G.R. Nos.

176951, 177499, and 178056: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping1 in this case.
On 18 November 2008, the Court rendered a decision declaring unconstitutional the
16 Cityhood Laws. The decision became final after the denial of two motions for
reconsideration filed by the 16 municipalities. An Entry of Judgment was made on 21
May 2009. The decision was executed (1) when the Department of Budget and
Management issued LBM (Local Budget Memorandum) No. 61 on 30 June 2009,
providing for the final Internal Revenue Allotment for 2009 due to the reversion of 16
newly created cities to municipalities; and (2) when the Commission on Elections issued
Resolution No. 8670 on 22 September 2009, directing that voters in the 16
municipalities shall vote not as cities but as municipalities in the 10 May 2010
elections. In addition, fourteen Congressmen, having jurisdiction over the 16 respondent
municipalities, filed House Bill 6303 seeking to amend Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9009. The proposed amendment

was intended to correct the infirmities in the Cityhood Laws as cited by this Court in its
18 November 2008 Decision.2

Subsequently, the Court rendered three more decisions: (1) 21 December 2009, declaring
the Cityhood Laws constitutional; (2) 24 August 2010, declaring the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional; and (3) 15 February 2011 declaring the Cityhood
Laws constitutional. Clearly, there were three reversals or flip-flops in this case.

In the Resolution of 15 February 2011, the majority upheld the constitutionality of the 16
Cityhood Laws, declaring that (1) the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution; and (2) the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

I reiterate my unwavering position from the start that the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional.

I.
The Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code.

In sustaining the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, the majority ruled in the
Resolution of 15 February 2011 that in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended RA No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory RA No. 9009, such
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. In the
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the majority stated that RA

9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, x x x by way of the express exemptions
embodied in the exemption clauses.

This is egregious error.

Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this interpretation be discerned.
Neither the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws sustains such conclusion. Simply put,
there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that
the Cityhood Laws further amended the Local Government Code, which exclusively
embodies the essential requirements for the creation of cities, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city.

An amendment refers to a change or modification to a previously adopted law. 3 An

amendatory law merely modifies a specific provision or provisions of a previously
adopted law.4 Indisputably, an amendatory law becomes an integral part of
the law it seeks to amend.

On the contrary, each Cityhood Law contains a uniformly worded Separability Clause
which expressly states:

Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or

provision of this Charter shall be held unconstitutional, invalid
or inconsistent with the Local Government Code of 1991, the
other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect. Moreover, in cases where this
Charter is silent or unclear, the pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code shall govern, if so provided therein. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)

Each Cityhood Law states that if any of its provisions is inconsistent with the Local
Government Code, the other consistent provisions shall continue to be in full
force and effect. The clear and inescapable implication is that any provision
in each Cityhood Law that is inconsistent with the Local Government Code
has no force and effect in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law
expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local Government
Code, and thatin case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail
over the Cityhood Law. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the Local
Government Code, and the Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend the
Local Government Code. The clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is
for these laws to conform to the Local Government Code and not the other way around.

To repeat, every Cityhood Law unmistakably provides that any provision in the Cityhood
Law that is inconsistent with the Local Government Code is void. It follows that the
Cityhood Laws cannot be construed to authorize the creation of cities that have not met
the prevailing P100 million income requirement prescribed without exception in the
Local Government Code.

Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government
Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and
distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not
form integral parts of the Local Government Code but are separate and
distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are
laws other than the Local Government Code. As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot
stipulate an exception from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the
Local Government Code, without running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

This constitutional provision reads:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.6 To avoid discrimination and
ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate
in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria
in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

II.
The increased income requirement of P100 million
is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.

The majority resolution of 15 February 2011 states that the imposition of the P100
million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities
wasarbitrarily made. The majority resolution further declares: x x x there was no
evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this
amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased
from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities
to become component cities.

This is glaring error.

In stating that there is no evidence to support the increased income requirement, the
majority is requiring the Legislature, the sole law-making body under the Constitution,
to provide evidence justifying the economic rationale, like inflation rates, for the increase

in income requirement. The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the
Constitution to show the courts data like inflation figures to support the increased
income requirement. Besides, even assuming the inflation rate is zero, this Court cannot
invalidate the increase in income requirement on such ground. A zero inflation rate
does not bar the Legislature from increasing the income requirement to
convert a municipality into a city, or increasing taxes or tax rates, or
increasing capital requirements for businesses. This Court should not venture
into areas of analyses obviously beyond its competence.

As long as the increased income requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase
is a policy determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies within
the province of the Legislature. When the Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax
rates, or capital requirements for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws
on the ground that there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic,
political or social justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law,
outside the purview of judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the law unless
the law violates a specific provision of the Constitution. There is plainly nothing
unconstitutional in increasing the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million
because such increase does not violate any express or implied provision of the
Constitution.

The majority declares that the P100 million income requirement under RA No. 9009 was
imposed simply to make it extremely difficult for the municipalities to
become component cities. In short, the majority is saying that the Legislature, out
of sheer whim or spite at municipalities, increased the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million. Thus, the majority applied the P20 million income requirement
under the repealed law, not the P100 million income requirement under the prevailing
law. Yet, the majority does not state that the P100 million income requirement is
unconstitutional. The majority simply refuses to apply the prevailing law, choosing
instead to apply a repealed law. There is neither law nor logic in the majority decision.

The majority's conclusion that the Legislature increased the income requirement
from P20 million to P100 million simply to make it difficult for the
municipalities to become component cities is not only unfair to the Legislature, it
is also grossly erroneous. Contrary to the majority's baseless conclusion, the increased
income requirement of P100 million is not at all difficult to comply. As pointed out by
petitioner, the cities of San Juan7 and Navotas,8 which met the P100 million income
requirement, were created at the same time as the enactment of the Cityhood Laws by
the same 13th Congress.9 Prior to this, the City of Sta. Rosa, which also met the P100
million income requirement, was created through Republic Act No.
9264.10 Subsequently, the cities of Dasmarias in Cavite11 and Bian in Laguna12 were
created in full compliance with the P100 million income criterion.

Further disproving the majority's erroneous conclusion, an additional twenty-one (21)

municipalities have satisfied the P100 million income requirement for the creation of
cities.13 Accordingly, petitioner League of Cities has endorsed the cityhood application of
these 21 municipalities.14 These municipalities are:

Cabuyao and San Pedro (Laguna)

Cainta, Taytay, and Binangonan (Rizal)

Bacoor, Gen. Trias, Imus, Carmona, and Silang (Cavite)

San Pedro (Laguna)

Pantabangan (Nueva Ecija)

Calaca, Sto. Tomas, Bauan and Nasugbu ( Batangas)

Mauban in (Quezon)

Marilao, Sta. Maria and Norzagaray (Bulacan)

Limay (Bataan)

Compliance by these municipalities with the P100 million income requirement

underscores the fact that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply
at all, contrary to the baseless and speculative conclusion in the majority decision. In
short, the majority decision is based on patently and undeniably false and erroneous
premises.

Indisputably, right after the enactment of RA No. 9009, Congress passed laws converting
municipalities into cities using the new P100 million income requirement. Subsequently,
Congress enacted the 16 Cityhood Laws using the old P20 million income requirement.
Thereafter, Congress again passed laws converting additional municipalities into cities
using the P100 million income requirement. The 16 Cityhood Laws stick out like a sore
thumb, starkly showing an obvious violation of the equal protection clause. The Cityhood
Laws create distinctly privileged cities with only P20 million annual income,
discriminating against cities with P100 million annual income created before and
after the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. This kind of discrimination is precisely what
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution seeks to prohibit when it commands that no x x
x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code.

The majority harp on the fact that 59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an
average annual income of P100 million.

Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the

59 existing cities to comply with the P100 million income requirement. Obviously,
these cities were already cities prior to the amendment of the Local
Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of P100
million. In other words, at the time of their creation, these cities have complied with the
criteria prescribed under the old Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and
thus are not required to comply with the P100 million income requirement of the
prevailing Local Government Code. It is utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite
the non-compliance by the 59 existing cities with the increased income requirement
of P100 million to conclude that the P100 million income requirement is arbitrary and
difficult to comply.

Moreover, as stated, the majority do not find the increased income requirement of P100
million unconstitutional or unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement
violates a provision of the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the creation of a

city must be strictly complied with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood,
whether located in or outside the metropolis and whether within the National Capital
Region or not, must meet the P100 million income requirement prescribed by the
prevailing Local Government Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional or
unlawful if the P100 million income requirement is easily complied with by local
government units within or near the National Capital Region. The majority's groundless
and unfair discrimination against these metropolis-located local government units must
necessarily fail.

Further, that San Juan and Navotas had not allegedly been classified by the President as
highly urbanized cities, pursuant to Section 453 of the Local Government Code, does not
signify that these cities do not meet the P100 million income requirement. In fact, the
majority concedes that it is presumed that San Juan and Navotas cities have complied
with the P100 million income requirement. Besides, it is totally pointless to fault the
cities of San Juan and Navotas for an unperformed duty of the President.

III.
The reduction of the share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
will adversely affect the cities' economic situation.

In the Resolution of 15 February 2011, the majority declared that petitioner's protest
against the reduction of their just share in the Internal Revenue Allotment all boils
down to money, criticizing petitioners for overlooking the alleged need of respondent
municipalities to become channels of economic growth in the countryside.

The majority gravely loses sight of the fact that the members of petitioner League of
Cities are also in need of the same resources, and are responsible for development
imperatives that need to be done for almost 40 million Filipinos, as compared to only 1.3
million Filipinos in the respondent municipalities. As pointed out by petitioner, this is
just about equal to the population of Davao City, whose residents, on a per capita basis,
receive less than half of what respondent municipalities' residents would receive if they
become cities. Stated otherwise, for every peso that each Davaoeo receives,
his counterpart in the respondent municipality will receive more than two
pesos.

In addition, the majority conveniently forgets that members of the LCP have more
projects, more contractual obligations, and more employees than respondent
municipalities. If their share in the Internal Revenue Allotment is unreasonably reduced,
it is possible, even expected, that these cities may have to lay-off workers and abandon
projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing, the delivery of much needed public
services in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

Obviously, petitioner's protest does not boil down to money. It boils down to equity
and fairness, rational allocation of scarce resources, and above all, faithful
compliance with an express mandatory provision of the Constitution. No one
should put a monetary value to compliance with an express command of the
Constitution. Neither should any one, least of all this Court, disregard a patent violation
of the Constitution just because the issue also involves monetary recovery. To do so
would expose the stability of the Constitution to the corrosive vagaries of the
marketplace.

IV.

Not substantial compliance,

but outright violation of the Constitution.

In his Concurring Opinion to the Resolution of 15 February 2011, Justice Roberto A.

Abad stated, These new cities have not altogether been exempted from the operation of
the Local Government Code covering income requirement. They have been expressly
made subject to the lower income requirement of the old code. There
remains, therefore, substantial compliance with the provision of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.

This is gross error.

There is a wide disparity an P80 million difference in the income requirement of P20
million under the old Local Government Code and the P100 million requirement under
the prevailing Local Government Code. By any reasonable yardstick known to man since
the dawn of civilization, compliance with the old income requirement, which is only 20%
compliance with the new income requirement under the prevailing law, cannot be
deemed substantial compliance. It is like saying that those who obtain a general
average of 20% in the Bar Examinations are in substantial compliance with the
requirement for admission to the Bar where the highest possible score is 100%.

RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the
old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed
the old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our
statute books. Compliance with the old income requirement is compliance with a
repealed, dead, and non-existent law a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse,
compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution
which expressly commands that no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. To
repeat, applying what Justice Abad calls the lower income requirement of the old code

is applying a repealed, dead, and non-existent law, which is exactly what the majority
decision has done.

The invocation here of substantial compliance of the Constitution reminds us of what

Justice Calixto Zaldivar wrote in his dissenting opinion in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary:15 It would be indulging in sophistry to maintain that the voting in the citizens
assemblies amounted to a substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed in
Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The same can be said in this case.
A final point. There must be strict compliance with the express command of the
Constitution that no city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code. Substantial compliance is
insufficient because it will discriminate against all other cities that were created before
and after the enactment of the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. The conversion of
municipalities into new cities means an increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment of
the former municipalities and a corresponding decrease in the Internal Revenue
Allotment of all other existing cities. There must be strict, not only substantial,
compliance with the constitutional requirement because the economic lifeline of existing
cities may be seriously affected. Thus, the invocation of substantial compliance with
constitutional requirements is clearly misplaced in this case.

V.
Conclusion

To repeat, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local

Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity
and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in any other law except the Local
Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably

laws other than the Local Government Code, provide an exemption from the increased
income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and
intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Moreover, by express provision in the Separability Clause of each Cityhood Law, in case
of inconsistency between the Cityhood Law and the Local Government Code, the latter
shall prevail. Thus, the P100 million income requirement in the Local Government Code
prevails over the P20 million income requirement under the Cityhood Laws.

Finally, this Court must be true to its sworn duty to uphold, defend, and protect the
Constitution fully and faithfully, without indulging in sophistry or seeking refuge
behind a patently dubious invocation of substantial compliance with the Constitution.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
the Philippines.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
1Flip-flop is defined as an abrupt reversal of policy: the candidate flip-flopped on a
number of issues (The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998); a sudden
reversal (as of policy or strategy) (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary
Version 3.0, 2003); A reversal, as of a stand or position; a foreign policy flip-

flop (American Heritage Talking Dictionary, 1997); A decision to reverse an

earlier decision (WordWeb Pro Version 6.4, 2011); an abrupt reversal of policy
(Oxford Dictionaries Online, accessed 4 April 2011).
2 http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/commnews/commnews_det.php?
newsid=1162
3 See Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48886-88, 21 July
1993, where the Court stated that The change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision
from that it originally had.
4 See Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Edition, 1990, pp. 278-279,
citing David v. Dancel, G.R. No. 21485, 25 July 1966, 17 SCRA 696 (1966).
5Section 63, Republic Act No. 9389 (Baybay, Leyte); Section 61, Republic Act No. 9390
(Bogo, Cebu); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9391 (Catbalogan, Samar); Section
63, Republic Act No. 9392 (Tandag , Surigao del Sur); Section 63, Republic Act
No. 9393 (Lamitan, Basilan); Section 61, Republic Act No. 9394 (Borongan,
Samar); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9398 (Tayabas, Quezon); Section 57,
Republic Act No. 9404 (Tabuk, Kalinga); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9405
(Bayugan, Agusan del Sur); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9407 (Batac, Ilocos
Norte); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9408 (Mati, Davao Oriental); Section 62,
Republic Act No. 9409 (Guihulngan, Negros Oriental); Section 61, Republic Act
No. 9434 (Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte); Section 64, Republic Act No. 9435 (El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9436 (Carcar, Cebu);
and Section 65, Republic Act No. 9491 (Naga, Cebu).
6 Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.
7 Through Republic Act No. 9388. Approved on 11 March 2007.
8 Through Republic Act No. 9387. Approved on 10 March 2007.
9 Republic Act No. 9356, converting the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan into a city,
was enacted on 2 October 2006 also during the 13th Congress.
10 Enacted 10 March 2004.
11 Through Republic Act No. 9723. Approved on 15 October 2009.
12 Through Republic Act No. 9740. Approved on 30 October 2009.
13 http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=666748&publicationSubCategoryId=200
14 http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=666748&publicationSubCategoryId=200
15 G.R. No. L-36142, 31 March 1973.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by
LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS,
in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 176951

- versus COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS;MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by
LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.

G.R. No. 177499

Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS,

in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
AND MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF
NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by
LCP National President Jerry P.
Treas; CITY OF CALBAYOG,
represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS,
in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR,
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL; MUNICIPALITY OF
NAGA, CEBU; and DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 178056

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 15, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:

1.

Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010

dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of
Baybay, et al.; and

2.

Opposition [To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution

dated August 24, 2010].

Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set

Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010 for
Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by
the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, [1] each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant
to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote,
[2]

granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for

violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote,
[3]

denied the first motion for reconsideration.

On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,
[4]

which denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009

Resolution in this wise

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days
from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second
motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore
allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case,
the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the
filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion
for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for
lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the
second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.[5]

Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a
vote of 6-4,[6] declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,
[7]

resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the

Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City,
Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18,
2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its
position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of
the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis
of the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August
24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009,
which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a
locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance,
of
at
least One
Hundred
Million
Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based
on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the
last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into
component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills

were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16
municipalities that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the
sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill
to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have
introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it
is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local Government
was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased
to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion to the
same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that
before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among
other things, that the financial requirement, which, under the Local
Government Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to
enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the
P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities
aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in terms of financial
requirements by incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of
the nation on to their regularly generated revenue. Under that
requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this
country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the
approval of this Chamber to amend, particularly Section 450 of Republic
Act No. 7160, the requisite for the average annual income of a
municipality to be converted into a city or cluster of barangays which
seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the last two consecutive years based
on 2000 constant prices.[8]
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the
pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the
Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20
million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of
Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory
point.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the
Senate which propose the conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present
standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that
this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as
proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for
consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make
this bill, on the assumption that it is approved, retroact to the
bills that are pending in the Senate conversion from
municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to
reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber,
assuming that this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those
bills which are already approved by the House under the old version of the
Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair
does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application
to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the
Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is
necessary to put that provision because what we are saying
here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if
there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill
would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which
are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.[9]

Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher
income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was
amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent
of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the
Cityhood Laws was gauged.

Notwithstanding that both the 11 th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending
cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A.
No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate
President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the
wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income
requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities
have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their
respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral,
and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to
mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz
Batac, Ilocos Norte It is the biggest municipality of the 2 nd District of
Ilocos
Norte,
2nd largest
and
most
progressive
town
in
the province of Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the
neighboring towns to transact their commercial ventures and other daily
activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities of
modern living like banking institutions, satellite cable systems,
telecommunications systems. Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public
transport systems, sports, and entertainment facilities. [Explanatory Note
of House Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental It is located at the center of the
Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and home to a number of industrial
companies and corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El
Salvador is aptly credited to its industrious and preserving people. Thus,
it has become the growing investment choice even besting nearby cities
and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of
their product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of Companies is also
doing business in the area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to
spur economic and financial prosperity to this coastal place in NorthWestern Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6003,
introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte It is the largest of the eleven (11)
municipalities in the province of Agusan del Norte. It plays strategic
importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and
development of Agusan del Norte. It is the foremost in terms of trade,
commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the
new seat and capital of the provincial government of Agusan del Norte

pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16,
2000. Its conversion will certainly promote, invigorate, and reinforce the
economic potential of the province in establishing itself as an agroindustrial center in the Caraga region and accelerate the development of
the area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep.
Ma. Angelica Rosedell M. Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar It is the capital town of Eastern
Samar and the development of Eastern Samar will depend to a certain
degree of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization
and progress of adjacent towns considering the frequent interactions
between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2640,
introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan Before Basilan City was converted into a separate
province, Lamitan was the most progressive part of the city. It has been
for centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the
Yakan people of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-industrial and
others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income generating
ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to
be the center of commerce catering to the municipalities of Tuburan,
Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786,
introduced by Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar It has always been the socio-economic-political
capital of the Island of Samar even during the Spanish era. It is the seat of
government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at
the crossroad between Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also
hosts trade and commerce activates among the more prosperous cities of
the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol
region. The numerous banks and telecommunication facilities showcases
the healthy economic environment of the municipality. The preeminent
and sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the
call of residents for a more vigorous involvement of governance of the
municipal
government
that
is
inherent
in
a
city
government. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2088, introduced by
Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income,
population and area among others. It has been elevated to the Hall of
Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green
program. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced by Rep.
Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur This over 350 year old capital town the
province has long sought its conversion into a city that will pave the way
not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in the
development of its neighboring municipalities and the province as a
whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the provinces trade,
financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]

Bayugan, Agusan del Sur It is a first class municipality and the

biggest in terms of population in the entire province. It has the most
progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that
comprise the province. Thus, it has become the center for trade and
commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and
facilities than other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo Ompong G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to
urban and now boast of its manufacturing industry, agricultural farming,
fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small
commercial establishments contributing to the bulk of economic activities
in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral groups,
political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in
Carcar, they expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality
into a component city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990,
introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental Its population is second highest in
the province, next only to the provincial capital and higher
than Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its
economy. There are very good prospects in agricultural production
brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that
provides a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its potential
to grow commercially is certain. Its strategic location brought about by its
existing linkage networks and the major transportation corridors
traversing the municipality has established Guihulngan as the center of
commerce and trade in this part of Negros Oriental with the first
congressional district as its immediate area of influence. Moreover, it has
beautiful tourist spots that are being availed of by local and foreign
tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep.
Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon It flourished and expanded into an important
politico-cultural center in [the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (1179-1910),
it served as the cabecera of the province which originally carried
the cabeceras own name, Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture, heritage
and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active centers of
coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and services
within the first district of Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and
trade, but also the cultural center of the rich customs and traditions of the
different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the
income of Tabuk has been steadily increasing, which is an indication that
its economy is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]

Available
information
Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows
viability, thus:

on Baybay, Leyte;
their
economic

Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of

92 barangays, 23 of which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69 are
rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is
situated on the western coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4
climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous
in the eastern portion as it slopes down west towards the shore
line. Generally an agricultural city, the common means of livelihood are
farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall
activities. The most common crops grown are rice, corn, root crops,
fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating include the Specialty Products
Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries
can also be found in the city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics,
dress-making, fiber craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal craft,
fine Philippine furniture manufacturing and other related
activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist destination, especially
for tennis players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it also
houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte
State University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural
College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High
School and the Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for
river cruising, numerous caves for spelunking, forests, beaches, and
marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly Baybayanos,
will be an element of a successful tourism program. Considering the role
of tourism in development, Baybay City intends to harness its tourism
potential. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visitedSeptember
19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of
the island of Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers
away
from Davao City,
a
one
and
a
half-hour
drive
from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City through the
Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum
highway. Travels by air and sea are possible, with the existence of an
airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital
of Mindanao if not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is
planted to coconuts, and a significant number of its population is largely
dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn,
coffee and cacao are also being cultivated, as well as the famous
Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of shoreline
and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of
resorts have been developed and are now open to serve both local and
international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast
of Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western coast of the bay
lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants
and trees grow, some of which are believed to be a hundred years old or
more. On its peak is a lake, called Tinagong Dagat, or hidden sea, so
covered by dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for hours to reach

it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus
becoming
a
wildlife
sanctuary
for
these
life
forms.
(<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat,
Chamber President of the Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in
the province of Davao Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as
the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?
m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date,
accessed
on September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical BackgroundIn the early times, the place now
known as Naga was full of huge trees locally called as Narra. The first
settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which
later simply became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements in
the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on June 12, 1829. The
municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its economic
development has undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming
and fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the Spaniards came
and discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the
municipality, as the Spaniards mined and sent it to Spain. The mining
industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the years
progressed, manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga
one of the industrialized municipalities in the Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality
Province
Distance from Cebu City
Number of Barangays
No. of Registered Voters
Total No. of Precincts
Ann.
Income

1st class
Cebu
22 kms.
28
44,643 as of May 14, 2007
237 (as of May 14, 2007)
(as
of Dec.
31,
2006) Php112,219,718.35
Agricultural, Industrial,
Agro-Industrial,
Mining
Product

(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?
option=com.content&view=article
id=53:naga-facts-andfigures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September
19, 2008)

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative

power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them.[10] The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in
their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress

of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. [11]
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No.
9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted
the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government unitsincome,
population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement
with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from
locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from
the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to
the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and
the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood
Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress
that the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the
Cityhood Laws infringed on the just share that petitioner and petitioners-inintervention shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to
them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid
classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
applies equally to all members of the same class.[12]
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that
did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another
for the purpose of the income requirement. This contention misses the point.

It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate
President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009
was merely to stop the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities
and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average
annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily
made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to
support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement
of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult
for municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and
the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed
component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of
the LGC, to wit

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum

population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified
by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income
of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be
considered component cities of the province in which they are
geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)

The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an
arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount sufficient, based on
acceptable

standards,

to

provide

for

all

essential government facilities and services and special functions

commensurate with the size of its population, per Section 7 [13] of the LGC. It was
imposed merely because it is difficult to comply with. While it could be argued that P100
million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the essential government
facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a municipality
wanting to become a component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of P20
million would be insufficient. This is evident from the existing cities whose income, up
to now, do not comply with the P100 million income requirement, some of which have
lower than the P20 million average annual income. Consider the list[14] below
CITY
1. Marawi City
2. Palayan City
3. Sipalay City
4. Canlaon City
5. Himamaylan City
6. Isabela City
7. Munoz City
8. Dapitan City
9. Tangub City
10. Bayawan City
11. Island Garden City of Samal
12. Tanjay City
13. Tabaco City
14. Oroquieta City
15. Ligao City
16. Sorsogon City

AVERAGE ANNUAL
INCOME
5,291,522.10
6,714,651.77
9,713,120.00
13,552,493.79
15,808,530.00
16,811,246.79
19,693,358.61
20,529,181.08
20,943,810.04
22,943,810.04
23,034,731.83
23,723,612.44
24,152,853.71
24,279,966.51
28,326,745.86
30,403,324.59

17. Maasin City

18. Escalante City
19. Iriga City
20. Gapan City
21. Candon City
22. Gingoog City
23. Masbate City
24. Passi City
25. Calbayog City
26. Calapan City
27. Cadiz City
28. Alaminos City
29. Bais City
30. San Carlos City
31. Silay City
32. Bislig City
33. Tacurong City
34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental)
35. Kabankalan City
36. Malaybalay City
37. La Carlota City
38. Vigan City
39. Balanga City
40. Sagay City
41. Cavite City
42. Koronadal City
43. Cotabato City
44. Toledo City
45. San Jose City
46. Danao City
47. Bago City
48. Valencia City
49. Victorias City
50. Cauayan City
51. Santiago City
52. Roxas City
53. Dipolog City
54. Trece Martires City
55. Talisay City (Cebu)
56. Ozamis city
57. Surigao City
58. Panabo City
59. Digos City

30,572,113.65
32,113,970.00
32,757,871.44
34,254,986.47
36,327,705.86
37,327,705.86
39,454,508.28
40,314,620.00
40,943,128.73
41,870,239.21
43,827,060.00
44,352,501.00
44, 646,826.48
46,306,129.13
47,351,730.00
47,360,716.24
49,026,281.56
52,609,790.00
53,560,580.00
54,423,408.55
54,760,290.00
56,831,797.19
61,556,700.49
64,266,350.00
64,566,079.05
66,231,717.19
66,302,114.52
70,157,331.12
70,309,233.43
72,621,955.30
74,305,000.00
74,557,298.92
75,757,298.92
82,949,135.46
83,816,025.89
85,397,830.00
85,503,262.85
87,413,786.64
87,964,972.97
89,054,056.12
89,960,971.33
91,425,301.39
92,647,699.13

The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their respective
provinces emphasizes the arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as the new income

requirement for the conversion of municipalities into component cities. This

arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level of
economic development of the individual respondent municipalities as above submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of
substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the
Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the
very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward
this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.

Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by
the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose
way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their just
share in the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a just share, not a specific
amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the implementation of
the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the
table[15] below
CITY

CY 2006 IRA

CY 2008 IRA

(Before Implementation of
Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws)
Bais
Batangas
Bayawan
Cadiz
Calapan
Calbayog
Cauayan
Gen. Santos
Gingoog
Himamaylan
Iloilo
Iriga
Legaspi
Ligao
Oroquieta
Pagadian
San Carlos
San Fernando
Santiago
Silay
Surigao
Tacurong
Tagaytay
Tarlac
Tangub
Urdaneta
Victorias
Zamboanga

219,338,056.00
334,371,984.00
353,150,158.00
329,491,285.00
227,772,199.00
438,603,378.00
250,477,157.00
518,388,557.00
314,425,637.00
248,154,381.00
358,394,268.00
183,132,036.00
235,314,016.00
215,608,112.00
191,803,213.00
292,788,255.00
239,524,249.00
182,320,356.00
508,326,072.00
216,372,314.00
233,968,119.00
179,795,271.00
130,159,136.00
348,186,756.00
162,248,610.00
187,721,031.00
176,367,959.00
918,013,016.00

(Actual Release After

Implementation of Sixteen [16]
Cityhood Laws)
242,193,156.00
388,871,770.00
388,840,062.00
361,019,211.00
252,587,779.00
485,653,769.00
277,120,828.00
631,864,977.00
347,207,725.00
277,532,458.00
412,506,278.00
203,072,932.00
266,537,785.00
239,696,441.00
211,449,720.00
327,401,672.00
260,515,711.00
204,140,940.00
563,679,572.00
241,363,845.00
260,708,071.00
197,880,665.00
152,445,295.00
405,611,581.00
180,640,621.00
207,129,386.00
194,162,687.00
1,009,972,704.00

What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA
shares was based on a computation of what they would receive if respondent
municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a
bigger amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils
down to money and how much more they would receive if respondent municipalities
remain as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national
government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove
enlightening:

SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again

on the previous qualification and the present one being proposed. Before
there were three
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to
become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I
used to be the chairman of the Committee on Local Government, but the
new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my
memory as far as the Local Government Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are
three requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100
million of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before
includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never
have been included. That was not the intention when we first
crafted the Local Government Code. The financial capacity was
supposed to be demonstrated by the municipality wishing to
become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not
rely on the internal revenue share that comes from the
government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in past
conversions of municipalities into cities was, the Department
of Budget and Management, along with the Department of
Finance, had included the internal revenue share as a part of
the municipality, demonstration that they are now financially
capable and can measure up to the requirement of the Local
Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20 million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread
that into the Record because otherwise, if he did not mention the
Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management,
then I would have been blamed for the misinterpretation. But anyway,
the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation given to us during
the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from
locally generated income as far as population is concerned.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be

no change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still
100 square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was either/or?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three
requirements, basically, as long as it meets the financial requirement,
then it may meet the territorial requirement or the population
requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains or?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other
words
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be
any municipality that will qualify, Mr. President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which
can qualify, but it will take a little time. They will have to
produce more babies. I do not knowexpand their territories,
whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the whole
proposal is geared towards making it difficult for
municipalities to convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact
that in the amendments that we are proposing for the entire
Local Government Code, we are also raising the internal
revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila
dehado in this particular instance.

SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr.

President, I throw my full support behind the measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis
supplied)[16]

From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood
Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into
component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered
thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the
income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the privilege that they have
already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or class as the respondent
municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the
expenditures that they would not be able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent
municipalities obligations arising from the contracts they have already entered into, the
employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they have already initiated
and completed as component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of
respondent municipalities to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate economic
growth in the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-borns so
that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his
vineyard. After reaching an agreement with them for the usual daily wage, he sent them
out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men standing around
the marketplace without work, so he said to them, You too go along to my vineyard and
I will pay you whatever is fair. They went. He came out again around noon and midafternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late afternoon he found still others
standing around. To these he said, Why have you been standing here idle all day? No

one has hired us, they told him. He said, You go to the vineyard too. When evening
came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, Call the workmen and give them
their pay, but begin with the last group and end with the first. When those hired late in
the afternoon came up they received a full days pay, and when the first group appeared
they thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon
they complained to the owner, This last group did only an hours work, but you have
paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching
heat. My friend, he said to one in reply, I do you no injustice. You agreed on the
usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man who was
hired last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or
are you envious because I am generous?[17]
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only
sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to
make the local government units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very
mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense
of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must
end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last
resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the
following pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether
enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are
invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a
solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to
questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution,
and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising
their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even
reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a
court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a
state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case

must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with
the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect
to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by
which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the
contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful
case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the
constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the
doubt in favor of its validity.[18]

WHEREFORE, the
dated August

24,

Motion

2010,

for

dated

Reconsideration
and

filed

of

the

Resolution

on September

14,

2010 by respondentsMunicipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution

dated August 24,

2010 is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. The

Cityhood

Laws

Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See dissenting opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

I maintain my vote in the original ponencia. Hence, I

concur with the dissent of J. Carpio
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

No part
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

I certify that J. De Castro left her vote concurring with

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

J. Bersamin
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

I join the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

(No part)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

See concurring opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

I join the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic Acts 9389 [Baybay City, Leyte], 9390 [Bogo City, Cebu], 9391 [Catbalogan
City, Samar], 9392 [Tandag City, Surigao del Sur], 9393 [Lamitan City, Basilan], 9394
[Borongan City, Samar], 9398 [Tayabas City, Quezon], 9404 [Tabuk City, Kalinga], 9405
[Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur], 9407 [Batac City, Ilocos Norte], 9408 [Mati City, Davao
Oriental], 9409 [Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental], 9434 [Cabadbaran City, Agusan del
Norte], 9435 [El Salvador City, Misamis Oriental], 9436 [Carcar City, Cebu], and 9491
[Naga City, Cebu].
[1]

Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,

Velasco, Jr., and Brion, concurring; dissenting, J. Reyes, joined by JJ. Corona, Azcuna,
Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro; C.J. Puno, and JJ. Nachura and Tinga took no
part; J. Ynares-Santiago was on leave.
[3]
Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices YnaresSantiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro. Chief Justice Puno and
Justice Nachura took no part.
[4]
Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices YnaresSantiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin. Chief Justice
Puno and Justice Nachura took no part. Justice Quisumbing was on leave.
[5]
Citations omitted.
[6]
Penned by J. Velasco, Jr., with JJ. Corona, Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and
Villarama concurring; dissenting, J. Carpio, joined by JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, and
Peralta; C.J. Puno and JJ. Nachura and Del Castillo took no part.
[7]
Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Mendoza,
and Sereno, concurring; dissenting,, J. Velasco, Jr., joined by C.J. Corona, and JJ.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez; JJ. Nachura and Del Castillo took no
part.
[8]
II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 164 (October 5, 2000); rollo (G.R. No. 176951),
Vol. 5, p. 3765.
[9]
Id. at 167-168; id. at 3768-3769.
[10]
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2,
2009, 583 SCRA 428, 450, citing Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National
Economic Development Authority, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 623.
[11]
Id., citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[2]

De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v. Court of
Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242 (1999).
[12]

SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a

local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected
of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population . It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area . It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bound with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department
of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
(Emphasis supplied.)
[14]
The figures reflect the actual income of the cities for 2006. If R.A. No. 9009 is to be
applied such that the figures are expressed in 2000 constant prices, the income of the
cities will even be lower. (Certification from the Bureau of Local Government Finance
dated December 5, 2008; rollo [G.R. No. 176951], Vol. 5, pp. 3731-3734.)
[13]

Based on the letter dated December 9, 2008 of the Department of Budget and
Management; rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, pp. 3978-3986.
[16]
Committee Amendments re S. No. 2157, Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 24,
October 5, 2000, pp. 165-166; id. at 3766-3767.
[17]
Mat. 20: 1-15.
[18]
Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 584 (1915).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
[15]

EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

June 28, 2011

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National

President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel
Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte;
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del
Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and
Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel
Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan;
Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan,
Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte;
Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of
Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel
Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan

del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El

Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and
Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby consider and resolve: (a) the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which is a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For
Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set
aside; and (b) the respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for
Reconsideration and grant the Motion for Entry of Judgment.
As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the reconsideration,
reversal, or setting aside of the resolution of April 12, 2011. 1 In turn, the resolution of
April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011).2 Clearly, the Motion for Reconsideration is really a
second motion for reconsideration in relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011. 3
Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact that
the Motion for Reconsiderationraises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners
already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated
15 February 2011). The following tabulation demonstrates the sameness of issues
between the motions, to wit:
Motion for Reconsideration
of April 29, 2011

Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the

Decision dated 15 February 2011) dated March 8,
2011

I. With due respect, neither the Rules of Court

II. The Resolution Contravenes The 1997
nor jurisprudence allows the Honorable Court
Rules Of Civil Procedure And Relevant
to take cognizance of Respondent Municipalities Supreme Court Issuances.
multiple motions. By doing so, the Honorable
Court therefore acted contrary to the Rules of
Court and its internal procedures.

II. Contrary to the ruling of the Honorable

Court in the Assailed Resolution, the
controversy involving the Sixteen (16) Cityhood

I. The Honorable Court Has No Jurisdiction To

Promulgate The Resolution Of 15 February 2011,
Because There is No Longer Any Actual Case

laws had long been resolved with

finality;thus, the principles of immutability
of judgment and res judicata are applicable
and operate to deprive the Honorable Court of
jurisdiction.

Or Controversy To Settle.

III. Contrary to the Assailed Resolution of the

Honorable Court, the sixteen (16) Cityhood laws
neither repealed nor amended the Local
Government Code. The Honorable Court
committed an error when it failed to rule in the
Assailed Resolution that the Sixteen (16)
Cityhood Laws violated Article X,
Sections 6 and 10 of the Constitution.

IV. The Resolution Erroneously Ruled That The

Sixteen (16) Cityhood Bills Do Not Violate Article
X, Sections 6 and 10 Of The 1987
Constitution.

III. The Resolution Undermines The Judicial

System In Its Disregard Of The Principles Of Res
Judicata And The Doctrine of Immutability
of Final Judgments.

V. The Sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws Violate The

Equal Protection Clause Of The Constitution And
The Right Of Local Government Units To A Just
Share In The National Taxes.

IV. With due respect, the constitutionality of

R.A. 9009 is not an issue in this case. It was
error on the part of the Honorable Court to
consider the law arbitrary.

That Issue No. IV (i.e., the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9009) appears in
the Motion for Reconsideration but is not found in the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is of no consequence, for the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009 is neither relevant nor decisive in this case, the
reference to said legislative enactment being only for purposes of discussion.
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be
entertained. As to that, Section 24 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The
Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading,5 and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave
has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. 6 The
restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in
the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15
states:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a
second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only
be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote
of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the
higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is

likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and

irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration
can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes
final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only
be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of
law or by the Courts declaration" even renders the denial of the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of April 12, 2011 bears out, 7the
ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by the Courts express declaration.
Consequently, the denial ofthe Motion for Reconsideration is immediately warranted.
Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted
the respondents own second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between
then and now, however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the
resolution of June 2, 2009 that the respondents second motion for reconsideration was
"no longer a prohibited pleading."8 No similar declaration favors the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.
Finally, considering that the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes
the issues previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011), the Court, having already
passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid
repetition and redundancy.
Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of the 16
Cityhood Laws now absolutely warrants the granting of respondents Motion for Entry
of Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011; grants the respondents Motion for
Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011; and directs the Clerk of Court to forthwith issue
the Entry of Judgment in this case.
No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

The prayer for relief of the Motion for Reconsideration states:

WHEREFORE, Petitioners most respectfully pray that the Resolution
dated 12 April 2011 be forthwith RECONSIDERED, REVERSED or SET
ASIDE.

The dispositive portion of the resolution of April 12, 2011 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.

The dispositive portion of the resolution of February 15, 2011 says:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated
August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents
Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August
24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublic
Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
4

Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566 SCRA 451
(2008); APO Fruits corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195, April 5, 2011; Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 254
SCRA 234.
5

Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra.

Supra, note 2.

The resolution of June 2, 2009 pertinently declared:

xxx
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent cities. In effect, the
Court allowed the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the
required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2009 Decision
and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.
xxx

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:

The majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1) of
the pendency of the conversion bills during the 11th Congress; and (2) compliance with
the requirements of the Local Government Codeprior to its amendment by Republic Act
No. 9009.
I reiterate my dissent.
I.
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.1 To avoid discrimination and
ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate
in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that if any of its
provisions is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other
consistent provisions "shall continue to be in full force and effect." The clear
and inescapable implication is that any provision in each Cityhood Law that
is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code" has no force and effect
in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law expressly and unequivocally
acknowledges the superiority of the Local Government Code, and that in case of
conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood
Law. The clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is for these laws to
conform to the Local Government Code and not the other way around.
Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government
Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and
distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words,the Cityhood Laws do not
form integral parts of the Local Government Code but are separate and
distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are
laws other than the Local Government Code. As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot
stipulate an exception from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the
Local Government Code, without running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to the faulty conclusion of the majority, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the
Local Government Code. The Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend
the Local Government Code. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can

this interpretation be discerned. Neither the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws
sustains such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to
support the majority decision that the Cityhood Laws amended the Local Government
Code.
II.
The Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills.
In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will
never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be
limited to existing conditions only.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their
cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Further, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement
that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
III.
Respondent municipalities must comply with the
P100 million income requirement under the prevailing LGC.
RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the
old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed
the old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our
statute books. Compliance with the old income requirement is compliance with a
repealed, dead, and non-existent law a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse,
compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution
which expressly commands that "no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code."
Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into cities must comply
with the P100 million income requirement under the prevailing Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, and not with the old P20 million income requirement.

Otherwise, such compliance with the old P20 million income requirement is void for
being unconstitutional.
There must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no
city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code." Substantial compliance is insufficient
because it will discriminate against all other cities that were created before and after
the enactmentof the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. The conversion of municipalities into
new cities means an increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment of the former
municipalities and a corresponding decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment of
all other existing cities. There must be strict, not only substantial, compliance with the
constitutional requirement because the economic lifeline of existing cities may be
seriously affected.
IV.
The increased income requirement of P100 million
is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.
According to the majority, "the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million
from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. x x x no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the aftereffects that were likely to arise."
This is glaring error.
The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to show
the courts data like inflation figures to support the increased income requirement. As
long as the increased income requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a
policy determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies within the
province of the Legislature. When the Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax rates,
or capital requirements for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws on the
ground that there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic, political or
social justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law, outside the
purview of judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the law unless the law
violates a specific provision of the Constitution. There is plainly nothing unconstitutional
in increasing the income requirement from P20 million toP100 million because such
increase does not violate any express or implied provision of the Constitution.
V.
Failure of 59 existing cities to post P100 million annual income
does not render the P100 million income requirement
difficult to comply.
Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the
59 existing cities to comply with theP100 million income requirement. Obviously,
these cities were already cities prior to the amendment of the Local
Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of P100
million. In other words, at the time of their creation, these cities have complied with the
criteria prescribed under the old Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and
thus are not required to comply with the P100 million income requirement of the

prevailing Local Government Code. It is utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite
the "non-compliance" by the 59 existing cities with the increased income requirement
of P100 million to conclude that the P100 million income requirement is arbitrary and
difficult to comply.
Moreover, as stated, the increased income requirement of P100 million is neither
unconstitutional nor unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement violates a
provision of the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the creation of a city must be
strictly complied with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whether located
in or outside the metropolis and whether within the National Capital Region or not, must
meet the P100 million income requirement prescribed by the prevailing Local
Government Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional or unlawful if the P100
million income requirement is easily complied with by local government units within or
near the National Capital Region. The majoritys groundless and unfair discrimination
against these metropolis-located local government units must necessarily fail.
VI.
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code
are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local
government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory,
there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should
not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100
million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local
government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just
distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
As pointed out by petitioners, "respondent municipalities have a total population
equivalent to that of Davao City only, or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the IRA that
pertains to the 16 municipalities (P4,019,776,072) is more than double that for Davao
City (P1,874,175,271). x x x As a result, the per capita IRA alloted for the individual
denizen of Davao is even less than half of the average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of
the sixteen (16) municipalities (P1,374.70 divided by P3,117.24)."
This indisputable fact vividly reveals the economic inequity that will inevitably result
from the unjust allocation of the IRA as a consequence of the conversion of respondent
municipalities into cities. Clearly, if the existing cities share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment is unreasonably reduced, it is possible, even expected, that these cities may

have to lay-off workers and abandon projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing,
the delivery of much needed public services in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
VII.
Conclusion
The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code
itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality,
such criteria cannot be embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code. In
this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local
Government Code, provide an exemption from the increased income requirement for the
creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
No. 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. In addition, the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution on the fair and equitable distribution
of national taxes to all local government units. Without any doubt, the Cityhood Laws
must be striken down for being unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
the Philippines.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnote
1

Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
"If changing judges changes laws, it is not even clear what law is."
- Richard A. Posner1

I maintain my dissent that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. In

questioning the Courts latest Resolution,2 petitioners have raised concerns over the
"highly irregular and unprecedented" acts of entertaining several motions for
reconsideration.3 In response to these concerns, I wish to expound on the effects of the
"flip-flopping" decisions on the Courts role in our democratic system and its decisionmaking process, in order that it may "serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws."4
Our system of democracy is committed irrevocably to a government of laws, 5 and not of
men.6 Laws give witness to societys moral values7 and are the depositories of what the
sovereign as a whole has agreed to uphold as the minimum standards of conduct that
will govern relationships and transactions within that society. In a representative
democracy, the Filipino people, through their elected representatives, deliberate, distill
and make moral judgments, which are crystallized into written laws that are made
public, accessible and binding to all.8 Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and
cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern
their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner. 9
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. 10 Once the
sovereign peoples "soft" moral choices are hardened through the constitutionally
mandated legislative process,11 statutory laws perform an equalizing function of imposing
a knowable standard of conduct or behavior to which all members of society must
conform to a social contract which everyone regardless of class, sex or religion is
bound.12 Legislative enactments are ordinarily prospective and general in character
insofar as they prescribe limitations on an individuals future conduct. Under the rule of
law,13 ordinary people can reasonably assume that another persons future conduct will
be in observance of the laws and can conceivably expect that any deviation therefrom will
be punished accordingly by responsible authorities. Thus, written constitutions and
statutory laws allow citizens a minimum confidence in a world of uncertainty:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and
ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic, and even
despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound
ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of
laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men,
would try to live by their word.14
As man-made creations, however, laws are not always entirely encompassing, as future
conditions may change conditions that could not have been perceived or accounted for
by the legislators. Actual situations may arise between two conflicting claims by specific
parties with differing interpretations of the law. In those instances in which a gray area
or an unintended gap exists in the implementation or execution of laws, the judicial
department is charged with the duty of determining the limitations that the law places
upon all actions of individuals.15 Hence, the courts primary adjudicatory function is to
mark the metes and bounds of the law in specific areas of application, as well as to pass
judgment on the competing positions in a case properly brought before it.
The Court not only functions to adjudicate rights among the parties, but also serves the
purpose of a supreme tribunal of last resort that establishes uniform rules of civil
justice.16 Jurisprudence "narrows the field of uncertainty"17 in the application of an

unclear area of the law. The certainty of judicial pronouncement lends respect for and
adherence to the rule of law "the idea that all citizens and all organs of government are
bound by rules fixed in advance, which make it possible to foresee how the coercive
powers of government will be used, whether in its own interests or in aid of citizens who
call on them, in particular circumstances."18 The Courts historic role of pronouncing
what the law is between the parties19 is the cornerstone of a government of laws, and not
of men.20Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court expounded on the
objectives of uniformity and predictability of judicial decisions, to wit:
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as possible a
clear, general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler times uncertainty has
been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes. It is said
that one of emperor Nero's nasty practices was to post his edicts high on the columns so
that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress. As laws have become more
numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in
the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may
mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, "reckonability," is a needful characteristic of
any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule
at all.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Certainty and "reckonability" in the law are the major objectives of the legal system, and
judicial decisions serve the important purpose of providing stability to the law and to the
society governed by that law.22 If we are to subscribe to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
theory of a bad man,23 then law provides reasonable predictability in the consequences of
ones actions relative to the law, if performed in a just and orderly society. As judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land,24 there is a strong public interest in stability
and in the orderly conduct of our affairs, an end served by a consistent course of
adjudication.25 Thus, once a court has decided upon a rule of law, "that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages" of the same case 26 and thus
offers to the people some measure of conviction about the legal effects of their actions. In
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, courts should be loathe to revisit prior
decisions.27
In the instant case, the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Courts
decisions, has yielded unpredictability in the judicial decision-making process and has
spawned untold consequences upon the publics confidence in the enduring stability of
the rule of law in our jurisdiction.
The Court has been entrusted by the sovereign with the duty of voicing out and
sharpening with finality societys collective ideals in its written decisions. Yet, if cases are
litigated in perpetuity, and judgments are clouded with continuous uncertainty, the
publics confidence in the stability of judicial precedents promulgated by the Court would
be greatly diminished. In this case, the Court has reviewed and reconsidered, no less
than five times already,28 the constitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws.29 During this
time, the public has been made to endure an inordinate degree of indecision that has
disturbed the conduct of local government affairs with respect not only to the
municipalities asking to become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful of
the destruction of the standards for the creation of cities and the correlative diminution
of the internal revenue allotments of existing cities. The Courts commitment to provide
constant and steadfast rules on the creation of cities has been inevitably weakened by the

"flip-flopping" in the case that has opened the doors to rabid criticisms of the Courts
failure to abide by its own internal rules and, thus, diminishing reliance on the certainty
of its decisions.
To be sure, the Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability30 would involve the sacrifice of
justice for technicality.31 The Court has previously provided for exceptions to the rule on
immutability of final judgments, as follows: (1) the correction of clerical errors; 32 (2)
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; 33 (3) void judgments;34 and
(4) supervening events.35As exceptions to the general rule, their application to instances
wherein a review of a final and executory decision is called are to be strictly
construed.36 No convincing argument or extraordinary circumstance has been raised to
justify and support the application of any of these exceptions to warrant a reversal of the
Courts First Decision. Reversing previous, final, and executory decisions are to be done
only under severely limited circumstances. Although new and unforeseen circumstances
may arise in the future to justify a review of an established legal principle in a separate
and distinct case, the extension of a principle must be dealt with exceptionally and
cautiously.
Undeniably, the Court in the past has overturned prior decisions even on a second or
third motion for reconsideration and recalled entries of judgment on the ground of
substantial interest of justice and special and compelling reasons. 37 The Court bows to
"the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function."38Notable reversals in recent memory include the cases involving the request
for extradition of Mark Jimenez,39 the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995,40 the land title covering the Piedad Estate in Quezon City,41the just compensation
due to Apo Fruits Corporation,42 and the "deemed resigned" provision for public
appointive officials in the recent May 2010 election.43 Although no prohibition exists that
would prevent this Court from changing its mind in the light of compelling reasons and
in the interest of substantial justice as abovedemonstrated, extreme retrospect and
caution must accompany such review.
In the instant case, there is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that
would warrant the reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional. There is no injustice in preventing the conversion of the sixteen
municipalities into cities at this point in time. In fact, justice is more equitably dispensed
by the stringent application of the current legislative criteria under the Local
Government Code (LGC),44 as amended by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), for
creating cities without distinction or exception. It must be remembered that the
declaration of unconstitutionality is not an absolute ban on these municipalities
prohibiting them from pursuing cityhood in the future once they are able to achieve the
PhP100,000,000 income requirement under RA 9009.45Alternatively, their
congressional representatives can also press for another amendatory law of the LGC that
would include an explicit exception to the income requirement for municipalities with
pending cityhood bills prior to the enactment of RA 9009. The route purportedly chosen
by Congress to indirectly amend the LGC through the exemption of annual income
requirements in the Cityhood Laws is improper. If Congress believes that the minoritys
construction of its intention in increasing the annual income requirement is erroneous,
then the legislature can show its disapproval by directly enacting amendatory legislation
of the LGC. In both cases, the remedy available to the sixteen municipalities is not with

the Court, but with the legislature, which is constitutionally empowered to determine the
standards for the creation of a local government unit. The reasoning and substantial
justice arguments expounded to reverse the initial finding of the Court that the Cityhood
Laws are unconstitutional are poorly founded.
The LGC is a distinctly normative law that regulates the legislative power to create cities
and establishes the standards by which the power is exercised. Unlike other statutes that
prohibit undesirable conduct of ordinary citizens and are ends by themselves, the LGC
prescribes the means by which congressional power is to be exercised and local
government units are brought into legal existence. Its purpose is to avoid the arbitrary
and random creation of provinces, cities and municipalities. By encapsulating the criteria
for cityhood in the LGC, Congress provided objective, equally applicable and fairly
ascertainable standards and reduced the emphasis on currying political favor from its
members to approvingly act on the proposed cityhood law. Otherwise, cities chartered
under a previous Congress can be unmade, at a whim, by a subsequent Congress,
regardless of its compliance with the LGCs requirements. Fairness and equity demand
that the criteria established by the LGC be faithfully and strictly enforced, most
especially by Congress whose power is the actual subject of legislative delimitation.
In granting it the power to fix the criteria for the creation of a city, the Constitution, of
course, did not preclude Congress from revising the standards imposed under the LGC.
Congress shall enjoy the freedom to reconsider the minimum standards under the LGC,
if future circumstances call for it. However, the method of revising the criteria must be
directly done through an amendatory law of the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not
through the indirect route of creating cities and exempting their compliance with the
established and prevailing standards. By indiscriminately carving out exemptions in the
charter laws themselves, Congress enfeebled the normative function of the LGC on the
legislative power to create cities. Taking the argument to the extreme, a single barangay
now has the chance of being chartered as a component city without compliance with the
income, territorial or population requirements under the LGC, for as long as enough
Congressional support is mustered to push for its exemption not in a general
amendatory law, but through its own specific legislative charter. The selective disregard
of the norms under the LGC in favor of some municipalities cannot be sanctioned in a
system where the rule of law remains dominant. Unless prevented by the Court,
Congress will now be emboldened to charter new cities wholesale and arbitrarily relax
the stringent standards under the LGC, which it imposed on itself.
It must be emphasized that no inconsistency arises from the present minoritys
continued participation in the disposition of the second or subsequent motions for
reconsideration of the parties with the avowed purpose of predictability of judicial
pronouncements. The reiteration of the minoritys position that the Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional is an expression that none of the "new" or rehashed arguments in the
subsequent motions have merited a change in their stand and appreciation of the facts
and the law. For the minority to abandon their involvement from the proceedings in a
mechanical adherence to the rule that the second and subsequent motions for
reconsideration are prohibited pleadings that do not warrant the Courts attention is to
capitulate to the sixteen municipalities abhorrent strategy of insistent prayer for review
of re-hashed arguments, already passed on, repeatedly.
If stability in the Courts decisions46 is to be maintained, then parties should not be
encouraged to tirelessly seek reexamination of determined principles and speculate on

the fluctuation of the law with every change of its expounders. 47 In Clavano v. Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Court explained that:
"The tendency of the law," observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "must always be to
narrow the field of uncertainty." And so was the judicial process conceived to bring about
the just termination of legal disputes. The mechanisms for this objective are manifold
but the essential precept underlying them is the immutability of final and executory
judgments.
This fundamental principle in part affirms our recognition of instances when disputes
are inadequately presented before the courts and addresses situations when parties fail
to unravel what they truly desire and thus fail to set forth all the claims which they want
the courts to resolve. It is only when judgments have become final and executory, or even
when already deemed satisfied, that our negligent litigants belatedly come forth to pray
for more relief. The distilled wisdom and genius of the ages would tell us to reject their
pleas, for the loss to litigants in particular and to society in general would in the long run
be greater than the gain if courts and judges were clothed with power to revise their final
decisions at will.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Unlike that of the other two political branches whose mandates are regularly renewed
through direct election, the Courts legitimacy must be painstakingly earned with every
decision that puts voice to the cherished value judgments of the sovereign. The judicial
function in an organized and cohesive society governed by the rule of law is placed in
serious peril if the people cannot rely on the finality of court decisions to regulate their
affairs. There is no reason for the Court to bend over backwards to accommodate the
parties requests for reconsideration, yet again, of the unconstitutionality of the sixteen
Cityhood Laws as borne by the First Decision, especially if the result would lead to the
fracturing of central tenets of the justice system. The peoples sense of an orderly
government will find it unacceptable if the Supreme Court, which is tasked to express
enduring values through its judicial pronouncements, is founded on sand, easily shifting
with the changing tides.
The legal process of creating cities as enacted and later amended by the legislature,
implemented by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary serves as the peoples
North Star: certain, stable and predictable. Absent the three branches adherence to the
rule of law, our society would denigrate into uncertainty, instability and even anarchy.
Indeed, the law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to
submit to that supremacy and to observe the limitations it imposes upon the exercise of
the authority that it gives.49 No public officer is held to these highest of normative
standards than those whose duties are to adjudicate the rights of the people and to
articulate on enduring principles of law applicable to all.
As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently expressed,50 the Supreme Court is not final because
it is infallible; it is infallible because it is final. And because its decisions are final, even if
faulty, there must be every energy expended to ensure that the faulty decisions are few
and far between. The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able
to administer justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that
the people who run the system have done justice.51

The determination of the correctness of a judicial decision turns on far more than its
outcome.52 Rather, it turns on whether its outcome evolved from principles of judicial
methodology, since the judiciarys function is not to bring about some desired state of
affairs, but to find objectively the right decision by adhering to the established general
system of rules.53
What we are dealing with in this case is no longer limited to the question of
constitutionality of Cityhood Laws; we are also confronted with the question of certainty
and predictability in the decisions of the Court under a democratic system governed by
law and rules and its ability to uphold the Constitution and normative legislation such as
the LGC.
The public has unduly suffered from the repeated "flip-flopping" in this case, especially
since it comes from the branch of government tasked to embody in a clear form enduring
rules of civil justice that are to govern them. In expressing these truths, I echo the
sentiment of a judicial colleague from a foreign jurisdiction who once said, "I write these
words, not as a jeremiad,54 but in the belief that unless the courts adhere to the guidance
of fixed principles, we will soon bring objective law to its sepulcher." 55
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Posner, Richard A., How Judges Think (2008), at 1.

Resolution dated 12 April 2011.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 April 2011, para. 1.6, at 7.

"In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to
express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment." (Villavicencio v. Lukban, G. R. No. 14639, 25 March 1919, 39
Phil. 778; emphasis supplied)
4

Dissenting Opinion, Justice Paras, Austria v. Amante, G. R. No. L-959, 09

January 1948, 79 Phil. 780.
5

"The Government of the Philippine Islands is essentially a Government of laws

and not of men." (In Re: Mulloch Dick, G. R. No. 13862, 16 April 1918, 38 Phil.
41)
6

"The laws enacted become expressions of public morality. As Justice Holmes put
it, (t)he law is the witness and deposit of our moral life. In a liberal democracy,
the law reflects social morality over a period of time. Occasionally though, a
disproportionate political influence might cause a law to be enacted at odds with
7

public morality or legislature might fail to repeal laws embodying outdated

traditional moral views. Law has also been defined as something men create in
their best moments to protect themselves in their worst moments. Law deals
with the minimum standards of human conduct while morality is concerned with
the maximum. Law also serves as a helpful starting point for thinking about a
proper or ideal public morality for a society in pursuit of moral progress."
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, 04 August 2003, 408 SCRA 1)
"In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is
distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public
square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the
bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief,
and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral
judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs
and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups." (Estrada
v. Escritor, id.)
8

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).

10

People v. Veneracion, G. R. No. 119987-88, 12 October 1995, 319 Phil. 364.

11

Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 26 and 27.

"For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to
act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for
that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it,
and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary
the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body,
one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed
that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the
majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive
laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act
of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as
having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole." (Locke, John.
Second Treatise on Civil Government, cited in footnote no. 47 of Chief Justice
Reynato Punos Concurring Opinion in Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402)
12

The rule of law has likewise been described as "a defeasible entitlement of
persons to have their behavior governed by laws that are publicly fixed in
advance." (Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex. L.
Rev. 425 [1982] at 438)
13

Separate Opinion, Justice Santiago Kapunan, Estrada v. Desierto, G. R. No.

146710-15 & 146738, 02 March 2001, 356 SCRA 108.
14

Separate Opinion, Justice Reynato Puno in IBP v. Zamora, G. R. No. 141284, 15

August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
15

" Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true
meaning and operation. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must,
like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce
uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort,
to one supreme tribunal. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men.
We often see not only different courts but the judges of the same court differing
from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the
contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have
found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a
general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a
uniform rule of civil justice." (Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 22;
emphasis supplied)
16

"Still, the tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of
uncertainty." (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law at 53)
17

J. D. Heydon, Limits to the Powers of Ultimate Appellate Courts, L.Q.R. 2006,

122(JUL), 399-425, 404, citing Planned Parenthood of South Eastern
Pennsylvania v Casey,505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
18

19

Abueva v. Wood, G. R. No. 21327, 14 January 1924, 45 Phil. 612.

20

Separate Opinion, Justice Reynato Puno in IBP v. Zamora, supra. Note 12.

Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175 (1989) at 1179.
21

Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal

Association, et al., v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, 01 February 2005.
22

"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." (Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. R. 457 [1897])
23

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall

form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (Civil Code, Art. 8; Floresca v.
Philex Mining Corporation, G. R. No. L-30642, 30 April 1985, 136 SCRA 141)
24

Concurring Opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, Thornburgh v.

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
780-781, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986)
25

Jano Justice Systems, Inc., v. Burton, F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 2012941 (C.D.Ill.)

(2010), citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816,
108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988).
26

27

Jano Justice Systems, Inc., v. Burton, id.

In a little over three years, the Courts decisions in the instant case have swung
like a pendulum from unconstitutionality to validity. Beginning with the First
Decision dated 18 November 2008, the Court initially found the subject sixteen
Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional, but reversed itself in the Second Decision
dated 21 December 2009, where the laws were declared valid. However, the
Court had a change of heart and reinstated its earlier finding of
unconstitutionality in the Third Decision (SC Resolution dated 24 August 2010,
penned by Justice Antonio Carpio), but less than a year later, it overturned the
last ruling by again declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional in the Fourth
Decision (SC Resolution dated 15 February 2011, penned by Justice Lucas
Bersamin). The Fifth Decision and latest Resolution of the Court denied with
finality the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and reiterated that the
Cityhood Laws were constitutional (SC Resolution dated 12 April 2011 penned
again by Justice Bersamin)
28

The sixteen Cityhood Laws consist of Republic Acts Nos. 9389-94, 9398, 940405, 9407-09, 9434-36 and 9491.
29

"A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land." (Labao v. Flores, G. R.
No. 187984, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 723, citing Pea v. Government
Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 383,
404)
30

Republic v. Ballocanag, G. R. No. 163794, 28 November 2008, 572 SCRA 436,

citing Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G. R. No. 147082, 28 January 2008, 542
SCRA 406, 421-422.
31

FGU Insurance Corporation v. RTC of Makati, G. R. No. 161282, 23 February

2011, citing Villa v. GSIS, G. R. No. 174642, 31 October 2009.
32

"The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one
placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial
action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously
render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been." (Mocorro v. Ramirez, G. R. No. 178366, 28 July 2008, 560
SCRA 362, citing Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 482, 492
[2005])
33

"Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court
without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion." (Legarda
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 642)
34

"One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the

existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances
which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters
which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not
yet in existence at that time." (Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
126462, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA 370)
35

"Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should

be strictly but reasonably construed." (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA,
G. R. No. 107135, 23 February 1999, 303 SCRA 508)
36

" In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing
judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice and
where special and compelling reasons called for such actions."
37

"Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, Galman v. Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers
Foundation v. National Telecommunications Commission, andRepublic
v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second motion for
reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we did so on a third motion for
reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo and Cosio v. de Rama, we
modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for
reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Muoz v. Court of
Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque,
and Barnes v. Padilla, we recalled entries of judgment after finding that
doing so was in the interest of substantial justice." (Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, G. R. No. 164195, 12 October
2010, 632 SCRA 727)
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 407-408 (1932).
38

In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G. R. No. 139645, the Court first ordered the
Secretary of Justice to furnish private respondent Mark Jimenez, copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to give him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. (Decision
dated 18 January 2000) The Court subsequently reversed itself and declared that
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. (Decision 17 October 2000)
39

In La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, the Court

first declared some of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining
Act of 1995) unconstitutional and void (Decision dated 27 January 2004); but on
a motion for reconsideration the ruling was later reversed and the mining law
was declared constitutional (Resolution dated 01 December 2004).
40

In Heirs of Manotok v. Barque, G. R. No. 162335 & 162605, the Courts First
Division initially affirmed the cancellation of the Manotok title over the friar land
and ordered that the title be reconstituted in favor of the Homer L. Barque, Sr.
(Decision dated 12 December 2005) After the Decision was recalled and the case
remanded to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence (Resolution dated 18
December 2008), the Court en banc nullified the titles of Manotok and Barque
and declared the land as legally belonging to the national government. (Decision
dated 24 August 2010)
41

In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Landbank of the Philippines, G. R. No. 164105, the

Courts Third Division ordered Landbank to pay Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation to pay P1,383,179,000 with 12% legal interest as just compensation for
the two companies expropriated lands. (Decision dated 06 February 2007)
Landbanks motion for reconsideration was partially granted and the award of
legal interest was deleted (Decision dated 19 December 2007 and 30 April 2008),
which was affirmed by the Court en banc. (Decision dated 04 December 2009)
However, the award of legal interest was reinstated later on. (Decision dated 12
October 2010)
42

In Quinto v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 189698, the Court first declared

unconstitutional the provision in the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, considering public appointive officials asipso
facto resigned from the filing of their certificate of candidacy. (Decision 01
December 2009) The Court again reversed itself and declared the same provision
as "not unconstitutional." (Resolution dated 22 February 2010)
43

44

Republic Act No. 7160, Sec. 450.

"Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be

converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred
million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
45

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,

as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income." (RA 9009, Sec. 1, amending Sec. 450 of the LGC; emphasis
supplied)
Concurring Opinion, Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., Lambino v. COMELEC, G. R.
No. 174153, 25 October 2006, 505 SCRA 160, citing London Street Tramways
46

Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, in COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 117-118.
47

Concurring Opinion, Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., Lambino v. COMELEC, supra.

48

G.R. No. 143781, 27 February 2002, 378 SCRA 172.

49

U. S. v. Lee, 106 US 196, 261 (1882)

"Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing profession that
this Court no longer respects impersonal rules of law but is guided in these
matters by personal impressions which from time to time may be shared by a
majority of Justices. Whatever has been intended, this Court also has generated
an impression in much of the judiciary that regard for precedents and authorities
is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have always meant to the
profession, that the law knows no fixed principles. "
50

" Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a

percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook
normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However,
reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done.
There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial
proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final." (Concurring Opinion of Justice Robert Jackson, Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 [1953]; emphasis supplied).
Spouses Sadik v. Casar, A. M. No. MTJ-95-1053, 02 January 1997, 266 SCRA 1,
citing Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, Administrative Matter No. RTJ-96-1336, 25 July
1996.
51

Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal

Association, et al., v. Ramos, G. R. No. 127882, 01 February 2005.
52

Dissenting Opinion, Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, La Bugal Blaan Tribal

Association, et al., v. Ramos, id.
53

A lamenting and denunciatory complaint; a doleful story; or a dolorous tirade.

(Websters Third New International Dictionary [Merriam Webster 1993] at 1213)
54

Dissenting Opinion, Circuit Judge Tam, In Re: Estate of Burrogh, 475 F.2d 370,
154 U.S.App.D.C. 259 (1973).
55