Geert Wilders and the Dutch Party for Freedom: A Turn Towards the Centre?

By

Justin Crewson

A Major Research Paper

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2014

2014 Justin Crewson

Geert Wilders and the Dutch Party for Freedom: A Turn Towards the Centre?
by
Justin Crewson
APPROVED BY:

______________________________________
W. Soderlund
Department of Political Science

______________________________________
J. Sutcliffe, Advisor
Department of Political Science

14 January 2014

Authors Declaration of Originiality

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been
published or submitted for publication.
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyones
copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any other
material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully
acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I
have included copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of
the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright
owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright
clearances to my appendix.
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved by my
thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been submitted for a
higher degree to any other University or Institution.

iv

Abstract
The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) is headed by Geert Wilders, and has participated in three
national Dutch elections. It is currently the third largest party in the Netherlands, and is considered
by most observers to be located on the far right of the ideological spectrum. With regards to this, this
paper provides an evaluation of moderation theory and applies it to the case of the PVV. Moderation
theory holds that extreme political parties will tend to moderate over time as a result of a desire to
capture median voters. A content analysis of the PVVs blog will be used in order to determine
whether language appearing on it has moderated over the three elections that the party has contested.
It will be shown that there is no evidence of such moderation, and that moderation theory does not
hold true in this instance.

Aknowledgements
Special thanks to my family and friends: Mom, Dad, Brittany, Alina, Jordan and Jonathan. Extra
special thanks to Dr. Sutcliffe and Dr. Soderlund. Without your help this work would not have been
able to be completed.

vi

Table of Contents

Authors Declaration of Originality

Abstract
Acknowledgements

iii
iv
v

Chapter
I.

Introduction: Moderation Theory

and Extreme Political Parties
1

II.

Geert Wilders and the PVV

III.

Literature Review: Radicalism,

Populism and Moderation

19

IV.

Methods and Analysis: Directed

Qualitative Content Analysis of
Geert Wilders Blog

41

V.

Conclusion: Evidence against

Moderation Theory?

66

Bibliography

69

Vita Auctoris

75

vii

Chapter I
Introduction: Moderation Theory and Extreme Political Parties
The 2008 global financial crisis significantly altered the political landscape of Europe.
Though there has been a growing tide of anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment within Western
European countries for some time, 2008 represented a watershed moment for political parties
appealing to such feelings. Since the crisis the continent has observed the creation of formal alliances
between many of Europes far-right parties, predicated upon opposition to immigration and the
European Union. 1 Such resentment can be traced to EU policies regarding immigration and
increasingly to economic policies enacted to combat the global recession.2 This paper will discern
that these parties are unique in that they have managed to distance themselves from the crude tactics
of their neo-Nazi predecessors, and are in many ways unique phenomena. As noted academic Paul
Taggart asserts, such parties have generally relied upon populism in order to appeal to voters, which
he warns is a dangerous trend for European democracy.3 Such danger lies in the fact that populism
counters debate informed by empirical observation, by playing upon uninformed emotional
responses.4 Taggart warns that populism is able to operate within existing politics while having the
effect of changing the behaviour of other mainstream political actors, which has led to widespread
frustration in Europe with the complexity of politics.5 In this manner, these parties are claimed by
many to represent a threat from within, and whose influence many argue must be curtailed.6
Given such concerns, there has been significant debate regarding how to best tackle such
threats. Countries like Greece have used legal measures to ban these parties, while countries such as

1 Gavin Hewitt, 2014: Europes Year of Decision, BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25547651
(Posted: December 30, 2013 Accessed: December 30, 2013).
2

Hewit, 2014: Europes Year of Decision,

Observer, Beware this populism sweeping across Europe, The Guardian Online
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/europe-british-politicians-stand-up-anti-eu-populism (Posted:
December 29, 2013 Accessed: December 29, 2013).
4 The Observer, Beware this populism sweeping across Europe,.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
3 The

Belgium have relied on political means to outcast them.7 However, there are other countries such as
the Netherlands that have continually included these parties in politics. Adherents to such strategies
generally base them upon moderation theory. They argue that the inclusion of extremist parties into
electoral politics will serve to moderate them as a result of the need to contest elections and gain the
support of median voters.8 In recent years though, extreme political parties have achieved relative
political success in countries such as the Netherlands and France.9 This raises the question as to
whether moderation theory is valid, and whether political inclusion can actually lead to the
moderation of such parties.
It is this question that this paper attempts to address. The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) has
experienced relatively significant electoral successes in the three national elections that it has
contested. Nevertheless, the party is still considered by many to be on the far-right of the political
spectrum. Thus, this paper will focus upon discerning whether its experience in mainstream politics
has served to moderate the party, or whether it has done the opposite and actually emboldened the
party. There is also the chance that it has had no effect upon it. In either case, this paper sets out to
advance research upon moderation theory, and to help determine whether it is a viable strategy in
which to moderate extreme political parties. This is crucial information as Europe is currently
confronted with the reality that many of these parties appear to be on the cusp of power. Moreover,
with EU parliamentary elections coming up in May 2014, many of these parties have formed
alliances which represents a clear electoral threat to the legislative effectiveness of more mainstream
political parties. As mentioned, they even threaten to change the political game, forcing mainstream
parties to adopt elements of their extreme agendas.

7 Joost Van Spanje and Wouter Van der Brug, Being Intolerant of the intolerant. The exclusion of Western European
anti-immigration parties and its consequences for party choice, Acta Politica 44, no.4 (2009): 353-384.
8 Gunes Murat Tezcur, The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors, Party Politics 16, no. 1
(2010): 69.
9 The Observer, Beware this populism sweeping across Europe,.
2

Chapter II
Geert Wilders and the PVV
As mentioned, this paper focuses upon analyzing the change, or lack thereof, in the ideology
of the PVV over the course of the three national elections that it has contested. The PVV is headed
by its only official member, Geert Wilders, and was established in 2005. 10 It is most noted for
shocking many political observers by winning 24 of 150 seats in the 2010 Dutch national elections.11
Additionally the party has had various members in municipal and provincial councils, and four
members in the European Parliament.12 The 2010 election resulted in the PVV becoming the third
largest party in the Dutch national parliament, and was a vast improvement upon the nine seats the
party gained in the preceding election.13 In the aftermath of this election the PVV supported the
liberal VVD and the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) allowing for the formation of a razor-thin
majority-right coalition government.14 However, due to disagreements over austerity policy, the
PVV withdrew support of this government in the spring of 2012, leading to a new round of elections
on September 12 2012.15 Compared to the previous election the PVV had a poor showing, winning
only 15 seats.16 Regardless, this result maintained the PVV in a tie with the far-left Socialist Party as
the third largest political party in the Netherlands.17

10

Ilse Rooyackers and Maykel Verkuyten, Mobilizing Support for the Extreme Right: A Discourse Analysis of
Minority Leadership, British Journal of Social Psychology 51, (2012): 134.
11
Barry Rubin, The Netherlands, the Middle East, and the 2010 Parliamentary Elections, Middle East Review of
International Affairs 14, no. 3 (September, 2010): 65.
12
Koen Vossen, Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom,
Politics 31, no. 3 (2011): 179.
13
Rubin, 65.
14
Ibid.
15
Country Forecast, Netherlands: Update, Country Forecast (May, 2012): 1.
16
Janes Intelligence Weekly, Centre-right wins Dutch poll making centrist grand coalition likely, Janes Intelligence
Weekly 4, no. 38 (Sept. 19, 2012): 1.
17
Unnamed Author, Sept. 2012, 2.

Figure 1: PVV Seat Allocations in the House of Representatives by Election:

Election Year

Percentage of Overall Vote

Number of Seats Won

2006

5.9%

9 of 150

2010

15.5%

24 of 150

2012

10%

15 of 150

Despite having had as many as 24 members in parliament, Wilders has maintained tight
control over the PVV in terms of selecting and training candidates, preparing political strategy and
articulating the partys platform and ideology. 18 Since 2005 the party has become known for
displaying a fierce opposition to Islamic culture. 19 This is demonstrated in Wilders frequent
references to Islam as a backward and fascist religion.20 As a Member of Parliament, Wilders has
lobbied for a ban on immigration from Islamic countries, a prohibition on the building of new
Mosques, the closing of Islamic schools, and the legal prohibition of the Quran.21 However, Wilders
most well-known anti-Islamic action was the release of a seventeen-minute film in 2008 called
Fitna.22 Fitna juxtaposes images of September 11 and other terrorist acts with verses from the Quran
in order to project Wilders assertion that the text is no different than Mein Kampf.23
Wilders anti-Islamic message has increasingly been intertwined with anti-establishment
and Eurosceptic rhetoric.24 With regards to this, Wilders increasingly considers one of his primary
enemies to be a progressive elite, which he believes to be made up of most political parties, nearly
all politicians, large parts of the media, the courts, the universities and the bureaucracy of the

18

Sarah De Lange and David Art, Fortuyn versus Wilders: An Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party
Building, West European Politics 34, no. 6 (November, 2011): 1232.
19
Rooyackers and Verkuyten, 134.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Liz Fekete, The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre, Race and Class 53, no. 3 (2011): 36.
23
Fekete, 36.
24
Koen Vossen, Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders Compared, Perspectives
on European Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (April, 2010): 27.

Netherlands.25 Central to his arguments are his reservations with what he considers to be the doctrine
of cultural relativism, which he claims is supported by the Netherlands progressive elite.26 Cultural
relativism is considered to entail the belief that all cultures are equal in their own right, which
Wilders claims has allowed for the rise of a violent, expansionist and fascist Islamic culture in
Western countries. 27 In this manner, the establishment is portrayed as the enemy within by
Wilders, as he claims that it is committed to a policy of multiculturalism that is destroying the
Netherlands.28 In recent years Wilders has also focused on making Euroscepticism a central tenant of
his political strategy, with opposition to EU-supported austerity measures, as well as resistance to
bailing out other EU member states being of particular note.29 Indeed, it was his opposition to
proposed budget savings measures that forced the downfall of the centre-right Rutte coalition
government in April 2012.30 This resulted in the election on September 12 2012, in which the PVV
gained 15 seats.31 The big winner of this election was Ruttes center-right VVD, which captured 41
seats, followed by the center-left Labour Party with 39 seats.32 Tied with the PVV for third was the
far-left Socialist Party (SP), which was the only other major Eurosceptic party in the election.33
According to analysts, this result paved the way towards a grand, centrist coalition [] rejecting the
main Eurosceptic parties and reaffirming the Netherlands commitment to the EU.34 Nevertheless,
while this coalition still exists there are increasing levels of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands. These
have led to a recent surge in support for the PVV.

25

Vossen 2010, 27.

Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Bas Heijne, The Netherlands: Prosperity and Populism, World Policy Journal 28, no. 2 (Summer, 2011): 32.
29
Country Forecast, Netherlands: Update, 1.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Janes Intelligence Weekly, Centre-right wins Dutch poll making centrist grand coalition likely, 2.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
26

Figure 2: Party Seat Projections for the House of Representatives Throughout the 2012 Campaign35

Figure 3: September 2012 Election Outcomes in the House of Representatives

Party

Percentage of Overall Vote

Number of Seats Won

Centre-Right VVD

26.6%

41 of 150

Centre-Left PvdA

24.8%

39 of 150

Far-Right PVV

10.1%

15 of 150

Far-Left SP

9.7%

15 of 150

There is little formal academic research on the ideology of Geert Wilders and the PVV.36
Vossen argues that this is likely due to the recent emergence of the PVV as a meaningful political
entity, and because of Geert Wilders unique ideological development. 37 Nonetheless, scholars
generally classify the party as populist in terms of its political strategy and locate it on the far,
extreme or radical right of the political ideological spectrum.38 Additionally, analysts generally
classify the PVV as belonging to a group of populist radical right (PRR) parties that have grown
throughout Europe in recent decades.39 Scholars such as Mudde claim that this grouping includes the

35

Maurice De Honde, Ontwikkeling Politieke Voorkeur in 2012, www.peil.nl (Accessed: September 26, 2012).
Vossen 2011, 180.
37
Ibid.
38
Heijne, 31.
39
Cas Mudde, Whos Afraid of the European Radical Right? Dissent 58, no. 4 (Fall, 2011): 7.
36

French National Front (FN), the German Republicans (REP), the Flemish Bloc in Belgium (VB), the
Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP).40 This phenomenon will be
covered in greater detail in the literature review, nevertheless many scholars see the PVV as having
followed many of the policies and practices developed by these other populist radical right parties.41
Vossen claims that despite Wilders contemporary self portrayal as an outsider politician, he
might be better characterized as a professional politician, who has worked in the Dutch House of
Parliament most of his adult life.42 In 1990, at the age of 27, Wilders entered politics as a
speechwriter and assistant for the parliamentary group of the Liberal party, the VVD.43 After years of
climbing the ranks of the party, Wilders became a member of the VVD parliamentary group in
1998.44 According to Vossen, Wilders quickly came to portray himself as a whistle-blower, the
most notable action in support of this image being his presentation of a report to parliament in 1999
on Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.45 In an interview
regarding the report Wilders is quoted as claiming:
The extremism in the Middle East is a threat to the stability of Europe and
the Netherlands. It will even be the most urgent problem of the next ten
years since this extremism will also come to the Netherlands as a result of
immigration. This is already happening but everybody is silent about this.46
By 2000 many Dutch political commentators considered Wilders to be a viable candidate for the
leadership of the VVD.47 Nonetheless, in 2004 Wilders left the VVD after a conflict with the
parliamentary leader over the issue of admitting Turkey into the EU.48 Following this Wilders
became an independent Member of Parliament, and quickly began forming a new right-wing party,
beginning what Vossen considers to be the neoconservative phase of Wilders ideological

40

Mudde 2011, 7.
Ibid, 7-8.
42
Vossen, 180-181.
43
Ibid, 181.
44
Ibid.
45
Vossen 2011, 181.
46
Ibid, 181-182.
47
Ibid, 182.
48
Stijn Van Kessel, Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The Netherlands as a Case Study,
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12, no. 1 (April, 2011): 75.
41

development.49 During this period Wilders contacted chairman of the Edmund Burke foundation,
Bart Jan Spruyt, and the two toured Israel and the United States meeting with leading conservative
figures and think tanks.50 During this time Vossen asserts that Wilders rhetoric changed to that of
a fierce supporter of the American war on terror and all its policy measures, such as the opening of
Guantanamo Bay and the military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.51 At this time Wilders also
began advocating for radical measures against those he perceived to threaten Dutch security.52 This
included identifying the whole Dutch elite as one homogenous and self-serving progressive caste
which had hijacked democracy through a policy of subsiding progressive indoctrination and
demonizing all dissenters.53 Finally, during this period Wilders also developed a much fiercer
animosity towards Islam and Muslims.54 As Vossen claims, Following neoconservatives such as
Daniel Pipes and Norman Podhoretz () Wilders began identifying Islam as a totalitarian ideology,
which after communism and fascism posed the third greatest threat to Western modernity.55
It is important to note that Wilders was not the first political figure to support such radical
ideals in the Netherlands. The Dutch Peoples Union (NVU), was a neo-fascist political party in the
country in the 1970s, and was made up of a significant number of former Nazi collaborators and
sympathizers. 56 Despite a relatively consistent level of support for the NVU, the party never
garnered more than marginal levels of electoral support.57 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Centre Party
(CP) and the Centre Democrats (CD) succeeded the NVU.58 However, these parties never gained
more than three members in parliament.59 According to Dorussan, established political parties in the

49

Vossen 2011, 182.

Ibid.
51
Ibid, 183.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid, 183.
56
Han Dorussan, Pim Fortuyn and the New Far Right in the Netherlands, Representation 40, no.2 (2004) : 135.
57
Dorussan, 135.
58
Dorussan, 35.
59
Ibid.
50

Netherlands unanimously condemned such actors.60 Voting for these extremist parties was generally
associated with collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War.61
This trend continued until the spring election of 2002.62 The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), which
had only been created three months earlier, managed to win 26 seats in the national parliament
making it the second largest party in the country.63 The leader of the LPF, Pim Fortuyn, entered
politics on a platform emphasizing opposition to immigration, support for law and order, and the
defense of 'typical' Dutch or Western values.64 Only nine days prior to the 2002 national election
Dutch citizens were shocked to hear that Fortuyn had been assassinated.65 Many commentators
viewed the subsequent success of the LPF to be caused by a temporary emotional reaction by the
Dutch electorate to Fortuyns assassination. 66 Contrastingly, others considered it just another
example of the rise of the radical right in Europe.67 Hosteyn et al. claim that there is empirical
evidence to support the assertion that a majority of voters recognized the rightness of the LPFs
primary issues, and in turn supported it regardless of the murder.68
Nonetheless, the collapse of the ruling coalition that resulted from the 2002 election, caused
another election to be held in 2003. Without the presence of Fortuyn, the LPF secured only eight
seats.69 Following this, the LPF suffered from severe internal dissent, and eventually disbanded.70
For many though, the LPF served as an inspiration for the radical right in the Netherlands. Dorussan
asserts that the party could be identified as radical right on immigration and law and order issues,
however it was much more left on economic and other social issues.71 In fact, Pim Fortuyn was

60

Dorussan, 35.
Ibid.
62
Ibid, 131.
63
Joop Van Holsteyn, Galen Irwin and Josje Ridder, In the Eye of the Beholder: The Perception of the List Pim Fortuyn
and the Parliamentary Elections of May 2002, Acta Politica 38 (2003): 70.
64
Dorussan, 131.
65
Holsteyn et al., 69.
66
Ibid, 70.
67
Dorussan, 131.
68
Holsteyn et al., 69.
69
Ibid, 70.
70
Ibid.
71
Dorussan, 138-139.
61

known to be an open homosexual,72 and was legitimized through his role as a respected sociology
professor.73 Regardless, it was the LPFs anti-immigrant and pro-law and order rhetoric that made
many consider it to be a precursor to parties such as the PVV.74 The LPF became known for
supporting anti-immigrant measures that were later mimicked by the PVV.75 For instance, Fortuyn
often referred to Islam as a backward culture, and routinely warned of the alleged dangers of
Muslim immigration.76 One example of this was the LPFs request for a parliamentary debate on
religious symbolism in the public service, which they justified by arguing:
My faction worries about the gradual Islamization of the Dutch society.
Some of our fundamental values are undermined: the equal treatment of
men and women, of homosexuals and heterosexuals, and last but not least
the separation of church and state. The LPF faction thinks that the Dutch
citizen has a right to a neutral state. The right, derived from modernity, is
one of our basic citizenship rights.77
Such sentiment was arguably the inspiration for Wilders 2005 motion to Dutch parliament that the
burqa be banned in all public spaces.78 He argued that the burqa was a symbol of gender inequality,
which was diametrically opposed to Dutch cultural values.79

Wilders Turn to the Radical Right

Vossen and Mudde note that since 2006, and largely influenced by the LPF, Wilders has
made a clear turn from neoconservative values, towards those of the populist radical right.80 Vossen
considers this development to have began in 2006, and to be marked by:
on the one hand a strong resistance against immigration and supranational
cooperation because both would threaten national identity, and on the other
hand a populist framing of politics as a moral conflict between the corrupt

72

John Gee, The Political Uses of Islamophobia in Europe, The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 30, no. 9
(Dec., 2011): 34. (34-35)
73
Dorussan, 138-139.
74
Ibid.
75
Doutje Lettinga and Sawitri Saharso, The political debates on the veil in France and the Netherlands: Reflecting
national integration models? Comparative European Politics 10, no. 3 (2012): 323-324.
76
Gee, 34.
77
Lettinga and Saharso, 323-324.
78
Ibid, 324-325.
79
Ibid.
80
Vossen, 184.

10

elite and the virtuous people and the aspiration to build a polity in which the
voice of the virtuous people would prevail.81
Vossen claims that this sentiment was articulated in Wilders interviews and speeches where he
expressed a much more radical form of Islamophobia, based on conspiracy theories predicting
the coming Islamification of Europe. 82 Gee contends that such pronouncements have been
significantly more radical than those of the LPF.83 According to Mudde, Wilders aggressive
Islamophobia has become similar to that of the FN in France, the FPO in Austria and other PRR
parties in Europe.84 However, for tactical reasons Wilders has often been careful to eschew contact
with many of these parties.85 As Gee points out, in this regard Wilders has also followed Fortuyns
lead.86 As a case in point, the LPF was careful to disassociate itself with many other parties of the
radical right, which had been discredited by being seen as carrying Nazi baggage.87 However, in
recent years this has changed, which will be discussed later.
Aside from Wilders distaste for Muslims, he has also capitalized upon more generalized
discontent with immigration.88 Lindeboom claims that such general disgruntlement with immigration
has contributed strongly to the electoral performance of the PVV, with the 2010 election result being
of particular note.89 Evidence of this is the fact that Wilders has recently been directing his attacks on
other groups such as Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian workers.90 The PVV also directed criticism
towards immigrants from the Dutch Antilles.91 An example of this turn can be seen in proposals in
the PVVs 2010 election program to close the Dutch labour market to Eastern Europeans, and to

81

Vossen, 85.
Ibid.
83
Gee, 35.
84
Mudde 2011, 8.
85
Ibid.
86
Gee, 34-35.
87
Ibid, 34.
88
Gert-Jan Lindeboom, Public Priorities in Governments Hands: Corresponding Policy Agendas in the Netherlands?
Acta Politica 47, no. 4 (2012): 458-459.
89
Lindeboom, 459.
90
Vossen 2011, 185.
91
Ibid.
82

11

sell the Antilles.92 Wilders has also incorporated a stronger form of nationalism into his views, and
a stronger dislike of supranational collaboration.93 Demonstrative of this have been the PVVs calls
for increased national pride in schools.94 Moreover, in May 2009 Wilders was reported as demanding
government measures that would aid in the dismemberment of Belgium, in order that the Dutch
speaking Flanders region could be incorporated into the Netherlands.95
In regards to the September 2012 election, the PVV increasingly positioned itself in
opposition to the EU.96 Such Euroscepticism is well documented in PRR parties across Europe.97
Indeed, traces of this position within the PVV can be identified as early as May 2005, when The
Economist reported that Geert Wilders had created a Eurosceptical party. 98 However, what is
important to note is that at this time, the Eurosceptical stance that the PVV held was primarily
directed against the inclusion of Turkey (a Muslim country) into the EU. 99 Moreover, it was
specifically concerned with the effects that the EU had on Dutch culture, as it pertains to Islamic
immigration.100 Such concerns were displayed in June 2005, when Wilders served as one of the most
influential actors in the campaign against the European Unions Constitutional Treaty.101 This treaty,
which would have created a single unified constitution for the EU, was eventually rejected in a
national referendum on 1 June 2005.102
As has already been mentioned, Wilders has largely come to be known for concentrating
upon cultural and immigration issues, albeit while intertwining them with other subjects. An example
of this is Wilders opposition to cuts in pension coverage in the Netherlands, suggesting instead that

92

Vossen 2011, 185.

Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
The Brussels Journal, Wilders Hopes for Flemish Independence, www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3919 (Accessed:
August 1, 2012).
96
Timothy Garton, The Crisis of Europe: How the Union Came Together and Why Its Falling Apart, Foreign Affairs
91, no. 5 (Sept./Oct., 2012): 6.
97
Sofia Vasilopoulou, Varieties of Euroscepticism: The Case of the European Extreme Right, Journal of
Contemporary European Research 5, no. 1 (2009): 3.
98
The Economist, The New Dutch Model? The Economist (March 31, 2005): 10. (10-11)
99
The Economist, The New Dutch Model?, 11.
100
Ibid.
101
De Lange and Art, 1235.
102
Ibid, 1235.
93

12

immigration programs be cut.103 Aside from this, Geert Wilders has made an effort to broaden his
election platform in recent years. One of the main methods that he has used to achieve this has been
the use of increasing levels of anti-EU sentiment.104 This is evidenced by the transformation of
Wilders stance against the admittance of Turkey into the EU in 2005 into a more general call against
EU enlargement by early 2010.105 Such efforts were intensified so that by June 2011, the PVV
opposed the EU on many issues, the most notable of which was the financial support of bankrupt
Greece.106 It is interesting to note that by May 2011, Wilders Euroscepticism had been steered away
from cultural issues per se, and towards the effects that EU provisions would have upon Dutch social
programs.107 In the September 2012 election Wilders continued this focus upon Euroscepticism,
attempting to capitalize upon anti-EU sentiment throughout Europe and the Netherlands.108 This was
caused by a number of factors the most significant of which was opposition to EU-supported
austerity measures and the aforementioned financial support of Greece.109 Notably, the PVV became
one of the first non-marginal parties in Europe to call for a withdrawal from the European Union
and currency.110 Worthy of note is the fact that while sceptical of the EU, neither the Austrian FPO
nor the Belgian (VB) have gone so far as to call for the exit of their respective countries from the
EU.111 Regardless, the PVV campaigned hard on such Euroscepticism, demonstrated by tactics such
as the creation of an online petition, which led with the opener: Join our protest against the

103

DutchNews.nl, FNV will not talk pensions with Wilders,

www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/10/fnv_will_not_talk_pensions_wit.php (Accessed: August 1, 2012).
104
The Economist, Wild Things: The Far Right Promises to do Disturbingly Well on June 9th, The Economist (Feb. 25,
2010): 1.
105
The Economist, Wild Things: The Far Right Promises to do Disturbingly Well on June 9th, 1.
106
The Economist, With irresponsibility comes power, The Economist (June 13, 2011): 2.
107
The Economist, Keeping government hands off their benefits, The Economist (May 27, 2011): 23. (23-25)
108
Cas Mudde, The Dutch Elections and the Eurosceptic Paradox, www.extremisproject.org/2012/09/the-dutchelections-and-the-eurosceptic-paradox (Accessed: September 2, 2012).
109
Mudde, The Dutch Elections and the Eurosceptic Paradox.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.

13

profiteering eurocrats.112 Visitors are invited to digitally sign a petition opposing the salaries of
European commissioners and other EU bureaucrats.113
Regardless, it is important to mention that there are some programmatic differences that
many argue separate the PVV from other PRR parties in Europe.114 Foremost, traditionally Wilders
has sought his primary political allies in Israel and the United States, not in Europe.115 This focus on
the US and Israel is quite uncommon amongst PRR parties, and is useful in distancing the PVV from
Nazism, which is an especially sensitive topic in the Netherlands.116 Close inspection of the PVV
indicates that Wilders pro-Israeli stance is far from solely an attempt to distance himself from
Nazism. As Gee points out, Wilders is strongly supportive of Zionism of a far-right variety.117 This
is evidenced by Wilders frequent visits to Israel, the most notable of which was his December 2008
participation in the Facing Jihad conference in Jerusalem.118 This conference was held by National
Union Knesset member Aryeh Eldad, whose party favours the expulsion of all Palestinians from
Israeli-controlled territory.119 This is a position advanced by Wilders as well.120
Wilders is also extremely pro-US, which can be attested to by his praise of US foreign policy,
and his September 11 2010 speech at ground zero in New York.121 In this speech he extended
support for the US and denounced the building of a mosque in the area.122 Notably, former US
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich was also in attendance. 123 Wilders can also be linked
financially to American and Israeli conservative groups. Unlike other Dutch political parties, the
PVV is self-funded, therefore it does not have to meet the same disclosure requirements as other

112

Party for Freedom, Join our protest against the profiteering eurocrats, www.stopeuprofiteers.com (Accessed:
August 1, 2012).
113
Party for Freedom, Join our protest against the profiteering eurocrats.
114
Vossen, 186.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Gee, 34.
118
Ibid, 35.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Geert Wilders, NYC Speech Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Weblog
www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1712-nyc-speech-geert-wilders (Posted:
September 11, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
122
Wilders, NYC Speech Geert Wilders.
123
Ibid.

14

parties.124 Nevertheless, in September 2012 Reuters reported that notable American conservative
thinkers such as Daniel Pipes and David Horowitz had acknowledged that they paid for expenses and
visits by Wilders.125 Furthermore, they also admitted making contributions to Wilders fundraising
efforts.126 Despite such backing there are indications that the PVV is not always in line with the
interests of its supporters. An example of this is the PVVs recent stance against ritual slaughter,
which was originally meant to pester Muslims, and appease animal rights activists.127 In this manner
Cohen argues that Wilders has been one of the most outspoken supporters of Israel.128 Yet he
claims that the Dutch government arrived at an agreement to allow Muslims to sedate animals before
performing ritual slaughter, while neglecting Jews who are bound by their religion to perform ritual
slaughter on conscious animals.129 Nevertheless, the PVV continued to support the measures. As
Cohen claims:
Wilders realized that opposing Islam and supporting Israel wasnt going to
muster sufficient votes; accordingly, he seized upon the traditional
conservative rejection of the European Union as the centerpiece of his
platform, extending his reach to people who did not share his opinion of
Israel as a privileged ally in the war on Islamism.130
PVV opposition to ritual slaughter, and the events that were described above all occurred just prior to
the September 2012 election.131 This demonstrates an instance in which Cohen asserts that the PVV
moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum in order to draw more mainstream voters.132
Despite this, the PVV has remained relatively pro-Israel which serves to distinguish them from many
PRR parties in Europe.

124

Anthony Deutsch and Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: U.S. groups helped fund Dutch anti-Islam politician Wilders.
www.reuters.com (Posted: September 10 2012, Accessed: September 20, 2012).
125
Deutsch and Hosenball.
126
Ibid.
127
Ben Cohen, Europes Assault on Jewish Ritual: Is Judaism Just Collateral Damage, or the Target Once Again?
Commentary 134, no. 4 (November, 2012): 17.
128
Cohen, 18.
129
Cohen, 18.
130
Ibid, 19.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.

15

Moreover, Wilders libertarian views on ethical issues are also quite unique for PRR parties.
He supports the right to abortion, euthanasia and embryo selection, while the party also presents
itself as a defender of women and gays in the face of the advance of an intolerant and backward
Islam.133 Nevertheless, academics such as Wolin warn that one should not be fooled by Wilders
frequent appeals on behalf of seemingly liberal values such as freedom of speech, gay rights and
womens rights.134 He argues that the PVVs previously mentioned objection to immigration and
Islamic culture departs from the idea of universal equality, which is the foundational precept of the
rule of law, in favour of the idea of ethnic and racial hierarchy.135 Gee agrees with this stance as he
considers it highly problematic to label an entire culture based on the actions of a small minority of
extremist Muslims.136 He claims, similar expressions of hostility toward Jewish, Asian or Black
people would not be accepted.137 Mudde refers to the reasoning behind such claims as nativism,
which he describes as an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members
of the native group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state.138 Thus, it is these nationalist, anti-immigrant, and populist traits that many assert
connect the PVV to other PRR parties and place it on the far reaches of the political spectrum.139
The proceeding analysis uses Wilders and the PVV as a case study in investigating the
common assertion made by researchers that political inclusion serves to moderate radical political
parties. 140 Anthony Downs seminal work on party ideology titled, An Economic Theory of
Democracy, is the primary influence for this hypothesis.141 In this work Downs argues that ideology
essentially serves as a political tool that parties use to combat the uncertainties involved in the

133

Vosen, 187.
Richard Wolin, Ghosts of a Tortured Past: Europes Right Turn. Dissent 58, no. 1 (Winter, 2011): 62.
135
Wolin, 65.
136
Gee, 34.
137
Ibid.
138
Wolin, 65.
139
Ibid.
140
Jillian Schwedler, Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, World
Politics 63, no. 2 (April, 2011): 348.
141
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
134

16

struggle for political office.142 His argument rests on the basic theory that political parties are
primarily interested in securing political office, as opposed to promoting a better or an ideal
society per se. 143 In line with this theory, he asserts that in multi-party systems such as the
Netherlands, parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum are likely to be farther apart
ideologically than in two party systems.144 Nevertheless, in order to gain power, parties on the left
and right of the political spectrum are more likely to work together in order to gain power for their
side of the spectrum.145 Thus, Downs argues that, Since it is very difficult to attract enough support
with narrowly targeted extremist or sectarian appeals, over time the competition for votes will force
extremist parties to jettison radical positions and adopt broader, more centrist platforms capable of
attracting support outside their original core constituency.146 In addition to Downs arguments, two
other theories have contributed to the moderation hypothesis.
A second theory relates to party institutional structure, and is largely based on the work of
German sociologist Robert Michels.147 Michels found that when highly controversial parties decide
to participate in elections, they find themselves forced to set up formal, bureaucratic organizations
capable of mounting public campaigns, raising and disbursing funds, and developing policies.148 He
claims that this draws energy and resources away from traditional radical activities, which serves to
moderate the party.149 This paper will also consider what Berman and others refer to as pothole
theory.150 This is essentially the proposition that extremist parties become more moderate as a result
of being concerned with the daily functions of government upon inclusion into a democratic
system.151 Thus, all three theories are similar in that they argue that the inclusion of radical parties in

142

A. Downs 1957, 96.

Ibid.
144
Ibid, 163.
145
Ibid.
146
Sheri Berman, Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons From Europe, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (January, 2008): 6.
147
Robert Michels, A Sociological Study if the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy trans. Eden and Cedar
Paul (New York.: Free Press, 1962): 333-341.
148
Michels, 333-341.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
151
Michels, 334-341.
143

17

democratic systems serves to bring them towards the center in terms of the extremity of their
ideology, issues and policy. This paper will focus on testing these assertions as they pertain to Geert
Wilders and the PVV, through analysis of Geert Wilders official blog.152 Directed content analysis
will be used in order to test the hypothesis that extreme parties will tend to moderate as a result of
contesting political elections and participating in parliamentary politics.

152

Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Weblog www.geertwilders.nl (Accessed: August 1, 2012).

18

Chapter III
Literature Review: Radicalism, Populism and Moderation
Vossen asserts that Dutch journalists, scientists and fellow politicians alike seem to agree
that Wilders and his PVV are best qualified (to at least some degree) as populists.153 Populism is an
inexact term though, and there is much discussion as to exactly what it entails.154 Albertazzi and
McDonnell argue that historically populism has been employed in a loose, inconsistent and
undefined manner, as a way of denoting appeals to the people, demagogy and catch-all
politics.155 They further define populism as pitting a virtuous and homogenous people against a set
of elites and dangerous others who are depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the
sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.156 Albertazzi and McDonnell
argue that populism can mend itself to any ideology, left or right.157 What these two academics see
as critical is the fact that populists always appear to be fighting to reclaim the peoples
sovereignty, be it from politicians, the elite or immigrants.158 Similarly, Vossen claims that most
academics generally consider populism to be built on the perception of current politics as being a
conflict between two homogenous and antagonistic groups, a virtuous people and a malicious elite
and on the aspiration to build a polity in which the will of the virtuous people prevails.159 This has
come to be termed the discursive definition of populism.160 As mentioned above, this definition
depicts populism as being a Manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the
people and Evil with a conspiring elite.161 As Hawkins claims, these Manichaean aspects of
populism are central to it as a discourse, since it attempts to assign everything a moral dimension

153

Vossen 2010, 26.

Ibid, 24.
155
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre, In Twenty-First Century
Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (New York:
Palgrave, 2002): 2.
156
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2002, 2.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.
159
Vossen 2010, 24.
160
Kirk A. Hawkins, Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective, Comparative
Political Studies 42, no. 8 (August, 2009): 1042.
161
Hawkins, 1042.
154

19

and interprets it as part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil. 162 Roger Eatwell
acknowledges this tendency to be one of the central pillars of populism.163 Testament to this is the
noted tendency for populists to dichotomize issues into black and white.164 He argues that this
explains populist parties preference for referendums on subjects, as opposed to parliamentary forms
of democracy.165 According to Eatwell, this indicates the majoritarian character of populism.166
Like Albertazzi and McDonnell, Eatwell argues that populism is best seen in Europe as a
political style rather than a specific body of thought.167 As will be touched upon, the term populism
is often used synonymously with the phrases extreme-right or radical right, which Eatwell
claims can be misleading.168 In support of this, he points out that there is populism of not only the
right, but the left as well, since it is a language and style that can also be used by groups which
genuinely support a radical redistribution of income and power within society.169 Hanz-Georg
Betzs assertions are similar to Eatwells as he describes populism as a form of political rhetoric that
is designed to tap feelings of resentment, and exploit them politically. 170 Like Eatwell, Betz
considers populism to be largely a political strategy, whose political rhetoric is the evocation of
latent grievances and the appeal to emotions provoked by them, rather than an ideology per se.171 In
order to stress this difference it is important to first define exactly what constitutes an ideology.
Hainsworth defines political ideologies as bodies of interconnected ideas or systems of thought that
constitute the basis for political action, reflection and debate.172 In light of this definition, populism
is something different from ideology that is difficult to discern because parties such as the PVV have

162

Hawkins, 1043.
Roger Eatwell, The New Extreme Right Challenge, In Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right
Challenge, ed. Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde (New York: Routledge, 2004): 12.
164
Eatwell, 12-13.
165
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid, 12.
168
Eatwell, 12.
169
Eatwell, 12.
170
Hanz-Georg Betz, Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in
Contemporary Democracies, In Democracies and the Populist Challenge, ed. Yves Meny and Yves Surel (New York:
Palgrave, 2002): 198.
171
Betz, 198.
172
Paul Hainsworth, The Extreme Right In Western Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008): 67.
163

20

been keen to use anti-establishment populism as a manner of expressing their ideology. 173
Taggart refers to this form of populism as new populism, and acknowledges that while it is not
necessarily an ideology in itself, it has tended to be used in Europe by far-right parties.174 He claims
that:
new populism is a contemporary form of populism that emerged, primarily
though not exclusively in Western Europe, in the last part of the twentieth
century. It is a populism that has been advocated by a number of parties on
the far-right of the political spectrum as a reaction against the political
dominance and the agenda of certain key parties of government in their
party systems, and which is usually associated with particular political
leaders.175
The Right and the Radical-Right
Historically, left/right ideological polarity arose from the seating arrangement of the first
French General Assembly, where the supporters of the political ideas inspired by the enlightenment
were seated on the left, while those who backed the ancien regime were seated at the right side of the
president of the Assembly.176 According to Cole, the term right is used to describe styles of
thought having emerged as a response to the left dating back to the values of 1789: egalitarianism,
brotherhood and fraternity.177 With regards to this, oriented to the new and the modern has come
to be associated with the left and conservative with the right.178 This is far from an exact
classification though. For instance, supporters of nuclear energy, a modern solution to energy
problems, are generally considered to be on the right.179 Meanwhile, those who wish to preserve
nature are often placed on the left of the political spectrum.180 Regardless, over the years the right
has become synonymous with conservatism.181 As Shannon famously points out, conservatism as a

173

Hainsworth, 69.
Paul Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000): 20.
175
Taggart, 2
176
H. F. Bienfait and W. E. A. Van Beek, Right and Left As Political Categories: An Exercise in Not-So-Primitive
Classification Anthropos 96 (2001): 169-170.
177
Cole, 205.
178
Ibid, 170.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid.
181
Ibid.
174

21

term is approximately 170 years old, and came into usage after the Great Reform Act of 1832 in
Great Britain.182 It referred to opposition to reform, and has since become associated with wishes to
preserve present or past values rather than to create or adopt new ones.183 Moreover, historically
conservative parties in Europe have generally stood for loyalty to the monarchy, and the traditional
way of doing things.184 The right of the political spectrum has also become associated with the
ideological presence of authoritarianism. 185 Authoritarianism is the belief that infringements of
authority should be punished severely, and that there should be a focus on a law and order agenda.186
Indeed, as argued by Layton-Henry, such authoritarianism is characteristic of many ideologies of the
right.187
In regards to this, Mudde asserts that the PVV is part of a grouping of radical right political
parties that have enjoyed electoral success in Europe since the 1980s partly through the use of
populist discourse and its incorporation with authoritarian elements.188 As Zaslove confirms, such
parties have participated in coalition governments in Austria, Switzerland and Italy, and have
supported center-right coalition governments in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.189 Mudde
refers to such parties collectively as the populist radical right.190 The other parties that Mudde
considers to make up this grouping include the French National Front (FN), the German Republicans
(REP), the Flemish Block in Belgium (VB), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the Swiss
Peoples Party (SVP).191 Muddes label populist radical right recognizes the fact that these parties,
as previously mentioned, use populism as one of their primary political tools. As Zaslove remarks,

182

Jasper B. Shannon, Conservatism, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 344 (Nov.,
1962): 13-24.
183
Shannon, 14.
184
Ibid.
185
Mudde 2010, 1174.
186
Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 23.
187
Zig Layton-Henry, Conservatism and Conservative Politics, Introduction In Zig Layton-Henry (ed.) Conservative
Politics in Western Europe (New York: St. Martens Press, 2007): 1.
188
Mudde 2011, 8.
189
Andrej Zaslove, The Populist Radical Right in Government: The Structure and Agency of Success and Failure,
Comparative European Politics 10, no. 4 (2012): 421.
190
Ibid.
191
Ibid, 7.

22

thanks to Muddes contributions, The PRR is now accepted as a party family that combines nativist
nationalism, authoritarianism and populism. The PRR also combines charismatic and populist
leadership, and a number of these parties combine these features with a well-organized political
party.192
Mudde stops short of using the term extreme to describe such parties, as many scholars
specify that extreme-right generally refers to the desire for the overthrow of democratic
institutions, and the instalment of a totalitarian based system of governance.193 As Hartleb observes,
the fact that parties such as the PVV approve of the democratic system serves to separate them from
the extreme-right.194 Moreover, extreme-right is considered by many scholars to infer a connection
or affinity with postwar neofascist organizations.195 This distinction can be made most clear when
one looks at the Greek party, Golden Dawn. Golden Dawn came to prominence in Greece following
the global economic crisis in 2008, and is classified by most scholars as an extreme neo-fascist
party.196 This is largely due to the partys use of Nazi-like symbolism, links to neo-fascist groups and
various anti-Semitic statements.197 Meindert Fennema makes a similar argument in claiming that the
categorization extreme-right is a misleading term for parties such as the PVV, as most of them do
not call for the destruction of democratic institutions.198 In order to rectify this, many scholars
combine the terms radical-right and populist to denote that these parties are both populist in
style, and located on the far right of the political spectrum ideologically.199 While populism has
generally been acknowledged by most scholars to be a defining component of these political parties,
their ideological components have been less clear. Instead, some scholars refer to these parties as

192

Zaslove 2012, 423.

Hainsworth, 19.
194
Florian Hartleb, After their establishment: right-wing populist parties in Europe, European View 10 (2011): 267.
195
Hainsworth, 19.
196
Alexandra Koronaiou and Alexandros Sakellariou, Reflections on Golden Dawn, community organizing and
nationalist solidarity: helping (only) Greeks, Community Development Journal 48, no. 2 (April, 2013): 336.
197
Koronaiou and Sakellariou, 335.
198
Meindert Fennema, Populist Parties of the Right, In Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the
Western World, ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Nova Science, 2005): 1.
199
Hainsworth, 22.
193

23

anti-immigration parties200 or simply populist parties.201 Regardless, most scholars generally

agree these parties are best classified as sitting on the right reaches of the political ideological
spectrum.202
As mentioned, while there is much agreement that populist parties such as the PVV can
generally be situated on the right of the ideological spectrum, many scholars consider such parties to
be misclassified as extreme-right due to a lack of connection to historical fascism. With regards to
this, Nolte argues that fascism can be described as a phenomenon that can be limited to between the
years 1920 and 1945.203 Nolte proposes the following definition of fascism. Fascism [] is antimarxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of a radically opposed and yet related
ideology and by the use of almost identical and yet typically modified methods, always, however,
within the unyielding framework of national self-assertion and autonomy. 204 Fennema makes
similar claims as she considers a fascist party to be an extreme-right party in a specific time period,
and with a specific party organization.205 Most notably she argues that fascism can be embodied in
the Fuhrer principle in Nazi Germany.206 In consideration of this, Fennema proposes [] to
define the term extreme-right as a concept that refers only to ideology and not to political practices.
Only on the level of ideology, does extreme-right equal fascism.207 Therefore, Fennema views the
primary difference between the two terms to be that fascism is always a certain type of mass
movement, while the extreme-right does not necessarily have to be a mass movement.208
Hainsworth argues that part of the cause for such debate over terminology is due to the fact
that many of the terms used to describe these parties are not labels readily accepted or espoused by

200

Fennema, 2.
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2002, 10-11.
202
Alexandra Cole, Old right or new right? The ideological positioning of parties of the far right, European Journal of
Political Research 44 (2005): 203.
203
Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism and National Socialism, (New York: Henry
Holt & Company, 1966) 27.
204
Nolte, 40.
205
Fennema, 4.
206
Fennema, 4.
207
Ibid.
208
Ibid.
201

24

the parties that they are considered to reference.209 Paxton argues that another cause of this is the
repugnancy that Hitlers form of fascism inspired in European society.210 He claims that out of
necessity fascism changed its stripes in an attempt to remain politically viable.211 He believes that
fascism has transformed into the movements that we now see as radical-right or extremeright.212 He warns that this is a worrisome situation as all that is needed is the lawless treatment of
national enemies for fascism to emerge.213 Similar to Paxton, Griffin asserts that fascism simply
changed its face in the post-war period.214 He claims, once fascism is teased free from its
contingent expression as a specific type of historical movement and regime, it can be conceptualized
[] as a particular politico-cultural project.215
Bar-On shares a similar analysis. 216 He claims that the intellectual roots for modern
extreme-right parties can be traced to the French Nouvelle Droite (ND).217 He describes the ND as
a cultural school of thought and a metapolitical movement that began in France, but had farreaching effects throughout Europe.218 Bar-On states that The ND helped to create a sophisticated
European-wide political culture of the revolutionary right in an anti-fascist age and nurtured the
politically correct discourse of extreme right-wing political parties. 219 According to Bar-On,
ultranationalist Alain de Benoist was pivotal to this movement as he and forty other ultranationalists
with ties to neo-fascist organizations formed the Research and Study Group for European
Civilization (GRECE).220 GRECE serves as the principle think-tank for the ND.221 Bar-On observes
that one of the NDs primary contentions is that a right to difference exists that dictates that

209

Fennema, 4.
Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Random House, 2004): 172.
211
Paxton, 172-173.
212
Ibid.
213
Ibid.
214
Roger Griffin, Another Face? Another Mazeway? Reflections on the Newness and Rightness of the European New
Right, In Tamir Bar-On, Where Have All the Fascists Gone (New York: Ashgate, 2007): i.
215
Griffin, i.
216
Tamir Bar-On, Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite, Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 3 (2011): 200.
217
Bar-On, 200.
218
Bar-On, 200.
219
Ibid.
220
Ibid, 203.
221
Ibid.
210

25

communities must constantly be nourished and promoted in order to allow all world cultures to
maintain their uniqueness and distinctiveness.222 Moreover, he asserts that the ND pushes for a right
to preserve cultural, regional and national identities, and that the best place to do so is within national
territories.223 This point is especially worthy of note as it mirrors the logic espoused by Wilders that
was mentioned earlier. It is these traits that many argue serve as the ideological connections to
historical fascism.
Andrej Zaslove supports Bar-Ons findings, as he claims that the ND has based much of its
ideology of exclusion upon cultural, as opposed to historically discredited racial differences.224
According to Zaslove the far-right proceeds on the line of argument that since there are no
biological distinctions between races, culture makes us distinctly human and gives us our
identity.225 He asserts that this concept is used as the philosophical justification for the opposition to
uncontrolled immigration,226 that is one of the primary programmatic issues which all of the
previously mentioned parties share.227 Thus, it can be seen from this that scholars such as Bar-On,
Eatwell, Paxton and Zaslove consider parties such as the PVV to share an ideological connection to
fascism and neo-fascism, and are generally more apt to classify these parties as extreme-right.
Academics such as Mudde do not deny the influence of such thought.228 However, they stipulate that
extremism requires the desired and expressed overthrow of the institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide
issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble to carry out its will.229 Far from
being anti-democratic though, Mudde points out that many of these parties are majoritarian, and

222

Bar-On, 203.
Ibid, 207.
224
Andrej Zaslove, Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an AntiGlobalization Movement, Comparative European Politics 6 (2008): 179.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
Fennema 1.
228
Cas Mudde, The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy, West European Politics 33, no. 6 (November,
2010): 1167-1186.
229
Mudde 2010, 1168.
223

26

opposed instead to the liberal basis of their respective democracies.230 Nevertheless, for ease of
clarity this paper will hitherto follow Muddes assertions and refer to this grouping of parties as the
populist radical right (PRR).

A Winning Formula for the PRR

In addition to anti-immigrant, and particularly anti-Muslim sentiment, increasingly parties of
the PRR have also used Euroscepticism to create a winning formula,231 though the nature and form
of such scepticism has varied over time.232 In 1998 Paul Taggart noted that since the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there had been a significant rise in levels of Euroscepticism in all EU
member nations.233 This included those countries most supportive of EU integration, such as France
and the Netherlands.234 He notes that PRR parties had been keen to latch onto this issue, as was
evidenced by the FN in Frances and the VB in Belgiums Eurosceptical tendencies.235 Nevertheless,
he was careful to point out that in none of these countries was Euroscepticism found to be the central
tenant of PRR party policy, but rather was secondary to cultural issues.236 Moreover, Taggart was
careful to use the word Eurosceptical to describe these parties policies, as he points out that not all
of them opposed the EU per se.237 With regards to the term Eurosceptical, he claims that it is used
because it is more inclusive as, All opponents of the EU are, at least, sceptical, but not all sceptics
are opponents.238
In the 1990s Taggart asserts that Euroscepticism generally revolved around the ratification
process of the Maastricht treaty. 239 Since the debate over the ratification of this treaty,

230

Mudde 2010, 1169.

Hartleb, 267.
232
Vasilopoulou, 3.
233
Paul Taggart, A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems,
European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 363-364.
234
Taggart 1998, 364.
235
Ibid, 365.
236
Taggart 1998, 365-366.
237
Ibid, 366-367.
238
Ibid, 366.
239
Ibid, 366-367.
231

27

Euroscepticism has continued to rise in relation to pivotal periods of EU expansion. 240 As

Halikiopoulou et al. attest, examples of this can be seen during the debates over the failed ratification
of the European Constitution and the protracted progress of the Lisbon Treaty. 241 Since the
beginning of the 2008 global recession, the European financial crisis has led to another significant
increase in Euroscepticism, caused largely by discontent with EU-supported financial assistance
packages being given to Greece, and the imposition of EU-mandated austerity measures on member
nations.242
Taggart has observed that parties peripheral to their party systems are generally more
predisposed to incorporating Euroscepticism into their platforms.243 This is a tendency that has been
noted by a number of scholars, and is evidenced by the presence of increased levels of support for
Euroscepticism by both far-right and far-left parties across Europe.244 This was also the case in the
September 2012 Dutch election, where both the PVV and the far-left SP incorporated
Euroscepticism into their platforms.245 With regards to this, Taggart contends that the protest
nature of peripheral parties produces the need for them to distinguish themselves from more
mainstream elements, and that this leads them to be more prone to adopting Eurosceptic views.246
Scholars adhering to this logic maintain that all parties attempt to strategically manipulate the
European integration issue.247 Hooghe et al. argue that:
Parties that are successful in the existing structure of contestation have little
incentive to rock the boat, while unsuccessful parties, that is, parties with
weak electoral support or those that are locked out of government, have an
interest in restructuring contestation. The same strategic logic that leads
mainstream parties to assimilate the issues raised by European integration

240

Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou and Sofia Vasilopoulou, The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common
Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism, European Journal of Political Research 51 (2012): 506.
241
Halikiopoulou et al., 506.
242
The Economist, Leftward Tilt: As Voters Lean Left, the Next Government May be Awkward Over the Euro, The
Economist (August, 25, 2012): 1-2.
243
Taggart 1998, 372.
244
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson, Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration
Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 8 (October, 2002): 968.
245
The Economist, August 2012, 1.
246
Taggart 1998, 382.
247
Hooghe et al., 968.

28

into the Left/Right dimension of party competition leads peripheral parties

to exploit European integration to shake up the party system.248
Similar to this line of reasoning, many academics claim that peripheral opposition to the
project of European integration also lies in the fact that the EU is a creation of the Centre-Right,
Centre, and to a lesser extent, the Centre-Left which has dominated European decision making for
the past half century.249 Therefore, such scholars not only view Euroscepticism as an inevitable
reaction to the EUs policies, but also see it as a rejection of the ideological foundation of the
organization.250 However, scholars such as Halikiopoulou et al. argue that there are other factors that
can explain this occurrence.251 They assert that the importance of nationalism in the peripheral
regions of the ideological spectrum helps to account for far-right and far-left parties tendency
towards Euroscepticism.252 Halikiopoulou et al. recognize that definitions of nationalism vary, but
argue the key promise of any nationalism is the right of the nation to act as independent, free and
sovereign.253 According to these scholars, PRR parties seek to portray the nation to be an organic
pre-modern community and defend its homogeneity by promoting differences and exclusivity.254
Therefore, since the EU is fundamentally heterogeneous in nature, these elements put the PRR
naturally at odds with the EU.255
Similarly, Halikiopoulou et al. also consider nationalist impulses to drive a degree of the farlefts Euroscepticism.256 They argue that these parties fundamental distrust of great powers causes
them to equate freedom from such countries with the emancipation of the popular classes.257 Thus,
the integrative nature of the EU is what is seen to be threatening by such parties.258 Additionally,

248

Hooghe et al., 968-969.

Ibid, 969-970.
250
Ibid, 969.
251
Halikiopoulou et al., 506.
252
Ibid, 504.
253
Ibid, 509.
254
Halikiopoulou et al., 510.
255
Ibid, 509-510.
256
Ibid, 512.
257
Ibid.
258
Ibid.
249

29

Conti and Memoli argue that the far-left is also often opposed to the largely economic basis of the
EU, and wants to see it transformed from a Common market into a social market economy.259
Notably, this highlights the differing nature of Euroscepticism.260 As Conti and Memoli point out,
PRR parties are much more apt than far-left parties to unconditionally oppose the EU.261 As was
mentioned, this is largely attributed to concerns over EU infringement of national sovereignty.262 In
light of such tendencies, Taggart and Szczerbiak make a distinction between hard and soft
Euroscepticism.263 They define hard Euroscepticism as outright rejection of the entire project of
European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining
members of the EU.264 Contrastingly, soft Euroscepticism is described as qualified opposition or
disagreement on one or more policy areas associated with the project of European integration.265 In
lieu of these categorizations, in the months leading up to the 2012 election the PVV can be
categorized as hard Eurosceptics, since they called for a full Dutch withdrawal from the EU.266

Electoral Support for the PRR

Traditionally across Europe PRR voters have been disproportionately lower-class males.267
This holds true in the Netherlands, as males have consistently supported PRR parties more than
females, and have been largely from the working class.268 There has also been a tendency for
unemployed persons to be more likely to vote for PRR parties than other segments of the

259

Nicolo Conti and Vincenzo Memoli, The multi-faceted nature of party-based Euroscepticism, Acta Politica, 47, no.
2 (2012): 105.
260
Conti and Memoli, 105.
261
Ibid.
262
Ibid.
263
Paul Taggart and A. Szczerbiak, Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central
and Eastern Europe, Opposing Europe, Sussex European Institutional Working Paper no. 46 (2001): 10.
264
Taggart and Szczerbiak, 10.
265
Ibid.
266
The Economist, August 2012, 2.
267
Mudde 2010, 1169.
268
Hainsworth, 91-99.

30

population.269 First-time voters have also been shown to support PRR parties in disproportionate
numbers.270 In regards to the causes of such support, Mudde and Holsteyn claim that there are two
traditional hypotheses. 271 These are known as the support thesis, and the protest thesis. 272 The
support thesis argues that voters support radical-right parties because they consider their platforms to
best represent their ideas.273 As has been discussed, many consider populism to be one of the primary
methods employed by radical right parties in order to attract such support.274 As Betz claims, this
strategy is designed to mobilize people to act politically by appealing to grievances and
resentments.275 In relation to this, many PRR parties, including the PVV, have campaigned on antiimmigration rhetoric.276 Geert Wilders has largely focused on Muslim immigrants, claiming that they
commit crimes, drain the social-welfare system, are a drag on the standard of living and are part of a
barbaric culture.277 According to Richard Wolin, in this manner PRR parties excel at playing on
the cultural and economic anxieties of average citizens, especially those of the lower middle classes
who have been unable to keep pace with the demands of a globalized, information-based economy
and whose employment prospects have grown correspondingly precarious.278 This line of thinking
essentially argues that the PVV and other PRR parties succeed in gaining the support of the losers
of modernity, who are threatened by rapid social change and lend their support to these parties out
of general discontent.279 The process that leads to the creation of such support has come to be known
as modernization theory, and considers support for radical right-wing movements to be a

269

Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers, Extreme-right-wing Voting in Western Europe, European
Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 370.
270
Hainsworth, 101-102.
271
C. E. Mudde and J.J.M. Van Holsteyn, Over the Top: Dutch Right-Wing Extremist Parties in the Elections of 1994,
Politics 14, no. 3 (1994): 131.
272
Mudde and Holsteyn, 131.
273
Ibid.
274
Betz, 198.
275
Ibid, 200.
276
Wouter Van Der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others
Suceed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support, Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 5 (June, 2005): 537538.
277
Heijne, 31.
278
Ibid.
279
Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 540.

31

pathological normalcy.280 That is, [i]n all fast-growing modernizing countries, there are people
who cannot cope with rapid economic and cultural developments and who react to the pressures of
readjustment with rigidity and closed-mindedness.281 Supporters of this argument generally attach
such discontent to disgruntlement with globalization more generally. As Zaslove points out:
fear and skepticism towards economic liberalization, immigration, and
European integration have been linked to the process of globalization. As
with other parties that oppose globalization, the radical right does not speak
to deaf ears. There is considerable evidence that a significant portion of
Europeans are concerned and sceptical of economic liberalization, they are
apprehensive about surrendering their national sovereignty, and they are
concerned about immigration.282
In the Dutch case, Heijne argues that this process is further aided by the fact that the country
has developed a reputation for practicing an almost radical form of tolerance.283 He argues that while
this has undoubtedly aided the emancipation of immigrants, women and gays, it has undermined
national social cohesion.284 Heijne contends that this has created a vacuum that PRR politicians
such as Wilders have capitalized on.285 Moreover, he claims that this has allowed Wilders to largely
avoid economic solutions to the countrys ills, by using immigrants and European integration as
scapegoats for the countrys problems.286 Nevertheless, academics such as Heijne are careful to note
that while parties like the PVV succeed in capitalizing upon fears related to a perceived loss of social
identity, support for Wilders should not necessarily be associated with economic hardship.287 The
irony is, he argues, that the rise of Wilders and the PVV is evidence of the prosperity and economic
stability of the Dutch middle class.288 Testament to this is the fact that only a relatively prosperous

280

Michael Minkenberg, The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and
Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization, Comparative European Politics 1 (2003): 150151.
281
Minkenberg, 150-151.
282
Zaslove 2008, 181-182.
283
Heijne, 32.
284
Ibid.
285
Heijne, 31.
286
Ibid.
287
Heijne, 31-32.
288
Ibid, 32.

32

electorate could afford to become obsessed with the Islamization of the Netherlands and the
bureaucratic wastefulness of the European Union.289
However, as Mudde points out, this only explains the demand side of support for the PVV
and other PRR parties.290 He argues that one must also consider the actions of mainstream parties,
and the effects that these have upon support for the PRR.291 As a case in point, he notes that the PRR
has only grown where mainstream parties ignore issues that large parts of the population care
about.292 Examples of these are crime, corruption, European integration and immigration.293 In light
of this, many argue that PRR voters do not vote for these parties as the support thesis suggests, but
support them in order to punish mainstream parties.294 This has become known as the protest
thesis.295 The protest thesis argues that voters use PRR parties to channel their discontent with more
mainstream parties.296 This suggests that these voters are not necessarily in favour of PRR parties,
nor do they support them, but that they use their vote to signal political discontent.297 Mudde and
Holsteyn argue that this helps to explain the relatively strong support for PRR parties in the first
rounds of parliamentary voting in many countries.298 They note that PRR parties often receive much
weaker support in subsequent rounds, when voters are hesitant to to waste their vote on a PRR
party.299

Taming PRR Parties

Regardless of the causes of support, William Downs claims that, Traditional conservative
parties throughout Europe face the reality that radical right-wing parties are winning representation

289

Heijne, 32.
Mudde 2011, 9.
291
Ibid.
292
Ibid.
293
Ibid.
294
Mudde and Holsteyn, 131.
295
Ibid.
296
Ibid.
297
Ibid, 132.
298
Ibid.
299
Ibid.
290

33

across all levels of the polity: subnational councils, national legislatures, and the European
Parliament. 300 W. Downs argues that mainstream parties have generally adopted five distinct
strategic reactions to the presence of PRR parties in legislatures. These have been to ignore, isolate,
co-opt, collaborate and impose legal restrictions. 301 The strategies of ignoring, isolating and
imposing legal restrictions seek to deprive PRR parties of any legitimacy or importance that could be
gained by being the subject of attention.302 Starved of both power and publicity, the logic goes, the
pariahs allure would soon whither and fade. 303 However, Downs warns that these are risky
strategies since the failure to address the sources of PRR party success can result in continued or
increased levels of support.304 In accordance with these findings, Spanje and Van der Brug find that
ignoring or excluding a PRR party has mixed effects on their level of support depending on the
context of the situation.305 In cases such as Belgium, they found that the Flemish Bloc actually
benefitted from exclusion, and the Northern League in Italy would have benefitted if it had been
excluded. 306 Conversely, they found that the Progress Party in Denmark would have suffered
electorally had it been excluded.307 While the broader effects of exclusion are found to be mixed,
exclusion using electoral laws specifically have been found by many academics to be largely
ineffective. For example, Ezrow claims that there is little evidence to suggest that electoral law
(specifically the proportionality of the electoral system) exert an effect either directly or indirectly on
parties tendencies to propose extreme as opposed to moderate policy positions.308

300

William M. Downs, Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats, West
European Politics 24, no. 3 (July, 2001): 23-42.
301
Downs 2001, 24.
302
Ibid, 26.
303
Ibid.
304
Ibid.
305
Spanje and Brug, 353-384.
306
Ibid, 375.
307
Ibid, 353.
308
Lawrence Ezrow, Parties Policy Programmes and the Dog that Didnt Bark: No Evidence that Proportional Systems
Promote Extreme Party Positioning, British Journal of Political Science 38 (2008): 480.

34

However, as mentioned, political inclusion itself has been argued to moderate radical
political parties. Tezcur asserts this is known as moderation theory.309 This line of thinking is present
in the works of Downs, Michels and Berman. Prior to testing these theories as they pertain to the
PVV, it is important to first specify what is meant by the term moderation. As Sanchez-Cuenca
asserts, moderation is best understood as another name for convergence to the position of the
median voter. 310 In light of this, she views moderation as being similar to a loosening of ideological
rigidity, which is best measured by a shift in a partys ideology towards the position of the median
voter in an electorate.311 Schwedler contends that moderation broadly refers to movement along a
continuum from radical to moderate, with the term moderate being tied to liberal notions of
tolerance, pluralism, and cooperation.312 In the literature though, there are generally considered to
be two types of political parties.313 The first are office seeking parties, which Downs claim never
seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of
gaining office per se.314 As was covered, by Downs logic, these parties are primarily interested in
maximizing the utility of gaining public office and are therefore more likely to move towards the
median voter.315 Office seeking parties are more likely to converge towards the median voter because
the possible electoral gains are more valuable to the party.316 The second type of parties are referred
to as policy seeking parties, which Sanchez-Cuenca considers to be primarily interested in policy
making, and value the creation of policies in themselves.317
For policy seeking parties there may be times when the party may want to be faithful to its
constitutive ideological principles, even if by doing so it forgoes the gains of a more preferred

309

Tezcur, 69.
I. Sanchez-Cuenca, Party Moderation and Politicians Ideological Rigidity, Party Politics 10, no. 3 (May, 2004):
327.
311
Sanchez-Cuenca, 327.
312
Schwedler, 352.
313
Ibid, 328.
314
A. Downs, 28.
315
Ibid, 96.
316
Sanchez-Cuenca, 329-330.
317
Ibid, 328.
310

35

policy. 318 Sanchez-Cuenca contends that this thinking is diametrically opposed to Downsian
logic, as it supposes that voters preferences are not exogenous.319 Rather, it considers voters
decisions to be a result of the very activities of the party.320 Thus, through this lens parties may think
that their ideologically driven policies are the cause for their popularity, and hope that the party will
attract progressively more votes without renouncing its basic ideological tenants.321 There is another
explanation for this tendency though, and that is the observation by Sanchez-Cuenca that there are
parties that seem to exist in order to defend certain principles, regardless of policy outcomes.322
This phenomenon is generally attributed to parties that derive expressive utility from defending
principles.323
In studying socialist parties in Europe during the twentieth century Michels produced what he
termed to be the iron law of oligarchy, which found that most political parties are controlled by a
small group of leaders who develop strategies with minimum input from the masses.324 In relation to
this, he argues that there tends to be two primary ways in which radical socialist parties moderate:
the pursuit of votes, and organizational survival.325 With regards to the former, he found that when
party elites participate in elections they quickly realize that espousing radical ideological policies
alienates large segments of the electorate.326 As a result, the party in question will seek to transform
into a vote-maximizing electoral party in order to remain politically viable.327 As Tezcur points out
though, this causal process is based on the assumption that vote-maximization entails developing
centrist political platforms rather than radical ones.328 As pertains to the latter, Michels also found
that political parties concern with organizational survival often serves to lessen their radical

318

Sanchez-Cuenca, 330.
Ibid.
320
Ibid.
321
Sanchez-Cuenca, 330.
322
Ibid.
323
Ibid.
324
Michels, 18.
325
Ibid, 333.
326
Ibid, 334.
327
Ibid.
328
Tezcur, 71.
319

36

ideological commitment.329 This is a result of the tendency for electoral participation to expose
political parties formerly clandestine networks to state authorities, which forces them to
moderate.330 Michels found that as a result, the higher a partys electoral organizational capacity, the
more moderate its political policies tend to be.331 Thus, as Tezcur claims, much of moderation theory
is based upon the unintended consequences of European socialist parties participation in democratic
politics, which resulted in their transformation from radical movements into parties that represented
the interests of working classes within the established political system.332
McDonald and Newell argue that this is a fairly common phenomenon as the very basis of
support for many parties of this type lies in their opposition to mainstream politics,333 and their
struggle against economic and political elites.334 Consequently, Luther points out that often a PRR
partys outsider status is a result of opponents preventing its entry, and also by strategic choices the
party makes itself.335 Luther claims that in order for a PRR party to enter government there are many
tough decisions that must be made.336 For instance, many PRR parties seeking to enter government
must tone down radical viewpoints in order to find willing coalition partners and attract mainstream
voters.337 In relation to this, Adams et al. claim that mass-based political parties in Western Europe
tend to alter their ideological orientations in response to changes in voters policy preferences.338
However they claim that niche parties, which includes PRR parties, tend to react differently than
larger catch-all parties to public opinion.339 Adams et al. claim that PRR, Communist and Green

329

Michels, 334.
Ibid.
331
Michels, 340.
332
Tezcur, 72.
333
McDonnell and Newell, 447.
334
Zaslove 2012, 424.
335
Kurt Richard Luther, Of goals and own goals: A case study of right-wing populist party strategy for and during
incumbency, Party Politics 17, no. 4 (2011): 454.
336
Luther, 454.
337
Ibid.
338
James Adams, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garrett Glasgow, Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different
from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties Policy Shifts, 19761998, American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (July, 2006): 513.
339
Adams et al., 513.
330

37

parties do not generally adjust their policy programs in response to shifts in public opinion.340 When
these parties do shift their policies, Adams et al. assert that they have often been hurt at the ballot
box, since these actions serve to alienate their electoral base.341 Thus, PRR parties often face a
dilemma upon reaching the cusp of political power. As has been discussed, PRR parties offer radical
solutions to various issues, but unlike fascist and communist parties they do not oppose liberal
democracy and parliamentary politics outright. 342 The supporters of these parties can be
characterized as radical, but not necessarily extreme.343 Therefore these parties are careful not to
contravene the boundaries of democracy.344 According to Zaslove, this creates a dilemma for many
PRR parties, as they must demonstrate to their electorate that they are capable of influencing public
policy, which serves to compel them to participate in government.345 However, this is often in
opposition to their desire to retain their populist and radical identity.346
The PRR Lega Nord (LN) in Italy was able to remain in government from 2001 to 2006 by
walking the populist tightrope of being seen to have one foot in and one foot out of
government.347 However, as was mentioned, doing this can often alienate the base of support for
these parties.348 Aside from rejecting those PRR parties that do not moderate their platforms, Mudde
claims that European governments have very few strategies for opposing parties such as the PVV.349
As is the case with the PVV, many governments have chosen to work with PRR parties. While the
PVV was not formally included in the Dutch government, in return for its support Wilders received

340

Adams et al., 514.

Ibid.
342
Jens Rydgren, The Sociology of the Radical Right, Annual Review of Sociology 33, no. 1 (2007): 243.
343
Jens Rydgren, The Populist Challenge: Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization in France. (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2004): 213.
344
Rydgren 2004, 213.
345
Zaslove 2012, 424.
346
Ibid.
347
Adams et al, 514.
348
Ibid.
349
Mudde 2011, 10.
341

38

a promise that immigration will be reduced by half and that foreigners who refuse integration
measures will be subject to strict penalties.350
Mudde contends that when members of PRR parties have entered parliament, their electoral
success has tended to rely upon their own behaviour.351 Many parties have failed to maintain
organizational control, and have imploded after being unable to deal with the pressures of
parliamentary work and increased media scrutiny.352 Mudde asserts that key to the success of PRR
parties is the presence of effective leadership, organization and propaganda. 353 In terms of
leadership, Mudde notes, successful populist radical right parties are led by charismatic figures,
who attract new voters, and competent party managers, who build and lead the organization.354 As
McDonnell and Newell point out, the FPO in Austria was ill prepared for government as it failed to
possess a suitable number of personnel to occupy key positions, and also lacked a party organization
capable of handling the added pressures of office. 355 Nevertheless, they were able to enter
government by moderating their ideology, which allowed for the party to be a viable coalition
partner.356 Though Luther is careful to note that this ideological shift came at the cost of significant
votes from the partys core electorate.357
This lends support to the moderation hypothesis discussed above. That is, the FPO
demonstrates that at least some parties that make up the PRR have moderated as a result of electoral
participation. This paper seeks to analyze the PVV and to determine whether or not this occurrence
has been exhibited over the nearly ten years that the party has been contesting elections. In order to
do this, content analysis will be used in order to code the public statements of Wilders and the PVV.
As will be discussed, Wilders blog was chosen for the content analysis since it was deemed to be the

350

Wollin, 60.
Mudde 2011, 9.
352
Mudde 2011, 9.
353
Ibid.
354
Ibid.
355
McDonnell and Newell, 447.
356
Luther, 454.
357
Ibid, 454-455.
351

39

most suitable English language data source. His blog posts will be coded for the extremity of
language used, and will be utilized in order to assess the merit of moderation theory. It is hoped that
this will serve as evidence in the growing literature as to whether electoral participation serves to
moderate extreme political parties.

40

Chapter IV
Methods: Directed Qualitative Content Analysis of Geert Wilders Blog
This research uses directed content analysis of Geert Wilders official blog to test whether the
language used by the party has moderated over time. Should the moderation theory hold, one would
expect to see a reduction in the extremity of the language used in the partys posts. Wilders blog
was used because it is one of the only sources of English language content originating from the PVV.
Moreover, it was also chosen since it provides content from a period spanning all three elections that
the PVV has contested. Matheson defines blogs as:
web diaries based on simple and often free- software. The blogger simply
logs into his or her website, types a new entry, and the software then posts it at
the top of the site with a datestamp, pushing previous entries down the page.
Because such pages are so easy to produce, blogs are to be found across the
Internet and are well suited to producing daily comments and to topical
discourse in informal styles. Blogs have also developed a convention of rich
linking to other websites, with many bloggers using their pages to tell others
about interesting sites they have found and to quote on the content of those
sites.358
In following this format, Wilders blog is updated regularly with various posts relating to
party policy initiatives, events that the party (and Wilders) feels are important, as well as a variety of
other documents that can be used to measure the ideological direction of the PVV. As Matheson
claims, the fact that users often return to any given blog in order to obtain content from the writer
selecting the website from the countless other online offerings available tends to create a
relationship between the writer and the reader.359 He claims that it is for this reason that blogs are
often used for research.360
Content analysis is used to evaluate Wilders blog. Content analysis is defined by Holsti to be
any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified
characteristics of messages.361 According to Neuendorf, content analysis may be conducted on

358

Donald Matheson, Media Discourses: Analyzing Media Texts (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005): 171.
Matheson, 171-172.
360
Ibid, 172.
361
Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (London: Addison- Wesley, 1969): 14.
359

41

written text, transcribed speech, verbal interactions, visual images, characterizations, nonverbal
behaviors, sound events, or any other message type.362 Furthermore, Holsti describes the technique
as especially applicable:
when data accessibility is a problem and the investigators data are limited to
documentary evidence. [] When restrictions of time or space do not permit
direct access to the subjects of research, they must be studied at a distance,
with the consequence that other research techniques (interview, questionnaire,
observation, and the like) are not applicable.363
Content analysis of Geert Wilders blog was chosen because it conforms to these guidelines,
and also because of the considerations discussed above. Moreover, there is a significant amount of
research that indicates that political bloggers use their blogs to express their political beliefs, inform
their readers, and influence the political world around them.364 Particularly telling is the study by
Wallsten on video linking by political bloggers.365 This study found that political bloggers are often
willing to post videos produced from a wide array of sources ranging from highly polished
advertisements filmed by interest groups to footage recorded by ordinary citizens using cell phone
cameras. 366 Significantly, Wallsten claims that bloggers demonstrate a preference for linking
content that confirms their views of the political world and avoid cross-ideological linking.367
Furthermore, he also found that political bloggers are likely to post content criticizing aspects of
their political opponents views, and thus are useful as an indicator of ideological views.368
This paper uses directed qualitative content analysis to code the blog, which is a common
method for academic undertakings of this type.369 Directed qualitative content analysis is used to

362

K. A. Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook (California: Thousand Oaks, 2002): 24.
Holsti, 15-16.
364
Kevin Wallsten, Many Sources, One Message: Political Blog Links to Online Videos During the 2008 Campaign,
Journal of Political Marketing 10 (2011): 96.
365
Wallsten, 88-114.
366
Ibid, 90.
367
Ibid.
368
Wallsten, 90.
369
Rufina Fung, Bringing the Virtual Community into Action: A Content Analysis of Barack Obamas Blog in the 2008
Presidential Campaign (MA Dissertation), (Virginia, Regent University, 2010): 7-8.
363

42

help validate or extend conceptual frameworks or theory.370 This method has been used by a number
of academics in a number of different disciplines, the most notable of which being Abel et al. in
nursing research.371 Abel et al. define qualitative content analysis as a method for systematic and
rule-guided classification and description of text material considering latent contents and
contexts.372 In performing such research, text or other media segments are assigned codes within a
developed coding scheme.373
According to Abel et al. the coding procedure is the key element of the analytic
procedure.374 Therefore, reliability is primarily a function of coders skill, insight, and experience,
clarity of categories and coding rules which guide their use; and the degree of ambiguity in the
data. 375 Holsti contends that in the absence of an objective instrument such as a computer,
individual reliability must be determined in order to calculate the extent of agreement between
coders.376 In this study four coders were selected in order to determine the reliability of the coding
scheme. Conventionally individual coder reliability is measured with the help of inter-coder
agreement coefficients.377 The most simple of these is the percent agreement ! =

!"#$% !!!
!

, where A

refers to the number of units for which the coders agree and n to the total number of coded
units.378This was the method that was selected. According to Gray and Denston, an inter-coder
agreement coefficient exceeding 0.7 suggests an acceptable level of reliability.379 In regards to this,
an inter-coder agreement coefficient of .82 was achieved.

370

Fung, 7-8.
Thomas Abel, Margreet Duetz, Jurgen Barth, Birte knierim and Laila Burla, From Text to Codings: Intercoder
Reliability Assessment in Qualitative Content Analysis, Nursing Research 57, no. 2 (March/April, 2008): 113-114.
372
Abel et al., 113.
373
Ibid, 113.
374
Ibid, 113-114.
375
Holsti, 135.
376
Ibid.
377
Anton Oleinik, Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analysis: Triangulation at Work, Quality & Quantity
45 (2011): 861.
378
Oleinik, 861.
379
J. Gray and I. Denston, Integrating quantitative and qualitative analysis using latent and manifest variables, Quality
& Quantity 32 (1998): 423.
371

43

The coding scheme was developed using the directed qualitative analysis approach.380 That
is, coding categories and key concepts were identified using the research that appears in the literature
review.381 Using these categories it was hypothesized that should the assertions of moderation theory
hold, one would expect to find the PVV moving towards selecting more moderate language in
regards to the various issues that were identified. It was presumed that this would be a result of the
party attempting to appeal to median-voters in the 2012 election.382
The first blog post on the site that was coded was dated January 21 2005. Every post was
coded thereafter up to the September 2012 Dutch election. The last post examined and coded
appeared on August 9 2012. In total, 203 blog posts were considered, which contained 1879
sentences that were coded as containing content that could be coded. Links to outside websites were
not opened to be coded, thus only text or media appearing within the geertwilders.nl domain were
considered. Those blog posts that did not appear in English were not considered, as translation was
outside of the financial constraints of this research. During instruction, coders were directed to
consider each English blog post in its entirety when coding them into categories, excluding the titles.
The unit of analysis was the blog posts, and content in each blog post was coded by sentence.
Sentences were coded that involved any of the categories that were included on the coding form. As
depicted, they were to be coded according to their intensity of language. Extreme intensity language
was that which spoke in conspiratorial terms, and those that used inflammatory language. Moderate
intensity sentences were those that used mildly conspiratorial themes, but stopped short of using
inflammatory language. Mild intensity sentences were those that touched upon the categories in the
coding scheme, but did not use conspiratorial or inflammatory language. Figure 4 depicts the coding
form filled out by the coder during their assessment of each blog post. It is important to note that
while the unit of analysis was individual blog posts, statistics relating to the individual sentences that

380

Fung, 8.
Ibid.
382
Berman, 6.
381

44

were coded in these posts were also analyzed as they offered useful insights into the data. These
sentences were acceptably correlated with the blog posts they are contained in.
Figure 4: Coder Form:
Case Number:
Date of Post: Day__ Month__ Year__
Election: (1) 22/11/06___ (2) 9/6/10___ (3) 12/10/12___

Issues:

Intensity:

1) Islamic Culture/Immigration
2) Freedom of Speech
3) Elite Conspiracy
4) Law and Order
5) Support for Israel
6) Euroskepticism

(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___

(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___
(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___
(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___
(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___
(1) Mild___ (2)Moderate___ (3)Extreme___

Categories that were coded as being extreme contained language that is almost profane in
nature and deeply offensive to general political and cultural sensitivities. In terms of anti-Islamic
themes examples of these include Wilders repeated claims that the Prophet Muhammad was a
pedophile and a barbaric conqueror. 383 Such extreme language also often contained highly
conspiratorial themes. With regards to anti-Islamic themes, such language generally included claims
that Islam is attempting to dominate Dutch culture with a political aim of abolishing our freedoms
and our democracy.384 Such conspiratorial language was also used to identify extreme language
pertaining to other categories as well. For instance, extreme freedom of speech language often
contained claims that the Dutch people were being intentionally silenced.385 These themes are often

383 Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Receives Free Speech Award in Miami, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1573-geert-wilders-receives-free-speech-award-inmiami (Posted: April 30, 2009, Accessed: December 29, 2013).
384 Geert Wilders, The Spectre of Islam is Haunting the Free World, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-de-media-mainmenu-74/81-nieuws/1836-geert-wilders-the-specter-of-islam-ishaunting-the-free-world (Posted: October 8, 2013, Accessed: December 29, 2013).
385
Geert Wilders, The Spectre of Islam is Haunting the Free World,.

45

interrelated with anti-Islamic rhetoric. For instance, Wilders often claims that laws aimed at banning
hate-speech are attacks upon freedom of speech ordered by Islam.386
Intense language involving elite conspiracy was also similar in this manner, only the Dutch
elite were claimed to be behind such evils. Extreme language pertaining to law and order was
similar to that found relating to anti-Islam themes. That is, it generally called for authoritarian type
responses to Wilders alleged Islamic threat. Calls for the banning of the Koran, and the deportation
of criminal Islamic Dutch citizens are examples of such language.387 This is very similar to language
coded as being extreme pro-Israel. Such language often supported Israel in an alleged battle against
Islam for freedom.388 Intense Euroscepticism contained similar conspiratorial themes as the other
categories, only it claimed that the EU is to blame for such phenomena. An example of this is the
claim that the EU is a mastodon Kafkaesque structure, consuming astronomical sums, which often
enables European leaders to implement an authoritarian policy escaping peoples awareness.389
Evident is the fact that such language is often related to the aforementioned anti-Muslim themes.
Nevertheless, often such extreme language referred to the effect that the EU has on European culture
more generally. Indicative of this is the claim that the EU adheres to an ideology which posits that
our sovereign nation-states have to submerge in a subservient pan-European superstate.390 This will
be discussed at length in the analysis section.

386 Geert Wilders, We have no problem to be tolerant of the tolerant, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1692-we-have-noproblem-to-be-tolerant-of-the-tolerant- (Posted: June 14, 2010, Accessed: December 29, 2013).
387
Geert Wilders, The Spectre of Islam is Haunting the Free World,.
388 Geert Wilders, We have no problem to be tolerant of the tolerant,.
389 Geert Wilders, Bat Yeor on Geert Wilders Acquittal, Geert Wilders Weblog http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/inenglish-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1757-bat-yeor-on-geert-wilders-acquittal (Posted: July
1, 2011, Accessed: December 28, 2013).
390 Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders in Berlin, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1764-speech-geert-wilders-in-berlin-3-september2011-english-version (Posted: February 13, 2011, Accessed: September 3, 2012).

46

Analysis:
SPSS software was used to analyze, calculate and present the coding results.391 There were
203 blog posts coded in total. Figure 5 displays a distribution of these posts by election. A post was
considered to apply to a particular election if it appeared prior to one of the three elections that the
PVV has participated in. It is very important to note that a disproportionate amount of blog posts
appear in 2009 and 2010. Rather than taking a sample, this paper used the entire population of blog
posts, as Wilders blog is used only sporadically. In consideration of this, this paper focused
primarily on data relating to the last two elections, as there were too few cases relating to the first
election to offer reliable insights. A large majority of the posts were found to contain content relating
to anti-Islamic themes. As Figure 7 depicts, 174 or 85.71% of all cases coded were found to contain
anti-Muslim themes. Moreover, 66% of all sentences coded were classified as anti-Muslim, which is
displayed in Figure 6. As Figure 8 displays, such sentiment was coded as being the first issue
touched upon in 63.55% of the posts. Blog posts appearing prior to the September 2012 election
tended to have a greater focus on criticism of Islam, with 72.62% of the cases mentioning antiMuslim themes first. This is in contrast to 57.52% prior to the June 2010 election, and 50% prior to
the November 2006 election. Such a focus is to be expected given that Geert Wilders central
political focus is widely acknowledged to concern what he views as the threat of Islam and of
Muslim immigration to both the Netherlands and to the West. Typical of this is a post appearing on
February 13, 2009.392 This post contains a speech that Wilders is claimed to have prepared to present
to the House of Lords in the United Kingdom.393 He had been invited to speak to the House by
members of the UK Independence Party but was barred from entering the country just prior to his
visit.394 In this post Wilders claims that Islam is better classified as an ideology than as a religion.395

391

IBM Corp, IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 21.0. (Armonk, NY: IBM Corp, 2012).
Geert Wilders, The speech Geert Wilders would have given, Geert Wilders Weblog
www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1515-the-speech-geert-wilders-would-have-given
(Posted: February 13, 2009, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
393
Geert Wilders, The speech Geert Wilders would have given,.
394
Ibid.
392

47

For instance, he asserts that Islam poses as a religion, but its goals are very worldly: world
domination, holy war, sharia law, the end of the separation of church and state, the end of
democracy.396 This particular sentence was coded as being extreme, because of the extreme imagery
of conspiracy that it displays and due to its inflammatory nature. Nevertheless, despite such
statements, as in many of his posts, Wilders is careful to walk a politically correct line. As a case in
point, he is routinely cautious to only criticize Islam and not Muslims per se.397 Demonstrative of
this are his claims that There might be moderate Muslims, but there is no moderate Islam.398 This
is a very important point, as this distinction is what eventually secured an acquittal of Wilders in his
trial for hate speech in the Netherlands. 399 According to the judges in the case, Wilders
pronouncements are directed at a religion, rather than at particular people.400 Nevertheless, such
sentences were coded as being moderate in intensity since they were clearly condemning Islam, yet
did not criticize Muslims specifically, or use extremely inflammatory language to do so.
Figure 5: Blog Posts by Election:

395

Geert Wilders, The speech Geert Wilders would have given,..

Ibid.
397
Ibid.
398
Ibid.
399
The Economist, Not a hater, say the judges, The Economist (June 23, 2011): 1.
400
The Economist, June 23 2011, 1.
396

48

Figure 6: Cumulative Percentages of Sentences Coded by Issue

3%
6%
An+-Islam

8%

Pro-Freedom of Speech

5%

Elite Conspiracy
Law and Order

12%

Support for Israel

66%

Euroskep+cism

Figure 7: Cumulative Blog Posts Coded by Issue:

200
180

174

160
140
120
100
80
60

90
57
41

40

21

20
0

49

17

Figure 8: Cumulative % of First Issues Coded:

Figure 9: Percentage of Sentences for Each Election Coded Extreme Separated by Category:
40
35

36.88
35.96
31.58

30
25
Elec+on 1

20

Elec+on 2

15

Elec+on 3

10
5
0

0
Extreme An+-
Islam

2.49
0.9

Extreme Pro-
Freedom of
Speech

7.47
5.26
3.53
0
Extreme Law
and Order

1.7 1.14

1.6
0 0.23

Extreme Elite
Extreme
Conspiracy Euroscep+cism

50

3.42
2.04
0
Extreme
Support for
Israel

Figure 10: Percentage of Sentences in Each Election Coded as Extreme:

50

45.63

46.58

2010 Elec+on

2012 Elec+on

45
40

36.84

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2006 Elec+on

Wilders typical anti-Muslim logic argues that Islam is built on two fundamental beliefs that
will never change, and that these are the Quran, and the life of Muhammad.401 He asserts that for
this reason Islam will never moderate, as the Quran is believed to be Allahs personal word and
can only be taken literally.402 Moreover, as is common in the posts analyzed, Wilders claims that
since Muhammad was a warlord and a conqueror and is to serve as a role model for Muslims,
Islam will never moderate.403 This is a very important theme to expand on, as it is prevalent
throughout PVV blog posts. Wilders is routinely critical of the Quran, contending that Muslims
believe that Allah himself wrote it and that it was dictated to Muhammad in the original version, the
Umm al-Kitab, which is kept on a table in heaven.404 As a result of this, he argues that the Quran
can only be taken literally.405 He claims that this is problematic as the Quran supports everything
from the violence of jihad to the hatred and persecution of Jews, Christians and other non-Muslims
and apostates.406 A second prominent aspect of Wilders anti-Muslim sentiment is his opposition to

401

Geert Wilders, The speech Geert Wilders would have given,.

Ibid.
403
Ibid.
404
Geert Wilders, Time to unmask Muhammad by Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Weblog
www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-news/1741-time-to-unmask-muhammad-by-geert-wilders
(Posted: March 30, 2011, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
405
Geert Wilders, Time to unmask Muhammad by Geert Wilders.
406
Ibid.
402

51

Muhammad.407 In a blog post dated March 30 2011, Wilders asserts that Muhammad is widely held
as al-insan al-kamil, the perfect man.408 As such, he claims that Muhammads life is to be imitated
by all Muslims.409 He finds this as a clear flaw of Islam, since he claims that Muhammad is a
narcissist, a pedophile, a mass murderer, a terrorist, a misogynist, a lecher, a cult leader, a madman, a
rapist, a torturer, assassin and a looter.410
Such language was coded as being extreme, and it is this logic that Wilders and the PVV use
to make many of their most extreme claims regarding Muslim culture. The use of such extreme
language was present relatively consistently throughout the periods studied. Figure 11 depicts the
ratio in which sentences coded to be extreme in the anti-Muslim category were dispersed throughout
the blog posts analyzed. These are rounded to the nearest whole number. As can be seen there is
roughly an even divide between the 2010 and 2012 elections. This suggests that there was no
moderation in the ideological stance of the PVV, at least as it pertains to this issue. In addition, when
one looks at the percentage of posts coded as anti-Islamic within each election there appears to be
little support for moderation either. As a case in point, 64.6% of all the posts coded as anti-Muslim in
the 2010 election were considered to be extreme. This is in comparison with 67.86% that were coded
as extreme for the 2012 election. This suggests that extreme anti-Muslim rhetoric remained a focus
point of the PVV. With regards to the mean levels of extreme anti-Muslim language, there is also
little difference between the 2010 and 2012 elections. The mean number of extreme anti-Muslim
sentences per case for the 2010 election was 2.89. This is in comparison with a mean of 3.75 for the
2012 election. Finally, a large percentage of the sentences coded to be anti-Muslim were assessed to
be extreme. In demonstration of this, there were 647 sentences deemed to be extreme, 149 coded
moderate and 378 recorded as mild. Figure 12 depicts this.

407

Geert Wilders, Time to unmask Muhammad by Geert Wilders,.

Ibid.
409
Ibid.
410
Ibid.
408

52

Figure 11: Percentage of Cumulative Blog Posts Coded Extreme Anti-Muslim by Election
1%

Elec+on 1

49%

Elec+on 2

50%

Elec+on 3

Figure 12: Cumulative Intensity Percentages of anti-Muslim Sentences

32%

Mild an+-Muslim
Moderate an+-
Muslim

55%
13%

Extreme an+-
Muslim

The second most prominent issue or position covered in Wilders blog was support for
freedom of expression and freedom of speech. As Figure 7 illustrates, 90 or 44.34% of all cases were
coded as containing the theme. Additionally, as shown in Figure 6, 12% of all sentences coded were
deemed to be pro-freedom of speech. Figure 8 shows that 16.26% of the cases analyzed presented
this issue first. Thus, it was the second most prominent theme in this respect. Leading up to the
second election 50% of posts were coded as having contained pro-freedom of speech sentences.
There was a slightly smaller percentage, 40.48%, coded in this category prior to the third election.
The relative prevalence of this theme throughout all of the coded posts is not surprising given the
name of the PVV, the Party for Freedom, and its vested interest in ensuring the legality of its highly
53

controversial pronouncements. Moreover, this is also to be expected as the Netherlands has relatively
strict hate speech laws, which have been used against Wilders in the past.411 In relation to this, as
Figure 13 demonstrates, there was a significantly larger amount of posts coded as extreme profreedom of speech during the second election period. This detracts from the moderation hypothesis.
However, a likely cause of this was Geert Wilders trial for hate speech, which began on January 20th
2009.412 Following this event, numerous posts appeared attempting to rally support for Wilders.
During this period, the PVV generally attempted to portray the trial as a conspiracy against freedom
conducted by the Dutch government and Islamic agents.413 Such pronouncements were coded as
extreme. In addition, many of these posts also called for the enactment of an American style
European First Amendment.414 In most cases these calls were coded as mild or moderate.
Figure 13: Percentage of Extreme Pro-Freedom of Speech Sentences Coded by Election:

0%

27%
2006 Elec+on
2010 Elec+on
2012 Elec+on
73%

There are likely other reasons for the PVVs support of freedom of speech though. As
mentioned earlier, some of Wilders largest financial supporters are alleged to be conservative

411

Unnamed Author, June 23 2011, 1.

Geert Wilders, Free Speech on Trial, Geert Wilders Weblog http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1618-free-speech-on-trial (Posted: December 17, 2009, Accessed: August
19, 2012).
413
Geert Wilders, Free Speech on Trial.
414
Geert Wilders, A Ludicrous Verdict, Geert Wilders Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-englishmainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1774-a-ludicrous-verdict- (Posted: December 23, 2011,
Accessed: August 1, 2012).
412

54

freedom of expression organizations in the United States and elsewhere.415 Regardless of whether
they fund Wilders or not, he is clearly allied with many of these groups at an ideological level.
Testament to this are his routine engagements with such groups on his blog. For example, a blog post
appearing on July 1 2012, contains a speech that Wilders delivered at the US Western Conservative
Summit.416 In this speech he touches upon the aforementioned anti-Islamic themes. For instance, he
claims that Islam, rather than a religion, is predominantly a totalitarian ideology striving for world
dominance.417 As mentioned though, he is careful to remain somewhat politically correct, claiming
I want to make clear that I do not have a problem with Muslims. There are many moderate
Muslims. I always make a distinction between the people and the ideology, between Muslims and
Islam.418 Nevertheless, he asserts that as a result of criticizing Islam he has lost his freedom, and is
forced to live under twenty-four hour police protection. He goes on to claim that, In Europe we are
experiencing that if Islam becomes stronger in a society even when the majority of Muslims are
moderates a society becomes less free and more intolerant of freedom of speech and nonMuslims.419 In this manner, Wilders intertwines support for freedom of speech with his anti-Islamic
message. In fact, in many ways it is an essential component of this message. He warns:
there is also the phenomenon of non-violent jihad. Europes increasingly
assertive Islamic lobby has successfully pressured European politicians into
implementing pro-Islamic policies and adopting elements of Islamic Sharia
law. [] It is partly our own fault because we have foolishly adopted the
ideology of multiculturalism. I use the term multiculturalism to refer to
cultural relativism. This is the crazy idea that all cultures are equal. Of
course they are not. Our culture based on Christianity, Judaism and
humanism is far better, far superior to the Islamic culture. We should not be
afraid to say so.420

415

Deutsch and Hosenball.

Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June 2012, Geert Wilders
Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1795-speech-geert-wilders-at-thewestern-conservative-summit-denver-30-june-2012 (Posted: July 1, 2012, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
417
Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June 2012,.
418
Ibid.
419
Ibid.
420
Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June 2012,.
416

55

Wilders uses such logic, to argue that there is a stealth jihad occurring that uses
multiculturalism to invade Western societies.421 He argues that attempts in the Netherlands to silence
him under freedom of speech laws are an example of such an occurrence. This line of thinking places
Wilders naturally in line with many conservative groups. One of his most notable international
conservative supporters is Daniel Pipes, who is the director of the Middle East Forum and a visiting
fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.422 He is quoted in a post on January 22 2010,
as disagreeing with Wilders about Islam, but rejecting the criminalization of political differences
and the attempted thwarting of a political movement through the courts.423 As a result of these
opinions, Pipes is quoted as acknowledging the Middle East Forums Legal Project has worked on
Wilders behalf, raising substantial funds for his defense and helping in other ways.424
The PVV can also be linked to conservative groups elsewhere, as an October 27 2012 speech
to the Swedish Free Press Society demonstrates.425 As is usual, Wilders begins by criticizing Islam
and then specifies that such views are not directed at Muslims, but rather at the ideology of
Islam.426 Entwined with this message are assertions that the growing presence of Islam within
Sweden is leading to an erosion of civil liberties, and that it is all part of a concerted effort by the
Muslim world to establish Sharia law in the West.427 This theme is especially notable in blog posts
surrounding the 2010 anniversary of September 11th. On this date, Geert Wilders spoke as part of a
grouping that contained noteworthy American Republican official Newt Gingrich.428 The two were

421

Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June 2012,.
Geert Wilders, The Trial of Geert Wilders: A Symposium, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1644-thetrial-of-geert-wilders-a-symposium (Posted: January 22, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
423
Geert Wilders, The Trial of Geert Wilders: A Symposium.
424
Ibid.
425
Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders, Swedish Free Press Society, Malmo, October 27, 2012, Geert Wilders
Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-thepress/1809-speech-geert-wilders-swedish-free-press-society-malmoe-october-27-2012 (Posted: October 27, 2012,
Accessed: August 1, 2012).
426
Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders, Swedish Free Press Society, Malmo, October 27, 2012.
427
Ibid.
428
Geert Wilders, Wilders and Gingrich in Manhatten on 9/11 to Oppose Ground Zero Mosque, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1712-Wilders-and-Gingrich-inManhatten on 9/11 (Posted: August 6, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
422

56

rallying against the development of a mosque near the former World Trade Centre.429 In this speech
Wilders used his usual criticism of Islam, and framed it around his assertion that the development of
the mosque served as a symbol of the erosion of American freedoms.430 In Wilders words, This
means that we must not give a free hand to those who want to subjugate us.431
The third most common category coded was support for law and order. As Figure 6 depicts,
8% of all sentences coded were found to be in support of law and order. In addition, 28% of all cases
considered were deemed to contain this theme. This focus on law and order took two main forms.
First, the PVV supports many traditional law and order policies, such as calls for a tougher stance on
crime, and more police officers.432 Statements of this sort were generally coded as mild due to the
fact that they are quite common among right leaning parties. Often though, the PVVs law and order
themes are used as solutions to what it considers to be the Islamic problem. As a case in point,
Wilders posts routinely highlight various statistics relating to crimes committed by Muslims.
Wilders argues that such occurrences are a result of Muslims failure to integrate into Dutch
society.433 Moreover, the blog posts often call for measures such as the deportation of Muslims that
commit crime, and the removal of the citizenship of Muslims that are arrested.434 Such statements
were generally coded as extreme. Furthermore, Wilders also frequently calls for ban on headscarves
and the Koran. 435 These pronouncements were coded as extreme as they are in opposition to the

429

Geert Wilders, Wilders and Gingrich in Manhatten on 9/11 to Oppose Ground Zero Mosque,.
Geert Wilders, NYC speech Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1712-nyc-speech-geert-wilders
(Posted: September 11, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
430
Ibid.
431
Geert Wilders, NYC speech Geert Wilders,.
432
Geert Wilders, Wilders Triumphs, Geert Wilders Weblog http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1695-wilders-triumphs (Posted: June 14, 2010, Accessed: October 25,
2013).
433
Geert Wilders, If Jerusalem Falls, Athens and Rome are Next, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1697-geertwilders-if-jerusalem-falls-athens-and-rome-are-next (Posted: June 21, 2010, Accessed: October 14, 2013).
434
Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders Speech in Bonn, Geert Wilders Weblog http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-englishmainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1820-geert-wilders-speech-in-bonn (Posted: February 6, 2010,
Accessed: September 10, 2013).
435
Geert Wilders, Gerts Wilders PVV is Ready to Rule on Behalf of Henk and Ingrid, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1687-geertwilders-pvv-is-ready-to-rule-on-behalf-of-henk-and-ingrid- (Posted: May 4, 2010, Accessed: August 29, 2013).
430

57

fundamental basis for the rule of law as discussed before. With regards to the extremity of law and
order sentences, they remained relatively constant throughout the period studied. Prior to the first
election, 16.67% of cases were coded as extreme law and order. For the second election this
percentage rose to 25.67%, and leading up to the 2012 election 20.24% of cases were coded as
extreme law and order. Similarly, the percentage of sentences deemed to be extreme law and order
was relatively constant throughout the three elections. As Figure 9 shows, for the 2006 election
5.26% of sentences coded were recorded as extreme law and order. Prior to the 2010 election 7.47%
of sentences were extreme law and order. Finally, for the 2012 election 3.53% of the sentences were
coded in this category.
Wilders often claims the presence of a leftist elite or a ruling establishment in Western
countries, which is alleged by Wilders to assist in the erosion of Western values.436 As Figure 6
shows, 5% of all sentences coded were deemed to contain this theme. Moreover, as Figure 7 shows,
in terms of cumulative frequency this category was the fourth most coded. With regards to this, 71 or
34.96% of all blog posts were deemed to contain this theme. In terms of the percentage of sentences
in each election coded extreme, the leftist elite theme remained relatively constant with 1.7% for the
2010 election and 1.14% for the 2012 election. This is demonstrated in Figure 9. The issue
infrequently appears first in blog posts, as only 3.47% of the posts demonstrate this. This is likely
due to the fact that when this issue is touched upon, the blog posts generally relate it to another issue.
In terms of extreme sentences, 60% of all extreme elite conspiracy sentences were coded in the posts
leading up to the 2010 election. This is in comparison with 40% coded leading up to the 2012
election. Figure 14 shows this. Despite this, due to the small amount of cases to consider in this
category, these fluctuations are not considered to be indicative of any moderation by the party,
especially in consideration of the other themes coded. However, this theme is generally used to

436

Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders PVV is Ready to Rule on Behalf of Henk and Ingrid,.

58

expand upon other themes, which is shown in a blog post that appears on October 3 2010.437 In this
post Wilders speaks against Islam, and argues that the influence of Islam has spread so much that
people can no longer criticize the religion without fear of being charged for hate speech. He argues
that the establishment elite are responsible for facilitating this occurrence, which he argues
consists of universities, churches, trade unions, the media, politicians, all of which are accused of
putting hard-earned Dutch liberties at risk.438 This line of thinking is present throughout Wilders
blog posts and takes different forms. Often he accuses leftist parties of being multiculturalist
enablers, and blames them for the threat that he perceives the West as facing.439 Wilders posts also
routinely use the blanket term political elite to refer to anyone that opposes the PVVs policies.440
As was mentioned, this is almost always intertwined with anti-Muslim rhetoric, and generally
accuses the elite of putting citizens liberties at stake. This concept also appears in Wilders blog,
cited from more mainstream sources. For instance, Wall Street Journal op-eds are referred to, which
in one instance claim that Wilders is routinely hampered by the Dutch elite, which is wedded to
multiculturalism.441 This post argues in favor of Wilders right to free speech, in light of hate
speech charges that were brought against him in 2010.442 It is in this manner that Wilders largest
theme, anti-Muslim sentiment, is linked to freedom and claims of the presence of a conspiratorial
elite.

437

Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders in Berlin, Geert Wilders Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/inenglish-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1713-speech-geert-wilders-in-berlin (Posted: October
3, 2010, Accessed: August 1, 2012).
438
Geert Wilders, Speech Geert Wilders in Berlin,.
439
Geert Wilders, The speech Geert Wilders would have given,.
440
Geert Wilders, Nobody Will Stop Me, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/80-geertwildersnl/1710-nobody-will-stop-me (Posted:
August 13, 2010, Accessed: August 22, 2012).
441
Geert Wilders, In Holland, Free Speech on Trial, Geert Wilders Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/inenglish-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1715-in-holland-free-speech-on-trial- (Posted:
October 12, 2010, Accessed: August 22, 2012).
442
Geert Wilders, In Holland, Free Speech on Trial,.

59

Figure 14: Percentage of Total Extreme Elite Conspiracy Sentences Coded by Election:
0%

40%
60%

2006 Elec+on

2010 Elec+on

2012 Elec+on

As was touched upon earlier, from analysis of Wilders blog it can be discerned that the PVV
has ideological links to various conservative freedom of speech groups. Similarly, Wilders can also
be determined to have links to various right-wing groups in Israel. This can be seen in the presence
of proclamations in favor of Israel throughout the blog posts analyzed. Of all the sentences coded,
6% were recorded as being pro-Israel. In terms of frequency, 21 of the 204 posts coded, or 10.29%,
were found to be pro-Israel. In consideration of this, this theme was seldom the first subject to be
touched upon, with only 1.97% of the posts coded touching upon this theme first. As a percentage of
extreme sentences coded by election, Figure 9 shows that 2.04% were extreme pro-Israel for the
2010 election, and 3.42% extreme pro-Israel in the posts prior to the 2012 election. Figure 15 and
Figure 16 show that there was more pro-Israeli content coded in the posts prior to the 2012 election,
as compared to the 2010 election. As a case in point, 62.5% of extreme pro-Israel sentences were
coded prior to the 2012 election. Moreover, 66.67% of all extreme pro-Israel cases appeared before
the 2012 election. This occurrence also detracts from the moderation hypothesis, as it demonstrates
that extreme pro-Israeli sentiment actually increased prior to the 2012 election. This follows the
general trend demonstrated by almost all of the other categories. The figures below demonstrate this
graphically.

60

Figure 15: Percentage of Extreme Pro-Israel Sentences by Election:

0%

37.50%
62.50%

2006 Elec+on

2010 Elec+on

2012 Elec+on

Figure 16: Percentage of Blog Posts Coded Extreme Pro-Israel by Election:

0%
33.33%

66.67%

2006 Elec+on

2010 Elec+on

2012 Elec+on

By all indications Wilders support for Israel has been longstanding. As a case in point, in a
blog post dated November 9 2009 Wilders asserts that he has admired the country ever since he lived
there in his twenties.443 In this post he is quoted as proclaiming that Israel is a beacon of light in an
area - the Middle East - that is pitch black everywhere else. Israel is a Western democracy, while
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt are medieval dictatorships.444 Noticeably, blog posts deemed to
be extremely supportive of Israel generally express such support along similar lines as Wilders antiMuslim sentiment. An example of this can be seen in Wilders claim that Islam forces Israel to fight
and Israel is not just fighting for itself. Israel is fighting for all of us, for the entire West. Israel is
fighting the jihad that is meant for all of us. So we should all defend Israel. We all are Israel.445 In
this manner, Wilders uses the same logic as is described above. He warns of the infringement of

443

Geert Wilders, An Interview With New English Review, http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-englishmainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1606-an-interview-with-new-english-review (Posted: March
1, 2010, Accessed: November 15, 2012).
444
Geert Wilders, An Interview With New English Review,.
445
Geert Wilders, An Interview With New English Review.

61

Islam upon Western values of freedom, and combines this with his support for Israel. However,
analysis of the blog indicates that such support is generally of a far-right nature in terms of Israeli
politics. Testament to this is Wilders claim in an interview with an Israeli newspaper that Jordan
should serve as the Palestinian state and that Israel needs to settle Judea and Samaria in order to
have strategic depth against Islam, which is determined to destroy the country.446 Such statements
are generally considered to be in line with the pronouncements of right-wing politicians in Israel.
Testament to this is Wilders proclamation of support for Israeli politician Avigdor Lieberman, who
is widely considered to be on the far-right of the Israeli political spectrum.447
As this research shows, Wilders blog has generally maintained a consistent focus on antiIslamic sentiment. Intertwined with this theme has been support for the freedom of speech and
expression, as well as anti-establishment sentiment and support for Israel. While the literature review
indicates that Wilders and the PVV have long held anti-EU attitudes, this is not overly apparent in
Wilders blog posts. Testament to this is the fact that 88% of all sentences coded to contain extreme
Euroscepticism appeared prior to the 2012 election. Figure 17 demonstrates this. Nevertheless, there
were only 16 sentences coded as being extreme Eurosceptic in total, with 14 of those being coded in
the period leading up to the last election. Despite this small number, when taking into consideration
the tendency for most of the categories not to support the moderation hypothesis, this serves as
another piece of evidence against the theory. However, that being said, there was also another factor
that likely accounted for this occurrence besides a lack of moderation. This is political opportunism.
In the years following the 2008 global recession, there was strong opposition to EU imposed
austerity measures in many European countries. This also occurred in the Netherlands. This is
especially informative when one considers Eurobarometer data from this same time period that is

446

Geert Wilders, Israel is Fighting Our War, Geert Wilders Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-englishmainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1730-israel-is-fighting-our-war (Posted: November 22, 2010,
Accessed: December 2, 2012).
447
Geert Wilders, Geert Wilders: Israel is Wests first line of defense, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1587-geert-wilders-israel-is-wests-first-line-ofdefense (Posted: June 18, 2009, Accessed: December 3, 2012).

62

displayed in Figure 18.448 As is indicated in Figure 18, discontent with EU institutions was recorded
as being at a high in 2012 in the Netherlands, as the country debated introducing EU supported
austerity measures, and discussed financial bailouts for Greece and Spain.
Figure 17: Percentage of Extreme Euroscepticism Sentences by Election

0%
12%
2006 Elec+on
2010 Elec+on
2012 Elec+on

88%

Figure 18: Eurobarometer Data on Anti-EU Attitudes

It is important to note that the European Union was mentioned in some earlier posts but was
not recorded as being Eurosceptic because such posts rallied against the enlargement of the EU to
include Turkey. For instance, as early as December 4 2004, a blog post quotes Wilders as being

448

European Commission, Eurobarometer, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (Accessed: September 1,

2012).

63

against the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, primarily due to the fact that it was a Muslim
country.449 Such logic was also applied to poor countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which
Wilders argued were not fit for entrance into the EU.450 These posts were not considered to be antiEU as they are only opposed to the entry of such countries for cultural and socioeconomic reasons.
In later posts though, mentions of the EU are much more negative on fundamental grounds.
Demonstrative of this is a blog post on May 28 2009, which claims that the PVV is supported
because citizens feel that Dutch politics is controlled by a political elite that ignores the dangers of
European unification, immigration, and globalization.451 As this shows, anti-EU sentiment is often
interwoven with other issues in the blog posts studied. Supportive of this is an official election
advertisement that appears on Wilders blog on July 17 2012.452 It begins by claiming that the
upcoming Dutch elections are about only one thing, the European Union.453 It then goes on to
proclaim that the EU costs the Netherlands too much, and is used to overpay civil servants and to
bail out Greece, Portugal and Cyprus.454 It then proceeds to claim that the EU has taken all
immigration powers away from the Netherlands, and that as a result Islamic immigrants are flooding
the country.455 The video claims that such immigration costs the country 7 billion dollars a year.456
Moreover, it refers to the elite that controls the EU as eurocrats, and argues that they are seeking
full control of the country.457 In this manner Wilders manages to tie all of these various themes

449

Geert Wilders, Financial Times Dutch MP resigned to living under protection, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-de-media-mainmenu-74/interviews-mainmenu-76/91-financial-times-dutch-mpresigned-to-living-under-protection (Posted: December 4, 2004, Accessed: November 6, 2012).
450
Geert Wilders, The Rotterdam Speech, Geert Wilders Weblog http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-englishmainmenu-98/rotterdam-speech-mainmenu-118 (Posted: March 25, 2006, Accessed: November 6, 2012).
451
Geert Wilders, University Professor: PVV a healthy correction to Dutch political system, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/component/content/article/87-news/1582-university-professor-pvv-a-healthycorrection-to-dutch-political-system (Posted: March 28, 2009, Accessed: December 1, 2012).
452
Geert Wilders, A Referendum on the EU in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders Weblog
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/1798-areferendum-on-the-eu-in-the-netherlands- (Posted: March 28, 2009, Accessed: December 1, 2012).
453
Geert Wilders, A Referendum on the EU in the Netherlands,.
454
Ibid.
455
Ibid.
456
Ibid.
457
Geert Wilders, A Referendum on the EU in the Netherlands.

64

together, while focusing on the debate over participation in the European Union, which was one of
the most important issues in the election.

65

Conclusion
Evidence against Moderation Theory?
At the time of writing, Wilders is again in the media spotlight as a result of his controversial
actions. This time he has garnered attention for placing a sticker on the door of his parliamentary
office that reads, in Arabic, Islam is a lie, Mohammed is a criminal, the Koran is poison.458 This
sticker is a deliberate parody of the Saudi Arabian flag, and is a good example of the extreme actions
that the PVV has become known for.459 Moderation theory, which is primarily based on the work of
Downs, suggests that extreme political parties will tend to moderate as they are forced to compete in
democratic elections. This paper sets out to test this theory as it pertains to the PVV. A content
analysis was performed on the official blog of the PVV, and blog posts were coded for extreme
content in six categories. These were: anti-Muslim sentiment, support for freedom of speech, proIsraeli stances, pro-law and order content, elite/leftist conspiracy and Euroscepticism. Of all these
categories, there was only evidence for the moderation of content relating to extreme elite
conspiracy. Nevertheless, as has been argued, this is not necessarily evidence in support of the
moderation theory, as the Dutch governments court case against Wilders was a significant issue
considered in many of the posts prior to the 2010 election. Wilders framed his opposition to the case
around his claims that the trial was politically influenced by the Netherlands leftist elite, which led
to a spike in this category during this time. This indicates that the decrease in the presence of
extreme language in this category does not represent moderation as much as it does a return to the
norm for this category.
All of the other categories analyzed exhibited roughly the same amount of extreme posts
throughout the elections studied, or exhibited an increase in the amount of extreme cases prior to the
2012 election. This suggests that the moderation theory does not hold ground, at least not in the

458

DutchNews.nl, Government condemns Wilders Saudi flag anti-Islam sticker, DutchNews.nl

http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/12/government_condemns_wilders_an.php (Posted: March 28, 2009,
Accessed: December 22, 2013).
459
DutchNews.nl, Government condemns Wilders Saudi flag anti-Islam sticker,.

66

context of the PVV and the material studied. However, it is important to point out that this paper
acknowledges the shortcomings of this method. Most notably the sporadic appearance of PVV blog
posts, and the possibility that Wilders English messages differ in key respects from those projected
towards Dutch voters. However, with the resources available, Wilders English language blog was
deemed to be the best source of English data relating to the PVV. Thus, this paper offers valuable
insights into such data. Despite the efforts of this research, there are many opportunities for
refinement, expansion, and continuation. The most obvious of these is to continue analysis of Geert
Wilders blog to include future elections. Should increased resources make it possible, analysis of
the PVVs official election manifestos would also be highly insightful, as these are currently
unavailable in English. This would allow for a comparison of Wilders messages to Dutch, as
opposed to international observers. Finally, such data should also be compared to that of other
extreme PRR parties. As was uncovered in the literature, nearly all of the parties that are considered
to make up this grouping differ in key ways. Thus, it cannot be automatically assumed that data
garnered from the study of the PVV can be applied equally to all parties. Regardless, this study has
provided some useful insights. As demonstrated in the literature, moderation theory is often applied
to extreme political parties. It suggests that such parties should be included in democratic political
systems, and that their inclusion can serve to moderate them. However, this research offers evidence
to the contrary. While the shortcomings of this study have been illuminated, it nonetheless suggests
that there is at least a need for further research pertaining to the moderation hypothesis.
This research is important for a number of reasons. First, with alleged extremist political
parties such as Hezbollah in Lebanon competing for political office, there are significant questions as
to whether such parties should be barred from political activity. Proponents of moderation theory
argue that these parties should be included, as their participation in the electoral process will serve to
moderate them over time. However, critics of the theory argue that such views are naive, and that the
risk that such parties pose to democracy is significant and permanent. For the same reasons this

67

research is applicable to European PRR parties. Many argue that allowing these parties to participate
in national and European elections will serve to moderate their views, and avoid alienating their
bases of support. Yet others assert that parties of the PRR pose a threat to European democracy and
unification. This is especially so in the case of Eurosceptic parties such as the PVV, especially with
the upcoming European Parliamentary elections in May 2014. Most notably, the PVV has announced
an alliance with the French FN. Wilders has also spoken at public events held by the aforementioned
Italian PRR party the Northern League. 460 This is claimed to have potentially disastrous
repercussions for the legislative functioning of the European Parliament, and to open the doors for a
minority coalition between such parties. 461 In recognition of this, more research should be carried
out regarding the best strategies for democratic political systems to use in countering the threats
posed to them by extreme political parties. Perhaps there is no more pressing time for this as Europe
faces looming electoral unrest from a number of years of economic stagnation that was brought on
by the 2008 global financial crisis.

460 Geert Wilders, Congresso Federale Lega Nord 2013, Geert Wilders Weblog http://geertwilders.nl/ (Posted:
December 21, 2013, Accessed: December 29, 2013).
461 Charles Bremner, Francois Hollande faces another horror year, The Australian Online
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/francois-hollande-faces-another-horror-year/story-fnb64oi61226791556707# (Posted: December 30, 2013, Accessed: December 30, 2013).

68

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Vita Auctoris
Name:
Justin Crewson
Place of birth: Brampton, Ontario
Year of birth: 1986
Education: Mayfield High School, Caledon, Ontario
2000-2004
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario
2004-2009 B.A. [H].
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario
2011-2014 M.A.
University of Michigan-Dearborn, Michigan, USA
2013-2014 M.P.P.

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