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2006 Writing Qualitatively
2006 Writing Qualitatively
van
Manen / WRITING
HEALTHQUALITATIVELY
RESEARCH / May 2006
ARTICLE
10.1177/1049732306286911
Keynote Address:
Third Nordic Interdisciplinary
Conference on Qualitative Methods
Writing Qualitatively, or the Demands of Writing
Max van Manen
Have you ever said this or heard someone say this: I have done all of my data analysis
I just have to write it down. Or, I just have to write it up? I will suggest that within the
context of phenomenological inquiry, it is not necessarily helpful to try to assist researchers
learning how to write down their reflections or how to write up their results. What
should be more helpful is learning how to write. Qualitative writing may be seen as an
active struggle for understanding and recognition of the lived meanings of the lifeworld, and
this writing also possesses passive and receptive rhetoric dimensions. It requires that we be
attentive to other voices, to subtle significations in the way that things and others speak to
us. In part, this is achieved through contact with the words of others. These words need to
touch us, guide us, stir us.
Keywords: space of writing; phenomenological method; phenomenological reflection;
gaze of Orpheus; desire; hypomnesis; anamnesis; primal impressional
consciousness
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inquiry, the more we should resist the temptation to surrender to a view of method
that hollows out our understandings and cuts us off from the deeper sources of
meaning. In the following pages, the meaning and place of writing in qualitative
and phenomenological research are considered.
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philosophy? (p. 7). Ferraris questions the generally accepted version of this
entrance, which holds that after the end of metaphysics, philosophers are no longer
dealing with truth but are serving something like a sort of social welfare service
based on conversation (p. 7). Ferraris is troubled by the new tolerance for letting
philosophers do whatever they wish, with the exception of their proper work,
which is, in his words, the search for truth (p. 8). This tolerance is actually repressive, he said, as it leads to the historical circumstance in which philosophy has
become just another form of literature.
Not unexpectedly, Ferraris is provocatively contradicted by Derrida, who
counters, Writing did not enter philosophy, it was already there (Derrida &
Ferraris, 2001, p. 8). Derrida continues, This is what we have to think aboutabout
how it went unrecognized, and the attempts to repudiate it (p. 8). However, in
passing, Derrida agrees with Ferraris that truth is not outmoded. Truth is not a
value one can renounce, he says (p. 8). Derrida points out that writing is essential
to all philosophic reflection and that it is worthwhile to think about the relation
between phenomenology or philosophy in general and writing in general.
It is in the act of reading and writing that insights emerge. The writing of work
involves textual material that possesses hermeneutic and interpretive significance.
It is precisely in the process of writing that the data of the research are gained as well
as interpreted and that the fundamental nature of the research questions is perceived. In a phenomenological sense, the research produces knowledge in the form
of texts that not only describe and analyze phenomena of the lifeworld but also
evoke understandings that otherwise lie beyond their reach.
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farewell recede with such speed that they barely reach his ears. He has lost her for a
second time, and now this loss is forever.
All that Orpheus is left with is the image of that fleeting gaze that he saw of
Eurydice. This is the way the story is usually told: When in fear he might again lose
her, and anxious for another look at her, he turned his eyes so he could gaze upon
her (Ovid, 1955, lines 95-98). However, Blanchot (1981) has suggested a different
interpretation: Orpheus was not forgetful at all; he was motivated by a different
gazethe gaze of desire.
According to Blanchot (1981), the ambiguous gaze of Orpheus was not really an
accident. The gaze was motivated by desire, said Blanchot, but it was not the simple
desire for the person, Eurydice, in her visible flesh and blood appearance. No, said
Blanchot, the force that drove Orpheus
does not demand Eurydice in her diurnal truth and her everyday charm, but in her
nocturnal darkness, in her distance, her body closed, her face sealed, which wants to
see her not when she is visible, but when she is invisible, and not as the intimacy of a
familiar life, but as the strangeness which excludes all intimacy. (p. 100)
Thus, what Orpheus came to seek in the darkness of the Underworld was not a
lost love but the meaning of love itself. That alone is what Orpheus came to seek in
the Underworld. He came to look in the night at what night is concealing (p. 100).
It is about a mortal gaining a vision of what is essentially invisible, the perfection of
Eurydicebefore she resumed her mortal state as they approached the light of day.
We all know how writing makes something or someone disappear and then
reappear in words. Love had driven Orpheus into the dark, the darkness of the text.
His consuming desire was to see loves essence and to feel its form, but such a glance
is not permitted to mortals. What lies on the other side belongs to the great silence,
to a night that is not human. So the gaze of Orpheus expresses a desire that can
never be completely fulfilled: to see the true being of something. Yet, it is this veil of
the dark that every writer tries to penetrate. This is the very nature of writing: The
act of writing begins with Orpheuss gaze (Blanchot, 1981, p. 104), and one writes
only if one has entered that space under the influence of the gaze, or perhaps it is the
gaze that opens the space of writing. When Orpheus descends toward Eurydice,
art is the power by which night opens (p. 99). Thus, we can read the whole myth as
an event of writing. Orpheus the poet tries to capture the love that has ensnared him
to Eurydice.
The writer uses words to uncover a truth that seems almost within reach.
Indeed, at first it seems that Orpheuss words (his poetic songs) bring his love into
presence. His words and songs have made her visible, so to speak. He dimly discerns the image of his love in the dark of the Underworld, but this is not enough. He
desires to see more clearly. He must bring her back from the dark of night to the light
of day. Orpheus is not satisfied with the image evoked by his words. He wants the
immediacy of a presencea presence that is not mediated by words or other means.
This description is uncannily close to the ambition of any phenomenologist motivated by the desire to bring to nearness that which constantly eludes our grasp
a human truth. To grasp the naked now and rescue it from the just now (see van
Manen, 1997, 2002).
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who leaves the everyday reality of ordinary daylight and whose gaze creates the
space of the text, and then enters, dwells in this space of the text to bring back what
cannot be brought back: the object of desire. The writers problem is that the
Orphean gaze unwittingly destroys what it tries to rescue. In this sense, every word
kills and becomes the death of the object it tries to represent. The word becomes the
substitution of the object.
Even the most subtle poem destroys what it names. For this reason, Blanchot
(1982) said that the perfect book would have no words. The perfect book would be
blank, as it tries to preserve what it can only destroy if it tried to represent it in language (see Nordholt, 1997). Perhaps this is why writing can be so difficult. The
author becomes tacitly aware that language annihilates or kills whatever it
touches. The result is the terrible realization that one has nothing to say. There is
nothing to say, or, rather, it is impossible to truly say something. The writer
desires to capture meaning in words, but the words constantly substitute themselves, destroy the things that they are meant to evoke. There are no thingsonly
evocations, nothings.
At the level of raw existence, there are no things, only the darkness of the
night from which human insight and meaning arise. In the space of the text, we witness this birth of meaning and death of meaningor perhaps meaning becomes
indistinguishable from the dark. This dark can be experienced as the frightful allure
of Existence itself that fascinates the writer but that cannot be written: the there is
or the il-y-a. Lvinas (1996) described the il-y-a as something that resembles what
one hears when holding an empty seashell against ones ear, as if the emptiness is
full, as if the silence is a murmuring, as if one hears the silent whispering of the Real.
This Orpheic image of the difficulty of writingof writing in the darkmight
seem overly trite for the philosopher, who already knows this intellectually, or it
might seem totally absurd for the nonphilosopher, who regards this as unacceptably intellectual. But is this not what a writer experiences? Furthermore, as
phenomenologists, should we not draw from it practical conclusions? Whether one
ponders the meaning of the most consequential or the most trivial of human concerns, the act of phenomenological writing, if done with utmost seriousness, confronts the writer with the dark, with the enigma of phenomenality.
This is what it means to dwell in the space of the text, where the desire for
meaningfulness leads. The act of writing begins with Orpheuss gaze, said
Blanchot (1981, p. 104), but to write, one must already be possessed by the desire to
descend into the darkness of the night: One can only write if one arrives at the
instant towards which one can only move through space opened up by the movement of writing (Blanchot 1981, p. 104). Like Orpheus, the writer must enter the
dark, the space of the text, in the hope of seeing what cannot really be seen, hearing
what cannot really be heard, touching what cannot really be touched. Darkness is
the method.
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mindful thinking). Good writing is thus always hant [haunted] by bad writing,
said Derrida (p. 8). The distinction between good writing and bad hinges on a reliance on method, not on method as such but on method conceived as prescriptions,
strategies, procedures, and techniques. Derrida pointed out that in Heidegger we
can already find the distinction between bad writing and good writing, hypomnesis
and anamnesis, between mere philosophic technique, on the one side, and poetic
thinking as a kind of writing, on the other.
For Heidegger (1982), genuine phenomenological method consists in creating
ones path, not in following a path: When a method is genuine and provides access
to the objects, it is precisely then that the progress made by following it . . . will cause
the very method that was used to become necessarily obsolete (p. 328). After all,
when we try to reflect on the originary dimensions of meaning of some phenomenon, we would abandon the single-mindedness of reflection for reflection relying
on some preconceived method. Moreover, suggested Heidegger, it is difficult to
commit oneself to certain phenomenological research methods, as even within the
tradition of philosophy, there is no such thing as one phenomenology, and if there
could be such a thing it would never become anything like a philosophical technique (p. 328).
Thus, qualitative method is often difficult, as it requires sensitive interpretive
skills and creative talents from the researcher. Phenomenological method, in particular, is challenging, because it can be argued that its method of inquiry constantly
has to be invented anew and cannot be reduced to a general set of strategies or
research techniques. Methodologically speaking, every notion has to be examined
in terms of its assumptions, even the idea of method itself.
One might dismiss this cautionary tale about method by proposing that the literature of the great philosophers is contradictory: Heidegger (1982) warned us
against a reliance on method, yet he and others described phenomenology in terms
of method. Phenomenology is accessible only through a phenomenological
method . . . each person trying to appropriate phenomenology for themselves, said
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. viii). How do we reconcile these claims? It appears that
Heidegger was warning against reducing phenomenology to a set of philosophical
strategies and techniques, and Merleau-Ponty referred to method not as techniques
but as something like an attitude: Phenomenology can be practised and identified as a
manner and a style of thinking (p. viii, italics in original text).
Indeed, it is apt to think of the basic method of phenomenology as the taking up
of a certain attitude and practicing a certain attentive awareness to the things of the
world as we live them rather than as we conceptualize or theorize them. Doing
phenomenology, as a reflective method, is the practice of the bracketing, or reduction of what prevents us from making primitive contact with the concreteness of
lived reality (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).
Although, according to Derrida (Derrida & Ferraris, 2001), all reflection of a
general philosophic nature can be seen as a form of writing (p. 9), Derrida was not
speaking of the act of writing in only a metaphorical manner. What is critical about
the Ferraris-Derrida discussion of the entrance and place of writing in
phenomenological thinking is not only that writing has a place in phenomenology
but that phenomenological reflection is, first of all, an experience of writing.
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Max van Manen, PhD, is a professor in the Department of Secondary Education at the University of
Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.