RONAN PHILIPPOT (ERASMUS)

TRANSFORMING CITIES
DECEMBER 2013

URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS

Urban Development Corporations

Introduction

This essay will provide a critical evaluation of a flagship government urban regeneration policy;
the Urban Development Corporations (UCDs). The essay is based on Part 2 of the module, the
evolution of national urban policy and on some key readings. Firstly, we will present the political
and philosophical context of the 1980s behind the UCDs and a succinct summary of the policy.
Secondly, we will draw up a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UCDs using city case
study examples. To conclude we will resume the key messages and state the lessons learnt for
future regenerations and urban policies.

Establishment of the UCDs: political and philosophical context and

succinct summary of the policy
The great recession of the 1970s and 1980s was bound to change the nature of the basic
perceived problem with which planning had to deal, and thus to threaten its very legitimacy. It
hit British economy with especial force, exposing deep structural weaknesses: a large part of the
country s manufacturing base disappeared, bringing a loss of two million factory jobs between
1971 and 1981.1 Especially in over wide areas of the country, like Liverpool, London and
Birmingham.
Therefore, during the 1980s, conventional planning, the use of plans and regulations to guide the
use of land, seemed more and more discredited. Instead, planning turned from regulating urban
growth, to encourage it by any and every possible means. Cities, the new message rang loud and
clear, were machines for wealth creation; the first and chief aim of planning must be to oil the
machinery. The guidance and control of growth, traditional concern of the British statutory
planning system since 1947, had quite suddenly been replaced by an obsession with
encouraging growth at any cost.
The 1980s were also characterised by an entrepreneurial approach to urban policy. It is a
perspective on urban development that views the city as a product that needs to be marketed.
This marketing approach and emphasis on restructuring the city to appeal to global business,
assign pre-eminence to economic interests in the decision-making process of urban planning.2
Consequently, cities competed for investment, jobs, skilled workers, visitors and affluent
residents. Those cities were focused on competitiveness, marketing and image management. The
1980s were the beginning of public-private partnership, based on US experience in the 1970s.
That partnership consists in a shift from public to private sector in regeneration and in cooperation between government and private sector.
In this context, the UDCs were created by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act
and became the most significant element of urban policy in England and Wales. UDCs
1
2

Hall, 2002; Massey and Meegan 1982.

Pacione, 2009; Transforming Cities.

represented also the flagship, the jewel in the crown, of Conservative government urban policy.
Their remit was originally outlined by Michael Heseltine, then Secretary of State for the
Department of the Environment, in 1979. He saw the UDCs as both a political and economic
mechanism for unlocking the development potential of the inner cities. The UDCs were
forerunners in reorienting urban policy towards new economic imperatives in urban
regeneration with the objective of pump-priming inner city land values through infrastructure
projects, creating, and enabling, the new spaces of production and consumption, and utilizing
private sector capital as a mechanism for revitalizing the cities. The essential notion was
American: leverage. Public investment, kick-starting the process, plus the new powers, would
create the right conditions to bring in a much bigger volume of private funds.
UDCs were government agencies, or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization
(quangos), implanted directly upon designated areas and were responsible for the regeneration
of these areas. They were run by appointed boards consisting largely of representatives from the
local business community and typically exhibited little representation from the local resident
community. They aimed encourage the private sector back to run-down inner-city areas through
a market-oriented and property-led approach. In order to achieve this area regeneration
objective, UDCs were given substantial powers to acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of
land and other property; carry out building and other operations; enhance the environment.
They also were given powers to ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage and
other services; provide a transport infrastructure; carry out business or undertaking for the
purposes of the objective of urban regeneration; and provide financial incentives for the private
sector.3
The UDCs were also born at a time of great upheaval for local government, where local
authorities were being questioned. In particular, government concern was premised on an
ideological distaste of public sector intervention, and, in the early years, the Thatcher
administration were particularly zealous in seeking to privatize public policy and reduce the role
of what was being presented as the interfering state .4 Heseltine was quite specific about
bypassing the local planners:
we took their powers away from them because they were making such a mess of it. They are the
people who have got it all wrong. They had advisory committees, planning committees, interrelating committees and even discussion committees but nothing happened UDCs do things.
More to the point hey can be seen to do things and they are free from the inevitable delays of the
democratic process. 5
UDC policy, like that of the Enterprise Zones, was focused on the local as opposed to the regional
scale and especially at those cities, scattered across the UK, where there were particularly local
urban problems of severe de-industrialization, economic restructuring, environmental
degradation, but also of economic potential. The phase one UDCs, comprising the flagship,
London Docklands, and Merseyside Development Corporation, were set up in 1981. Five more
followed at the beginning of 1987, comprising Teesside, Tyne and Wear, Trafford Park, the Black
Country, and Cardiff Bay. These were followed in 1988 with the announcement of the so-called

Imrie and Thomas, 1999 ; Tallon, 2013.

Imrie and Thomas, 1999.
5
Hall, 2002; Thornley, 1991.
4

mini-UDCs for Central Manchester, Bristol, Sheffield and Leeds. In

announced, one in Birmingham, the other in Plymouth.6

, two further UDCs was

Figure 1: The UDCs at designation

In our critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UDCs we will particularly take the example of
the London Docklands, Cardiff Bay and Bristol to illustrate our words.

Critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the UDCs

Controversy of the UDCs
As we are going to see, UDCs had a relatively highly controversial history. The most important
controversy was the London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC).
Indeed, the transformation of London Docklands during the 1980s emerged as London s greatest
development opportunity since the Great Fire of 1666. It also represented the biggest piece of
urban revitalization in Europe, if not the world. Form some, it was a shining example of how to
do it; for others, of how not to. It was accused of favoring elitist luxury developments rather than
affordable housing, and it was unpopular with the local communities, who felt that their needs
were not being addressed. Nonetheless, the LDDC was central to a remarkable transformation in
the area, although how far it was in control of events is debatable.

Imrie and Thomas, 1999.

Figure 2: London Docklands. Source: Jason Enright

Some surveys conclude that as an exercise in regeneration, the London Dockland has to be
judged a modest success. Between 1981 and 1990 Docklands lost 20,532 old jobs but gained
41,421 new ones: 24,862 by transfers from other places and 16,862 new jobs. But the lost jobs
were very different from the new ones: port jobs disappeared, manufacturing stayed almost
static, while the big gains were in advanced services, above all banking insurance and finance;
service employment rose from 32 to 60 percent of the total. And very few jobs no more than a
quarter, probably far fewer went to local people. Furthermore, in 1991 unemployment across
Docklands was nearly two and half times the London average. One good explanation for the low
take-up of new jobs by residents is that educational achievements in Docklands were often very
low.
Susan Fainstein, a Senior Research Fellow in the Harvard Graduate School of Design, consider
that;
the failure indicates the limits on turning to the private sector for achieving public ends. The whole
Docklands experience exposes the fatal weakness of relying heavily on property development to
stimulate regeneration government-supplied incentives to the development industry inevitably
beget oversupply if not accompanied by other measures to restrict production.
However, the LDDC succeed in some points. The Docklands historically had poor transport
connections. This was addressed by the LDDC with the construction of the Docklands Light
Railway (DLR), which connected the Docklands with the City. It was a remarkably inexpensive
development, costing only 77 m in its first phase, as it relied on reusing disused railway
infrastructure and derelict land for much of its length. LDDC also built Limehouse Link tunnel, a
cut and cover road tunnel linking the Isle of Dogs to The Highway (the A13 road) at a cost of over
150 million per kilometre, one of the most expensive stretches of road ever built. The LDDC

also contributed to the development of London City Airport, opened in October 1987 on the
spine of the Royal Docks.
Furthermore, over the past 30 years, the population of the Docklands has more than doubled
and the area has become both a major business centre and an increasingly desirable area to live.
Transport links have improved significantly and Canary Wharf has become one of Europe's
biggest clusters of skyscrapers and a direct challenge to the financial dominance of the City.
Although most of the old Dockland wharfs and warehouses have been demolished, some have
been restored and converted into flats. Most of the docks themselves have survived and are now
used as marinas or watersports centres (the major exception being the Surrey Commercial
Docks, now largely filled in). Although large ships can - and occasionally still do - visit the old
docks, all of the commercial traffic has moved down-river. Besides, the revival of the Docklands
has had major effects in run-down surrounding areas. Greenwich and Deptford are undergoing
large-scale redevelopment, chiefly as a result of the improved transport links making them more
attractive to commuters.
The Docklands' redevelopment has, however, had some less beneficial aspects. The massive
property boom and consequent rise in house prices has led to friction between the new arrivals
and the old Docklands communities, who have complained of being squeezed out. It has also
made for some of the most striking disparities to be seen anywhere in Britain: luxury executive
flats constructed alongside run-down public housing estates.
To conclude on the benefits effects, the Dockland s environment has been transformed, the
population has grown, there are new jobs, road and rail construction continue at a frenetic pace.
London Docklands has become almost a symbol of a certain style of development, culture, and
politics in the 1980s and 1990s.

Positive results of UDCs

Overall, some UDCs had positive results on regeneration of their designated areas. For example,
the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation which was set up by the United Kingdom Government
in 1987 to redevelop of one sixth of the area of Cardiff to create Cardiff Bay. The Secretary of
State for Wales, Nicholas Edwards set out the CBDC's mission statement as:
To put Cardiff on the international map as a superlative maritime city which will stand
comparison with any such city in the world, thereby enhancing the image and economic well-being
of Cardiff and Wales as a whole.
The five main aims and objectives were to: promote development and provide a superb
environment in which people will want to live, work and play; re-unite the City of Cardiff with its
waterfront; bring forward a mix of development which would create a wide range of job
opportunities and would reflect the hopes and aspirations of local community; achieve the
highest standard of design and quality in all types of development and investment; and establish
the area as a recognized centre of excellence and innovation in the field of urban regeneration.
Overlooking these objectives, over a period of 15 to 20 years, the UDC aimed to act as the
catalyst for the transformation of 2,700 acres of land into 6,000 new homes, 4 million square
feet of commerce, 5 million square feet of industry, providing 30,000 new jobs. Cardiff Bay

continues to develop and by the early 2010s housed buildings including the Senedd housing the
National Assembly for Wales and the Wales Millennium Centre.

Figure 3: Cardiff Bay. Source: Ronan Philippot

As a result, an evaluation of the regeneration of Cardiff Bay published in 2004 concluded that the
project had "reinforced the competitive position of Cardiff" and "contributed to a massive
improvement in the quality of the built environment".
Other example, in greater Manchester, next to the Trafford Development Corporation and
Enterprise Zone, the City of Salford itself successfully turned its docks around, culminating in
2000-2001 with a spectacular arts and museum complex incorporating a new gallery for the
city s most famous artist, L. S. Lowry, and a northern branch of the Imperial War Museum
designed by Daniel Libeskind.

Figure 4: Imperial War Museum. Source:

Looking at the above examples, a number of positive results can be drawn from the UDCs. There
is little doubt that a single-purpose body concentrating on a narrowly defined area,
unencumbered by the diverse range of local authority responsibilities, and negating local
democratic accountability, can achieve things very quickly. UDC areas benefited from investment
from central government and levered in European as well as private sector fund, resulting in
new employment and environmental improvements. Such schemes helped in changing public
attitudes and perceptions of UDC areas which have been largely positive. It is argued by their
proponents that urban regeneration stimulates further private investment in the areas, which
arguably would not otherwise have been attracted to the area.

Negative results of UDCs

As we have seen with the regeneration of London Docklands, UDCs have been subject to
widespread and deep criticism. As a case in point, the designation of the Bristol UDC drew
immediate criticism from the local authority, which was concerned about five issues: outside
intrusion into the key areas of planning and development; the use of public funding to subsidise
private development; the lack of the UDC s local accountability; potential clashes with existing
local government policies of urban regeneration; and the definition of regeneration within the
designated area the local authority felt that the UDC was more concerned with the
regeneration of the local property market than with the social needs of the areas.

Figure 5: Bristol Temple Mead. Source: Transforming Cities

Many sites remained derelict, and the process had become bogged down in a number of costly
and lengthy public inquiries. The recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s particularly
affected the property market, demonstrating the limitations of relying on market forces and
private capital to regenerate local economies. The lack of alternatives strategies precluded any
effective response to the prevailing negative economic conditions.7 So Bristol s UDC is regarded
as one of the least successful, one that disappeared without managing to agree a development
plan for his flagship city centre site, Quay Point, let alone attract investors and occupiers to the
area.
A single-purpose and single-minded organization might also limit urban regeneration. In
accordance with the government s philosophy that wealth creation was the goal and trickledown would distribute that wealth to those in need, most UDC policies, certainly in their earlier
7

Oatley and May, 1999.

years, concentrated purely on property-led physical regeneration with little regard to human
social provision or the development or to the development of human capital, including lowincome housing, community facilities and education and retraining programmes. Despite
massive expenditure, very few new jobs were actually generated. Most economic activity was
centred on property speculation, and inward investment attracted was small compared with the
public money invested in the UDCs. Significant amounts of money were also lost in land deals.
Perhaps most controversially, UDCs were appointed and not democratically elected bodies. In a
number of cases such as in London Docklands, Liverpool and Bristol, there were serious
breakdowns in communication between the UDCs and local authorities.8

Conclusion
To conclude, UCDs were influenced by an entrepreneurial approach to urban policy driven by
the philosophies of the New Right which characterized the period from 1979 to 1991. Looking at
that, the urban regeneration policy was distinctive from that which had been characteristic of
the period 1945 to 1979; the focus shifted from social welfare projects to private sector and
property-led approaches. The problems at the beginning of the Thatcher years in government
were seen as too much state intervention and public spending, individual and group dependency
on the state and restriction of the free market. In response to the problems as interpreted by
Thatcher s government,
s urban regeneration focused on profit, property and market-led
regeneration, public-private partnerships, an emphasis on better and corporate management,
and a marginalization of local government and local community in the regeneration process.
The flagship policy was the Urban Development Corporations, which were essentially propertyled regeneration projects, which offered fiscal and regulatory incentives to businesses. The goal
of urban policy was to roll back the state and to free market forces, core wider philosophies of
Thatcherism at that time. The approach to countering the urban problem combined social
pathology and structural economic approaches.
Problems with urban policy, identified at the end of the period, centred on the scale of the
response to urban problems, the lack of a co-ordinated policy approach, the lack of long-term
strategy, the growing dissatisfaction with property-led-regeneration, the lack of benefits for
local communities and problems of urban governance. In response, 1990s urban policy sought to
ensure that excluded communities benefited from urban regeneration projects, to address the
incoherence of area-based initiatives and levels of governance, and to achieve sustainable
urban regeneration.9

8
9

Hall, 2002; Tallon, 2013.

Tallon, 2013 ; Transforming Cities.

References
Peter Hall (2002). Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the
Twentieth Century, 3rd Edition.
Rob Imrie and Huw Thomas (1999). British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban
Development Corporations, 2nd Edition.
Andrew Tallon (2013). Urban Regeneration in the UK, 2nd Edition. Routledge.
Coulson (1990). Flagships and flaws assessing the UDC decade. Town and Country Planning.
Walton (1990). Cardiff Bay development. The Planner.