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Spain - Political Risk Update
Spain - Political Risk Update
May 2015
Index
1. Recent developments
A wide range of coalition scenarios are feasible. In the absence of bilateral pacts between PP and PSOE
(theoretically possible in most regions), Ciudadanos, Podemos and regional parties could play a significant
role in government formation.
The key question is whether national parties are willing to reveal their preferences regarding preferred
coalition partners ahead of general elections so as to govern at the regional level. We see three scenarios:
(1) abstention until general elections, (2) strategic pacts dictated by national party leaders, (3) nonstrategic pacts depending on regional arithmetic and interests.
New parties could play a crucial role in injecting new life into the policy position of the next Spanish
government. There is potential for a new consensus to emerge around reforming regional finances
(especially, harmonising tax powers), measures to reduce corruption and reform of electoral
institutions, as well as some simplification of individual debt restructuring procedures.
Recent developments
Since the Transition, Spanish politics have been dominated by two parties. Seven
out of eleven governments were minority governments.
Source: Afi.
However, EP elections in May 2014 marked a sharp drop in support for the two main
parties, which has been sustained in recent opinion polls.
-2.5m
-2.5m
Displacement of votes first towards Podemos and, more recently, Ciudadanos. The
principal drivers are the economic crisis and corruption.
2015 a year of elections in Spain. Regional and municipal elections in May the
first test of new political environment.
22 March
24 May
Source: Afi.
Elections in Andaluca
27
September
SeptemberOctober
October
November December
10
Spanish election
(general election)
mechanics
Source: Afi.
Number of
seats
Provinces
36
Madrid
31
Barcelona
16
Valencia
12
Alicante, Seville
10
Mlaga, Murcia
Soria
Ceuta, Melilla
11
Valencia had 16 seats assigned to it in the 2011 elections (2 seats plus proportional share of remaining 248)
Under the DHondt method, the total votes are divided by 1, 2, 3, etc. up to the number of seats to be allocated (16).
The 16 seats are then allocated according to the highest ratio of votes to seat (marked in green).
PP were allocated 9 seats, PSOE gained 4 seats and EUPV, Compromis-Q and UPyD were assigned one seat each.
PP
743,604
52.2%
Factor of division
Votes
Share
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Source: Afi.
743,604
2
371,802
4 247,868
5
185,901
7
148,721
8
123,934
10 106,229
12 92,951
16 82,623
PSOE
EUPV-EV COMPROMIS-Q
370,499
96,417
85,797
26.0%
6.8%
6.0%
3
370,499
6
185,250
9
123,500
13 92,625
74,100
61,750
52,928
46,312
41,167
11
96,417
48,209
32,139
24,104
19,283
16,070
13,774
12,052
10,713
UPyD
PACMA
84,394
6,381
5.9%
0.4%
14 85,797
15 84,394
42,899
28,599
21,449
17,159
14,300
12,257
10,725
9,533
42,197
28,131
21,099
16,879
14,066
12,056
10,549
9,377
6,381
3,191
2,127
1,595
1,276
1,064
912
798
709
Eb
3,972
0.3%
ERPV
3,648
0.3%
Others
14,159
1.0%
3,972
1,986
1,324
993
794
662
567
497
441
3,648
1,824
1,216
912
730
608
521
456
405
14,159
7,080
4,720
3,540
2,832
2,360
2,023
1,770
1,573
12
The distribution of seats tends to favour rural and low populated areas. E.g. in the 2011 elections, 16,066 votes were required to
obtain a seat in sparcely-population Soria, while in Madrid 86,839 votes were necessary.
The system favours majority parties (over-assigns seats relative to proportion of votes). Parties can secure more seats by
having a concentration of the vote in a small number of (relatively populous) regions, instead of widely dispersed. This has
created a bias in favour of nationalist parties.
Party
6 of Amaiurs 7 seats
were a result of achieving
24.1% of the vote in the
Basque Country
Share of
votes
Share of
seats
PP
44.6%
53.1% (186)
PSOE
28.8%
31.4% (110)
CiU
4.2%
4.6% (16)
IU-LV
6.9%
3.1% (11)
Amaiur
1.4%
2% (7)
UPyD
4.7%
1.4% (5)
PNV
1.3%
1.4% (5)
ERC
1.1%
0.9% (3)
BNG
0.8%
0.6% (2)
CC
0.6%
0.6% (2)
Compromis
0.5%
0.3% (1)
FAC
0.4%
0.3% (1)
GBAI
0.2%
0.3% (1)
The smaller the district, the bigger the advantage for majority parties
Source: Afi.
13
14
15
2015
2012
PSOEs success in Andalucian elections unlikely to be replicable elsewhere due to PSOE historic dominance in region, personal
popularity of Andalucin leader Daz and lack of preparation time, which reduced new parties preparedness.
Formation of PSOE minority government blocked by PP, Podemos, Ciudadanos and Izquierda Unida: Three failed attempts to
approve PSOE led-minority government. PP and IU refusal to negotiate. Podemos (reduction in senior civil servants, break in relations
with banks responsible for evictions) and Ciudadanos (signing of anti-corruption pact, electoral reform, reduction in fiscal pressure)
only willing to offer support in return for specific demands.
If no agreement reached by 5 July, new elections will be called.
Source: Afi.
16
17
2011
PP
absolute
majority
PSOE
absolute
majority
PP + Cs
PP + C +
regional
PP +
regional
PP
+PSOE
PSOE +
POD
PSOE +
Cs
PSOE + POD
+ Cs (* + IU)
Madrid
PP
PP
X*
Valencia
PP
PP
Castilla-Len
PP
PP
Extremadura
PP + IU
PSOE
Murcia
PP
PP
Cantabria
PP
PP
Aragn
PP + PAR
PP
CLM
PP
PP
Balearics
PP
PP
Canaries
PSOE+CC
PSOE
Navarra
UPN + PSOE
UPN
La Rioja
PP
PP
Asturias
FORO
PSOE
Viable options
PSOE +
POD +
regional
PSOE +
Cs +
Regional
POD +
regional
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
?
11
X
1
X
3
PP expected to be most voted party in 9 out of 13 regions, but to retain absolute majority only in Castilla y Len (possibly Murcia)
Coalition/pact between traditional parties (PP & PSOE) is an available option in all but one region (Navarre)
Ciudadanos a necessary (but not always sufficient) coalition partner for PP in up to 9 regions
PSOE reliant on broad left-wing coalitions (Podemos + others) to govern in most regions, except Castilla-La Mancha
Regional parties play a key role in Navarra, Canary Islands, Cantabria and to a lesser extent Valencia & Asturias
Source: Afi, CIS.
* PP and Podemos coalition/pact discounted. In some regions we discount more complex coalition options, if easier and more feasible coalition options are available.
18
Risk to PP hegemony
PP heartland: large
incentive to pact
Traditional parties
tarnished by corruption
2015
PP heartland
Navarra, Aragn
2011
Valencia
PP tarnished by
corruption
9.7% of GDP and 11%
of population
2015
2011
PP on track to hold large cities: PP neck-andneck with Podemos in Madrid, CiU lead
reduced in Barcelona
Intermediate cities (provincial capitals) a key
battleground
19
Three possible scenarios for pacts following regional elections. Trade-off between
obtaining power at regional level and revealing cards ahead of national elections.
1.
2.
3.
Pacts and coalitions formed on ad hoc basis according to regional arithmetic and degree of independence/power
of regional leader vs. national leaders
Possibility of opportunistic agreements
Some read-across to post-general election scenarios but regional power dynamics influence outcomes
Source: Afi.
20
21
Latest opinion polls point to some signs of stabilisation: PP and PSOE recovering,
Podemos in freefall and Ciudadanos continuing to make inroads
Evolution of estimated vote of main Spanish political
parties (%)
22
Podemos attracts voters from left and Ciudadanos from centre-right (PP, UPyD).
Debate has shifted from left towards centre (anti-corruption, social democracy).
Vote intention according to vote recollection in 2011 elections
Podemos
attracting former
PSOE & IU voters
& disenfranchised
Left
Source: Afi, CIS, Metroscopia.
Centre
Right
23
Translation of opinion polls (direct vote intention) into final votes remains
uncertain and will depend on several factors
24
Prospect of pact-based government not necessarily bad news for markets. Three
possible scenarios for government formation after the elections.
Formal coalition between centre parties (PP + Cs, PSOE +Cs, PP + PSOE)
Market
impact
Central
scenarios
+ Will create need for greater consensus building, avoids populist takeover by Podemos
+ Historically proven to be relatively stable (albeit at a price of minority interests)
- Increased difficulty to pass necessary reforms/consolidation, risk of stagnation
- Increased fragility of government
Low-prob
scenarios
Source: Afi.
i.
Absolute majority government surprise (e.g. UK elections): low likelihood due to corruption scandals facing PP &
PSOE, weaker overall economic recovery and reduction in fear scenarios (e.g. Podemos led government)
ii. Populist government: reduction in support for Podemos and move towards centre mean low risks
iii. Second round of elections
25
Necessary reforms
Source: Afi.
26
Fiscal policy
Debt
Regions
Podemos
Welfare state
Podemos
28
Catalonia Independence
29
Support from independence has fallen from peak levels recorded last year, reflected
in a reduction in market concern (though Catalonia still pays a risk premium).
Catalan voter preference over status of Catalonia
9-N quasiconsultation
Early elections in Catalonia scheduled for 27 September (but not yet formally
called). Polls suggest plans to turn vote into a de facto plebiscite on independence
would give pro-independence parties a slender majority of seats but not votes.
Estimated share of vote in Catalan regional elections
Possibility that Catalan leader, Mas, may reconsider decision to hold early elections on a plebiscitary basis a
final decision will have to be taken in mid-August (40 days before election date)
Source: Afi, CEO.
31
The timeline proposed by the pro-independence parties (ERC + CiU) would see
a formal UDI in March 2017
March 2017
27 September
Formal UDI
Vote in favour of
independence in
early elections
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Referendum on
Catalan Constitution
Key uncertainties
Source: Afi.
32