Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Reform, Reform The Reforms or Simply Regression? The 'Washington Consensus' and Its Critics
Reform, Reform The Reforms or Simply Regression? The 'Washington Consensus' and Its Critics
Reform, Reform The Reforms or Simply Regression? The 'Washington Consensus' and Its Critics
D. MAVROUDEAS'&
. Department
..Bank
of Greece.
44
REFORM,
REGRESSION?
/ 45
46
/ 47
lower strata. The same holds for the push towards a market economy
and the opening of the economy. The first stems from a neoconservative
conception of the economic role of the state and of its alleged inability
to manage properly the economy. The second has the same origins
complimented with the simplistic belief that it will lead. to increased
competition and thus consumers will in the end be better off. As it will
be shown in the next chapter, these had the same negative effects as
the first big idea. In this sense, the Washington Consensus is a
perspective that dictated a policy prescription. Indeed, under its
auspices, numerous reform programs were imposed-w'illingly or
unwillingly-on less developed or developing countries.
The controversy about the definition established rightfully a
meaning for the term. The actual content of a term is not given by the
intentions of its founders but by the broader socio-political environment
and the practical outcomes of the policies dictated by the term. On
these grounds, it is overwhelmingly clear that .in the 1980s and 1990s
there predominated in official circles a current that considered as its
main task the abolition of the state-run development policies and the
restoration of the free operation of the market disregarding costs and
special features of the developing economies. This current was clearly
associated with neo-liberal theory and the Washington Consensus was
its arm in the field of Development theory and policy. Consequently,
the discussion of the concept cannot be constrained to the limited
agenda of issues that its creator proposed but must encompass its whole
spectrum of theory and applications. Williamson (2002) himself soon
conceded the argument accepting that, from the time that the term
became public property, its meaning is being set by the wider
perception about it. Therefore, he declared that there is no meaning in
struggling for the content of the term and called for an issue-by-issue
discussion of the proposed policies.
WASHINGTON CONSESUS AND ITS CONSEQUENSES
Besides the controversy on its definition, there is also a heated debate
on whether the Washington Consensus promoted the development of
developing and less developed economies or not. Today there is a
widespread perception that it failed and that it led to crises and
impoverishment. It would not be unfair to state that the term truly
carries a bad reputation. This is accepted even by its defenders as, for
example, by Naim (2002) who acknowledged that the Washington
Consensus is a 'damaged brand name'. Criticisms and the concomitant
bad reputation do not stem only from theoretical and ideological
48
49
In the first case, Mexico, the problems were caused by the attempt
to open the economy and introduce financial liberalisation. This led to
the collapse of the peso and the default of the Mexican debt. In the
Asian case the crisis was caused by the attempts to conform to an
international environment a-la Washington Consensus and at the same
time to reform their internal structure away from the Asian
developmental model and towards the Washington Consensus
prescriptions. The crisis took again the form ohn exchange rate crisis
and led to abrupt abandonment of these reforms. The Russian case is
different since it stems from the transition process towards a market
economy. Shock adjustment policies, the opening of the economy and
its increased financialization made it vulnerable to contagion effects
of the Asian crisis. This caused the collapse of the stock market,
subsequent devaluations of the rouble and finally the suspension of
its convertibility. In the Brazilian case the attempt to ir1troduce financial
liberalisation backfired. The imposition of fiscal discipline by
redirecting public expenditure towards other fields and the reform of
the tax system towards Washington Consensus standards demolished
the Brazilian fiscal and tax system. This led to an exchange rate crisis
again. Finally, the Argentinean case encompasses all the features of
the Washington Consensus prescription. It began with an ambitious
plan of budget, trade and monetary reform and quite soon proceeded
to a currency board, Le. the pegging of the peso to the US dollar on an
one-to-one basis. These reforms created serious problems in the
economy and led to the biggest sovereign default in modern history.
A closer look to each of these cases will enlighten the inherent
problems of the Washington Consensus prescriptions and the causes
51
52/
REFORM,
BULLETINOF POLmCALECONOMY
REGRESSION?
/ 53
54
REFORM,
REGRESSION?
/ 55
56 /
the Argentinean economy got out of control not because of the lack of
fiscal order or a high debt/ GDP ratio but exactly because of the attempt
to impose internal macroeconomic' discipline' and external openness
almost automatically through the currency board.
FRIENDS AND FOES OF THE WASHINGTON CONSESUS
Three broad streams can be discerned regarding the evaluation of the
Washington Consensus. The first stream encenipasses its defenders
and supports, critically or uncritically, its legacy. The second one stems
also from neoclassical economic theory but assesses negatively the
impact of the Washington Consensus and also disputes part of its
analytical framework. This second stream is associated with the postWashington Consensus argument. Finally, there is a third stream
coming from Marxist ana Radical Political Economy that not only
assesses negatively the impact of the Washington Consensus but also
adheres to a completely opposite analytical and ideological perspective.
Reformists and Fundamentalists
The supporters of the Washington Consensus are subdivided in two
camps. The first one comprises of the fundamentalists that argue that
the failures of the Washington Consensus were the result of faulty
implementation and reluctant reformers (e.g. Krueger (2000), Franco
(1999. The sec.ond camp argues that there should be 'a reform of the
reforms', i.e. that despite Washington Consensus merits it is necessary
a reappraisal of its agenda (e.g.Kuczynski &Williamson (2003),ECLAC
(1995), Ffrench-Davis (2000.
For the fundamentalists both the neo-liberal character and the
policy prescriptions are correct. What went wrong is the way they were
applied. Thus, in pushing through the reforms careful consideration
has to be given to state capacity, bureaucratic constraints and agency
problems. Issues of effective governance and even' second-best options'
have to be taken into account. There is, however, a new element that
creeps in their defence of the Washington Consensus. By focusing on
these issues, they have to pay attention to the role of the institutions;
an elementrather alien to the pure versions of the neo-liberal approach.
However, a growing majority of the adherents to the Washington
Consensus recognizes that its problems are much more serious than
simply implementation errors. This approach has been enforced by
internal disagreements within mainstream economics. The poor record
of the Washington Consensus has caused significant urieasiness within
the mainstream~ which culminated, from the mid-1990s and onwards,
/ 57
58
REFORM,
REFORM
THE REFORMS
OR SIMPLY
REGRESSION?
/ 59
60 /
There is also a more radical critique of both the Washington and the
post-Washington Consensuses coming from the Marxist Political
Economy. This approach follows a different analytical course by
focusing on social classes and the struggle between them rather than
on maximising individuals (as both Consensuses do). In this context
the Washington Consensus is a vehicle for the exertion of imperialist
dominance by the developed capitalist economies (and primarily the
US) over the developing and less developed countries. Its set of policies
advances the specific interests of these economies, which are similarly
advanced with the so-called globalisation.
Thus, Shaikh (2003, 2004) disputes that trade and financial
liberalisation promotes development, as both the Washington and the
post-Washington Consensus (more qualified) believe. Empirically, the
now developed economies have, in the past, systematically used activist
and protectionist trade and financial policies in order to attain their
present status and, in many cases, they follow them even today. Also,
as even mainstreamers accept (e.g. Rodrik (2001), p.7), it has been
proven that liberalisation policies do not lead to higher growth rates.
Thus, the pressure the pressure to liberalise favo~s the developed over
the developing by prohibiting for the latter to follow the path of the
former. Shaikh, also, shows that these ill-guided policies stem from
the erroneous orthodox 'theory of comparative costs' and he argues
that an approach based on the classical theory of 'competitive
advantage' is both analytically and empirically superior.
Similarly, Fine (2001a, 2001b, 2002) criticises the Washington
Consensus for consciously neglecting crucial aspects of the
development process in order to push the neo-liberal reforms that
promote the interests of domina.nt capitalist economies. He also
criticises the post-Washington
Consensus for not being a true
alternative to its predecessor and for, ultimately sharing the same
analytical and policy agenda. Despite its vociferous opposition, it
actually shares the same analytical foundations, namely methodological
individualism, with the additionally flavour of the emphasis on
informational asymmetries. This reductionism to individual behaviour,
/ 61
62 /
/ 63
theory and policy. As such it has similar merits but also suffers from
similar deficiencies with its developed countries' blueprints. It has
sustained capitalist profitability in the mid -run by providing new areas
for investment, reducing labour wage and non-wage costs and clearing
the economy from unviable individual capitals. On the other hand, by
overemphasising the role of competition it fall to the naive belief that
simply the spontaneous action of individual capitals will suffice to
return the capitalist economy to another' golden era' of accumulation.
However, there exist significant contradictions between individual and
collective capitalist interests and for this reason the role of the state, as
a 'collective capitalist', is necessary. Furthermore, the width and the
depth of the capitalist restructuring required to surpass the structural
crisis necessitates much more than the spontaneous action of the market
forces. This is another reason why the state is required as a commanding
centre, which will guide, motivate and correct the market.
These inabilities lie at the heart of the failures of neo-liberalism
and of the Washington Consensus. Tantamount to that is the renewed
emphasis-either by its supporters or by its mainstream critics-on the
role of institutions. For these reasons both neo-liberalism and the
Washington Consensus are virtually dated in the beginning of the 21"1
century and the search began for their successors. Social-liberalist trends
appear as such successor and the post-Washington Consensus is part
of them. Their main trust is that they represent a rupture within the
continuum of neo-liberalism. They built upon its successes but also
strive to correct its deficiencies. Thus a new role for the stateheadquarter is researched and also, in the face pf serious social
upheavals, a more sophisticated form of attacks on and compromises
with the working class and the other popular classes.
However, this new emerging orthodoxy has its own deficiencies
and, in the cases of the post-Washington Consensus, the radical critiq!le
is very accurate on that. In analytical terms, its critique against the
Washington Consensus correctly pinpoints its non-social character and
its inability to grasp the socia-political dimensions of the development
process. However, this defect cannot be repaired by simply adding a
role for the state and the institutions to combat market imperfections
caused by informational asymmetries and conceived on the basis of
methodological individualism. The sodo-political dimensions ofthe
development problem are far wider, cannot be grasped properly even
by 'socialised' versions of methodological individualism and require
more radical and rigorous instruments than simple institutionbuilding. In a sense, where the Washington Consensus creates (or
64
expands) markets-and
in some cases where this cannot be done it
creates quasi-markets by imposing private-sector modes of operationthe post-Washington
Consensus attempts to create quasi-societies as
complements
to the markets. It neglects that it is social and class
interests that create institutional frameworks and rules -and som.etimes
even markets. Furthermore, the division in different social and class
interests is not the result of more or less fleeting informational
asymmetries but of more fundamental and deep-rooted socio-political
factors. For all these reasons and despite the valiant critique of its
proponent against its predecessor, it seems that the most that the postWashington Consensus can offeris a compromise with the former.
This is probably bound to produce similar dismal results with the
Washington Consensus regarding the development process. The only
area where it may have a limited success is in a form of gatopardismoto borrow from Lucino Viscodi's famous film: everything in the system
has to be changed in order for the system to remain unchanged.
References
Atkinson, A. (1999a), 'Is Rising Inequality Inevitable? A Critique of the
Transatlantic Consensus', third WIDERAnnual Lecture, Helsinki.
Atkinson,A. (1~99b)TheEconomicConsequences
of RollingBacktheWelfareState,
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chossudovsky,M. (1997),TheGlobalisation
of Poverty:Impactsof IMF and World
BankReforms,
London:Zed Books.
Economic Commission for the Latin America and ,the Carribean of the U.N.ECLAC(1995)PoliciestoImproveLinkageswith theGlobalEconomy,
Santiago:
United Nations.
Fine,B.(2001a),SocialCapitalversusSocialTheonj:PoliticalEconomy
andSocialScience
at theTurn of theMillennium,London: Routledge.
Fine, B. (2001b)~'Neither the Washington nor the post-Washington consensus:
An introduction' in Fine B., Lapavitsas, e. and Pincus, J. (eds) From
DevelopmentPolicyin theTwenty-firstcentury:BeyondthePost-Washington
Consensus,
London: Routledge: Studies in Development Economics.
Fine, B. (2002), 'Globalisation and Development: The Imperative of Political
Economy', preliminary draft for the Conference 'Towards a New Political
Economy of Development: Globalisation and Governance', Sheffield, July.
Fisher, S. (2003),'Globalization and its Challenges', AmericanEconomicReview93:
1-30.
Ffrench-Davis, R. (2000),Reformingthe Reforms in
G. (1999), 'Brazil's
Economic
Complacency,
REGRESSION?
/ 65
Economics.
D. (1992), 'Conceptual
Stiglitz,J.(1989),'Markets,MarketFailuresandDevelopment',AmericanEconomic
Review79: 197-203.
Stiglitz, J. (1994), 'The Role of the State in Financial Markets' in Proceedings of the
World Bank Annual Conference on Development economics, vol. 2, World
Bank, Washington, D.e., May.
Stiglitz, J. (1998a), 'More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the
Post-Washington Consensus', the 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture Helsinki,
January.
Stiglitz, J. (1998b), 'Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies
.
and Processes', Prebisch Lecture, UNCTAD, Geneva.
Williamson,!- (1990~, 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform' in Williamson
(ed.) Latm Amerzcan Adjustment: How much has happened?,Washington: Institute
for International Economics.
Williamson,}- (1997), ?he Washington Consensufi Revisited', in Emmerij, L. (ed.),
EconomIcand SocIalDevelopmentinto theXXI Century, IDB,Washington, D.e.
66
l
C
[
!