Jack Rosenthal memo to Pierre Salinger. October 1962.
Source:
Memos, Box 003, Folder: "[Memoranda]: 1962-June 1963," Jacob Rosenthal Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
Jack Rosenthal memo to Pierre Salinger. October 1962.
Source:
Memos, Box 003, Folder: "[Memoranda]: 1962-June 1963," Jacob Rosenthal Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
Jack Rosenthal memo to Pierre Salinger. October 1962.
Source:
Memos, Box 003, Folder: "[Memoranda]: 1962-June 1963," Jacob Rosenthal Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
WHETE HOUSE EMERGENCY INFORMATION PROGRAM
Your assignment to me was to ignore policy questions and to
develop an immediate stop-gap staff and procedures which could be
put into effect quickly in an emergency and to arrange an exercise
to test both. An outline of such staff and tentative procedures
is attached, and I'm working out « plen for the exercise.
How this exercise might work and the impression we make on
the participating reporters, however, depend greatly on several
questions of policy, I do not mean to exceed my assignment, but I
think I should at least call to your attention the policy problems
that have become apparent to me in the past week.
Several previous efforts to work out such @ program have
foundered because of lack of policy guidance and I think answers -~
if only provisional -- to these questions must be provided before
the exercise, especially in view of the current flap about “managing
the news."
Let me frame the questions in connection with what I think are
some basic assumptions:
1, ASSUMPTION: To insure the secrecy of information which would
assist the enemy, the Government will want to have contrel over sli
information going out of the classified location and the executive
agencies’ relocation sites. This would be achieved by the centrali«
zation of releases.
STATUS: Reporters in the site might be limited to handouts
and briefings for official information, but they will have access
to a number of alternate sources of information, mich of it highly
sensitive, simply by being in the site -- announcements on the inter-
com, closed-circuit TV from the War Room on sets which sre placed in
a number of offices, and just casual dormitory or hall contacts.
QUESTION: Wow is their use of such sensitive information
controlled?
Restct ther access
DECLASSIFIED
SEC.
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2. ASSUMPTION: The Government is not interested in attempting to
censor spot news across the country.
STATUS: Nevertheless, local radio or press reports of mushroom
clouds over important targets -- particularly if rounded up by national
news agencies -- could help the enemy make damage assessments or be
detrimental to national security in other ways.
QUESTION: Should some effort be made to control such information,
if only through a code to which news outlets voluntarily subscribe?
(A related question is, should or would local or regional civil defense
officials risk forfeiture of public confidence by denying or refusing
comment on visible or obvious attack damage?)
3. ASSUMPTION: The Presidential Press Pool members would report not
for their individual papers or stations but for the press corps they
represent.
STATUS: Previous plans for a central gathering point for the
rest of the press corps have been abandoned for various reasons, such
as difficulty of reporters getting to such a point, the cost of
establishing one, and the uncertainty both of commnications to
their papers and the very survival of their papers. The only present
link for the pool is the combined AP/UPI wire at the classified si
QUESTION: Who the pool reporters be writing for?
Who would the still and movie ‘be shooting for?
Wier ¢ darkioom is
4, ASSUMPTION: Assuming that there was no central site for the
press corps, the reporters at the site could write for the combined
42 /UPT wire out of the site to New York and Atlanta (or radio wire
which could be connected at Colorado Springs.)
STATUS: All three of these wire service locations either are
wulnerable or Likely targets. Because of its technical nature, the
wire service lines would be difficult and enormously expensive to
harden. In short, there is no link between the pool reporters and
the press corps. OUtside of the vulnerable AP/UPI teletype, the
only link between the reporters and their ow papers would be
equally vulnerable ATST phone Lines. And, again, many newspapers,
located in the heart of metropolitan areas, would be destroyed by
an attack. Consequently, there has been an unspoken semi-assumpt ion
in previous press planning that newspaper capability should be largely
discounted, at least for the immediate post-attack period.
QUESTION: Is this a tenable assumption? Or should an effort
be made to create and harden the missing newspaper links? That is:
1. Should consideration of a hardened "newspoint” withwun
3.
necessary communications for the rest of the Washi
pre
corps be revived? Special arrauscnuh Pr gn eepalias?
2, Should consideration be given to a hardened, non-
metropolitan AP/UPT transmission center, as an alternate to New
York and Atlanta? (This very likely would have to be done at
Government expense.)
3. Should a newspaper group analgous to NIAC be instituted
to consider such problems as hardened relocation sites for indivi-
dual papers and their communications lines?
5, ASSUMPTION: It is desirable, especially for broadcast purposes,
to have familiar names and faces -- rather than some anonymous
Government announcer -- broadcast the news,
STATUS! This aim has been achieved, but twice. OEP and FCC,
working with NIAC, have on call 4 group of private industry broad-
casters and technical personnel (Lew Scholienberger, Steve McCormick,
etc.) for emergency use. The Presidential Press Pool, however, also
ineludes brosdcasters (Sender Vanocur, Bill Lawrence, etc.) for the
same purpose.
QUESTION: Who will do the broadeasting? Is this not needless
Fepitition and should not some combination be effected? (I would
Seabees chek HAE ovakinen te peoriay technical personne) end that
he networks get together and decige either that ig te ot eight
for thelr White louse staffers to take the place of the NIAC broad-
asters in the pool or vice versa. aad tm tho, Spee, since the
aim_{s familiar personalities, consideration aight be given to using
Brinkleys or Cronkhites for example, rather than the somewhat lesser~
known people now listed.)
Stupptettens tues the 16 people in. che Beergeuny Petes Peck 2ive
Of Hell's Half Acre, complicating the assembly and trans-
portation problem, might it not make more sense to have the press
corps pick representatives whose homes are closer together?
Ag 2, {ill you go to one of the altemete Prestdentiat
‘sites, 30, which one’
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