n i n g a new v i e w o f i t s e l f
i n t h e Phenomenology o f Mind
t h a t H e g e l d e s c r i b e s as e x p e r i e n c e :
' T h i s d i a l e c t i c a l movement w h i c h c o n s c i o u s n e s s
on i t s e l f
as w e l l as on i t s
knowledge
so f a r as a new o b j e c t a r : s e s f r o m i t
is
h o w e v e r , as
called
experience
r i s e t o experience i s
and i t s
- is
We may t a k e i t
the a c t i v i t y
in
perpetrates
object
fact that
result
of
of the i n d i v i d u a l conscious-
an
51.
its
own v i e w o f i t s e l f
with its
has changed.
picture
O n l y when
i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s a p p e a r s m a new l i g h t t o
H e g e l ' s c l a n m i s o f t h e same K i n d as t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t
because t h e w e a t h e r h a s c h a n g e d w e a t h e r i t s e l f h a s c h a n g e d .
W e a t h e r , as we a l l know, does n o t h o w e v e r become a new
oojecr
f o r u s as a r e s u l t o f a change m i t .
I t i s t h e same old
weather.
We may f o r i n s t a n c e d e s c r i b e a h o t s p e l l a s m a r K i n p ,
'a change i n t h e w e a t h e r .
Bui. w e c a n h a r d l y say t h a t w e a t h e r
qaa o b j e c t h a s c h a n g e d .
O t h e r w i s e a change m t h e w e a t h e r
would almost c e r t a i n l y e n t a i l the e n d o f meteorology.
1
52.
Even-
' e x p e r i e n c e d ' u n l e s s , as a
o f comparing t h e account o f i t s e l f
itself,
which
t h a t what g i v e s
ness t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f statements about i t s e l f .

t h e n i t c a n n o t be s a i d t o have
- in
H e g e l . W e r k e ^ J , p. ?8.
240.
h i m s e l f has he, a c c o r d i n g t o H e g e l ,
'experienced'.
Since
H e g e l a s s o c i a t e s t h i s w i t h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a new o b j e c t he
puts i t
t h i s way: s i n c e t h a t
ness o f t h e f i r s t ,
it
'new o b j e c t c o n t a i n s a n o t h i n g -
i s t h e experience
that
i s made a b o u t
53
it'.
The i n d i v i d u a l must a p p e a r i n a new l i g h t
then, m
t h e sense t h a t he has a c q u i r e d a new
of
himself.
is
o f the breaking-up o f h i s i n i t i a l
For
this
The e x p e r i e n c e
reason
for
on t h a t
experience
consciousness
t h a t he h a s o f h i m s e l f ,
therefore,
estimation of himself.
Hegel describes t h e experience
consciousness m
to himself,
of the ordinary
t h e Phenomenology as ' t h e l o s s o f i t s e l f '

t
i
54
path
i t loses i t s t r u t h
The a c c o u n t o f
can t h e r e f o r e 'be seen as t h e p a t h o f d o u b t o r
more p r e c i s e l y as t h e p a t h o f d e s p a i r ' ,
(lb.)
t h i s path o f d e s p a i r i s a l s o t h e 'conscious
But since
insight
into the
u n t r u t h o f s e e m i n g k n o w l e d g e ' i t i s t h e most a p p o s i t e and

complete t h e o r y o f knowledge.
itself
gams, m
a t e l y Absolute
of
losing
H e g e l ' s v i e w , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and
and e p i s t e m o l o g y ,
to which
consciousness.
f o r Hegel, c o i n c i d e i n t h e
consciousness subjects i t s e l f
Through t h a t t e s t
experience.
That t e s t
the in
ness which
itself
is
nature
is therefore a l l important m the
make-up o f t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f m i n d .
of
the science
consciousness learns
b o t h t h e f a l s e h o o d o f s e e m i n g k n o w l e d g e and t h e t r u e
of
ultim-
Knoweldge.
Experience
truth-test
Consciousness m
I tis
t h e comparison
o f consciousness w i t h t h e theory o f conscious-
f o r i t s e J f which
53-
Ibid.,
p. (1
54.
Ibid.,
p. 72.
p r o d u c e s e'c e a c h s t a g e
t h e new
24l.
mode o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
is
it
is that
test
that
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m one mode o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness t o a n o t h e r .
I t is
t h e r e f o r e what we m i g h t c a l l
m o t o r o f t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d .
the
I t is
w h a t i n d u c e s t h e change i n t h e V o r s t e l l u n g e n i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s
itself.
I t b r i n g s about f o r consciousness i t s e l f ,
s t a n d i n g and Reason, o r what H e g e l

An
the
sich:
the being f o r i t s e l f
c a l l s das F u r - e s - S e l n d i e s e s
of this
is
of
i t s e l f which i s
it
appropriates to i t s e l f
in itself
is
subverted.
itself.
Through
n o t i o n of what
From i t s b e i n g a
f i x e d and u n c h a n g e a b l e
it
consciousness
becomes one
and t h e r e b y g i v e s i t s e l f
sciousness m
its
f i x e d and
s t a b l e view o f i t s e l f
The
collapse of i t s
At
p r o c e s s the o t h e r n e s s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s '
it
I t drives i t
knowledge,
i n d e e d , shakes
its
a new
con-
on b e c a u s e
to build
a new
t h e same t i m e , h o w e v e r , d o u b t i s r e v i v e d by t h e
world collapres m
which
becomes s u b j e c t t o d o u b t .
o l d world leads i t
so t h e new
Under-
turn.
Hegel's
one.
truth-test,
cheory o f
the world of the ordinary conscious-
n e s s t o i t s f o u n d a t i o n s w x t h t h e most r a d i c a l
scepticism;
it
systematic order
the
offers
its
place, through b r i n g i n g i n t o
but
v a r i o u s modes o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , e v e n t u a l peace o f m i n d .
T r u t h o r t h e r e a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t , H e g e l cla.ims, t h e
continued
but
c o l l a p s e o f the w o r l d o f the o r d i n a r y
t h e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge
ience that
to i t s
of
55-
of that
process.
c o n s c i o u s n e s s makes a b o u t i t s e l f
concept, comprise i n n o t h i n g l e s s
consciousness
As
'the
exper-
can, a c c o r d i n g
that
t h e whole
system
consciousness o r t h e wnole realm o f t h e t r u t h o f Mind..'-'

Ibid.
p.
80.
W i t h t h i s H e g e i b r i n g s t o an end
presuppositions that
Philosophy.
The
h i s c r i t i c i s m of the
l e d t o the problem
r e a d e r may
of knowledge i n
w e l l breathe a sigh
of
f o r H e g e l ' s a r g u m e n t f o l l o w s so many r a p i d t w i s t s
that
it
is difficult
position.
of
We
might
our conclusions m
not l o s t
do w e l l
the
o r d e r t h a t we
the problem
may
e n s u r e t h a t we
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e we
o f knowledge.
mind v i a t h e senses.
But
it
of experience
has
r e c e p t i o n o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
limits
or r e a l i t y o f knowledge.
ways: p e r h a p s ,
was
of
see
experience
know w h a t we
still
see
i t , i t is
s u p p o s e d i n t h i s e n q u i r y , and we
can
secondly,
and, t h i r d l y , t h a t
can
see
side separated
that
itself.
trie
several
to discover
Hegel,
object.
are
I t was
t h i s most
typically
f i r s t l y , t n a t we
as
from the o b j e c t t o
t h e o b j e c t was
k n o w l e d g e was
the
t h e same p r o b l e m :
the meeting
unique
in
of subject
o b j e c t t h r o u g h the t h i n k e r becoming acquainted

o b j e c t was
see
relates to i t s
t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i e s o f L o c k e and K a n t ,
be known, and
with
with establishing
a b l e t o a s p i r e t o o b j e c t i v e knowledge?
t h i n k e r s s t o o d on t h e one
clear
know, o r p e r h a p s as d o e s
W h i c h e v e r way
we
t o be
I have argued,
T h i s we
thought
may
e v e r y t h i n g t o do
as d o e s o p i n o z a , as t h e a t t e m p t
i t i s t h a t we
really
by now
As
as t h e a t t e m p t t o d i s c o v e r how
we
have
A f t e r a l l , experience
ought
p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y
how
turns
much o f M o d e r n P h i l o s o p n y meant no more t h a n w h a t e n t e r e d
t h a t Hegel's account
his
and
t h e n t o r e v i e w t h e most i m p o r t a n t
H e g e l ' s c o n c l u s i o n as a f a r c r y f r o m t h e a c c o u n t
relief,
t o keep i n mind t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f h i s
t r a c k o f o u r theme.
t h a t gave us
Modern
WLth
itself,
and
what
However, i n H e g e l ' s v i e w , w h a t
the
the
243.
c l a s s i c a l epistemologists ignored
t h a t wnat a t h i n g i s
tion.
Their standard
material
itself
of
can
truth,
supposing a l l
o n l y be
an
idea.
e m o l o g i c a l g r o u n d s H e g e l a p p e a r s t o be
an
e n q u i r y we
d e c i d e t o a d o p t as
can
only adopt i t
t h a t takes
place
a l w a y s one
b e t w e e n one
a thing m
itself
of
truth.
an
right
an
as
i d e a and
another.
the standard
t o be
idea ol
of t r u t h
and
is patently
t h a t o n l y by
just
the o b j e c t i v i t y
p o i n t s o u t , we
to
its
impossible.
say
that
that:
t i m e can
has
that
reality
since
existence.
to postulate
the
classical
s e t t i n g up
it
standard
form:
suggestion
be
the
overcome.
s i n c e , as H e g e l
himself
of t r u t h
- and
It
it
has
However H e g e l goes
immediately clear.
time.
its
appearance m
i s m e r e l y a phenomenon m
of our
view-
unthought
Hegel's
r e a l i t y of knowledge i s
of the s p i r i t
an
i n the
For
is
it
what
t o become
its
t h e r e f o r e the
in
on
our time
h a v e t o overcome t h e p h e n o m e n a l i t y o f
the ordinary test
is
p o s t u l a t e s as
this difficulty
on t h e s c e n e .
is, i s not
The
o n l y know what r e a l i t y o u r k n o w l e d g e
arrived
this,
comparison
o f t h i n g s , as
r e g a r d i n g k n o w l e d g e as an
can
c l e a r t o us we
ology
that
as d i d
pristine,
Now,
i s a s e n s i b l e enough s u g g e s t i o n
after i t
Thus t h e
So
of t r u t h ,
seen as
the o b j e c t i n
consciousness o f our
It
epist-
of t r u t h
T h i s means t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y
standard
is
purely
in claiming
Idea.
p o i n t o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o ] o g y because i t
this
something
t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f an e x p l a n a t i o n
e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s , has
idea, a l b e i t
On
our standard
as
was
thought-construc-
instead of being
'out t h e r e ' , c o u l d o n l y be
f o r w h a t e v e r we
this
phenomen-
thi_s c o n t e x t
i s Hegel's suggestion
that
that
244.
t h i s JS a l l that t h e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g y amounts t o - comes i n t o i t s own f o r H e g e l .

The e x i s tence o f t h e t e s t i s a p o s i t i v e advantage f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
who seeks t o l e a d t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o r e a l k n o w l e d g e .
For, i f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t e s t s t h e t r u t h o f t h e
p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f m i n d i n t h a t f a s h i o n i t w i l l , so H e g e l c l a i m s ,
e n g e n d e r t h e d i a l e c t i c a l p r o c e s s w h i c h i s EXPERIENCE.
Indeed
i t i s t h a t p r o c e s s t h a t g i v e s movement t o t h e Phenomenology
o f Mind.
As we have seen, t h e o r d i n a r y t e s t o f t r u t h i n
t h e Phenomenology o r i n g s a b o u t a change i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s
itself.
Now t h i s a c c o r d s w i t h t h e consummate s c e p t i c i s m o f
t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness t n a t p r e s e n t s t h e phencmenol~
o g i c a l p r o c e s s because c o n s c i o u s n e s s m t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f
what t h e p h i l o s o p h e r h a s t o s a y o f i t c o n t i n u a l l y d i s c o v e r s
t h a t i t s view o f i t s e l f i s untrue.
I n t h e course o f t h a t
" e s t i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s , as we s e e , a l w a y s c h a n g e s i t s v i e w o f
i t s e l f and i t i s t h a t change t h a t H e g e l c a l l s e x p e r i e n c e .
One t h i n g i s c l e a r t h e n : t h i s i s n o t e x p e r i e n c e as t h e p a s s i v e
sense-perception o f objects.
Indeed f a r from i t g i v i n g r i s e
t o problems o f knowledge i t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, t h e p a t h
t o t h e f u l l e s t c o n c r e t e knowledge.
I t i s an e x p e r i e n c e i n
w h i c h we p a r t i c i p a t e and m w h i c h , i f o n l y as t h i n k e r s , we
a r e a c t i v e a n d m w h i c h , a g a i n i f o n l y i n t h e same l i m i t e d
c a p a c i t y , we change and d e v e l o p .
There
ipation
ation
a r e two a s p e c t s , m
experience.
First
Hegel's
there
is
view, t o t h i s o u r p a r t i c that
side t o our p a r t i c i p -
e x p e r i e n c e whicti,Hegel says, engenders
u s . V/hat n a p p e n s i s
that
i n comparing
a new o b j e c t f o r
t h e theory o f consciousness
2^5-
w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t we
one
wishes,
have o f o u r own
comparing
that
object.
Second, and
w h a t we h a v e a l r e a d y had
in
the l a s t Chapter,
we
a new
there is
light,
the
have o f o u r s e l v e s - i s
of
the
i s t h i s aspect t h a t
the l a s t
I t is,
Chapter,
experience t h a t
last
stage m
our
becomes
repeats
t h a t side t o our experience
objectivity.
suppressed.
t h a t a new
I n experiencing
as we
this
- the i n i t i a l
expect
becomes
from our d i s c u s s -
l a t t e r aspect
t r i u m p h s a t t h e end.
o f Hegel's
account
I n A b s o l u t e Knowledge,
t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d , no new
j s g e n e r a t e d by t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
p o i n t a t wnich consciousness
our-
Therefore, not only
the o l d object
would
which
view
object i s generated
course o f our experience but t h a t
n o t h i n g f o r us.
ion
it
I n Hegel's terms, i t
the previous object
do we h a v e t o u n d e r s t a n d
if
t o say o f H e g e l ' s n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e
undermines consciousness'
selves m
or,
theory w i t h our experience,
view o f our e x p e r i e n c e changes.

o u r new
consciousness
object
I t is
the
' d i s c a r d s t h e appearance o f b e i r g
56
encumbered w i t h w h a t i s a l i e n t o i t ' ,
the
^6.
consciousness
of the science of
H e g e l . W e r k e j5, p.
81.
and becomes s i m p l y
consciousness.
246.
SENSE-CERTAINTY AND PERCEPTION

T h a t t h e n i s how, i n my v i e w , t h e p r o b l e m
of
Modern P h i l o s o p h y
account
We must
work
now
examine
order
of
of
the
substantiate
indicate
might
and i n d e e d
details
of
that
oar view.of Hegel's
o u r g e n e r a l view o f h i s
be w e l l ,
if
o n l y t o r e f r e s h o u r memory,
once a g a i n t h e most i m p o r t a n t o f o u r c o n c l u s i o n s
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y
general.
o u r c o n c l u s i o n s was, I t h i n k ,
Hegel's philosophy i s
continuity with
The most
accounts
thac a l l philosophy i s
past p h i l o s o p h i e s .
with the History
significant
t h a t t h e view c e n t r a l t o
m
critical
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t he
t h i n k s o f p h i l o s o p h y as b e i n g f i r s t and f o r e m o s t
of
modified
Our v i e w o f t h e f o r m e r s c a r c e l y r e q u i r e s r e -
peating; but, i t
about
to
some
o f experience
philosophy.
to
issues i n t o Hegel's r a d i c a l l y
o f e x p e r i e n c e : The Phenomenology o f M i n d .
account
o f knowledge
o f Philosophy.
settling
Doing
philosophy,
t h e n , has f o r h i m t h e l i t e r a l sense o f s t u d y i n g and

absorbing past philosophy.
problem
it
o f Knowledge i s ,
i s a phenomenon m
says "
and
what i s p r e s e r v e d
The
parallel
So much as H e g e l ' s a n s w e r t o t h e
Yes. we h a v e d e p e n d a b l e k n o w l e d g e ,
each and e v e r y o n e ' s e x p e r i e n c e ,
i s h i s a n s w e r t o What i s
be
philosophy?
s i m p l y w h a t h a s r e c e i v e d t h a t name m
f o r us i n
our culture
though
- and I t h i n k
as t h e r e a l
this
i n Hegel's mind
b e t w e e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f k n o w l e d g e and t n e c o u r s e
- for jast
I t is,
the works o f past p h i l o s o p h e r s .
goes d e e p e r t h a n t h a t
o f philosophy
so a l s o
matter of fact.
i s b e c a u s e t h e r e i s u l t i m a t e l y no d i f f e r e n c e
Historv
critically
of tne
problem o f
247.
knowledge c o n s i s t s f o r him m
apparently
doing
the overcoming of
chaotic existence
philosophy
its
the c u l t u r e o f the
c o n s i s t s , m h i s view, m
ciir.e,
so
the overcoming
of
the a p p a r e n t l y h a p - h a z a r d a p p e a r a n c e o f p h i l o s o p h y
history.
was,
The
1 think,
philosophy
it
s e c o n d most s i g n i f i c a n t
that
if
is that
of
our
in
conclusions
there i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n m
it
assumes as
its
part of i t s
Hegel's
approach
t h e r e i s an a l i e n ,
m a t e r i a l e x t e r n a l w o r l d b u t , on t h e
h a n d , assumes t h a t
the a l i e n world
H e g e l ' s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e was
mind i s g r a t u i t o u s .
that
it
m i g h t be
This
He
a world
We
external to
order
Mind.
our
C h a p t e r s o f t h e Phenomenology
a s s u m i n g an
'the knowledge w h i c h i s f i r s t
that
the
i s an a p p r o p r i a t e p o i n t a t w h i c h t o b c g j n
p r e c i s e l y by
other
concluded
a p p e a r s o n l y t o assume i t
integrated into
a n a l y s i s of the f i r s t
they begin
is not.
that
since
external world,
or immediately
our
that
is,
object..the
57
knowledge o f the immediate' or t h a t which i s .
are
first
exists m
presented
w i t h on
l o o k i n g a t Mind o r S p i r i t
consciousness, Hegel claims,
sense c e r t a i n t y
What
(smnliche Gewissheit).
is
Hegel suggests
I t o f f e r s t o consciousness a l l the r i c h data
senses, the o b j e c t s o f experience

and
therefore m
their
the
r o l e of oast
philosophies
57.
Ibid.,
p.
82.
fullness.
as
the knowledge
i t "appears t o o f f e r t h e r i c h e s t k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e t o
ness.
we
unimpaired
by
From a l l we
any
of
that
consciousof
the
obstacle
have s a i d
i n Hegel's system i t
it
about
is clear
218.
t h a t we
of
can
see
t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the i n i t i a l
experience
t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s as b e i n g a l s o a d e s c r i p t i o n
a philosophical position.
H e g e l i s most l i k e l y
Philosophers,
t o h a v e i n m i n d L o c k e and Hume s i n c e
a r e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who
i m p a r t e d by
Among t h e Modern
of
s e t so much s t o r e by
our sense-experience.
the knowledge
Like the ordinary consciou
n e s s when i t b e g i n s
e x p e r i e n c i n g , they take the knowledge
the
the r i c h e s t
i m m e d i a t e t o be
see,
t h e n , how
He
attained
We
conceptual
might
Hegel
a g a i n , as d i d Hume, see
i s prepared
something t o t h i s
seems t o c o n s t i t u t e
impressions
that
apprehen(Begreifee
w i t h the
truth,
as c o n t a i n i n g i n f e r -
that
w i t h o b j e c t s them-
t h e r e appears t o
What o u r s e n s e s l e t i n ,
t h e p u r e s t and
he
t r u e s t knowledge.
to maintain this
be.
position?
But
w o u l d we
Since, Hegel
a s s e r t s o f w h a t i t knows t h i s a l o n e :
it
is;
be
says,
The
t h e y i m p a r t a p p e a r t o be wha.t t h i n g s a r e .
i s what knowledge s h o u l d
correct
it
be
t h a t adequate t o
n o t h i n g t o do
t o admit
position.
us
of
comprehension
s e e n as b e i n g 3 ess
e n c e s t h a t w e r e o n i y o u r s and
selves.
is to
(Auffassung)
f o r m e r mode o f c o g n i t i o n b e i n g i d e n t i f i e d
it.
'it
that t r u t h
s e e k s , as a i d Hume, t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s
l a t t e r c o u l d o n l y be
Let
of
position.
as t h e v i e w
sion o f o b j e c t s from t h e i r
the
o f knowledge.
t h r o u g h o u r mere a p p r e h e n s i o n
o b j e c t s and
The
kind
Hegel t a c k l e s t h i s
characterises i t
they
And
however
be
contmuas,
and
its
truth
Kg
only contains the being of the thing'.''"

on t h e c o n t r a r y t h e p o o r e s t k i n d o f t r u t h *
'am c e r t a i n
ideas
in
58.
Ioid.
of t m s
Is it
5
1,
n o t , he
this
person,
t h i n g ' n o t because I have developed
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i t o r b e c a u s e I have a n a l y s e d
says,
my
it
from
249.
t h e v i e w p o i n t s a f f o r d e d by : r s v a r i o u s p r o p e r t i e s - w h i c h
o f course place i t
relation
b u t s i m p l y because i t
is.
t o innumerable other t n i n g s -
I t i s t h i s mere b e i n g t h a t
e s s e n t i a l t o sense-knowing
o r , as H e g e l
says,
'this
cannot
constitutes i t s truth
r e s t a t t h i s , Hegel
d e a l more i m p l i e d
this
initial
than i t cares t o admit.

t o be c e r t a i n
directly
shall
subject
and,
is
is
only
opinion that
consciousness
f u r n i s h e d by
faith
of the ordinary
it
a r g u e s , I have n o t i n t e r f e r e d w i t h what i t
it
t h e d i -"ectness o f t h e r e l a t i o n .
59-
is a relation,
xbid
indica-
consciousnes
that
i s I have
relation
i s I h a v e t o know.
it
is
I n sense-experience,
however, t h a t
no m a t t e r w h a t ,
that
sense-impressions
in
r e a d y an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h what i t
sense-exper-
as we h a v e a l r e a d y
t h i n g s a r e r e v e a l e d t o us i n o u r
other
i s of the
I t is a certainty
on t h e m i s g u i d e d n o t i o n t h a t ,
Hegel's p o i n t i s ,
presence
on t h e
brief,
is
know.
This,
receives i t s s i g n i f -
that the ordinary
ience i s a mistaken c e r t a i n t y .
The
thinker
mediated.
immediacy
Hegel,
t h e knowledge
as t h e y a r e .
as
through the subject.
f o r t h e i r supposed
the c e r t a i n t y
are
through i t s
only
present object
t h i n k s t o have f o u n d m
directly
supposed
so, f o r , on t h e one h a n d , t h e
on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e o b j e c t
and a r e , t h e r e f o r e , m e d i a t e d .
ted,
consciousness
object por the object i t s e l f
c e r t a i n of the cbjecr
B o t h are dependent
We
N e i t h e r the I which i s
self-evidently
i c a n c e as a d i r e c t l y
based
position of
B o t h , a r e , as H e g e l p u t s i t ,
see,
s i n c e there i s a g r e a t
p r e s e n t ( u n m i t t e l b a r ) as t h e e m p i r i c a l
suggests.
we
of i t s
claims,
pure
59
b e i n g o r s i m p l e immediacy
i s most
does n o t r e v e a l
tc
is a l Since
objects
250.
t o us d i r e c t l y as t h e y a r e .
them.
m
They a r e as !_ s e n s e - p e r c e i v e
E m p i r i c i s m then, Hegel
t h e sense i t
would
considerations.
like
it
appears.
eration
it
would, Hegel
a relation with
t o be - u t t e r l y
devoid of
covets.
implies,
objects m
Hegel
seeks
o f t h e 'Here'
I f it
which a l l n o t i o n of r e l a t i o n d i s -
t o p r e s s home h i s p c m t w i t h a c o n s i d and
'Now'.
I n h i s view these are
the
certainty of i t s
knowledge:
or simply immediate.
'Now i s Midday'
say Now
t h a t what i s
thinking
As
i s gone.
The
p o s i t i o n o > o t h e r w i s e a l ^ e r my
Here i s n o t h e r e .
Indeed, Hegel
'Here' i s
adds,
field
As
are
soon
the f a c t that
able.
As H e g e l
'Nov/' w h i c h was
s a y s , we
I f t h e y were,
expressed
pure being.
say a 'Here'
we
e m p i r i c i s t b e c a u s e any
mutter
and
satisfy
saying involves a r e t r a c t i o n of
t h a t d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o tine o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h
covets.
they
could not
e v e r e x p r e s s t h i n g s i n a manner w h i c h w o u l d w h o l l y
the
these
t h e y w o u l d be
could not p o s s i b l y
as
of v i s i o n
t h e y t r a n s c e n d bhe h e r e and now:
not merely immediate.
As
equally
s o - c a l l e d t r u t h s o f common-sense t h i n k i n g can o n l y be
i n l a n g u a g e means t h a t
the
i s no l o n g e r t h a t .
c h a n g e a b l e ; "what i s h e r e depends on w h e r e I am.

I change my
and
Hegel
soon as, f o r i n s t a n c e ,
i s made i t
t h a t now
bases
crue i s here
B u t what i s h e r e and now,
shows, i s n o t h e i e and now.
s o o n as we
immediate
have a c h i e v e d t n e i m p o s s i b l e
two p a r a m o u n t n o t i o n s on w h i c h e m p i r i c i s t
statement
subjective
d i d enjoy that
the
now,
objective
I t does n o t e n j o y t h e p r i v i l e g e d
relation to objects that

relation,
suggests, i s not
he
251-
In a transition
philosophical
o f t h e Phenomenology w h i c h o n l y
consciousness
i n g consciousness, t h a t
in
s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y now
alone.
at
For i f ,
of discovering m
cannot
c e r t a i n t y which
say w h a t i t
s u g g e s t s , we
a l o n g one
the d i a l e c t i c
l e d g e was
The
one
that
that
consciousness
It
asserts,
it
sense-perceives i t .
instance,
We
may
o t h e r words,
t h a t now
recall
Philosophers,
that
60.
shall
see
result
that
that
immediate
itself
had
was
the
observers
sense-know-
established.
WD11,according t o Hegel,
t r u t h now
lies
t h a t what i s t r u e
the
rrue
insist,
because I p e r c e i v e i t
i t was
F i c h t e who,
t o be
because
for
so.
amongst t h e M o d e r n
for a l lcertainty
I n his estimation,
I ' . ^
is
Thus c o n s c i o u s n e s s w i !
the grounds
it
the
rather than i n
i s day
reduced
ledge t o the I .
s t a n d s as a
as p h i l o s o p h i c a l
consciousness
' t h e power o f i t s
look
found i n sense-knowledge
the stardard-of t r u t h :
experiencing
insist
So we
finds
subject
the observers
f o r consciousness
o b j e c t s o f t h e senses.
the
o f t h e h e r e and now,
i n t e n d s t o say., we
t h a t was
p o i n t out t h a t
consciousness
i n which consciousness
c e r t a i n t y which consciousness
ail
not the experienc-
comes t o be l o d g e d m
as H e g e l
the r e l a t i o n s h i p
o b s e r v e s , and
the
even t a u t o l o g i c a l
Know propos-
I b i d . p. 8 6 .
A l t h o u g h I h a v e c h o s e n t o show t h a t t h e f i r s t
C h a p t e r s o f t h e Phenomenology p r e s e n t p o i n t s o f v i e w t h a t
p a r a l l e l many o f t h o s e t o be f o u n d m the h i s t o r y o f M o d e r n
P h i l o s o p h y t h i s does n o t mean t h a t s u c h a p a r a l l e l must be
confined to that.
H e g e l , as I h a v e a r g u e d , e n t e r s i n t o a
d i a l o g a e w i t h t h e whole h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y .
Thus m
t h i s i n s t a n c e we c o u l d j u s t as w e l l see h i m as o b j e c t i n g t o
P r o t a g o r a s ' t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e as t o t h a t o f F i c h t e .
Hegel
h i m s e l f n m t s as much i n h i s r e v i e w o f P r o t a g o r a s ' p n i l o s o n h y
m h i s Le c t v
s o n c he H J. S t o r y o f P h 1 1 o s o oh y V o l . I . pp. '428
4 3 4 Werke TB.
252.
l t i o n s were t r u e
of the I .
(qua
the
So, as we w o u l d e x p e c t , t h e o b j e c t i o n
p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness) raises
ordinary
when d e a l i n g
is
o n l y because o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t i n u i t y
consciousness i s
that
to the solipsism
t h e same as t h e one he
s p e c i f i c a l l y with Fichte's solipsism.
t h a t when a l l b e i n g a n d k n o w l e d g e i s
t h a t we a r e l e f t
Hegel
raises
I t
reduced t o t h e I a l l
w i t h as k n o w l e d g e i s mere o p i n i o n .
of course, that w i l l
not do.
o f one i n d i v i d u a l 1 i s
I t means t h a t
just
And,
the affirmation
as good as any o t h e r .
In
questions of t r u t h ,
t h e n , w h a t I a f f i r m t o be t r u e w i l l
e q u a l l e d and i n d e e d
cancelled
insists
is
t h e case.
The n e x t s t a g e i n t h e d i a l e c t i c o f
am c e r t a i n o f t h i s , i s
i n o t h e r words,
affirm
I
cause f o r u n c e r t a i n t y ,
shows t h a t w h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l I means when i t
this,
t h e same.
am a c t u a l l y
t h a t I as u n i v e r s a l
So t h a t
saying
saying, Hegel claims,
an i s o l a t e d
jects.
set
Kegel
himself:
says
that
am c e r t a i n o f
i f y o u were i n my p o s i t i o n y o u w o u l d
' I , thx& i n d i v i d u a l
T h e r e i s no s u o h
tiling
i n d i v i d u a l I : we a r e a l l i n d i v i d u a l s a n d s u b therefore
suggests t h a t
the task
the deduction o f the world
t o be m e r e l y a mine and i s an
We h a v e t h e r e f o r e
that
Fichre
f r o m t h e I , was w h o l l y
m i s c o n c e i v e d s i n c e as soon as w h a t he d e d u c e s i s
said
it
got to this
H e g e l . Werke 3, p. 87.
cease
universal.
stage i n t h e d i a l e c t i c o f
s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y : C o n s c i o u s n e s s , as H e g e l c l a i m s , h a s j u s t
61.
'every I ; e v e r y o n e i s t h a t
what I say: I t h i s i n d i v i d u a l I ' . ^

as
be
o u t by whac a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l
s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y , h o w e v e r , removes t h i s
it
of
discovered
t h a t t h e essence o f sense-awareness i s t o
found n e i t h e r i n
the o b j e c t nor
the
result
of t h i s discovery,
to
the t r u t h o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y
see
seeks t o a t t r i b u t e
object
to
subject.
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , he
As
but
a sense-experience which
as a w h o l e .
comes
Thus i t
rather attributes
'excludes from
suggests,
c e r t a i n t y n e i t h e r t o the I nor
i n sense-certainty,
he
to
the
certainty
itself...all
62
opposition'.
Consciousness r e a c t s , then,
of sense-certainty
by a t t e m p t i n g
p o s i t i o n s t h a t had
l e d t o tne d i a l e c t i c
According to êgel i t t r i e s
c e r t a i n t y by
distinction
I and
to avoid
those- o n e - s i d e d
i n the
of e s s e n t i a l i t y
J
and
I n order
to preserve the
remain i n d i f f e r e n t
to the
Hegel d e p i c t s t h i s
claims
of subject
clear that i t
problem created
by
is
intended
the
rnd object
the sense-certainty
in
which
on
object.
only
tc
the
model o f knowledge.
t o Hegel's account
the H i s t o r y of
t h e c o r r e c t v i e w o f k n o w l e d g e as
e r e n c e o f s u b j e c t and
it
sense-certainty
of philosophy
according
the Lectures
of
to
for
in
to i n d i c a t e not
the h i s t o r y
i s , o f c o u r s e , S c h e l l m g wno
of h i s philosophy
'no
ruse of the o r d i n a r y consciousness,
also a reaction w i t h i n
Ibid.
sense-
certainty
From t h e way
a r e a c t i o n of consciousness to the d i a l e c t i c
62.
of
consciousness decides
precedence w i t h i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p .
depicts
place.
i n e s s e n t i a l j t y between
the experiencing
It
first
t o preserve the t r u t h
of sense-certainty
but
dialectic
p o s i t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p j n which there i s
the o b j e c t ' .
o u g h t t o be
to the
the
Pnilosopny
p o i n t of
indiff-
In Schelling's opinion,
as
254.
we
h a v e seen, s u b j e c t and
two
e q u i v a l e n t poles
absolutely
instance
w h i c h met
indifferent
k n o w l e d g e was
an
as any
absolute
of past
tells
Phenomenology i s ,
identity.
philosophy
us a b o u t t h e
I think,
would
(somehow) be
lier,
when H e g e l i n i t i a l l y
an
on
t h a t doubt since
entering into
r o l e of past
that
is
no'man o f s t r a w ' .
makes t h e
is
not
I said
that
o n l y w i t h w h a t we
the
i n philosophy.
so
far, that
its
way
I t i s therefore settling
t o be
its
own
to
science
I b e l i e v e , judge
be
entirely
chis f o r ourselves
stages the d i a l e c t i c
t h e i r most
implausible.
since
of sense-certainty
in
its
on
are
suggestion
philosophies
not
path
view
past
may
of
accounts
naive
I n o t h e r words,Hegel's
s u c h a manner t h a t
cast-
the
the path of the o r d i n a r y consciousness to science
a r g u m e n t s a r e met
regard
the stages
that
an
consciousness
k n o w l e d g e b u t a l s o w i t h ^ i e w s o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t were and
prevalent
crit-
tend t o
the o r d i n a r y
have a n a l y s e d
would take
ear-
however', a o u b t i s
I t appears, at l e a s t from
philosophical.
the
a l s o b r i n g about
t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s t r a v e r s e s on
itself
As
suggestion
Nov/,
in
play a part which
philosophical.
t u r n s out t h a t
g e l ' s a r g u m e n t w h i c h we
an
Hegel's
philosophies
t h e y do n o t
implausible suggestion.
it
since
T h i s i s as p l a i n
o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s we
as
that
They were
knowledge
i c i s m o f the o r d i n a r y consciousness w i l l
it
as
of the n a t u r a l consciousness.
Jess t h e n
adequate c r i t i c i s m
regarded
I n Knowledge.
t o each o t h e r m
account of the experience

What I t
o b j e c t "were t o be
revives
telling
We
may,
culmmacing
i s d i r e c t e d towards
255-
what i s p a t e n t l y a l s o
It
i s the d i f f i c u l t y
the
a difficulty in Scnellmg's
t h a t had
led Schelling to
c e r t a i n t y o f immediate knowledge
object
but t o both i n d i f f e r e n t l y .
t h a t p o s i t i o n , Hegel
immediacy
that
there
The
transcends i t s
I n each
and o b j e c t
to claim
'as a b s o l u t e l y
one.
The
the n o t i o n
one.
unique i n t u i t i n g
acknowledges
community.
an a b s t r a c t
that
in
Thus i t
There
subject
of such a r e l a t i o n
i s no
An o b j e c t ,
to other
Ibid.,
is a
are
already
redundant
unreal
s u c h t h i n g as an i s o l a t e d ,
Hegel's
or isolated.
utters
something
linguistic
it
supposes
view, i s not
I t i s what i t
is
something
is
only
objects.
us t o p e r c e p t i o n .
p. 9 1 .
subject
f o r Schelling,
lfe. s u p p o s e s i s an
on c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' p a t n t o s c i e n c e .
64.
subject
or objective
and o b j e c t
S i m i l a r l y , the p a r t i c u l a r object
This brings
of
that i t is at least, part of a
i s merely immediate
relation
j s no use
c o n s c i o u s n e s s - as soon as i t
one.
or
are capable of a p r i v i l e g e d
p a r t i c u l a r subject
or abstract
it
Each r e l a t i o n
i n which the abstract
since
such
p a r t i c u l a r , wholly
particular subjective
are u n i v e r s a i s .
united
i s no
such r e l a t i o n , Hegel a r g u e s , b o t h
that philosophers
intuition
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t ,
personal, i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' . ^
location.
no/
error involved
I n d e e d he c l a i m s t h e r e
are such t h i n g s
and o b j e c t
to neither subject
does n o t p e r t a i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
and o b j e c t .
t h i n g as an a b s t r a c t
predicate
a r g u e s , i s t h a t i t a p p e a l s t o an
which simply
of subject
philosophy.
T h i s i s t h e second
Hegel's
stage
view i s t h a t
it
256.
i s o n l y p e r c e p t i o n t h a t c a n t a k e up t h e c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t c f
s e n s e - a w a r e n e s s because p e r c e p t i o n , u n l i k e
has u n i v e r s a l i t y
as i t s
principle
o b j e c t as an u n i v e r s a l .
come o f t h e d i a l e c t i c
sense-awareness,
and t h e r e f o r e
Perception, m
regards
fact,
is
the out-
o f sense c e r t a i n t y w h i c h showed
b o t h t h e s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o f s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e were
This, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel,
issues m
its
that
mediated.
p e r c e p t i o n , as ' t h e t h i n g
65
w i t h many p r o p e r t i e s ' .
ectic
I t is
o f perception begins.
complex.
We s h a l l
find,
at this point that the d i a l -
This d i a l e c t i c
however, t h a t
of sense-certainty.
p o s i t i o n s which the ordinary
i s particulax^ly
in pattern
c o n s c i o u s n e s s t r a v e r s e d were
and I i n d i c a t e d
some o f t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s w e r e .
b e l i e v e , m i g h t be s a i d o f H e g e l ' s
it
does i n making
bitter
to taste,
etc.
it
apcears
make an
o b j e c t as a 'pure o n e . ^
s u c h an a t t e m p t i s t o l i s t
properties o f the thing;
it
says t h e t h i n g i s b l a c k ,
However, m
simply
says, t h a t
regarding i t
65.
I b i d . , p. 9h.
66.
Ibid.,
p. 9 7 .
it
as a One.
Hegel's
What
the various
doing t h i s
round,
the focus o f
a t t e n t i o n o f t h e experiencing consciousness s h i f t s .
d i s c o v e r s , Hegel
what
account o f p e r c e p t i o n .
t o t h e n a t u r a l consciousness t o r e q u i r e t h a t
an
in
The same, I
the process o f perception f i r s t
a t t e m p t t o apprehend
follows
We f o u n d t h e r e t h a t t h e
most r e s p e c t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s ,
He s u g g e s t s t h a t
it
I t
m i s c o n c e i v e s t h e t h i n g by
I tfeels
emphasis.
it
ought, since
each
257.
of
t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t h i n g i s an u n i v e r s a l ,
it
as a Many.
I t must t h e r e f o r e , H e g e l r e a s o n s ,
sake o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y
find
their
'for the
o f the p r o p e r t y take the o b j e c t i v e
e s s e n c e as a c o m m u n i t y ' .
consequently
t o regard
The p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t h i n g
place
a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium.
f o r consciousness m
T h i s i s because
an
consciousness
now v i e w s i t s o b j e c t n o t as a s i n g l e t h i n g b u t as
thmghood
68
i n general.
As i t
make o f t h i s
stands,
there is
conclusion o f Hegel's.
u n i v e r s a l medium' o r ' t h m g h o o d m
glance,
n o t h i n g a t a l l t o us.
some l i g h t on t h i s
Spinoza's philosophy
t h a t we c a n
Phrases l i k e
'abstract
g e n e r a l ' mean, a t f i r s t
B u t we c a n , I t h i n k ,
conclusion i f
i s most l i k e l y t o be i t s
little
origin,
we r e c o n n e c t
it
throw
with
what
namely, Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f
h i s review
of the History of Philos-
69
ophy.
We w i l l
w h a t we m i g h t
recall
call
t h a t S p i n o z a espoused a n o t i o n o f
'thmghood m
g e n e r a l ' - Substance
Hegel g r e a t l y admired .
Indeed
into
of his philosophy.
the very conception
remember t h a t
in
related
We w i l l
t o one a n o t h e r .
Their only r e l a t i o n
Similarly,
this
p e r c e p t i o n t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t h i n g become s u n k
tbmghood
also
t h e a t t r i b u t e s and modes, a r e
c o m m u n i t y i n t h e One S u b s t a n c e .
of
we h a v e seen t h a t n o t i o n e n t e r
t h a t a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium o f S p i n o z a ' s
none o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s , i . e .
directly
which
i n general
f o rthe experiencing
is
tneir
stage
m
consciousness.
I t seems as t h o u g h
those p r o p e r t i e s permeate t h a t
67.
Ibid.
68.
I b i d . , p. 9 5 .
69.
H y p p o l i t e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e C n a p t e r on
h i s Genese e t S t r u c t u r e de l a Pheriome'riologie
support t o t h i s view.
medium
Perception in
de 1 ' E s p r i t l e n d s
'
258.
without
impinging
argues, i s not
perception
on
each o t h e r a t a l l .
But
the proper view of those p r o p e r t i e s which
discovers.
As
H e g e l i n d i c a t e s a t t h e end
h i s C r i t i q u e o f S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y , we
of i n d i v i d u a t i o n
simply
a l l o w t h e p r o p e r t i e s t o be
acknowledge t h a t they
are
We
o f M i n d : i t has
appear m
determinate.
h i s Lectures
L o c k e and
L e i b n i z who
abstractness
through
on
excluding
had,
ones.
aspect of t h i s p r i n c i p l e
only d i s t i n c t
and
t h a t they are d i s t i n c t
and
t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f an
one
each o t h e r .
were s i m p l y
they
another but
Since
'if
indifferent
o b j e c t as
would not
be
the
most
notion
also excluding
were t h r o u g h o u t
perceiving
in
themselves.
the
fact
that
a l l different
v i e w e d Dy
t h e many d e t e r m i n a t e
and
so
The
f o r the
different
i m p l i e s t h a t t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s h a v e t o be
excluding
was
I t implied that
consciousness' experience of perception,
comes t o see
to
f o r the
f o r Hegel u s ,
different
as
According
of individuation.
t h i n g s are not
it
they
Leibniz especially
implied.
Thus m
Phenomen-
i n t h i s way, c o m p e n s a t e d
the p r i n c i p l e
what
Those p r o p e r t i e s
^ s e l f - d i f f e r e n t l a t i o n w h i c h i t
subject but
i n the
the H i s t o r y of Philosophy i t
of Spinoza's philosophy,
developing
significant
seen as
One
This i s
t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s as
t h e a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium.
have t h e r e f o r e t o be
Hegel m
to isolate
cannot
have r a t n e r t o
p e r c e i v i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a s k e d t o do
ology
We
account
r e f e r r e d back t o t h e
general.
really
of
have t o t a k e
the t h i n g s of perception.
Substance o r thinghood
the
t h i s , Hege]
Lt n o t
themselves
only
from
properties
only
determinate p r o p e r t i e s f o r they
self-related
only
are
259-
this
i n so f a r as t h e y d i f f e r e n t i a t e
This wnole process, from
property that
the
consciousness.
universality';
secondly,
general
tothe
H e g e l ' s v i e w how
formed f o r t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g
I t i s each o f t h o s e
I tis therefore
properties
thmghood
i s an e x c l u d i n g o n e , i s
'thing' of perception is
a whole.
themselves....
firstly,
moments c o m b i n e d
into
' i n d i f f e r e n t passive
' t h e one, t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r
; thirdly,
t h e many p r o p e r t i e s m
t h e m s e l v e s .'
Thus, f o r H e g e l t h e ' t h i n g ' o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e ' p o i n t o f

isolation m
t h e medium o f p e r s i s t e n c e e m a n a t i n g i n m u l t i p -
7 2
l i c i t y .
We
c a n see w h a t H e g e l means by t h i s i f
i n m i n d w h a t he h a s t o say o f p e r c e p t i o n m
Modern P h i l o s o p h y .
B u t even so i t
complex way o f d e f i n i n g
as t h e d e f i n i t i o n i s
the n a t u r a l
We m i g h t
i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y
c o n s c i o u s n e s s on i t s
path
in defining
r e a l knowledge.
brushed aside
ophers
to real
knowledge.
t h a t Hegel m
construc-
p a t h a t t e n d s n o t so much t o t h e p r o b l e m s c f
c o n s c i o u s n e s s as t o t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t
be
especially
t o f o r m u l a t e w h a t goes on i n
be l e d t o c o n c l u d e f r o m t h i s
ting that
his Critique of
the object o f perception
intended
we k e e n
that
since i t
This
natural
p h i l o s o p h e r s have had
c o n c l u s i o n cannot
seems t o me t h a t
it
is
only
lightly
philos-
can h a v e o r w o u l d h a v e i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e c o n t e n t
o f p e r c e p t i o n i s m e r e l y a 'point o f i s o l a t i o n ' o r s i m p l y
70.
H e g e l . Werke 3 >
71.
Ibid,
P- 95
72.
Ibid,
260.
'medium o f p e r s i s t e n c e . '
c o u l d be
not,
is
called
surely,
too
how
is it
n e s s can
His
the
we
the
The
p r o b l e m t h a t we
are
that
points
of
the
ordinary
view
d e v e l o p m e n t may
analysis
the
is:
of
question
perception.
consciousness' experience
confined to i t s
1
the
conscious-
s h a l l postpone answering t h a t
'thing of perception
i n which f i n a l l y
language
left with
h a v e e x a m i n e d more o f H e g e l ' s a n a l y s i s
perception i s not
of the
of view would
epistemologically naive natural
moment we
belief is
what
I f , however,we were t o g i v e H e g e l
doubt tne
that
t h a t way.
experience philosophical
For
until
articulate itself m
of the
consciousness or
a naive epistemological point
technical.
benefit
A natural
definition.
leads i t
The
isolation
into a further dialectic
t h i n g of perception dissolves.
appear s u r p r i s i n g
the
This
c o n t e x t of
Hegel's
of consciousness' experience of p e r c e p t i o n , but
can
hardly
appear s u r p r i s i n g i n the
as
a whole.
suggest t h a t
Our
it
interpretation
is
part
and
context of his
of
parcel
it
of
comes t o m i n d h e r e , i s o f c o u r s e , t h e
p h i l o s o p h y : Substance i s S u b j e c t .
idealism.
At
one
and
assume t h a t t h e r e i s an
the
w o u l d on
its
the
contrary
approach.
This i s Hegel's
reality
it
philosophy
What
principal thesis
same t i m e , he
external
of
s u g g e s t s , we
of
Hegel's
objective
are
which involves
to
genuine
o p p o s i t i o n and that that externa], r e a l i t y is not or, rather, shews I t s e l f essentially

to be subject.
Thus, as we have seen, we
can assume with the Empiricists that there
i s a t h i n g of perception, but we can also show t h a t we are misled i f we

that
this
t h i n g 3
persists
the
f a c e of
the
believe
philosophical
261.
analysis of perception.
We
ions,
if
have d i s s e n t e d
pointing
73
^
before from Hegel's
out that
not contradictory,
t h e y a r e based
is
a s i d e , h o w e v e r , t h e way
that
to
the t h i n g
them
s t a g e we
is
before i t
created
of
n w h i c h H e g e l
Again i t
positions m
perception
ing
circular.
This
sets about
seems t o me
the h i s t o r y
t h a t he
for it
h a v e now
showing
o f p h i l o s o p h y and
that
thing.
reached
in
the stage at which tne o r d i n a r y

the thing.
by i t s
c o n s c i o u s n e s s now
the t h i n g .
73
idealism
much
t a k e s up
woiks
T i n s t h i n g , Hegel
c l a i m s , has
p a t h so f a r .
The
sets i t s e l f
t o apprehend
is
task that
Therefore i t relates l c s e l f
(As we
have seen,
of
consciousness
the
the
the
or
been
perceivtruth
passively
h p p i n g t h a t w h a t comes t o i t as a c o n s e q u e n c e i s
of
which,
through.
The
has
on an a r g u m e n t
o f p e r c e p t i o n d i s s o l v e s has, I b e l i e v e ,
recommend i t .
important
certainly
i d e a l i s t conclus-
to
it,
reality
sense-
G.R.G Mure m The P h i l o s o p h y o f K e g e l h a s t h i s t o say on t h e

p o i n t : 'Hegel has no i n t e n t t o c r i t i c i s e t h i s a t t i t u d e ' t h a t
t h e f i n i t e i s r e a l ' 'm t h e sense o f t e l l i n g t h e o r d i n a r y man
o r t h e s c i e n t i s t how t o r u n t h e i r own b u s i n e s s , f o r t h e i r
business i s not philosophy.
For Hegel the f i n i t e i s not
u n r e a l o r i l l u s o r y ; i t i s as r e a l as i t must be t o be t h e
c o r r e l a t e of ordinary consciousness.
B u t when we v i e w them
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , o r d i n a r y cuociousness and i t s world are a r e l a t i v e l y
u n d e v e l o p e d phase m t h e s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t .
So
seen t h e f i n i t e i s o n l y m a d e g r e e r e a l ' , ( p . 1 7 ) Mure i s
c o r r e c t m h i s c o n c l u s i o n , b u t H e g e l does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e
o r d i n a r y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s as r a d i c a l l y as Mare
suggests.
H e g e i i s c o n c e r n e d t o make t h e o r d m a i y c o n s c i o u s ness p h i l o s o p h i c a l .
262.
certainty
consciousness s i m i l a r l y
to the object.)
Now
relates
itself
p e r c e p t i o n , Hegel
claims, although
we h a v e t o do o n l y w i t h u n i v e r s a l s t h e r e l a t i o n
to inessential
persists.
I n the f i r s t
t a k e s t h e t h i n g t o be t h e e s s e n t i a l
the
inessential
itself
tual
aspect.
occurs t o i t , Hegel
place,
of
essential
consciousness
a s p e c t and
the subject
T h e r e f o r e as c o n s c i o u s n e s s
t o be t h e i n e s s e n t i a l
relationship that
passively
takes
aspect - the side of the percep-
\fc i s now
f i x e d and u n c h a n g e a b l e
s u g g e s t s , t h a t w h a t i t may
apprehend
it
m
74
that
r e l a t i o n s h i p may
to believe
that
deed H e g e l
suggests that
as we
it
perceive i t
may
misrepresent the t h i n g .
be d e c e i v e d by i t s p e r c e p t i o n .
'its
criterion
when t h e o r d i n a r y
it
for
it
seeks
is
comes t o b e l i e v e t h a t
counts
consciousness
self-same but o f p e r c e p t i o n J
1
observes a l l t h a t
persistence of the thing.
1 0
ordinary
will
Thus,
of the object
T h e r e f o r e what
is not consistent with
This is
what
o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t o remove
the
o f course a procedure
t h a t Descartes adopts i n h i s epistemology.

the
to
'self-sameness'.'^
'not as an u n t r u t h
t o do t o g e t a t t h e t r u t h
f r o m what i t
thing
-êge! assumes t h ^ t
the n a t u r a l
of t r u t h ' ,
the
In-
consciousness observes a divergence m
perceives, this
that
it
i s not the t r u t h -
overcome " i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s
a d o p t , as
I t begins
He
sought,
like
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t o r e d u c e t o a minimum t h e chance
74.
H e g e l . Werke
75-
Ibid.,
p. 97-
p.
99.
76.
Ibid.
26^.
of
our being
deceived
by w h a t we
consequence o f a d o p t i n g
was
of
this
l e d t o c o n c l u d e t h a t we
objects.
perceive.
I t was
p r o c e d u r e , we
could
I n h i s v i e w we
only
recall,
predicate
could not
be
from
of
t o H e g e l , what t h e
applying this
i t e perception
perception.
be
it
is
that
i t s own
it
itself
is
its
own
that
s i m i l a r t o an
that
stage of sense-certainty.
to
learn that
it
was
as
a result
certainty
of t h i s
was
p e r c e i v i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s has
t h a t what i t
in
the
took
o b j e c t ) was
concludes t h a t
any
c o n s c i o u s n e s s has
There i t
the
t o be
m e r e l y an
a result
t now
inaccuracies
that
Therefore
from
77-
78.
of i t s misconception.
f e e l s able
it
to
declared
of
the u n t r u t h of i t s
its
the
setfse-sameness
i t s perception.
I t
perception
Having experienced
corrects i t . .
this
perception.
apprehension of the
perception,
sense-
to learn
t o remove t h e s o u r c e s o f e r r o r m
'differentiates
I t concladed
to i t s e l f '
itself
sense-
Here e q u a l l y
c r o p up
again
the
'return to
( i . e . a lack of
error m
not
at
'returned
are
had
subject.
deception
This experience
'homecoming' t h a t
from
is
to
Perception,
i~he most c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e .
derived
takes
o f t h e o b j e c t and
the consciousness t h a t
awareness t o f u r n i s h
learns
content
what i t
perception.''''
perception
experience
them.
involved
(Auffassung)
p u r e o b j e c t - w h a t e v e r t h a t m i g h t be.
is
any
pertained to
is actively
o r mere a p p r e h e n s i o n
m
he
extension
of self-sameness t o the
active mediation
discovers,
that
o r d i n a r y consciousness
I t l e a r n s , Hegel claims,
pure p a s s i v i t y
fact
criterion
certain that
o t h e r of t h e i r observed p r o p e r t i e s a c t u a l l y
According
as
truth
So
we
I b i d . , p. 9 8 .
Kegel's suggestion i s t h a t consciousness r e t u r n s t o i t s e l f (Puokehr i n s i c h s e l b s t ) a s a r e s u l t o f t h i s
reflection into self (Peflexion in sich).
Ibid.,
p.
99.
79.
Ibid.
264.
may now see t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s as no l o n g e r

p e r c e i v i n g h u t a l s o as b e i n g
perceiving.
This,
o f course,
o f Descartes.
principal
o f the nature
of its
I t t h e r e f o r e now l o o k s u p o n p e r c e p t i o n as a f o r m
of thinking.
Critique
conscious
merely
b r i n g s us back t o Hegel's
B e c a u s e , i f we r e c a l l ,
one o f h i s
c r i t i c i s m s o f D e s c a r t e s was t h a t he d i d n o t c o u n t
p e r c e p t i o n as a f o r m o f t h o u g h t ,
I t i s p r e c i s e l y because
D e s c a r t e s d i d n o t come t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o w h i c h t h e n a t u r a l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s comes t h a t ,
d i s t i n g u i s h thought
It
was, m
from
j_n H e g e l ' s e s t i m a t i o n , he h a s t o
extension.
Hegel's view t h e Lockean p h i l o s o p h y
r a i s e d Mind beyond t h i s
impasse.
the conclusion t h a t ,
we a r e t o p e r c e i v e w i t h o u t
ourselves
if
t o deception
L o c k e , we r e c a l l ,
that
first
came t o
exposing
we have t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e w h a t p e r t a i n s
t o t h e t h i n g from what p e r t a i n s t o o u r p e r c e p t i o n o f i t .
The
o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e r e f o r e , has t o d i s t i n g u i s h
L o c k e ' s t e r m i n o l o g y ) b e t w e e n t h e s e c o n d a r y and p r i m a r y
of a thing.
that
' i s o n l y w h i t e t o o u r eyes, a l s o sharp t o o u r
tongue, also cubic
that
The
that
is
if
t o our f e e l i n g ' .
As we c a n s e e , i t
now
' i n t h e movement o f p e r c e p t i o n s o m e t h i n g
contradictory this
i s t o be r e c o g n i s e d
as my
self-
By t a k i n g on t h e s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s o f a t h i n g ,
the t h i n g preserves
consciousness.
t h e form
of i t s being
one f o r t h e o r d i n a r y
Thus by a d o p t i n g a p r o c e d u r e f r o m
epistemology, t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness prevents

o f self-sameness from
Ibid.
occurs
reflection'
many and v a r i e d q u a l i t i t e s o f a t h i n g c o n t r a d i c t i t s
sameness.
80.
qualitie
The o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e r e f o r e s u g g e s t s
the thing
holds
(m
êducing t h e content
Locke's
the c r i t e r i o n
of sensation,
as w i t
265.
Descartes, t o a
nullity.
When we see t h a t t h e Phenomenology o f Mind may be d e s c r i b e d

i n these terms we are tempted t o suggest t h a t a l l t h e work
amounts t o i s a r e p e t i t i o n o f Hegel's account o f t h e H i s t o r y
of Philosophy.
This suggestion i s plausible
s i n c e , as we have
s a i d , t h e view t h a t l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s
that a l l philosophy i s m
osophy.
a c r i t i c a l c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past
But Hegel, as I have suggested p r e v i o u s l y , does n o t
intend t h i s m
t h e sense t h a t each p h i l o s o p h y merely works anew
on t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y .
that,
phil-
as i s so m
There i s more t o h i s view t h a n
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r instance.
What Hegel
is
d o i n g here i s g i v i n g an account o f p e r c e p t i o n as one o f the

forms o f consciousness which i s p r i o r t o p m l o s o p h i c a l reasoning.
I n Hegel's view t h i s e n t a i l s t h a t a T i m b e r o f o r d i n a r y
c o n c e p t i o n s about t h e n a t u r e o f p e r c e p t i o n have t o be shown

t o be u n t r u e .
One
o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n s he f e e l s he has t c
rebut
i n t h a t area i s t h a t knowledge i t s e l f has merely t o do w i t h the

correct perception of a thing.
As i t
stands Hegel's account o f
the H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y has n o t h i n g t c do w i t h t h a t r e b u t t a l .
I t e n t e r s i n t o t h e p i c t u r e ; and i t i s by p r o v i d i n g t h e
w i t h which t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness may
t h a t the confusion a r i s e s .
seeking t o e s t a b l i s h
defend its p o s i t i o n ,
We can u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Hegel,
the t r u t h o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y , w i l l
w i t h p r e v i o u s and cor.temporaiy p h i l o s o p h e r s .
m
which he does so t h a t causes c o n f u s i o n .
consciousness o f h i s t i m e .
ness comes,
so
to
speaK:,
betv een
contend
I t i s t h e form
He t a c k l e s past
p h i l o s o p h i e s , as forms o f t h i n k i n g t h a t appear m
natural
arguments
the
The n a t u r a l consciousphilosophy
itself
8l
and
8l.
t h e account o f i t s h i s t o r y .
Werner Marx. Hegel_s__ P h f e c i e n o l o g i e
1971)PP 21 - 22.
I f this is
so,
deb__Geis_tes (Klostenr.ar
266.
might we n o t f a i r l y
consciousness
weight
of
suggest t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y o r n a t u r a l
o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y has t o c a r r y t o o much
C l e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems and t h e e x p e r i e n c e
t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness a r e n o t t h e same.
I t is
p o s s i b l e t o imagine t h a t t h e common-sense t h i n k e r runs

a c r o s s some o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t Hegel analyses m
account o f perception,, b u t i t
it
i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine
can e x p e r i e n c e t h e whole d i a l e c t i c .
has
that
Surely the only place
t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness w i l l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t
as a whole i s i n Hegel's Phenomenology o f Mind?
dialectic
I n other
words, Hegel has c o n s t r u c t e d an account o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f

the
o r d i n a r y consciousness which does n o t correspond t o t h e
e x p e r i e n c e o f any a c t u a l consciousness.
Indeed a l l
that
e x p e r i e n c e does correspond t o i s Hegel's view o f t h e p a t h

t h a t p h i l o s o p h y must t a k e and l o g i c a l l y must have t a k e n f o r
i t to attain truth.
of
T h i s i s why Hegel's account o f t h e p a t h
t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness' e x p e r i e n c e r e l i e s so h e a v i l y
on t h e work o f p r e v i o u s p h i l s o p h e r s .
The h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s -
ophy must f o r him be t h e p r e - e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e

of
t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness
and m
t h a t c a p a c i t y supply t h e
raw m a t e r i a l f o r t n e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r d i n a r y
consciousness.
I f t h i s i s a l l t h a t goes i n t o the making o f t h e H e g e l i a n

n a t u r a l consciousness
it
appears
t h a t we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h
between two t h i n g s w i t h i n t h e Phenomenology o f Mind each o f

which may have been b e t t e r done i f
ately: f i r s t ,
i t had been tacl.led
separ-
the attempt t o reconstruct r a t i o n a l l y the h i s t o r y
267.
o f p h i l o s o p h y t o show t h e way t o genuine knowledge and second,

the a t t e m p t t o induce t h e common-sense t h i n k e r t o t h i n k
philosophically.
I t I s t h e l a t t e r , o f course, which most
r e a d i l y comes t o mind when Hegel t a l k s o f t h e Phenomenology

as t h e p a t h o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t o s c i e n c e b u t i t
i s the former, i t
seems, t h a t t a k e s precedence i n h i s account
o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness.
With t h i s m
mind we s h a l l r e t u r n t o o u r r e v i e w o f
Hegel's a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n .
I t w i l l g i v e us an i n d i c a -
t i o n o f some o f t h e problems t h a t a r e caused by Hegel's

f a i l u r e t o s e p a r a t e t h e two s t r a n d s m
system.
part of h i s
We can, I b e l i e v e , agree w i t h Hegel on t n e f i r s t
p o i n t t o be c o n s i d e r e d , namely
r e g a r d each and every o b j e c t i t
external
the f i r s t
t h e common-sense t h i n k e r
will
p e r c e i v e s as b e i n g a body
t o h: s consciousness.
The man m
generally a m a t e r i a l i s t of t h i s kind.
the street
But i t
is
i s ths con-
v i c t i o n o f t h e o r d m a r j consciousness t h a t Hegel,, i s s e e k i n g
t o undermine.
I n defence o f i t s p o s i t i o n t h e o r d i n a r y con-
s c i o u s n e s s w i l l adopt t h e view t h a t a l l t h e p r o p e r t i e s we
p e r c e i v e t o be p a r t o f a t h i n g do i n f a c t b e l o n g t o i t .
Hegel says, i t w i l l suggest
that
' i t i s the t h i n g
As
itself
82
1
w h i c h i s w h i t e and a l s o c u b i c , a l s o sharp and so o n .

far,
so good.
However, a t i s n o t p l a u s i b l e
t o suggest
So
that
t h e common-sense t h i n k e r w a l l r e f l e c t on, o r indeed see, t h e

implications
o f t h i s p o s i t i o n as Hegel d e s c r i b e s them.
I t
w i l l not, I believe, notice that i n i t s i n s i s t i n g that a thing

82.
Hegel. Werke 5; p. 100.
263.
i s w h i t e , and a l s o c u b i c , a l s o sharp e t c . t h a t the a l s o

c o n t r a d i c t s the u n i t y o f t h e t h i n g .
We
cannot, Hegel says,
c l a i m t h a t a t h i n g i s b o t h one and many and y e t s t i l l
persists.
T h i s s u b t e l t y w i l l c e r t a i n l y escape the o r d i n a r y consciousness

qua man
the s t r e e t .
Our man
would n o t acknowledge t h a t i t was
the s t r e e t c l e a r l y
h i s t h i n k i n g that; m a i n t a i n e d
t h a t u n i t y and t h e n a p p o r t i o n the d i v e r s i t y t o the t h i n g .

He w i l l n o t , as does Hegel's n a t u r a l consciousness, know o r
d e c l a r e h i m s e l f t o be t h a t which b r i n g s u n i t y t o the o b j e c t s
of experience.
T h i s s o p h i s t i c a t i o n can, I t h i n k , most approp-
r i a t e l y be seen as b e l o n g i n g t o Kant's t h e o r y o f knowledge.

It
i s he, r a t h e r t h a n our man
the
i n the street,who claims
' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' which accompanies the
' I think'
g i v e s t h e d i v e r s e m a t t e r o f appearance i t s c o n c r e t e
i n our e x p e r i e n c e .
What he says i s t h a t m
that
structure
any g i v e n i n s t a n c e
o f p e r c e p t i o n t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t such as w h i t e ,
sharp e t c . , are s u p p l i e d by our : n t u i t i o n , but m a t i t
understanding
cubic
i s the
t h a t combines those v a r i o u s p r o p e r t i e s t o g i v e
us t h e o b j e c t .
Thus what we
p e r c e i v e , m Kant's view,
is
always made up o f t h e d i v e r s e d a t a t h a t we r e c e i v e from t h i n g s

and t h e u n i f y i n g manner m
t h a t data.
w h i c h our u n d e r s t a n d i n g
Hegel i s r i g h t t o suggest,
deals
i n h i s a n a l y s i s of
p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t the problem which a r i s e s i f we accept

view i s t h a t s i n c e now
properties'
we i n t u i t
t o consciousness o n l y ' ,
must t h e r e f o r e prevent them from f a l l i n g i n t o one

As we
83.
remember, Kant, m
I b i d ; p.
101.
this
'the c c i n c i d n e c e ( i n e m s e o z e n ) o f
' i s due
with
those
:t
the t n m g '
a s s e n t i n g t h a t our U n d e r s t a n d i n g
was
269.
a b l e t o know o b j e c t s was o b l i g e d t o add t h a t i t was n o t a b l e

to
know t h i n g s m
themselves.
N a t u r a l l y t h e Understanding
c o u l d know phenomena because i t was t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
that
gave them t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , b u t i n Kant's view we had t o

d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s p e r c e p t u a l knowledge from what t h e t h i n g
might be o u t s i d e o u r e x p e r i e n c e .
A
claim t o know i t as a noumena/.
We c o u l d n o t , i n h i s view,
What Hegel however wishes t o
p o i n t o u t here i s t h a t Kant has t o make t h i s
distinction
s i m p l y because t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s a l l o w e d t o t a k e on t h e
unity of the thing m
experience.
T m s i s a clear enough
p o i n t a g a i n s t Kant s i n c e i f Kant wants t o a t t r i b u t e t h e u n i t y

of
the t h i n g o f perception t o the Understanding i t
i s apparent
t h a t he has t o r e j e c t any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e t h i n g i n i t s e l f
i s as we p e r c e i v e i t .
However we a r e l e f t wondering
what k i n d o f p o i n t t h i s i s a g a i n s t t h e o r d i n a r y
It
is difficult
Kant.
but
just
thinker.
t o imagine t h a t he w i l l ever have t h o u g h t
like
True enough, he w i l l have c e r t a i n views o f p e r c e p t i o n
s u r e l y t h e y w i l l s t o p a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t began t h i s
stage o f t h e d i a l e c t i c , namely, t h e s u g g e s t i o n thac a l l t h e

p r o p e r t i e s we p e r c e i v e t o be an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a t h i n g a r e
indeed so.
As we have suggested
examining m
t h e n , t h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t Hegel
is
t h e Phenornneology o f Mitid i s p r i m a r i l y p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l experience.
I t i s t h e r e f o r e what I s h a l l c a l l an a b s t r a c t
F o r even when he r e f e r s us t o a non-
p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , f o r i n s t a n c e t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f need
270.
or t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f L i f e , he does so from a p h i l o s o p h i c a l
p o i n t o f view; j u s t as i t
i s h i s h a b i t t o r e f e r t o the
g
p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s o f animals merely t o prove h i s idealism.'

We have a l r e a d y remarked on t h i s d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y
n a t u r e o f Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e .
We
abstract
d i d so m
our
d i s c u s s i o n i n the l a s t Chaptex o f the Preface o f the Phenomen ology.
Indeed t h e r e tne a b s t r a c t n e s s was
since i t
f o l l o w e d on a f a s c i n a t i n g account o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l
and s c i e n t i f i c n a t u r e o f e x p e r i e n c e .
even more marked
I n our c o n c l u d i n g
remarks on t h e Phenomenology we w i l l a t t e m p t t o b r i n g out

t h i s a b s t r a c t n e s s m Hegel's t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e .
84.
I b i d ; The argument i s t n a t animals do n o t t r e a t the o b j e c t s

of t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e as m a c c e s s i o l e t h i n g s i n themselves.
They q u i e t l y s e t t o and eat them.
I n Hegel's view t h i s
shows what the ' t r u t h o f sensuous t n t n g s 1,:'
their
nothingness'.
See Werke ~*>, v. 91.
1
271.
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 'THING' OF PERCEPTION

To grasp t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e d i a l e c t i c o f p e r c e p t i o n
we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h two aspects
These a r e , f i r s t l y ,
o f Hegel's a n a l y s i s .
what I s h a l l c a l l t h e w e l l - g r o u n d e d
ique o f e m p i r i c i s m he deploys
i n h i s a n a l y s i s and, secondly,
the i d e a l i s m o f h i s a n a l y s i s .
T h i s seems a s t r a n g e
t i o n t o make s i n c e , s u r e l y , i t
distinc
c o u l d be argued t h a t Hegel's
c r i t i c i s m o f empiricism i s h i s idealism.
so, f o r i t
crit
But t h i s i s n o t
i s possible t o c r i t i c i s e empiricism without being
an i d e a l i s t .
The E m p i r i c i s t s '
t h e o r y o f knowledge need n o t
be t h e o n l y one t h a t i s open t o a m a t e r i a l i s t .
T h i s i s an
i m p o r t a n t p o i n t , f o r when we come t o o u r a n a l y s i s o f Marx

we s h a l l f i n d t h a t i t
i s t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t he adopts.
Hegel
i d e a l i s m then i s not e n t i r e l y t i e d t o h i s c r i t i q u e o f e r r p i r i
cism a l t h o u g h i t p l a y s a r o l e i n t h a t c r i t i q u e .
I t is for
t . i l s reason t h a t i t becomes i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h what i s

well-founded
h i s c r i t i q u e and what i s merely
idealist.
Marcuse i n h i s Reason and R e v o l u t i o n f a i l s t o make t h i s d i s tinction.
He b r i n g s o u t t h e element m Hegel's a n a l y s i s
o f p e r c e p t i o n which i s a w e l l - f o u n d e d
c r i t i q u e o f empiricism
o r what he c a l l s p o s i t i v e s m , w i t n o u t remarking
i d e a l i s t element m
the analysis.
on t h e o t h e r
The r e s u l t i s , and t h i s
may be s a i d i n g e n e r a l o f Marcuse's work, t h a t we g e t a p i c t u r e o f Hegel p r e p a r i n g t h e ground f o r Marx i n what we might

c a l l merely a l i n e a r sense.
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y o n l y m
u t i o n t o Marx's t h i n k i n g .
By t h i s I mean t h a t Marcuse se
the l i g h t of i t s p o s i t i v e
contrib
No mention i s made o f t h e d e b i t
s i d e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p , o f which p l a i n l y Hegel's i d e a l i s m
i s an i m p o r t a n t
part.
272
T h i s s a i d , l e t us now see
the i d e a l i s m
and
what the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
well-founded c r i t i q u e of empiricism
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y amounts t o .
Marcuse's p o i n t t h a t what we
I n the f i r s t
of
p l a c e I taKe
might c a l l the p o s i t i v e aspect
of Hegel's d i a l e c t i c o f p e r c e p t i o n i s i t s i m p l i e d c r i t i c i s m
'of common-sense and
t r a d i t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c thought' which
'takes the w o r l d as a t o t a l i t y o f t h i n g s , more or l e s s

i n g per se,
and
seensthe t r u t h m
objects
t h a t are
exist-
independent
0(-
o f the knowing s u b j e c t s ' .

t h e r e are no
The
p o i n t b e i n g of course t h a t
f a c t s of e x p e r i e n c e which are n o t ,
t e r m s , mediated by the knowing s u b j e c t .

c l e a r t h a t one
of Hegel's i n t e n t i o n s i n o u t l i n i n g the
d i v i s i o n between ' e s s e n t i a l
and
ordinary
Hegel's
I t is perfectly
o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t o show t h a t t h e r e i s no
object
' and
sucn a b s o l u t e
' i n e s s e n t i a l ' - the
the i n e s s e n t i a l s u b j e c t m
consciousness i s wont t o assume.
a form o f knowledge i t
The
may
Any
is.
as they are
o f f e r us s u p e r i o r - b e c a u s e d i r e c t - k n o w l e d g e .
can
as Hume b e l i e v e s ,
by s t i c k i n g i n t h i s way
Reason and
it
T h i s means t h a t
does n o t
H.^-arcuse.
one.
g a m as a r e s u l t i s c e r t a i n l y f o r us but
p e r c e p t i o n does o f f e r us knowledge o f t h i n g s
85.
of
i s an a l t e r n a t i n g movement from
i s a l s o a knowledge o f what the o b j e c t
not,
the
relation
s u b j e c t t o o b j e c t w i t h o u t e i t h e r t a k i n g precedence.
knowledge we
essentia
t h i s i n s t a n c e - as
p e r c e p t i o n , as Hegel c l e a r l y proves, i s a d i a l c r t i e a J
As
dnalccti
to
R e v o l u t i o n , o p . c i t . p.
but
We
the
112.
appearance o f t h i n g s ensure the c e r t a i n t y o f our knowledge.

Indeed
i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t we s n a i l confuse o u r s e l v e s
t h e r e are so many p o i n t s o f view from v;hich we can

a thing.
as
perceive
A l l t h i s , I t h i n k , we can regard as p a r t o f
Hegel's w e l l - g r o u n d e d
c r i t i c i s m of empiricism.
However.
Hegel goes on t o say t h a t the v i e w p o i n t o f p e r c e p t i o n as

a whole i s f a l s e .
I n h i s view i t
s u b s i d i a r y element m
can o n l y e x i s t as a
knowledge and then o n l y when i t s
premisses have been undermined.
T h i s i s where the a b s t r a c t
c o n c l u s i o n t o the a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n comes i n .
The
premisses he wants removed are these which l e a d t o the d i a l e c t i c

o f p e r c e p t i o n : the two poles o f p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t and
object.
subject.
And,
as we would e x p e c t ,
perceived
the outcome f a v o u r s the
Hegel t h e r e f o r e c o n c e n t r a t e s on showing t h a t
the
t h i n g goes t o ground o r , s i n c e Zugrunde gehen a l s o means demise

i n German, t h a t i t
has
it
perishes.^
a certain plausibility.
The
argument, though j d e a l i s t ,
I t goes as f o l l o w s .
t o be t h e n a t u r e o f a t h i n g t h a t i t
through i t s opposition to other t h i n g s .
preserves
Hegel takes
its
identity
I t is essential
from t h e p o i n t o f view o f the t h i n g t h a t i t be

o f o t h e r t h i n g s and t h e r e f o r e opposed t o them;
independent
T h i s means,
a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, t h a t i t s e x i s t e n c e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Other t h i n g s a r e , he argues, b o t h e s s e n t i a l and
to i t .
I t i s what i t
inessential
:s o n l y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r t h i n g s
b u t e q u a l l y washes t o be r i d o f those o t h e r t h i n g s .
86.
Hegel.
V/erke 3 p. 103.
Thus
274.
' d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h t h e a b s o l u t e c n a r a c t e r and i t s o p p o s i t i o n
it
r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o o t h e r s and e s s e n t i a l l y i s o n l y t h i s relating;
r e l a t i o n however i s the n e g a t i o n o f i t s independence and t h e

1
t h i n g on t h e c o n t r a r y p e r i s h e s t h r o u g h i t s essentia.1 p r o p e r t y .
T h i s c l e a r l y i s t h e i d e a l i s t aspect o f Hegel's a n a l y s i s o f
perception.
Though n o t separate
m Hegel's mind from
his
c r i t i c i s m of empiricism i t
can, as I have s a i d , be i s o l a t e d
from what i s acceptable
his critique.
It
i s o f course
t r u e t h a t t h i s account o f t h e ' p e r i s h i n g o f t h e t h i n g '

a l s o aimed a t e m p i r i c i s m .
is
I t misses i t s mark however because
the m a t e r i a l i s t p o s t u l a t e o f e m p i r i c i s m
i s one t h a t concerns
the e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s and n o t what t h e e x p l a n a t i o n or a

t h i n g looks l i k e .
It_is
self-evident
t h a t the r a t i o n a l
unaerstandmg of a t h i n g i s not m a t e r i a l ,
e x i s t s o u t s i d e our minds.
sonse i d e a l .
it
it
i s nothing
that
An e x p l a n a t i o n i s always m
that
I t does n o t , however, f o l l o w t h a t t h e ^hnrgs
explains are.
Hegel b e l i e v e s uhat by showing t h a t a t h i n g
i s an u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s : something t h a t can o n l y
preserve
i t s i d e n t i t y by b e i n g b o t h a s s o c i a t e d w i t h and d i s a s s o c i a t e d
from a l l o t h e r t h i n g s he has shown t h a t i t
m
f a c t , he has o n l y succeeded m
perishes.
But,
showing t h a t i f we are t o
know what a t h i n g i s we have t o t a k e a p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t

n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e one t h i n g .
is
Hegel has
made t.~-e e r r o r o f i d e n t i f v i n g t h e uiyierstanding o f a t h i n g

with i t s existence.
87 .
I b i d . , p. I OP .
l c may w e l l be t h a t m
understanding
275.
what an apple i s we do n o t t a l k about apples but more

about f r u i t , t r e e s , and
of
p l a n t l i f e i n g e n e r a l ; but none
t h i s means t h a t the e x i s t e n c e o f our e m p i r i c a l apple
i s impaired.
down i f we
Again,
o f course,
our a n a l y s i s would break
r e l i e d e n t i r e l y on p e r c e p t i o n but t h i s does n o t
mean t h a t our e m p i r i c a l apple w i l l have broken down.
By
c o n c l u d i n g t h e o p p o s i t e , however, Hegel i s a b l e t o conclude

h i s a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n w i t h t h e announcement o f t h e
a b o l i t i o n o f the t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n .
This conclusion
(and t h e reader w i l l n o t be s u r p r i s e d by t h i s ) I c a l l
abstrac
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n I have made between the i d e a l i s t

w e l l - f o u n d e d aspect
o f Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f i d e a l i s . n v i l l i ,
t h i n k , serve us w e l l i n the b r i e f l o o k we s h a l l now

Hegel's account o f t n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
It
and
take at
I n the Phenomenology.
i s the d i s s o l u t i o n o f the t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n t h a t
us i n t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
now
t h i n g of perception
become what Hegel d 3 s c r i b e s as the
universal'.
The
The
leads
has
'unconditioned-
This f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f
as Force.
p l a u s i b i l i t y o r o t h e r w i s e o f t h i s t r a n s i t i o n does n o t
d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t us h e r e .
What does i n t e r e s t us i s t h e
d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Hegel makes between what he c a l l s t h e o u t e r

e x p r e s s i o n o f f o r c e and
i t s inner r e a l i t y .
This inner
r e a l i t y f i r s t a r i s e s f o r consciousness, Hegel c l a i m s , w i t h
t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f the t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n .
i t t h i n k s i t has b e f o r e i t
But i t s experience
87.
I b i d . , p.
I n perception,
a t h i n g whose r e a l i t y i s
certain.
o f the d i a l e c t i c o f p e r c e p t i o n undermines
107.
276.
t h i s c o n v i c t i o n and b r i n g s i t
t o p o s t u l a t e , t h a t behind
p e r c e p t i o n t h e r e must be some s u p e r s e n s i b l e
notion of force f i t s
t h i s experience
that
reality.
The
because i t has, as I
g
have i n d i c a t e d , b o t h an o u t e r e x p r e s s i o n
The
outer expression
and an i n n e r r e a l i t y .
accounts f o r t h i s changeable and
unstable
w o r l d o f p e r c e p t i o n , the i n n e r n o t i o n a l l y f o r the e x p l a n a t i o n
of t h a t u n s t a b l e w o r l d .
1 say
'notionally
since
t o Hegel when the o r d i n a r y consciousness f i r s t
according
comes t o d e a l
w i t h t h i s p o s t u l a t e o f an i n n e ^ and o u t e r c e r t a i n problems
arise.
Although
t h a t what i t
the e x p e r i e n c i n g consciousness has
thought
t o be p e r f e c t l y c e r t a i n and o b j e c t i v e ,
namely, t h e t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n , has
opposite, i t
still
i s the e x p r e s s i o n
But because i t
it
certainty
o f another
I t i s prepared
to grant
that
r e a l i t y , beyond appearance.
f i n d s i t s c e r t a i n t y i n t h e w o r l d o f appearance
i s o n l y prepared
beyond.
the
A d m i t t e d l y , i t no l o n g e r t h i n k s o f
t h a t w o r l d as s t a b l e o r f i x e d .
t
shown i t s e l f t o be
c l i n g s t o i t s n o t i o n o f the
of the p e r c e i v e d w o r l d .
discovered
t o t h i n k o f t n a t r e a l i t y as an unknowable
Because, Hegel says, 'the i n n e r i s s t i l l
pure beyond
OQ
f o r consciousness' ' i t dees not f i n d i t s e l f m

Therefore
i t regards
beyond m
comparison w i t h i t s c o n c r e t e
i t yet'. ^
the i n n e r r e a l i t y o f f o r c e as a mere
expression.
The
inner
r e a l i t y , Kegel says, merely expresses a v o i d f o r i t .

What the n a t u r a l consciousness has
m
i n s i s t i n g on t h i s i s t h a t what i t
beyond has a r i s e n from experience

88,
I b i d . , p.
110.
i g n o r e d , Hegel c l a i m s ,
c a l l s t h e supersensuous
itself.
I t is therefore
277-
m i s t a k e n , Hegel argues, t o t h i n k o f i t
as something t h a t
i s f o r e v e r beyond our ken.
I t has o n l y appeared as a
r e s u l t o f a development m
our knowledge about t h e w o r l d .
The development t o which he r e f e r s i s o f course t h e one

l e d t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f tne t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n .
that
I ti s
t h i s whach p r o v i d e s t h e c o n t e n t f o r the supersensuous beyond.

T h i s i t does n o t as i t appears: as what Hegel c a l l s a mere
90
f l u x or a play of forces.
After a l l ,
t h e mere d i s s o l u t i o n
o f t h e t h i n g s o f appearance i s no adequate c o n t e n t f o r experience.
I t must g i v e r i s e t o a new o b j e c t .
We s h a l l
have
t h a t new o b j e c t o r c o n t e n t t o t h e supersensuous beyond, Heg^l

c l a i m s , t h r o u g h r e g a r d i n g appearance as appeara.nce.
In
o t h e r words, t h e w o r l d beyond p e r c e p t i o n w i l l o n l y cease t o

be a mere v o i d f o r us when we l o o k on t h a t f l u x o f appearance
as t h e e x t e r n a ] appearance o f a more p r o f o u n d and deeper
ity.
real-
Thus a l l we p e r c e i v e has, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, n o t t o
be t a k e n a t face v a l u e ; we have t o see i t

more permanent r e a l i t y .
We ha.ve t o understand and n o t
merely take n o t e o f t h a t e v i d e n c e .
I t i s at t h i s
91
t h a t Hegel i n t r o d u c e s the notaon o f Law,

manner m
as evidence o f a
point
f o r law i s t h e
which t h a t evidence can be u n d e r s t o o d o r a.ppearance
e x p l a i n e d as appearance.
Because law o r the who]e system
o f laws i s t h e permanent r e a l i t y beyond appearance, i t

t o r e s t t h e p l a y o f f o r c e s f o r consciousness.
lays
Therefore
' w i t h t h i s t h e supersensuous w o r l d i s a serene kingdom o f

laws indeed beyond t h e p e r c e i v e d w o r l d , f o r t h i s onLy p r e s e n t s
I b i d . , p. 119.
I b i d . , p. 120.
90.
278.
the law t h r o u g h c o n t i n u o u s change, however j u s t as much

present m
i t and i t s immediate p e a c e f u l image ( A b b i l d ) ' .
Hegel's answer then t o those wno, l i k e Kant, c l a i m t n a t t h e r e

i s n o t h i n g knowable beyond appearance i s t h i s : We may know
what noumena a r e p r e c i s e l y because we a r e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d
what phenomena a r e .
m
That knowledge i s n o t t o be d i s c o v e r e d
phenomena p e r se; i t o n l y comes t o l i g h t when we seek t o
i n t e r p r e t them as evidence o f a noumenal r e a l i t y .

Kant, as we know, r e j e c t s such a c l a i m because he h o l d s
t h e E m p i r i c i s t s ' view t h a t knowledge o f what t h i n g s are m
themselves
may o n l y be d e r i v e d from s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n .
And
t h a t , o f course, i s n e i t h e r s u f f i c i e n t l y dependable n o r
s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e t o p r o v i d e us w i t h t h a t knowledge.
Hegel's a n a l y s i s o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g
d i r e c t e d a t Kant's e m p i r i c i s m .
suggested
i s the.i i n one dimension
There i s however, as T have
a n o t h e r , the i d e a l i s t dimension.
most p l a i n l y m
We c?n see t h i s
the conclusion of the analysis
He
concludes
t h a t t h e supersensuoas r e a l i t y beyond appearance should be

known as s e l f .
Here a g a i n Hegel p r e s e n t s us w i t h a paradox.
He p r o v i d e s us w i t h a more o r l e s s c o n v i n c i n g account
o f one
o f t h e aspects o f s c i e n t i f i c e x p e r i e n c e , b u t t h e n he undermines what a r e p o s i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s by i d e n t i f y i n g t h a t

ience w i t h self-consciousness.
exper-
I t seems t o me t h a t , as
Hegel suggests, t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f s c i e n c e dees show t h a t

what i s t r u e about n a t u r e i s n o t s i m p l y what we can p e r c e i v e
9^5
o f i t b u t what we know o f i t
9ST-~TbidT
our s c i e n t i f i c
laws.
We
~
9.P. T h i s may not seem t o be s a y i n g much. I f , however, we c o n s i d e r

what f l o w s from i t : t n e d i s t i n c t i o n between appearance and rea
i c y , we can see t h e c o n t r a r y i s t h e case. Gadatier p r e s e n t s an
a n a l y s i s of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n or. r a t h e r , wnat i t supposes :n
h i s essay on'Die Y e r k e h r t e Welt' m Hegels D i a l e k t i k , pp/O -V,'
279-
have come a c r o s s t h i s p o i n t o f Hegel's b e f o r e i n o u r r e v i e w

of h i s c r i t i q u e
o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y .
There he made t h e
p o i n t t h a t o u r U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s h i g h e r t h a n o u r sense-percept i o n because, and he c i t e s as an example our knowledge o f t h e

heavens, i t
world.
i s what f u r n i s h e s us w i t h o u r knowledge o f t h e
The g e n e r a l c l a i m t h a t Hege] i s making i s t h a t o u r
knowledge o f t h e w o r l d i s always c o n c e p t u a l m
form.
This
c l a i m i s u n d e n i a b l y t r u e and as u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l a c r i t i c i s m
of E m p i r i c i s m as one c o u l d have.
The same cannot be d a i d
f o r what Hegel goes on t o c l a i m .
He goes on t o c l a i m t h a t
objective r e a l i t y i s therefore self.

have t o examine an d e t a i l ' s i r c e
it
T h i s i s one c l a i m we
i s what makes Hegel's
account o f e x p e r i e n c e a b s t r a c t .
F i r s t we ought t o see how i t
i s t h a t Hegel i n t h e
a n a l y s i s o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g comes t o make t h i s
Self-consciousness f i r s t
comes on t h e scene, i t
the e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e Law.
claim.
seems, w i t h
A l l t h e law p r o v i d e s
itself,
he c l a i m s , i s a s t a b l e p i c t u r e o f t h e f l u x o f appearance.
It
i s , he s u g g e s t s , an i n n e r r e a l i t y o n l y m
e x t e r n a l appearance.
c o n t r a s t t o an
What occurs t h r o u g h t h e law b e i n g
e x p l a i n e d i s t h a t t h e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' view o f t h e

law i s revoked.
is that i t
As we see, t h e o n l y i d e n t i t y
i t has
i s opposed t o t h e f l u x o f appearance.
initially
What e x p l a i n -
i n g i t does, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, i s t o show t h a i law i s t h e

r e a l i t y o f appearance.
9^.
I n e x p l a i n i n g t n e law, Hegel c l a i m s ,
Hegel. Werke 3 J p. 1^3>
A l s o Gadamer, op. c i t . , p. ~j>0.
280.
consciousness d i s c o v e r s
t o come about m
that i t
i s a l s o a law f b f d i s t i n c t i o n s
p e r c e p t i o n t h a t are n o t d i s t i n c t i o n s a t a l l .
Consciousness t h e r e f o r e comes t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t
is
u s e l e s s t o f a l l back on p e r c e p t i o n t o e x p l a i n a n y t h i n g .
What appears t o o u r senses i s merely c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
the e x p e r i e n c i n g
Thus
consciousness cor.tes t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n
that
knowledge i s n o t f u r n i s h e d by mere consciousness i . e . t h e

mere p e r c e p t u a l awareness o f t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , b u t
by o u r r e f l e c t i o n on consciousness.
self-consciousness.
And t h i s i s o f course
But t h e r e i s more t o i t
than t h a t ,
s i n c e r e f l e c t i o n on consciousness i n v o l v e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
i s a l s o t h e r e f l e c t i o n on u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f .
consciousness makes i t s appearance m
it
Thus s e l f -
the Understanding n o t
o n l y t h r o u g h t i t s becoming t h e consciousness o f consciousness

but a l s o t h r o u g h
self.
t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s own r e f l e c t i o n on i t -
The U n d e r s t a n d i n g f i r s t comes t o see t h i s : t h a t t h e
r e a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s when i n t h e course
o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e law i t
realises a u
i n Hegel's words, c o n v e r s i n g
m
that i t
with i t s e l f .
che e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e Jaw i t
i s doing i s ,
Then i t knows t h a t
'only enjoys
itseldP-', ^
and
t h e r e f o r e r e a l i s e s t h a t t h e r e a l i t y o f appearance i s n o t t h e
'play o f f o r c e s ' b u t i t s e l f .
This conclusion
philosophy.
thesis.
i l l u s t r a t e s t h e s o l i p s i s m o f Hegel's
T h i s s o l i p s i s m i s a l s o t h e core o f i t s i d e a l i s t
The s t r e n g t h of Hegel's p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i t
based on an a n a l y s i s o f t h e n a t u r e
9b-
Hegel, i b i d . , p. I'jh.
of scientific
is
explanation.
281.
He
concludes t h a t the r e a l i t y
thought
or self-consciousness
identifies
o f phenomenal
'reality'
is
because, l i k e S c h e l l i n g ,
science's m t e l l e c t u a l i s a t i o n
of nature
he
with
the
d i s s o l u t i o n and
disappearance of m a t e r i a l t h i n g s e x t e r n a l
to
N a t u r a l S c i e n c e f o r them b o t h
ourselves.
H e g e l , h o w e v e r , g o e s one
his solipsism.
He
Understanding,
called
go
a t t h e end
o f h i s account of
the
' i t becomes a p p a r e n t t h a t b e h i n d t h e
so-
c u r t a i n of- a p p e a r a n c e w h i c h i s
the i n n e r
(world) there
behind i t ,
just
idealist.
step f u r t h e r than S c h e l l i n g w i t h
claims,
that
is
is nothing
as much t h a t we
supposed t o
t o see
can
unless
see,
as
conceal
we
ourselves
that there
be
96
something behind
then
it
t h a t science
t h a t cam be
not
seen
only discovers the
b e h i n d a p p e a r a n c e buc i n a sense p u t s
p o i n t H e g e l seems t o be
maintains,
we
can
as
such, i . e . ,
unless
I t is
anything without
it
The
scientist,
as H e g e l c l a i m s ,
reality
he
went b e h i n d t h e
aware t h e e x p l a n a t i o n
c l a i m more t h a n
t h a t the
this.
scientist
Ibid.
p.
135.
by
of
there.
Up
to a
clear that,as
putting
we
might
regarding
As
ourselves
agree,
them as
H e g e l , however, wishes
knows w i t h t h i s
them
evidence
tc
ks we
o f n a t u r a l phenomena i s t h e
h a v e s e e n , he
he
regarding
c u r t a i n o f appearance.
we
is
things
T h e r e w o u l d i n d e e d be n o t h i n g
of the s c i e n t i s t ' s a c t i v i t y .
96.
it
suggestion
o n l y hope t o e x p l a i n n a t u r a l phenomena by
of a deeper r e a l i t y .
all
correct.
c a n n o t see
i n a p o s i t i o n t o see
His
see
are
outcome
to
suggests t h a t a l l
explanation
can
accurately
282.
be
called
self-consciousness.
Science,
I s t h e overcoming o f a l l otherness.
most s i m p l e t o r e f u t e
if
it
f o r him,
T h i s c l a i m would
shows i t s e l f
ness o r s o l i p s i s m m
to
p o i n t cut, subtle.
is
a fact.
he
i s prepared
the
For Kegel,
this
i s apparent
nowledges i n
for
h i s account
is a contradiction
no s u c h t h i n g .
an e x t e r n a l
I t will
be a l l o w e d t o c i r c u l a t e
fall
o r otherness
out o f use.
is
self-
alienation.
He a c k -
has t o account
B u t , as I h a v e p o i n t e d o u t ,
reality
o n l y t o prove
n o t do t o m i n t a c o m
I fi t
freely.
is
that
i s n o t genuine;
legal tender i t
or else i t
has
of
would n o t
This leads t o a l l s o r t s o f confusion.
t h e case we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , i t means
of the s c i e n t i f i c
that
t h e s c i e n t i f i c law
t h e k n o w l e d g e o f a p p e a r a n c e as a p p e a r a n c e .
as a r e s u l t
there
simply t o
Hegel's assumption
he h a s t o c o n t r a d i c t h i s own c l a i m t h a t
is
But at
H e g e l ' s w h o l e p h i l o s o p h y t h a t he
i t from c i r c u l a t i o n .
externality
philosophy
of science.
i n s t a n c e t h a t what i t
i s outside consciousness.
withdraw
In
its
tried
otherness
thesis.
self-consciousness m
the f i r s t
assumes t h e r e i s
to
as I h a v e
same t i m e , he w i s h e s t o c l a i m t h a t o t h e r n e s s
And
is
The a b s t r a c t -
as we have s e e n ,
the materialist
science
However, t h e
I n o t h e r words, a t t h e o u t s e t o f h i s
consciousness, a l b e i t
it
t o be s e l f .
Hegel's philosophy i s ,
t o admit
be
meant s i m p l y t h a t a l l t h a t
s e e k s t o e x p l a i n i s p e r se s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
claim is that i t
therefore
He a r g u e s
that
e x p l a n a t i o n , we c a n d i s c a r d any
28^.
concrete referent.
But i f
that referent
is
w h a t sense a r e we t o r e g a r d t h e s c i e n t i f i c
b e i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n y t h i n g
of experience
into
direction.
F o r i n s t a n c e , we m i g h t
that
science
its
result,
does n o t work a t a l l m
is
distillation
i n the forward
be l e d t o b e l i e v e now
self-consciousness.
the reverse
t o work backward t h r o u g h
out, i n
e x p l a n a t i o n as
Hegel's
t h e s e l f may w o r k w e l l
left
direction.
experience
what i s i t
Indeed
if
a l l is
science?
with t h i s hypothesis
lower
science
self-consciousness
then
t h a t we c a n r e t u r n
is
for
I fa l l is
explained?
w h a t need i s t h e r e f o r
T h e r e seems no
from
any o f t h e h i g h e r
l e v e l s b e c a u s e t h e more a d v a n c e d l e v e l s
the lower
e x a m p l e , we c a n n e v e r r e t u r n
u s now.
I t s real existence
This i s
are constructed
l e v e l s no l o n g e r e x i s t .
t o the assumption t h a t
a world o f sense-impressions since i t
ed u n i v e r s a l .
he
we
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e Phenomenology t o any o f t h e
o;. t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
For
i s supposed t o have
T h e r e can be no phenomena.
possibility
levels
that
it
I f we w e r e
w o u l d be f a c e d w i t h c o n t r a d i c t i o n a t e a c h t u r n .
self,
But
is
the p i t - f a l l
its
h a s no r e a l
r e s u l t - the
consciousness' alone.
He c a n n o t assume t h a t
when i t
existence
unconditio
o f Hegel's i d e a l i s m
w a n t s t h e r e t o be a w o r l d b a t t h a t w o r l d h a s t o be
there
that
self-
He c a n n o t h a v e i t b o t h ways n o w e v e r .
t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d and t h e n ,
is explained, that
i t i s no l o n g e r t h e r e .
284.
CHAPTER FIVE
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
T h e r e i s , I have a r g u e d , a d i f f i c u l t y
philosophy.
He p o s t u l a t e s t h a t t h e r e
o n l y t o show t h a t
he
claims, i s
that world
identity
i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d
i s Mind o r S p i r i t .
t h e process o f thought
the other o f i t s e l f
in-Hegel's
through
therefore, is
Nature,
itself'
and t h e ' t h i n k i n g way o f r e g a r d i n g '

is
n e s s t o become Mind'."'"
this
self-
t h e overcoming o f t h a t
ness.
itself
(Geist),
e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as
and t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g o f i t s
and freedom
how N a t u r e i n
Mind
'Mmd t h a t h a s i t s e l f
it
other-
alienated
i s t o 'watch
process o f overcoming i t s
other-
H e g e l , n o t h e r w o r d s , a a s n o s o o n e r
e s t a b l i s h e d a N a t u r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f M i n d t h a n he r e t r a c t s
independence.
claims,
is
itself
i=, t h e c o n t e n t
this
I t s apparent existence
abstract.
o f Mind: s c i e n t i f i c knowledge.
much o f i t s
show t h a t a l l e x p e r i e n c e
detail
h a s o n l y one e n d :
may be r e d u c e d t o k n o w l e d g e o r
it.
Because he b e l i e v e s
h a s shown t h i s t o be so i n h i s Phenomenology he c l a i m s
all
that
experience
it
c a n be s a i d t o be i d e a l .
I n s h o r t , ne
H e g e l . Werke 9> p. 25.
that
believes
i s only t h e thesus o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m t h a t
sense c f t h e w o r l d .
].
I tis f o r
h i s a c c o u n t o f experience i s
' A b s o l u t e K n o w l e d g e ' , as H e g e l c a l l s
he
Its reality
I t i s , as we h a v e s e e n , an a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e
which though concrete

to
o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , he
o n l y an appearance o f Mind.
reason t h a t I say t h a t
its
makes
285.
However t h e f a c t
I n v o l v e s him m
t h a t Hegel's account o f experience
the d i f f i c u l t y
I have m e n t i o n e d does n o t
mean t h a t he i s n o t a g r e a t t h i n K e r .
the
view t h a t i t
For, i t
may be c l a i m e d ,
h i s i d e a l i s m from h i s philosophy
of
about i t .
Hegel:
and d o m i n i o n :
position'.
take
t o exclude
is
detach
peculiarly
As t h e M a r x i s t , H e n r i L e f e b v r e ,
'his ambition coincides w i t h t h a t
outside i t s e l f ,
i f we
there is nothing
w i t h t h e most s e c r e t d e s i r e o f t h e l i f e
expansion
indeed
i s because o f h i s i d e a l i s m t h a t H e g e l
a great philosopher.
Hegelian
We m i g h t
says
of philosophy,
o f m i n d , s e e n as
n o t h i n g , t o leave
t o abandon and t r a n s c e n d
H e g e l i a n i s m , he c o n t i n u e s ,
every
nothing
one-sided
'asserts
implicitly
that a l l conflicts
c a n be r e s o l v e d , w i t h o u t m u t i l a t i o n o r
renunciation..;
asserts that
it
the l i f e
o f Mind t h e r e
no need f o r o p t i o n s , a l t e r n a t i v e s o r s a c r i f i c e s .
able c o n f l i c t s
last
forever.
forward
are o b j e c t i v e l y
Every c o n t r a d i c t i o n
leap o f Mind'.
a type o f s p i r i t u a l
life
at
acquiescing too h a s t i l y
to
hide
from ourselves
is still
torn
- and no g r e a t e r
'Hegelianism
valid.
represents
Not t o aim
t o ourselves or t o the world; not
the contradictions i n the world, i n
each i n d i v i d u a l ,
b a t , on t h e c o n t r a r y , t o a c c e n t u a t e
t h e m , h o w e v e r much we may s u f f e r ,
be
c a n be t r a n s c e n d e d
than t h i s
that
Innumer-
b u t none o f them
And a g a i n , he s a y s ,
c o m p l i m e n t can be p a i d H e g e l
man and m
experienced,
is
a s u n d e r and because,once
because i t
i sfruitful
to
t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s h a v e become
T e f e b v r e . D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i sin, J o n a t h a n Cape, p. -46.
286.
u n b e a r a b l e , t h e need t o t r a n s c e n d them becomes s t r o n g e r t h a n

any r e s i s t a n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e p a s s i n g
away; s u c h i s
ful
the p r i n c i p l e
of a s p i r i t u a l
life
both
and j o y o u s , w h o l l y r a t i o n a l and u n c o n f u s e d ' .
Lefebvre's view i t
world m
still
w h i c h we l i v e ,
f r e e from moral
sorrowThus
makes sense t o be a H e g e l i a n .
m
The
he b e l i e v e s , i s n o t one where we a r e
compromise
and, i n d e e d , c o n f u s i o n .
H e g e l i a n p o i n t o f v i e w , he s u g g e s t s ,
autonomy by r a i s i n g o u r s e l v e s m
t i o n s o f our existence.
And
The
a l l o w s us t o a s s e r t an
t h o u g h t above t h e c o n t r a d i c -
t h i s thought, Lefebvre
h a s not t o be t h i s o r t h a t t h o u g h t b u t t h e f a i t h f u l
argues,
reflection
of
t h e dilemmas o f o u r e x i s t e n c e .
I t h a s t o be t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of
those c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .
seems, we
to
choose a l t e r n a t i v e o
in
our knowledge o f t h e w o r l d .
o r make s a c r i f i c e s .
L e f e b v r e p o i n t s o u t , we a r f
contradictions
them u n t i l
Thus, i t
can have no need

We
can t a k e r e f u g e
B u t i n t h a t k n o w l e d g e , as
'not t o h i d e f r o m o u r s e l v e s t h e
of the w^rld'.
I n d e e d we a r e t o a c c e n t u a t e
t h e y become a l m o s t u n b e a r a b l e .
This, of coarse,
i s where t h e s t r e n g t h o f H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y l i e s .
ages us t o be s e v e r e l y c r i t i c a l
i n d e e d t o see a l l l i f e
fore,
is
prepared
as e s s e n t i a l l y n e g a t i v e ' .
t o accept
to
this extent a r e a l i s t .
is
no mere a p o l o g y
3-
Ibid.,
p. 4 7 .
o f our e x i s t i n g
I t encourconditions,
Hegel,
the worst of the world.
He
thereis
His Philosophy o f Right, f o r instance,
f o r Modern
Society.
T h a t much i s
clear
28 7-
f r o m t h e most r e c e n t d e b a t e s on t h e w o r k .
For realism,
H e g e l b e l i e v e d , was n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s i d e a l i s m .
Indeed,
in h i s Preface
us
that
h i s view
t o t h e Philosophy
o f R i g h t , he t e l l s
t h e t a s k f o r p h i l o s o p h y i s t o 'grasp what i s ' , and,

'what i s
is
Reason'.^
W h i l s t agreeing t h a t Hegel i s a great p h i l o s o p h e r I should

like
t o question Lefebvre's
i o n a l and v a l i d .
For i t
claim that his philosophy i s
is
true that Hegelianism
t o e x e r c i s e a h o l d on many t h e o r i s t s .
philosophy is
which
s u r e l y one t h a t
t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e
is
4.
'magical' i d e a s . ^
a rational
free of a l l i l l u s i o n ,
as L e f e b v r e h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , ' H e g e l i a n
steeped
continues
Nevertheless,
o f m y s t i c a l o r magical
rat-
one
ideas.
speculation is
By p o s i t i n g a m a g i c a l
But,
still
participation
The a r g u m e n t s , f o r a n d a g a i n s t , c a n be f o u n d m H e g e l ' s P o l i t i c
P h i l o s o p h y ( A t h e r t o n , 1970) e d i t e d b i W a l t e r Kaufmann. A v m e r i
g i v e s a most s y m p a t h e t i c r e n d e r i n g o f H e g e l ' s p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t
m h i s H e g e l ' s T h e o r y o f t h e Modern S t a t e . Hans F r i e d r i c h F u l d a ' r
Das R e c h t d e r P h i l o s o p h i e m H e g e l ^ ~ s ~ P n i l o s o p h i e d e s R e c h t s
( F r a n k f u r t , 1 9 6 8 ) c o n t a m s t h e most" r i g o r o u s a n a l y s i s I have r e a d
on t h e t o p i c .
5. H e g e l . Werke 7, P- 26.
6. R i c h a r d K r o n e r ( V o n K a n t b i s H e g e l , P a r t T w o , o p . c i t . ) goes so f a r
as t o s a y t h a t H e g e l i s w i t h o u t d o u b t t h e g r e a t e s t i r r a t i o n a l i s t
t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y has ever seen'.(p.271) T h i s a g a i n
t h o u g h d o e s n o t l e a d K r o n e r t o d i s m i s s H e g e l as a g r e a t t h i n k e r .
He f i n d s h i m s e l f m t h e same p a r a d o x as L e f e b v r e t h a t i t i s
p r e c i s e l y t h i s weak p o i n t m H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i s i t s
s t r e n g t h . He s a y s : ' D i e l t j e n i g e n , d i e m dem P a t i o n a l i s m u s d e s
S y s t e m s e m lhrn e i g e n t u m l i c h e s K e n n z e i c h e n s e h e n , m e m e n a b e r
v i e l l e i c h t n i c h t so s e h r s e m e m e t h o d i s c h e F o r m , s o n d e r n s e m e n
A n s p r u c h , j e d e s P r o b l e m , d a s d i e P h i l o s o p h i c n u r immer a u f w e r f e n
mag,auch p h i l o s o p h i c h e b e w a l t i g e n z u k o n n e n , - s i e m e m e n d i e
V e r z i c h t l o s i g k e i t d e s H e g e l s c h e n Denkens. . . ( p 2 6 8 ) D i e s i s t e s ,
was man m i t F u g K e g e l s R a t i o n a l i s m u s n e n n e n d u r f t e . . . . A b e r d e r
Name i s t l r r e f l i h r e n d . Denn f u r H e g e l b e d e u t e t d a s Denken u n d d e r
P e g r i f f n i c h t s , was s i c h m G e g e n s a t z zu e t w a s Anderem b r m g e n
l i e s s e , s o n d e r n etwas,was s i c h s e l b s t e n t g e g e n s e t z t , w a s s i c h s e l o
zum A n d e r e n s e i n e r s e l b s t w i r d u n d mi A n d e r e n s i c h m i t w i e d e r
zusammenschliesst. Der R a t i o n a l i s m u s d e s Hegelschen DenKen e n t h a l
a l s o e m e n I r r a t i o n a l i s m u s a n lhm s e i b s t : d e r B e g r i f f seci'c s i c h
G r e n z e n u n d i s t eben n u r d a d u r c h d e r B e g r i f f , d a s s e r es i s t , d e r
s i c h d i e Grenzen s e t z t u n d d i e g e s e t z t e Grenze a l s d i e von ihm
an lhm g e s e t z t e aucn w i e d e r a u f h e b t . N u r ,ienn man d i e s b e r u c k s i c n
t i g t , v e r s t e h t man K e g e l s Ford s r u n g a u f U n i v e r s a l h e r r s c h a f t d e s
B e g r i f f s r i c h t i g , - d a n n a b e r w i r d m m n i o h t rnehr v o n R a t i o n a i i ; m u .
reden.' (pp.270 - 271).
28 8.
i n absolute Being
it
(conceived
combines t h e m a g i c a l
fully
this
rational'.
irrationalism
explicit
schema w i t h an a t t e m p t
t o be more
He h i m s e l f g i v e s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r
m
'Hegel was n o t m e r e l y
it
o f as k n o w l e d g e and r e a s o n ) ,
Hegel's philosophy
content
order t o a t t a i n
when he
says:
t o deepen t h e c o n t e n t and make

t h e f o r m , he r e d u c e d i t t o
g
t h o u g h t , by c l a i m i n g t o g r a s p
it
totally
and e x h a u s t
H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y does n o t t h e n r e p r e s e n t a w h o l l y
p o i n t o f v i e w because
it
e m p i r i c a l experience.
irrelevance
Lefebvre
Our e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e
becomes a n
which,
himself points out, 'thought..is the secret
an i l l u s i o n
rational
c o n j u r e s away t h e c o n t e n t o f o u r
f o r Hegel because h i s i s a system m
of the content'.
it'.
F o r an H e g e l i a n
t h a t Mind r e c e i v e s i t s
therefore ' i t
is
as
source
only
content from o u t s i d e , i n
accordance w i t h t h e u n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f obseri
9
v a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e
Ultimately
t h e n - and L e f e b v r e
t o a g r e e - H e g e l i a n i s m i s an i n c o n s i s t e n t d o c t r i n e b e c a u s e
reduces a l l experience
t o the thought
admire Hegel f o r seeking

experience
at which
again,
h i s system.
'it
is
may
Y e t t h e r e must a l w a y s be a p o i n t
F o r as L e f e b v r e
inconceivable that the limited
of a
We
it
the e n t i r e content of
we must c u r b o u r a d m i r a t i o n .
individual,
entire
t o grasp
of experience.
seems
says
m i n d o f one
p h i l o s o p h e r , s h o u l d be a b l e t o g r a s p t h e
1
c o n t e n t o f human e x p e n e n c e . ^
There i s
always
7.
Lefebvre.
8.
Ibid.,
p. 5 1 -
9-
Ibid.,
p.
10.
I b i d . , p. 48. T h i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s w h a t K r o n e r ha-., i n
mm
when he r e f e r s t o H e g e l as an i r r a t i o n a l i s t : t h e c l a i m t h a t
h i s Concept i s t h e r e a l i t y o f r e a l i t y .
op.cit.
p. 57.
52.
289
s o m e t h i n g new t o be f o u n d , t o be e x p l a i n e d .
human and n a t u r a l e x i s t e n c e a r e p o t e n t i a l l y
P h i l o s o p h y and t h e s c i e n c e s may, as H e g e l
t u a l i z e human and n a t u r a l
life
The f o r m s o f
limitless.
claims,
mtellec-
b u t b o t h , n a t u r e and H u m a n i t y ,
because t h e y a r e d e v e l o p i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r
s t a n d i n g remain u n l i m i t e d
Hegel
ignores i s ,
thought that
is
s o u r c e s o f new k n o w l e d g e .
as L e f e b v r e n o t e s , t h a t
real
n o t o n l y would
knowledge o f o u r consciousness b u t i t
w h a t we do.
'practice is
deduced from t h e c o n c e p t .
own d i s c i p l i n e
is
primarily
- its
is,
turn
11.
active beings.
Ibid.,
o f o u r exper-
h a v e t o be t h e
w o u l d a l s o h a v e t o be
perhaps'.
1 1
addresses
p. 50.
impossibi
i t c a n n o t be
erwn e x i g e n c i e s ,
t h e problem o f t h e r e l a t i o n
its
Thus i n h i s
view,
of practice to
p h i l o s o p h y r a i s e s and l e a v e s u n a n s w e r e d
o f course, t o t h i s
- first
it
creative,
I t has i t s
own l o g i c
philosophy t h a t Hegel's
It
We a r e n o t
And f o r t h o u g h t t o be a l l t h a t we do i s
As L e f e b v r e c o n c l u d e s ,
What
i s not only
cannot t h e r e f o r e e n c a p s u l a t e t h e whole
i e n c e , because t o do t h a t ,
it
it
f o r us b u t a l s o p r a c t i c e .
only t h i n k i n g beings but also p r a c t i c a l l y

Thought
under-
p r o b l e m t h a t M a r x - t o whom we now
himself.
290 .
TWO'CONTRADICTIONS'IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

We s h a l l b e g i n w i t h a n a n a l y s i s o f M a r x ' s
of
the Hegelian D i a l e c t i c
f o r m s p a r t o f t h e famous
and P h i l o s o p h y ' .
'Critique
T h i s essay
P a r i s M a n u s c r i p t s o f 1844.
I t is
c e n t r a l t o o u r i n t e r e s t i n t h e end o f German C l a s s i c a l
Philos-
ophy because
plain
t h e c o u r s e o f h i s C r i t i q u e M a r x makes
h i s differences w i t h Hegel.
I n examining those
differences
we can, I b e l i e v e , d i s c o v e r t h e r e a s o n s why H e g e l ' s

ophy
the
fell
into disrepute
so r a p i d l y a f t e r h i s d e a t h and a t
same t i m e d i s c o v e r t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i t
Marx's hands.
I tis
undergoes
t h e s e t w o 'ends' w h i c h m
German C l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h y h a s .
There i s
p l a c e t h e end t o w h i c h H e g e l b r i n g s i t
and s e c o n d l y t h e r e i s
in
his
a c q u a i n t us w i t h
In
to
the f i r s t
philosophy
t h e end t o w h i c h Marx p u t s i t
his
Critique
as I have s u g g e s t e d , i n t e n d s
s e t t l e h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
b a c h h a d begun.
to
both.
t h e C r i t i q u e Marx,
sees h i s c r i t i c i s m
nry v i e w
p h i l o s o p h y , a n d , as I s a y , an a n a l y s i s o f M a r x ' s
will
philos-
Now he
o f H e g e l as c o n t i n u i n g a t a s k t h a t
Feuer-
T h e r e a r e t h r e e a s p e c t s o f what he t a k e s
be F e u e r b a c h ' s C r i t i q u e w h i c h he r e g a r d s a s p a r t i c u l a r l y
12
important.
to
the
I nthe f i r s t
be i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e
it
p l a c e he t a k e s F e u e r b a c h ' s
proved t h a t Hegel
a l i e n a t i o n o f Substance, t h e absolute,
critique
'proceeds from
fixed
abstraction'."'"
12.
A . S c h m i d t i n h i s The C o n c e p t o f N a t u r e i n Marx (NLB) and

Emanzipa r o n s c n e S m n l i c h k e i t ( R e i h e H a n s e r ) h a s g i v e n a
most c o m p r e h e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f t h i s M a r x ' s d e b t t o F e u e r b a c h
13.
M a r x M a r x - E n g e l s Werke, E r g a n z u n g s b a n d , E r s t e r T e i l ,
p. 5Y0
29J .
F o r t h e want o f a b e t t e r w o r d , M a r x c o n t i n u e s , we
call
this abstraction
God.
And
this,
can
he c l a i m s , i s
F e u e r b a c h showed: t h a t H e g e l ' s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t was

Feuerbach then b u i l t
s e c o n d move was
m
the
t h e second
'actual,
to posit
stage
sensuous,
theological.
c r i t i c i s m , by s h o w i n g t h a t
t h a t God
was no more.
Hegel's
o f h i s philosophy Hegel l a i d
bach completed t h i s
showing t h a t
on t h i s
what
emphasis
1
real, finite
and p a r t i c u l a r ' . ^
Feuer-
i m p o r t a n t c r i t i c i s m , Marx s u g g e s t s ,
the t h i r d
aspect
on
of his
philosophy
by
Hegel
' r e - e s t a b l i s h e s r e l i g i o n and t h e o l o g y ' by a b o l i s h i n g
the
15
finite
and t h e r e a l .
I n sum
b a c h had p r o v e n t h a t
ophy.
That a m b i g u i t y ,
upholder
terms,
t h e r e was
and c r i t i c
an a m b i g u i t y
seems, was
of theological
Hcge]'s
t h a t H e g e l was
notions.
philos-
both
existence.
philosophy: that
Substance i s S u b j e c t .
we have s e e n , t h a t
S u b s t a n c e and i t s
is a thesis
of view t h a t
the p r i n c i p a l thesis
reality
The
thesis
is,
and p a r t i c u l a r i s a t i o n as
t h a t , as we have
there is a f i n i t e
o f Hegel's
i s both the all-embracing
limitation
the
the r e a l i t y
I n c l a i m i n g t h i s M a r x seems t o have
called
an
I n secular
p a r t i c u l a r w o r l d and d e n i e d
m i n d what I have
It
Feuer-
M a r x c l a i m s , t h i s means t h a t he b o t h a c k n o w l e d g e d
existence of a f i n i t e
of i t s
it
t h e n , Marx suggests,
seen, r e p r e s e n t s t h e
as
One
Subject.
point
p a r t i c u l a r world only t o
show t h a t
that world is of i t s e l f
infinite
infinite,
H e g e l c l a i m s , has t o be shown t o emerge f r o m t h e
finite.
Marx r e f e r s
t o t h i s aspect
or divine.
The
o f H e g e l ' s s y s t e m as t h e
16
'Negation
of the Negation'.
I t represents
14.
' c o n t r aIdbiicdt.i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t15.
h i t s e Il bf i' d. .
16.
I b i d . , p.
570.
f o r him t h e
B u t what
Marx
292 .
means by r e f e r r i n g t o i t
clear.
fortunate
I t is
therefore
t h i s way i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y
Pheno n e n o l o g y t o c l a r i f y h i s
I n h i s view,
it
the Hegelian
philosophy
he t h i n k s
is
his attention
'the t r u e b i r t h p l a c e
.
because,
and t h e s e c r e t o f
Marx g i v e s l i t t l e
indication
t h i s t o be so o t h e r t h a n t o say t h a t ,
view, t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n Hegel's philosophy

clearly
t o Hegel's
point.
Phenorneno 1 o g / now o c c u p i e s
The
why
t h a t he t u r n s
t h a t work.
What t h e n a r e t h o s e
i n his
a p p e a r most
contradictions
l8
Marx c l a i m s t h a t
place Hegel
t h e y a r e t w o i n number.
(rightly
it
I n the f i r s t
seems) d e p i c t s t h e w o r l d o f t h e
ordinary
c o n s c i o u s n e s s as an e s t r a n g e d w o r l d b u t , M a r x
objects,
this
alone.
I n o t h e r words, Marx s u g g e s t s ,
estrangement takes place
a t i o n o n l y as a m e n t a l
phenomenon.
the thought-form
Hegel regards
I n t h e second
Hegel e r r o n e o u s l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e process
can
in
all
overcome a l i e n a t i o n .
that
t h e process
place,
o f t h e Phenomenology
I n Marx's view Hegel i s
t h i s b e c a u s e no amount o f t h i n k i n g
alien-
- which,
mistaken
after all,
o f t h e Phenomenology r e p r e s e n t s - c a n
overcome a phenomenon t h a t
is
r o o t e d i n man's s o c i a l
So a l t h o u g h M a r x a g r e e s w i t h H e g e l t h a t man i s
existence.
an e s t r a n g e d
b e i n g he b e l i e v e s t h a t w h a t he c a l l s
'man's t r u e b e i n g '
be
But t h i s ,
achieved
through thought
i s what h a p p e n s w i t h H e g e l
world
f o r man' i s m e r e l y
estranged
is
alone.
' the vindication
an i n t e l l e c t u a l
o b j e c t . . i s . . . only the thought
a b s t r a c t and t h e r e f o r e
L7.
I b i d . , p. 5 7 1 .
cannot
Marx c l a i m s ,
of the objective
one.
Because ' t h e
of alienation,
empty and u n r e a l e x p r e s s i o n . . t h e
18.
I b i d . , p. 572,
its
over-
293-
coming o f a l i e n a t i o n i s e q u a l l y
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n an
119
abstract,
The
two o b j e c t i o n s
then,
as
empty o v e r c o m i n g o f t h a t
empty
abstraction.
t h a t Marx has t o H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y a r e ,
m u t u a l l y complementary.
We c a n r e a d i l y see t h a t
M a r x s a y s , H e g e l c o n c e i v e s o f a l i e n a t i o n as m e r e l y a
m e n t a l phenomenon he w i l l
conceive o f i t s r e s o l u t i o n
t e r m s as w e l l .
if
can
us
if,
Equally,
we t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t
i n those
alienation
be r e s o l v e d b y t h o u g h t a l o n e t h e r e i s e v e r y r e a s o n f o r
t o believe
tnat
it
i s m e r e l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l
phenomenon
M a r x o f c o u r s e b e l i e v e s b o t h i d e a s t o be m i s t a k e n ,
The
m
first,
he s u g g e s t s , i s w r o n g b e c a u s e H e g e l i s
believing
Marx argues
mistaken
that
a l i e n a t i o n i s only a mental
phenomenon.
that
the fact that
the f i r s t
it
appears m
i s d e p e n d e n t on c e r t a i n e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s ,
place
notably the
p r e v a l e n c e o f commodity p r o d u c t i o n .
I t s existence is a
prerequisite
- as M a r x c o n c e i v e s
the notion.
as
o f man's b e i n g a l i e n a t e d
Thus t o s u g g e s t t h a t a l i e n a t i o n h a s a p p e a r e d ,
H e g e l d o e s , t h r o u g h t h e mere p o s i t i n g
o f an m
itself
o f 'the o p p o s i t i o n
( a n s i c h ) and f o r i t s e l f ,
o f consciousness
20
and
self-consciousness,
o f object
view, t h o r o u g h l y m i s l e a d i n g .
has
and s u b j e c t
The n o t i o n ,
of abstract
Ibid.,
, with
t h o u g h t and s e n s u o u s r e a l i t y
p. 585.
20.
Ibid.,
is,m
Marx'
Marx c o n t i n u e s ,
t o do w i t h man's s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e and n o t ,
of Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y would suggest
19-
as a r e a d i n g
'the opposition
or real
p. 572.
sensuousness
294.
21
i n s i d e thought
itself'.
the
that a l l alienation
ical
impression
So, M a r x c l a i m s , H e g e l
e r r o r on t h e p a r t
Marx says,
Hegel, m
is
results
from a t h e o r e t -
o f t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
surely a basic f a i l i n g
in his
might
be a r g u e d t h a t
t h a n H e g e l , who h a s m i s u n d e r s t o o d
c o u l d be s a i d , h i s c r i t i c i s m
a t i o n s which,
it
This,
philosophy.
h i s o p i n i o n , has w h o l l y misunderstood
However, i t
gives
t h e problem.
i s Marx, r a t h e r
t h e problem.
For, i t
o f H e g e l i s b a s e d on c o n s i d e r -
by any s t a n d a r d s ,
are extraneous
t o philosophy.
P r i m a f a c i e s u c h an o b j e c t i o n w o u l d a p p e a r t o be c o r r e c t .
Marx, i t
seems, i s g u i l t y
o f an i g n o r a t i o e l e n c h i m
claiming
t h a t H e g e l m i s u n d e r s t a n d s t h e phenomenon o f a l i e n a t i o n .
even i f
we suppose t h e phenomenon o f a l i e n a t i o n
result
o f a c e r t a i n mode o f p r o d u c t i o n t h i s
mean t h a t H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y h a s f a i l e d
p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument, o u r c r i t i c
For
t o be t h e
still
need n o t
any r e s p e c t .
w o u l d c l a i m , c a n o n l y be
refuted
by a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t ; a n d M a r x ' s a r g u m e n t
plainly
an e c o n o m i c one.
I would suggest,
t h e r e h a s t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s
rule;
however,
is
that
a n d t h i s w o u l d be
where t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument d e a l s w i t h a problem
that
i s best d e a l t w i t h w i t h i n
the context o f a d i f f e r e n t or,
indeed,
T h i s w o u l d a p p e a r t o be p a r t o f
new d i s c i p l i n e .
Marx's c l a i m h e r e .
the
matter drop
However, o u r c r i t i c
at that.
He w i l l
is unlikely
tol e t
consider that i f a question
i s best d e a l t w i t h outside t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c i p l i n e
21.
Ibid.
then
295-
it
But
of
i s n o t , and c a n n e v e r have been, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n .

a r e t h i n g s a l w a y s as c l e a r c u t as t h i s
appeared m
the past.
For i t
is a matter of fact that
natural
would
s c i e n c e t o see t h i s .
be q u i t e w r o n g t o e x c l u d e
that.
I t i s best, I think,
separate
relation
Indeed
Marx c r i t i c i s m
t o judge each p a r t i c u l a r
that
o f H e g e l h a s some m e r i t .
Certainly his
crit-
that the bifurcation
alienation
sciousness.
alienation
associates i t
that
elenchi.
a philosophical
I t i s h e , as we h a v e s e e n ,
is inherent m
experience
I t i s h e , who as M a r x s a y s ,
For i t
problem
who
is
claims
reflected
reduces t h e problem
t o t h e p h i l s o p h i c a l o r , more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,
o l o g i c a l problem
i nitself
own m e r i t s .
a p p e a r s t o me
w i t h a s o c i a l problem.
of
argument,
t h i s more g e n e r a l sense i t
i s H e g e l h i m s e l f who h a i i d e n t i f i e d
philosophy.
it
s i m p l y because t h e y a r e
i c i s m does n o t i n v o l v e h i m i n an i g n o r a t i o
in
t o theology
I believe that
w h e t h e r d r a w n f r o m p h i l o s o p h y o r n o t , on i t s
Judged m
disciplines.
from p h i l o s o p h y a l l arguments
t h a t a r e drawn from o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s
the
it
a t c e r t a i n t i m e s b o t h been subsumed u n d e r and h a s sub-
One need o n l y l o o k a t what has been i t s
the
boundaries
T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y how p h i l o s o p h y h a s
sumed w h a t a r e now r e c o g n i s e d t o be q u i t e
and
The
philosophy are n o t f i x e d n o r f o r that matter are they
readily discernible.
has
epistem-
o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n s u b j e c t and o b j e c t ,
and t h e f o r i t s e l f ,
c o n s c i o u s n e s s and
This o p p o s i t i o n Hegel,
self-con-
as we have s e e n ,
o f mind o r t h e l o s s o f s e l f ,
calls
a n d he f i r m l y
w i t h t h e ' s h a t t e r e d h a r m o n y ' o f man's d a y t o
29 6.
day
existence.
T h i s was
most e x p l i c i t
D i f f e r e n z s c h r - i f t b u t , as
P l a n t and
his early
R o h r m o s e r have shown,
i s a theme o f h i s w h o l e p h i l o s o p h y .
t h i s t o be
We
ourselves
t r u e o f t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d .
argued, i d e n t i f i e s
tne t h e s i s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l
it
have
found
Hegel,
materialism
22
with alienation.
i c i s m by
pleading
He
cannot t h e r e f o r e escape Marx's
p h i l o s o p h i c a l immunity.
t h e k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m Marx p u t s
s u g g e s t s t h a t k n o w l e d g e can
He
forward.
crit-
himself
invites
I t i s Hegel
overcome a l i e n a t i o n .
who
And
it
makes sense f o r M a r x t o r e p l y t h a t t h i s i s n o n s e n s e .
a t i o n , he
claims,
i s much more t h a n a mere p o s t u l a t e
philosophical materialism.
external world
responsible
object is,
can,
The
according
h i s view, a l i e n a t e no-one.
t o Marx, man's r e a l
lxi c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n .
What, t h e r e f o r e ,
Hegel i t
t h a t t h e human b e i n g
himself m
thought
o p p o s i t i o n t o h i m s e l f but
distinction
w h i c h c o u n t s as
t h e e s s e n c e w h i c h has
being
t o and
its
mistake,
it
objectifies
t h a t he
himself
objectifies
opposition to abstract
the p o s i t e d essence o f a l i e n a t i o n
t o be
o v e r c o m e . A n d
i s one
f a r from
See
23.
Marx, i b i d j
above.
C h a p t e r 3, P- 151
p.
572.
and
this
t h a t gets at the heart of Hegel's
philosophy.
22.
object
is that f o r
a c r i t i c i s m w h i c h i n v o l v e s w h a t some w o u l d c a l l
category
is
particularly
Hegel's account of a l i e n a t i o n
inhumanly m
an
What
loss of h i s
i r r i t a t e s him m
'not
of
mere i d e a o f t h e r e b e i n g
f o r what H e g e l c a l l s t h e s e l f ' s l o s s o f
is
Alien-
297.
We can see t h i s more c l e a r l y , I b e l i e v e , when we have

a more p r e c i s e i d e a o f t h e n a t u r e o f Marx's c r i t i c i s m .
T h i s w i l l n o t be a s i m p l e t a s k s i n c e Marx r e l i e s h e a v i l y
on aphorism
i n making h i s p o i n t s m
the Critique.
however make a b e g i n n i n g by examining
We can
t h e grounds f o r Marx's
second p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n t o Hegel's system.
The second
e r r o r he d e t e c t s m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s , as I have s a i d ,
that i t
i s i t s e l f supposed t o r e p r e s e n t t h e overcoming o f
man's a l i e n a t i o n .
'the
Thus m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , Marx c l a i m s ,
a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e e s s e n t i a l powers o f man which have
become o b j e c t s and a l i e n o b j e c t s i s t o b e g i n w i t h o n l y an
a p p r o p r i a t i o n which occurs i n consciousnes, m
,24
i.e. m
abstraction.
pure
So t h e c l a i m t h a t h i s
thought
philosophy
has, o r can, overcome a l i e n a t i o n m
Marx's view r e p r e s e n t s
an e r r o r on Hegel's p a r t because i t
i s too ambitious.
it,
Marx c l a i m s , t h o u g h t i s o v e r - r e a c h i n g i t s e l f .
t h e n , wants t o demarcate t h o u g h t and p r a c t i c e m

that
In
Marx,
such a way
i t would p r e c l u d e t h e c l a i m t h a t t h o u g h t by i t s e l f can
a l t e r s o c i a l phenomena.
no such d i s t i n c t i o n .
Hegel however, Marx i m p l i e s , a l l o w s

Indeed, he c l a i m s , Hegel's view i s
t h a t t h e thought o f a t h i n g o r an a c t i v i t y i s t h e essence o f
t h a t thing or a c t i v i t y .
Marx appears t o be c o r r e c t
a s s e r t i n g t h a t Hegel t a k e s t h i s view.
We r e c a l l , f o r example
t h a t Hegel regards t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y as t h e essence

of w o r l d h i s t o r y .
He c l a i m s , as we have seen, t h a t 'the
2h.
I b i d . p. 573.
25.
I b i d , pp 580 - 1 .
I n s a y i n g t h i s Marx i s q u o t i n g Feuerbach.
29'8.
h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y i s the innermost ( s o u l ) o f w o r l d
h i s t o r y - t h i s work o f t h e mind o f man m
h i s i n n e r thought
26
i s p a r a l l e l w i t h a l l t h e stages o f r e a l i t y . '
I n short.,
he i m p l i e s , as Marx c l a i m s , t h a t our r e f l e c t i o n on our a c t i v i t y ,

o r more p a r t i c u l a r l y
o f our a c t i v i t y .
t h a t o f the p h i l o s o p h e r , i s t h e essence
E q u a l l y , we might r e c a l l an aspect o f
Hegel's g e n e r a l view o f p h i l o s o p h y .
P h i l o s o p h y , we have
seen Hegel c l a i m , i s t h a t process which w h i l e l o o k i n g on a t

t h a t a c t i v i t y which appears t o be g o i n g on e x t e r n a l t o Mind
( G e i s t ) shows t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y o f i t s e l f becomes Mind.
Hegel c l a i m s , we may
Or,
s i m p l y see t h e process as 'pure s e l f -
recognition i n absolute otherbemg' .
But m
'pure s e l f -
r e c o g n i t i o n ' t h e r e can, as Marx c l a i m s , be no room f o r any

d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between t h o u g h t and a c t i v i t y .
Such
a p h i l o s o p h y has t o reduce p r a c t i c e t o t h e t h o u g h t o f i t .
Thus f o r i n s t a n c e t h e H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y can o n l y c o n t e m p l a t e
'sensuousness, r e l i g i o n , s t a t e - p o w e r ' , Marx suggests, as
28
' i n t e l l e c t u a l essences'.
Marx, t h e n , s t r e s s e s t h e a b s t r a c t n e s s o f Hegel's p h i l o s ophy.
I have a l r e a d y drawn a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s f a c e t o f Hegel's
system.
I have suggested t h a t i t
difficulty,
i s evidence o f a f u n d a m e n t a l
namely, t h a t he supposes t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l
w o r l d o n l y t o undermine t h a t s u p p o s i t i o n .
I suggested t h a t
t o do t h i s was l i k e m i n t i n g a c o m s i m p l y t o w i t h d r a w i t
26.
27.
28.
See above.
Chapter
Hegel. Werke 3, P- 29.
Marx, i b i d . , p. 573.
pJ-^5-
from
299.
circulation.
Now, Marx I b e l i e v e
D i a l e c t i c has m
He i s ,
mind t h e same f a c e t o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
so t o speak, i n t e r e s t e d
of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n
circulate freely.
the same n o t i o n
notion
i n t h i s C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's
allowing
t h i s Hegelian c o m
( t h e p o s i t i n g o f an e x t e r n a l w o r l d ) t o
To be sure, he has n o t m
of the abstraction
mind
precisely
m Hegel's as we; h i s
i s c l e a r l y more comprehensive t h a n o u r s .
I was
concerned w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y m Hegel's system

he w i t h what appears t o be an o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy.
We
s h a l l f i n d , however, t h a t our l e s s a m b i t i o u s n o t i o n w i l l
us w e l l m
ism
t h e e f f o r t t o understand Marx's o n t o l o g i c a l
of H gei,
serve
critic-
F o r , as we s h a l l see, Marx begins from t h e
l e s s comprehensive view o f Hegel's a b s t r a c t n e s s i n makang

those c r i t i c i s m s .
I have suggested t h a t Marx m
d i s c o v e r t h e consequence
h i s e n q u i r y wishes t o
of maintaining consistently the
H e g e l i a n view t h a t t h e s u b j e c t f i n d s i t s e l f o b j e c t i f i e d
i n the external
world.
As we have seen, Marx t h i n k s
that
Feuerbach has shown t h a t t h i s was t h e second aspect o f Hegel's

system, namely, t h a t he ' a b o l i s h e s t h e I n f i n i t e ,
posits the
,29
a c t u a l , sensuous, r e a l , f i n i t e ,
particular.
But i n
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , t h i s aspect i s superceded (as Marx a g a i n

b e l i e v e s Feuerbach t o have shown) by t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e
Infinite,
t h e t h i r d aspect o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
words, we can see Marx's i n t e r e s t as b e i n g m

of d i s c a r d i n g
he s t r o n g l y
I n other
the implications
t h i s t h i r d aspect o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
For
b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e second a s p e c t o f Hegel's system
i s h i s most l a s t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e development o f what.

29Marx, i b i d . , p. 570.
300.
Marx c a l l s man's s e l f - k n o w l e d g e .
t o go so f a r as t o say t h a t i t
Indeed he i s
prepared
is
'the g r e a t e s t t h i n g
30
about t h e H e g e l i a n Phenomenology.'^
We can best understand why Marx wishes t o c l a i m t h i s
we keep m
mind t h e view o f man t h a t
many o f Marx's c r i t i c i s m
of nature'.
o f Hegel.
if
l i e s a t t h e back o f
Man f o r Marx
And what he means by t h i s
is
part
i s complex.
Nature
i s , he suggests, 'the i n o r g a n i c body o f man, namely, n a t u r e

m
so f a r as i t
i s n o t i t s e l f human body.
Man l i v e s from
n a t u r e means: Nature i s h i s body w i t h which he must remain

31
m
c o n s t a n t process m
o r d e r t h a t he n o t d i e ' .
words, he suggests, man's p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y

activity.
I n other
is his
life
I t i s h i s l i f e a c t i v i t y n o t o n l y as a means t o
s a t i s f y h i s needs b u t a l s o as t h e p r i n c i p a l way he expresses

himself.
So, Marx argues, a man i s what he does.
o n l y t h a t , t h e whole o f humanity
species l i f e
its
And n o t
o r what Marx c a l l s man's
( G a t t u n g s l e b e n ) , i s t o be c h a r a c t e r i s e d by
t y p i c a l a c t i v i t y which i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, conscious
productive a c t i v i t y .
'Free conscious a c t i v i t y ' , he c l a i m s ,
' i s t h e s p e c i e s c h a r a c t e r o f man'.^
productive a c t i v i t y
from t h a t o f an a n i m a l i s t h a t h i s
course w i t h n a t u r e i s governed
believes,
What d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s
by h i s w i l l .
As a r e s u l t , Marx
33
'nature appears as h i s work and h i s r e a l i t y ' .
Man t h e n i s a n a t u r a l b e i n g m
inter-
a p r i v i l e g e d sense f o r Marx.
Because
30.
I b ihe
d . i sp.n 57^.
o t o n l y a b l e t o secure
u r e516.
h i s means
31.
Ifrom
b i d . ,n a tp.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Ibid.
301.
of subsistence but i s a l s o able t o c o n t r o l i t

h i s requirements h i s
m
t o meet w i t h
' n a t u r a l n e s s ' i s one t h a t i s n o t o n l y
n a t u r e but above i t as w e l l .
Now,
Marx, i t
seems, a s s o c i a t e s t h e second stage o f
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , o f t h e I n f i n i t e b e i n g a b o l i s h e d and t h e
f i n i t e and p a r t i c u l a r b e i n g a f f i r m e d ,
w i t h t h i s view o f
man.
To d i s c o v e r why he does so i s , o f c o u r s e , o f some importance

t o us.
I n t h i s i n s t a n c e he r e f e r s t o t h e second stage o f
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y as t h e d i a l e c t i c o f n e g a t i v i t y .
he has m
mind m
What
u s i n g t h e term i s t h e m a t e r i a l i s t , c o n c r e t e
aspect o f the phenomenological p r o c e s s ; the aspect o f Hegel's

approach which l e a d s t o t h e p o s i t i n g o f an e x t e r n a l w o r l d
whjch i s g e n u i n e l y opposed t o o u r s e l v e s .
refers to this m
a famous passage m
Hegel h i m s e l f
t h e Preface t o t h e
Phenomenology as t h e aspect o f t h e l i f e o f Mind which does

not
'shy away from d e a t h ' but r a t h e r
'puts up w i t h i t
and
.34
preserves i t s e l f m
n e g a t i v e was
Now
it.
I n h i s view, l i v i n g w i t h t h e
an e s s e n t i a l aspect o f t h e l i f e
o f Mind
(Geist).
Marx b e l i e v e s t h a t as a r e s u l t o f t h i s , what he c a l l s
the d i a l e c t i c o f n e g a t i v i t y , ' H e g e l comprehends t h e s e l f f o r m a t i o n ( S e l b s t e r z e u g u n g ) o f man
as a process,
objectific-
a t i o n as o p p o s t i o n , as e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n and as overcoming t h i s
35
externalisation'.
I t appears t h a t i n s a y i n g t h i s Marx has
3^.
35-
Hegel. Werke 3* p. 36.

Marx, i b i d . , p. 57^. T h i s i s what leads Marx t o say t h a t
Hegel's s t a n d p o i n t i s t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f modern P o l i t i c a l
Economy. As I v m e r i says,(The SociaJ and P o l i t i c a l Thought
K a r l Ma r x ) M a r x p o i n t s out t h a t what t h e c l a s s i c a l economTs
expressed i n terms o f economic a c t i v i t y Hegel has a l r e a d y
f o r m u l a t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ' . But, as A v m e n adds, m
Mao
view 'Hegel saw o n l y l a b o u r ' s c r e a t i v e n a t u r e and d i d >iot
p e r c e i v e t h e a l i e n a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s accompanying i t m pres
s o c i e t y ' . p. 78.
302 .
particularly
mind t h e s e c t i o n o f t h e Phenomenology
which d e a l s w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f 'Master and Slave'.
As
t h i s w i l l b r i n g us t o a p o i n t w h i c h i s o f some importance
t o Marx's view o f e x p e r i e n c e i t
i f only m
i s w o r t h o u r w h i l e examining,
b r i e f , the structure of that
The whole d i a l e c t i c ,
dialectic.
i t appears, r e v o l v e s around t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f b o t h t h e master and t h e s l a v e t o what Hegel

calls the object of desire.
s u r p r i s i n g l y , appears t o be m
A t t h e o u t s e t t h e master, n o t
t h e dominant p o s i t i o n .
He
i s a b l e t o c a l l on t h e s l a v e t o s a t i s f y h i s every need by
f u r n i s h i n g him w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f h i s d e s i r e .
He i s ,
Hegel
36
claims, t h e r e f o r e t h e consciousness t h a t i s f o r i t s e l f .
At t h e end o f t h e d i a l e c t i c , however, t h e p o s i t i o n o f master
and s l a v e a r e a p p a r e n t l y r e v e r s e d .
There
independent c o n s c i o u s n e s s . . i s t h e s e r v i l e
37
consciousness' .
-".lich Hegel i n t e r p r e t s t h e process o f
N e g a t i o n f o r Hegel i s t h e process o f what Marx
c a l l s man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n .
the
(knechtische)
The d i a l e c t i c has t h i s outcome, I thmK.,
because o f t h e way m
negation.
'the t r u t h o f t h e
As Marx i n d i c a t e s , f o r Hegel
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e process e n t a i l s t n a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l
consciousness ( m t h i s i n s t a n c e t h a t o f t h e s l a v e ) must f e e l
genuine o p p o s i t i o n .
And by t h i s Hegel means n o t merely t h a t
consciousness s h o u l d have f e l t t h i s o r t h a t d i s c o n t e n t
but
t h a t i t s whole b e i n g s h o u l d have been p l a c e d m j e o p a r d y .
Thus he says o f t h e s l a v e ' s o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f h i m s e l f : ' t h e r e i n

36.
Hegel. Werke j; p. 150,
37.
I b i d . , p. 152.
303.
he i s i n w a r d l y d i s s o l v e d , has t r e m b l e d t o t h e c o r e , and
38
everything fixed
h i s e x i s t e n c e has been shaken'.
otherness which he e x p e r i e n c e s
has t o be genuine o r e l s e
i s n o t o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n t h a t he e x p e r i e n c e s .
on t h i s p o i n t .
Hegel
it
insists
He argues t h a t t h e o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f sub-
j e c t t h a t t a k e s place m
And
The
h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s no mere i l l u s i o n .
so f a r as t h i s i s t r u e o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y , Marx would
suggest,
it
is i t s strength.
Through p r e s e n t i n g man's
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as 9 process he had, Marx c l a i m s , come c l o s e

t o g i v i n g an u n d i s t o r t e d view o f man's n a t u r e .
n a t u r e t o be a l i m i t e d ,
who has t o remain m
secure h i s l i f e .
f i n i t e and indeed, s u f f e r i n g
Equally i t
i s h i s n a t u r e , Marx c l a i m s , t c
t o seek t o d i m m i s h h i s
T h i s Marx r e g a r d s as t h e p o s i t i v e aspect o f
man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n .
T h i s aspect
o f o b j e c t : f i c e t i o n , he
c l a i m s , d i d n o t escape Hegel's n o t i c e e i t h e r .
this f o r o u r s e l v e s m
t h i s very aspect
t h i s instance.
We can see
Because i t
is
through
o f o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel t h a t
t h e r o l e s o f master and s l a v e a r e r e v e r s e d .
he argues,
being
coastant i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h nature t o
seek t o overcome h i s l i m i t a t i o n s
suffering.
I t i s man's
For the slave,
overcomes h i s dependent and e s t r a n g e d c o n d i t i o n
through h i s struggle w i t h nature.
By s e e k i n g t o d i m m i s h
'through l a b o u r ' t h e o p p o s i t i o n he f e e l s between h i m s e l f and h i s

s u r r o u n d i n g s t h e s l a v e . Hegel claims,'comes t o h i m s e l f ' . ^938.
I b i d . , p. 153.
39. I b i d p o r a comprehensive, i f obscure, account o f t h e n o t i o n o f
l a b o u r i n " H e g e l ' s Phenomenology see Sok-Zm Lim, Per B e g r i f f
der A r b e i t be: Hegel (Bonn 19t>3) A c l e a r e r view o f Hegel Is
n o t i o n o f p r a c t i c e i s g i v e n by Re: d e l m h i s The o n e und
P r a x i s im Denken Hegels.
304-
He
i s no l o n g e r e s t r a n g e d .
T h i s change m
the s l a v e ' s S t a t u s
i s symbolised
f o r him m
desire.
o b j e c t o f d e s i r e i s no l o n g e r something which
The
a transformation m
he f e a r s as the t h i n g f o r which he was

h i s own
object.
He
comes t o see i t
i s he t h a t produces i t .
that i t
the o b j e c t .
i s t h i s aspect
enslaved, i t i s
t h i s way
now
because
He d i s c o v e r s t h r o u g h h i s own
t i f i c a t i o n or negation, t h a t i t
embodied m
the o b j e c t o f
i s h i s own
it
objec-
l a b o u r which
is
I t would, I t h i n k , be t r u e t o say
o f the d i a l e c t i c t h a t appeals
most
t o Marx.
For i t
he says m
the C r i t i q u e t h a t Hegel 'comprehends the essence
o f l a b o u r ' and
f o r t h i s reason grasps ' o b j e c t i v e man,
because r e a l man
h i s own
appears t o be what Marx has i n mind when
as a r e s u l t o f h i s own
true
labour'.^^
For
l a b o u r the s l a v e , as we can see, comes t o see
his
c o n d i t i o n as t h e r e s u l t o f h i s a c t i v i t y ; and t h i s , Marx c l a i n s ,
i s so n o t o n l y f o r Hegel's account o f t h e s l a v e but f o r h i s
whole p h i l o s o p h y .
by Marx's own
T h i s assessment i s , o f course, i n f l u e n c e d
view o f man
but i t
i s n o t o n l y he and h i s
foll-
owers who
have p o i n t e d out t h i s aspect o f Hegel's n o t i o n o f
labour.
What Mure m
h i s e x c e l l e n t The
Philosophy
o f Hegel
has t o say on Hegel's account o f t h e Master and Slave

Marx's p o i n t .
A l t h o u g h , Mure says, the s l a v e m
'serves under the compulsion
h i s work
o f an u t t e r f e a r which d i s s o l v e s
h i s whole b e i n g , y e t as he l a b o u r s he l e a r n s .
r e f a s h i o n h i s d i s s o l v e d and
echoes
He
learns to
s h a t t e r e d consciousness t o a
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s by f a s h i o n i n g e x t e r n a l t h i n g s b e f o r e
he does n o t t r e m b l e . . h i s l a b o u r changes the w o r l d
40.
Marx, i b i d . , p. 574.
new
which
permanently,
105.
as h i s master's t r a n s i t o r y s a t i s f a c t i o n s do n o t .
products accordingly m
His
a measure r e f l e c t h i m s e l f , and i n
t h a t measure g i v e him a f r e e
self-consciousness.'^
We can now assess t h e v a l i d i t y o f Marx's s u g g e s t i o n

t h a t m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y man overcomes h i s estrangement
consciousness a l o n e .
I t i s v a l i d I would argue because -
even i n t h i s n o t a b l e i n s t a n c e - Hegel's assumption o f o t h e r ness i s n o t , as he l i k e s t o c l a i m , w h o l l y genuine.

words, t h e r e i s an e r r o r m
what u l t i m a t e l y
I n other
h i s account o f n e g a t i o n .
concerns Hegel m
For
t h e d i a l e c t i c o f t h e master
and s l a v e i s n o t t h e p r i v a t i o n t h a t t h e s l a v e s u f f e r s
as a
man t h r o u g h b e i n g a s l a v e b u t t h e p r i v a t i o n that he has t o

put up w i t h as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
Man f o r Hegel
counts
o n l y as a t h i n k i n g b e i n g o r , as Marx suggests, man f o r Hegel

42
i s only self-consciousness.
I t i s therefore s u f f i c i e n t
t h a t t h e s l a v e , as Mure p u t s i t ,
're-fashion h i s dissolved
and s h a t t e r e d s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s '
t u r n e d i n t o a p o s i t i v e bounty.
f o r h i s p r i v a t i o n t o be
He i s a b l e t o r e c o v e r h i s
l o s s o f s e l f t h r o u g h t h e mere i n s i g h t i n t o t h e master's
reciprocal
dependence on him.
Indeed Hegel c l a i m s
that,
t h r o u g h h i s l a b o u r t h e s l a v e comes t o view t h e 'independent

b e i n g as h i m s e l f . ^
even i f ,
m
But t h i s , s u r e l y , cannot be so.
For
as Mure says, t h e s l a v e g a m s a measure o f freedom
l a b o u r he h i m s e l f does n o t , t h r o u g h t h a t l a b o u r , come t o
possess h i s p r o d u c t o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , h i m s e l f .
c l e a r l y s t i l l not free.
He
is
To be sure, he may come t o see t h e
41.
G.R.G. Mure. The Philosophy
42.
43.
Marx, i b i d . , p. 575H e g e l . Werke 3, p- 154.
o f Hegel, pp.76 - 77.
30 6
world m
a more u n i v e r s a l , and i f we are t o b e l i e v e
Hegel,
more human way as a r e s u l t o f r e f l e c t i n g on h i s work; b u t he

has
m no way recovered t h e a c t u a l l o s s o f s e l f t h a t
implies.
slavery
He cannot, as Hegel suggests, t h i n k h i s c h a i n s away.
T h i s o f course b r i n g s us t o t h e h e a r t o f Marx's case a g a i n s t

Hegel.
For Marx, as I have s a i d , wants t o demarcate t h o u g h t and
practice
such a way t h a t i t would p r e c l u d e t h e c l a i m
thought by i t s e l f can a l t e r s o c i a l phenomena.
that
But t h i s
is
precisely
what Hegel suggests, t h a t t h e slave can overcome
his actual
dependence on h i s master by comprehending h i s
situation.
say,
T h i s c l e a r l y i s an i n s t a n c e o f , as Marx would
thought over-reaching i t s e l f .
F o r what Hegel does i s
t o equate t h e s l a v e ' s comprehension o f h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h

those c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
Now Marx's
point
i s t h a t no m a t t e r
how w e l l t h e s l a v e comprehends h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t
would cause no o b j e c t i v e
itself
change t o come about i n them.
The
s l a v e m i g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e , come t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e laws t h a t
governed a s l a v e - s o c i e t y
understand t h a t i t
runaway s l a v e .
in his society
l i k e h i s own.
i s t h e Master's r i g h t t o p u t t o d e a t h a
So f o r t h a t s l a v e t h e p u b l i c use o f f o r c e
might cease t o appear e n t i r e l y a r b i t a r y .
indeed he may g a m some s u b j e c t i v e

insight.
As a r e s u l t he may
s a t i s f a c t i o n from
And
this
However none o f t h i s would a l t e r t h e f a c t t h a t
s h o u l d he h i m s e l f t r y t o escape he h i m s e l f would be s u b j e c t
t o t h e same law and l i a b l e t o be punished s i m i l a r l y .
w i l l be no more f r e e f o r knowing how i t
He
i s t h a t he can be
307.
punished - as h i s a c t u a l e x e c u t i o n w i l l show.
So, Marx
would conclude, h i s s e r v i t u d e i s an o b j e c t i v e s e r v i t u d e which

can o n l y be overcome by o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l change.
i s being thoroughly misleading m
And
Hegel
suggesting t h a t the opposite
i s t h e case.
In
the l i g h t of t h i s i t
seems p a r a d o x i c a l t h a t Marx
i n s i s t s as s t r o n g l y as he does t h a t t h e ' d i a l e c t i c o f n e g a t i v ity'
i s t h e g r e a t e s t t h i n g about t h e Phenomenology o f Mind.
Surely i f ,
as i t now
seems, i t
i s a prime example o f t h e
a b s t r a c t n e s s o f Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e i t
nothing positive m
it
f o r Marx.
can have
T h i s i s a paradox
that
Marx r e s o l v e s by r e f e r r i n g us back a g a i n t o Hege 's p h i l o s ophy.
I n h i s view t h e paradox belongs t o Hegel's
system.
For we can see, Marx says, t h a t many o f t h e s e c t i o n s o f t h e

Phenomenology o f which the d i a l e c t i c o f t h e Master and Slave
1;- one,
' c o n t a i n t h e c r i t i c a l e l e m e n t s . . o f whole
such as r e l i g i o n , t h e S t a t e , o f b o u r g e o i s l i f e ' .
spheres,
Because,
t h e r e f o r e , Hegel r e g a r d s man's e x i s t e n c e as a n e g a t i v e one

he i s , Marx c o n t i n u e s , a b l e t o p r e s e n t an account o f e x p e r i e n c e
w h i c h throws i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e o f a f f a i r s .
He i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , a b l e t o p o i n t t o t h e dissemblance o f t h e
m o r a l consciousness, t o c r i t i c i s e t h e n a i v e l y r e l i g i o u s
and, m
person
t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f R i g h t , almost p r o p h e t i c a l l y , t o +he chaos
44. Indeed as Mclennan (Marx b e f o r e Marxism, Penguin.) p o i n t s OUT;

'Marx makes t h e a s t o n i s h i n g c l a i m f o r the Phenomenology t h a t
' A l l t h e elements o f c r i t i c i s m are i m p l i c i t m i t , a l r e a d y
prepared and e l a b o r a t e d m a manner f a r s u r p a s s i n g t h e H e g e l i a n
s t a n d p o i n t ' , (p.252) I f i n d i t l e s s a s t o n i s h i n g t h a i Mclennan
says.
C e r t a i n l y i t appears t o f l o w from what Marx says about
the p o s i t i v e aspect o l t h e work.
308 -
of c a p i t a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n .
Yet because he t h i n k s o f t h e
n e g a t i v e aspects o f e x p e r i e n c e as a mere d e n i a l o f t h e
freedom o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , Hegel, Marx suggests,
t o shrug o f f t h e r e a l d e n i a l t h a t takes p l a c e m
experience
modern s o c i e t y .
i s able
man's
Thus t h e paradox m
Hegel's
p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a t under h i s c r i t i c a l eye, t h e e x i s t i n g
state
of a f f a i r s i s f i r s t d i s s o l v e d and t h e n , i n a most m a t e r i a l
45
way
it
is reinstated.
I t i s d i s s o l v e d , Marx suggests,
Hegel a b o l i s h e s t h e I n f i n i t e and e s t a b l i s h e s t h e r e a l ,
finite
and p a r t i c u l a r b u t i t
i s r e i n s t a t e d when, and a t t h e same
t i m e as, t h e I n f i n i t e
is re-established.
And, a c c o r d i n g
t o Marx, t h i s I n f i n i t e o r I d e a l Hegel r e - e s t a b l i s h e s m
A b s o l u t e Knowledge.
I t i s t h e d i v i n e d i a l e c t i c ; t h e most
complete knowledge o f man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n .
\^>.
Marx. VJerke, Erganzungsband E r s t e r T o i l , p. 573-
when
30 9.
MARX'S NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY.

There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f Marx's i s
obscure.
I s a i d t h a t h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Hegel g e t s a t the
h e a r t o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y and I added t h a t t h i s would become

c l e a r when we had a more p r e c i s e view o f the n a t u r e o f h i s
criticism.
ing
At p r e s e n t we seem t o be a l o n g way
this objective.
from
attain-
However, from behind t h e w e l t e r o f
H e g e l i a n t e r m i n o l o g y t h e r e i s one view o f Marx's t h a t clearly emerges.

T h i s i s h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y .
And
t h i s view he c o n s t r u c t s
by
persevering w i t h t h i s second aspect o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y :
the
d i a l e c t i c of n e g a t i v i t y .
l i s h i n g of the f i n i t e ,
the
For, i n h i s view, t h a t 'estab-
sensuous, r e a l and p a r t i c u l a r '
c l u e t o a c o r r e c t view o f man.
holds
Marx comes t o t h i s
aspect
of h i s a n a l y s i s i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the l a s t Chapter o f Hegel's

Phenomenology.
I n t h a t chapter,he b e l i e v e s , we can d i s c o v e r the e s s e n t i a l s
o f Hegel's p o s i t i o n .
Through c r i t i c i s i n g i t ,
t h i n k s t h a t he can demonstrate m
Hegel's system.
abstract.
attributes
c o m p l e t e l y the n a t u r e o f
T h e r e f o r e h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s , Marx
suggests,
T h i s a b s t r a n t n e s s , Marx c o n t i n u e s , extends
v e r y f i r s t assumption.
Now,
to i t s
what concerns Marx most about
p h i l o s o p h y i s i t s view o f man.
can f a i l t o advance a view o f man.
t h i s i s the p r i n c i p a l way
he
t h e one-sideness o f
T h i s one-sideness Marx n a t u r a l l y
t o Hegel's f a i l u r e t o understand
objectivity.
full
therefore,
I n h i s o p i n i o n no
philosophy
Indeed he suggests
i n which a p h i l o s o p h y can be
that
judged.
310'.
The
l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f a p h i l o s o p h y f o r hirn then
where i t
p o s i t s man.
assumption.
The
T h i s f o r him has t o be i t s very
very f i r s t
is
first
assumption o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y
i s t h e r e f o r e shot t h r o u g h w i t h a b s t r a c t i o n because i n i t
i s p o s i t e d as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
man
Thus t h e n o t i o n o f o b j e c t -
* l v i t y t h a t Hegel puts f o r w a r d i s one which i s merely
'object-
46
i f i e d self-consciousness
not r e a l o b j e c t i v i t y .
r e a l o b j e c t i v i t y because Hegel conceives

t h i n k i n g being.
o f man
Because Hegel o n l y p o s i t s man
consciousness, Marx says, he o n l y conceives

o b j e c t s of thought or thought o b j e c t s .
I t i s not
o n l y as a
as
self-
o f h i s o b j e c t as
Indeed, he
argues,
f o r Hegel 'the o b j e c t o f consciousness i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n

, 47
self-consciousness . '
At i t s base t h e n , Marx concludes, Hegel's n o t i o n o f
o b j e c t i v i t y i s not concrete.
suoject of a l i e n a t i o n .
T h i s b r i n g s him back t o t h e
I t i s now
t h a t Hegel has misunderstood
more than e v i d e n t , he c l a i m s ,
the phenomenon.
For i t i s t h i s
i n i t i a l p o s i t i n g o f o b j e c t i v i t y , Marx d e c l a r e s , t h a t Hegel
as t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a l i e n a t i o n .
t h i n k o f a l i e n a t i o n as merely
o p p o s i t i o n which i s t o blame f o r i t .
is
Thus n o t o n l y does Hegel
the o p p o s i t i o n o f s u b j e c t and
o b j e c t but he a l s o supposes t h a t i t
for Hegel i t
counts
i s the p o s i t i n g o f t h a t
Or as Marx says here,
' o b j e c t i v i t y as such ( t h a t ) counts as an
a t e d r e l a t i o n , one which does n o t correspond
alien-
t o t h e human
48
n a t u r e , t o the s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f man.'
46.
48.
I b i d . , p. 575I b i d . p.
575.
47.
Ibid.
Hegel's t a r g e t
3U
is,
as we have s a i d , p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m .
I t is
t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h e r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f man's o b j e c t ive
b e i n g ' s h o u l d have n o t o n l y
'the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e
i 49
overcoming o f a l i e n a t i o n b u t t h e overcoming o f o b j e c t i v i t y
. ^
Marx's view i s o f course t h a t t h e r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f man's

o b j e c t i v e b e i n g would i n v o l v e no such t h i n g .
not
Alienation
f o r him a mere t h e s i s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m .
is f i r s t
and foremost a s o c i a l phenomenon;
related to the productive

I n h i s view, t h e n ,
closely
society.
t h e r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f man's o b j e c t i v e n a t u r e
would r e q u i r e a s o c i a l and n o t a merely p h i l o s o p h i c a l

formation.
I t
one t h a t i s
relations of a c a p i t a l i s t
is
trans-
And a l t h o u g h such a s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n might
overcome a l i e n a t i o n , i t would n o t m
nature of o b j e c t i v i t y .
the least a l t e r the
There would, i n h i s vierf,
still
be o b j e c t s e x t e r n a l t o mind when a l i e n a t i o n i s overcome.

But
as I have s a i d , Hegel b e l i e v e s
t h a t we a l i e n a t e
ourselves
as soon as we e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t o u t s i d e o u r
consciousness, and m
e n e r g i e s toward
i
t h e Phenomenology he bends a l l h i s
'the conquest (Uberwmdung) o f t h e o b j e c t o f

50
consciousness .
I n Marx's view, t h e r e f o r e , one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l aims o f
the Phenomenology i s t o deny that there is from t h e philosophical point o f
49- I b i d .
50.
Ibid.
As Meszaros says m one o f t h e more l u c i d passages m
h i s Marx's Theory o f A l i e n a t i o n : 'Thus H e g e l , m t h e end, assi g n s t h e sane c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f u n t r a n s c e n d a b l e a b s o l u t e n e s s
and u n i v e r s a l i t y t o t h e a l i e n a t e d form o f o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as
t o a c t i v i t y i t s e l f and t h e r e f o r e he c o n c e p t u a l l y n u l l i f i e s t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f an a c t u a l s u p e r c e s s i o n o f a l i e n a t i o n , ( i t goes
w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t a form, o r some form o f e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n o b j e c t i f 1 c a t i o n i t s e l f - i s as a b s o l u t e a c o n d i t i o n o f d e v e l o p
ment as a c t i v i t y I t s e l f : a n o n - e x t e r n a l i s e d , n o n - o b j e c t L f i e d
a c t i v i t y ^ 'Jpp. 90 - 9 1 ) .
3l .
view such a t h i n g as o b j e c t i v i t y .
aim
is,
in
Marx's c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s
one way a t l e a s t , p e c u l i a r .
For he i s con-
cerned n o t only t o show t h a t t h e aim suggests confused
thinking
on Hegel's p a r t , b u t a l s o why Hegel s h o u l d come t o t h i n k i n

such an a p p a r e n t l y confused way.
i s p l a i n enough.
He b e l i e v e s t h a t Hegel came t o t h i n k
such a confused f a s h i o n
opher.
The e x p l a n a t i o n he o f f e r s
m
because he was t o o much o f a p h i l o s -
T h i s w i l l seem a s t r a n g e c l a i m
t o those o f us who
associate philosophy w i t h clear t h i n k i n g .
But what Marx
suggest here i s t h a t Hegel i s t o o much o f a p h i l o s o p h e r
t h a t he tends t o see human problems o n l y as
philosophical
problems and, c o n t r a r i w i s e ,
philosophical
problems as i n c o r p o r a t i n g
he tends t o see
a l l human problems.
Indeed i t seerns
t h a t Marx t a k e s L e f e b v r e ' s view t h a t , f o r Hegel, p h i l o s o p n y

properly
t a u g h t can exclude m
us t h e need f o r t a k i n g any
o p t i o n s o r making any s a c r i f i c e s .
1
F o r Marx, t h i s i s a con-
f u s i o n m Hegel's think. ng because i t

abstraction.
involves u n j u s t i f i e d
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , he argues, why i s i t
Hegel f i n d s i t necessary t o p o s i t o b j e c t i v i t y a t a l l ?
Marx's p o i n t o f view t h e r e i s l i t t l e
For, as f a r as he can see, ' i t i s w h o l l y
for i t s
natural
t h a t a l i v i n g n a t u r a l b e i n g equipped and endowed w i t h

ive i.e. material
essential
both r e a l n a t u r a l objects
From
sense i n s e t t i n g o u t t o
t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t human consciousness has o b j e c t s

object
that
powers (Wesenskrafte)
object-
has a l s o
o f i t s essence and t h a t i t s
self-
e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n i s the p o s i t i n g of a real..objective world'.
313.
'indeed'j he c o n t i n u e s ,
puzzling'.^
' i t i s t h e o p p o s i t e t h a t would be
S u r e l y , he says, we would f i n d i t most odd
we had no o b j e c t s f o r our consciousness.

of p o s i t i n g them?
The
Why
second reason why

i f i a b l y abstract.
then go t o l e n g t h s
k i n d o f beings we are makes i t
t h a t we have o b j e c t s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s .
inevitable
T h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e
Marx b e l i e v e s Hegel's t h i n k i n g t o be u n j u s t For Hegel does n o t see man
must have o b j e c t s o u t s i d e h i m s e l f .
Man
as a b e i n g
f o r him, may
be subsumed under t h e n o t i o n of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
as i t
if
i s c l e a r t o Marx t h a t
' r e a l man'
o b j e c t s f o r h i s o b j e c t so a l s o i s i t
who
happily
So
just
should have r e a l n a t u r a l
p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t o him
'that a self-consciousness through i t s e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n

only p o s i t thmghood, that i s , only p o s i t i t s e l f
can
as an a b s t r a c t
t h i n g , a t h i n g o f a b s t r a c t i o n and n o t a r e a l t h i n g ' . " "

Marx i t
For
i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t i f Hegel has a t the b a s i s o f h i s
p h i l o s o p h y a view o f man
as t h i n k e r o r , indeed,
philosopher
o n l y t h e o b j e c t s w i t h which he d e a l s w i l l o n l y be t h o u g h t
philosophical objects.
Furthermore,
Marx says, i t
t h a t such 'thmghood w i l l not be independent m
i s evident
the l e a s t
By which Marx means t h a t i t w i l l be a t h m g h o o d t h a t i s

mere c r e a t i o n (Gesch6pf)'
one
or
J J
'a
t h a t i s as we have s a i d merely
54
p o s i t e d by s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
I t i s t h i s t h e n t h a t happens,
51.
Marx, i b i d . , p. 57752.
Ibid.
53- I b i d . We would do w e l l t o r e c a l l here Hegel's p o s i t i n g o f t h i n g hood m the Phenomenology
54. I b i d . Marcuse puts i t w e l l when he says i n h i s essay on 'The
Foundations o f P h i l o s o p h i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m ' ( S t u d i e s m C r i t i c a l
Ph 1 1 osoohy;NLB) 'The o b j e c t m Hegel i s o n l y an o b j l i c t t o r consciousness m the very s t r o n g sense t h a t consciousness 1s the
t r u t h " o"f the o b j e c t and t h a t t h e l a t t e r i s o n l y t h e n e g a t i v e
side of consciousness:having been'posited'(created,engendered)by
consciousness as i t s a l i e n a t i o n and estrangement, i t must a l s o
be transcended by consciousness a g a i n , o r 'taken back' i n t o
consciousness. The o b j e c t i s t h u s , by the n a t u r e o f i t s e x i s t e n c
a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e t h i n g , a n u l l i t y - i t i s merely an o b j e c t o f abs
t r a c t t h o u g h t , f o r Hegel reduces s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o a b s t r a c t
t h o u g h t . ' (pp. 42 - 4 1 . ) .
1-
314 .
Marx c l a i m s , when Hegel broaches o b j e c t i v i t y i n

philosophy.
of
He
p o s i t s i t and i t
confirming i t s e l f ,
his
i s a p o s i t i n g which
'instead
i s o n l y a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the a c t o f
p o s i t i n g which f o r one moment f i x e s i t s energy as t h e p r o d u c t

and g i v e s t o i t
pro forma the r o l e - but o n l y f o r a moment
- o f an independent,
r e a l being . ^
The
objectivity
that
Hegel e s t a b l i s h e s m h i s p h i l o s o p h y , Marx a l l e g e s , i s a
f o r m a l one merely.
The
o b j e c t t h a t Hegel c o n j u r e s up
is
o n l y r e a l f o r t h a t moment.
I t s r e a l i t y t h e r e f o r e Hegel
a t t r i b u t e s t o mind s o l e l y .
Thus Hegel appears t o assume
t h a t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i v e , f i n i t e w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o mind
o n l y t o show t h a t i t
i s not t h a t .
t h i s t o be an u n t e n a b l e
He
mistaken
Marx, as vie d i d ,
view.
t h i n k s so because he b e l i e v e s t h a t i t
view o f man's n a t u r e .
r e s t s on a
I have a l r e a d y s a i d t h a t
what appears t o concern Maix most about p h i l o s o p h y i s

view o f man.
out t h i s s u g g e s t i o n m
We
s h a l l see now
how
fail
Marx c a m e
a s s e s s i n g Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y .
a b l e t o assess a p h i l o s o p h y m
the f i r s t
its
H i s s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t no p h i l o s o p h y can
t o advance a n o t i o n o f man.
finds
such a f a s h i o n does o f
Being
course
p l a c e depend on our h a v i n g our own n o t i o n o f
man,
and Marx,as I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , has one such n o t i o n

of man.
H i s view o f man,
as a n a t u r a l b e i n g .
c a t e d sense.
55-
as we have seen, i s t h a t o f
T h i s , o f course, he means m
By t h i s , he does not mean t h a t man
Marx. i b i d .
man
a sophistic
i s simply
an
33 5
animal l i k e any o t h e r .
has
not only
Rather he means t h a t t o be man
t o s u r v i v e b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y has t o
s u r v i v e as a p r o d u c t i v e b e i n g .
life
man
F o r him then man's s p e c i e s -
i s an unique one because man a p p r o p r i a t e s n a t u r e
consciously.
56
It
i s t e m p t i n g t o r e g a r d t h i s as Marx's o n t o l o g y .
we might do f o r two reasons.

argue t h a t s i n c e i t
This
I n t h e f i r s t place we might
i s w i t h t h i s n o t i o n o f man t h a t Marx
assesses Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , which boasts an o n t o l o g y , Marx's

n o t i o n o f man has a l s o t o be o r t o i m p l y an o n t o l o g y .
The
p o i n t b e i n g t h a t Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y can be t a c k l e d o n l y on
o n t o l o g i c a l grounds.
Secondly, we might
Marx's n o t i o n o f man p l a i n l y determines

experience
general.
c l a i m t h a t because
how he understands
I f Marx were o b l i g e d t o say where we
should b e g i n o u r r e f l e c t i o n s on t h e w o r l d he would say: w i t h

man's r e l a t i o n s h i p t o n a t u r e .
The o n l y d i f f i c u l t y
r e g a r d i n g t h i s as an o n t o l o g y , however, i s t h a t i t
1
a g r e a t e r s y s t e m i s a t i o n ;o Marx p h i l o s o p h i c a l
t h a n they perhaps possess.
implications f o r the
How, t h e n , does Marx assess Hegel's
on t h e
as we have seen, depends on a view
w i t h t h i s view o f experience?
o f experience
speculations
I t must a l s o have an impact
t h e o r y o f knowledge which,
of experience.
attributes
Be t h a t as i t may, we can see
t h a t Marx's view o f man has profound

n o t i o n o f experience.
with
philosophy
U n l i k e Hegel he wishes t o t a l k
terms o f man's n a t u r a l b e i n g and n o t m
terms
o f consciousness and s e l f - consciousness.

What does t h i s imply?
56.
As do Lukacs, Mezaros and L e f e b v r e . L e f e b v r e says t h i s m h
S o c i o ] ogy o f ivarx: ' "an ' s fundamental r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r e may
l e g i t i m a t e l y be c a l l e d ' o n t o l o g i c a l ' . ( p 4 0 ) .
1
3i6
It
i m p l i e s t h a t whereas Hegel sees man's e s t a b l i s h i n g him-
s e l f as a process
Marx sees i t
of the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f self-consciousness,
s i m p l y as t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f man's o b j e c t i v e ,
n a t u r a l being.
Thus whereas Hegel regards t h e appearance
o f o b j e c t i v i t y t o man as a r e s u l t o f h i s own a c t o f t h o u g h t
Marx takes t h e view t h a t man 'produces, p o s i t s o b j e c t s o n l y
because he i s p o s i t e d by o b j e c t s , because a t bottom he i s
57
nature' .
So, Marx c l a i m s , m
i s wrong t o conceive
words, as though
itself.
suggesting o b j e c t i v i t y
o f t h e p o s i t i n g as s u b j e c t ; m
the o b j e c t i v i t y o r i g i n a t e s m
it
other
the suggestion
R a t h e r we have t o see t h e s u g g e s t i o n as an e x p r e s s i o n
o f o u r own o b j e c t i v i t y .
We o u r s e l v e s , Marx says, a r e o b j e c t s .
We cannot be o t h e r w i s e as we a r e n a t u r a l b e i n g s .
The o b j e c t s
t h a t we i n t u i t o u r s e l v e s cannot t h e r e f o r e be mere c o n s t r u c t i o n s
(-o
1
o f mind, as 'man i s i m m e d i a t e l y a n a t u r a l b e i n g .
h i s very f i r s t
Thus
s u b j e c t i v e a c t has t o be an e x p r e s s i o n o f a
n a t u r a l , o b j e c t i v e power.
Immediacy t o Marx suggests man's
immediate dependence on n a t u r e u n l i k e Hegel t o whom, as we

59
have found, i t suggests merely thought as s e n s a t i o n .
C l e a r l y t h i s view o f Marx's depends f o r i t s f o r c e on h i s
n o t i o n o f man as a n a t u r a l b e i n g .
Marx c o n t i n u e s , man ' i s , m
w i t h powers o f l i f e . . . . :
And 'as a n a t u r a l b e i n g ' ,
p a r t , equipped w i t h n a t u r a l powers,
these powers e x i s t m
him as t e n d e n c i e s
and c a p a b i l i t i e s , as d r i v e s : and as a n a t u r a l , c o r p o r e a l , sensuous,

o b j e c t i v e b e i n g he i s , m
5758.
59-
Marx,
Jbid >
p a r t , a s u f f e r i n g , c o n d i t i o n e d and
P. 577-
i b i d . p. 578.
See above.
Chapter 4, pp
317.
l i m i t e d b e i n g , as i s a l s o t h e a n i m a l and t h e p l a n t , t h a t
is,
t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s d r i v e s e x i s t o u t s i d e him, as o b j e c t s
independent o f him; b u t these o b j e c t s a r e t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s

needs, e s s e n t i a l o b j e c t s and i n d i s p e n s a b l e
and
t o the activation
c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s e s s e n t i a l powers', ( l b . )
cannot regard what i s Immediate m

o f merely s u b j e c t i v e powers.
So we
e x p e r i e n c e as an
expression
Indeed i t makes no sense t o
Marx t o t a l k , as does F i c h t e , o f t h e immediate o b j e c t s o f

e x p e r i e n c e as e x p r e s s i o n s
of the p o s i t i n g a c t i v i t y of the I .
For when we l o o k a t o u r s u b j e c t i v e powers as a whole, o u r

d r i v e s , as Marx c a l l s them, we d i s c o v e r t h a t they a r e n o t
s i m p l y independent e x p r e s s i o n s
are a l s o an e x p r e s s i o n
Therefore,
o f o u r b e i n g b u t t h a t they
o f o u r l i m i t a t x o n s as n a t u r a l b e i n g s .
m F i c h t e ' s terms, we are j u s t as much p o s i t e d by
n a t u r e as we p o s i t i t .
For o u r d r i v e s correspond t o l i m i t -
a.< i o n s , l i m i t a t i o n s which would n o t e x i s t m

m
us u n l e s s
t u r n , d i d n o t correspond t o o b j e c t s o u t s i d e us.
Marx suggests, i s how o b j e c t s f i r s t appear t o us m
they,
So t h i s ,
our e x p e r i -
ence: as t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r c o n d i t i o n e d , l i m i t e d n a t u r e ,
s h o r t , as t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r needs.
I n c r i t i c i s i n g Hegel's n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y Marx, as
I have suggested, does n o t i n t e n d t o d i s c a r d c o m p l e t e l y t h e
t h e s i s t h a t l i e s behind i t .
He would n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e ,
w i s h t o q u a r r e l w i t h t h e n o t i o n t h a t man has t o o b j e c t i f y
himself.
m
What he does f i n d inadequate though i s t h e way
which Hegel p r e s e n t s
t h i s process.
He f i n d s i t
both
partial
318.
and t r a n s i e n t .
I t i s p a r t i a l , Marx c l a i m s , because Hegel
conceives o f i t o n l y as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t , and i t i s t r a n s c i e n t m t h a t he t h i n k s o f i t as something t h a t ought not t o
be.
T h i s must be f o r Marx where t h e H e g e l i a n p o i n t o f view
breaks down.
For i f , as Hegel acknowledges m the e a r l i e r
stages o f h i s system, 'man i s a c o r p o r e a l , l i v i n g , r e a l ,
sensuous o b j e c t i v e b e i n g ' t h i s means f o r Marx t h a t man has
always and i n e v i t a b l y ' r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s as o b j e c t s o f
h i s b e i n g ' and t h i s f o r t h e very s i m p l e reason t h a t he can
o n l y 'express ( a u s s e r n ) h i s l i f e m r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s .
A l i f e w i t h o u t r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s f o r i t s o b j e c t s i s f o r
Marx no l i f e a t a l l .
T h i s , t h e n , i s what Marx means by o b j e c t i v i t y .

Hegel we assume t h a t man,
even as consciousness alone,
o b j e c t s f o r h i s o b j e c t we must acknowledge
t h a t assumption, namely,
I f like
has
what f l o w s from
t n a t n o t o n l y has consciousness an
o b j e c t b u t i f t h a t i s t ~ be a r e a l o b j e c t consciousness must
be an o b j e c t f o r i t .
I t w i l l not do f o r Hegel, as he does
i n h i s account o f p e r c e p t i o n , t o p o s i t a t h i n g o u t s i d e c o n s c i o u s
ness o n l y f o r consciousness.
I f it
i s r e a l l y t o be a t h i n g ,
and n o t d i s s o l v e , consciousness has t o be a

We
can see more c l e a r l y what i s Marx's view from an example
t h a t he g i v e s .
In
The example i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f hunger.
t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p , he argues, the o b j e c t o f our c o n s c i o u s -
ness i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y o b j e c t i v e t o us.
60.
third for i t .
Marx, i b i d . , p. 578.
I t i s n o t adequate
319 .
t h a t i t merely be an o b j e c t f o r us one, say,

intuited.
my
I t w i l l n o t do t o say t h a t i t
c o n s c i o u s n e s s } i t has
t o be one
i t t o s a t i s f y my n e e d . ^
o u t s i d e m y s e l f i t has
l i m i t s me.
Indeed u n l e s s
o b j e c t o f hunger. An
it
e x i s t s merely f o r
t h a t i s outside myself f o r
Andfor i t
t o be one
t h a t I have
t o be an o b j e c t t h a t i s
t h a t I not only l i m i t
l i m i t s me
i t w i l l not be
o b j e c t o f hunger l i m i t s me
because w i t h o u t e a t i n g i t I w i l l remain hungry.

Marx says, ' i s a n a t u r a l need, i t
outside i t s e l f ,
but
an
simply
As
hunger,
requires therefore a nature
an o b j e c t o u t s i d e i t s e l f
to satisfy
itself,
62
i n order to s t i l l
itself'.
T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s most
t y p i c a l o f o b j e c t i v i t y f o r Marx because i t
is a relationship
o f need.
i n which o b j e c t s
For t h a t , he argues, i s the way
do c o n f r o n t man.
capability
Not
as mere e x p r e s s i o n s
(to posit, i n t u i t
o r w h a t e v e r ) but as an
o f our a c t u a l dependence on o b j e c t s .
The
need i s t h e r e f o r e n o t one we e s t a b l i s h i t
f i n d ourselves.
of a s u b j e c t i v e
expression
r e l a t i o n s h i p of
i s one
.vhich we
I t i s such r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e
our o b j e c t i v i t y f o r Marx.
That i s how
Marx p o s i t i v e l y e x p l a i n s o b j e c t i v i t y .
It
i s n o t a p a r t i c u l a r l y l u c i d e x p l a n a t i o n , but what he means

comes out more c l e a r l y when he r e t u r n s t o h i s c r i t i c i s m
Hegel.
of
What occurs t o him here i s the q u e s t i o n , what would
i t be i f we were t o t a k e a view which was o p p o s i t e t c h i s own

61. Marx b r i n g s up the same example when d e a l i n g w i t h the a t o m i s t i c
view o f man m the Holy Family. 'The e g o i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l o f
b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y ' , he says, may i n f l a t e h i m s e l f i n h i s unsensuous i m a g i n a t i o n and u n l i v e l y a b s t r a c t i o n i n t o an atom , t h a t i s
i n t o a r e i a t i o n l e s s , s e l f - s a t i s f y m g , need] ess, a b s o l u t e l y complete,
b l i s s f u l b e i n g ' . However'wretched sensuous r e a l i t y shows no concern f o r h i s lmag m a t i o n , each o f h i s senses f o r c e s him t o believe
m the e x i s t e n c e o f the w o r l d and the i n d i v i d u a l s o u t s i d e him,
and even h i s profane stomach remands him d a i l y t h a t the w o r l d
outside him i s not empty but i s a c t u a l l y what f i l l s ' . Marx-Pa<-<-e"i s
Werke 2, p. 127.
62.
Ibid.
1
3?o
and
' p o s i t a b e i n g , which i s i t s e l f n e i t h e r an o b j e c t
has
an o b j e c t '
Marx has
mind, o f course, Hegel's
notion of Geist.
S u r e l y , he c o n t i n u e s ,
would m
place be the o n l y b e i n g ,
the f i r s t
e x i s t no b e i n g except f o r i t ,
alone'.
'such a b e i n g
t h e r e would
i t would e x i s t s o l i t a r y
I t would be then the unique b e i n g .
Marx says, i s an u n r e a l b e i n g .
for
nor
and
This e v i d e n t l y ,
C e r t a i n l y i t i s not o b j e c t i v e
'an u n o b j e c t i v e b e i n g ' , he says, ' i s an unbeing'.
as soon as t h e r e are o b j e c t s o u t s i d e me,
as soon as I am
a l o n e ' , he adds, ' I am an o t h e r , an o t h e r r e a l i t y t h a n

o b j e c t o u t s i d e me'.^
not
the
T h i s , c l e a r l y , g i v e s a more cogent
n o t i o n o f what Marx means by o b j e c t i v i t y .

precludes
'For
I t evidently
an o b j e c t i v i t y such as t h a t which Hegel suggests:
f o r Mind alone.
I t i s a n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y which, I t h i n k ,
f o l l o w s out c o n s i s t e n t l y the consequences o f our
'positing'
o b j e c t s - which, a f t e r a l l , i s an H e g e l i a n i d e a .
Marx, u n l i k e
Hegel, p o i n t s out t h r e e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e
from i t .
Hegel would, I b e l i e v e , c o n f i n e h i s account t o the
f i r s t two o f these r e l a t i o n s .
F i r s t l y we
we have an o b j e c t f o r our o b j e c t i t
for
us t o have an o b j e c t i t has
can
see t h a t i f
i s f o r us.
Secondly,
t o be an m
itself.
even t h i s second r e l a t i o n does n o t take us beyond the

f o r Marx and a c q u a i n t
object i s m
63.
Ibid.
64.
Ibid.
itself
Now,
subject
us w i t h t r u e o b j e c t i v i t y because the
simply
f o r us.
True o b j e c t i v i t y i s
only
321.
e s t a b l i s h e d when t h e o b j e c t ceases t o be merely f o r us.

t h a t t o be so we have t o concede a t h i r d
ourselves
For
relationship.
have t o be an o b j e c t f o r t h a t o b j e c t or, m
We
other
words, as Marx says, I have t o be 'an o t h e r r e a l i t y than t h e

object'.
T h i s , I b e l i e v e , Marx t a k e s t o be no more than a
consequence o f o u r p o s i t i n g an o b j e c t m
the f i r s t
place.
Once we have p o s i t e d an o b j e c t we cannot b u t admit as Marx

has s a i d t h a t ' f o r t h i s t h i r d o b j e c t I am a n o t h e r r e a l i t y
than i t ,
i.e. i t s object'.
Indeed, he adds, 'a b e i n g
which
i s n o t the o b j e c t of another being' which denies t h e r e f o r e

t h i s t h i r d r e l a t i o n s h i p 'presupposes..that no o b j e c t i v e
exists'.
being
For, Marx concludes - s t r e s s i n g h i s p ^ i n t a g a i n -
'as soon as I have an o b j e c t t h i s o b j e c t has me f o r an o b j e c t .

However an u f o o b j e c t i v e b e i n g
i s an u n r e a l , unsensuous, o n l y
65
thought i . e . merely imagined b e i n g ,
a being of a b s t r a c t i o n ' .
That i s t h e k i n d o f b e i n g t h a t Hegel's n o t i o n o f G e i s t
conjures
up f o r Marx.
I t i s what ne c a l l s an unbemg (Unweseri)
His notion of o b j e c t i v i t y i s m
suggests t h i s example.
venture,
direct contrast to i t .
Mind ( G e i s t ) , Hegel is prepared t o
o b j e c t i f i e s i t s e l f as sensuousness.
I t is
process t h a t g i v e s us t h e stage o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y
Phenomenology.
Marx
this
m the
But what Hegel does n o t take i n t o account
i s t h a t f o r Mind g e n u i n e l y
64.
Ibid.
65.
I b i d . , pp. 578 - 579-
t o o b j e c t i f y i t s e l f as sensuousness
322
i t has n o t o n l y , as he says, t o r e c e i v e sense-data from

o b j e c t s o u t s i d e i t s e l f b u t a l s o be t h e k i n d o f b e i n g which
i s capable o f d o i n g t h a t .
Hegel c l a i m s i t
is.
He says
t h a t Mind as consciousness r e l a t e s i t s e l f p a s s i v e l y t o t h e
world.
What i t
then experiences,
he c l a i m s , i s t h e appar-
e n t l y r i c h content o f sense-certainty.
Mind Marx, however, regards
This p a s s i v i t y of
as a mock p a s s i v i t y .
p a s s i v i t y , which a g a i n , i s merely p o s i t e d .
simply m
o r d e r t h a t Mind can t r a n s c e n d
it.
I t is a
I t i s posited
Genuine pass-
i v i t y , Marx b e l i e v e s , p e r t a i n s o n l y t o a b e i n g t h a t i s capable o f s u f f e r i n g .
Because f o r Marx ' t o be sensuous i s t o
66
be s u f f e r i n g ' .
And man
t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t e d being.
i s such a b e i n g .
He i s a n a t u r a l ,
Thus he has sensuous o b j e c t s f o r
h i s o b j e c t which he n o t o n l y d e t e r m i n e s b u t determine him.

There i s something odd m
t h i s argument o f Marx.
I t
appears t h a t he wants us t o concur w i t h h i s argument not o n l y and
some i n s t a n c e s , i t
seems, - n o t p r i m a r i l y , because
it
i s l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t b u t because i t accounts most r e a d i l y

for
our experience.
I t seems t h a t i t
i s almost b e s i d e t h e
p o i n t f o r Marx t h a t he e s t a b l i s h l o g i c a l l y , s t e p by s t e p ,
m
o u r sense-experience we are passive
and t h e r e f o r e s u f f e r .
T h i s i s odd because t o do t h i s he need o n l y have repeated

argument about G e i s t .
that
his
J u s t as G e i s t , he c o u l d have s a i d ,
would be n o t h i n g a t a l l w i t h o u t b e i n g an o b j e c t f o r a n o t h e r
66.
I b . , p. 579- S u f f e r i n g i s a r e n d e r i n g o f L e i d e n . I t i s tnc
best t h a t i s p o s s i b l e b u t does n o t q u i t e convey Marx's meaning.
S u f f e r i n g , i f a n y t h i n g , i s a b i t s t r o n g . L e i d e n Marx
means i n t h e sense o f an openess t o b e i n g e x t e r n a l l y d e t e r r n n
Thus t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f sensuousness he w i s h e s ~ t o b r i n g o^
i s t h a t aspect o f i t i n which we a r e s u b j e c t t o t h ? t h i n g <x
sense.
323.
so we cannot sense-experience w i t h o u t b e i n g
passive
i . e . without suffering.
genuinely
However, he p r e f e r s t o
r e s t h i s case on what he t h i n k s t o be a s e l f - e v i d e n t f a c t
of our experience,
beings.
Now
namely, t h a t we are l i m i t e d ,
suffering
t h e q u e s t i o n t h i s r a i s e s i s : t o what n o t i o n o f
t r u t h does Marx s u b s c r i b e
formal consistency
Is it
Or has he m
consistency altogether?
one which r e l i e s on mere

mind a n o t h e r k i n d o f
The answer t h a t he g i v e s t o these
problems, we s h a l l f i n d , hang t o g e t h e r w i t h h i s view o f objectivity.
We s h a l l see how they do so i n t h e n e x t Chapter.
32 4.
PHILOSOPHY AND RESIGNATION

For t h e p r e s e n t we s h a l l c o n t i n u e w i t h o u r review o f t h e
C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's Phenomenology.
There a r e some problems
of d e t a i l t h a t we have t o s e t t l e .
Marx's p r i n c i p a l
thesis
i n t h e essay i s , as we have seen, t h a t Hegel has m i s u n d e r s t o o d

the n a t u r e o f t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f modern man.
the overcoming o f a l i e n a t i o n
'has f o r Hegel..the
67
of t h e overcoming o f o b j e c t i v i t y . '
' he
rests
He argues t h a t
significance
I n t h i s connection
h i s .case on what Hegel has t o say m t h e
b e g i n n i n g o f t h e l a s t Chapter o f t h e Phenomenology.
a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, Hegel argues t h a t i t
character o f the object
Here,
'is not the p a r t i c u l a r
b u t i t s o b j e c t i v e c n a r a c t e r which f o r
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e and t h e a l i e n a t i o n ' . ^
I t i s f o r t h i s reason, Marx argues, t h a t Hegel d e s c r i b e s t h e
object
o r o b j e c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l as t h e N e g a t i v e .
i d e n t i f i e s t h e i d e a o f an e x t e r n a l
Hegel,
w o r l d w i t h n e g a t i o n , and
Marx's s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t Hegel does t h i s because he confuses

the n e g a t i v i t y o r t h e i n h u m a n i t y o f man's e x i s t e n c e w i t h
tence per se.
exis-
T h i s , i f we remember, i s what o u r r e a d i n g o f
Hegel's D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t suggested: t h a t he thought

dissonance o r b i f u r c a t i o n
i s inherent
i n experience
that
as
such.
This indicates
t o Marx t h a t t h e r e s i g n a t i o n
shows b e f o r e t h e f a c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e , i s one t h a t
h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y , and t h e r e f o r e ,
t h a t Hegel
permeates
t h a t t h e r e 'can be no
more t a l k o f Hegel's accommodation w i t h r e l i g i o n , s t a t e , e t c .

67.
68.
I b i d . , p. 580.
11-id.
325 .
because t h i s l i e i s t h e l i e o f h i s p r i n c i p l e ' . ^
why
This
is
t h e c l a i m a t t h e end o f t h e Phenomenology p a r t i c u l a r l y
catches Marx's eye:
'Consciousness, s e l f consciousness
a t home w i t h i t s e l f m
i t s o t h e r - b e i n g as s u c h ' . ^
As
Marx i s e v i d e n t l y aware t h i s argument has a r e l i g i o u s

sion.
God
is
dimen-
t h e o r d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s consciousness i s an
o b j e c t i v e b e i n g , i f one wishes, an o t h e r t o man.
The term
t h a t Hegel uses f o r such an i d e a i s , V o r s t e l l u n g .
God
app-
ears t o t h e o r d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s consciousness as something

positioned before i t .
Now,
what m Hegel's view t h e Pheno-
menology does i s , t o d i s s o l v e such V o r s t e l l u n g e n .
I t is
i n t e n d e d t o break them aown i n t o i d e a s which are c l e a r l y t h e

property of the s e l f .
Thus, Hegel would c l a i m ,
need no l o n g e r f e e l estranged m
can now,
consciousness
i t s r e l i g i o u s being.
he argues, know o t h e r - b e i n g as i t s own
I t
externalisation.
For t h e r e l i g i o u s person o f c o u r s e , such a n o t i o n would

an a b o m i n a t i o n , f o r i t
the
e x i s t e n c e o f God.
s h o c k i n g as t h e y seem.
recognise m
seems t h a t i t
i s tantamount t o d e n y i n g
B u t , Marx says, t h i n g s are n o t as

Hegel i s , a f t e r a l l , prepared t o
religion a relative truth.
The V o r s t e l l u n g e n
o f t h e r e l i g i o u s person a r e , as t h e i d i o m has i t ,
the
rest.
be
a c u t above
They are t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t o f A b s o l -
71
u t e Knowledge.
R e l i g i o n f o r Hegel, i s t h e way
which
69-
I b i d . , p. 581.
I t i s a p i t y t h a t v e r y l i t t l e n o t i c e has
been t a k e n o f t h i s important view o f Marx's m t h e d i s c u s s i o n
o f Hegel's p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . For, as Marx i s c l e a r l y
aware, the ambivalence m Hegel's p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p n y which
has l e d t o so mucn c o n t r o v e r s y i s one t h a t as r o o t e d i n h i s
system as a whole.
70.
H e g e l . Werke 3. p. 575-
71.
Ibid.
326
Mind o r S p i r i t i s r e v e a l e d t o t h e o r d i n a r y
All
that i t
that m
lacks m
consciousness.
comparison w i t h A b s o l u t e Knowledge i s
i t Mind appears m
t h e form o f mere o b j e c t i v i t y .
Thus a l t h o u g h r e l i g i o n i s r e c o g n i s e d as an a l i e n a t i o n o f
self I t
'nevertheless f i n d s i t s e l f affirmed
r e l i g i o n as
72
religion'.'
Init
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , j u s t as i t
o t h e r modes o f consciousness,
Is In the
i s a b l e t o be a t home w i t h
i t s e l f m i t s o t h e r - b e i n g as such.
T h i s f o r Marx i s 'the r o o t o f t h e f a l s e p o s i t i v i s m o f
73
Hegel o r h i s merely
it
seeming c r i t i c i s m .
p r o v i d e s i n t o man's a l i e n a t i o n m
For t h e i n s i g h t
contemporary s o c i e t y
one t h a t i s shot t h r o u g h w i t h r e s i g n a t i o n .
promises,
as he says i n t h e Preface
'pure s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n m
is
A l l t h a t Hegel
t o t h e Phenomenology i s
a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s , t h i s e t h e r as
74
such..
He i s indeed aware o f what Marx c a l l s man's inhuman
objectification m
contemporary s o c i e t y ,
b u t a l l he has t o o f f e r
i s t h e knowledge t h a t we o u r s e l v e s a r e t h e a u t h o r s o f t h a t
condition.
T h i s u n c r i t i c a l p o s i t i v i s m Marx t h i n k s i s
m Hegel's l a t e r work The P h i l o s o p h y

sets himself the task of d e p i c t i n g
of Right.
clearest
There, Hegel
t h e S t a t e as i t
is.
And
indeed Marx seems t o t h i n k t h a t he does t h i s w i t h some success.

For m
h i s notes f o r a C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's P h i l o s o p h y
of Fight
he argues t h a t Hegel ' p o r t r a y s t h e essence o f t h e Modern S t a t e ' .

72.
Marx, o p . c i t . , p. 5 8 l .
73-
I b i d . , p. 581.
75.
Marx-Engels Werke I , p. 266.
74.
Hegel, l b . , p. 29-
327.
I n Marx's view t h e r e f o r e
t h e ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' w i t h which Hegel
d e a l s I n the work m i r r o r e x a c t l y
the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s '
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s m
the Modern World.
But
none o f t h i s i s t o say t h a t Hegel comes up w i t h
critical
c o n c l u s i o n s , because (and t h i s i s the view t h a t Marx appears

to
take m
the C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's Phenomenology) t h e knowledge
o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n as a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r Hegel.
A symptom o f t h i s i s t h a t Hegel f i n d s complete
knowledge o r A b s o l u t e Knowledge.
Knowledge i s u l t i m a t e l y
a l l t h e r e i s t o e x p e r i e n c e f o r Hegel.
which t h e Phenomenology ends.
fulfilment m
That i s t h e p o i n t a t
At i t s end t h e r e appears,
as L e f e b v r e suggests, t o be no room m
s a c r i f i c e s o r t a k i n g any d i f f i c u l t
e x p e r i e n c e f o r making
options.
Indeed a l l such
p r a c t i c a l problems become non-problems because t h e y are n o t

part of the r e a l i t y of experience.
The o n l y r e a l i t y
e x p e r i e n c e has i s , Hegel suggests, what we know about
that
it.
Thus, f o r him, t o know a ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' i s t o e x p e r i e n c e a l l

t h a t i s r e a l about i t .
Our o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o f a
'con-
t r a d i c t i o n ' as what Marx c a l l s l i m i t e d , s u f f e r i n g b e i n g s

not
a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel our t r u e e x p e r i e n c e o f i t .
ience i t
We
t r u l y , he c l a i m s , when t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y i s
Hegel t h e r e f o r e
contradictions
pays no heed
exper-
retracted.
t o the s u f f e r i n g caused by t h e
o f Modern S o c i e t y because he t a k e s t h e view
t h a t t h a t o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o f them i s overcome m
ledge.
is
Reason i s t h e n
because o n l y i t ,
t h e rose m
ultimately, is real.
know-
the c r o s s o f t h e p r e s e n t
I t knows the c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n s o f our e x p e r i e n c e as c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
b u t , Marx suggests,
328
the
H e g e l i a n Reason i s unperturbed by them because i t
knowing t h a t counts f o r i t .
ian
I n that
i s a t home w i t h h i m s e l f .
i s only
knowing the H e g e l -
I t i s t h i s resignation that
Marx cannot countenance because i t
i m p l i e s f o r him t h a t
76
'Reason i s a t home w i t h i t s e l f m
unreason as unreason'.
T h i s i s a f a l s e p o s i t i v i s m and merely
Hegel's system.
Marx suggests,
The c r i t i c a l element m
it
i s not sustained,
because Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t o u r t r u e e x i s t e n c e
i s n o t t o be a f f i r m e d p o s i t i v e l y m
our knowledge o f i t .
to
seeming c r i t i c i s m o f
Thus i t
our e m p i r i c a l l i f e but m
i s a matter o f i n d i f f e r e n c e
t h e H e g e l i a n whether o u r p r a c t i c a l l i f e
i s a r a t i o n a l one.
I f i t i s an i r r a t i o n a l one, h i s o n l y concern Marx argues,

t h a t he should know i t
as such.
He f u l f i l s
' s c i e n t i f i c ' knowledge o f t h e w o r l d .

Hegelian i s philosophy.
And 'science' f o r t h e
f o r i n s t a n c e , 'my b e i n g m t h e
p h i l o s o p h y o f r e l i g i o n ' and, s i m i l a r l y ,
being m
'my t r u e
political
th<=> p h i l o s o p h y o f r i g h t , my t r u e
the philosophy o f a r t j '
says, t h a t f o r t h e H e g e l i a n
77
osophical being'.
It
himself m the
Thus f o r t h e H e g e l i a n , Marx says,
'my t r u e r e l i g i o u s b e i n g i s ' ,
b e i n g i s my b e i n g m
is
finally it
artistic
i s c l e a r , Marx
'my t r u e human b e i n g i s my p h i l -
i s t o t h i s t h a t Marx a t t r i b u t e s t h e a b s t r a c t n e s s o f
Hegel's t h i n k i n g .
Hegel i s an a b s t r a c t t h i n k e r because he
reduces a l l o u r e x p e r i e n c e
we s h a l l now see,
t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l experience.
This
i s a more comprehensive c l a i m than o u r s ,
because we a t t r i b u t e d Hegel's a b s t r a c t n e s s p r i m a r i l y t o h i s
philosophical idealism.
This, I t h i n k , i s probably the
76.
Erganzungsband a s t e r T e i l , p. 5 8 ] .
77-
Marx, i b i d . , p. 582.
329
sounder course
philosophy
all
t o adopt,
f o r Marx's c l a i m h e r e , t h a t a l l
is necessarily abstract, is
p h i l o s o p h e r s have t r i e d
thought
of i t .
Hegel i s
certainly
t o reduce experience
I t
is
o n l y some; and
one
o f them.
t a k e s 'feer -fee t h e i l l u s i o n t o be
ical
of
speculation.
the exaggerated
saying that
l e d g e he
value t h a t
be
of truth.
that
of
things.
I n one
if
its
'essence'.
aspect
But
him c o r r e c t l y ,
that
be
f o r him.
the
would
essence
this is perfectly
obviously acquainted
true.
with
tend t o s t r e s s
itself,
and
this
is
our
where
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , i f Marx under-
goes on t o a r g u e t h a t
Our
our knowledge
is
knowledge o f
it
T h i s , as I h a v e s a i d , M a r x b e l i e v e s
and
f o r him
it
p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d an a b s t r a c t
one.
I t d o e s n o t t h e r e f o r e know
i s man
as an
78.
so t h e y
know-
Marx's p o i n t appears
t h e e s s e n t i a l weakness o f p h i l o s o p h y ,
makes any
In
v a l u e on
k n o w l e d g e as t h e
i s o b j e c t i v e about the t h i n g .
it
because
They t e n d t o s t r e s s t h a t
is m
For
Marx
on k n o w l e d g e .
they did
Rather,
claim.
may,
suggests,
p h i l o s o p h e r s , Marx t h i n k s ,
of t h i s
their
suggests
they exaggerate
sense, o f c o u r s e ,
d i f f i c u l t i e s arise.
exhausts
to
mean t h a t
Presumably i f
k n o w l e d g e i s what t h e t h i n g
all
placed
I know w h a t a t h i n g i s I am
another
stands
is
it
Not
inherent i n a l l philosoph-
p h i l o s o p h e r s t e n d t o see
For
the
one
t h a t as
p h i l o s o p h e r s p l a c e an e x a g g e r a t e d
subject to illusions.
to
Be
to
as M a r x
i l l u s i o n a r i s e s , he
does n o t o f c o u r s e
importance
n o t be
The
too sweeping.
Ibid.,
' r e a l man'.
A l l i t knows
7o
'abstract t h i n k i n g being'.
B u t f o r M a r x , as
p. 584.
we h a v e s e e n , man
has o b j e c t s
need.
f o r his object.
They a r e n e c e s s a r i l y
merely thought
objects.
i s a n a t u r a l being
objects.
I n h i s view I t
T h a t , he c l a i m s ,
therefore
then
o b j e c t s which are n o t
i s an i l l u s i o n
is
always
They a r e t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s
They must be t a n g i b l e
the objects t h a t immediately

kind.
who
c o n f r o n t man
the i l l u s i o n
concrete
to believe
a r e o f any
of
that
other
philosophy.
CHAPTER S I X
THE THESES ON FEUERBACH
EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE ( 1 1 )
Experience
juxtaposed.
two
I have d e l i b e r a t e l y
reasons.
call,
and e p i s t e m o l o g y a r e t e r m s t h a t
I n the f i r s t
t o challenge a thesis
are not often
s e t them s i d e by s i d e f o r
p l a c e I h a v e done s o , as we r e o f J u r g e n Habermas, n a m e l y ,
that
M a r x and H e g e l ' s e x t i r p a t i o n o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o i o g y was

without positive
outcome.
This thesis
i s wrong, I have
said,
b e c a u s e , on t h e r u m s o f t h e o l d t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e H e g e l
and M a r x b u i l t
t h e o r i e s o f experience which are m
pects convincing.
w h i c h was, o f c o u r s e , t h e c e n t r a l
have, c l e a r l y , n o t pursued
of classical
juxtaposition
a j u x t a p o s i t i o n would
t o the develop-
an e n t i r e l y
t o see i f
detached
a n y t h i n g c a n be made
o f e p i s t e m o l o g y and e x p e r i e n c e
H e g e l and M a r x e v i n c e m
their writings.
suggest
their thinking; especially
that
epist-
I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e we
t h i s aim m
For, I should also l i k e
of t h i s
problem
o f knowledge"
I come now t o M a r x ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n
ment o f a new i d e a o f e x p e r i e n c e .
way.
res-
I have a l r e a d y examined t h e p o s i t i v e
aspects o f Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f " t h e problem
ernology.
many
Prima
that
facie
such
there i s a contusion
so i f we b e a r m
o r d i n a r y usage o f t h e word " e x p e r i e n c e " .
mind
the
When we t a l k o f
" o u r e x p e r i e n c e " we g e n e r a l l y mean a ] 1 t h a t
the course o f
o u r e x i s t e n c e we have come a c r o s s and i n w h i c h we h a v e i n v o l ved
o u r s e l v e s p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n a s o c i a l and p r a c t i c a l way.
Epistemology
on t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s a m e r e l y
theoretical
activity
332
with
little
o r no
practical
would c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h i t
But
a r e we
correct m
doing
or social implicateons,
from
this
any
notion of
s o c i e t y , has
experience.
a great deal
as
t o do
our
have s e e n > i s t h e v i e w t h a t H e g e l t a k e s .
takes
t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r our
and
the account of the
s h a l l now
see,
continues
fewer r e s e r v a t i o n s .
of
k n o w l e d g e has
theory
t h i s t a s k , and
He
t o be
of experience.
is
firmly
The
was,
conclusion
as we
I t is this
has
who
is
p o s i t e d by
o b j e c t s , b e c a u s e he
To
be
the case.
I t will
o t h e r w o r d s man
he
s u p p o s e s he
far
we
theoretically
In
see
convinced t h a t the
theory
practical
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t more
t o be
than
Philosophy.
Phenomenology
regarded
seem t h a t man
has
does.
i s at bottom
man
as
nature'.
as does H e g e l ,
the opposite
simply
will
there - present
appear t o
f i n d s h i m s e l f b e c a u s e he
I t is
They
desires
the r e l a t i o n s h i p m
i s a n a t u r a l being.
Marx. M a r x - E n g e 1 s W e r k e ,
be
f o r a moment,
o u t s i d e h i m - b e c a u s e he
man
only
T h i s , M a r x s a y s , w i l l n o t do.
r a t h e r because t h a t i s s i m p l y
he
posits objects.
o b j e c t s because, j u s t
but
1.
with
more s e n s i b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t o b j e c t s p o s i t man.
are n o t
we
'produces, p o s i t s o b j e c t s o n l y because
Marx s a y s , i f
a b s t r a c t l y and
experience
does so
German C l a s s i c a l
n a t u r a l being
sure,
he
o f Marx's C r i t i q u e o f the
h a v e s e e n , t h a t man
He
M a r x , as
a p a r t o f a more g e n e r a l ,
a n y t h i n g e l s e b r i n g s t o an end
knowledge.
o r d i n a r y view of
o r i g i n s of knowledge.
is
practical
with
T h i s , as we
steps
we
I believe that there
room f o r t h e v i e w t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , r e g a r d e d
Involvement m
and
As
it
which
part
Erganzungsband E r s t e r T e i l ,
p.577
33:;.
o f n a t u r e , Marx s u g g e s t s ,
o u t s i d e him.
man must n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e o b j e c t s
They a r e t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s n e e d s .
indeed
"his"
but
t h a t they are e x t e r n a l t o him, they are n o t " h i s " .
in
so f a r as t h e y c o r r e s p o n d
They a r e
The p r o o f o f t h a t
claim then i s
t o h i s requirements
i s t h a t he has t o a p p r o p r i a t e them.
Marx's
t h a t o b j e c t s do n o t p r i m a r i l y a p p e a r t o us as
o b j e c t s o f o u r I n t u i t i o n b u t as o b j e c t s o f o u r n a t u r e .
T h i s b r i n g s us t o M a r x ' s f i r s t
t h e s i s on F e u e r b a c h .
I n my v i e w , t h e Theses as a w h o l e summarise M a r x ' s i d e a o f

experience.
I need h a r d l y s a y t h a t he a r r i v e s
at that
idea
through a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l view o f our r e l a t i o n ship t o objects.
He t a k e s H e g e l and F e u e r b a c h t o be r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e o f t h a t v i e w , and he t h i n k s t h a t
defect is i t s
naturally,
contemplative
says l i t t l e .
its
principal
approach t o experience.
I t depends on what M a r x means by
c o n t e m p l a t i o n ; and one of the a i m s o f t h i s C h a p t e r w i l l

e l u c i d a t e h i s meaning.
m
be t o
H o w e v e r one t h i n g t h a t we can say
a d v a n c e i s t h a t M a r x d o e s not, a p p o r t i o n t h e blame f o r t h i s
defect of philosophy
evenly.
I n m a k i n g h i s c r i t i c i s m he
d i v i d e s t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s
i n t o t w o g r e a t camps: t h e
I d e a l i s t s and t h e M a t e r i a l i s t s .
f o r Hegel's idea of experience
For
This,
it
seems t o h i m t h a t
recognises
roach.
I t is,
that
1 t h i n k , h i s sympathy
l e a d s h i m t o do
this.
h i s Phenomenology o f M i n d H e g e l
some o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e
But w i t h o u t superceding
he w o u l d , Marx s u g g e s t s ,
it.
Had he s u p e r c e d e d
h a v e c e a s e d t o t h i n k o f man
as an a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g b e i n g .
Hegel, then,
is
appit,
merely
ambivalent
334.
on a p o i n t
rejects
of vital
g i v e an example o f w h a t M a r x h a s m
He b o t h
We c a n ,
mind h e r e .
In
o p e n i n g c h a p t e r s o f t h e Phenomenology Hege] comes t o
discuss the relationship

w o u l d be i n c l i n e d
philosophical
something
work.
want
which
T h i s , we
i s an i n t r i g u i n g d e p a r t u r e m
Indeed i t
suggests t h a t Hegel
takes
i s e x a m i n i n g t h e most c o n c r e t e a s p e c t s
accounting f o r our experience.
he i s .
analyses i t ,
felt
(Begierde).
l i k e M a r x ' s v i e w o f man's o b j e c t i v i t y , f o r i t
our l i f e
a sense,
of desire
to think,
suggests t h a t Hegel
of
i m p o r t a n c e t o Marx.
and p r e s e r v e s t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e approach.
I think,
the
which i s
'is
As Mure s a y s :
'At f i r s t
(selfish) appetition,
(of l i f e )
as sttch i s
And s o , m
desire',
as H e g e l
impulse t o s a t i s f y a
by a b s o r b i n g i n t o o n e s e l f an o t h e r
t h e r e b y m e r e l y c a n c e l l e d and d e s t r o y e d
(food
-7.
for
example).'^
c-n be s e e n m
Mare s a y s ,
but
only
true
what f o l l o w s .
interest
is
the relationship
'In t h i s p r a c t i c a l
'the s u b j e c t e n j o y s a c e r t a i n t y
such s a t i s f a c t i o n
alternate
the
But Hegel's
which i s
t r a n s i t o r y ; w a n t and i t s
and r e c u r e n d l e s s l y .
True
satisfaction ,
truth,
satisfaction
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s :s
r e a c h e d when t h e r e l a t i o n o f s e l f and o t h e r d e v e l o p s
reciprocal
r e l a t i o n o f two s e l f - c c n s c i o u s
In
o t h e r words,
of
the relationship
as Mure p u t s i t .
Hegel's
true
interest
is
f o r knowledge o r 'true
The i n t e r e s t
into
individuals'.(lb.)
the implications
self-consciousness'
i n a concrete aspect o f o u r
2.
H e g e l . Werke 3, p. 139.
3-
G.R.G.Mure. H^he P h i l o s o p h y o f H e g e l ,
p.
74.
535.
experience
in
i s merely
partial.
o r d e r t o supercede i t .
g e s t , h i s approach i s
Hegel, merely
To t h a t
still
e x t e n t , Marx would
famous f i r s t
the
This i s
Kantian
synthesis o f apprehension
his
A g r e a t d e a l h i n g e s on
to this
b u i l d s h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e .
the
mind t h e
t h e t e r m t h a t Marx uses m
m e a n i n g t h a t we a c c o r d
sug-
a c o n t e m p l a t i v e one.
When I say ' c o n t e m p l a t i v e ' I have m

t e r m Anschauung.
posits desire
term,
f o r on i t
Marx
F o r Kant t h e term
that
takes place m
signified
t h e mind
of
e a c h i n d i v i d u a l when c o n f r o n t e d by t h e e m p i r i c a l m a n i f o l d
of
experience.
For that
as i n t u i t i o n .
the
reason
i t is normally
translated
F o r i n K a n t ' s v i e w an A n s c h a u u n g c o n t a i n s b o t h
c h a o t i c data
sense-experience
synthesis into a Vorstellung.
and, i m p l i c i t l y ,
its
A V o r s t e l l u n g , as we have
i s an image t h a t we h a v e o f an a s p e c t
o f our experience
representation.
So an i n t u i t i o n ,
is
g o e s t o make u p a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
of
merely
sense.
' l o o k i n g on a t ' t h e w o r l d .
seen,
or a
K a n t ' s v i e w , what
An A n s c h a u u n g , i s a r e s u l t
That i s
its
literal
K a n t ' s u s e o f t h e t e r m E , as we h a v e s e e n , c l o s e l y
con-
nected w i t h h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e empiricists.
He h e l d i t
by e x p e r i e n c e :
of
it.
t o d e s c r i b e a c c u r a t e l y w h a t t h e y meant
o u r l o o k i n g on a t t h e w o r l d o r o u r o b s e r v a t i o n
There i s ,
h o w e v e r , an i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n
t h a t he
w a n t e d t o b r i n g o u t , n a m e l y , t h a t no m a t t e r w h a t Hurne o r L o c k e
may s u g g e s t
involved
4.
our ' l e t t i n g
a synthesis.
I.Kant. K r i t i k
reality'
t h r o u g h t h e senses
Hume and L o c k e , j n s i & t
d e r Remen Vernunft,pp.
that
itself
sense-
162 - l6j5.
336 .
experience i s
that
'pure'.
i t a c q u a i n t s us d i r e c t l y
There
is
But Kant's
t h a t even o u r s e n s e - o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d
c e r t a i n amount o f s e l e c t i o n and
m
p r o v i n g t h i s was
m e t a p h y s i c s was
t o demonstrate
misconceived.
We
able t o
know t h i n g s m
therefore,
f o r Kant.
it
that
His
the goal of
o r phenomena.
two p r i m e
of that
view.
i n t o more r e a d i l y u n d e r s t o o d t e r m s we
i f we
I t
significations
on t h e one h a n d , o u r a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e w o r l d
on t h e o t h e r ,
that
experience m
Kant
is
and
our minds.
the fashion m
Intuition
secondly,
translate
can see t h e c l o s e
connection w i t h our o r i g i n a l n o t i o n o f the term.
e x p e r i e n c e and,
are
r e p r e s e n t s h i s assessment o f t h e view
represents his c r i t i c i s m
this
this
themselves o r noumenally.
o f e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s L o c k e and Hume and,

it
o u r e x p e r i e n c e , we
t h a t A n s c h a u u n g has
Firstly,
involves
is
I n h i s v i e w , because o f
can know them o n l y as a p p e a r a n c e s
follows,
view
o r d e r i n g on o u r p a r t .
s y n t h e s i s t h a t always takes place m

never
conviction
w i t h the nature of objects.
i s no i n t e r v e n t i o n on o u r p a r t .
object
their
ôr i t
our
w h i c h we
is,
sensesynthesise
(Anschauung) f o r
t h e r e f o r e b o t h a manner o f " l o o k i n g on a t " e x p e r i e n c e
o f knowing
it.
337.
MARX AMD
Marx, as
ive,
I have a l r e a d y s a i d ,
s e n s u o u s and
to his thesis
In
the
are
m
"there".
we
ivity
t e r m s , he
o f our
he
c o u l d say
not
from t h e i r
point
he
says,
'is that
the
that
s i d e was
know r e a l ,
moves m
directions.
as
objection
d o u b t t h a t he
m
rrnnd t h e
i s not
as
intervention
the
m
object-
position
of view
of
by
of
material-
Feuerbach)
only grasped
such'."*
he
under
as
sens-
Therefore,
idealism
Marx's
oppnot
objection
c r i t i c i z e s w h a t I have
surprisingly,
suggests
a p p a r e n t l y t o l e a v e us
idealist.
those of Kant.
does K a n t , t h a t
nores our
point
For,
did.
I n the
no
Because M a r x
K a n t i a n t e r m t h e r e i s a marked s i m i l a r i t y
h i s c r i t i c i s m s and
out,
the
subjectively.
then,
h i m s e l f an
mis"'
- w h i c h n a t u r a l l y does
First
to his c r i t i c i s m
him
empiricist.
(Anschauung); not
developed a b s t r a c t l y
- idealism
sense
w o u l d be
materialists'
from the
not
c a l l e d L o c k e a n m a t e r i a l i s m and
an
an
sensuousness i s
sensuous a c t i v i t y
two
it
f o r him i n c l u d e s t h a t
practice;
o s i t i o n to materialism
we
classical empiricists
or of i n t u i t i o n
u o u s human a c t i v i t y ,
active
objects
mam d e f e c t of a l l previous
reality,
form of object
the
is therefore
of view but
(and
object,
the
mind.
r e c k o n i n g , must p u t
rehearses the
'The
objectcentral
p l a c e s f a r g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s on
t h a t he
Kant's C r i t i q u e .
an
o u t s i d e the
philosophy; but
knowledge than the
One
Ism',
M a r x ' s own
as
therefore
objects
must show t h a t
t o c o n c l u d e t h a t he
see,
I t is
t h e r e s h o u l d be
T h i s , by
shall
r e g a r d s man
being.
m a t e r i a l i s t camp m
leading
as
natural
that
plainest
the
TRADITIONAL MATERIALISM
first
has
between
p l a c e he
points
Lockean account o f e x p e r i e n c e i g -
the
apprehension of
reality.
Our
5- Marx. 'Theses on F e u e r b a c h ' , H a r x - E n g e l s Werke 3, p. 5- I t i s

t r u e t h a t Marx's r e f e r e n c e t o l d e a L i s m p o i n t s t o Hege
rather
t h a n K a n t , b u t i t seems t o me t h a i , b e c a u s e o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
o f t h e K a n t i a n n o t i o n o f Anschauung m Marx's o b j e c t i o n s
to
t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s m , K a n t J S t h e more i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e m
thi
instance.
1
338.
m i n d s a r e not s i m p l y b l a n k when we s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .
clearly
involved m
our apprehension
o f an o b j e c t .
s e c o n d p l a c e he p o i n t s o u t , l i k e K a n t ,
our r e l a t i o n
means t h i s
from t h e f i r s t ,
t o an o b j e c t i s an a c t i v e one.
Marx o f c o u r s e
a much more c o m p r e h e n s i v e sense t h a n
form o f i n t u i t i o n
is
i n this
Marx d i f f e r s
he
I n the
that,
He i s n o t o n l y r e f e r r i n g t o a t h e o r e t i c a l
It
We a r e
synthesis m the
b u t t o 'sensuous human a c t i v i t y ,
comprehensiveness o f o u r a c t i v e
from t h e I d e a l i s t s .
Kant.
practice'.
involvement
They, he c l a i m s , and h e r e
e c h o e s w h a t he h a s t o say o f H e g e l m
his Critique
Phenomenology, do n o t know ' r e a l s e n s u o u s a c t i v i t y
ofthe
as
such'.
L e t us now t a k e a ~ l o s e r l o o k a t t h e t w o a s p e c t s
criticism
had,
of t r a d i t i o n a l materialism.
human p r a c t i c e ' .
Indeed
m
saying that
regards
it
I ti s not immediately
an " o b j e c t i v e "
"subjectively"
'under t h e f o r m
n o t under t h e form
on t h e f a c e o f i t t h e r e i s
o f Marx's
Traditional materialism
only taken hold o f r e a l i t y
of object or o f i n t u i t i o n ' ,
'of sensuous
c l e a r what t h i s means.
something
quite
view o f r e a l i t y
confusing
i s one t h a t
as 'sensuous human p r a c t i c e ' .
we may p e r h a p s c l a r i f y M a r x ' s p o i n t w i t h an e x a m p l e .
kind
o f e x a m p l e t h a t we r e q u i r e w o u l d
o f Marx's view o f ' o b j e c t ,

materialism.
his Critique
reality'
f o r Locke
bright,
But
The
i n v o l v e a comparison
and t h a t
of previous
F o r M a r x ' s v i e w we n e e d go no f u r t h e r
than
o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology; and f o r t h e e m p i r i c i s t
v i e w , Locke's accounc o f t h e sun w i l l serve.

is
that
'but an a g g r e g a t e
o f those
The i d e a
o f t h e sun
s e v e r a l simple
h o t , roundish, having a constant
ideas,
r e g u l a r motion, a t
a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e f r o m u s , a n d p e r h a p s some o t h e r : as he who
t h i n k s and d i s c o u r s e s o f t h e s u n h a s be en more o r l e s s a c c u r a t e
m
observing those
sensible qualities,
ideas, or properties,
which are
say
of t h i s
lative
t h a t t h i n g he
calls
i d e a o f t h e sun
one.
t h e sun'.
is that
i t is
of Substances'.
He
Through observing
ssions of i t
c o m p l e x Jdea o f t h e sun
several simple
s t a n d M a r x t o say
and
the world
'but
Now,
it
t h e sun,
as a n a t u r a l b e i n g .
seen as
Indeed
t h a t o b j e c t are the ideas

t h e sun'.
T h i s , we
it
i s the f i l l i n g
sense-perception,
that
o f and
it
s e n s u o u s and
contemplative.
osophical Manuscripts):
an
indispensable
6.
J.Locke.
p. 177-
Ibid.
t o misunderthis
ourselves
account.
The
The
ooject,
c o n f r o n t s men
the
ideas
' t h i n k s and
know, i s L o c k e ' s v i e w o f
on
he
puts
'The
object to i t ,
it
sun
the world.
experience:
our
But
that
For him experience

it
(m
of
discourse
i s g i v e n t o our minds t h r o u g h
reflection,
is
between
one.
o f a b e i n g who
of
His quarrel
Locke's terms,
of o b j e c t s ; but
As
our
primarily with
actually
i s not Marx's view o f e x p e r i e n c e .

indeed,
case
( t h e ) aggregate
giving that
i s merely a n m t u i t e d
Marx would argue, i s n o t
of
i d e a s , and
o f our complex i d e a s .
from
sense-impre-
w o u l d be
t h a t h i s q u a r r e l was
(or object) m
our
this
receive
the r e l a t i o n s h i p t n a t Locke i n v o k e s
object,
and
we
simple
is nothing
ideas'.
account of the o r i g i n
with
question, m
t h e sun
o r what Locke c a l l s ,
of
b e l i e v e s they a r i s e
our o b s e r v a t i o n of the substance m
those
c l e a r l y a contemp-
Locke i s concerned w i t h t h e o r i g i n
'Complex I d e a s
t h e sun.
What M a r x w o u l d
i s not merely
is,
passive
t h e Economic and
Phil-
i s the object of the plant
confirming i t s
life
- just
Essay C o n c e r n i n g t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
Locke heads t h e C h a p t e r m
that
way.
as
op.ci
340.
the p l a n t i s
an o b j e c t o f t h e s u n , b e i n g an e x p r e s s i o n o f
t h e l i f e - a w a k e n i n g power o f t h e s u n , o f t h e o b j e c t i v e
g
e s s e n t i a l powers o f t h e sun'.
not
simply passive
Experience,
is
therefore,
most s e n s i b l e he c l a i m s
relation to reality
as s e n s u o u s human
t h e terms t h a t
interdependence.
t o see o u r g e n e r a l
this
insight
demands:
practice.
This view o f experience

implications
is
and c o n t e m p l a t i v e , b e c a u s e o u r i m m e d i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o b j e c t s i s one o f n a t u r a l
It
has, I b e l i e v e , very
f o r epistemology.
Marx's c l a i m w o u l d , I t h a n k ,
important
Our i m m e d i a t e r e a c t i o n t o
be t o j o i n Habermas i n
Marx o f o v e r t h r o w i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y
to l i t t l e
L o c k e , we w o u l d s a y , may have m i s c o n c e i v e d
good
accusing
effect.
the nature of
e x p e r i e n c e b u t he does a t l e a s t h a v e t h e m e r i t o f p u r s u i n g
his enquiry into
t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f o u r knowledge.
There
i s , h o w e v e r , more t o M a r x ' s v i e w t h a n meets t h e e y e .

suggestion
is,
ir,
as we h a v e s e e n , t h a t o b j e c t s i m 3 d i a t . e l y
c o n f r o n t man as o b j e c t s o f h i s n a t u r e .
what i t
plies
means t o be o b j e c t i v e .
we a r e s i m p l y o b s e r v i n g i t ^
Marx.
intuited
an o b j e c t o r t h a t
p e r c e p t i o n ) h a s t o be
more s i g n i f i c a n t
O b j e c t s , he s a y s ,
r e l a t i o n o f man t o
a r e as t h e y f i r s t
us m e d i a t e d by o u r n a t u r e o r n a t u r e
8.
is
R a t h e r he w o u l d s a y t h a t t h e
o b j e c t o f o u r Anschauung ( i n t u i t i o n ,
seen as p a r t o f a n o t h e r
This f o r him
F o r us t o be o b j e c t i v e i m -
f o r h i m t h a t we h a v e n o t m e r e l y
his objects.
His
itself.
Werke, E r g a n z u n d s b a n d , o p . c i t . ,
appear t o
And o u r n a t u r e
p. 578.
343.
f o r Marx i s ,
as we h a v e seen,
humanly a c t i v e ,
environment
say,
we
i n o t h e r words t o produce:
accordance
will
one?
T h i s , we
if
thoroughly subjective.
our o v e r r i d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t
answer i s
o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t a o n e - s i d e d one.
that
our s u b j e c t i v i t y ,
or i f
the nature of the world.

derive
How,
Our
one w i s h e s ,
d r i v e s , he
c a u s e we
Our d e s i r e s m
are s e l f i s h
continual
subjecti-
His
claim
a r g u e s , do n o t
natural
g e n e r a l e x i s t n o t s i m p l y be-
c r e a t u r e s b u t because w i t h o u t
s a t i s f a c t i o n we w o u l d n o t s u r v i v e .
t h e r e f o r e , Marx would
practical
our n a t u r e , i s
f r o m mere o n e - s i d e d w i s h e s b u t f r o m o u r
limitations.
be
is a
t h a t f o r Marx t h i s i n e v i t a b l e
their
They a r e n o t
a r g u e , mere e x p r e s s i o n s o f o u r n a t u r e ,
t h e y a r e a l s o how
t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d i m p i n g e s on u s .
he w o u l d
that
had
suggest
made an e r r o r m
o b j e c t s w h a t was
subjective
merely
the c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c a l
tiymg
the r e s u l t
faculties.
subjective
So
materialists
t o e x c l u d e f r o m our' k n o w l e d g e o f
o f t h e i r i m p a c t on o u r m e r e l y
B e c a u s e , i n M a r x ' s v i e w , we h a v e
faculties.
c u s s i o n o f t h e sun:
our
would
ask,can our knowledge o f t h e w o r l d p o s s i b l y
The
vity
sensuously
to transform
w i t h o u r needs.
i s where M a r x ' s v i e w i s
objective
is
w i t h o u t d o u b t t o be
To
' t h e sun i s
t a k e up a g a i n M a r x ' s
dis-
the object of the plant'
'an e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e l i f e - a w a k e n m g p o w e r s o f t h e s u n ,
t h e sun's o b j e c t i v e e s s e n t i a ]
powers'.
p l a n t as a n a t u r a l o b j e c t e x p e r i e n c e s i t s
as i t
our
really
is,
no
Tnus, j u s t
object,
as
the
as
of
the
sun,
we as n a t u r a l o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h
(apparently merely s u b j e c t i v e ) f a c u l t i e s
they are in themselves.
What he i m p l i e s
objects
therefore
is
as
that
342.,
our
p r a c t i c a l human s e n s u o u s
relation
to object,
as he s a y s m
the f i r s t
o f the objective nature
This,
reality,
t h e s i s , i s a t one and t h e same t i m e
o f course, w i l l
of reality.
n o t do t o e s t a b l i s h M a r x ' s
p o s i t i o n as a s e r i o u s
critic
We c a n p e r h a p s see i t
as a p l a u s i b l e a c c o u n t o f t h e s u b j e c t -
object
are,
I
relation but
its
as y e t , u n c l e a r .
think, help
of c l a s s i c a l epistemology.
precise
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r epistemology
A slight
us h e r e .
digression
As we have
on H e g e l
seen
it
contention
that our understanding o f the world
because
i s ours,
this
it
is,
however,
unobjective.
He does s o , we r e c a l l ,
h i m , t h e human b e i n g
his object
through
qua s c i e n t i s t
puts himself
scientific
sulates
scientific
law.
reality
coincide.
knowledge.
The s c i e n t i f i c
(the m
itself)
its
known i s
s u b j e c t i v e l y h i s and o b j e c t i v e l y as i t
object
is.
both
subsumes t h e
l a w , H e g e l s u g g e s t s , encapf o r us.
Now Marx w o u l d
on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t
disregards
man's n a t u r a l
objec-
seen M a r x s a y , i s n o t m e r e l y an a b s t r a c t
So even h i s b e i n g
of a n a t u r a l being.
into
the role ofthe
object
t h i n k i n g being.
right
'self-subsistence'
The s u b j e c t
This i s
For
This f o r him i s
t o Hegel's account o f t h e coincidence
Man, we have
substantiates
f o r Hegel
object
tivity.
simply
f r o m t h a t o f Marx.
t h i s way, he s a y s , n e g a t i n g
and o b j e c t
i s not,
Hegel's
an a n a l y s i s o f s c i e n c e .
Thus t h e o b j e c t as s c i e n t i f i c a l l y
how s u b j e c t
is also
The manner^he
altogether different
will,
But since
qua s c i e n t i s t
Idealism,
is but part
and H e g e l ' s
idealism
343.
particular,
'does n o t know r e a l , s e n s u o u s a c t i v i t y
H e g e l r e d u c e s man t o s c i e n t i f i c
ledge.
as s u c h ' ,
man o r , more p r e c i s e l y ,
know-
The c o i n c i d e n c e o f o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y
man's e x p e r i e n c e i s ,
takes place m
Marx b e l i e v e s ,
more b a s i c t h a n t h a t
which
knowledge.
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f M a r x h a s a l l t o do w i t h t h e way m
v/hich
he c o n c e i v e s o b j e c t i v i t y a n d , above a l l , man's o b j e c t i v i t y .
He s a y s , a g a i n m
the Critique
be o b j e c t i v e ,
natural,
self,
nature,
object,
o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology,
s e n s u o u s and b o t h t o have o u t s i d e
sense o r t o be o n e s e l f o b j e c t ,
'to
one-
nature,
9
sense f o r a t h i r d
is
this
third
third
is
identical.'
aspect t o being o b j e c t i v e ,
aspect t h a t ensures t h a t
to the object
nature.
it.
i s one t h a t
This t h i r d
it
i s h i s view t h a t
object
this
t h a t we a r e an o b j e c t f o r
the object
object
claiming
t o t h e sun m i r r o r s
relates
t o the plant.
is.
c a n be an
The 'sun
he s a y s , as ' t h e p l a n t
that
The p l a n t
is
t o take t h i s
t h e way m
precisely
Indeed
As i t s t a n d s ,
his point.
is the
sentence
which t h e p l a n t
t h e way i n w h i c h t h e sun
t o t h e sun m
( b i o l o g i c a l ) r e l a t i o n what t h e sun i s
Ibid.
it
is.
But again t h e analogy
We must be c a r e f u l
relates
9-
objectively
f o r Marx.
of the plant',
Marx i s
we a r e an o b j e c t f o r
objectively
serve t o e s t a b l i s h
o f t h e sun'.
literally.
if
i s no o t h e r way t h a t
i s nothing but a claim
there
this
objective
f o r us o t h e r t h a n as i t
w i t h t h e sun w i l l
is
corresponds t o i t s
f o r us as i t
there
and, i t
relation
Now, w h a t Marx c l a i m s i s t h i s :
i t must be an o b j e c t
Marx's view,
our subjective
aspect i s
it
is
So, m
to it.
their
natural
What t h e sun
344
is to i t
in that relation
o t h e r w o r d s , Marx i s
point
i s what i t
does n o t d i s t o r t
itself.
is
is
F o r t h e sun's p r i n c i p a l
i nitself.
i s also
as i t
itself
itself.
The n a t u r a l
f o r t h e p l a n t what t h e sun i s
would argue, t h e energy i t

it
In
c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e sun seen f r o m t h e p l a n t ' s
o f view appears j u s t
relation
objectively is.
objective quality
transmits.
B u t , and t h i s
This
is,
Marx
i s t h e s u n as
i s Marx's p o i n t , t h e p l a n t
o f t h a t e n e r g y o f , as he s a y s ,
'the l i f e - a w a k e n i n g powers o f t h e s u n ' .
Man's
objectivity,
Marx argues, i s o f t h i s k i n d .
T h i s i s because o b j e c t s a r e
always o b j e c t s
O b j e c t s a r e t o us as n a t u r a l
of our nature.
b e i n g s what we a r e t o taem, we a r e t h e i r o b j e c t
are
our objects.
objectively
as
is.
I n o t h e r words, I r e l a t e t o i t
For, f o r they
t o be o u r o b j e c t s
f o r u s t o be t h e i r o b j e c t s .
ical
materialism
objects
(which
b r e a k s down f o r Marx.
This r e l a t i o n
For i f
is
it
t h e same
I t confronts
o f Anschauung
as
classits
(intuition,
c a n n o t be a d e q u a t e t o o b j e c t i v i t y
I intuit
if
only mentally.
an
o b j e c t , Marx s u g g e s t s , i t
i s n o t so.
an o b j e c t I c o n f r o n t
Now, f o r me t o c o n f r o n t
w h a t am I t o i t :
this
just
i s o f c o u r s e t h e c e n t r a l m a t e r i a l i s t s t h e s i s ) as M a r x
understands i t .
But
as t h e y
We c a n see now w h e r e
as we have seen a s o b j e c t s
perceptjon).
just
it
p r o p e r l y as
being?
Clearly
i s what t h e c l a s s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t
suggests: t h a t I experience i t
m e r e l y by ' l o o k i n g on a t '
If
properly
I am t o c o n f r o n t
h a s t o be t o me w h a t I am t o i t .
a merely passive i n t u i t i n g
But t h i s
it
the object
it.
i n my m i n d I h a v e ,
345.
Marx s u g g e s t s , t o t a k e i n t o account
what I am f o r i t .
w h a t I am f o r a n o t h e r o b j e c t , M a r x s a y s ,
clearly
an a c t i v e ,
of t h i s ,
an o b j e c t i v e
fore
i s p l a i n l y and
s e n s u o u s , human b e i n g .
Marx s u g g e s t s ,
That
is a prerequisite
relation with
t h a t I see m y s e l f m
And
I am
conscious
f o r my c o m i n g
into
the objects outside myself.

s u c h a way i s n o t m
I n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h my k n o w i n g
There-
the least
bit
t h e o b j e c t s o f my e x p e r i e n c e as
they o b j e c t i v e l y are.
T h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e second aspect
of previous materialism.
reality
therefore
claims
had n o t , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx,
as s e n s u o u s .human a c t i v i t y ,
development o f t h i s
fallen
to idealism.
him, seen t h a t
founded.
to the passive m a t e r i a l i s t
abstract.
show t h a t ,
Because i t
this
wished
to refute
relation
m
was
p o i n t we may t a k e
I have
necessanother
tried
(Aufheben)
'opposition o f consciousness'.
t h e same as t h a t
the view t h a t
to reality
opposition
t h a t w o r k , H e g e l s e t s o u t t o overcome
one s e n s e , h i s a i m i s
rel-
He h a s t o add
developed
o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology.
w h a t he c a l l s t h e m a t e r i a ] i s t s '
So,
one.
view o f e x p e r i e n c e , i t
To i l l u s t r a t e
l o o k a t t h e process
to
our subjective
t h e Hegelian view o f our a c t i v e
was n o t p r o p e r l y
The
I n d e e d , as we h a v e seen, M a r x
a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d was a l s o an o b j e c t i v e
arily
Praxis.
s i d e o f o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p ô o b j e c t s h a d
t h a t H e g e l had, l i k e
however t h a t
criticism
Because p r e v i o u s m a t e r i a l i s m c o n -
c e i v e d e x p e r i e n c e as A n s c h a u u n g i t
viewed
o f Marx's
experience i s
s e e n as p a s s i v e s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .
o f Marx: he
s i m p l y t o be
I n doing t h i s ,
as I have
already p o i n t e d out, Hegel i n t r o d u c e s concepts

p r a c t i c a l arid s o c i a l l i f e
(One
such concept
(Begierde).)
is,
But
have s e e n , t h e c o n c e p t
so d o i n g , he
M a r x c a l l s an a b s t r a c t a p p r o a c h
failure
lies
concepts
epistemology a p r a c t i c a l
for
concepts
i n s t a n c e , he
Hegel's
p r e s e n t s n o t as one
p r e s e n t s the concept
is
thesis.
seeks t o g i v e
an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .
i t s equality with
consciousness
than seeking t o give
s i g n i f i c a n c e he
o p p o s i t i o n i s overcome and
ists'
t o g e t beyond what
to experience.
Rather
r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o o b j e c t s but
itself
fails
of Desire
I n t h e manner i n w h i c h he i n t r o d u c e s p r a c t i c a l
to epistemology.
practical
our
i n t o the t h e o r y o f knowledge.
as we
in
from
46.
The
Desire,
o f o u r mundane
practical
'as t h e movement w h e r e i n
this
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s becomes t o
1
itself'. ^*
I n o t h e r words, Hegel
o f d e s i r e as t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h
itself
aim
assured
self-
of the u n t r u t h of the
o f the process
material
o f t h e Phenomenology
t h e n , i n d e e d t o show t h a t e x p e r i e n c e
i s not properly
when c o n c e i v e d
p u r s u i n g t h i s aim
develops
But
it
of experience.
materialism,
side of our r e l a t i o n s h i p t o
T h i s i s because i t s
t o show t h a t t h e r e a r e no
r a t h e r t h a t a l l are merely
i s m has
before i t
suggests,
10.
is
conceived
it
objects.
does not. as M a r x p o i n t s o u t , make p r a c t i c e t h e p r i m a r y
aspect
but
as A n s c h a u u n g ; and
the
that
Hegel.
its
real,
a i m i s t o oppose
sensuous o b j e c t s
thought objects.
are thought o b j e c t s i t
must f o l l o w ,
v i e w o f p r a c t i c e i s an a b s t r a c t
Werke 3, p. 139.
I f a l l idea]
Marx
one.
347.
Marx's a t t i t u d e
On
t h e one
hand he
understanding
to idealism
of o b j e c t i v i t y
and,
on t h e o t h e r ,
of i t .
f o r seeing the s i g n i f i c a n c e
significance.
it
f o r not
practical
philosophy
different
forms.
t h e o r e t i c a l and
realted.
(ethics).
With Hegel,
Fichte
first
order that
is that
hope t o know; and

osophy.
For
it
i s of major
The
e s t a b l i s h w h a t we
and
political
m
osophy, however, e p i s t e m o l o g y
Now
of experience
seen t o c o n v e r g e .
the
with
comes
can
reasonably
o f P u r e Reason
his p o l i t i c a l
and
ethics
phil-
t h a t K a n t makes b e t w e e n
philosophies.
it.
on
mter-
pattern
is
Indeed,
theory, f o r his
I n Hegel's
converge
phil-
completely.
f a c t , h i s Phenomenology o f M i n d i s b o t h an e t h i c
account
with
o e t s t n e scene f o r t h e p r a c t i c a l
significance
t h e o r y o f knowledge.
call
from
the t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy
w h o l e n o t i o n o f p r o p e r t y d e p e n d s on
In
that,
f o r instance,
between t h e two.
instance, the d i s t i n c t i o n
i n t o h i s moral
Is
(epistemology)
Pichte,
pehnomenon and noumenon i n t h e C r i t i q u e

carried
for this
philosophy are d i s t i n c t y e t
t h e y may
that
understanding
on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e i s
b e g i n n i n g no d i s t i n c t i o n
K a n t and
our
This, a d m i t t e d l y , takes
W i t h K a n t and
practical
praises
t h e r e i s what I s h a l l
a convergence o f t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy
our
it
of practice m
Part o f the reason
common t o t h e German I d e a l i s t s ,
that
M o r e o v e r , he
relation to objects yet c r i t i c i s e s

that
ambivalent.
claims that idealism c o n t r i b u t e s to
h i n d e r s our u n d e r s t a n d i n g
idealism
is undeniably
and
Marx a l s o wants t o p u t f o r w a r d
which,
epistemology
and
ethics
However, he w a n t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h
his
an
are
348..
account from
that of his idealist
t h a t e x p l a i n s h i s ambiguous
attitude
of the c o n f l a t i o n of the theory

t h e i r philosophies
done.
I t is
t o them.
this
He a p p r o v e s
o f k n o w l e d g e and e t h i c s
y e t d i s a p p r o v e s o f t h e way
T h i s i s b e c a u s e he t h i n k s ,
theory
forerunners.
o r , more g e n e r a l l y , t h o u g h t
which i t
is
that with the I d e a l i s t s ,

has t h e u p p e r hand
over
practice.
A great
deal
There i s very
t u r n s on what we t a k e
little
t h a t t h e I d e a l i s t s had
oped t h e a c t i v e s i d e o f o u r r e l a t i o n
We
this.
i n d i c a t i o n n t h e 'Theses on F e u e r b a c h '
t h e m s e l v e s o f why M a r x t h o u g h t
p l e t e way.
Marx t o mean by
can, however,
to reality
shed l i g h t
devel-
an i n c o m -
on t h e m a t t e r
by
l o o k i n g a t t h e o b j e c t i o n s he r a i s e s t o H e g e l ' J v i e w o f
tice
recall
t h e C r i t i q u e o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology.
F o r , i n Marx's
H e g e l had shown t h a t t h e e s s e n c e o f man

productive
activities.
understands i t
insight.
was
evinced
For i f
f o r H e g e l , no more t h a n
t h e t r u t h be known,
s u r p r i s e us.
Marx.
1 1
We
This conclusion
have a l r e a d y
his
only
a
theoretical
Marx c o n t i n u e s ,
l a b o u r w h i c h H e g e l knows and a c k n o w l e d g e s i s
intellectual'.
labour
view,
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, Hegel
as t h e e s s e n c e o f man t h o u g h t .
Marx s u g g e s t s , i t i s ,
wnilst
into the significance of
f o r t h e ' s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f man'.
11.
will
t h a t Marx d i s c u s s e s H e g e l ' s n o t i o n o f a c t i v i t y
p r a i s i n g Hegel f o r h i s i n s i g h t
only
We
prac-
o f Marx's need
'the
the abstract
hardly
seen h i m c l a i m t h a t H e g e l r e d -
Erganaungsband, o p . c i t . ,
p. 57^-
349.
uces a l l a s p e c t s
of oar l i f e ,
r e l i g i o n and
a r t f o r instance,
to the philosophy o f those v a r i o u s aspects.

Marx s u g g e s t s , b e c a u s e he
place m
sees t h e o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n
our experience merely
consciousness.
H e g e l does
that
takes
as an e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n o f
self-
Thus t h e a c t i v e s i d e o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e
Hegel develops
is
only
'an a c t i v e
side thought'.
o n l y t a k e s n o t e o f l a b o u r as t h e t h o u g h t o f i t ,
affects
self-consciousness.
nothing else l e f t
conceives i t :
Marx says,
' t h e way
he
o r as
it
I n d e e d , Marx c l a i m s , t h e r e i s
experience of which
which
is its
sole act.
t o t a k e n o t e as H e g e l
w h i c h ( t h e H e g e l i a n - H.W.)
something i s
for it,
i s knovjledge.
Something i s t h e r e f o r e
so f a r as as i t
that
So
as t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
i s and
this,
knows t h i s
something.
for
Because,
consciousness
Knowledge
consciousness
Knowledge i s i t s
12
sole objective
he
relation'.
says H e g e l o f f e r s a merely
active relation
one
kind
to r e a l i t y :
of object,
nothing else is
and
real
w h a t he means by
practice is,
about
that
is
Ibid.
i s knowledge.
our
As we h a v e
seen,
f o r Hegel o t h e r than the r a t i o n a l .
And
i s the precise s c i e n t i f i c
Thus what M a r x c a l l s
know-
s e n s u o u s , human
Wha.t i s
real
f o r Hegel the t h e o r e t i c a l understanding of
s e n s e , t h e n , t h e o r y subsumes p r a c t i c e .
p.
:nto
that h i s analysis recognises only
as M a r x s a y s , d o e s n o t know r e a l o b j e c t s ,
12.
insight
t o t h a t e x t e n t , u n r e a l f o r him.
practice
m
that
theoretical
the r a t i o n a l ,
ledge of the present.
So
T h i s i s w h a t M a r x means when
58G.
just
it.
Hegel,
thought
objects.
350.
It
was F e u e r b a c h ' s g r e a t m e r i t , M a r x a r g u e s , t h a t he h a d
stressed
the r e a l i t y
senses.
and m a t e r i a l i t y
I n d e e d , Marx d e s c r i b e s
o f the objects o four
F e u e r b a c h as t h e t r u e c o n q u e r o r
13*
of the Hegelian
had
by
philosopher.
To a c h i e v e h i s c o n q u e s t he
t o b r i n g down t h e H e g e l i a n
i n t r o d u c i n g t o philosophy
nature, h o s t i l e
believed
n o t i o n o f G e i s t , and he d i d so
a view o f n a t u r e ,
t o the principal
and o f man's
thesis of idealism.
He
t h a t much o f t h e a p p e a l o f i d e a l i s m r e s t e d on a
defamation
of nature.
Idealism m
the w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o mind, simply

freedom.
Negation i s
h i s v i e w h a d seen
as t h e n e g a t i o n
nature,
o f man's
o f c o u r s e an a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m
f o r Feuer-
b a c h t o use b e c a u s e , as we have s e e n , t h e w h o l e c f r e a l i t y
t o mind i s
f o r Hegel t h e negative.
to slander nature.
as
Nature,
external
B u t , Feuerbach argues, thus
he p o i n t s o u t , h a s n o t o n l y t o be seen
f u r n i s h i n g us w i t h t h e 'common w o r k s h o p o f t h e s t o m a c h ' b u t a l s o
14*
the temple o f t h e b r a i n .
Nature,
he a r g u e s , h a s t o be s e e n
as
t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f o u r h u m a n i t y , and t h e r e t u r n t o n a t u r e
as
the proper
f o u n d a t i o n o f o u r freedom.
F e u e r b a c h , as M a r x s a y s ,
But
there i s ,
For t h i s
the impact t h a t
Marx c l a i m s ,
Marx b e l i e v e s , s o m e t h i n g odd m
o b j e c t s have on a l l o u r f i v e
t h e way
He
stresses
senses w i t h o u t ,
comprehending that'human a c t i v i t y
is
itself
1 16*
,
objective activity
all
reason,
'wants s e n s u o u s human o b j e c t s ' . ^ *
w h i c h F e u e r b a c h a p p e a l s t o sensuous o b j e c t i v i t y .
in
is
This i s
odd, Marx t h i n k s ,
s t r e s s i n g t h e sensuous aspect o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e
b u t a t t a i n s a proper view o f o b j e c t i v i t y .
See o v e r f o r r e f e r e n c e s .
because
Feuerbach
As we h a v e
351.
13L
Ibid.
1
1 \.
Feuerbach.
'Zur K r i t i k d e r H e g e l s c h e n P h i l o s o p h i e ,
S a m t l i c h e Werke11, p. 20^.
15-
Marx.
MEW ~3> P- 5Feuerbach says m h i s ' P r e l i m i n a r y
T h e s e s Towards t h e R e f o r m o f P h i l o s o p h y ' t h a t ' t h e e s s e n t i a l
implements, organs o f p h i l o s o p h y are t h e head, t h e source o f
a c t i v i t y and f r e e d o m , o f m e t a p h y s i c a l i n f m i t e n e s s , o f i d e a l i s m , and t h e h e a r t , t h e f o u n t a i n h e a d o f s u f f e r i n g , o f f i n i t e ness, o f needs, o f s e n s u a l i s m - t h e o r e t i c a l l y
expressed;
t h o u g h t and sense p e r c e p t i o n .
F o r t h o u g h t i s t h e need o f
t h e h e a d ; p e r c e i v i n g , s e n s i n g , t h e need o f t h e h e a r t .
Thought i s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f the School, o f the system;
sense p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l i f e .
I n sensep e r c e p t i o n I am d e t e r m i n e d by t h e o b j e c t , m t h o u g h t I
d e t e r m i n e t h e o b j e c t , m t h o u g h t I am I , i n sense p e r c e p t i o n
not - I .
Only t h r o u g h t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h o u g h t , t h r o u g h
b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d by t h e o b j e c t , f r o m p a s s i o n , t h e f o u n t a i n head o f a l l p l e a s u r e and need i s b r o u g h t f o r t h t r u e ,
o b j e c t i v e thought, the t r u e o b j e c t i v e philosophy.
Sense
p e r c e p t i o n g i v e s t h a t w h i c h i s i m m e d i a t e and i d e n t i c a l
w i t h i t s e x i s t e n c e , t h o u g h t essence which mediated
through
s e p a r a t i o n , a b s t r a c t i o n from e x i s t e n c e .
I t is only
t h e r e , t h e r e f o r e , where e s s e n c e i s u n i t e d w i t h e x i s t e n c e ,
t h o u g h t w i t h sense p e r c e p t i o n , a c t i v i t y w i t h p a s s i v i t y ,
t h e s c h o l a s t i c phlegm o f German m e t a p h y s i c s w i t h t h e
a n t i - s c h o l a s t i c , sanguine p r i n c i p l e o f French sensualism
and m a t e r i a l i s m , o n l y t h e r e w i l l y o u h a v e l i f e and t r u t h ' .
S a m t l i c h e Werke, F d s . B o l i n & J o d l , p. 2^5.
Apart from
i l l u s t r a t i n g Marx s pffeint t h i s T h e s i s g i v e s a s p l e n d i d
i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e m a m themes o f F e u e r b a c h ' s p h i l o s o p h y :
s e n s u a l i s m and a n t i - s c h o l a s t i c i s m .
16.
Marx.
ibid.
-352.
seen, a p r o p e r v i e w o f o b j e c t i v i t y
i s a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t an o b j e c t
f o r Marx i s
one w h e r e
is not only there m
and f o r us b u t a l s o t h a t we a r e t h e r e f o r i t .
is
Marx
t h r o u g h p a y i n g heed t o o u r s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .
c o u r s e , i s what Feuerbach does.

We
become c e r t a i n
view o f o b j e c t i v i t y
our sense-experience,
most n e g l e c t e d , a s p e c t
sense-experience
that
This, of
itself
Marx
suggests,
an e x a m p l e o f t h e t h i r d ,
C l e a r l y we o n l y
b e c a u s e we a r e t h e o b j e c t o f a n o t h e r
Somehow, M a r x s u g g e s t ,
says,
suggests,
t h a t we have t h e c o r r e c t
of objectivity.
F o r w i t h o u t an e x t e r n a l
sense-experience
is
way
As I have s a i d , he s t r e s s e s
our sensuousness.
because s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e
itself
The
t h a t we can c o n f i r m t h i s v i e w o f o b j e c t i v i t y ,
the significance
escapes Feuerbach.
o f t h i s aspect o f
He
sees c l e a r l y ,
itself
It
Only
B u t he f a i l s
t h e n do we see t h a t
t o grasp t h a t
it
i s n o t e a s y t o see how
is
i m p o r t a n t t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d
what I have c a l l e d
it.
third
l e a d s Marx i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f p r a c t i c e .
the t r a n s i t i o n
the
m a t t e r because
it
from epistemology t o e t h i c s
f r o m an a b s t r a c t
o l o g i c a l view o f experience t o a concrete, practical

of
objects
activity
the discussion of t h i s
i s h e r e t h a t we have t h e t r a n s i t i o n
or
s e n s u o u s human
objective.
aspect o f o b j e c t i v i t y
But
Marx
f o r us t o e x p e r i e n c e o b j e c t s t h e y have t o be more
a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r b e i n g o b j e c t s f o r u s , we have t o be
is
object.
s t i m u l u s t h e r e c a n be no s e n s a t i o n .
than thought o b j e c t s f o r us.
f o r them.
it
From t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h i s
epistem-
notion
study then i t
represents
353;
t h e end o f C l a s s i c a l German P h i l o s o p h y .
Now
is
t h a t when we come t o see o u r r e l a t i o n
w h i c h we b o t h have o b j e c t s m
we a r e t h e i r o b j e c t , we s h a l l
our
practice.
it
t h e m s e l v e s and f o r u s , and
T h i s i s n o t an o b v i o u s p o i n t .
o b j e c t n o r indeed being
their object.
and n o t h i n g
We
objects f o r
w o u l d say t h a t
t r a n s f o r m i n g an o b j e c t o r
i s t r a n s f o r m e d , we w o u l d a r g u e ,
o u r mere c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h an o b j e c t .
But i t
through
i s axiomatic
w i t h M a r x t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a p r a c t i c a l one.
does n o t e n t e r
f o r Marx.
self.
ships
i n t o our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h objects
I t inheres
I t does so, i t
between o u r s e l v e s
Practice
from
and objects as determining
T h u s , f o r Marx, f o r me
t o p r a c t i c e than
is
and i t
this?
f o r h i m no r e l a t i o n
practical
ones .
I h a v e an object
Contrariwise,
it
there
There
to objects that is not u l t i m a t e l y a
one.
t o Marx because o f h i s view o f
As I h a v e s a i d , he r e g a r d s man
i s n o t a mere c o n t i n g e n c y
with
f o r me
What more i s
seems t h a t he w o u l d s a y .
t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y has o b j e c t s
it
determines
t o c o n f r o n t an o b j e c t i s
t o d e t e r m i n e me.
This view i s axiomatic

man.
it-
seems, b e c a u s e he v i e w s t h e r e l a t i o n -
I am t h e o b j e c t o f a n o t h e r o b j e c t , r e a d s f o r h i m : i t
to determine i t
outside
the r e l a t i o n s h i p of o b j e c t i v i t y
f r my o b j e c t , r e a d s f o r h i m a s : I d e t e r m i n e i t .
me.
Our p r a c t i c e ,
consist of having
consists of our i n t e n t i o n a l l y
objects,
t o o b j e c t s as one
see how o b j e c t s c o n f r o n t us
we m i g h t a r g u e , does n o t s i m p l y
our
Marx's p o i n t
objects m
as a n a t u r a l b e i n g
f o r his object.
t h a t leads
our experience.
as t o be
They are t h e
who
F o r Marx
confronted
counterparts
354
of our n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s .
other objects
live
order
o f f them.
As n a t u r a l b e i n g s we r e q u i r e
t h a t we m i g h t s u r v i v e .
So t h a t o b j e c t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y
us a s o b j e c t s o f o u r n e e d s .
through
a p p r o p r i a t i n g those o b j e c t s .
Is practically.
So t h e way m
We c o n f r o n t
on s a t i s f y i n g o u r n e e d s .
it
the principal defect
them as b e i n g s
o f previous
o f Feuerbach, t h a t i t
failure
fails
Marx's
t o grasp t h e o b j e c t ,
objects o r are immediately
i s merely animal.
indicated.
His i s
This
is
w h i c h we immedconfronted
by them
a c o m p l e x n o t i o n o f n e e d , as 1 h a v e
I t h a s t o be so t o be c o m p a t i b l e
h i s v i e w o f man's n a t u r e .
ially
was
t o see t h a t o u r i m m e d i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e
confront
already
reality,
I t sf a i l u r e
t o s a y t h a t Marx t h i n k s t h a t t h e way m
iately
view
materialism, including
o b j e c t s o f o u r s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e was one o f n e e d .
not
which
'energetically
T h a t i s why m
s e n s u o u s n e s s as s e n s u o u s human a c t i v i t y .
Its
quell
t o t h e o b j e c t s t h a t c o n f r o n t us
bent'
that
confront
And o u r n e e d s we c a n o n l y
we as n a t u r a l b e i n g s r e l a t e
is
We h a v e t o
For i f ,
a s o c i a l and p r o d u c t i v e
being
f o r man's n e e d s t o be m e r e l y a n i m a l .
as he s a y s , man i s
it
is
scarcely
Objects
with
essent-
possible
immediately
c o n f r o n t u s t h e n , Marx s u g g e s t s , as o b j e c t s o f o u r human n e e d s .
And w h a t t h e y
a r e i s w h a t man's d e v e l o p m e n t h a s made them.
Human n e e d s t h e m s e l v e s , M a r x s a y s , a r e t h e r e s u l t s o f h i s t o r y .
They a r e l i v i n g
embodiments o f a l o n g p r o c e s s o f c i v i l i s a t i o n .
They a r e n a t u r a l n e e d s w h i c h h a v e been c i v i l i z e d .
therefore,
add a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t
Marx's t h e o r y
o f experience.
We m u s t ,
dimension t o o u r account o f
F o r he v i e w s man's i m m e d i a t e
355
relation
t o o b j e c t s n o t o n l y as a n a t u r a l p r a c t i c a l
relation
b u t a l s o as a h i s t o r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d
we s h a l l
see, t h i s l a s t
mes t o t h e f o r e
m
the next chapter.
and
social
relation.
As
a s p e c t o f Marx's view o f e x p e r i e n c e
t h e German I d e o l o g y , w h i c h I w i l l
discuss
356.
MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
For
t h e p r e s e n t , however, I should
on
the narrower
of
experience.
of
the
like
episternological implications
t o concentrate
o f Marx's
This, a f t e r a l l , i s the p r i n c i p a l
'Theses on F e u e r b a c h . '
I n those
view
concern
'Theses' M a r x b r i e f l y
w i s h e s t o g i v e h i s g r o u n d s f o r d i s m i s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m o f knowledge.
to
I t i s h i s v i e w a s i t was H e g e l ' s t h a t
pursue the problem concerning
The
q u e s t i o n : How i s
interest
f o r him.
certainty
it
that
knowledge.
w h a t we know? i s w i t h o u t
The same goes f o r a l l q u e s t i o n s a b o u t
f o r Hegel, queries that

But
is fruitless
the r e a l i t y o f our
we know
o f our knowledge.
knowledge.
it
They a r e
f o r h i m , as t h e y w e r e
a r o u s e an u n e c e s s a r y d i s t r u s t
b e c a u s e he d e v e l o p s
we
have seen, d i s m i s s e d
assurance t h a t
proof that
time m
We s h a l l
o f knowledge.
trying t oestablish
matter.
determined
natural,
o f our
hardly
their
knowledge.
we a r e t o
a t r a d i t i o n a l con-
M a r x , h o w e v e r , i s more c o n v i n c i n g o n
by h i s v i e w o f o b j e c t i v i t y .
three aspects
the
He r e s t e d
h a d been w a s t i n g
Once a g a i n , h i s a t t i t u d e
o f excessive
Hegel,
T h i s i s , o f course
a n y t h i n g c a n come o f r e j e c t i n g
p e n e t r a t i n g and l a s t i n g
risk
o fHegel.
r e q u i r e more t h a n a mere a s s u r a n c e i f
cern o f philosophy.
problem
the problem o f knowledge w i t h
t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s
believe that
the
from those
knowledge o r s c i e n c e had appeared.
h i s case on t h e f a c t
i n our
t h i s view as a c r i t i c i s m
of Hegel's philosophy h i s grounds f o r d i s m i s s i n g the

h a v e t o be r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t
the
msignt
repetition,
t o the problem
This i s
o fhis early
l e t us remind
o f Marx's v i e w o f o b j e c t i v i t y .
is
t h e most
work.
At the
ourselves o f the
'To be
s e n s u o u s ' , he s a y s , 'and b o t h t o have o u t s i d e
objective,
oneself
357.
object, nature,
sense o r t o be oneself o b j e c t ,
nature,
17
sense f o r a t h i r d i s
s o o n as t h e r e
alone,
me.
identical'.
are o b j e c t s
I am an o t h e r ,
'For', he a d d s ,
outside
me, as soon as I am n o t
another r e a l i t y , than
the object
F o r t h i s t h i r d o b j e c t I am t h u s an o t h e r
Itself,
that is,
I am
its
object.
exists.
outside
reality
Thus t o suppose a
which i s not the object of another being

no o b j e c t i v e b e i n g
'as
than
being
i s t o presuppose t h a t
As s o o n as I have an o b j e c t ,
this
18
o b j e c t has me
f o r an o b j e c t ' .
t h i r d aspect of
his notion of objectivity

problem o f knowledge.
I t i s this
t h a t governs Marx s response t o t h e
This t h i r d aspect, i s
t h a t as w e l l
as o u r h a v i n g an o b j e c t t h a t o b j e c t has us f o r an o b j e c t ;
e v i d e n t l y t h a t o b j e c t has us f o r an o b j e c t as i t
is
We
h a s us f o r
then
have i t
an o b j e c t .
is.
The
formal
are
itself
is
for itself.
as a m e r e l y f o r m a l
an o b j e c t
by t h i s
on a n o t h e r .
relationship.
i s a n a t u r a l one.
ones.
of our thought
relation,
is
for m
f o r me
it
and
M a r x h o w e v e r does n o t want t o see
congruence i s ,
determining
itself.
i s o u r o b j e c t as i t o b j e c t i v e l y
f o r the o b j e c t i v i t y
t o Marx> s t i s f l e d
for the formal

to
conditions
it
i s a congruence between what t h e o b j e c t
what i t
it
as
are, a c c o r d i n g
there
f o r an o b j e c t
and
his
The
reason, the ground
view,
Natural
r e l a t i o n s , he
I n a natural relation
The o n l y way
it
t h a t our
an o b j e c t
can i m p i n g e on a n o t h e r i s
relation
argues,
impinges
as
i t objectively is.
I t w o u l d make l i t t l e sense t o s u g g e s t ,
17.
Marx. E r g a n z u n g s b a n d , o p . c i t . , p. 578.
18.
Ibid.
358.
or indeed i t
w o u l d be n o n s e n s e t o s u g g e s t , t h a t
an o b j e c t
n a t u r e h a s an o b s e r v a b l e i m p a c t on a n o t h e r t h r o u g h a m e r e l y
subjective property.
I f t h a t were t h e case t h e r e w o u l d o f
c o u r s e be no o b s e r v a b l e i m p a c t .
t o suggest, f o r instance,
the
rain
get
wet.
w o u l d be n o n s e n s e
t h e r a i n w e t us n o t b e c a u s e
i s w e t , but simply because of a p r o p e n s i t y on o u r p a r t t o

We do i n d e e d g e t w e t b e c a u s e we a r e t h e k i n d s o f
beings that
but
that
Equally i t
are p o t e n t i a l l y subject t o that
discomforture,
we a l s o g e t w e t b e c a u s e one o f t h e o b j e c t i v e ,
properties of ram
natural
i s wetness.
So f o r M a r x t h e r e i s
r e l a t i o n s a congruence between what t h i n g s
v e l y a r e f o r u s and w h a t t h e y o b j e c t i v e l y a r e m
F o r him what n a t u r a l
ence o f t h e m
It
natural
i n our
subjecti-
themselves.
r e l a t i o n s a r e a l l about i s t h e correspond-
itself
and t h e f o r i t s e l f .
i s o n l y w i t h some d i f f i c u l t y
t h a t we _can e x t r i c a t e
a view o f knowledge from t h i s account o f o b j e c t i v i t y , o r

natural
relations.
We s h o u l d l i k e
t o d i s c o v e r from a l l t h i s
w h a t i s M a r x ' s n o t i o n o f t r u t h , and we c a n b e s t s e t a b o u t
by a p r o c e s s o f e l i m i n a t i o n .
Marx, f o r m a l c r i t e r i a
We
are n o t m
w o u l d n o t do f o r i n s t a n c e t h a t
know a l r e a d y t h a t , f o r
themselves
sufficient.
contemporary
Nor,
do t o put' f o r w a r d what i s a m e r e l y
coherent account o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e .
example, t h e p o l i t i c a l
I t
an a c c o u n t o f an a s p e c t o f o u r
experience s i m p l y correspond t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e m a t t e r .
on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w o u l d i t
it
I n some r e s p e c t s , f o r
e c o n o m i s t s p r e s e n t an a n a l y s i s o f
social experience that
correspond t o the f a c t s
359.
of
the matter.
Y e t M a r x c r i t i c i s e s them.
cannot f a u l t Hegel
for experience m
it
f o r his
consistent
voices his objections to that

t o say w h a t , m
d o i n g so.
But i t
objectivity
or natural
it
i s because
it
find
i e n c e them.
system.
them,
is,
Y e t Marx
I t i s extremely
both instances,
are h i s grounds f o r
i s o n l y by p u r s u i n g M a r x ' s a c c o u n t o f
r e l a t i o n s t h a t we
of t r u t h
i s Marx's o p i n i o n t h a t
ively
H i s system
internally.
o f h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y
formal c r i t e r i a
we
l a c k o f coherence i n a c c o u n t i n g
h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l system.
c o u l d be a r g u e d , f u l l y
difficult
Equally
inadequate.
succeed,
t h a t he
since
finds
F o r , as we h a v e
things objectively
seen,
a r e as we
subject-
o t h e r w o r d s , as we as n a t u r a l b e i n g s e x p e r -
This view o f t r u t h
ence n o t i o n o f t r u t h
shall
differs
from the correspond-
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h we
establish
what
t h i n g s o b j e c t i v e l y a r e by d i s c o u n t i n g w h a t t h e y a r e t o u s .
Locke,
ies
f o r instance,
sought t o e l i m i n a t e
o f t h i n g s w h i c h f o r h i m were
t h e m s e l v e s , b u t powers
'm t r u t h n o t h x n g m
qualitthe objec
t o produce v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s m
T h i s Marx cannot countenance.

a coherence account o f t r u t h .
philosophy
the secondary
And
n e i t h e r can he
us'.
countenance
F o r s u c h an a c c o u n t , i f
Hegel's
i s a n y t h i n g t o go b y , does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t
be any o b j e c t s t o know.
A l l that
it
thought objects.
B u t , M a r x c l a i m s , we must d e a l
the
c o n c r e t e , sensed o b j e c t s o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e .
c e r n s o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o them.
Essay
with
with
Truth
con-
T h i s does n o t , however, b r i n g
us b a c k t o an e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n o f t r u t h .
19- J o h n L o c k e .
there
r e q u i r e s us t o d e a l
are
Because M a r x
is
C o n c e r n i n g t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , p.85
360.
not
concerned w i t h o b j e c t s
pristine
is
condition
Truth,
we
t h e y r e l a t e t o us
o u r s e l v e s as
T h i s i s why
'The
truth
he
we
are
as
we
man
must p r o v e t h e
and
power, t h e
this-sideness
The
d i s p u t e about the
objects.
problem o f knowledge m
a q u e s t i o n of t h e o r y , but
this
attain
objective
a practical
question.
truth i.e.
the
reality
( D i e s s e i t i g k e i t ) of his
reality
and,
or p r a c t i c a l l y .
n a t u r a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by
responds t o the
(the) practice
He
practically find
q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r human t h o u g h t w i l l
- i s not
their
subjectively
r e l a t e t o them o b j e c t i v e l y
t h e n , f o r Marx c o n c e r n s o b j e c t s
t h e m and
way:
as
they might appear m
o u t s i d e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o us.
c o n c e r n e d w i t h them as
c o n v e r s e l y , we
In
as
thought.
or u n r e a l i t y of thought - which
20
is
isolated
from p r a c t i c e
These, b a l d l y
of the
i s a purely
stated,
are
problem of knowledge.
t h a t a l l our
s a y i n g , our
subjective
The
grounds f o r Marx's r e j e c t i o n
of our
the
f o r m a l sense o f t r u t h .
precise expressions of the
like
e n t l y r e f l e c t s the
The
a l l natural
true
- and
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f our
r e l a t i o n s , i s one
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f what the
object
is
Marx s e r i o u s l y ,
are
always o b j e c t i v e
t o land
Marx m
the
most i n t r a c t a b l e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
For,
m i g h t ask,
20.
Marx.
MEW
what a b o u t t h e
3, p. 5.
Our i d e a s , i f
ideas.
we
every
that
are
thought
that
i t s e l f w i t h what i t
we
f o r us.
said,
objective
i s t h a t e a c h and
t h o u g h t s , past or p r e s e n t , are
to i t s object,
I have
( i n c l u d i n g , i t goes w i t h o u t
implication
one
question'.
I t i s h i s v i e w , as
re'ations,
knowledge) are
nature of r e a l i t y .
the
scholastic
coher-
is
to
T h i s would
thoughts of the
take
appear
problems.
madman?
,361.
Are
they a l s o o b j e c t i v e
Yes.
Marx's answer would have t o be:
But t h i s would p l a c e l i t t l e
s t r a i n on h i s argument.
Because what he says i s t h a t what t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y a r e t o us

( m t h i s instance
t h e madman's t h o u g h t s ) i s what
n a t u r a l l y a r e m themselves.
things
What t h i n g s a r e m t h e madman's
t h o u g h t s ase i s , o f course, confused b u t i f we l o o k a t h i s

n a t u r a l and s o c i a l environment, we f i n d t h a t i t
fused.
true.
The
Thus m
a l s o i s con-
t h e f o r m a l sense t h e madman's t h o u g h t s a r e
Marx's argument does n o t o f course depend on t h i s example.
implications
of i t
i s , however, t h a t he must d e a l w i t h
each and every i d e a o r a l l t h o u g h t as evidence f o r , o r more

strongly,
stance
as an a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n o f some o b j e c t i v e
or other.
that a l l theories,
true.
circum-
I t f o l l o w s , as I have s a i d , t h a t f o r him
judged on f o r m a l grounds a l o n e , must be
T h i s would appear t o leave Marx w i t h a b s o l u t e l y
c r i t e r i a on which t o judge a t h e o r y .
theories
I f he t h i n k s
r e f l e c t the facts or that a l l theories
that a l l
are coherent
t h e n i t appears t h a t there are none t h a t he can r e a d i l y

But
t h e r e i s o f course many an i n s t a n c e o f h i s d o i n g
that m
h i s works.
reject.
precisely
H i s r e j e c t i o n o f many o f t h e views o f
p o l i t i c a l economists a r e cases m
a ' C r i t i q u e o f P o l i t i c a l Economy'.
t h i s point, therefore,
no
point.
Ijdeed, C a p i t a l
What we must e x p l a i n a t
i s how Marx w i t h o u t a d h e r i n g t o f o r m a l
c r i t e r i a o f t r u t h , can n e v e r t h e l e s s d i s c a r d
the theories of
others.
Marx sketches h i s p o s i t i o n on t h e i s s u e i n t h e second
T h e s i s on Feuerbach.
is
Since i t
i s o n l y a s k e t c h , we s h a l l
have t o do some o f t h e r e a s o n i n g f o r him m
answering o u r
362.
question.
What Marx does m t h a t T h e s i s i s , as I have
a l r e a d y suggested, t o r e j e c t t h e problem o f knowledge as

i t was f o r m u l a t e d by t h e c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s .
r e j e c t s t h e manner m
which t h e y pose i t
posed as a merely t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n .
because i t
He
is
I n Marx's view
can have no s a t i s f a c t o r y t h e o r e t i c a l answer.
it
I have sugge-
s t e d t h a t Marx h o l d s t h i s view because o f h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t ,

judged on f o r m a l grounds a l o n e , a l l t h e o r i e s would be t r u e .
W i t h h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y he i m p l i e s t h a t a l l t h e o r i e s a r e ,
I n one way o r a n o t h e r , coherent and c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h e f a c t s .
Now,
o u r problem i s : g i v e n t h i s view o f Marx, how i s i t
poss-
i b l e f o r him t o suggest t h a t one view o f t h e w o r l d , namely,

h i s own, i s t h e c o r r e c t o n e
t h a t can be r e a d i l y deduced.
The answer t o t h i s i s n o t one

But i t seems t h a t i t
is at t h i s
p o i n t t h a t p r a c t i c e p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e f o r Marx.
One
t h i n g t h a t we can be sure o f , I t h i n k , i s t h a t i t does n o t

p l a y t h a t r o l e m t h e same way t h a t i t does f o r the p r a g ' i i a t i s t .
Marx w i l l n o t a l l o w e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e t o d e c i d e f o r him what
is true.
Indeed, n o t h i n g would be f u r t h e r from h i s mind than
t o suggest t h a t t h e o r i e s and i d e a s s h o u l d be judged upon t h e i r

u s e f u l n e s s i n overcoming p r a c t i c a l
problems.
What he does
w i s h t o suggest, however, i s something f a r more r a d i c a l t h a n

that.
He wants t o suggest t o us t h a t t h e whole problem o f
knowledge i s a p r a c t i c a l one.
'The q u e s t i o n whether human
t h o u g h t w i l l a t t a i n o b j e c t i v e t r u t h ' , he says,
question of theory, but a p r a c t i c a l question.
'is not a
This
is,
c l e a r l y , d i s t i n c t from what t h e p r a g m a s i s t has t o say because

the p r a g m a t i s t o f f e r s h i s n o t i o n o f t r u t h as a way
of side-
363.
s t e p p i n g o r a v o i d i n g t h e problem c o n c e r n i n g
o f our t h o u g h t .
The p r a g m a t i s t ' s n o t i o n o f t r u t h i s a f l a t
r e j e c t i o n o f t h e problem o f knowledge a l o n g t h e l i n e s t h a t
Habermas has m
mind.
Marx, as I i n d i c a t e d
as a more c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m .
earlier, offers
He does n o t r e j e c t t h e
whole q u e s t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f o u r t h o u g h t o u t o f
hand.
Indeed he suggests t h a t , m
a s e n s i b l e q u e s t i o n t o ask.
is
Marx, then, does n o t want us t o
b e l i e v e , as does t h e p r a g m a t i s t ,
as t h e r e are t e c h n i c a l
a certain context, i t
t h a t t h e r e a r e as many t r u t h s
problems t o be s o l v e d .
F o r him, it
seems, as f o r t h e c l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h e r e i s one overr i d i n g t r u t h about t h e w o r l d .

concerns o u r p r a c t i c e .
And t h a t t r u t h , ne argues,
T h i s i s where Marx b e l i e v e s t h a t ne
d e p a r t s from p h i l o s o p h y .
The p h i l o s o p h e r s , Marx t h i n k s ,
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r u t h was a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l
caestion.
Those who had f i r s t posed t h e problem o f know-
ledge, he suggests,
had t h o u g h t t h a t t h e o r y o f i t s e l f
decide
But m
the issue.
thought i s o b j e c t i v e
alone.
could
Marx's view whether o r n o t my
does n o t l e t i t s e l f be decided
Rather i t i s p r a c t i c e
by t h o u g h t
t h a t h o l d s t h e key t o t h e i s s u e .
T h i s , however, i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r t h e
t r u t h o f an i d e a o r t h e o r y i s i t s p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y .
c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , f o r Marx, i s o b j e c t i v i t y .
a l l t h e o r i s t s worthy
The
Marx, l i k e
o f t h a t name, r e j e c t s o r accepts
about r e a l i t y on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y .
views
The p o i n t
is, however, t h a t w i t h him o b j e c t i v i t y i s a p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t ivity.
As I have p o i n t e d o u t Marx's n o t i o n o f t r u t h does n o t
r e l y on f o r m a l c r i t e r i a alone.
I t depends a l s o on h i s view
364,
of man o r , more p r e c i s e l y , o f man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n .

notion
It
of t r u t h is therefore
a t i t s base b o t h f o r m a l and e t h i c a l .
i s now t h a t we see t h e p o i n t o f my o f t repeated
of Marx's n o t i o n
tivity
His
analysis
of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n or o b j e c t i v i t y .
Objec-
f o r him, as we have seen, t u r n s o u t t o be a t h r e e f o l d
d e t e r m i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and h i s o b j e c t s .
I t
i s f o r t h a t reason a p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n m Marx's view.
I t
i s a p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n because o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s a n a t u r a l
relation.
I t i s t h e r e l a t i o n t h a t we as n a t u r a l beings have
w i t h the objects
objects
that confront
us m
our experience.
o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e , Marx says, c o n f r o n t
o f o u r needs.
we have t o d e p i c t
I f , t h e n , we are t o d e p i c t
i t m
we analyse as o b j e c t s
t h i s way.
o f need.
The
us as o b j e c t s
reality
objectively,
We must c o n f r o n t
the objects
We must see them t h e r e f o r e
as l i m i t i n g o u r s e l v e s as n a t u r a l b e i n g s and o u r s e l v e s as
n a t u r a l beings e n e r g e t i c a l ] y bent on a l l e v i a t i n g t h i s dependency.
That, f o r Marx, i s what i t i s t o be o b j e c t i v e
thinking.
Objective thinking is p r a c t i c a l thinking.
m our
I t is
p r a c t i c a l o r e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g f o r him because, as we can see,

it
carries within i t s e l f a prescription.
Objective t h i n k i n g ,
he c l a i m s , t h r o u g h v i e w i n g man as a n a t u r a l b e i n g
struggling
t o overcome h i s dependence on o b j e c t s c o n t a i n s w i t h i n
the value and m o t i v e t h a t t h a t s t r u g g l e
r a t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e p o s s i b l e way.
fashion,
itself
be waged i n t h e most
Now, i t
is m
this
I suggest, t h a t e t h i c s and e p i s t e m o l o g y converge and
c o i n c i d e m Marx's t h e o r y .
o f t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e
T h i s i s t h e much vaunted u n i t y
t h a t Marx proposes.
him t o mean t h a t an o b j e c t i v e
By i t ,
I take
view o f r e a l i t y i s a p r a c t i c a l
365.
o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y one.
difficult
point m
he h i m s e l f
This, possibly,
i s the most
h i s t h i n k i n g f o r us t o u n d e r s t a n d .
sees no problem m
it
at a l l .
Yet
Theory and
prac-
t i c e are as i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d m h i s mind as are bread

butter.
We
can
see
and
t h i s most c l e a r l y when he comes t o
d i s c u s s the r e l a t i o n o f h i s views t o those o f the French

Materialists m
required', he
the Holy F a m i l y .
says,
t o see
'No g r e a t
acumen i s
the necessary c o n n e c t i o n between
the t h e o r i e s o f the m a t e r i a l i s t s o f the o r i g i n a l goodness

e q u a l i n t e l l e c t u a l endowment o f men,
erience,
21.
the omnipotence o f exp-
h a b i t , e d u c a t i o n , h a b i t , the i n f l u e n c e o f
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f man,
o f the g r e a t
and
external
s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n d u s t r y ,
Those who are f a m i l i a r w i t h the work o f X o l a k o w s k i w i l l ,

I am s u r e , have a l r e a d y n o t e d the s i m i l a r i t y between h i s
a n a l y s i s o f Marx's n o t i o n o f c o g n i t i o n m h i s essay on
' K a r l Marx and the C l a s s i c a l D e f i n i t i o n o f T r u t h
(m
Marxism and Beyond, P a l a d i n ) and my own.
In particular, I
have c o n c u r r e d w i t h K o l a k c w s k i on these p o i n t s .
'The b a s i c
p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e of Marx's e p i s t e m o l o g i c ^ I t h o u g h t i s ' , he
says, 'the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between man and h i s
environment are r e l a t i o n s between the species and the o b j e c t s
o f i t s need, i t a l s o concerns the c o g n i t i v e c o n t a c t w i t h
things.
Marx's t h i n k i n g can be summarised m the f o l l o w i n g
observations: I .
The w o r l d o f t h i n g s e x i s t f o r man o n l y as
a t o t a l i t y o f p o s s i b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n s o f h i s needs. 2. 'And
n a t u r e , conceived a b s t r a c t l y , nn and o f i t s e l f , p e r p e t u a t e d i n
i t s s e p a r a t i o n from man i s n o t h i n g t o him'.
I f various
o b j e c t s , l i k e the o b j e c t s o f s c i e n c e o r a r t , are o n l y p a r t
o f h i s consciousness, t h e n m p r a c t i c e they are o n l y a p a r t
o f h i s l i f e and a c t i v i t y .
N a t u r e c o n s t i t u t e s man's i n o r g a n i c
f l e s h ' , ( o p . c i t . pp 64 - 6 3 ) A l s o K o l a k o w s k i says, (and t h i s
i s o f most s i g n i f i c a n c e h e r e ) f o r Marx 'to ask how the w o r l d
would be seen t o an o b s e r v e r whose essence was pure t h i n k i n g
and whose consciousness was d e f i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y by a d i s i n t e r e s t e d c o g n i t i v e e f f o r t , i s t o ask a b a r r e n q u e s t i o n , f o r
a l l consciousness i s a c t u a l l y b o r n o f p r a c t i c a l needs, and
the a c t o f c o g n i t i o n i t s e l f i s a t o o l designed t o s a t i s f y
these needs. ...Mature appears as the o p p o s i t i o n encountered
by human d r i v e s , and a i l p o s s i b l e c o g n i t i o n i s man's r e a l i s a t i o n o f the c o n t a c t between conscious man and the e x t e r n a l
r e s i s t e n c e he e x p e r i e n c e s ' , ( i b i d . p. 64 - 6 5 . ) .
1
366,
the
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f enjoyment and communism and s o c i a l i s m .
I f man
forms a l l knowledge and f e e l i n g from the w o r l d o f sense
and from e x p e r i e n c e m
the w o r l d o f sense what t h e r e f o r e
m a t t e r s i s t h a t the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d be so ordered t h a t
experiences
it
(and becomes accustomed t o ) what i s
he
truly
22
human, t h a t he e x p e r i e n c e s h i m s e l f as a man'.
The t h e o r i e s
of t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s c o n t a i n , m h i s view, the elements o f an

o b j e c t i v e understanding of experience.
s i m p l y t o see
For, he
argues,
(as they d i d ) t h a t e d u c a t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , was
of such v i t a l importance
the f o r m i n g o f a man's c h a r a c t e r
put them on t h e t h r e s h o l d o f a s o c i a l i s t view o f e x p e r i e n c e ,

because f o r Marx t h a t view i m p l i e s b o t h t h a t e d u c a t i o n should
form an i m p o r t a n t aspect o f a y o u t h ' s l i f e and t h a t
e d u c a t i o n be as human as p o s s i b l e .
And,
that
he argues m
the
same v e i n , t o know, as the French M a t e r i a l i s t s appeared t o

do, t h a t I d e r i v e a l l my
experience m
f e e l i n g s and s e n s a t i o n s from
t h e sensor us w o r l d means t h a t I must
my
advocate
a c t i o n t h a t w i l l ensure t h a t I e x p e r i e n c e o n l y t h a t which
human i n t h e sensuous w o r l d .
As we can see, then, p r e s c r i p t i o n
f o l l o w s from d e s c r i p t i o n f o r Marx.
So,
f o r i n s t a n c e , he
c l a i m t h a t i f I know t h a t a disease i s d e s t r u c t i v e o f
it
i s necessary
t h a t I take s t e p s t o c o n t r o l i t
h o l d m my d i s t r i c t .
necessity involved m
22.
From t h e p o i n t o f view o f l o g i c a l
be f a l s e t o a b s t a i n from a c t i n g .
Marx.
MEW
2,
p.
138.
life
logical
t h i n k i n g o r r e a s o n i n g as such i t makes no sense t o say

i t would
would
should i t take
C l e a r l y , t h e r e would be no
this.
is
that
However, from
367.
Marx's p o i n t o f view we would be making an e r r o r s h o u l d

we n o t a c t on t h e d e s c r i p t i o n .
T h i s i s because,
as I have
a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , Marx's n o t i o n o f t r u t h t r a n s c e n d s a l l
formal c r i t e r i a o f t r u t h .
The o b j e c t i v e , t r u e way o f
s e e i n g a dangerous d i s e a s e would f o r him m

t i o n be a p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e one.
i t s v e r y concep-
O b j e c t , r e a l i t y has, he
suggests m t h e f i r s t t h e s i s , t o be grasped as P r a x i s .
Thus an o b j e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n o f r e a l i t y , m
this
instance
o f t h e d i s e a s e , i s f o r him c o n d i t i o n e d by an i n t e r e s t .
That
i n t e r e s t i s t h e n a t u r a l , human one t h a t s u f f e r i n g be a v o i d e d .
There i s a n e c e s s i t y then t h a t we a c t on t h e d e s c r i p t i o n
because, Marx argues, t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n must i t s e l f be occasioned by a p r a c t i c a l concern.
So, n o t t o a c t on t h e obser-
c a t i o n would c o n t r a d i c t t h e i n i t i a l
T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t .
are no d e s c r i p t i o n s
reason f o r making i t .
Marx's view i s t h a t t h e r e
which are n o t m some sense p r e s c r i p t i o n s .
There i s no doubt t h a t at a l o g i c a l l e v e l t h i s cannot be so.

I f I d e s c r i b e t h e weather as bad I have i n no way suggested
t h a t we do a n y t h i n g .
To make t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n i n t o a p r e s -
c r i p t i o n I would have t o add some e x h o r t a t i o n , o r o t h e r such

as: t h e weather's bad, let's n o t go o u t t o d a y .
B u t , as I
have suggested, Marx i s n o t making h i s p o i n t a t t h i s
level.
He i s concerned w i t h t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n which we use language.

He argues t h a t i t
or o t h e r .
i s always employed
some p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t
No-one, he suggests, s i m p l y observes t h a t , f o r
i n s t a n c e , t h e weather i s bad.
for
the observation.
There i s c l e a r l y some m o t i v e
Maybe t h e o b s e r v e r had i n t e n d e d t o go
368
out f o r a s t r o l l some time i n t h e day and t h e bad weather

p r e v e n t s him.
Whatever t h e motive t h e o b s e r v e r must a c t on
his observation.
The p r e s c r i p t i o n f o l l o w s from t h e d e s c r i p -
t i o n because t h e d e s c r i p t i o n t a k e s p l a c e m a p r e s c r i p t i v e
c o n t e x t , m o t h e r words, because t h e d e s c r i p t i o n i s made by
a p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e human b e i n g .
Marx's n o t i o n o f t r u t h i s t h e n , I suggest,
of this
kind.
Tneory, he b e l i e v e s , always r e f l e c t s and i s g i v e n r i s e t o by

our p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
We t u r n t o i t ,
we have a p r a c t i c a l problem.
he c l a i m s , because
Or, more s t r o n g l y , Marx's view
i s t h a t o u r whole e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g o u r t h i n k i n g , i s a
n a t u r a l , p r a c t i c a l one.
i n t h i s nexus.
it,
Theory, he argues,
i s always caught
Whether i t i s t r u e o r one-sided,
as he p u t s
cannot t h e r e f o r e be decided w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e o r y a l o n e .
T h i s , Marx suggests,
origins m
i s s i m p l y because any t h e o r y has i t s
an o b j e c t i v e s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
i s no i d l e t h e o r i s t .
F o r Marx t h e r e
Each and every t h e o r i s t , m h i s view,
d e p i c t s some r e a l i t y o r o t h e r , and each t h i n k e r , he b e l i e v e s ,

i s i n a measure c o r r e c t .
by i t s n a t u r e no merely
because t h e merely
I t appears t o him t h e r e f o r e t h a t
t h e o r e t i c a l d i s p u t e can be r e s o l v e d ,
t h e o r e t i c a l or contemplative a t t i t u d e
not i t s e l f o b j e c t i v e .
The a t t i t u d e t h a t Marx sees as prom-
o t i n g truth i s the t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e t h a t has man a t i t s

and
is
concerns i t s e l f w i t h o b j e c t s as he e x p e r i e n c e s
s u f f e r i n g , l i m i t e d being.
centre
them as
I t i s o n l y t h i s a t t i t u d e , he i m p l i e s
t h a t can g i v e an unambiguous c o n t e n t t o t r u t h .
Because t h e o n e
369.
t h a t are
put
f o r w a r d from t h i s p o i n t o f view can
themselves t o be
true m
e x p e r i e n c e . Trie converse
the
show
the course o f man's p r a c t i c a l
can
o f course be
t h e o r y i s a m i s t a k e n one.
shown t o be
Thus, Marx might say,
t h e o r y t h a t i s p a t e n t l y wrong, such as t h i s : man

mate o b j e c t .
We
know t h a t t h i s i s p a t e n t l y
i s the burden o f Marx's argument, because we

p r a c t i c e we
cannot get
T h i s i s not
t o say
wrong.
i s an
A c c o r d i n g t o him i t
t i c e as our
t h a t we
of practice.
our
I suggest a
i s an
inani-
wrong, and
this
know t h a t
He
proves i t
s i m p l y shows us
does not
c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h .
derive
if
f a r by espousing such a t h e o r y .
t h a t , f o r Marx, p r a c t i c e
i n c o r r e c t one.
true
t h a t the
suggest t h a t we
Rather, what he
c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h from the
I t i s not
therefore
my
to
practice
be
view
take prac-
suggests i s
observation
that t e l l s
me
2^
a t h e o r y i s i n c o r r e c t but
can
see
that i t
my
i s wrong.
reflection
his claim
o n l y I n the
t h a t a l l t r u t h concerns our
makes sense f o r him.
Once we
t h a t the
depend e n t i r e l y
i t s own
criteria.
t h a t we
establish
on
be
the
because
criterion
practice.
I t is
question of
truth
acknowledge t h i s , however,
have t o acknowledge t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y

not
criteria
d i s c a r d e d by him
that practice
context of p r a c t i c e
coherence s t i l l have a
They are not
i s , I repeat, not
o f t r u t h but
practice.
I t i s here t h a t f o r m a l
o f t r u t h such as correspondence and

r o l e t o p l a y f o r Marx.
on
formal c r i t e r i a .
we
o f our t h o u g h t does
Practice
a l s o imposes
Foremost amongst t h o s e , Marx suggests,

m
practice
the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f our
is
ideas.
We have t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t i s not enough t o argue our t h e o r y .

2T~Marx.MEW ~5~, P7) says as much m T h e s i s '6'. ' A l l m y s t e r i e s ' , he
says,'which o c c a s i o n t h e o r y t o m y s t i c i s m f i n d t h e i r r a t i o n a l
s o l u t i o n m human p r a c t i c e c.nd m the comprehension o f t h i s
p r a c t i c e ' . For a l l m y s t e r i e s would f o r nun have t h e i r s o l u t i o n
i n p r a c t i c e i f our r e f l e c t i o n on i t d i d not p l a y the r o l e I
suggest m h i s t h e o r y .
370.
We have t o a c t on i t .
Only then w i l l we have t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove, by t h e c r i t e r i a t h a t p r a c t i c e
imposes, t h a t our t h e o r y i s o b j e c t i v e .
Thus m
itself
establish-
i n g t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f a t h e o r y f o r m a l c r i t e r i a do
indeed
count f o r Marx b u t , because he sees t r u t h as b e i n g
concerned
w i t h p r a c t i c e , what counts,
to hold true m
h i s eyes, i s t h a t i t be proved
our a c t i v e experience.
Then, Marx c l a i m s ,
we are assured o f t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f o u r t h e o r y .
So,_ as I
have a l r e a d y suggested, a t h e o r y t h a t i s t r u e i n a l l i t s
f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y t r u e f o r Marx.
t r u e t h e o r y i s one which, superadded t o t h a t , has successf u l l y a l t e r e d the world.
T h i s i s what leads him t o lament,
m the l a s t t h e s i s o f a l l , that
variously
'the p h i l o s o p h e r s have o n l y
i n t e r p r e t e d t h e w o r l d , what m a t t e r ^ i s , i s t o change
, 24
it
For i f we t h i n k , as does Marx, t h a t t r u t h concerns
our a c t i v e experience
we must conclude t n a t i t
i e n t t o expound a t h e o r y we t h i n k t o be t r u e .
all,
a c t on i t ,
is o t
suffic-
We must, above
and p h i l o s o p h e r s he blames f o r n o t h a v i n g
done
this.
Marx's a n a l y s i s o f t h e problem o f knowledge b r i n g s him
t h e r e f o r e to the theoiy of experience
and p r a c t i c e .
as t o whether my knowledge i s o b j e c t i v e
p r a c t i c a l one.
merely m
The
question
i s , he c l a i m s , a
Marx, I have argued, does n o t mean p r a c t i c e
i t s narrow technical sense.
As w i t h h i s
Idealist
f o r e r u n n e r s , i t a l s o s i g n i f i e s f o r him e t h i c a l a c t i o n .
question concerning
.Marx.
ibid.
t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f o u r knowledge i s ,
The
m
371,
o t h e r words, an e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n .
j e c t i v e f o r Marx i s n o t , as i t
What i s r e a l o r ob-
i s w i t h t h e merely
theoretical
t h i n k e r , a r a t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f a t h i n g o r event, but our

r e l a t i o n as n a t u r a l b e i n g s t o t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s .
So,
m h i s view, t h o u g h t w i l l n o t be o b j e c t i v e o r have a t t a i n e d
r e a l i t y where i t
s i m p l y e x p l a i n s what i s g o i n g on i n t h e w o r l d .
To t h i n k t h a t i t w i l l i s the e r r o r o f p h i l o s o p h y .
for
Reality,
Marx, i s our p r a c t i c a l p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d .
Marx t h e r e f o r e wants t o t h i n k about t r u t h m those terms.

True t h o u g h t i s t h o u g h t t h a t comprehends t h e p r a c t i c a l
t i v e ) c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f man
how
and m comprehending them i n d i c a t e s
they might be changed f o r t h e b e t t e r .
appears
T h i s , o f course,
t o be an odd k i n d o f t r u t h a t which t o aim.
notion of o b j e c t i v i t y , i t
(objec-
Marx's
seems, t a k e s no account o f genuine
t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y which we n o r m a l l y t a k e t o i n v o l v e an
element o f detachment from p r a c t i c a l concerns.
wrong t o t h i n k t h i s however.
a l l depends on what i s meant by
But, m h i s view,
'detachment'.
I f all
i s meant by detachment i s t h a t t o g i v e an o b j e c t i v e
of
be
Marx does have a p l a c e f o r
t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y m h i s system.
it
We would
that
account
an aspect o f our e x p e r i e n c e we must a b s t r a c t from t h i s o r
t h a t p r a c t i c a l concern, he would agree.
For i t
stands t o
reason t h a t we cannot g i v e an o b j e c t i v e account i f we a l l o w

o u r s e l v e s t o be d i s t r a c t e d by our day t o day a f f a i r s .
But
t h i s does n o t mean t h a t t o t a k e an o b j e c t i v e view we have t o

a b s t r a c t from human p r a c t i c a l concerns m
general.
That,
i n Marx's view, would be the detachment o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ,

who
p r e f e r s t o c o n t e m p l a t e e x p e r i e n c e r a t h e r t h a n know i t .
372.
T h i s k i n d o f detachment leads t o no t r u t h a t a l l .
Because
e x p e r i e n c e i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l , t r u t h , Marx b e l i e v e s ,
must a l s o concern p r a c t i c e .
I n o t h e r words, he sees no
reason why h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y s h o u l d be i n c o m p a t i b l e

w i t h genuine t h e o r e t i c a l
It
objectivity.
i s o n l y w i t h some unease, however, t h a t we should
accept Marx's view o f t h e t r u t h .
F o r as i t stands i t
t h e merest s k e t c h o f an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n which
is
though
b o t h s e r i o u s and c h a l l e n g i n g r a i s e s d i f f i c u l t and as y e t unanswered p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems.
I t i s o f course beyond t h e
scope o f t h i s work t o a t t e m p t t o answer a l l those
problems.
But we have a t t e m p t e d t o r a i s e those amongst them which a r e

most p r e s s i n g m
t h e i r c l a i m s t o be answered* and a t t h e same
time t o c l e a r away some o f t h e more obvious m i s c o n c e p t i o n s

s u r r o u n d i n g Marx's views.
Since t h e p r i n c i p a l
difficulty
we have encountered w i t h t h a t view o f t r u t h concerns Marx's

n o t i o n o f t h e u n i t y o f t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e we might do w e l l
now t o c l o s e t h i s Chapter w i t h some r e f l e c t i o n s on those Theses
on Feuerbach /here
t h a t n o t i o n comes p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e f o r e .
I t does so where Marx i n Thesis 3 and 4 g i v e s two examples

of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .
He says m
T h e s i s 3: 'The m a t e r i a l i s t
doctrin
o f t h e a l t e r a t i o n o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and e d u c a t i o n i g n o r e s t h a t
c i r c u m s t a n c e s must be t r a n s f o r m e d by men and t h e e d u c a t o r must
h i m s e l f be educated.
I t must t h e r e f o r e s e p a r a t e s o c i e t y
into
two p a r t s one o f which i s s u p e r i o r t o t h e o t h e r . '

'The c o i n c i d e n c e o f t h e a l t e r a t i o n o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and
human a c t i v i t y o f s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n can o n l y be grasped and
373.
r a t i o n a l l y understood
as r e v o l u t i o n a r y
practice.'
And
m Thesis 4: 'Feuerbach proceeds from t h e f a c t o f r e l i g i o u s

s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , the d u p l i c a t i o n
and s e c u l a r one.
the
o f the w o r l d i n t o a r e l i g i o u s
H i s work c o n s i s t s o f t h i s , t h a t he d i s s o l v e s
r e l i g i o u s w o r l d i n t o i t s s e c u l a r base.
However t h a t
the
s e c u l a r base l i f t s o f f from i t s e l f and f i x e s i t s e l f an i n d e p endent kingdom m

the
the c l o u d s i s o n l y t o be e x p l a i n e d from
s e l f - d i s r u p t i o n and s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n
base.
T h i s i t s e l f must t h e r e f o r e
contradiction
of t h i s secular
b o t h be understood
and be p r a c t i c a l l y r e v o l u t i o n i s e d .
i n s t a n c e , a f t e r the e a r t h l y
family
its
Thus, f o r
i s d i s c o v e r e d t o be the
s e c r e t o f t h e Holy Farm l y the f i r s t must now
i t s e l f be t h e o r -
25
e t i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y d e s t r o y e d . ' ~
Marx's c l a i m i s ,
as
I have s a i d , t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y i s n o t o f i t s e l f
sufficient.
I n h i s view, as we can see, t h e r e i s more t o
t r u t h than t h a t . For him f o r a t h e o r y t o be t r u l y r e e l i t

t o show i t s e l f t o be so m
these two Theses.
practice.
T h i s i s .he p o i n t
Both argue t h a t o b j e c t i v e
issue i n practice.
of
t h e o r y must
E a r l i e r , I b r o u g h t out t h e c o n n e c t i o n
t h a t Marx saw between h i s views and those o f French

ists.
has
Material-
I t need h a r d l y be s a i d t h a t he drew c o n c l u s i o n s from
those m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r i e s which were n o t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f

t h e i r authors.
he d i d so.
I n Thesis 3 he g i v e s us an i n d i c a t i o n
I t h i n g e s o f course, on h i s view o f the u n i t y
t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e .
25-
why
I b i d . p. 6.
of
He acknowledges t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s ,
374.
l i k e h i m s e l f , p r e s c r i b e on the b a s i s o f t h e i r m a t e r i a l i s t
d e s c r i p t i o n of experience.
They had n o t , however, seen t h a t
p r e s c r i p t i o n i s i t s e l f part of a p r a c t i c a l
of experience.
They had, he suggests
understanding
- u n w i t t i n g l y o r no -
drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l
and t h e i r p r a c t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s .
argues,
understanding
T h e i r m a t e r i a l s i s m , Marx
i s o n l y a c o n t e m p l a t i v e m a t e r i a l i s m (anschauende Mater
lalismus).
Theory and p r a c t i c e remain unconnected.
b a s i s o f t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m a t e r i a l i s t s had,
advocated
t h a t men
should be educated
On
the
indeed,
d i f f e r e n t l y , be brought
up under d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and g e n e r a l l y be made more

conversant w i t h what i s t r u l y human.
But t h i s , f o r Marx, f a l l
s h o r t o f b e i n g an o b j e c t i v e view o f e x p e r i e n c e because a t h e o r
t h a t s e p a r a t e s p r e s c r i p t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n _i.s n o t a
r e f l e c t i o n o f our c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
it
faithful
I n p a r t i c u l a r , Marx says,
f a i l s t o b r i n g out t h e c o n n e c t i o n between t r a n s T o r m a t i o n
o f the w o r l d and s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .
Amongst o t h e r t h i n g s
t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i m p l i e s , f o r Marx, t h a t my o b j e c t i v e knowing
o f the w o r l d can o n l y be seen as a process o f s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n brought about t h r o u g h my b e i n g a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d m
world.
Had
i n t h i s way,
the
t h e r e f o r e the m a t e r i a l i s t seen t h e i r knowledge

Marx c o n t i n u e s , t h e y would n o t have b e l i e v e d t h a t
t h e w o r l d can be changed s i m p l y t h r o u g h the b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n

o f people
For, Marx concludes,
p r o p e r e d u c a t i o n goes hand
i n hand w i t h t h e a l t e r a t i o n o f our c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
understand
we
We
can
and t r a n s f o r m s o c i e t y a l o n g human l i n e s o n l y when
see t h i s c o i n c i d e n c e o f t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e .
We
must,
t h e r e f o r e , f i r s t be r e v o l u t i o n s r i l y a c t i v e t o be p o t e n t t h e o r ists.
375.
T h i s , i n d i s p u t a b l y , i s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l view o f knowledge.
One
t h i n g i t does n o t mean, however, i s t h a t Marx wishes t o
discard theory m
favour of p r a c t i c e .
However much i t
seems
so a t f i r s t , he does n o t w i s h t o r e p l a c e the p h i l o s o p h i c a l
search f o r t r u t h w i t h t h e view t h a t t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f p r a c t ical
l i f e may
p r e s s on us.
Theory and
t r u t h , as I have argued,
have an i m p o r t a n t p l a c e m h i s system.
i s t h a t knowledge and
at
A l l t h a t Marx c l a i m s
t r u t h must, i f they concern a n y t h i n g
a l l , concern our p r a c t i c a l l i f e .
Theory can, Marx suggests,
f u r n i s h us w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e knowledge o f r e a l i t y .
Feuer-
bach, f o r i n s t a n c e , shows us c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t t h e s e c r e t o f
t h e Holy Family
i s the e a r t h l y f a m i l y .
does n o t f u r n i s h us w i t h t r u t h .
But t h i s o f
itself,
For i t i s our p r a c t i c e t h a t
p l a c e s b e f o r e us t h e o b j e c t s o f our knowledge and o n l y

t i c e , Marx c l a i m s , can g i v e a c o n t e n t t o t r u t h .
The
pracknow-
ledge o f r e l i g i o u s s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , t h e
t r u t h o f Feuerbach's p h i l o s o p h y
of r e l i g i o n .
we know, o b j e c t i v i t y i s n o t o f t h a t k i n d .
For Marx, as
T r u t h f o r Marx,
i s b o t h t h e a c c u r a t e knowledge o f t h e w o r l d and t h e c o n v i c t i o n
t h a t t h a t w o r l d be ordered
m the most human way
So he says o f Feuerbach's p h i l o s o p h y
e a r t h l y f a m i l y i s discovered
t h e f i r s t must now
destroyed.'
The
possible.
of r e l i g i o n
' a f t e r the
t o be t n e s e c r e t o f the H o l y
i t s e l f be t h e o r e t i c a l l y and
Family,
practically
o b j e c t i v e knowledge o f circumstances
has
to
be t h e spur t o a c t i o n o r e l s e , Marx suggests, we do n o t have

an a c c u r a t e
see how
Here, most c l e a r l y , we
t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge and e t h i c a l t h e o r y
i n Marx's t h i n k i n g .
Knowledge and
to h i s n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y m
can
coincide
t r u t h Marx views - t r u e
the P a r i s M a n u s c r i p t s
- as
376.
i n t e g r a l parts of a general theory of action.

b r i n g s us t o h i s t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y .
T h i s , o f course,
377
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

In h i s Sociology
o f Marx, H e n r i
Lefebvre
makes w h a t
is
an i n t e r e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n on M a r x ' s t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y .
t e l l s us ' t h a t t h e term
ophical school
"ideology" originated with a philos-
( e m p i r i c i s t and s e n s a t i o n a l i s t ,
t o m a t e r i a l i s m ) which enjoyed
considerable
w i t h a tendency
influence m
a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h and t h e b e g i n n i n g
teenth century.
According
( D e s t u t t de T r a c y i s
ideas,
and
i.e.
called
t o the philosophers
o f a b s t r a c t concepts,
of the nineof this
full
which studies t h e i r
starting
from
t h a t goes b a c k t o C o n d i l l a c ) .
" i d e o l o g y " and t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s
themselves " i d e o l o g i s t s " . '

Ideology,
France
school
t h e best known), t h e r e i s a science o f
can r e c o n s t r u c t i t
conception
He
genesis
s e n s a t i o n s (a
T h i s s c i e n c e was
who p r a c t i s e d i t
He adds t h a t ,
called
t h e German
' t h e o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g was n o t e n t i r e l y
]ost
sight
o f : Marx aimed a t f o r m u l a t i n g a t h e o r y o f g e n e r a l , i . e .
social
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s : he d e f i n e d t h e e l e m e n t s o f an e x p l a n a t o r y
genesis
o f " i d e o l o g i e s " and r e l a t e d
torical
and s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s " .
one
it
t h a t i s doubly
sets m
significant
the right
thelatter to their
f o r us.
This
his-
observation
I n the f i r s t
place,
k i n d o f c o n t e x t M a r x ' s v i e w on i d e o l o g y .
We, as o u g h t by now t o be c l e a r , a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h a t
o f i d e o l o g y as an a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e
we a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h i t
1.
2.
Ibid.,
pp.59 - 00.
p. 60.
and, m
theory
particular,
as a n a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n c e
H . L e f e b v r e . The S o c i o l o g y
1972,
is
that
o f Marx, P e n g u i n U n i v e r s i t y B o o k s ,
378
contrasts sharply with that
of the Empiricist
What L e f e b v r e ' s r e m a r k does i s

entirely
alone
or mistaken m
t o s u g g e s t t h a t we a r e n o t
persisting
t h e second p l a c e , h i s o b s e r v a t i o n
is
b e c a u s e we a l s o a r g u e t h a t Marx, i n
of
t h i s view.
of significance
constructing his
e x p e r i e n c e , does n o t l o s e s i g h t o f t h o s e
ally
posed by t h e E m p i r i c i s t s .
such t r a d i t i o n a l
problems
In
t o us
account
origin-
I n d e e d , I have s u g g e s t e d
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems are m
of
M a r x ' s rnind when he comes t o p r e s e n t
t h e German I d e o l o g y .
held m
philosophers.
But m
doing
the forefront
his theory
of action
t h i s I have a l w a y s
m i n d a v i e w t h a t i s w i d e l y a c c e p t e d , and one t h a t
M a r x h i m s e l f d i d much t o f o s t e r , n a m e l y t n a t M a r x b r e a k s
early w i t h philosophy
philosopher.
Lefebvre's
and i s
What t h e n ,
observation
therefore, m
t h e mam, n o t
above a l l e l s e , i s
is that
of
like
philosophers
epistemology.
is,
He i s
o f course,
attempts
h a s _,ts p o i n t
the E m p i r i c i s t
o f our ideas
in
his
a novel
context.
This
t h e Lockean approach t o t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge.
t h a t Locke m
h i s E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g
t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t our ideas
experience,
about
r e v i v i n g t h e approach o f t h i n k e r s
C o n d i l l a c and D e s t u t t de T r a c y m
We r e c a l l
of
Marx i s
t r y i n g t o explain the o r i g i n
theory of ideology.
i i / s u g g e s t s t h a t M a r x ' s more
level,
departure
very
^ntrigumg
m a t u r e w o r k , seen even on a s u p e r f i c i a l
like
that
and t h a t he d i d
innate o r inborn ideas.
so a f t e r
have t h e i r
first
B u t we f o u n d
origin
our
rejecting the notion

a t t h e t i m e - and
h e r e we a g r e e d w i t h H e g e l - t h a t h i s n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e
was
too narrow t o account f o r t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f our knowledge.
379.
He f a i l e d
t o c o n v i n c e us t h e r e f o r e t h a t
origin
experience.
ideas
do h a v e
I t i s o f some i n t e r e s t
their
t o us now,
t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r Marx h a s any g r e a t e r s u c c e s s m
s u c h an
enterprise.
Though t h e r e may be an i m p o r t a n t
similarity
between Marx's
t h e o r y o f I d e o l o g y and L o c k e ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e r e c a n be
little
erent
doubt t h a t Marx's c o n c l u s i o n s
from
ing.
those
found
Much o f t h i s
Locke argues
the n o t i o n o f a c t i o n being
included m
as ' o u r o b s e r v a t i o n
o u r minds..'^
have t h e i r o r i g i n .
to
the
in
an
As we h a v e s e e n , he c o n c e i v e s o f
employed e i t h e r ,
e x t e r n a l s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s , o r about t h e i n t e r n a l
of
diff-
f o l l o w s f r o m M a r x ' s t h e o r y o f ideology
a theory o f action.
account o f experience.
our experience
be r a d i c a l l y
t h e Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d -
simply
b e i n g , as I have s a i d ,
h i s Essay a g a i n s t
will
And i t i s h e r e ,
about
operations
he a r g u e s , t h a t a l l i d e a s
We c a n h a r d l y e x p e c t t h a t Marx w i l l
hold
t h i s v i e w , e s p e c i a l l y so now t h a t we h a v e e s c a d l i s h e d
from
'Theses on F e u e r b a c h ' t h a t M a r x a c c e p t s t h e i d e a l i s t
critique
o f t h e Lockean p o s i t i o n .
expect t h a t
the theory
Equally
o f knowledge w i l l
p l a y t h e same
role
for
M a r x as i t
the
'Theses' t h a t w h a t f o r L o c k e i s a m a j o r p r o b l e m , t h e p r o b l e m
concerning
for
Marx.
gether.
3-
does f o r L o c k e .
we c a n n o t now
the reality
from
o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , i s no p r o b l e m a t a l l
I n d e e d M a r x sees i t
Locke t h i n k s i t
J.Locke.
F o r we h a v e a l s o l e a r n e d
as a d i f f e r e n t
t o be a t h e o r e t i c a l
problem
alto-
question, b u t ,
Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , o p . c i t .
p.6l
380
for
Marx, i t
is
he a r g u e s , w i l l
one
that
argues,
i s one
is
practice.
Real
knowledge,
be shown t o be r e a l by o u r p r a c t i c e .
I n so f a r as M a r x has
Locke i t
concerns
that
objective
Thus,
an a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed
is
inconclusive.
by
A l l knowledge,
a c c o r d i n g t o Locke's c r i t e r i o n ,
t h i n k i n g c o r r e s p o n d s t o some a s p e c t o f r e a l i t y .
he
for a l l
So,
Marx
s u g g e s t s , we h a v e t o t u r n t o a p r a c t i c a l t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e
to indicate
knowledge which w i l l
be c o n c l u s i v e l y
i s t h i s view, I suggest, t h a t u n d e r l i e s
compose, w i t h E n g e l s ,
the theory of
real.
his decision
ideology.
to
I t
381
THE PREMISSES OF THE THEORY: REAL INDIVIDUALS
The
crisis
occasion
for writing
o f t h e Young H e g e l i a n
t h e German I d e o l o g y was t h e
movement m
movement was r a p i d l y d i s i n t e g r a t i n g
Prussian
censorship
and c r i t i c i s m
t h e i r homeland.
under t h e weight
of both
f r o m w i t h o u t and w i t h i n .
M a r x a n d E n g e l s h a d t h e m s e l v e s been p a r t o f t h a t
however t h e i r i n t e n t i o n i n
The
movement,
i n t e r v e n i n g was n o t t o save t h e
movement b u t t o d e l i v e r t h e coup de g r a c e .
Whether t h e y
h a v e s u c c e e d e d we s h a l l n e v e r know, f o r , m
t h e event, t h e
German I d e o l o g y was n o t p u b l i s h e d u n t i l
had
would
long a f t e r t h e occasion
p a s s e d and b o t h t h e a u t h o r s h a d d i e d .
I t is
nevertheless
i m p o r t a n t t o remember m
d i s c u s s i n g t h e i r i d e a s on i d e o l o g y ,
t h a t t h e Young H e g e l i a n s
a r e t h e i d e o l o g i s t s t h e y have
cipally
mind.
the t h i n k i n g
Marx and E n g e l s f i n d
o f t h e movement, o f w h i c h
prin-
one m a j o r d e f e c t
they
find
evidence
t h e w r i t i n g s o f e v e n Itz most a d v a n c e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , L u d w i g
Feuerbach.
The Y o u n g H e g e l i a n s ,
they argue,
share
the i l l -
u s i o n o f t h e i r past mentor and t e a c h e r , H e g e l , t h a t
ideas o r
t h e o r i e s can o f themselves t r a n s f o r m t h e w o r l d .
fore
r e b e l n o t so much a g a i n s t e x i s t i n g
c o n d i t i o n s but 'against
the tyranny o f ideas',^ f o r they take mistaken

t h e o r i e s t o be t h e s o u r c e
Men t h e y s u g g e s t ,
9
these
i d e a s and
o f a l l t h e m i s e r i e s o f mankind.
have o r g a n i s e d
misconceptions.
They t h e r e -
their affairs
according t o
S o ( a c c o r d m g t o Marx and E n g e l s ) t h e y
r e g a r d r e b e l l i n g a g a i n s t t h e t y r a n n y o f i d e a s as r e b e l l i n g
4.
K.Marx and F . E n g e l s . D i e D e u t s c h e I d e o l o g u e ,
Werke, V o l . 3, p. 15-
Marx-Engels
382
a g a i n s t e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s : ' t e a c h men,
these
imaginings
o f man,
teach
w i t h thoughts
them t o r e l a t e
the other, teach

and
-existing
L a t e r on
them t o p u t
reality
m
their intention
will
its
critically
that
to the
E n g e l s w e r e t o say
to
had
n o t been p u b l i s h e d .
that of t h e i r
a sense, i t
is
issues
(and,
they r a i s e ,
w h i c h Hegel's system g i v e s
placed
true to
rise.
C e r t a i n l y , the
conclude t h e i r Preface
too high a value
on
it
firm conviction that
from
t h e i r minds t h i s
5.
Ibid.
That
o b s e s s e d by
if
i d e a t h e y w o u l d be
rid
to
as much
'worthy
worthy
the idea
the idea of
o n l y men
so)
those
concerns a
thought.
d r o w n e d b e c a u s e t h e y were p o s s e s s e d by
it
as, was
For
men
Now,
works
anecdote
refers just
, Marx and E n g e l s t e l l
his
say
Hegelians.
I s h a l l argue, are
man
was
Clearly
S t i r n e r ' s case, c o p i o u s l y
t o H e g e l as t o t h e Young H e g e l i a n s .
who
served
E n g e l s make r e f e r e n c e most o f t e n t o t h e
o f t h e Young H e g e l i a n s
w i t h which they
settle
opponents,
t h e b o o k i s more a b o u t H e g e l t h a n t h e Y o u n g
tr.e p r i n c i p a l
that
f o r a l l w i t h t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l consc-
s y s t e m ; so,
Marx and
says
collapse'.^
They b e l i e v e d t h e r e ! o r e t h a t t h e b o o k had
the Hegelian
essence
t o themselves,
i n w r i t i n g t h e German I d e o l o g y was
purpose even t h o u g h i t
Although
man'
t o exchange
t~?~< o u t o f t h e i r rnmds, says a t h i r d
their philosophical heritage, like

was
correspond
t h e i r l i v e s M a r x and
a c c o u n t s f o r once and
iences.
that
s a y s one,
could
that
weight.
dismiss
of a l l danger
383
of drowning.
Thus
'his whole l i f e
'fought the i l l u s i o n o f weight
long' the worthy
o f whose d e l a t e m o u s
man
effects
e a c h s t a t i s t i c gave h i m new and a b u n d a n t p r o o f ' o n l y a t t h e

end
t o meet w i t h
frustration
and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . ^
l s m , M a r x and E n g e l s s u g g e s t , g i v e s r i s e
Hegelian-
t o l i t e r a r y heroes
o f t h e k i n d t h a t b e l i e v e t h e y have o n l y t o announce a new

idea m
one o f t h e i r j o u r n a l s and t h e w o r l d w i l l
med.
In this
a new
t h e Young H e g e l i a n s
garb.
have f o u n d
the right
maintain that
forget
expression
is that
they are m
fight
one w h i t
m
addressing
those
t h e o l d Hegel m
t o s o c i a l problems.
show t h a t
seen, i s
for its
calls
do n o t l e a v e
that
But
they
m
t h e ground o f p h i l o s -
abstract thinking.
So t h e Young H e g e l i a n s ,
6.
I b i d . , p p 15 - 14.
7-
Ibid.,
p. 20.
phrases'.
t h e i r approach t o the w o r l d .
i s , I believe,
T h i s , as we have
t h i n k i n g w h i c h he b e l i e v e s h a s o n l y i t s e l f
object.
nothing
they d i f f e r n o t
What M a r x and E n g e l s mean by p h i l o s o p h y
w h a t Marx e a r l i e r
A l l
t h e m s e l v e s t o s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , M a r x and E n g e l s
a r g u e , t h e Young H e g e l i a n s
ophy.
they
"phrases".
phrases w i t h
the world with
w h i c h t h e y do so t h e y
from t h e master m
o f them
no way f i g h t i n g t h e r e a l ,
may d i f f e r f r o m
a d d r e s s t h e m s e l v e s more r e a d i l y
t h e manner m
against
t h e y a l s o oppose t h o s e
e x i s t i n g w o r l d when t h e y
The Young H e g e l i a n s
'the l a t e s t
f o r t h e i r a c t i v i t y when
they are only f i g h t i n g
b u t p h r a s e s and t h a t
For
transfor-
are only t h e o l d Hegel
M a r x and E n g e l s say t h e r e f o r e t h a t
they
be
according
i.e.
thought
t o Marx
384
and
Engels,
believe that
to tackle social
problems
a t t h e i r r o o t what t h e y h a v e t o t a c k l e a r e i d e a s .
put i t
t h e Holy Family
Young H e g e l i a n s h a v e
( w r i t t e n about
'learnt
side myself
i n t o merely
t h e same t i m e ) , t h e
from t h e Hegelian
the a r t o f t r a n s f o r m i n g r e a l ,
ideal,
objective
merely
As t h e y
Phenomenology
chains e x i s t i n g
out-
s u b j e c t i v e chains
simply
existing m
ternal,
The
me and t h e r e f o r e t h e a r t o f t r a n s f o r m i n g a l l e x g
sensuous c o n f l i c t s i n t o p u r e t h o u g h t c o n f l i c t s ' .
o b j e c t o f Marx and E n g e l ' s
Ideology is,as i t
is
criticism
t h e Holy Family, Hegel's
What t h e y p a r t i c u l a r l y w i s h t o deny t h e r e f o r e
reality
argue
is thought'.
With that,
another view o f r e a l i t y :
subsumed u n d e r t h o u g h t .
o f course,
one w h i c h
Idealism.
is that
o f a l a r g e r whole.
I tis
t h e y have t o
cannot
which
thought i s
itself
be c o m p l e t e l y
seen as p a r t
t h i s v i e w , I suggest,
embryonic form m
t h a t we h a v e
Marx's C r i t i q u e o f t h e
Phenomenology and t h e 'Theses on F e u e r b a c h ' .
There i s
need f o r me t o r e p e a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e l a s t
here.
A l l I need remind
Marx's n a s c e n t
come t o f i l l
in
8.
t h e r e a d e r i s t h a t we d e a l t
little
Chapters
with
of his
I n t h e German I d e o l o g y M a r x and
out that notion.
view o f experience
against which
two
view o f experience under t h e heading
notion of objectivity.
'ail
I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y have t o a r g u e
a view o f experience
already found m
t h e German
They e x p a n d i t
a n d , as I have s u g g e s t e d ,
into a
Engels
complete
t h e background
t h e y do so i s a g a i n t h e H e g e l i a n s y s t e m a n d ,
particular its notion of reality.
D i e H e ' l i g e F a m i l i e , M a r x - E n g e i s W e r k e , V o l . 2, p. 87.
385.,
We
can see now
why
M a r x and E n g e l s p l a c e s u c h
on p r e m i s s e s and a s s u m p t i o n s
of
ideology.
is
intended to contrast
beginning t h e i r
They a r e p u t t i n g
emphasis
discussion
forward a view of r e a l i t y
s h a r p l y w i t h t h e H e g e l i a n one.
which
I t
i s Hegel's
p r o u d b o a s t t h a t h i s s y s t e m has n e i t h e r b e g i n n i n g
n o r end.
I t is,
circle
he c l a i m s , a c i r c l e
of c i r c l e s .
The
b e g i n n i n g , he
o r , more p r e c i s e l y ,
says, presupposes
the
Q
end a s , e q u a l l y ,
t h e end p r e s u p p o s e s
the beginning.
r e c a l l t h a t h i s account of experience m
of
Mind f o l l o w s such a p l a n .
beginning externalises i t s e l f
of
the ordinary
presupposes
that
retracted
and
itself.
So
of
Now,
is
Its
it
t o g i v e us t h e sensuous w o r l d
be r e s t o r e d
to i t s
t h e a c c o u n t , o r , more p r e c i s e l y ,
M a r x and E n g e l s
still
Geist
initial
it
be
unity
with
t h e outcome i s
the premiss.
a r e o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t German p h i l o s o p h y
the g r i p of t h a t H e g e l i a n view o f experience.
premisses, they t h e r e f o r e
t h e y say,
is
t h e p r e m i s s o f t h e a c c o u n t c o n t a i n s t h e outcome
They t h e r e f o r e i n t e n d
'we
suggest, are s t i l l
to begin with
can o n l y a b s t r a c t
premisses are, they continue,

and
Geist, Hegel argues, a t the
t h e end t h i s e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n w i l l
will
will
t h e Phenomenology
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t because i t
m
We
their material l i f e
a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d and
unreal
r e a l premisses from which,

our imagination'.
'real individuals,
These
their
circumstances, both those which

those produced
9.
H e g e l . Werke ( o p . c i t . ) V o l . 6,
10.
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke, V o l . 3, p.
ones,
by t h e i r own
pp. 570 - 571

20.
actions
are
activity'.
1 0
386. .
These p r e m i s s e s ,
The e x p e r i e n c e
their
they f e e l ,
i n no way
of real individuals
presuppose
i s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e d by
positing.
However t h e r e i s a r e a l d i f f i c u l t y
difficulty
is
t h e i r end.
which
i s n o t touched
r a i s e d by t h i s v i e w , a
on by M a r x and E n g e l s .
This
t h a t , no m a t t e r how much t h e y s t r a i n l a n g u a g e , t h e y
can
n e v e r c l a i m t o h a v e s e t down on p a p e r c o n c r e t e , p h y s i c a l i n dividuals.
those
'real individuals', just
us w i t h
can,
What t h e y h a v e s e t down has t o be t h e t h o u g h t o f

as t h e y h a v e o n l y
the idea of ' t h e i r m a t e r i a l l i f e ' .
a t b e s t , be c o n c r e t e
or r e a l ideas.
presented
T h e i r premisses
Marx and E n g e l s
must know t h i s t o be s o , b u t t h e y do n o t d e a l w i i , h t h e p r o b l e m s
it
raises.
us w h a t t h e s e
look l i k e .
and
Be t h a t as i t
may,
real individuals
Naturally,
human i n d i v i d u a l s
consciousness,
M a r x and E n g e l s
that
they b r i n g
go on t o
tell
t o our a t t e n t i o n
t h e y s a y , t h e y a r e human i n d i v i d u a l s ,
'one can d i s t i n g u i s h
from animals
through
t h r o u g h r e l i g i o n , t h r o u g h w h a t e v e r e l s e one
They t h e m s e l v e s b e g i n
to distinguish
themselves from
wills.
animals
as soon as t h e y b e g i n t o p r o d u c e t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e ,
a step which
i s determined
These a r e , we m i g h t n o t e ,
m
external
t h a t Marx has
t o t h e m s e l v e s because t h e y a r e n a t u r a l ,
a privileged
Ibid.,
1 1
the Paris
They a r e i n d i v i d u a l s who n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e o b j e c t s
They a r e n a t u r a l
11.
the real i n d i v i d u a l s
m i n d when o u t l i n i n g h i s n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y m
Manuscripts.
by t h e i r p h y s i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n ' .
beings
sense.
p. 21.
though
l i m i t e d creatures.
, as I have s u g g e s t e d
T h i s i s b e c a u s e men
before,
appropriate nature
387
consciously.
m
T h i s i s a p o i n t t h a t Marx b r i n g s out
Capital.
F o r , he
process, i t
i s indeed
that
resemble those
many an a r c h i t e c t
says m
d i s c u s s i n g t h e human l a b o u r
true that
'a s p i d e r c o n d u c t s
o f t h e w e a v e r , and
again
a bee
operations
p u t s t o shame
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of her w a x - c e l l s .
what from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e w o r s t
f r o m t h e b e s t o f bees i s t h a t
t h e a r c h i t e c t has
h i s m o d e l i n h i s i m a g i n a t i o n b e f o r e he
But
architect
constructed
constructs i t
wax'.
T h e r e f o r e w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e human l a b o u r p r o c e s s
from
the s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s
we
a r e s u l t which
of animals
already existed
is that at
'its
end
at the beginning m
the
have
lmagm12
a t i o n of the worker,
therefore existed already
This view, I suggest,

of r e a l i t y .
M a r x sees as
I t is tnis,
ideally'.
fundamental
t o an
added t o t h e n o t i o n t h a t o b j e c t s
a l w a y s c o n f r o n t us as o b j e c t s o f o u r n e e d s , t h a t
the s u b j e c t i v e aspect
view
m
o f Marx's f i r s t
of experience.
he
now
he u n d e r s t a n d s
now
labour.
next
(human) p r a c t i c a l
i t t o be a s e n s u o u s l y
a b l e t o see,
have a
For
one.
The
practical
w h a t he
t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e
clearer
outlining
subjectivity
reality
way
one
as t h e o b j e c t o f o u r c o n s c i o u s l y
T h i s comes o u t m
K.Marx. Das
constitutes
goes o n l y so f a r as t o say t h a t
always a sensuously
12.
We
t h a t t h e s i s h i s conception of the e s s e n t i a l
of experience
idea
is,
indirectly
that
'men
which
we
are
undertaken
and E n g e l s h a v e t o
They say
is
by
produce t h e i r
say
producing
material
K a p i t a l V o l 1 , M a r x - E n g e l s Werke V o l
2^,
p.l
388
l i f e i t s e l f ' . 13
I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y s u g g e s t t h a t men i n
t h e i r consciously undertaken labour create r e a l i t y .
By t h i s
o f c o u r s e t h e y do n o t mean t h a t we, m o u r l a b o u r , c r e a t e t h e
s u n , t h e moon, t h e s t a r s e t c . f o r t h e r e h a s a l w a y s t o be a
n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l s u b s t r a t u m t o f o r m t h e raw m a t e r i a l o f o u r
p r o d u c t i o n ; r a t h e r t h e y mean t h a t we, i n o u r l a b o u r , c r e a t e
the o b j e c t s o f our experience.
Even t h e h e a v e n l y b o d i e s ,
t h e n , a r e o u r o b j e c t s m t h i s way.
F o r , Marx w o u l d a r g u e ,
how we r e l a t e t o them a t any one t i m e i t s e l f depends on t h e
l e v e l o f d e v e l o p m e n t o f p r o d u c t i o n and i n d u s t r y .
To t h e
p r i m i t i v e man, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e y a r e d i v i n e o b j e c t s ; w h e r e as t o modern man, h i m s e l f a p r o d u c t o f i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t
s o c i e t y , they are o b j e c t s o f science.
We h a v e t o u n d e r s t a n d ,
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t o u r p r o d u c t i o n i s n o t m e r e l y an a s p e c t o f o u r
experience.
I t i s , M a r x s u g g e s t s , what c o n s t i t u t e s o u r e x perience.
The w o r l d t h a t i s g i v e n t o u s m o u r e x p e r i e n c e
i s o n e , he i s c o n v i n c e d , t h a t human l a b o u r h a s r t s e l f c r e a t e d .
J
But,
self-evidently,
chosen t o c r e a t e .
an a r b i t a r y
which
i n t o being.
turn
We a r e
produce
as much f o r m
' t h e i r means o f s u b -
p. 2 1 .
According t o
our experience
by o u r
What we a r e depends on t h e
M a r x - E n g e l s V/erke V o l . 3, p. 2 1 .
Ibid.,
activity
'on t h e s t a t e o f t h e g i v e n ( a n d
l a b o u r as we a r e f o r m e d by i t .
14.
fashion.
be r e p r o d u c e d ) means o f s u b s i s t e n c e ' . " ^
M a r x , t h e r e f o r e , we j u s t
13-
we do n o t
F o r , M a r x and E n g e l s a r g u e , t h e
'real individuals'
s i s t e n c e ' depends m
to
individuals,
entirely
s o l i t a r y F i c h t e a n Egos who by o u r mere t h e o r e t i c a l
bring the world

way
i s n o t one t h a t we have
S i n c e we a r e r e a l
c o n s t i t u t e our experience
not
it
389
m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s under which
a r e depends on how
to
organise
determine
we
This,
We
determine
of course,
notion of o b j e c t i v i t y .
For
find
For,
as we
themselves m
'these i n d i v i d u a l s '
as t h e y may
appear m
as t h e y r e a l l y
duce.
as what
can
which
is
continue
them j u s t
see,
the
'real
objective
a r e h i s and
t h e i r own
and
they
as
they
b r i n g s us b a c k t o M a r x ' s
s t r u c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p m
immediately
produce j u s t
have p r e v i o u s l y o r g a n i s e d
our p r o d u c t i o n .
us.
we
formal
individuals'
i n h i s sense.
Engels' premisses
or others'
'not
imagination, but
a r e , t h a t means, as t h e y w o r k , m a t e r i a l l y
Thus as t h e y - u n d e r d e f i n i t e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and
material
pro-
limitations,
c o n d i t i o n s a l l independent
of t h e i r w i l l
i n d i v i d u a l s t h e y have m
mind t h e r e f o r e
15
are a c t i v e ' .
The
a r e a c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s who,
f o r themselves m
Ego,
p o s i t e d and
indeed
l i k e F i c h t e ' s Ego^ p o s i t t h e w o r l d
p r o d u c t i o n but are themselves,

limited
by
consciously active
that material world.
we
can now
when t h e y p r o p o s e we
some d i f f i c u l t i e s
see
look at
individuals
other?
r a t h e r t h a n any
15.
saying that
'are n o t as t h e y may
imagination'.
Ibid.,
25.
accept
t h e i r view
H e r e t h e y seem t o
t h e i n d i v i d u a l s who
appear m
They a r e , s u p p o s e d l y ,
p.
E n g e l s have m
A major d i f f i c u l t y
s h o u l d we
premisses
are
mind
'real i n d i v i d u a l s ' , t h e r e are
w i t h t h e i r view.
q u e s t i o n a s i d e by
They
will.
w h a t M a r x and
r a i s e d by t h e q u e s t i o n : Why
the
Fichte's
i n d i v i d u a l s but a c t i v e under c o n d i t -
i o n s t h a t a r e n o t d e p e n d e n t on t h e i r
Although
unlike
their
own
still
is
of
brush
are
their
or others'
i n d i v i d u a l s as t h e y
'really
390
are.
But, i t
t h a t we
seems t o me,
o n l y see
lish
of the
the
therefore,
their
view.
Engels' v i s i o n i s
M a r x and
and
activity.
I d e a s and
products.
Indeed, m
intellectual
parcel
their
p r o d u c t i o n and,
say
I believe,
intellectual
also,
that
should not
s u g g e s t s as
be
this
the
production of
his
theorising
'Theses on
T h e r e he
we
experience but
has
he
a bearing,
argues t h a t
suggest t h a t
that
it
therefore,
our
theorising
ience i s always o v e r l a i d
he
our
s u g g e s t s , and
objects
as
objects
that
our
by
nature.
ex-
first
experience.
I t
t h i n k i n g experience.
about the
objects
think of things
human b e i n g s .
We
For
of our
relation.
that
So
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the
a l l our
i n d e e d must, o n l y
a l w a y s , even i n o u r
o f our
this natural
needy, l i m i t e d
the
have seen, i s t o s u g g e s t
b e a r s on
on
his
from
considers
H i s r e s p o n s e , as
o n l y does he
not
Feuerbach' but
perience.
we
still
Marx
m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m o f w h a t comes f i r s t
not
consciou-
is
traditional
as
of
t h i s goes a g a i n s t w h a t i s
Phenomenology.
us
has
makes sense t o t a l k
his Critique
always c o n f r o n t
namely,
themselves
t h i s v i e w a g a i n stem, I b e l i e v e ,
objects
one
life
reasons f o r h o l d i n g
of the
estab-
with
enmeshed i n p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y .
much as
productive
they argue, are
a w i d e l y a c c e p t e d v i e w t h e t t h i n k i n g and
and
more t o
say
we
ours
theory of ideology,
view, i t
to
Need
than
o f man's n a t u r a l
theories,
I need h a r d l y
are.
clearer
T h i s t h e y seek t o do,
part
a position
E n g e l s h a v e t o do
i n which they suggest t h a t
seen as
ness.
all m
they r e a l l y
p r i n c i p a l theses of t h e i r
thesis
t o be
are
i n d i v i d u a l s as
a c c e p t t h a t M a r x and
Clearly,
we
exper-
We
can,
which
are
are
t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y , enmeshed - m
therefore
a
prac-
391
tically
active
relation.
So, M a r x a r g u e s ,
o p h e r s we c a n n o t b u t c o n f r o n t o b j e c t s m
he
argued t h a t
e v e n qua p h i l o s -
t h i s way.
Indeed
a l l o t h e r n o t i o n s , s u c h as t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l one, o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f man t o h i s o b j e c t s w e r e
a b s t r a c t o r mere i m a g i n i n g s .
the
T h i s argument i s
German I d e o l o g y a n d , on i t , i s b u i l t M a r x and E n g e l ' s
fidence m
t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e i r view.
no d o u b t as t o t h e f a c t
conceptions,
determined
Far
by a d e f i n i t e
consciousness,
cess'.
that
they argue,
'can n e v e r be a n y t h i n g o t h e r
b e i n g , and t h e b e i n g o f men i s
mode o f i n t e r c o u r s e
which
ness.
and
of their
development o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e powers'.
By man's l i f e
with i t .
For they are i n
'men a r e t h e p r o d u c e r s
process
So i t
men a l w a y s t h i n k .
they suggest,
their
a n d , as t h e y p u t i t ,
which
is
the context
Theory i s t h e product
And c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s t h e p r o d u c t
it
pro-
( V e r k e h r s f o r m ) t h a t goes hand i n hand
i s this,
Engels conclude,
their life
M a r x and E n g e l s mean
p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e
the
con-
i d e a s ' b u t t h a t as ' r e a l a c t i v e men, a s t h e y a r e
than conscious
in
sustained
of l i f e .
i s 'not consciousness t h a t
o f consciousF o r , Marx
determines
17
life
but l i f e
determines
T a k e n on i t s
place
own t h i s may a p p e a r t o be a v e r y
suggestion.
p o i n t t h a t what i s
contemporaries
consciousness'.
However, I s h o u l d
obvious
o f Marx.
like
Ibid.,
p. 26.
17-
Ibid.,
p. 27.
t o make t h e h i s t o r i c a l
t o u s n e e d n o t h a v e been so t o t h e
M a r x and E n g e l s s t r e s s t h a t
ness i s t h e consciousness o f e x i s t i n g l i f e
16.
common-
consciou-
because t h e y a r e
392. .
d e a l i n g w i t h an i n t e l l e c t u a l
v i e w has
m
a powerful hold.
tradition
and,
i n t o the consciousness that
consciousness t h a t
appearance
i s A b s o l u t e Knowledge, Hegel
as t h e s o l e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e .
t h e n , he
suggests, i s not the
because a l l l i f e
is
ion
of the alienation
no b o u n d s .
I t is
so does r e a l i t y .
of
Hegel's
o f Mind.
i s t h e con-
Mind
The
that
i n short,
Marxian
is.
c o n s c i o u s n e s s knows
As
(Geist) which i s
it
the
changes,
then,
consciousness
consciousness i s the s p r i n g o f a l l l i f e .
is,
itself.
v i e w , be a mere e x p r e s s -
For Hegel,
simply a l l there
argues,
consciousness
consciousness.
view o f consciousness would,
Now
I t knows
s c i o u s n e s s b u t as t h e b e i n g w h i c h i s t h e o t h e r o f
Consciousness
of
i s A b s o l u t e Knowledge.
b e i n g , t h e r e f o r e , n o t as t h e b e i n g o f w h i c h i t
life
develops
self-consciousness through s c i e n t i f i c understanding
knows i t s e l f
of
argues,
consciousness f i r s t
s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h r o u g h t r a v e r s i n g t h e whole
Mind,
the
into
which the opposite
As we h a v e seen, H e g e l
t h e Phenomenology o f M i n d , t h a t
itself
Hegel's
thesis
t h e r e v e r s e o f t h a t o f M a r x and E n g e l s who
i n t h e German I d e o l o g y ' q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y
claim
t o German
osophy w h i c h d e s c e n d s f r o m h e a v e n t o e a r t h , h e r e we
phil-
ascend
l8
f r o m e a r t h t o heaven'.
F o r t h e i r hope i s
to explain
s c i o u s n e s s o r m i n d f r o m e a r t h l y , mundane, p r a c t i c a l
not
practical
It
life
t h e s i s o f Marx's t h e o r y o f
t h i n k a t any one
t i m e may
outcome o f t h e p r a c t i c a l m a t e r i a l
inevitably
part.
w i t h consciousness.
life
Marx can see no
Ibid.
ideology
be e x p l a i n e d as t h e
relations
o f w h i c h we
o t h e r way
I n h i s v i e w M i n d has no
are
which t o deal
independent
'Pure c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' t h e r e f o r e i s a t e r m w h i c h makes no

18.
and
from consciousness.
i s then a p r i n c i p a l
t h a t w h a t we
con-
being.
sense
393..
to him.
the
For
' f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g ' , he and E n g e l s a r g u e
German I d e o l o g y ,
"afflicted with"
agitated
'"Mind" has
t h e c u r s e on i t s e l f
m a t t e r which appears here m
layers of air,
sound,
i n short,
t o be
the form of
language.
Language
i s as o l d as c o n s c i o u s n e s s - l a n g u a g e _is t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h e x i s t s f o r o t h e r men
as
well,
r e a l consciousness t h e r e f o r e which also e x i s t s f o r the
first
time f o r myself.
And
language
first
arises,
like
consciousness
19
f r o m t h e n e e d , t h e n e c e s s i t y , o f i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o t h e r men
Consciousness,
whose p r o d u c t i s
thought, i s ,
they argue,
twined from the very beginning w i t h our p r a c t i c a l

It
is
p e r c e p t i b l e e x p r e s s i o n i n language.
i s a means w h i c h does n o t have i t s

itself.
tive
I t is
activity
are
and o f t h e c o n s e q u e n t n e c e s s i t y
suggest t h a t
rightly
- that
language
like
and
the
autonomous
They a r e i n e f f e c t
t h e r e i s , somehow, a p r i v a t e w o r l d .
consciousness
produc-
f o r society
Those t h e r e f o r e who,
suggestion.
its
s p r i n g i n Mind
consciousness o r Mind i s
m a k i n g an u n r e a l i s t i c
claiming that
And
r a t h e r the outgrowth o f our m a t e r i a l ,
i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o t h e r ên.
Hegelians,
o r i g i n and
inter-
activity.
o n l y made p o s s i b l e , Marx and E n g e l s s u g g e s t , by
material,
They
' i s rny r e l a t i o n s h i p t o my
claimsurr-
oundings', b u t t h e n they argue t h a t those s u r r o u n d i n g s are

themselves the product o f consciousness.
suggest, m
claiming that
n e s s o f some r e l a t i o n s h i p ,
it
19.
B u t , M a r x and
consciousness i s always the consciousthe Hegelians already admit
i s a p u b l i c w o r l d , a r e l a t i o n s h i p only e x i s t s f o r me
Ibid.,
p.
30.
Engels
that
because
394
consciousness i s a s o c i a l product.
a r g u m e n t and n o t one t h a t
relationship exists',
is
This i s a remarkable
simple t o follow:
t h e y say,
'there i t
exists
a n i m a l " r e l a t e s " t o n o t h i n g and n o t a t a l l .

its
'Where a
f o r me, t h e
For the animal,
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r s does n o t e x i s t as a r e l a t i o n s h i p .
From t h e o u t s e t t h e r e f o r e
consciousness i s a s o c i a l product
20
and
it
r e m a i n s so as long as men e x i s t a t a l l ' .

appears
t h a t M a r x and E n g e l s ' h a v e d r a w n
i o n t h e i r p r e m i s s e s can n o t b e a r .
established
i s always a s o c i a l product i s
mmd a t t h i s
that conscious-
somewhat u n e x p e c t e d .
point,
however,
language i s consciousness which e x i s t s
men.
a conclus-
A l l t h e y appear t o have
The c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e ,
have t o b e a r m
that
private
affair.
t h e i r suggestion
f o r me and o t n e r
B u t , as t h e y s u g g e s t ,
makes a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t f o r me i s
ship.
the notion of a
that
s c i o u s n e s s as i t
comes i n t o b e i n g f o r me, and t h a t
f o r others.
' p r a c t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' w h i c h i_s c o n because
I w o u l d n o t be c o n s c i o u s c o u l d I n o t
use a l a n g u a g e and m
using that
world.
therefore
Consciousness
because
M a r x and E n g e l ' s
terms, I possess
exists
what
relation-
I o n l y have t h a t n o t i o n a t my d i s p o s a l , h o w e v e r ,
I am a u s e r o f l a n g u a g e ; b e c a u s e t h e r e f o r e ,
the
We
So, i n t h e i r v i e w , t h e use o f a l a n g u a g e c a n n e v e r be
an e x c l u s i v e l y
it
sight
i s t h a t a n i m a l s h a v e no n o t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s h i p ,
and t h a t we d o .
ness
At f i r s t
v e r y medium w h i c h makes i t
l a n g u a g e I become p a r t
of a social
i s always a s o c i a l
p r o d u c t because
possible
a social
is
itself
Nowadays t m s w o u l d be r e g a r d e d as an u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l
view.
20.
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s v i e w s on l a n g u a g e
Ibid.,
p. 30.
i m p l y as much, f o r
relation.
395.
instance.
Not
so, however, Marx's r e s u l t a n t
ideology.
M a r x and E n g e l s l i n k
views
t h e i r concept o f i d e o l o g y
w i t h t h e i r v i e w s on t h e s o c i a l n a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e
t h e y b e l i e v e c o n t e m p o r a r y men
masters o f t h a t
intercourse.
have t h e i r o r i g i n
Language, t h e y a r g u e ,
our ideas, m
the p r a c t i c a l world.
B u t , c o n t e m p o r a r y men,
to realise
the l i m i t a t i o n s
s c i o u s n e s s and, most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l ,
c o n n e c t i o n between
material
are
fail
t h e i r c o n s c i o u s n e s s and
i s g o i n g on
M a r x and
of their
t o see
the
t h a n most o f t h i s
failing.
con-
this
practical
l i v e s t h e y l e a d , and p h i l o s o p h e r s , i n t h e i r
more g u i l t y
language
circumstance or other.
t h e i r v i e w , always r e f l e c t what
Engels argue, f a i l
arises
The w o r d s t h a t make u p o u r
some p r a c t i c a l
So
because
t o be more p r i s o n e r s t h a n
circumstance.
f r o m man's s o c i a l
on
Their
view,
systems^
M a r x and E n g e l a r g u e , s u f f e r f r o m a b a s i c d e f e c t o f a l l i d e o l o g y ,
namely,
the conviction that
t h e t h i n k i n g t h a t they e v i n c e c o n -
sists
o f t i m e l e s s and u n i v e r s a l t r u t h s .
trait
o f the i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r t o imagine t h a t h i s
is
n o t a n c h o r e d t o any
For i t i s a basic
thinking
p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l
circum-
21
stances.
Through
b e l i e v i n g t h e m s e l v e s t o be immune f r o m
any p a r t i c u l a r m a t e r i a l and
lay
s o c i a l circumstances,
t h e m s e l v e s open t o p r e c i s e l y
those e m p i r i c a l
philosophers
influences
they believe t o avoid.
T h i s , Marx b e l i e v e s ,
i s how
H e g e l i a n s had
i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s :
as t h e autonomous
seen t h e i r
c r e a t i o n s o f t h e i r minds.
21.
Ibid.,
p. 27-
For t h a t
r e a s o n , he and
t h e Young
Engels
396
s u g g e s t , t h e y had n o t t h o u g h t
those
t o examine t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s and t h e a c t u a l
state
of a f f a i r s
22
Germany.
Had
connection
that
t h e y done
existed
so, t h e y m i g h t
have seen t h e c l o s e
between t h e backwardness o f t h e i r
i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s and t h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d n a t u r e o f s o c i a l
and e c o n o m i c
r e l a t i o n s in Germany.
However we s t i l l
ogical
thinker.
socially
And i d e o l o g i c a l
believes i t s e l f
circumstances
measure
but which
of i t ,
thinking,
that
it
But
i s not t h i s i n t u r n too simple
does i t p r e s e n t
of ideological
illusion
w o r d s , w h a t h a s t o ce f i l l e d
We
in
reality,
a distorted picture
of thin
a view o f the m a t t e r
is
or d i s t o r t i o n .
f o r Marx and E n g e l s .
precise
I n other
'above
reality'
as h i s t o r y we
h a v e o u r measure
of i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n .
22.
20.
This, I
comes in, f o r t h e y
e f f e c t , t h a t by s e e i n g t h e p r e s e n t
p.
some m c e
out are the terms
i s where f o r them h i s t o r y
Ibid.,
material
s h o u l d know t h e n what c o n s t i t u t e s
r e a l account o f experience
suggest,
thinkm
s e e k s t o be above
p a r t i c u l a r a p p e a r s t o be l a c k i n g
'part o f i t ' .
cir-
a t t h e same t i m e c a n n o t be: i n t h a t
i s part
and
is
i t appears, i s
t o be above r e f l e c t i n g r e a l
then, they suggest,
yardstick
t o be an i d e o l -
reflecting real material
yet
What m
is
A l l t h m K i n g , M a r x and E n g e l s a r g u e ,
conditioned thinking,
cumstances.
which
do n o t know w h a t i t
argue,
shall
397
HISTORY AS A MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY.
T h e r e a r e many o b j e c t i o n s t h a t
use
c a n be made t o t h i s
o f H i s t o r y b u t t h e most s e r i o u s c o n c e r n s t h e k i n d o f
context m
which i t
makes sense t o expound a p h i l o s o p h y o f
history.
M a r x and E n g e l s o f c o u r s e i n t e n d t h a t
their
theory
of
i d e o l o g y be an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n
of
history.
to
be c o r r e c t : t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , as i t i s now
And i t w o u l d
seem t h a t e v e n t s h a v e p r o v e d
c a l l e d , h a s h a d an i m p o r t a n t i m p a c t
History
still
itself
b o t h on t h e i d e a o f
on t h e w r i t i n g o f h i s t o r y .
t o use a view o f h i s t o r y
explained
But
i n s u c h a way.
t o e x p l a i n w h a t c a n n o t be
What t h e y
are hoping
n o t simply t h e past b u t o u r t h i n k i n g
itself,
n o t a t one and t h e same t i m e t h e o r i s e a d e q u a t e l y

history
and o u r t h o u g h t .
activity.
place.
2^.
them
t h e o b j e c t i o n may be r a i s e d t h a t M a r x and E n g e l s a r e
hoping
is
and i n d e e d
t o the understanding
T h e r e i s no p a s t
Thinking is
thinking that
to explain
and we c a n about
always a
both
present
is actually
taking
H i s t o r y , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s a l w a y s c o n c e r n e d
with
I n a p e c u l i a r way M a r x r e c e i v e s some s u p p o r t on t h i s p o i n t
f r o m modern I d e a l i s t s .
Collmgwood, m p a r t i c u l a r , takes
t h e view t h a t ' H i s t o r i c a l knowledge..has f o r i t s proper
o b j e c t thought: n o t t h i n g s thought about, b u t t h e a c t o f
t h i n k i n g i t s e l f . ' ( R . G . C o l l m g w o o d . The I d e a o f H i s t o r y ,
p. 305 O x f o r d P a p e r b a c k s , 1966 - my e m p h a s i s ) B u t C o l l m g wood a r g u e s t h i s b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e s t h a t a l l h i s t o r y
i s the h i s t o r y o f thought.
So i n one sense he s u g g e s t s
that h i s t o r y i s the product o f thought.
Marx, o f c o u r s e ,
wants t o argue t h e o p p o s i t e : t h a t o u r t h i n k i n g i s a product
of h i s t o r y .
F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f some o f t h e p r o b l e m s
t h a t C o l l m g w o o d ' s ' i d e a ' o f H i s t o r y r a i s e s see W.H. W a l s h .
An i n t r o d u c t i o n t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f H i s t o r y ( H u t c h m s o n s ,
1951) PP. ^b' - 59.
398
past events.
So
it
is d i f f i c u l t
t o see
a historian,
or a philosopher of h i s t o r y ,
to
our t h i n k i n g .
say a b o u t
and E n g e l s
would
There i s l i t t l e
that thinking
they would n o t , f o r t h a t
e c t e d , f o r they suggest
content or matter i s
it
is
t h e i r view t h a t
our consciousness
that
reason,
and
it
thinking
to think.
activity;
them as b e i n g u n c o n n -
As
whose
we h a v e s e e n ,
determine
They f u r t h e r
argue
t h e r e f o r e what k i n d
established
F o r he w i l l
of
conditions
t o e x p l a i n these
t h e r e f o r e be
th^se c o n d i t i o n s which give r i s e
Marx
attempts to
i s an a c t i v i t y
and n o t t h e r e v e r s e .
historian w i l l
a r e most l i k e l y
that
our r e a l m a t e r i a l circumstances
l e a d depend on h i s t o r i c a l l y
The
doubt
a present
f u r n i s h e d by H i s t o r y .
i s the task of the h i s t o r i a n
ions.
is
see
t h a t w h a t t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e and
l i v e s we
can h a v e a n y t h i n g
have t o a c c e p t t h a t H i s t o r y
e x p l a i n p a s t e v e n t s and
but
how
able t o t e l l
condithow
we
have e x p l a i n e d p r e c i s e l y
t o our t h i n k i n g about
the
world.
T h i s may
I suggest,
be an o v e r a m b i t i o u s c l a i m b u t i t
that
is hardly
r e p r e s e n t s an abuse o f H i s t o r y .
grant f o r the present, then,that
We
an a p p r o p r i a t e measure o f i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n .
of
c o u r s e , M a r x and E n g e l ' s
that
out
suggests
that
t o them t h i s
ground .
view o f H i s t o r y .
I t is,
But even
with-
' p r e s e n t as h i s t o r y '
would
sense t o them b e c a u s e o f t h e i r H e g e l i a n b a c k -
I n t h e P r e f a c e t o t h e Phenomenology, H e g e l
that History
may
m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n of experience
stimulus the idea of the
make i m m e d i a t e
shall
' t h e p r e s e n t as h i s t o r y '
be
one,
finds a place f o r i t s e l f
ness o f the time t h r o u g h the s p i r i t
the o r d i n a r y
argues
conscious-
of the epoch,for the
399
spirit
of
o f t h e e p o c h e m b o d i e s , i n a h a p - h a z a r d way,
previous philosophy.
odian of the h i s t o r y
task m
It
is
of philosophy.
a kind
'embedded' m
a systematic
form.
This might
that
the o r d i n a r y person's understanding
standing t h i s
argues,
He
r e s u l t s of
He
l o o k , now,
a theory of ideology.
some m e a s u r e .
therefore,
suggests,
phenomenon.
o f Mind.
Not
it
The
Engels,
d i s t o r t s the r e a l world
t h e key
t o under-
o r d i n a r y consciousness,
he
(Geist),
attained
the
content w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l l y
mined, t h e r e f o r e r e l a t i v e ,
present
v e r y much
uhe mere a p p e a r a n c e o f M i n d
ness i t c l a i m s A b s o l u t e
previous
of the world i s less
w h e r e a s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s has
reality
his
as do M a r x and
a l s o c l a i m s t h a t he has
i s content w i t h
as
t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s and
like
than adequate t h a t ,
results
of vulgar cust-
H e g e l sees i t
t h e Phenomenology t o u n r a v e l t h o s e
philosophy
them m
Indeed
the
deter-
p o s i t i o n of the o r d i n a r y
conscious-
K n o w l e d g e as t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s
of
consciousness.
It
w o u l d h o w e v e r be
a mistake
to believe that
i s t h e g o a l o f M a r x and
Engels m
w i s h t o see
as h i s t o r y , n o t t o r a i s e
above i t ,
the present
to
I n d o i n g so,
t o p r o b l e m s t h a t Hege] poses and

dispense
e n t i r e l y w i t h h i s views.
they f i n d h i s suggestion
orical
German I d e o l o g y .
but t o gain a greater understanding
a t i o n s o f such a view.
ing
The
phenomenon t o be
that
sound.
this
they are
themselves
of the
implic-
still
respond-
t h e r e f o r e are not
I n the f i r s t
consciousness i s
They
prepared
place,
itself
a his1>
C o n s c i o u s n e s s , as I h a v e p o i n t e d
400
out, they
see as t h e p r o d u c t
o f innumerable
p r o d u c t i o n and s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e .
that
reality.
that
o f Hegel m
t h e manner m
t h e Phenomenology: t h e y
o f Mind.
dissimilar
But t h e d i f f e r e n c e l i e s
systematic Hegelian
and n o t M i n d , n o t e v e n m
form.
The H e g e l i a n
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s a t each s t a g e
' t h e r e i s t o be f o u n d
nature
and o f i n d i v i d u a l s t
succeeding generation
man's
more
i n our development.
a material result,
productive forces, a h i s t o r i c a l l y
its
they
"Geist" i s not the
r a t h e r , M a r x and E n g e l s a r g u e , a t e a c h s t a g e
opment,
F o r what,
t h i s appearance o f consciousness i s
natural productive l i f e
reality
In
intend t o indic-
w h i c h they c a r r y o u t t h i s aim.
argue, l i e s behind
with
as t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a d e e p e r
T h e i r aim, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t w h o l l y
a t e t o us t h e r e a l i t y
But
Equally they deal
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , as does H e g e l , as a phenomenon.
o t h e r words, they d e a l w i t h i t
to
generations'
created
our devel-
a sum o f
relationship to
each o t h e r w h i c h i s
i n h e r i t e d by e a c h
f r c m i t s p r e d e c e s s o r , a mass o f p r o d u c t -
ive
f o r c e s , c a p i t a l s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s
one
h a n d m o d i f i e d by t h e new g e n e r a t i o n b u t , on t h e o t h e r ,
also prescribes i t s
own l i f e
which i s
indeed
on t h e
c o n d i t i o n s and g i v e s i t a s p e c i f i c
d e v e l o p m e n t , a p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r . . . T h i s sum o f p r o d u c t i v e
forces,
and
c a p i t a l s and modes o f s o c i a l
each g e n e r a t i o n
finds before
it
r e a l ground o f what t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s
i n t e r c o u r s e each
individual
as s o m e t h i n g g i v e n
have c o n c e i v e d
t o them-
s e l v e s as " S u b s t a n c e " and " t h e e s s e n c e o f man", o f w h a t

have apotheosized
disturbed
is the
and f o u g h t , a r e a l g r o u n d w h i c h w i l l
they
n o t be
t h e l e a s t on its e f f e c t s and i n f l u e n c e s on t h e d e v -
401
e l o p m e n t o f men by t h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s r e b e l l i n g
against
24
It
as " S e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s " and t h e " U n i q u e " .
history
that
The
l i e s b e h i n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e r e f o r e h a s , as
we c a n s e e , l i t t l e
esoteric history
common f o r M a r x and E n g e l s w i t h t h e
o f Hegel's
system.
They a r e n o t t a l k i n g
about t h e h i s t o r y o f Mind b u t r e a l , m a t e r i a l h i s t o r y ,
Marx c a l l s e x o t e r i c h i s t o r y .
PR
ground
to
This, they argue, i s t h e r e a l
f o r a l lsocial l i f e .
see p h i l o s o p h y as i t s
o r what
I t makes no sense f o r them
essence.
Rather i t ,
like
a l l con-
s c i o u s n e s s , h a s t o be v i e w e d as an o u t - g r o w t h o f e x o t e r i c
developments.
the
ordinary
There
is
has f a i l e d
i n d e e d , as H e g e l
fused m
its
t o raise
b e a r i n g s about t h e w o r l d .
t o philosophy.
But i t
make i t
s u g g e s t , as do t h e H e g e l i a n s , t h a t
confused m
itself
so.
that
consciousness
suggests, a consciousness t n a t
e x o t e r i c h i s t o r i c a l developments
to
t h e i r minds t h e n
c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t a phenomenal
s i m p l y because i t
It
i s no q u e s t i o n m
i s con-
i s so b e c a u s e
I ti s
trite
o r d i n a r y people are
t h e i r t h i n k i n g about t h e w o r l d because t h e y a r e
bad
philosophers.
the
stick
They do n o t g e t h o l d o f t h e w r o n g end o f
f o r that
r e a s o n b u t because t h e i r r e a l l i f e
Werke, V o l . 3,
eircum-
24.
Marx-Engeis
p. 38.
25-
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke, V o l 2, pp. 89."" 90.

I n M a r x and E n g e l s '
v i e w H e g e l ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s t o r y p r e s u p p o s e s an a b s t r a c t
o r a b s o l u t e s p i r i t w h i c h d e v e l o p s i t s e l f m s u c h a way
t h a t m a n k i n d i s o n l y a mass w h i c h c o n s c i o u s l y o r u n c o n s c i o u
carries i t along.
Within the empirical exoteric history
he h a s t h e r e f o r e t a k e p l a c e a s p e c u l a t i v e , e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y
The h i s t o r y o f m a n k i n d t r a n s f o r m s i t s e l f i n t o t h e h i s t o r y
o f t h e a b s t r a c t - w h a t t h e r e f o r e i s t o t h e r e a l man - o t h e r w o r l d l y s p i r i t o f mankind', ( i b i d . ) .
r
26.
Marx-Engels
27.
Ibid.,
Werke, V o l 23,
p. 86.
28.
p.
87.
Ibid.,
p. 87
29-
Ibid.
402.
stances
will
a confused
not
a l l o w them t o see
the world other than
way.
T h i s p o i n t comes o u t most c l e a r l y
of
'Fetishism' m
Capital.
a capitalist
society.
t o show t h a t
i n Marx's d i s c u s s i o n
H e r e M a r x makes t h e
b e t w e e n t h e a p p e a r a n c e and
is
reality
The
purpose o f making t h i s
the confused
ideas
o f o r d i n a r y men
wants t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the confused,

ance o f t h e c o m m o d i t y i s
he
says,
they are
This is
t h e a r g u m e n t he
the product
of the
contemphe
m y s t i c a l appear-
en.ploys.
'In
acts of labour
o f each o t h e r .
first
t h e exchange o f these
commodity-form
The
general',
come i n t o
products
(Privatarbeiten)
complex o f
a c t s o f l a b o u r forms the c o l l e c t i v e
Since the producers
distinction
In particular,
almost
o n l y become c o m m o d i t i e s b e c a u s e
of private
pursued independently
private
a product
' o b j e c t s o f use
distinction
o f economic r e l a t i o n s
o r a r y s o c i e t y a r e n o t mere i l l u s i o n s .
itself.
labour of society.
social contact
of t h e i r
these
l a b o u r the
through
specific
s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r l a b o u r also appears f o r the
first
time w i t h i n
acts
of
this
labour f i r s t
through
products
form
those
exchange.
Or,
participate
relations m
of l a b o u r . . ' . ^
'consists m
this,
fact,
the c o l l e c t i v e
So
26.
labour.
labour
that
t h e m y s t e r y o f t h e commodity it
r e f l e c t s b a c k t o men,
s o c i a l n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of these
o f t h e i r own
social
w h i c h exchange t r a n s f e r s t h e
the o b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of the product
ter
the p r i v a t e
of labour i t s e l f ,
t h i n g s , the s o c i a l
Thus a l s o i t
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke, V o l . 23,
p.
as
87.
reflects,
as a
as
characsocial
403 .
relation
of things
e x i s t i n g o u t s i d e them, t h e s o c i a l
relations
27
of t h e producers t o the c o l l e c t i v e labour.'
w o u l d make l i t t l e
fetishises
sense t o s u g g e s t t h a t
'
Hence
the ordinary
it
individual
c o m m o d i t i e s b e c a u s e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l o v e r s i g h t on
his part.
The p r o d u c e r s , M a r x s u g g e s t s , do n o t have a c o n -
fused o r d i s t o r t e d
view o f t h e i r s o c i a l
t h e y a r e muddled t h i n k e r s .
relations
' R a t h e r ' , he a d d s ,
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e world o f commodities a r i s e s
because
'this
fetish
from t h e a c t u a l
28
social
c h a r a c t e r "of t h e l a b o u r w h i c h p r o d u c e s ' t h e c o m m o d i t i e s ' .
To
the producers
of
l a b o u r a p p e a r as w h a t t h e y a r e ,
social
as
relations
. ^
social
relations
of their private
t h e i r labour but rather
o f t h e p e r s o n s and a s s o c i a l
The m a t e r i a l
point
r e l a t i o n s which give
f o r us i s ,
rise
So, m
i n d i v i d u a l has a d i s t o r t e d
view o f things
relations
obscure t h e o b j e c t i v e
for the ordinary
consciosness.
that
indeed
Marx's view, t h e o r d i n a r y
T h i s , a s we c a n s e e , goes j u s t
as
relations
o f course,
to fetishism
a p p e a r as w h a t t h e y a r e .
social
acts
i . e . , n o t as i m m e d i a t e
o f t h e persons m
thing-like relations
of things
the
'the s o c i a l
because h i s
real
nature o f the world.
a s much f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h e r
The c o n f u s e d i d e a s o f
p h i l o s o p h e r s , M a r x and E n g e l s s u g g e s t , a l s o have t h e i r o r i g i n
i n confused h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l
are
in
wrong i n
their orientation
some m e a s u r e , - t h a t
27.
Ibid.,
p. 86
28.
Ibid.,
p. 87.
29.
Ibid.
circumstances.
Where t h e y
- as a r e a l l p h i l o s o p h e r s
c a n be e x p l a i n e d
f r o m some
real
404
circumstance o r other.
thought
fails
However, a l t h o u g h p h i l o s o p h i c a l
t o a c h i e v e what i t
i n g t o M a r x and E n g e l s , h i n t
with
It
that
the truth,
i tdistorts.
it
does,
accord-
a t t h e r e a l ground o f h i s t o r y
s u c h n o t i o n s as " S u b s t a n c e "
distorts
intends,
but i t
and " t h e e s s e n c e
o f man".
i s nevertheless the truth
To c l a r i f y
this
s u g g e s t i o n we must
r e t u r n t o M a r x ' s v i e w o f o u r n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s and p o w e r s
i n the Paris Manuscripts.
Our n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s and
p o w e r s when e x p r e s s e d , M a r x a r g u e s , a r e t h e m s e l v e s
ions of objective
conditions.
the n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e
express-
We may t a k e as an e x a m p l e
of sight.
W i t h o u r eyes,
Marx
w o u l d a r g u e , we see t h e w o r l d n o t o n l y as i t
subjectively
i m p i n g e s on us i . e . ,
o f t h e eye,
b u t a l s o as i t
a t t h e back
objectively
surround us.
o t h e r words,
ponds w i t h t h a t
Any o t h e r v i s i o n i s ,
there is
that
objects
a t best,
mirage,
What we s e e , t h e r e f o r e ,
t o be s e e n m
tne world,
corresother
o u r s i g h t g i v e s u s a c o h e r e n t image o f t h e r e a l
I n d e e d any o t h e r v i e w o f o u r n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e
fail
t h e image
When we s e e , we see t h o s e
a t w o r s t , an h a l l u c i a t i o n .
words,
is,
o f t h e eye i s an i m a g e ^ o f t h e o b j e c t s
come i n t o o u r v i e w .
that
as an image a t t h e back
t o make s e n s e .
of sight
argues t h a t a l l t h i n k i n g
some r e a l i t y
So when p e o p l e e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s
we c a n see a t w o r k
it
reflects
is
some o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l
o f course t h i s kind
h i s and E n g e l ' s
of reasoning that
suggestion that
He
because
t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f one o f o u r p o w e r s as n a t u r a l
beings.
would
T h i s view o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f o u r
a t t r i b u t e s and p o w e r s M a r x e x t e n d s t o o u r t h i n k i n g .
is
world.
it
limited
thought
stimulus.
lies
And
behind
the philosophers did not
405
entirely
m i s s t h e mark w i t h t h e i r s y s t e m s .
Indeed,
accord-
i n g t o Marx's view o f t h i n k i n g , t h e y c o u l d n o t .
There-
fore Hegel,
f o r one,
the
construction
of his
ideas concerning
out m
may
be
system but s t i l l
experience.
t h e German I d e o l o g y
tance" .
H e g e l had
d i s c u s s i n g how
f r o m one
seen t o h a v e e r r e d m
The
i s H e g e l ' s use
c u l t u r e was
h i s use
in
p a r t i c u l a r , but emphasising i t
what Marx t h i n k s
and
accumulated s k i l l s
ogical
seemingly
that
one
pointing
may
well
argue t h a t
M a r x and
circumstances.
For,
Now,
For
they, the
term
capitals
g e n e r a t i o n hands over
to the
of the
H e g e l , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e he was
an i d e o l o g i c a l
such t h i n k e r .
vagae
of
mind i n u s i n g t h e
at
Engels,
thinker
And
a l t h o u g h he
con-
ideol-
this.
Hegel's
reasoning
are u n l i k e l y t o t h i n k o f him
h o w e v e r , do;
i s one
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n h i s t h i n k i n g and
determined
is
n e v e r t h e l e s s as b e i n g
a g r e e t h a t , on some p o i n t s ,
ideologist.
to anything
supposes, t h e r e a l , p a l p a b l e source
shows s i g n s o f c o n f u s i o n b u t we
the
not
i n h i s t h i n k i n g no more t h a n h i n t e d
We
as an
r e c a l l t h a t he
of productive forces.
of a culture.
"Subs-
t h e Phenomenology
We
H e g e l r e a l l y had
the n o t i o n
o t h e r , a r e , he
of the term
preserving h i s t o r i c a l continuity.
was
tinuity
generation t o the other.
significance
important
handed down w i t h o u . t i n t e r r u p t i o n
prime
on
i n s t a n c e t h a t Marx p i c k s
used the term
of t h i s term,
t o have h i t
who
his
Hegel, they
realises
i n h i s t i m e i s a mere a p p e a r a n c e , he
n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e phenomenon and
fails
f o r they
fails
to
see
historically
suggest,
that
is
one
consciousness
t o grasp
the
con-
the r e a l ground o f h i s t o r y .
406 .
Thus he
fails
limited
one.
t o see h i s own
He
c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a h i s t o r i c a l l y
does i n d e e d
o t h e r s as l i m i t e d
and
see
infinite,
n e s s o f a p h i l o s o p h e r , he
the consciousness
b u t t o h i s own,
accords
or,
Geist.
rather,
it
Mind o r s p i r i t
is
one;
of course,
because i t
t h i s i s no
particularly
slurs
all
i d e o l o g y men
t h e i r circumstances
of
as
suggestion
is
ary
the r e t i n a
Consciousness i s
to give rise
of t h i s
to that
f o r M a r x and
indeed,
by K e g e l s own
culture
o f t h e t i m e s i m p l y as m i s t a k e n
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke 3> P-
26.
'if
it
of
m
though
as d o e s t h e
immediate p h y s i c a l
constitued
appearance.
reckoning,
cause
t h e mere i n v e r t e d
m
appearance
such
There i s
little
For him
does i n t h e
Engels,
question of representing the h a l f - t r u t h s ,
30.
process
Hegel's view o f t h i n g s .
But
They
phenomenon s p r i n g s
from t h e i r
s i m p l y t h e case t h a t Mind a p p e a r s as
consciousness.
Absolute.
position
a p p e a r as
life
r e a l i t y f o r them b e c a u s e r e a l i t y i s
a way
or
I n t h e i r view,
as much o u t o f t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l
process'.
limited,
the real
a Camera o b s c u r a s t o o d on t h e i r head t h i s
life
one
opposed t o H e g e l ' s
consciousness.
inversion of objects m
philos-
more t h a n a f a n t a s y .
phenomenality d
just
The
an i n f i n i t e
the
in
part-
i s a f o r c e above H i s t o r y
o v e r w h a t t h e y t a k e t o be
and
The
h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a
i t i s , Hegel suggests,
F o r M a r x and E n g e l s ,
are,
see
conscious-
i s able to
the moving f o r c e o f h i s t o r y .
o p h e r t h e r e f o r e need n o t
finite
the
a greater worth.
philosopher, through his s c i e n t i f i c e f f o r t s ,

icipate
of
ordin-
there is
no
the confusion
the d i s t o r t i o n
thinking
of
it
and
the
t o be
cured
407.
by p h i l o s o p h i c a l
of
Philosophy,
ations
reason.
F o r , as M a r x a r g u e s m
' t h e same men
conformity with
who
establish
t h e i r material
a l s o t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s , i d e a s and
the Poverty
their social
rel-
p r o d u c t i v e n e s s produce
categories m
conformity
31
with
and
their social
ideas are confused i t
and m a t e r i a l
It
relations',-
so t h a t
those
principles
stands t o reason t h a t those
r e l a t i o n s t o which they conform are the
also follows
that philosophical
t h i n k i n g on i t s
cure f o r t h a t d i s t o r t i o n o f r e a l i t y .
will
if
Ideological
own
ogy has
circumstances g i v i n g
rise
to i t
i n t h e i r society
might c a l l
the
to the d i v i s i o n of labour.
pretence that
' o r i g i n a l .'in
thinking is
of e x i s t i n g practice.
first
of ideological
where
ideolIndeed,
t o what
thinkers:
we
the
s o m e t h i n g more t h a n t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s
For, t h e y say,
'the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r
o f a l l becomes r e a l d i v i s i o n f r o m t h a t moment on w h e r e
h a v e a d i v i s i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l and m a t e r i a l
' f r o m t h i s moment', t h e y c o n t i n u e ,
itself
no
are removed.
t h e i r view, the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r g i v e s r i s e
labour'
' c o n s c i o u s n e s s can
and
imagine
or something o t h e r than the consciousness o f e x i s t i n g
practice,
thing
is
thinking
M a r x and E n g e l s a t t r i b u t e t h e p o w e r f u l h o l d t h a t
we
cause.
c e a s e t o h a v e a h o l d , M a r x and E n g e l s a r g u e , o n l y
those m a t e r i a l
social
r e a l l y conceive something, w i t h o u t
real
conceiving
any-
ition
f r o m t h i s moment on c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s m t h e p o s 32
t o emancipate i t s e l f from t h e w o r l d . .
But t h e y
31.
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke 4,
32.
Marx-Engels
Werke 3,
p.
130.
p. 31.
408
suggest the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r not

distortion
confusion
possible.
that
stances.
of
I t i s also the d i r e c t
reigns m
controlling
cause o f
until
the present,
p r o d u c t i o n and
As M a r x s a y s m
Capital
a s y s t e m o f p r o d u c t i o n whose t h r e a d s
so'.
conceptions
So,
that
they
suggest, i t
men
create
ions themselves bear witness

most t i m e s ,
foster
later,
Marx i n t r o d u c e s
that
the
not
i n s t e a d of the producers
it.
ution
i n t o his theory of
33-
Werke 23,
p.
121.
is
production
themselves
were weaved
I t is
conformity
at t h i s point,
ideology.
labour
behind
that
to
the
w i t h these
confusion
the n o t i o n s
controlled
continues
only natural
to this
division
'the d i v i s i o n o f
t h e b a c k s o f t h e p r o d u c e r s o f c o m m o d i t i e s and
be
the
circum-
p r o d u c t i o n , t h e c o u r s e o f p r o d u c t i o n has
the producers.
is
up
i t s e l f determined
the d i v i s i o n of labour,
ideological
men's m i n d s a b o u t t h e i r r e a l
They a r g u e t h a t ,
l a b o u r has
o n l y makes
relat-
and
indeed,
at
as we
shall
see
o f c l a s s and
revol-
409 .
THE CHARACTER OF MARX'S THEORY

B e f o r e we corne t o that p o i n t , however, t h e r e i s
some i m p o r t a n t ground we have t o cover m
t h e measure o f I d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n
propose.
still
our discussion o f
t h a t Marx and Engels
We may agree t h a t Marx's n o t i o n o f h i s t o r y makes
some s o r t o f sense as a measure o f i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n ;

b u t we must a l s o acknowledge t h a t Marx does n o t h i n g t o e s t a b l i s h the empirical v a l i d i t y o f his claim.
the impression
do so.
Indeed he g i v e s
t h a t i t would be beside t h e p o i n t f o r him t o
B u t t h i s i s n o t because, as Acton c l a i m s ,
'Marxists
tend t o r e g a r d t h e t h e o r y as one t h a t any candid person i s

bound t o accept as soon as he u n d e r s t a n d s i t ,
whole c r e a t i o n c o n s p i r e s t o p r o c l a i m . .
o r one t h a t t h e
I t i s because,
q u i t e s i m p l y , Marx's t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y i s n o t an e m p i r i c a l
theory.
one
An e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y
(and I f o l l o w Popper h e r e ) i s
t h a t can g i v e r i s e t o second o r d e r t e s t a b l e hypotheses.
These i f proved t o be t r u e can c o r r o b o r a t e t h e t h e o r y f o r us.

They must themselves pass a s t r i n g e n t t e s t , however, i f t h e y
are t o be regarded
as t e s t a b l e hypotheses.
They ( a g a i n
foll-
owing Popper) have always t o be open t o f a l s i f i c a t i o n o r ,

m
t h e p o s i t i v i s t s ' own j a r g o n , they have t o be such t h a t t h e
category
o f p o s s i b i l e f a l s i f i e r s remains open.
And these
f a l s i f i e r s must always c o n s i s t o f e m p i r i c a l l y o b s e r v a b l e
or events.
facts
No g r e a t i n s i g h t i s r e q u i r e d t o see, however,
t h a t no such t e s t a b l e hypotheses can be d e r i v e d from Marx and

Engels' theory o f ideology.
34.
From t h e Popperian p o i n t o f view
H.B.Acton. The I l l u s i o n o f t h e Epoch, pp 141 - 142.
410 .
the c a t e g o r y o f p o s s i b l e f a l s i f i e r s o f t h e i r t h e o r y always
remains c l o s e d .
Indeed Marx and Engels a r e n o t m
the least
concerned t o p r e d i c t what any one i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be observed

t o t h i n k a t any one t i m e o r t o e s t a b l i s h what m
caused t h a t t r a m o f t h o u g h t .
particular
They a r e r a t h e r concerned t o
e s t a b l i s h t h e parameters w i t h i n which we t h i n k .
Such para-
meters a r e , o f course n o t t h e k i n d s o f t h i n g t h a t can be

e m p i r i c a l l y observed n o r , even l e s s so, a r e hypotheses
them open t o e m p i r i c a l
falsification.
about
Marx and Engels
f o r e would n o t w i s h t h a t t h e i r t h e o r y be t e s t e d
They do indeed suggest, as do t h e E m p i r i c i s t s ,
that
theresense.
t h a t we r e f e r
t o our experience t o v e r i f y t h e i r theory.
But they do n o t
intend
When Popper t a l k s
experience m
t h e Popperian sense.
o f e x p e r i e n c e he means s c i e n t i f i c experiment and o b s e r v a t i o n .

Marx and Engels, however, have m
mind something f a r b r o a d e r
when t h e y appeal t o e x p e r i e n c e .
They have i n rnnd o u r a c t i v e
p r o d u c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e a r d what we might c a l l t h e c o l l e c t i v e
wisdom t o w h i c h i t has g i v e n r i s e .
Whatever e l s e t h i s mighc
make t h e i r t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y t o be, i t does n o t make i t an

empirical
t h e o r y i n t h e accepted s c i e n t i f i c
sense.
T h i s i s o f course a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t we have been l e d t o

expect.
I have argued t h a t what b r i n g s Marx t o compose h i s
theory o f ideology i s h i s conviction

our p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y .
t h a t a l l t r u t h concerns
He i s convinced o f t h i s because he
considers t h a t the only r e a l o r i e n t a t i o n m

p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e one.
experience i s the
A c c o r d i n g l y , h i s prime i n t e r e s t i s
i n why, how and under what c o n d i t i o n s we a c t ; and, as we have
411
seen., h i s view i s t h a t we a c t as n a t u r a l but c o n s c i o u s l y

p r o d u c t i v e beings under h i s t o r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d
conditions.
At t h e same t i m e , - and t h i s i s what excludes a p o s i t i v i s t

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e i r views - he and Engels are concerned
t o p o i n t out how we s h o u l d a c t .
s u r p r i s i n g , f o r Marx
and Engels assure us t h a t t h e i r s i s n o t
a m o r a l i s t i c standpoint.
not m o r a l i s t s
This conclusion i s a b i t
I t i s , indeed, t r u e t h a t t h e y are
i n the accepted sense, i . e . m o r a l i s t s
above
e v e r y t h i n g e l s e ; b u t i t does n o t mean t h a t t h e y dispense

altogether
w i t h t h e moral view.
i s t o integrate a morally correct

objective
view o f i t .
For what t h e y seek t o do

view o f e x p e r i e n c e w i t h an
They see themselves t h e r e f o r e as
d e r i v i n g t h e i r moral i m p e r a t i v e s from men's a c t u a l

affairs.
state of
T h i s we saw c l e a r l y i n Marx's C r i t i q u e o f t h e
Phenomenology.
For no
sooner does he argue a view o f man
t h e n he i s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e w o r l d be o r g a n i s e d m
way as t o accord w i t h t h a t view.
l i s h t h a t t h a t view s t i l l
such a
I t remains f o r us t o e s t a b -
prevails m
There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t i t does and t h a t ,
therefore,
the one consequence o f t h e view o f a c t i v i t y t h a t Marx and

Engels propose m
for
action.
the German I d e o l o g y i s i t s e l f a p r e s c r i p t i o n
Indeed t h i s i s an aspect o f t h e i r view o f exper-
i e n c e t h a t Marx and Engels themselves s t r e s s .

a r l y wish t o stress
it
They p a r t i c u l -
t h e German I d e o l o g y m
order t o d i s -
t i n g u i s h t h e i r views from those o f Ludwng Feuerbach.

bach h i m s e l f had suggested a t one p o i n t t h a t
Feuer-
'the h i t h e r t o
412
e x i s t i n g development o f s p e c u l a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y from t h e
a b s t r a c t t o t h e c o n c r e t e , from t h e i d e a l t o t h e r e a l
muddled' and, t h e r e f o r e ,
the r e a l has
'the t r a n s i t i o n from the i d e a l t o

35
i t s place only m
had a l s o suggested
- and may
p r a c t i c a l philosophy
He
- t h a t an adequate account
that i s already p r a c t i c a l .
But t h e y c l a i m ,
the German Ideology, t h a t Feuerbach does no more t h a n put
forward t h i s suggestion.
c a r r i e d out m
m
even have s t i m u l a t e d Marx and
. Engels t o t h i n k i n the same way

o f r e a l i t y I s one
is
I t i s n o t one
h i s philosophy.
We
that is successfully
can see t h i s , they suggest
t h e a t t i t u d e t h a t Feuerbach t a k e s t o Communism and
Ism,
'it
can be seen how
t h e y argue,
Social-
much Feuerbach deceives h i m s e l f ' ,
'when he d e c l a r e s h i m s e l f , c o u r t e s y o f t h e q u a l i f -
i c a t i o n "common man"
t o be a Communist.
He t h e r e f o r e t r a n s -
forms t h e word Communist i n t o a p r e d i c a t e " o f t h e " man,

wo^d which
the e x i s t i n g w o r l d denotes a p a r t i c u l a r
the
revol-
u t i o n a r y p a r t y he b e l i e v e s t o be a b l e t o t r a n s f o r m a g a i n
into
t 36
a category.
T h i s p a r t i c u l a r weakness i n Feuerbach's
i n g , t h e y suggest,
r e s t s on t h e g e n e r a l weakness t h a t m
reason
his
p h i l o s o p h y Feuerbach reduces each and every a c t i v i t y t o t h e

thought of i t .
bach contemplates
By t h i s Marx and Engels mean t h a t a l l Feuerwhen he contemplates
t h e w o r l d are
our
t h o u g h t s about i t and not its n a t u r a l sensuous impact on our35*

Ludwig Feuerbach.
P r e l i m i n a r y Theses Toward the Reform
o f P h i l o s o p h y , V o l . 2, SaTnlTche Werke, p. 231.
36.
Marx-Engels Werke 3, p.
4l.
413
selves.
Therefore, i t
appears t o Marx and Engels t h a t ,
when Feuerbach i s engaged i n a d v o c a t i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , Communism he has m
mind n o t t h a t t h e Communists s h o u l d make r e a l
p o l i t i c a l advances b u t t h e Communist t h e o r i e s
h o l d on E t h i c s .
should take a
For they argue t h a t Feuerbach shares
the i l l u s i o n o f t h e whole H e g e l i a n t r a d i t i o n , namely, t h a t

a change m
world.
our consciousness o f t h e w o r l d t r a n s f o r m s t h e
I t is therefore
go on t o c l a i m t h a t
n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Marx and Engels
'Feuerbach's whole d e d u c t i o n b e a r i n g on
the r e l a t i o n o f men t o one a n o t h e r o n l y goes so f a r as t o

prove t h a t men have need o f each o t h e r and always have done.
He wishes t o e s t a b l i s h a consciousness o f t h i s f a c t , wishes
therefore
j u s t l i k e the other t h e o r e t i c i a n s
about a c o r r e c t
o^ly t o b r i n g
consciousness c o n c e r n i n g an e x i s t i n g f a c t ,
w h i l s t what m a t t e r s f o r t h e r e a l communist i s t o o v e r t h r o w
the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o f a f f a i r s .
acknowledge t h a t Feuerbach m
For t h e r e s t , we c o m p l e t e l y
s t r i v i n g t o produce t h e c o n s c i o u s
ness o f t h i s f a c t goes as f a r as a t h e o r e t i c i a n can
possibly
go w i t h o u t c e a s i n g t o be a t h e o r e t i c i a n and p h i l o s o p h e r ' .
They f i n d t h a t Feuerbach s e t s as h i s aim t h e p r o p e r unders t a n d i n g o f our r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one a n o t h e r because he
thinks
t h a t s u f f i c i e n t t o b r i n g about a s i t u a t i o n where we do m
properly
r e l a t e t o one a n o t h e r .
For Marx t h e drawback o f Feuerbach's p o s i t i o n i s

fore clear.
37-
fact
there-
As w i t h Hegel, Feuerbach wishes men b o t h t o have
I b i d . , p. K2.
414
an awareness o f t h e r e a l i t i e s o f man's c o n d i t i o n and y e t

n o t t o a c t on t h a t where i t
man.
c o n t r a d i c t s a humanist view o f
As an example o f t h i s
f a i l u r e t o appreciate
'simultaneous r e c o g n i t i o n and
(verkennen) the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o f
a f f a i r s ' , he says m
t h e German I d e o l o g y ,
' l e t us r e c a l l t h e
p o i n t i n t h e 'Philosophy o f t h e F u t u r e ' where he " e l u c i d a t e s "

t h a t t h e b e i n g o f a t h i n g o r man i s a t t h e same t i m e h i s
essence, t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s
of existence,
mode
o f l i f e and a c t i v i t y o f an a n i m a l o r human i n d i v i d u a l i s t h a t
w h e r e i n i t f i n d s i t s "essence" s a t i s f i e d .
i s expressly
Here each e x c e p t i o n
understood as an u n l u c k y a c c i d e n t ,
m a l i t y w h i c h i s n o t t o be changed .^
as an abnor-
This represents a lack
o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s f o r Marx and
Engels because i t
The
p r o p e r way t o comprehend man i s n o t s i m p l y p a s s i v e l y , as
does Feuerbach.
ing
i s n o t an a c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y view o f t h i n g s .
on
We ought, i f we see man's essence as depend-
the p a r t i c u l a r conditions
t h a t those c o n d i t i o n s
of his existence,
t o recommend
o f e x i s t e n c e r e f l e c t what i s t r u l y human.
T h i s , Marx and Engels suggest, ought t o be p a r t o f o u r o b j e c t i v e

understanding of things.
the s h o r t - s i g h t e d
So we a r e n o t ,
f o r instance,
like
person who observes t h a t t h e whole mass o f
the w o r k i n g c l a s s i s d i s c o n t e n t e d
y e t concludes t h a t i t
w i t h i t s c i r c u m s t a n c e and
s h o u l d do n o t h i n g
about those c i r c u m s t a n c e ;
For Marx and Engels t h e r e i s no s t e p a t a l l between d e s c r i p t i o n

and
prescription m
an o b j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d .
To know how, why and under what c o n d i t i o n s

38.
Ibid.
we a c t i s , f o r
415
them, a t t h e same t i m e t o know how

So here a g a i n , m
we should a c t .
the German I d e o l o g y , we
find
that
Marx argues t h a t an o b j e c t i v e account o f the w o r l d i s a

p r a c t i c a l , r e v o l u t i o n a r y one.
measure o f an i d e o l o g y .
For t h i s a l s o i s p a r t o f h i s
Ideological thinking, is thinking

39
t h a t i s n o t premissed on p r a c t i c a l , r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y . ^
T h i s o f course would make v a s t c a t e g o r i e s o f t h o u g h t t o be
ideological.
who
Indeed
the s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t a l l t h i n k e r s
do not t h i n k l i k e Marx and Engels are i d e o l o g i s t s .
Now,
a l t h o u g h t h i s i s an a m b i t i o u s c l a i m , we would be wrong t o
condemn i t as mere arrogance on t h e i r p a r t .
to
As I have t r i e d
show, Marx does n o t a r r i v e a t h i s views w i t h o u t h a v i n g
first
r e f l e c t e d s e r i o u s l y on t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o -
blems.
He does so i n t h e f i r s t
i n s t a n c e by c o n f r o n t i n g h i s
views w i t h those o f Hegel and,> subsequently,

them w i t h those o f Feuerbach.
And
now
by c o n f r o n t i n g
again m
t h e German
I d e o l o g y he comes back t o t h e views o f Feuerbach.

in
f a c t , t o t h e p o i n t t h a t he made m
Feuerbach'.
i s t s conceived
intuition.
the f i r s t
He r e t u r n s ,
'Thesis on
Namely, t h a t Feuerbach l i k e a l l o t h e r m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y o n l y as Anschauung o r t h e o b j e c t o f

'Feuerbach's " c o n c e p t i o n "
o f the sensuous w o r l d ' ,
he says 'confines 11se 1 f on t h e one hand t o the mere apprehension

of
t h e same and,
on the o t h e r , t o mere f e e l i n g , . . ' ^
At
no
t i m e , t h e r e f o r e , ne suggests does Feuerbach r a i s e h i m s e l f above

39-
40.
'A second i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f t h e M a r x i s t t h e o r y i s t h a t t h e
" i d e o l o g i c a l " t h i n k e r i s h e l d t o be not only t h e o r e t i c a l l y , but
a l s o p r a c t i c a l l y , m i s l e a d i n g and m i s l e d . ' H.B.Acton, o p . c i t . p i 2
Marx-Engels Werke 3, p.
42.
416
the
p o s i t i o n o f a mere i n t e r p r e t e r o f t h e w o r l d .
Indeed
he cannot do so s i m p l y because what t h e w o r l d i s f o r him i s

what impresses i t s e l f on t h e senses, and t h a t sensuous w o r l d
is
( f o r Feuerbach) b o t h what i s r e a l and m o r a l l y d e s i r a b l e .
But he soon f i n d s , Marx suggests,

'm
the f i r s t place m
arily
t h a t t h i s w i l l n o t do, f o r
t h e apprehension
o f t h e w o r l d he necess-
comes across t h i n g s which c o n t r a d i c t h i s consciousness
and h i s f e e l i n g , which d i s t u r b what he assumes t o be t h e h a r mony o f a l l p a r t s o f t h e sensuous w o r l d and m

man w i t h n a t u r e ' . ^
What he f a i l s t o see i s
particular of
'how t h e sensuous
w o r l d s u r r o u n d i n g him i s n o t an immediate, something g i v e n

from a l l e t e r n i t y , a t h i n g t h a t i s c o n s t a n t l y self-same, b u t
the
p r o d u c t o f i n d u s t r y and t h e s t a t e o f s o c i e t y , and
i n t h e sense t h a t i t
the
indeed
i s a h i s t o r i c a l product, the r e s u l t of
a c t i v i t y o f a whole s e r i e s o f g e n e r a t i o n s each o f which
h?s stood on t h e s h o u l d e r o f t h e o t h e r , has developed
furtner
i t s i n d u s t r y and commerce and has m o d i f i e d i t s s o c i a l
order
42
a c c o r d i n g t o changed needs'.
What i s m i s s i n g m
Feuerbach's
account o f e x p e r i e n c e , i s a view o f t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r experi e n c e n o t as i s o l a t e d , self-same
o b j e c t s , g i v e n somehow from
a l l e t e r n i t y , b u t as h i s t o r i c a l p r o d u c t s .
'the
For, as Marx
says,
o b j e c t s o f t h e most simple " s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y " a r e g i v e n
t o him o n l y t h r o u g h s o c i a l development, i n d u s t r y and commercial

intercourse.
The c h e r r y t r e e , l i k e a l l f r u i t t r e e s was, as
i s w e l l known, o n l y transplanted t o o u r zone a few hundred

41.
Ioid.
42.
I b i d . , p. 43.
years
417
ago
by t r a d e and was
therefore f i r s t
o n l y by t h i s a c t i o n
o f a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y a t a c e r t a i n t i m e g i v e n t o "the sensec e r t a i n t y " o f Feuerbach'.

It
i s most i m p o r t a n t t h a t we
r i g h t context.
as a whole.
l o o k a t t h i s remark m
This context i s c l e a r l y t h a t of t h i s
I n t h i s s t u d y , I have shown how
e p i s t e m o l o g y and
study
the n o t i o n o f
e x p e r i e n c e are connected m
o f Marx and Hegel.
the
the t h i n k i n g
I n p a r t i c u l a r I have i l l u s t r a t e d
how
they t r a n s f o r m a narrow, merely e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f

e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a w i d e r s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l n o t i o n .
view t h a t Marx expresses about the o b j e c t s o f
represents
sense-certainty
the c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h a t development.
b r i n g s out p r e c i s e l y t h e change I have t r a c e d .
This
Indeed, i t
We
recall
from t h e f i r s t Chapter t h a t the E n g l i s h m a t e r i a l i s t s , Locke

and Hume, c o n c e i v e d e x p e r i e n c e ,
sense-perception
o f the w o r l d .
as does Feuerbach, as
The
our
o b j e c t s of experience
were f o r them what Marx and Hegel ca31 'immediate' and

Marx c a l l s
'given from a l l e t e r n i t y ' .
But
what
f o r Marx i t makes
no sense t o t a l k about o b j e c t s o r e x p e r i e n c e m
this
way.
O b j e c t s , he argues, are n e v e r ' c o n s t a n t l y self-same t h i n g s '

but always the p r o d u c t s
industry.
So
o f the e x i s t i n g s t a t e o f s o c i e t y
'the c a n d l e - s t i c k h e r e , the s n u f f box
as Hegel puts i t ,
\~i>. I b i d .
there',
o f the e x p e r i e n c e o f the c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m -
o l o g i s t s are h a r d l y p r t o f a somehow p r i s t i n e
and
sense-experience
418.
of the world.
be found m
They a r e , as Marx would p o i n t o u t , o n l y t o
t h e more c o m m e r c i a l l y advanced
societies.
Thus
even t h a t r e f l e c t i v e view o f e x p e r i e n c e was o n l y made p o s s i b l e

by a reasonable l e v e l o f advancement m
i n d u s t r y and c o m f o r t .
I t makes sense f o r Marx t o t a l k o f t h e o b j e c t s o f our experience m
t h i s way because i t
i s o f course h i s view t h a t t h e y
i m m e d i a t e l y c o n f r o n t us as o b j e c t s o f our needs, and t h a t
we
are from t h e b e g i n n i n g p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e m
r e l a t i o n t o them.
Experience i s always a p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
And s i n c e ob-
j e c t s are n o t g i v e n t o as i n a manner c o m p a t i b l e w i t h our

needs we have always t o t r a n s f o r m them i n t o our p r o d u c t s
t h r o u g h our l a b o u r .
I t i s these o f course t h a t the
contem-
p l a t i v e view o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t u i t s : t h e p r o d u c t s o f human
44
industry.
It
E x p e r i e n c e f o r Marx though b e g i n s p r i o r t o t h a t .
i s , as I have s a i d , t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f need whose s a t i s f a c -
t i o n , and what i s r e q u i r e d f o r i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n , depend on

the l e v e l o f advancement o f s o c i e t y .
Our e x p e r i e n c e i s
there-
f o r e always a n a t u r a l , s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
For as soon as we open our eyes t o t h e w o r l d ( b o t h m
and i n t e l l e c t u a l sense) we open our eyes t o a n a t u r a l ,
the n a t u r a l
limiting,
s o c i a l l y c r e a t e d and t h e r e f o r e h i s t o r i c a l l y l i m i t e d w o r l d .
T h i s i s what c o n s t i t u t e s e x p e r i e n c e f o r Marx.
44. Marx i s making a s i m i l a r p o i n t when he says i n C a p i t a l t h a t
' R e f l e c t i o n (Nachdenken) about the forms o f human l i f e , a l s o
t h e r e f o r e i t s s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s , t a k e s i n g e n e r a l an o p p o s i t e
p a t h t o t h a t o f t h e r e a l development. I t begins post festmus and
t h e r e f o r e w i t h t h e f i n i s h e d r e s u l t s o f the process o f development
The forms w h i c h stamp the p r o d u c t o f l a b o u r as commodities and
t h e r e f o r e are presupposed by commodity c i r c u l a t i o n a l r e a d y possess t h e f i x i t y o f n a t u r a l forms o f s o c i a l l i f e b e f o r e men seel; t o
g i v e an account o f themselves, n o t o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f
these forms, which a l r e a d y count as immutable f o r them, b u t o f
t h e i r c o n t e n t ( G e h a l t ) . MEW, V o l , 25,pp. 89 - 90.
419
And, as I have suggested, he i s k e e n l y aware o f how t h i s

view c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s t s view o f experience.
And he misses no o p p r t u n i t y , t o d r i v e home
his
point.
'So much i s t h i s a c t i v i t y , t h i s c o n t i n u o u s sensuous work and

c r e a t i o n , t h i s p r o d u c t i o n t h e b a s i s f o r t h e whole sensuous
w o r l d as i t now e x i s t s t h a t even i f i t were o n l y i n t e r r u p t e d
f o r a y e a r Feuerbach would n o t o n l y f i n d a huge a l t e r a t i o n
m
t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d b u t a l s o i n t h e whole human w o r l d and
he would v e r y soon miss h i s own means o f a p p r e h e n s i o n (Anschauungsverm8gen), indeed h i s own e x i s t e n c e ' . ^
I t makes l i t t l e
sense f o r him t o take a t i m e l e s s , p a s s i v e view o f e x p e r i e n c e

because what makes o u r a b i l i t y t o i n t u i t o b j e c t s a t a l l possi b l e , i s i t s e l f dependent on t h e c o n t i n u o u s l a b o u r and p r o d u c t i o n
o f mankind.
active m
We can o n l y i n t u i t because we a r e p r a c t i c a l l y
sustaining
our l i f e .
T h i s t h e r e f o r e , Marx s u g g e s t s ,
must be t h e way t o comprehend o u r e x p e r i e n c e , n o t az, o u r i n d i v i d u a l p r a c t i c a l l i f e b u t t h e 'sensuous w o r l d as f h e combined

l i v i n g sensuous a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t make i t
45.
Marx-Engels Werke 3, p. 44.
46.
I b i d . , p. 45.
up'.^
420
IDEOLOGY AMD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

I d e o l o g i e s , t h e n , a r e systems o f m i s t a k e n i d e a s
ning our a c t i v i t y .
system o f i d e a s .
concer-
And Feuerbach's p h i l o s o p h y i s one such

Vie have seen t h a t Marx a t t r i b u t e s t h e i r
development and h o l d t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r w i t h i n
As a system
o f p r o d u c t i o n t h a t has developed
o f t h e producers and t h e r e f o r e c o n t r o l s
society.
behind t h e backs
the l i v e s o f the
producers i n s t e a d o f b e i n g c o n t r o l l e d by them, i t i n e v i t a b l y
gives r i s e t o misconceptions m
t h e minds o f producers
about
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r a c t i v i t y and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o one a n o t h e r .
I d e a s , Marx and Engels argue, have t h e i r o r i g i n i n o u r experience.
But t h i s , they argue, i s n o t an a b s t r a c t e x p e r i e n c e ,
t h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s have i n v o k e d .
I t i s our
e x p e r i e n c e as c o n s c i o u s l y p r o d u c t i v e s o c i a l b e i n g s .
our i d e a s t h e r e f o r e , t h e y argue, m
i n which we reproduce o u r l i v e s .
We form
accordance w i t h t h e manner
A l l t h a t Marx's t h e o r y o f
i d e o l o g y says, t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t where t h a t system o f r e p r o d

u c t i o n i s confused o r d i s o r g a n i s e d o u r c o n c e p t i o n s w i l l be
s i m i l a r l y confused o r d i s o r g a n i s e d .
We can now see how Marx's sometimes c o n f u s i n g i d e a s
about
c l a s s and i d e o l o g y e n t e r i n t o h i s account o f e x p e r i e n c e and,

m
p a r t i c u l a r , h i s and Engels' s t r a n g e sounding c l a i m t h a t
t h e i r i d e a s , indeed t h e whole o f Marxian system,

t h e o r e t i c a l expression o f the r e a l l i f e
working class.
i s but the
position of the
F o r i t i s Marx's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t man - and
t h i s i n c l u d e s man qua p h i l o s o p h e r o r t h e o r i s t - as n o t a b e i n g
421
s q u a t t i n g o u t s i d e s o c i e t y , we know n o t where.
sum
of his social r e l a t i o n s .
He
i s the
I t follows therefore that
t h e r e can be no ideas which have no r e a l b a s i s m s o c i e t y .

They must be the e x p r e s s i o n o f some p r a c t i c a l m a t e r i a l c l a i m
or other.
And where those ideas concern
s o c i e t y as a whole
t h e y must be t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f the p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s o f
one o r o t h e r group.
E v i d e n t l y then Marx and Engels,
if
they are n o t t o condemn themselves as a b s t r a c t t h i n k e r s ,

have t o i n c l u d e t h e i r ideas under t h i s head as w e l l .
I h a r d l y need t o say a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t i t i s an axiom
f o r Marx and Engels t h a t
'the h i s t o r y o f a l l h i t h e r t o
existing
,47
s o c i e t y i s the h i s t o r y of class s t r u g g l e s .
So t h a t when
they come t o t a l k o f t h e s o c i a l groups whose i n t e r e s t s are

reflected m
The
systems o f t h o u g h t t h e y do so m
c l a s s r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f , t h e y argue,
terms o f c l a s s .
i s very
clearly
d e r i v e d from the n a t u r e o f t h e p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s m
epoch.
We
masters own
have masters and
any
given
s l a v e s , they c l a i m , where t h e
b o t h the means o f p r o d u c t i o n and t h e l a b o u r e r ;
l o r d s and s e r f s where t h e l o r d s own
b o t h t h e means o f produc-
t i o n and t h e s e r f ' s l a b o u r t i m e ; and c a p i t a l i s t s and wageworkers
where the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s owns the means o f p r o d u c t i o n
b u t buys the labour-power
o f the worker.
I t is
self-evident
from such an a n a l y s i s , they argue, t h a t t h e dominant c l a s s a t

any one
t i m e i s t h e dominant power m
production.
Now,
Marx and Engels f i r m l y b e l i e v e t h a t ideas have t h e i r

47.
Communist M a n i f e s t o , MEW,
VoJ 4, p.
462.
as
origin
422
i n such r e a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t
them t h a t m a t e r i a l dominance m
m
i s perfectly clear to
any epoch must be r e f l e c t e d
i n t e l l e c t u a l dominance, hence, t h a t
r u l i n g class are m
'the ideas o f t h e
each epoch t h e r u l i n g i d e a s ' .
T h i s they
argue must be so because 'the c l a s s which has t h e means o f

m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n a t i t s d i s p o s a l w i t h t h a t disposes
at the
same t i m e over t h e means o f i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n .
Thereby
the
ideas o f those who do n o t have t h e means o f i n t e l l e c t u a l
p r o d u c t i o n a r e on average s u b o r d i n a t e t o i t ' .
Furthermore,
they say, 'those r u l i n g ideas a r e n o t h i n g more than t h e i d e a l

e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e r u l i n g m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , t h e r u l i n g materi a l r e l a t i o n s conceived as i d e a s ; t h e r e f o r e j u s t t h e r e l a t i o n s
which make one c l a s s i n t o t h e r u l i n g c l a s s a r e t h e i d e a s o f
48
t h e i r dominance'.
C o n t r a r y t o g e n e r a l o p i n i o n , t h e n , Marx
and Engels do n o t see t h e r u l i n g c l a s s m
one epoch as c o n s p i r -
i n g t o delude e i t h e r themselves o r t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e c l a s s e s .
It
i s s i m p l y , they argue,
And
i f a person
one
such memeber.
t h a t people
t h i n k as they
live.
i s a member o f a r u l i n g c l a s s he t h i n k s as
So i t
i s o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t he should en-
courage t h e spread o f t h e i d e a s o f h i s c l a s s and a t t e m p t t o

ensure t h a t they p r e v a i l m
society at large.
For i t
is
no more t h a n a consequence of ins d e s i r e t o p e r p e t u a t e h i s b e i n g .

Marx and Engels f u r t h e r suggest t h a t w i t h t h e development o f
s o c i e t y and t h e subsequent i n c r e a s e m
48.
MEW
Z, p. 46.
the d i v i s i o n of labour
4?3
the
r u l i n g c l a s s may
producers
spawn a s p e c i a l c l a s s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l
t o c a r r y out t h a t t a s k f o r them.
they do n o t h e s i t a t e t o c a l l
uses t h e term m
And
people
when Marx
i t s most p e r f o r a t i v e form he has i n mind
those i n d i v i d u a l s who
livelihood
ideologists.
These
'make i t
t h e c h i e f branch o f t h e i r
t h e development o f t h e i l l u s i o n s o f t h i s c l a s s
, 4q
about i t s e l f
. ^
I f t h i s i s so, t h e r e i s one
theory of experience
an i d e o l o g i s t ?
r a i s e s : Who
final
q u e s t i o n t h a t Marx's
t h e n can p o s s i b l y n o t
Or, what i s s i m p l y t h e same q u e s t i o n m
s h a r p e r form, are n o t Marx and Engels,

themselves i d e o l o g i s t s ?
by t h e i r own
be
a
admission,
I t i s o r t h o d o x nowadays t o t h i n k
so.
For, i t
appear?, a system o f ideas e x p r e s s i n g t h e prac-
tical
i n t e r e s t s o f t h e w o r k i n g - c l a s s can be n o t h i n g but
that.
T h i s , however, i s not an o p i n i o n t h a t Marx would share.
The
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t r u t h and o b j e c t i v i t y
t a i n e d r i g h t t h r o u g h h i s system.
not,
i s one t h a t i s sus-
His theory of ideology i s
t h e r e f o r e , one t h a t i s i n t e n d e d t o s u s t a i n i d e o l o g y b u t
t o b r i n g i t t o an end.
What i s odd about t h i s however, i s
h i s b e l i e f t h a t the manner m
i s t h r o u g h the p r a c t i c a l ,
class being f u l f i l l e d .
which t h i s i s t o b e
achieved
m a t e r i a l a m b i t i o n s o f the w o r k i n g Somehow Marx comes t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n ,
t h e n , t h a t t r u t h and o b j e c t i v i t y can c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e aims

o f t h e w o r k i n g - c l a s s s o c i a l i s t movement.
about?
i s one
49.
We
does t h i s come
a l r e a d y know t h a t Marx's view o f t r u t h o r o b j e c t i v i t
that is practical.
Ibid,
How
T r u t h , t h e r e f o r e , i s what c o i n c i d e s
424
w i t h men's needs,
What remains t o be seen though i s how
these needs a r e reduced t o t h e needs o f t h e w o r k i n g - c l a s s .

The
reason i s t h a t t h e w o r k i n g - c l a s s i s ,
the only class t h a t i s m
Marx argues,
a p o s i t i o n , and ever has been
t h e p o s i t i o n , t o c o n t r o l man's p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t o p u t an end t h e d o m i n a t i o n

p r o d u c t i v e process i t s e l f .
o f t h e producers
by t h e
T h i s w i l l a t t h e same t i m e
b r i n g t o an end i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , he b e l i e v e s , because
those confused
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which g i v e r i s e t o i t
have ceased t o e x i s t .
Marx's c o n v i c t i o n
will
T h i s l a r g e c l a i m a g a i n a r i s e s from
t h a t what, a t base, i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g i s t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r and t h e c l a s s
r e l a t i o n s t h a t have grown up a l o n g s i d e i t .
thinking is therefore
c a p i t a l i s t society,
Ideological
his mind i n s e p a r a b l e from
present
because t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r comes i n t o
i t s own w i t h commodity p r o d u c t i o n , where p r o d u c t i o n i s

decisively
separated
from consumption.
That development h e i g h t e n
t h e c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by t h e p r o d u c t i v e process o v e r t h e producer
and
e n t a i l s , Marx argues, t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n
still
appear i n a n a t u r a l form t o t h e producers
Under c a p i t a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e ,
themselves.
as under a l l o t h e r
p r e v i o u s modes o f p r o d u c t i o n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n appear
t o t h e producers
n o t as ones t h e y themselves c r e a t e and p e r p e t -
u a t e b u t ones t h a t have been c r e a t e d f o r them and t h a t

u a t e themselves.
perpet-
However Communism, w h i c h i s t h e mode o f
p r o d u c t i o n t h a t most corresponds t o t h e needs o f t h e w o r k i n g class,
' d i f f e r s from a l l p r e v i o u s movements m
utionises
that i t
revol-
t h e b a s i s o f a l l p r e v i o u s p r o d u c t i o n and commercial
4? 5
r e l a t i o n s and d e a l s w i t h a l l n a t u r a l l y d e v e l o p e d
premisses
c o n s c i o u s l y as t h e c r e a t i o n s o f p r e v i o u s men, t h u s
off
t h e i r n a t u r a l n e s s and s u b o r d i n a t e s
united
individuals'.
it
strips
t o t h e power o f
By d e a l i n g w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g
p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s c o n s c i o u s l y and a t t h e same t i m e
c l a s s d i v i s i o n t h e Communist movement w i l l
ideology.
the
F o r , Marx c l a i m s m
social l i f e
strips
process
i.e.
Capital,
stands
t o an end
'the s t r u c t u r e
the material
o f f i t s m i s t y v e i l when i t
bring
ending
of
production only
as a p r o d u c t
of free
51
socialised
Up u n t i l
will
men u n d e r t h e i r c o n s c i o u s
that
point,
appear m
They w i l l
Marx s u g g e s t s ,
a d i s t o r t e d way
planned
the life-process
t o t h e producers
revolution
therefore
It
and
It
the
view, prove
can b o t h d i s p e l
give
will
play.
of h i s view o f
t h e 'clouds o f e r r o r '
society
thinkers.
plays a role that
ophy c o u l d n o t , t o M a r x ' s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
of
themselves.
b o t h b e , and be s u b j e c t t o , i d e o l o g i c a l
Socialist
his
control'.
philos-
I t can,
experience.
from our t h i n k i n g
us one c o n c l u s i v e a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r u t h .
therefore
be t h e end o f p h i l o s o p h y b e c a u s e i t
end o f p h i l o s o p h y .
50.
Ibid.,
51.
MEW,
p. 70.
V o l 23, P- 9^.
fulfils
CONCLUSION
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY?
It
i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t
Marx e n v i s a g e d
it,
socialist
has n o t o c c u r r e d .
r e v o l u t i o n , as
I t seems t h e n ,
M a r x ' s v i e w s on p h i l o s o p h y h a v e n o t been f i n a l l y
test,
and i n d e e d
ektik:
t h a t Adorno ' s
'Philosophy which
suggestion
put t o the
Negative
a t one t i m e seemed o b s o l e t e ,
i n order.
Philosophy,
Adorno's s u g g e s t i o n , has a c o n t i n u e d
remains
if
we w e r e t o f o l l o w
relevance
b e c a u s e we h a v e
passed o v e r t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e a l i s e Marx's aims.

my v i e w , h o w e v e r , t h a t
expedient
there is l i t t l e
t o sanction p r e s e n t
philosophical discussion,
What M a r x ' s v i e w s t h r e a t e n i s n o t p h i l o s o p h y
of i t ,
I t is
need t o a d o p t s u c h a n
a t no t i m e do M a r x ' s a r g u m e n t s t h r e a t e n p h i l o s o p h y
p a r t i c u l a r conception
Dial-
r e a l i s a t i o n was m i s s e d .1
a l i v e because t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r i t s
may be e n t i r e l y
that
for
itself.
as s u c h , b u t one
namely, t h a t o f Hegel.
T h i s we c a n see when we l o o k a t M a r x ' s m a j o r o b j e c t i o n

to philosophy.
osophy i s t h a t
As we have s e e n , h i s m a j o r o b j e c t i o n t o p h i l it
represents abstract thinking.
means t h i n k i n g w h i c h ,
like
that
found
o l o g y , ends u p w i t h o u t an o b j e c t .
By t h i s
theHegelian
for this
conflict
1.
that
process
Adorno.
which
Negative
1970, . y~.
P
is to
The g r o u n d s
o f v i e w s come o u t i n an a n a l y s i s o f t h e i r
respective notions o f experience.

as
Phenomen-
H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m t h a t Marx o b j e c t s .
Marx
Mind
Experience
(orSpirit)
Dialektik,
Hegel
describes
f i r s t externalises
Suhrkamp V e r l a g ,
Frankfurt,
427
itself
t o e s t a b l i s h t h e sensuous w o r l d b u t , s u b s e q u e n t l y ,
re-establishes i t s e l f
the
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y by
s e n s u o u s w o r l d as t h e o t h e r o f i t s e l f .
view, experience i s
objectification
It
in its
this
process
o f M i n d and
the r e t r a c t i o n
finite
for
t h i s view of experience.
seen, t h a t
things.
it
can
I n d e e d he
i s not a view t h a t
that
retract.
objects without
We
our
we
our o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n
c a n n o t , he a r g u e s ,
it
is,
tnave t o p r o p o s e
of course, m
of
is this
Marx's f i r s t
For i t
m a j o r p u b l i s h e d w o r k : The
must be g r a n t e d t h a t on f i r s t
we
might
expect
i n o t h e r words,
that
But
e t h i c s and
philosophy' - but r a t h e r a c r i t i c a l
once
view of
new
Poverty of Philosophy.
s i g h t t h e book seems
we
about
account
discover
of philosophy,
epistemology - a l l of
a book s u p p o s e d l y
i t does
paradoxical t i t l e
B e c a u s e , on g l a n c i n g t h r o u g h i t ,
instance, logic,
something
superceding philosophy.
no g e n e r a l d i s c o u r s e on t h e v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s
for
examin-
experience
a different
is
have
objectification
of i t .
t h a t e x p l a i n s the seemingly
badly e n t i t l e d .
as we
p r o p o s i n g such a
v i e w o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t M a r x t h i n k s he
It
justification
i s not
s u c h a way
on o u r c o n s c i o u s n e s s
a c k n o w l e d g e t h i s we
e x p e r i e n c e ; and
t h e essence o f
argues,
becoming t h e i r o b j e c t ,
or
alienation.
s t a n d s up t o i n t e r n a l
without the r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g
depend e n t i r e l y
his
opinion,
e x p l a n a t i o n of the n o t i o n of
shows, M a r x b e l i e v e s ,
not
i n Hegel's
Marx, h o w e v e r , f i n d s l i t t l e
For a f u l l
w h i c h we
of that
t h e v i e w t h a t M i n d i s a b s o l u t e and
all
ation.
So,
of the e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n
i s t h i s n o t i o n of experience which,
justifies
knowing
the
which
'poverty of
o f the work o f
428
a popular French economist.

the
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Marx i n t e n d s
w o r k t o be a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o p h i l o s o p h y b e c a u s e
it
he
a t t a c k s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l method w h i c h
to
have d e r i v e d f r o m H e g e l .
because I t
criticising
So
criticising
f o r M a r x t h e method
it
b e l i e v e s h i m s e l f t o have b r o u g h t
to
the thought of i t ,
that
i n the f i n a l
a b s t r a c t i o n and
a logical
drop b i t
it
Are
we
reduces every o b j e c t
'are we
t o be
t o be s u r p r i s e d
are concerned
with
front
t h e end
o f u s ; and
i t s e l f , the l o g i c a l
marks i t
have f i n a l l y
a space a l o n e ;
have no more l e f t ,
can w i t h t h e H e g e l i a n
finally
t h a t when we d i s r e g a r d
of
other than
c a t e g o r y o f q u a n t i t y * ^ So
'everything jnto a l o g i c a l
of a
o u t we
a b s t r a c t from the dimensions
we
as
s u r p r i s e d t h a t i f we l e t
then the form which
ultimately
a b s t r a c t i o n ' we
The
of a l l the b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s of
o u t l i n e s o f t h i s body we
space t h a t m
down p h i l o s o p h y .
says,
be
down
a l l t h a t makes up t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y
consists,
t h a t when we
he
of
n o t a n a l y s i s - each t h i n g p r e s e n t s i t s e l f
h a v e o n l y a body m
the
i n bringing i t
a b s t r a c t i o n - f o r we
category?
by b i t
and,
Proudhon
believes himself to
Marx's v i e w ,
house, d i s r e g a r d i n g f i r s t
which
he
p h i l o s o p h y and, indeed,
p h i l o s o p h i c a l method, m
takes
T h i s method o f P r o u d h o n ' s ,
i s Hegel's method, i s
philosophy.
he
and
this
quantity
'by d i n t
of
a b s o l u t e method t r a n s f o r m
category'.
2.
I t i s indeed t r u e t h a t t h e work t o w h i c h Marx a d d r e s s e s

h i m s e l f m p a r t i c u l a r was c a l l e d t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f P o v e r t y
and t h a t M a r x has n o t m i s s e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a p l a y
on w o r d s .
Marx.
M a r x - E n g e l s Werke 4,
p. 127-
429
T h e r e can
the
be no d o u b t t h a t
'poverty of philosophy'.
this,
f o r Marx,
H e g e l , he
represents
argues,
thinks
I s c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e w o r l d by means o f t h e movement o f
whereas', m
and
fact,
'he
is
only reconstructing systematically
are m
t h e minds o f a l l ' . *
t h e r e f o r e , has
world
Philosophical thinking,
The
p h i l o s o p h e r indeed
as
the
comprehends t h e
a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d manner t h a n t h e o r d i n a r y
b u t a t t h e same t i m e m i s t a k e n l y b e l i e v e s t h a t
of
thoughts
the basic defect of regarding thought
essence o f r e a l i t y .
ing
thought
c l a s s i f y i n g e c c o i d i n g t o t h e a b s o l u t e method t h e
which
exhausts
experience.
M a r x i s one
that
We
fits
a r e by now
this
clear that
to
any
p a r t i c u l a r philosophy nor
So
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u r s u i t s s u c h as l o g i c and
u n a f f e c t e d by any
criticism
p a r t i c u l a r philosophy.
i n Hegelian
H o w e v e r we
Hegel a p t l y
Philosophy
indeed
any
t h a t M a r x has
failed
t o see
to reject
this
is not
philosophical thesis.
ethics w i l l
to o f f e r of
remain
one
this.
For him,
to
is a child
reaching his
d o m i n a t e d by H e g e l i a n i s m .
We
As
of h i s time.
intellectual
should not
be
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Marx b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f t o have
philosophy
r e j e c t i n g Hegel's account of experience.
however, w i t h the b e n e f i t
4.
r e j e c t i n g philosophy
Ibid.
he
w o u l d be w r o n g t o condemn hirn f o r t h i s .
a t t h e t i m e M a r x was
one
I
tied
surprised,
rejecting
view
philosophy.
p o i n t e d o u t , each person
m a t u r i t y was
understand-
Marx, h o w e v e r , so w r a p p e d up was
philosophy,
r e j e c t H e g e l i a n i s m was
man
w e l l w i t h Hegel's i d e a l i s m .
need h a r d l y p o i n t o u t , h o w e v e r , t h a t p h i l o s o p h y
not
'he
view of
p. 130.
o f h i n d s i g h t , can
itself.
philosophy.
As
see
We,
t h a t he
I h a v e s a i d , he
rejected
is
was
simply
430
M a r x c a n , h o w e v e r , be
criticised
on one
score,
t h a t as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was
p h i l o s o p h y he
left
lems t h a t a r e
r a i s e d by h i s v i e w o f e x p e r i e n c e .
w o r d s b e c a u s e he
with
He
beyond
took the view t h a t philosophy deals
f o r i n s t a n c e , t o argue a p r a c t i c a l
knowledge which
notion of t r u t h .
inherently
But
only
can now
profound
Marx, h o w e v e r , has
M a r x , f a r f r o m b r i n g i n g an end
h i s view
of
course,
no d e s i r e t o
as
i g n o r e s what,
of experience.
to philosophy,
important philosophical questions.
views.
sees h i m s e l f
C o n s e q u e n t l y he
are p r e s s i n g problems m
see
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the
i m p l i c a t i o n s b e c a u s e he
philosophy.
theory
questions of t r u t h are, of
philosophical.
f o l l o w out these
superceding
c l e a r l y has
prob-
I n other
s e r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s a t t e n d a n t on h i s
wishes,
t o us,
going
u n t o u c h e d many o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t
s c h o l a s t i c q u e s t i o n s , he n e g l e c t e d w h a t we
t o be
namely,
r a i s e s new
So
and
43J -
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Durham E-Theses: The End of German Classical Philosophy An Interpretation of The Doctrines of Hegel and Marx

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THE END OF GERMAN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

AN INTERPRETATION OF THF DOCTRINES

OF HEGEL AND MARX.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author

p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem, ' t h e problem o f knowledge' m

t o b r i n g out the p o s i t i v e aspects

obstacle to a correct notion

n o t been t o deny t h a t H e g ^ l and

r e j e c t i n g the problem they, m

HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

HEGEL AND GERMAN IDEALISM

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND

The D i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e ' t h i n g ' o f

MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL's

THE THESES ON FEUERBACH:

Marx and t h e Problem o f Knowledge

THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

THE END OF PHILOSOPHY?

into three parts.

I discuss the p h i l o s o p h i c a l background

approaches, I b e l i e v e , run the r i s k

terms o f the system

d e a l i n g w i t h the c e n t r a l tenets of the

the S o c i a l Science Research C o u n c i l

HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

then, a major preoccupation

Marx and H e g e l ' s abandonment o f

c r i t i c i s m s " o f Habermas i s t h a t o w i n g t o M a r x and H e g e l

rather than being the

merely a work o f ' d e m o l i t i o n ' .

'Problem o f Knowledge ' s u g g e s t s , I b e l i e v e , an i g n o r a n c e o f

surrounding the problem.

o f our knowledge, i s a l e a d i n g motive

I n t e r e s s e o r what I have chosen t o c a l l Epi s t c m o i o g y

w i t h i n the context of epistemology.

( t o borrow a phrase o f Marcuse's) s o c i a l

sets about the t a s k

the account o f t h i s whole process,

H e g e l ' s most d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e and

not from something

but s i m p l y from t h i s freedom

I f thought begins from the c e r t a i n t y o f the

Descartes' philosophy that

the proper discern-

Ideas are true

i s not simply t o a t t a i n a certainty

What i s more, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e one a s p e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y ,

turns his a t t e n t i o n t o acquiring a concrete

from Descartes' P r i n c i p l e s o f Philosophy:'

only thought that

being able t o assert that

finds himself i n the position

ideas but also o f having t o assert that

ideas t o the e x t e r n a l world.

Suhrkamp Werke 20,p. 1^6.

For He has g i v e n me no means o f knowing t h a t t h i s i s so, but

emanate from m a t e r i a l t h i n g s , and i t would be d i f f i c u l t not t o