CAN OUR UNDERSTANDINGOF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

I. INTRODUCTION

Somepeopletoday would denythe possibilityof achievingan objectiveunderstandingof a contemporarytext, and then arguethat thereis even less chance
of achievingsuch an understandingof a text from the past. Such wholesale
skepticismneeds to be rejected,I shall argue, as quite often objectiveunderstandingof historicaltexts is possible.By an objectiveunderstandingof a text
I mean both one whichis rationallyjustifiableand one whichwould generally
be acceptedas correct.Sometimesthereis no rationalway of choosingbetween
two or morealternativeinterpretations,but this is by no meansalwaysthe case.
Firstlet me explainmy use of a few key terms. We understanda text when
we can say what it means. I have no comprehensivetheory of meaningto defend here, but will generallyassume that the meaningof sentencesincludes
theirillocutionaryforce togetherwith the conditionswhichmakethem true or
correct.
Thereare often severaldifferentways of expressingone's understandingof
the meaningof a sentenceor text. Any statementby a person of his or her
understandingof its meaning is what I call his or her interpretationof its
meaning.If thereare severalwaysof understandingthe meaningof a text, then
each of those ways of understandingit is an interpretationof its meaningas
well. So an interpretationof a text can be eitherone of severaldifferentways
of understandinga text, and/or one of severaldifferentwaysof expressingone's
understandingof a text. Generally,however,when I referto an interpretation
of a text I referto a statementof its meaning.
It is my belief that there are conventionallyacceptedcriteriaby which an
interpretationof a textcanbe justifiedas correct.Thosewho areskepticalabout
the objectivityof understandingsometimesignorethe existenceof thesecriteria,
focussingupon the subjectivedeterminantsof an interpretationalone. But a
glanceat any debateover the correctinterpretationof a text soon revealsboth
the presenceand the importanceof these criteria.Examplesof them will be
given below. If an interpretationsatisfiesthe relevantcriteria,it is not only
justifiedbut also correct.I preferto usethe word"true"just of statementswhich
of the meaningof a textaregenerally
correspondto somereality.Interpretations
not true in this sense. They do not necessarilycorrespondto any particular

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

303

reality. To call an interpretationof a text correctis to say that it would be

acceptedas the meaningof the text by the majorityof educatedspeakersof the
languagein which it is written,were they to know the literaryand historical
contexts relevantto its subject matter and the intentionsof its author. No
individualmight have such an understandingof the text, becauseindividuals
are occasionally mistaken about the conventional meaning of words and
phrases,and may be ignorantof the contextof the text and of the intentionof
its author.Nor is the author'sintendedmeaningthe correctmeaning,as authors
sometimesfail to say what they intend.
Before consideringthe possibilityof objectiveunderstandingof old texts,
let me addressJacquesDerrida'sattack upon the possibilityof an objective
understandingof any text, old or new. Following Saussure,Derridainsists
that the meaningof words is to be found in their role in a language,in their
implications,associations,andcontrasts.1 He goes beyondSaussurein allowing
that the meaningswhich words have for any readerare also to be found in
whateverliteraryand logical significancethey may have for that reader. So
Derridafinds a profusionof meaningsfor the texts he analyzes,a profusion
which he says is without limits. For him, a text "is henceforthno longer a
finishedcorpusof writing,somecontentenclosedin a book or its margins,but a
differentialnetwork,a fabric of tracesreferringendlesslyto somethingother
than itself, to other differentialtraces. Thus the text overrunsall the limits
assignedto it so far."2
He dismissesthe suggestionthat the meaningof a text correspondsto the
author'sintentionby pointingout that texts exist independentof theirauthors,
anddo not dependupona knowledgeof theirauthorto be meaningful.Similarly
he deniesthattheymustbe understoodby referenceto the contextin whichthey
werewritten,for theycan normallybe understoodwithoutanyreferenceto that
context.3The only thing whichhe admitsas determiningthe meaningof a text
is the languagein whichit is written,togetherwith the literaturein whichthat
languageappears.
Derrida'stheoryof meaningis of somevalue, but it is far from adequate.He
rightlydescribesthe meaningof wordsas a functionof their relationto other
wordsassociatedwiththemin one way or another,thoughhe shouldalso have
recognizedthe importanceof theirassociationwithotherthings,suchas objects
in the world,experiencespeoplehave, and changespeoplewantto bringabout.
The fact that manytexts can be understoodwithoutknowledgeof the circumstancesof their compositiondoes not mean that the words they use have no
associationwiththe world.Manywordsarecommonlyandregularlyassociated
1. See the essay "Differance" in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, transl. Alan Bass
(Brighton, Eng., 1982).
2. Jacques Derrida, "Living On," in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom et al.
(London, 1979), 84.
3. Jacques Derrida, "Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva," in Positions, transl. Alan Bass (London, 1972).

304

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

with thingsin the world, thingsto whichthey referor bringabout. However,

even if Derrida'stheorywereaugmentedto includeassociationssuch as these,
it still would not be adequate.For surelya theory of meaningshould explain
how we knowthe meaningof texts. Derrida'stheoryfails to explainhow we use
languageto communicateas clearlyand preciselyas we do. It simplyignores
the conventionsby whichwe decidewhich,amongthevariouspossiblemeanings
wordscan have, we shouldunderstandthemto havein the case of a giventext
or utterance.
It is difficultto formulatethese conventionsprecisely.Generallyspeaking,
the correctinterpretationof a text is that which(1) does not violate any of the
semanticand syntacticrulesof the languagein whichit is written;(2) resolves
any obscuritiesof referenceand ambiguitiesof meaning arising from these
rules;(3) providesa coherentbody of information;(4) performsthe firstthree
functionsto a muchgreaterdegreethan any otherinterpretationwhichthe text
warrants;and perhaps(5) convincinglyexplainsaway any failuresto perform
the firstthreefunctions(thatis, any inconsistenciesbetweenthe interpretation
and the rulesof the language,any remainingobscuritiesand ambiguities,and
anyinconsistencieswithinthe informationit provides).If an interpretercannot
meet these requirementsfrom a study of the text alone, then he or she may
examinethe contextin whichthe text was produced.This will often locate the
text in a widerframeof discourseand in an historicalcontextwhichwill clear
up uncertaintiesof referenceand meaning.If an adequateinterpretationis still
not available,the interpretermay then try to reconstructthe author'sintention
in order to resolve remaininguncertainties.Sometimeseven recourseto the
author'sintentionswill not removeall uncertainties,ambiguitiesand inconsistenciesfromone'sinterpretationof a text. Thesemayin fact havebeenintended,
as in the case of some diplomaticletters,and in some poems. Or they may not
have been noticedby the author.In cases such as these, the readerappreciates
an explanationof remaininginadequaciesin the interpretationwhichaccounts
for theirpresencethere. The interpretationof a text whichis arrivedat in this
way, and whichsatisfiesthe five criterialistedabove, is generallydeemedto be
the correctinterpretationof the text.
If the languageof the text is not verywell knownby the interpreter,and the
text providesa significantlylargepartof the evidenceof thatlanguage,thenthe
criteriaare a bit different.The interpreterstill wantsto find an interpretation
of the text whichis as unambiguousand coherentas possible.But it must also
be consistentwith the rules of languagewhich he or she judges to make best
sense of all the evidenceof that languageavailable.Thus, for example, if a
scholarwereunfamiliarwithPlato'sGreek,he or shewouldlook for interpretationsof the Platonicdialoguesconsistentwiththe besttheoriesof Plato'sgeneral
semanticsand syntax,as well as interpretationswhichare as unambiguousand
coherentas possible.
Derridamightarguethat anysuchconventionscannotbe justifiedas yielding
a correctunderstandingof a text withoutviciouscircularity.If we wereto say
thattheseconventionsareappropriatebecausein conformingto themwe always

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

305

arrive at a correct understanding of texts, that would indeed be circular, assuming that there is no independent check of their correctness. But if we say
that in our community conformity to these conventions is what we mean by
calling an interpretation of a text correct, then circularity has been avoided.
The claim that a correct understanding of a text is one which satisfies certain
conventional criteria does not necessarily entail any vicious circularity of reasoning.
Does it invite a charge of arbitrarinessinstead? This question is more difficult
to answer. But perhaps it is enough to say that, as Saussure has taught us, many
linguistic conventions are arbitrary. Saussure noted that the relations between
signifiers (words) and signifieds (things), though fairly regular, are usually arbitrary. It would be no great surprise, then, if the relations between texts and their
meanings are somewhat arbitrary too. They involve, at a minimum, rules of
semantics and syntax which seem largely arbitrary, varying as they do from
language to language. Whether they are arbitrary or not, the rules for interpreting texts generally enable quite effective communication of precise ideas, and
that is what justifies them.
II. BASIC AND SECONDARY INTERPRETATIONS

Another common reason for denying the possibility of an objective understanding of the meaning of a text is the observation that people's interpretations
generally vary with their culture and interests. This was a major argument of
Hans-Georg Gadamer. He noted how the interpretations of great historians
such as Mommsen, Treitschke, and Sybel differed in accordance with their
society, and went on to say:
No one disputesthe fact that controllingthe prejudicesof our own presentto such an
thewitnessesof thepastis a validaim, butobviously
extentthatwe do not misunderstand
suchcontroldoes not completelyfulfillthe task of understandingthe past and its transmission.Indeed,it couldverywell be that only insignificantthingsin historicalscholarship permitus to approximatethis idealof totallyextinguishingindividuality,whilethe
greatproductiveachievementsof scholarshipalwayspreservesomethingof the splendid
magicof immediatelymirroringthe presentin the past and the past in the present.4
It is not entirely clear what "insignificant things in historical scholarship"
Gadamer allowed can be objective. A close look at historical practice, however,
reveals that there is frequently complete agreement among historians about the
basic meaning of a text, though considerable disagreement about it secondary
meaning. Perhaps Gadamer meant that historians can get individual facts about
the past right, but that their understanding of constellations of facts is much
more subjective. When it comes to the interpretation of texts, what is certain
is that the variety of interpretations of the kind Gadamer has noted exists
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, transl. and ed. David E. Linge
(Berkeley, 1976), 6. Compare Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, 1975),
465-466.

306

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

predominantlyamong the interpretationsof the secondarymeaningsof texts.

Understandingof the basicmeaningof a text is muchless frequentlycontested,
so there is less reason to doubt that it can be rationallyjustified. However,
sometimesan interpretationof the secondarymeaningof a text is so well supported that it is undisputedtoo, and so one may assumethat it is rationally
justified.
Gadamer'sown essays on Plato'sLysis and Phaedo illustratewhat has just
been said quite well. The literalmeaningof Plato's text is neverin doubt, so
wellis his Greekunderstood.Any ambiguitiesareseento havebeendeliberately
introducedas a playon words.5Whatis uncertainis the pointof thesedialogues.
TheLysis,an inquiryintothe natureof friendship,seemsto be entirelyinconclusive, the discussionjumpingfrom point to point, with each suggestedanalysis
of friendshipbeing shown to be quite unsatisfactory.The Phaedo presents
argumentsabout the immortalityof the soul, but all of them are plainlyinadequate so that it is hard to see any point to the dialogue. Gadamerdiscusses
the force of these dialogues,and suggestswhat Plato might have intendedin
presentingthem as he did.
To helpfix the intentof thesedialogues,Gadamerconsiderstheirgenre.The
Lysis, he concludes,is not a systematicinquirybut "a discussion,"a form of
conversationin which "we move within the live play of riskingassertions,of
taking back what we have said, of assumingand rejecting,all the while proSince Socrates'discussion
ceedingon our way to reachingan understanding."6
in the Lysis is with two boys, Lysis and Menexenos,Gadamersuggeststhat it
is appropriateto findit inconclusive,"forchildrendo not yet knowwhatfriendship is and how complexa relationshipan enduringfriendshipcreatesbetween
the friends."IThe inconclusiveargumentshave a point though. WhenMenexenos cannottell whethera lover becomesa friendof the belovedor vice versa,
Gadamersays that Plato "certainlywants us to sense that in actualfriendship
it is impossibleto distinguishthe lover from the belovedin this way and to say
who is theloverandwho the beloved."8This, in Gadamer'seyes, is characteristic
of the forceof the discussion,andhe goes on to findsimilarsignificancein other
apparentlyinconclusivearguments.
Gadameralso detects implicit significancein the Phaedo. For example:
"WhenPlato has Socrates,in the hour of death, enterinto conversationwith
'Pythagorean'representativesof contemporaryscience,that is obviouslymeant
to show that Plato saw it as his own task to unite the moralintrospectionfor
whichSocratesstood withthe scientificknowledgerepresentedby the Pythagoreans."9Gadamer'scentralthesisis that "thePhaedo'spoetic powerto convince

Studies
5. For examples, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogueand Dialectic:EightHermeneutical
on Plato (New Haven, 1980), 9, 11.
6. "Logos and Ergon in Plato's Lysis,"ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 6.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Ibid., 32.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

307

is stronger than its arguments' logical power to prove."'0He sums up his discussion with these words:
Plato certainlydoes not wantto say thathe has provedthe sameimmortalityof the soul
whichis basicto thereligioustradition.Butwhathe doeswantto sayis thatthespreading
skepticismresultingfromthe scientificenlightenmentdoes not at all affectthe sphereof
of it. Thegrowingscientificinsightinto the causes
ourhumanlife andourunderstanding
of coming-into-beingand passing-away,into the courseof naturalprocesses,does not
obviatethe need for thinkingbeyondthe realityof this world, and it has no authority
to contestreligiousconvictions.Thusthe point of the demonstrations,it seemsto me,
is that they refute doubtsand not that they justify belief."
For proof of the uncertainty of secondary interpretations of the Lysis and the
Phaedo one need only glance at books about them. David Bolotin has given a
detailed account of the long dispute between Max Pohlenz and Hans von Arnim
about the significance of the Lysis. 12Pohlenz argued that it was meant to show
that friendship is related to erotic love in that it always includes an element of
desire; whereas Arnim produced reasons for thinking Plato regarded "true"
friendship as existing only between good people who are quite self-sufficient,
possessing the good already and so not desiring it. It is interesting to see how
texts can be found to support both interpretations.
As for the Phaedo, compare the following fairly recent interpretations:
The subjectof the discussionis the desirabilityof death.'3
It willbe wellto askwhatis the fundamentalpurposeof the dialogue.It is not, of course,
to provethat the humansoul is immortal,thoughmuch of it is devotedto arguments
for that thesis;it is not to pay a tributeof admirationto a belovedfriendand master,
thoughthattributeis undoubtedlypaid;it is not to expoundor propagatea metaphysical
doctrine,thoughthe doctrineof Forms(Ideas)bulkslarge;it is, I wouldsay, to extend
and deepen through the mouth of a consciouslyPlatonized Socrates, the essential
teachingof Socrateshimself,namelythatman'ssupremeconcernis the "tendanceof his
soul,"or (inmoremodernlanguage)the furtheringof his insightinto moralandspiritual
values and the applicationof that insightin all his conduct.'4
The Pythagoreans,Aristotleargues,differfrom Plato only in denyingany separation
betweenfirstprinciples- whichtheyidentifywithnumbersratherthan"ideas"-andthe
things said to be their imitations;the Pythagoreanteachingon reincarnation,on the
other hand, presupposesthe separabilityof the psychefrom the body. The attemptto
reinterpretthe meaningof "separation,"and in so doing to reversethe Pythagorean
position, is, one might say, the fundamentalintentionof the Phaedo.'5
With such a variety of secondary interpretations it is tempting to suppose that
each representsa subjective viewpoint and that none can be judged to be superior
to any other. But that is not what the commentators believe, as the quotation

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 37.
David Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979).
R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London, 1955), 1.
R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), 3.
Rome Burger, The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth (New Haven, 1984), 7.

308

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

from Hackforthindicates.CertainlyGadamerdefends his interpretationsby

suggestingthat they accountfor more featuresof the dialoguesthan previous
interpretationsdid. In particularhe believes they account for the inconclusiveness of the Lysis, and the obvious inadequacyof the argumentsin the
Phaedo.
The distinctionI havejust madebetweenthe basicmeaningof a text and the
text's secondarymeaningneeds to be explained.The secondarymeaningof a
text dependsupon its basic meaning,but the basic meaningof a text depends
on no other meaningit has. The basic meaningdoes, of course, dependupon
the meaningof the wordsand phrasesused in the text, but not upon any other
meaningof the text as a whole. It is not quite the same as the literalmeaning
of the text, for the latter is sometimestaken to be a function simply of the
semanticsand syntaxof the languageused in the text, and not of the context
in whichthe text appears.The basic meaningof a text is sometimesa function
of its context.
Indiscussionsof the meaningof texts,it is commonto distinguishthemeaning
of the sentences,accordingto the rulesof language;the meaningof the utterance, takinginto accountthe contextin whichthe text was produced;and the
meaningof the utterer,that is the meaningwhichthe authorintendedto convey
in writingthe text. How does the basicmeaningof a text relateto thesealternatives?From what I have observed,our practiceis to decidethe basic meaning
of a text by following the proceduredescribedabove. First we considerthe
meaningof the sentences,drawingsolelyupon our knowledgeof the language;
if this is unambiguous,we go no further.If it is ambiguous,however,we refer
to the context in the hope of clearingup the ambiguity.The sentence"There
arebats in the belfry"meansone thingif addressedto the local pest controller,
and anotherif spokento the churchcricketteam looking for theirequipment.
If a carefulstudyof the contextfails to resolvethe ambiguity,we then turnour
attentionto the speaker,and try to discoverwhat he or she probablyintended
in sayingwhat he or she did. Thusthe meaningof a text may dependupon the
meaningof the correspondingutterance,and even the meaningof the utterer,
but it neednot do so. Indeed,if the meaningof a text is unambiguousaccording
to the rules of the language,it may differfrom the meaningwhichthe utterer
intendedto convey. Interestinglyenough, preciselythe same procedureis followed to determinethe secondarymeaningof a text as well.
I have suggestedthat one can sometimesjustify one's understandingof the
basicmeaningof a text by referenceto rulesof semanticsand syntaxalone. In
practice,however, providinga completejustificationof an interpretationin
termsof these rulesis virtuallyimpossible,as the rulesinvolveddefy complete
formulation.Competentlanguageusersknowhow to applytheserules,but not
how to state them. In practice, therefore, we regardan interpretationof a
sentenceasjustifiedif mosteducatedusersof the languagejudgeit to be correct.
Sometimesthe meaningof a sentence,taken on its own, is ambiguous.To
resolvethe ambiguityit is conventionalto choose a readingwhichbest fits the

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

309

context. Derridaassertsthat thereare no absolutelydeterminablecontextsby

16Butonce againhe overlooksthe conventions
whichto justifyan interpretation.
we use to determinemeaning.We alwayschoose the meaningwhich fits best
with the surroundingtext, that is a meaningwhicheitherentailsor is entailed
by whatis said elsewherein the text, or at least whichis not incompatiblewith
what is said elsewhere.This usuallyresolvesthe ambiguityquite quickly.If it
does not, then we commonlydraw upon our knowledgeof the literaryand
historicalcontextin whichthe sentencewas uttered.And if this fails to resolve
the issue, we turn our attentionto the author and the circumstancesof her
composingor utteringthe text to determinewhat she probablyintendedit to
mean. Derridatries to precludethese moves by denyingthat the meaningof
texts dependsin any way upon the presenceof a context of utteranceor the
presenceof the author, but in that he is just mistaken.Often it does depend
upon those things. Certainlywe sometimescome upon texts in places far removedfrom the contextof theirproduction,and that fact sometimesmakesit
difficultto be sure that we have understoodthem correctly. Historiansare
particularlyconsciousof this difficulty,and do what they can to overcomeit.
II. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING SECONDARY INTERPRETATIONS

As has been shown, the secondarymeaningof texts is much more frequently

debatedthan their basic meaning,but that does not mean there is no way of
justifyinga secondaryinterpretation.A secondaryinterpretationof a text is
often an act of colligation,in which variousfeaturesof the basic meaningof
the text are shown to have a certain significancewhen consideredtogether.
Secondaryinterpretationstake a varietyof forms. They may simplybe statementsof theadditionalillocutionaryforceof a text, andperhapsof its secondary
fieldof reference.A secondaryinterpretationmighttakethe formof a statement
of the author'sgeneralintention,whichwould help accountfor the featuresof
the text which could be seen as helpingto fulfill it. We have alreadyseen an
exampleof thiskindof interpretationin Gadamer'sdiscussionof Plato'sgeneral
intentionsin writingtheLysis andthePhaedo.A secondaryinterpretationmight
also consistof a generalsummaryof the contentof the text, or a summaryof
its essentialideasor thesis.It couldevenbe a statementof someoverallstructure
of the text. The key criterionused in judgingthe adequacyof such interpretawhichcolligatethegreatestnumber
tionsis theirscope:we preferinterpretations
of facts aboutthe text. But they must also be not verycomplex,and coherent.
Generalsummariesareexpectedto satisfyadditionalrequirementsappropriate
to their nature:they must be accurate,informative,and comprehensive.
Texts sometimesillustratea numberof generaltruths, as the discussionof

16. Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 310.

310

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

the Lysis and the Phaedo has shown. All of these might be interesting, so the
search for one reading superior to the others could appear pointless. It has a
point, however, which is to provide a reading which somehow explains all the
major parts of the text, if possible, and thus to represent the whole text fairly.
That is why the scope of secondary interpretations is so important.
It is possible for a text to have a significance for its author's contemporaries
which the author did not intend. And it is possible for a text to have a significance
for modern readers which neither the author nor the author's contemporaries
would have known -the Freudian interpretation of The Turn of the Screw is
a case in point. Whose secondary interpretation is "the correct" one? I believe
that current conventions are captured by the following distinctions. I think we
judge the most comprehensive interpretation to be the correct one, whether or
not it accords with the author's intended reading, or the reading of the author's
contemporaries. The historically correct interpretation is that of the majority
of the author's educated contemporaries, which might well be that intended by
the author. The intended interpretation is simply that intended by the author.

1. The dangersof anachronism

The best secondary interpretation of a text is usually also the historically correct
one, because modern theories often have implications which do not apply to an
old text, and so frequently misrepresent them. Indeed, the appropriateness of
summarizing texts in modern terms which the author would never have used
has been questioned. Quentin Skinner has shown that this practice, by historians
who have not carefully understood the basic meaning of the texts first, can
lead them to misrepresent them. For example, those who have interpreted the
political views of the Levellers in seventeenth-century Britain as a "philosophy
of liberal democracy," simply because the Levellers were concerned with an
extension of the right to vote, have completely mistaken their views.
First the paradigmmakes it unnecessarilydifficultto account for some of the most
characteristicfeaturesof Levellerideology.For if we areprogrammedto thinkin terms
of the "republican
secularism"
of the movement,it is not surprisingthattheiragonizings
over the Monarchyand their appealsto religioussentimentbegin to look somewhat
baffling.And second, the paradigmof "democracy"will tend to lead the historical
investigationin ratherinappropriatedirections.Some anachronisticconcept of "the
welfare state"has to be found in Levellerthought, as well as a belief in "manhood
suffrage,"which they neverin fact held.17
To describe the Levellers as presenting a theory of liberal democracy is thus not
only unfair, in that it fails to accommodate many of their important concerns
about the crown and religion, but it is also misleading in that it implies concerns
for a welfare state and manhood suffrage which were not theirs at all. Such

17. QuentinSkinner,"MeaningandUnderstanding
in theHistoryof Ideas,"HistoryandTheory
8 (1969),27.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

311

mistakes can be avoided, however, if the historian carefully checks whether the
basic meaning of a text warrants the modern description of it.
Despite the dangers of summarizing old texts in modern terms, John Dunn
suggests that such summaries are useful in showing the modern relevance of
these texts. He therefore applauds the practice, while remaining concerned
about their accuracy: "To present a complex argument from the past in terms
of its significance for us may often seem mendacious and to present it with the
greatest concern for historical specificity but without exploring its "significance"
is likely to seem trivial.18 The history of philosophy, like the history of science,
must needs be Whig as to subject-matter . . . [and] . . . Tory as to truth."19
The process of carefully judging the justification of a modern summary of
an old text is well illustrated by J. W. Gough's discussion of Willmore Kendall's
thesis that Locke's theory was not "individualist," as has been commonly
thought, but that it gives an "authoritarian and collectivist" account of political
power.20To judge the adequacy of these descriptions, Gough interprets them
and then looks for evidence relevant to them in Locke's writing. An "individualist" theory, it seems, is one which presents government as severely limited by
the rights of individuals. An "authoritarian" theory insists upon the government's authority over individuals, unless the government is so bad that the
people are entitled to revolt. There are passages in Locke which support both
views, so how does Gough decide the issue? First, he carefully examines the
crucial passages in context to see whether they do support the interpretation
suggested for them. He finds that some which appear to support the individualist
interpretation do not really do so, when studied in their context.2"Second, he
points out that there is evidence for and against both readings, and that each
can only be defended by ignoring as insignificant those passages which tell
against it. As Gough puts it:
Many critics have noticed features of Locke's theory which seem inconsistent with the
usual individualist interpretation of him. The critics have varied, however, in the degree
of emphasis they have laid on such discrepancies, and have generally tended to treat the
individualism as fundamental, and to minimize what is inconsistent with this, either
ignoring it in their final verdict or dismissing it as ill-considered and unrepresentative of
Locke's real view. Mr. Kendall, in effect, reverses this tendency. It is the individualist
passages which are inconsistencies for him, and he emphasizes instead the points -and
they certainly amount to a considerable array-on the other side.22

Finally, Gough concludes that the truth about Locke lies somewhere between
the two extremes. His theory does not neatly fit either modern model, though
it contains important elements of both.

18. J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, Eng., 1969), 208.

19. J. Dunn, Political Obligationin Its HistoricalContext:Essays in Political Theory(Cambridge, Eng., 1980), 26.
20. J. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1956), chap. 2.
21. Ibid., 29-30.
22. Ibid., 28.

312

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

Was Lockethen, after all, an individualist?I think we can say he was, but he was not
a thorough-going,extremeindividualist.... He standsmid-waybetweentwo extreme
positionsin politics.... We may conclude,then, that Lockewas an individualistin a
qualifiedsense. He did not imaginethe stateto be an artificiallyfabricatedcombination
of naturallyseparateindividuals;he didnot championthe individualagainstthe community, andbarelyconsideredthe possibilityof conflictbetweenthem. Butthe government
he recommendedwas in effectthe parliamentarylimitedmonarchyapprovedof by his
Whigcontemporaries,and this meantthat it wouldbe constitutionaland not absolute,
and that it would not invadethe libertiesof the subject.23
Old theories seldom fit modern paradigms neatly, but they sometimes have
important ideas and values in common. These are highlighted by modern summaries of them. The extreme interpretations of Locke were neither accurate,
comprehensive, nor fair. They implied positions contrary to those Locke
adopted or they ignored important parts of his theory, thus giving a misleading
impression of the whole. That is why they were finally rejected by Gough.
2. The illocutionary force of texts
The historically correct interpretation of a text usually coincides with the author's intended meaning, as authors are usually well aware of how their texts
will be read by their contemporaries. Interestingly enough, historians frequently
take the identity of the two for granted. Skinner, for example, has shown
that John Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government, "was rejecting and
repudiating one of the most widespread and prestigious forms of political argument at the time," simply by noting "the prevailing conventions of debate about
political obligation," the role of "the ancient English constitution" in those, and
Locke's failure to mention it.24Similarly he has shown that Machiavelli in places
"challenges the prevailing assumptions of the mirror-for-princes writers," by
comparing what those writers said with certain passages in The Prince.25Skinner
assumes that these implications of the texts were intended by their authors,
which is probably true, though nothing need be known about their intentions
to identify them. These are conventional secondary meanings of the texts justified by the context of the writing together with the rules of language which
warrant the statements reporting them.
There are times, however, when the further illocutionary force of a text
cannot be inferred from the context, and can only be known by discovering the
author's intentions. For example, to decide whether Thomas Hobbes and Pierre
Bayle meant their pious utterances to be taken ironically, historians have to
judge their intentions, as there is no hint of irony in their texts.26

23. Ibid., 51.

24. QuentinSkinner,"SomeProblemsin the Analysisof PoliticalThoughtandAction,"Political Theory 2 (1974),286.
25. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Volume 1: The Renaissance (Cambridge,Eng., 1978), 131.

26. See QuentinSkinner,"Meaningand Understandingin the Historyof Ideas,"33-35.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

313

An author'sintentioncan be statedin modernwords, I think, so long as the

authorwouldhaveconsentedto an appropriatetranslationof themas accurately
representinghis or her intention.Skinner,for example,has said that: "During
the eighteenthcentury,the enemiesof the rulingoligarchyin Englandsoughtto
legitimatetheirattackson the governmentby insistingthattheyweremotivated
entirelyby reverencefor the constitution,and thus that their actionsdeserved
It is very
to be commendedas patrioticratherthan condemnedas factious."27
Britishpoliticianswouldhaverecognizedtheir
doubtfulthateighteenth-century
Legitimation,as Skinnerhimselfhas acknowlexplanationsas "legitimations."
edged,28is a Weberianterm, and derivesits modernmeaningfrom Weber's
politicianswouldhavesaidtheywere
theoryof legitimation.Eighteenth-century
justifyingtheir attackson the government,not legitimatingthem. But if the
meaningof Weber'sterm were explainedto them, then they probablywould
agreethatin justifyingtheirattackstheywereindeedlegitimatingthem,making
them politicallyacceptableaccordingto recognizedauthorities.
Becausethe best interpretation,the historicallycorrectinterpretation,and
the author'sinterpretationof a text are usuallythe same, historiansfrequently
fail to distinguishthem. This is the case in the commonlyacceptedreadingof
Gulliver'sTravelsas a politicalsatire.Thisis anexcellentexampleof a secondary
interpretationof a text, one whichstatesits additionalillocutionaryforce and
its secondaryfieldof reference.Gulliver'sTravelscan be understoodat a basic
level as a story about the adventuresof Gulliver.That, indeed, is how most
peopleunderstandit today. To Swift'scontemporaries,however,familiarwith
the detailsof politicallife in Britain,its force and its referencesappearedquite
different.They took it to be not just a story, but also a satire;it referrednot
just to Gulliverand the imaginarylandshe visited,but also to politicalfigures
of his day with the intentionof ridiculingthem. A. E. Case has pointed out,
for example,that when contemporariesreadthat the Emperorwhom Gulliver
encounteredin his firstvoyagewas "strongandmasculine,withanAustrianLip
and archedNose, his Complexionolive, his Countenanceerect, his Body and
Limbswell proportioned... His Dresswas veryplainand simple... His Voice
was shrill,but veryclearand articulate,"then theythoughtof GeorgeI's "thick
and ungainlyform, his bad taste in dress, and his gutturaland unintelligible
pronunciationof the little Englishhe knew."29
The interpretationof Gulliver'sTravelsas a politicalsatirehas the strongest
possiblesupport.It accountsfor a verylargenumberof the detailsof the story.
(The thirdessay in Case'sbook explainsthe politicalallegoriesin detail.) It is
an exampleof a genrefamiliarto Swift'scontemporaries,and so readilyidentifiedby them. And the interpretationis consistentwithwhatis knownof Swift's
intentionsin writing.Similarjustificationcanbe providedfor the interpretation

27. Quentin Skinner, "The Idea of a Cultural Lexicon," Essays in Criticism 29 (1979), 216.
28. Quentin Skinner, "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action," 292.
29. Arthur E. Case, Four Essays in Gulliver's Travels (Gloucester, Mass., 1958), 71.

314

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

of Cervantes'Don Quixoteas a parodyof both the aimsand meansof knightly

chivalry.A. J. Close, in defendingthis readingof the story, wrote:"Theaims,
like the acts, are a madly literal mimicryof the stereotypebehaviourof the
heroesof chivalricromance,"and would havebeen immediatelyrecognizedas
such by contemporaryreaders.30
Sometimesthe furtherforce of a text is not to be identifiedwith a genre
such as satireor parody,but with a conventionalimplicationof the text in its
particularcontext. For example, when a piano teachertells a pupil that she
playeda piecebeautifully,she is not only describingthe playing,but by doing
so she is praisingthe student,and by doing that she is encouragingher. These
furtherdescriptionsare warrantedby the rules of languageand the context.
3. Summariesof the basic meaningof a text
A verycommonform of higherunderstandingof the meaningof a text is that
achievedby producingan adequatesummaryof whatit says, thatis, of its basic
meaning.

A common reason for summarizingan author'sviews is to comparethem

with those of others. J. G. A. Pocock has made a specialstudy of the writing
of JamesHarrington.In an essayentitled"Machiavelli,HarringtonandEnglish
EighteenthCenturyIdeologies,"he produceda summaryof Harrington'spoliticalthought,quotinghimonly for the sakeof illustration.His summaryis often
quite terse: "Harrington'sentire theory of monarchycan be reducedto two
propositions:first,thatthe King'sagentsand servantsmustbe supportedeither
upon the land, as a feudal aristocracy,or about his person as praetoriansor
janissaries;second, that whicheverof these methodsis adopted, relationsbetweenthe militaryclassandthe Kingwill be so proneto tensionsthat monarchy
Pocock providedthis summary
can neverbe a stable form of government."'"
of Harrington'stheory in order to compareit with that of the first Earl of
Shaftesbury.This practiceis repeatedthroughoutthe essay. For examplehe
used summariesto compare what he called "the 'County'vision of English
politics"with Harrington'sview: "If we now summarizethe main outlines of
the 'County'vision of Englishpolitics as it appearsin a multitudeof writings
in the centurythat follows 1675,we may attemptto see what is Harrington,or
ratherneo-Harrington,about it."32
Historiansaim to producesummarieswhichare accurate,informative,and
comprehensive.A summaryis accurateif the statementsin the text instantiate
it and are not inconsistentwith it. Informativenessdecreasesas generalityincreases,as a very generalsummarycould be instantiatedby a largenumberof
diversetexts. So historiansprefera summarywhich is no more generalthan
30. A. J. Close, "Don Quixote and 'The Intentionalist Fallacy,"' BritishJournalof Aesthetics
12 (1972), 13.
31. J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Languageand Time:Essayson Political Thoughtand History
(London, 1972), 116-117.
32. Ibid., 124.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

315

they require.Thelevelof generalityis that at whichcomparisonsof interestcan

be mademost clearly.A summaryshouldbe comprehensivein that it coversthe
variousaspectsof the basicmeaningof the text in question,so that eachsignificant part of the basic text instantiatespart of the summary.Let me illustrate.
C. B. Macpherson'sMarxistinterpretationof Lockein ThePolitical Theory
of PossessiveIndividualismhas earnedmuch respectbut also some criticism.
Alan Ryan has arguedthat it is not accurate.For example,Macphersonsaid
that Locke denied that laborerswithout propertycould be full citizens, as
citizenshipwasreservedfor thosewithproperty.Ryanobjectsthat"someplainly
unambiguous statements by Locke . . . flatly contradict" this summary of

Locke'sviews.Lockein factmaintainedthatall rationaladultscouldbe citizens,

and deniedcitizenshiponly to "Lunaticksand Idiots."33Macphersonwas also
mistakenin thinkingthat Locke restricted"property"to goods, for Locke describedpropertyas that whichothershaveno rightto take withoutthe person's
consent, and specificallyincluded such personal things as life, liberty, and
health.Ryanconcludesthat"theforceof Macpherson'saccountchallengesone
to producesome alternativepicturethat fits the text betterthan this."34
Dunn'scriticismof John Plamenatz'sinterpretationof Locke revealsthe
importanceof summariesbeing comprehensiveif they are to be acceptable.
Plamenatz,seeing Locke as a great liberalphilosopher,assumedthat Locke
basedpoliticalobligationupon the consentof the governed.But, Dunn points
out, this interpretationignoresthe theologicaldimensionof Locke'sthought.
Referringto a largerangeof Locke'swritings,DunnshowsthatLockegrounded
political obligation in man's duty to God of self-preservation.Since people
cannotsubsistwithoutsociety, God, who wills themto subsist,also willsthem
to use theirreasonto discoverthe rulesby whicha societycan be maintained,
and to follow them. People consentto othershavingauthorityover them, so
that consentis a necessarycondition of political obligation. But what is also
necessary,to drivethem to obey, is duty to God.35By ignoringthe theological
dimensionof Locke'sthought,Plamenatzand othershad produceda summary
which said nothing about large and importantparts of Locke's writingson
politicalobligation.
Whenan important,relevantpartof any author'sworkis ignoredby a summarydescription,the summaryis proneto give a misleadingimpressionof the
whole. Pocockhas explainedhow the habitof commentatorsin ignoringbooks
III andIV of Hobbes'Leviathan,whichdiscussreligioushistory,has led people
to believe that Hobbes' thought was "unhistorical"to a degreewhich it was
not.36IndeedthepracticehasevenfuelledthebeliefthatHobbeslackedreligious

33.
223.
34.
35.
36.

Alan Ryan, "Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie," Political Studies 13 (1965),
Ibid., 227-228.
J. Dunn, Political Obligation in Its Historical Context, 29-33.
J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, 149-150.

316

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

convictionsand was, perhaps,an atheist.37Pocock condemnssuch interpretations of Hobbes'writingand of his convictionsas seriouslymisleading.
4. The "keyidea"of a text: a tertiaryinterpretation
Anotherkindof higherunderstandingof the meaningof a textwhichhistorians
sometimesseek involvesidentifyingthe "keyidea"of an author'swork. A key
idea,it seems,is one uponwhichthe otherprincipleideasto someextentdepend.
Oncea workhas been summarized,it is then sometimespossibleto identifyits
key idea. For this reason, an interpretationof the key idea of a text could be
regardedas a tertiaryinterpretationof the meaningof the text, dependingas
it does upon a secondarysummaryreadingof the text.
In a thoughtfuldiscussionof the fundamentalidea in Harrington'spolitical
philosophy Pocock discusses C. B. Macpherson'sbelief "that Harrington's
systemwill not work unless entrepreneurialbehaviourin land ownersis preMacphersonarguedthatchangesin thesocialdistribusumedto be at its basis."38
Englandwere seen by Harringtonto be
tion of power in seventeenth-century
the resultof changesin patternsof wealth,particularlylandownership.Pocock
thinksHarringtonsaw it as the resultof changesin the legal obligationswhich
went with land tenure. Feudal obligationsto serve an overlordgave place to
independenttenured freeholders.Pocock argues that Macpherson'sunderstandingof the key idea in Harrington'ssystemis wrong becausecertainimportantfeaturesof his systemdo not dependupon it. "Harrington'snotion of
the powerwhichthe man who has propertyexertsover the man who has none
does not entailany particulardescriptionof the economicrelationsbetweenthe
two men, or of the economicprocessin whichthe two are engaged.All that is
necessaryto know is that the one is independentand the other dependenton
him."s39
In anotheressay, on "Burkeand the AncientConstitution,"Pocock explains
how Burke'sconservativepoliticaltheoryis an expressionof a theoryaboutthe
natureof Englishlaw developedby Sir EdwardCoke and Sir MatthewHale in
the seventeenthcentury.This theorymaintainedthat Englishcommonlaw was
basedupon custom, interpretedand appliedin courts, from time immemorial,
and that it enshrinedthe practicalwisdomof ages and so deservedthe utmost
respect.This theorywas appliedto the Englishconstitutionin what was called
"the doctrineof the ancientconstitution,"to defend the constitutionagainst
reform.Thatdoctrinewas respectedby manyin Burke'stime, and was usedby
himin 1782to opposemovesto reformit. Insteadof talkingabouta "keyidea"
Pocock hererefersto a "rootidea":Burke"rootshis argumentin the idea that
the law is immemorialand customary."40

37.
38.
39.
40.

Ibid., 161.
Ibid., 111.
Idem.
Ibid., 229.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

317

of a secondaryinterpretation
5. Cases of underdetermination
In describingeach kind of secondarymeaningof a text I have drawnattention
to criteriawhichhistoriansrespectin decidingwhethera secondaryinterpretation of a text is acceptableor not. It sometimeshappens,however,that two or
more differentsecondaryinterpretationsmeet these criteriaequallywell, and
thenthereis no rationalgroundfor sayingthatone interpretationis morecorrect
than another.For example,accordingto ChristopherButler,thereare several
differentmodern summaryaccounts of Emily Brontd's WutheringHeights
whichare equallywarranted.He acceptsthat they all "meetinternalcriteriaof
Derek Traversi,
accuracy,consistency,scope, simplicity,and fruitfulness."41
for instance,sees it as contrastingbasic human emotions with the superficial
graces of civilizedlife; TerryEagleton arguesthat Catherine"tradesher authenticselfhood for social privilege,"showingan ideologicalcontradictionbetweenthe individualand the family;whereasPatsy Stonemansees it as demonstratingthe pressuresto conformity put upon women in Victorian nuclear
ourinterpretation,"43
Butlersaysthat"thetextaloneunderdetermines
families.42
and suggestswe should accept the diversityof readingsin this case.
SimilarlyPaulB. Armstronghasdiscusseddifferentsecondaryinterpretations
of EdgarAllan Poe's The Turnof the Screw.EdmundWilsonobservedthat as
only the governesssees the ghost of Peter Quint, the story can be seen to be
about the fantasiesof a "thwartedAnglo-Saxonspinster"-an interpretation
basedupon Freudiantheory. For WayneBooth, on the other hand, the ghosts
are real, and it is just a frighteningghost story. Finally,RobertHeilmannhas
read it as a "struggleof evil to possess the human soul."44Armstrongdraws
attentionto the way a critic'sview of life informshis or her interpretation.He
acknowledgesthat minimumstandardshave to be met for an interpretationto
be acceptable.It "mustdemonstrateinternalcoherenceand effectivenessin
he says, meaning that the interpretation
meeting unexpectedchallenges,"45
should coherewell with the basic meaningof the text, though even this is not
Armstrongarguesthat, in this case at least, an appeal
alwaysunambiguous.46
to the historyof the book's composition,to Poe's intentions,will not resolve
the issuebecausethesecanbe variouslyinterpretedas well.47He findsno rational
groundsfor preferringone of these interpretationsto another.
It is interestingto noticethat the Freudianinterpretationof The Turnof the
Screw nearly succumbedto the criticismby A. J. A. Waldockthat it could

41. Christopher Butler, "On the Rivalry of Norms for Interpretation," New Literary History 20
(1988-1989), 133.
42. Ibid., 129-130.
43. Ibid., 132.
44. Paul B. Armstrong, "History and Epistemology: The Example of the Turn of the Screw,"
New Literary History 19 (1987-1988), 697-698.
45. Ibid., 700.
46. Ibid., 701-702.
47. Ibid., 707-708.

318

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

not explainthe governess'saccuratedescriptionof Peter Quint, whose ghost

accordingto this theory she had never seen. Armstrongnotes that "a single
failureto fit maythus havedevastatingrepercussionsfor the entireinterpretive
As it turnedout, the Freudiantheory was saved, at least to
configuration."48
some extent,by John Silver,who identifiedseveralwaysin whichthe governess
could have learnedof Quint'sfeatures, includingreportsfrom people in the
village nearby.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF PAST CULTURES

I have arguedthat there are objective criteriafor decidingwhich basic and

secondaryinterpretationsof a text are acceptable,and which are not. In the
case of the basicmeaningof a text, these criteriaare normallydecisive.When
it comes to secondaryinterpretations,there is more room for equally well
supportedalternativereadings.Now I must raise a problemwhich confronts
historiansinterpretingold texts. Historianswantto know whatold texts meant
whentheywerefirstpublished.Historiansdo not merelylook for an interpretation of the text whichwill fit it well. Theylook for a readingwhichwill do that
and which is also likely to have been historicallycorrect-that is, a reading
whichthe majorityof educatedreaderswouldhaveacceptedat the timethe text
was written.But are they everjustifiedin thinkingthat their interpretationof
an old text is historicallycorrect?
Hans-GeorgGadamerhas arguedat length in his book Truthand Method
that it is neverreasonableto supposethat we have an accurateknowledgeof
whattextsreallymeantin the past. Gadamerpresentsthe processof interpretation as oneof tryingto findaninterpretationwhichwillmakethetextmeaningful
to oneself. He likens it to the process of trying to understandwhat another
personis sayingin conversation.One beginswith the physicalsounds,or in the
caseof texts, the markson a paper,andtheseareinterpretedin accordancewith
existingknowledgeof the languageand of the subject-matter.49
the interpreter's
If one'sinitialinterpretationof a text does not fit it exactly,if it is inconsistent
withsomefeaturesof the text, or makesno senseof them,thendifferentinterpretations are tried to see whetherthey are more comprehensive.At everystage,
Gadamerpoints out, the possible interpretationsare drawn from one's own
priorknowledgeof likely meanings,one's "prejudices,"as he calls them.50It is
no surprise,Gadamerconcludes,thatinterpretationschangefromtimeto time.
They are inescapablyrelativeto the knowledgeof the interpreter."You, for
example,know immediatelywhen you read a classic essay by Mommsenthe
only time when it could have been written. Even a master of the historical
methodis not ableto keephimselfentirelyfree fromthe prejudicesof his time,

48. Ibid., 701.

49. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 349-352.
50. Ibid., 240.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDINGOF OLD TEXTSBE OBJECTIVE?

319

his social environment and his national situation etc.""5This, he goes on, is "in
a fundamentally universal way what always happens."52There is no escape from
the historical relativity of historical understanding, he says. "The standpoint
that is beyond any standpoint, a standpoint from which we could conceive its
true identity, is a pure illusion."53According to Gadamer, the relativity of
historical understanding is partly a function of one's "prejudices,"but it is also
a function of one's interests. We tend to see what interests us. "All reading
involves application, so that a person reading a text . . . must accept the fact
that future generations will understand differentlywhat he has read in the text."54
A striking example of how interests influence interpretation is provided by the
convention of reading legal texts with an eye to their application to a case in
hand."5
When one is interpreting an historical text in an unfamiliar language, or from
an earlier period, there is a good chance that a complete understanding of its
meaning will not be immediately available. The historian will usually have to
spend some time finding an interpretation which will make sense of it in the
context of all else that he or she knows which is relevant to it in the culture
from which it came. The process of extending one's understanding in this way
Gadamer, following Dilthey and others, refers to as one of extending one's
"horizon" of understanding, or of "fusing" one's own present horizon with
the horizon of the author. One is often able to come up with an adequate
interpretation in the end, he says, because one is part of the cultural tradition
in which the text was originally created. Traditions, however, change over time,
and so one cannot ever be sure that one's interpretation is accurate.56
Gadamer does sometimes write of an interpretation being "objective" and
"true,"but he means these in a special sense. The only sense in which an interpretation is objective, he explains, is that it has been found to fit the relevant text
and other data well.57 It is certainly not objective in the sense of correctly
describing what the text meant either to its author or to the author's contemporaries.58Similarly, for Gadamer an interpretation is "true"if it is disclosed by
the text in a striking manner.
Whenwe understanda text, what is meaningfulin it charmsus just as the beautiful
charmsus [sayin a painting].It has asserteditself and charmedus beforewe can come
to ourselvesand be in a positionto test the claim to meaningthat it makes. What we
encounterin the experienceof the beautifuland in understandingthe meaningof tradition has effectivelysomethingabout it of the truth of play. In understandingwe are
drawninto an event of truth.59
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

465.
466.
339.
304.
275, 293.
358.
237.
220-222, 431.
446.

320

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

Gadamerwoulddenythatwe areeverin a positionto say that an interpretation

of a text correctlystates what it meant in the past.
Some have been persuadedby Gadamer'sargument,and agreethat because
everyinterpretationis the productof the interpreter'shistoricallyconditioned
preunderstanding,
there is no reason for thinkingit true. D. C. Hoy, for example, has written:"Gadamer'semphasison the finitudeand situatednessof
the interpretiveunderstandingmakesit difficultto see how a claimto truthor
even to validitycan be made."60
I do not think this skepticismis warranted.Therecan be good reasonsfor
believingone's understandingof a text to be historicallycorrect,that is, for
believingone's interpretationof the text correctlyrepresentswhat it meant at
the time when it was first published.
The possibilityof establishingan historicallycorrectbasic interpretationof
an old text can be appreciatedwhenone considerswhat it meansto say that an
interpretationof an old textis historicallycorrect.An interpretationof the basic
meaningof a text is correctif it satisfiesthe five criterialisted above, on the
basisof a correctknowledgeof the languageof the text, and upon a knowledge
of the literaryand historicalcontextsof its creationand of the intentionsof its
author. Gadamerdoubts whetherone is ever justifiedin claimingto have a
correctknowledgeof the languageof an old text, or a knowledgeof its context,
or a knowledgeof the intentionsof its author. What he fails to appreciateis
that historians'beliefs about these thingscan, on many occasions,be so thorough and so well supportedas to deserveto be calledknowledge- even though
it is alwayspossiblethat they are mistaken.I suspectthat Gadamerand others
think that becauseour beliefs about the past alwayscould be false, they never
deserveto be regardedas knowledge.But all our beliefs about the world are
fallible, and so none could be calledknowledgeif that standardwereadopted.
The fact is that manyof our beliefs aboutthe past areverystronglysupported,
and certainlydeserveto be acceptedas true.
An historicallycorrectinterpretationof an old text is one whichrests upon
a correctunderstandingof the languagein whichit is written.(A correctunderstandingof a languageis one whichwould be generallyacceptedas correctby
educatedusersof that language.)Knowingthis, historiansdo not simplyrely
upon theirown personalprejudicesto suggestinterpretationsof old texts. Becausethey are searchingfor an interpretationwhichwouldhavebeen generally
acceptedat the time of the text'scomposition,historiansbecomefamiliarwith
the languageof the time and with the prevailingworldview in orderto have a
betterchanceof thinkingof an interpretationwhichwouldgenerallyhavebeen
adopted.If thereis abundantevidenceof thatlanguage,anhistoriancanbecome
so familiarwith it as to be fully justifiedin saying that he or she correctly
understandsit. If the text is in a languagewhichis, to some extent,unfamiliar

60. David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literature, History and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley, 1978), 107.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

321

and of which there is only a moderate amount of evidence, then the historian
has to find an interpretation which fits what is known of the language as well
as possible, and the probability of the interpretation being correct will vary
depending upon the quantity of data and the degree to which the interpretation
fits it.
Historians who study texts from cultures other than their own are only too
well aware of the importance of mastering the language of those texts. This
involves learning the concepts it employs, and how its literature portrays the
society, indeed the world, of its day. To develop such mastery they immerse
themselves in its literature and in the world view of the times. J. G. A. Pocock
has stressed the importance of this practice.
[O]nly after we have understood what means [an author] had of saying anything can we
understand what he meant to say, what he succeeded in saying, what he was taken to
have said. . . . The historian's first problem, then, is to identify the "language" or
"vocabulary"with and within which the author operated.6'
If ... we are asked how we know the languages adumbrated [for example, theological,
legal, and humanist] really existed, or how we recognize them when we see them, we
should be able to reply empirically: that the languages in question are simply there, that
they form individually recognizable patterns and styles, and that we get to know them
by learning to speak them, to think in their patterns and styles until we know that we
are speaking them and can predict in what directions speaking them is carrying us. From
this point we may proceed to study them in depth, detecting both their cultural and social
origins and the modes, linguistic and political, of assumption, implication, and ambiguity
which they contained and helped to convey.62

Historians frequently try to fix the meaning of a text by defining the key words
it employs in terms of the author's personal world view. This can be a very
difficult task. When Peter Laslett presented his account of what Locke meant
by "property,"he referred to no less than thirteen previous attempts to explain
it.63When Dunn discussed Locke's notion of "consent," he contrasted his view
with those of J.Plamenatz and C.B.Macpherson.64 To decide what was meant
by the pamphlets which contributed to the American Revolution, Bernard
Bailyn made a special study of their use of the words "power," "constitution,"
"liberty," "sovereignty," and "slavery."65
What linguistic context should historians examine before they can be reasonably confident that they have mastered a language? There are two ways of
answering this, one statistical and the other historical. First, they should examine as many examples of a discourse as are necessary for them to read such

61. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, 25.

62. Ibid., 26.
63. Peter Laslett, The Two Treatises of Government, 2nd ed.(Cambridge, Eng., 1970), 100106. See footnote on 103.
64. John Dunn, "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke," in Political Obligation in Its
Historical Context, 29-52.
65. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Eng.,
1967), 55ff., 67ff., 79ff., 198ff., and 233ff., respectively.

322

C. BEHAN MCCULLAGH

examplesand experienceno difficultyunderstandingthem. At that point there

is little to be gainedby studyingmore: a law of diminishingreturnsapplies.
Second,if they areinterestedin the meaningof a text for a particularindividual
or group, they can read much of the literaturewhichthat individualor group
would have read, to become familiarwith their particularunderstandingof
the relevantdiscourse.It is reasonableto supposethat an understandingof a
languagewhich makes sense of large quantitiesof it is an accurateunderstanding.The chancesof two differentinterpretationsof a languageworking
equallywell are negligible,exceptin the case of individualwordsand phrases.
Whiletheseremainambiguous,historiansmuststudyas manyinstancesof them
as theycan, untilthey discoverone meaningwhichfitsall contexts,or untilthey
confirmthe ambiguityof the word or phrasein that language.Of courseit is
alwayslogicallypossiblethat a languagecan be understoodin more than one
way, so that it is possible that an historian'sunderstandingof a languageis
mistaken.But if it fits a largeandvariedsampleof that language,togetherwith
the contextsin whichit has been used, then we are justifiedin regardingthat
understandingof the languageas correct,since in practicethe chanceof any
other interpretationof the languagebeing so successfulis negligible.
And what historicalcontext should historiansstudy in orderto understand
an old text correctly?Theyshouldstudythe objectsandeventsto whichthe text
seems to refer, and try to imagine how these were conceptualizedby their
contemporariesby readingwhat they wrote about them. Informationabout
thesethingsis often usefulin clearingup uncertaintiesof referenceandambiguities of meaningin a text. Thereis often a lot of independentevidenceabout
the things to which a text refers, enough to warranthistorianssaying that
they have accurateknowledgeof them. I have describedthe nature of that
justificationelsewhere.66
Finally, an historian'sknowledgeof an author'sintentionscan also be well
justified.To understandan author'sintentionsone must findan interpretation
of the text whichfitswellwithwhatis knownof the author'sbeliefs,values,and
concerns.I considerintentionsto be statesof mindwhichcauseauthorsto write
as theydo. Forthatreason,descriptionsof an author'sintentioncanbe regarded
as trueor false, andnot merelycorrect.Suchdescriptionsarenormallyjustified
by meansof an argumentto the best explanation.(See, for example,my discussion of the interpretationsof Hitler'sintentionin writingthe HossbachMemorandum.67)The importantfact to notice here is that argumentsto the best
explanationareverycommonlyacceptedas yieldingconclusionswhichmay be
acceptedas true. They may be false, but if one explanatoryhypothesisis well
supported,and is far superiorto the othersthat can be thoughtof, it is reasonable to acceptit as true.68
Historianslook for interpretationsof the text whichfit well with whatthey
knowaboutits language,andif necessarywiththe circumstancesof its composi66. C. Behan McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge,Eng., 1984).
67. Ibid., 121.
68. Ibid., chap. 2.

CAN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OLD TEXTS BE OBJECTIVE?

323

tion and the intention of its author. These interpretationsare not simply a
function of the historian'sprejudicesor preconceptions,but are hypotheses
which, in manycases, aresupportedby quitea largeamountof historicaldata.
Gadamerportrayshermeneuticsas like an aestheticactivity,ignoringthe fact
that it is an act of historicalcognition. He likensthe discoveryof the meaning
of a text to the recognitionof the universaltruthexpressedin a work of art.69
Both aredepictedas the productof a sortof gameor conversationwiththe text,
or with the workof art, in whichone keepscorrectinginitialinterpretationsin
the lightof furtherobservations.Whathe doesnot noticeis thatthehermeneutic
exerciseof findingan interpretationof a text which fits it well is part of the
processof discoveringthe correctbasicinterpretationof that text. If the interpretationaccordswiththe rulesof the languageof the text, and sometimeswith
the contextof its creation,and with the author'sintention,then it is the correct
interpretationof the text.
A skepticmight arguethat the rangeof possibleinterpretationsconsidered
by historiansis limited not only by their preconceptions,but also by their
interests.I have shownthat the influenceof initialpreconceptionsis slight, as
hypothesesareusuallyformedonly aftera carefulconsiderationof the language
andthe contextof the text in question.Certainlyhistoriansareinclinedto think
of hypotheseswhich furthertheir interests.We have seen an exampleof this,
with Macphersonfavoringinterpretationsof Locke and otherswhich support
Marxisttheory.But suchinterpretationsare not generallyacceptedunlessthey
satisfythe relevantcriticalcriteria,and when they do they may be regardedas
correct.Macpherson'shypotheseswhich failed to meet the test wereset aside.
Interestsexertfar less influenceon the interpretationof old textsthanGadamer
would have us believe.
Gadamer,like Crocebefore him, actuallydeploresany understandingof the
pastwhichis not animatedby presentconcerns.He writes:"ahermeneuticsthat
regardedunderstandingas the reconstructionof the originalwouldbe no more
thanthe recoveryof a deadmeaning.... [T]heessentialnatureof the historical
spiritdoes not consistin the restorationof the past, but in thoughtfulmediation
with contemporarylife."70But these are statementsabout the value, or lack of
value,of historicalinterpretations,andarenot relevantto ourpresentconcerns.
WhetherGadamerlikes it or not, historiansare not restrictedto considering
hypotheseswhich appearto be relevantto their presentinterests.
This paper has shown how those who doubt the objectivityof historical
interpretationsof the meaningof texts eitherignorethe quitestringentconventionalcriteriaby whichsuchinterpretationsarejustified,as Derridadid, or they
overlookthe cognitivesignificanceof those criteria,as Gadamerdid. Historical
interpretationsof old texts whichsatisfythose criteriaare objectiveboth in the
sense of being rationallydefensibleand in the sense of being correct.
La Trobe University, Melbourne
69. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 145-146.
70. Ibid., 149-150.