Moldovas Foreign Policy Statewatch

Institute for
Development and
Social Initiatives
Viitorul

Issue 76, February, 2014

Veaceslav Berbeca

Political situation in Gagauzia:

the result of internal struggles
or external influence

wo referendums organized in Moldovas autonomous region of Gagauzia on 2 February provoked heated debate
in Moldovan society. At least two elements explain the attention of politicians and political commentators. First, the
political elite from Gagauzia insisted, as a political affront
to central authorities, on organizing these referendums
even if the Court from Comrat declared them illegal. Secondly, the referendums aftermath delivered a severe blow to the
Republic of Moldovas image of the foreign policy course. These
actions highlighted that there are contesters of the European integration idea. In this context, politicians and political commentators
in Chisinau should answer two major questions: Who is guilty?
And then, What has to be done? In this brief analysis we will try to
identify the genuine reasons that politicians from the autonomous
region held referendums and propose a range of recommendations to mitigate the implications of these events.

External influence version

Most political commentators and editorialists in Chisinau, with
some exceptions1, expressed the idea that Moscow was behind the
organization of the referendums on the foreign policy development vector
of the Republic of Moldova. This attitude is easy to explain because
the Russian Federation has repeatedly thwarted the evolution of the
http://www.timpul.md/articol/referendumul-gagauz-e-pe-contiina-conducerii-r-moldova-54604.html
1

Board:

Cornel Ciurea,
Cristian Ghinea,
Witold Rodkiewicz,
Martin Sieg,
Dan Dungaciu

Editor:

Elenbaum John Ryan

Moldovas Foreign Policy Statewatch

represents a series of brief analyses,
written by local and foreign experts, dedicated to the most topical
subjects related to the foreign policy of Moldova, major developments
in the Black Sea Region, cooperation with international organizations
and peace building activities in the
region. It aims to create a common
platform for discussion and to bring
together experts, commentators,
officials and diplomats who are
concerned with the perspectives of
European Integration of Moldova.
It is also pertaining to offer to
Moldovas diplomats and analysts
a valuable tribune for debating the
most interesting and controversial
points of view that could help Moldova to find its path to EU.

Moldovas Foreign Policy Statewatch

Eastern Partnership, Moscows role and influence in the Transnistrian conflict, and its actions aiming to
undermine the political stability in the Republic of Moldova such as launching an embargo on Moldovan
wines just several months before the initialing of the Association Agreement.
Political commentators in Chisinau generally concluded Russia is the true culprit that ordered the
referendum2 and leaders in Comrat were those who executed an order coming from Moscow.3 Besides the
obvious goal of the Russian Federation to compromise the Eastern Partnership, we can identify a number
of elements that justify deeming Russia as a key player behind the organization of these referendums.
The Bashkan of Gagauzia visits to the Russian Federation, particularly the October 2013 meeting
with the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin who is known as a harsh critic of the Chisinaus foreign
policy4. The funding of the referendums by a Russian millionaire born in the autonomous region, Yuri
Iacubov, and holder of the title of Honorary Citizen of Gagauzia since November 2012, when the
Bashkan Formuzal awarded him the distinction5. The presence of Roman Hudiakov, deputy of the
State Duma of the Russian Federation at the event of the 2nd February via statements by the Russian
ambassador to the Republic of Moldova, who declared that the Russian Federation would pay special
attention to the district of Taraclia, inhabited by Bulgarians, and to Gagauz autonomy6.
The uncompromising position the Republic of Moldovas government has taken toward EU
integration has resulted in a different situation than Ukraine and Armenia and it is more difficult to speak
about Moscows direct interference in the events in the Gagauz Autonomous Region. In other words,
the Russian Federations tactic was different than in Ukraine and Armenia where the Russian leadership
resorted to direct pressures and promises to compel their abandonment of their European paths.
The actions of Iacubov and Hudiakov, born in Ceadr-Lunga and Tiraspol, respectively and
considered to be old friends cooperating with Gagauz leaders, give the impression that they did not
represent the official position of Russia. Meanwhile, the statements of Muhametshin about paying more
attention to Russian speakers in Taraclia or ATU Gagauzia could be treated as a platform of cultural
support provided to Russian speakers from the localities mentioned.
The last events are directly linked to the political situation within the Gagauzias legislating body, the
Gagauzia Peoples Assembly (GPA.) On 13 February 2014, the Democratic Party of Moldovas Political
Council excluded four Gagauzian deputies on grounds of violating party discipline. This included GPA
chairman Dmitry Constantinov. However, the true reason seems to be that Constantinov, one of the
most important detractors of Formuzal7, joined the autonomy governor camp. The situation within
the autonomous regions legislature indicates that the Gagauz democrats lost their majority to the
communists and Formuzals team of ardent Customs Union proponents. We would like to believe that
there is no connection between this event and the claims by some deputies of the Republic of Moldova
Parliament that they have been offered money for leaving the Pro-European Coalition and forming
another fraction in order to change the governance8.

Internal conflict issue

The referendums organization should be considered within a broad context of earlier conflicts
occurring both within different political parties in the autonomy, Gagauz elite, and central authorities.
These dissensions molded the Gagauzia political situation and culminated with the decision on 27
http://ziarulnational.md/bogatu-referendumul-nepedepsit-risca-sa-provoace-o-reactie-in-lant/
http://www.moldova.org/oazu-nantoi-scenariul-pentru-referendumul-din-gagauzia-fost-scris-la-ambasadarusiei-din-chisinau/
4
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1722282.html
5
http://ziarulnational.md/ce-business-are-in-federatia-rusa-finantatorul-referendumului-din-gagauzia/
6
http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=10619
7
http://www.halktoplushu.com/index.php/glavnaia/novosti/315-predsedatel-nsg-provel-brifing
8
http://ziarulnational.md/doi-deputati-afirma-ca-cineva-a-incercat-sa-i-cumpere-pentru-a/
2
3

Str. Iacob Hncu 10/1, Chiinu

MD-2005 Republic of Moldova

373 / 22 221844 phone

373 / 22 245714 fax

office@viitorul.org

www.viitorul.org

Moldovas Foreign Policy Statewatch

November 2013 to organize the referendums, a day before the opening of the Summit in Vilnius.
First, we will refer to an older regional political conflict involving two of the most prominent politicians
of the autonomous region and a struggle which influenced their political parties. We mean the leader of
democrats in the region, Nicolai Dudoglo, and the Bashkan of the autonomous region, Mihail Formuzal.
The political stake is the election of the Bashkan at the end of 2014 as well as the general political
influence in Gagauzia. The DPM have repeatedly accused Formuzal of embezzling funds from Russian
humanitarian aid and established a commission to investigate the distribution of fuel and wheat from
the reserve funds. Moreover, they accuse the Bashkan of the abuse of power and disrespect of the
GPA decisions. The autonomys legislature established a special commission by decision nr. 56-VII/V
dated 12 March 2013 to investigate the claims. On 23 April 2013 the first session of this commission
took place. There an initiative by a group of deputies to start the procedure of impeachment of the
Bashkan 9 was also discussed. The Bashkan has vehemently denied all accusations and considers the
government in Chisinau abandoned him and joined the campaign to organize the referendum on the
foreign policy vector of the Republic of Moldova, registering an initiative in the Peoples Assembly in
October.
Dissension between the Comrat leaders and the central authorities on the distribution of power
between the center and the region is another problem. The Gagauz leaders have repeatedly complained
that Chisinau does not respect the autonomy conferred in 1994. This is aggravated by economics: the
extension of the revenue categories of the autonomous territorial unit with special legal status, as well
as transferring more funds for capital investments. The political elite from Gagauzia considers that the
amounts of capital investments for the autonomous region is much lower compared to other districts of
Moldova.
Finally, the regions situation worsened due to the communists skillful tactics that turned the region
into a platform for contesting the government coalitions policies in Gagauzia. The communists were the
first to launch an initiative on the external development vector of the Republic of Moldova in 2012 and
strongly criticized the policy of closer ties to the EU. Subsequently, all political parties from Gagauzia
voted for the referendum organization and spoke about the advantages of joining the Customs Union
and disadvantages of the approach to the European Union.
The Republic of Moldova leaderships failure to explain the essence of the approach to the EU was
used by the regions political parties to criticize the foreign policy adopted by Chisinau. Thus, against the
background of the above-mentioned conflicts, a fear of joining Romania upon initialing and subsequent
signing of the Association Agreement emerged. The communist propaganda associated the initialing of
the Association Agreement with joining Romania within a region dominated by pro-Russian sentiments.
Hesitation and weakness of state institutions to deal with the evolving conflict resulted in the decision
to hold referendums on the external development vector of the Republic of Moldova the EU or the
Customs Union (Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus) and the right to self-determination in case the Republic
of Moldova loses its independence.

Conclusions and recommendations

We say the reason for organizing these referendums should be viewed from a broader perspective
of several overlapping conflicts and the interests of the most important political parties in the region.
Chisinau failed in communicating with the autonomys residents about the advantages of approaching
the EU. In the absence of Russian and Gagauz language information, the communists took advantage
of the vacuum and promoted an anti-European campaign, which was later adopted by other political
parties in the region.
9

http://www.halktoplushu.com/index.php/glavnaia/novosti/140-o-zloupotrebleniyakh-vlastyu-glavoj-gagauzii

Str. Iacob Hncu 10/1, Chiinu

MD-2005 Republic of Moldova

373 / 22 221844 phone

373 / 22 245714 fax

office@viitorul.org

www.viitorul.org

Moldovas Foreign Policy Statewatch

The Chisinau authorities should implement a communication strategy explaining to the inhabitants
of the autonomy the advantages of closer EU relations and settle the dissensions between local and
central authorities. The European Commission and the EU Delegation to the Republic of Moldova
should be more active in promoting European values and implementing projects while emphasizing
that their implementation was possible thanks to the European funds. The lack of this information was
illustrated when Stefan Fule handed Formuzal a list of EU funded projects implemented within the
region. This was the European officials reaction to the declarations of the Bashkan who claimed that of
the 135 million Euros provided by the European Union to the Republic of Moldova in 2013, very little or
almost nothing of this money was spent for projects implemented in the region.

This publication was produced by IDIS Viitorul with the financial support of
Soros Foundation Moldova. The opinions expressed in this publication reflect the
authors/authors position and dont necessary represent the views of the donors.
Str. Iacob Hncu 10/1, Chiinu MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax office@viitorul.org www.viitorul.org
Str.
Iacob Hncu 10/1, Chiinu MD-2005 Republic of Moldova 373 / 22 221844 phone 373 / 22 245714 fax
office@viitorul.org
www.viitorul.org