Fuhrer Directives

y~VES
______
1146
P"Ir
f-7~
I'
FUEH.RER
AND
TOP-
OTHER
LEVEL
DIRECTIVES.
OF.
THE
GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

1942
-1945
)jQ^'C
Foreword
This is the second of two volumes of top-level directives issued

by Hitler and by the German Armed Forces High Command from 1939 through
195 and translated by this office. In a few cases it was possible to
aval directives showing the Navy's reaction. The
include top-leveli-'
first volume covers 1939 through 1941, the present one 1942 through
1945.
The statements made in the foreword of the first volume apply to
The directives of the later years of the war
the second one, as well.
clearly reflect the change in the character of German warfare from largescale planned offensives to piecemeal defensive operations.
Except when otherwise indicated the references given in the table
of contents denote the microfilm reels and sections thereof on which
of Naval Records and
the documents may be found in the microfilm library
Where WD numbers appear, the originals can be found in the
Library.
German Military Document Section of the Department of the Army.
Washington,
D.C.
1948
8-68
UNCLASSIHEP
TABLE
OF C ONTENTS.
Document
Signature Date
Reference
1i42
1.
Armament for 194 2
Hitler
Jan. T 413 B
PG 32020
2.
Armament for 1942
Raeder
Jan. T 7A
PG 32117
3.
Deception of the Enemy
Keitel
Feb.
4,
Operations in the Black Sea
Raeder
Feb. T 27 B
PG 32219
5,
Operations in the North
Hitler
Mar.
6.
Directive 40 - Command Organization on the Coasts
Hitler
Mar. PG 31755
Coasts
Raeder
Mar. PG 31755
Directive 41 - Eastern Front
Hitler
Apr. T 222 C
PG 31755
7,
T 222 C
PG 31755
T 3 B
PG 32160
T 222 C
T 222-C
Command Organization on the
Connec-
tion with Directive 41
Keitel
T 222 C
Apr. PG 31755
10.
Coastal Defense
Raeder
Apr. T 21 B
PG 32201
11.
Operations in the Mediterranean
Keitel
May
12.
Directive 42 - Operations
against Unoccupied France and
the Iberian Peninsula
Hitler
May
Appointment of Commissioner of
Maritime Shipping
Hitler
May
T 22 B
PG 32205
Regulations for Handling Secret

Documents
Hitler
June
T7A
PG 32117
15.
Manpower Needed for Shipyards
Hitler
Jul. .T 222 C
PG 31755
16.
Strengthening of Defense
Measures in the West
Hitler
Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31755
Hitler
Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31755
Special Order No. 1 i
13.
14.
'17.
18.
Directive 43
Operations in
the Crimea
Reinforcement of the African

Panzer Army
T 222 C
PG 31755
W.D.
80234
German
Jul., Naval Staff

War Diary,
Part A,
194 2.
8-68
tN1ASSIFLlP-iE
Documents
19.
20.
21.
22,
23.
24.
Signature Date
Reference
Directive 144 - Warfare in

Northern Finland
Hitler
T 222 C
21 Jul. PG 31755
39-
Directive 45 "Braunschweig
"
Hitler
T 222 C
23 Jul. PG 31755
41
Directive 46 - Fight Against

Banditry in the East
Hitler
18 Aug.
Reinforcement of Crete and

North Africa
Hitler
14 Sep.
PG 31755
47
Hitler
T 222 C
13 Oct. PG 31755
49
Hitler
18 Oct.
Operation
Unified Command in
Mediterranean
W.D.
80291
T 222 C
the
Destruction of Sabotage Troops
T 222 C
PG 31755
25.
26,.
27.
28.
Motivation for Above Order
Hitler
Naval
Staff
Defense of the French Mediterranean Coast
Armed
Forces High
Command
Coastal Defense
Directive 47 Europe
Southeastern
v'
Hitler
18 Oct.
T 222 C
51
T 222 C
4 Dec. PG 31755
53
5 Dec. T 222 C
PG 31755
55
T 222 C
28 Dec. PG 31755
56
T 222 C
PG 31755
Supplement to Directive 47
Keitel
3.
4.
5.
Hitler
Defense Measures for the

Balkans
Jodl
11 Jan.
Equipment for the Coming

Months
Supply of 6th Army
5 Jan. PG 31755
62
T 222 C
PG 31755
614
Hitler
T 44 B
14 Jan. PG 32602
67
Hitler
15 Jan. T 44 B
7.
8.
69
T 222-C
Naval
Staff
11 Feb. PG 31755
Operations of Naval Surface

Forces
Doenitz
19 Feb.
Operations Order No. 5
Hitler
13 Mar. T 222 C
Treatment of Saboteurs
61
T 222 C
German-Italian Command in
Tunisia
PG 32602
6.
60
3.Jan. T 222 C
PG 31755
2.
50
PG 31755
Annex to Directive 47
1.
44
69
T 373 B
PG 317147
PG 31755
71
74
8-68
Document
Signature Date
Reference
Page
1943
9,
Warfare in the East
Keitel
L7 Mar, T 222 C
PG 31755
10.
Expansion of Naval Bases
Mleisel
?4
Apr. T 119 D
46114
PG
11,
Defense
of Corsica
War imont
.2
May
Defenses in
14,
Reinforcement of Defenses in
Keitel
.3
May
Changes in Directive 47
Keitel
Jun. T 222 C
22/147
Warfare in Sicily
Ke itel
.3
Jul.
Directive 48 - Command Organization and Defense in the
Southeast Area
17.
18.
Operations
Operations
in
in
Italy
Italy
20.
21.
22.
Operations
in
222 C
PG 31755
84
Keitel
1 Aug.
WD H
22/147
87
Hitler
Southern Russia
Operations
in
Hitler
Jodl
Italian Capitulation
Southeast Europe
1 Aug. WD H
Keitel
!4 Aug.
24.
Directive 50 - Transfer of the

20th Mountain Army
Hitler
Note on Directive 4f9
PG 33658
89
6 Sep. T 222 C
PG 31755
89
Sep.
WD H
22/147
T 222 C
!8 Sep. PG 31755
7
26.
Application of Directive 4O
Italy
Oct. T
to
Hitler
3 Oct.
Hitler
4f Oct.
Hitler
'3 Oct.
92
93
222 C
94
119 D
PG 46114
95
Operations by Commanding
T
Geaeral,
Armed Forces, South

and Army Group B
27.
91
9 Sep. WD H
PG 31755
25.
88
T 572
22/147.
23.
83
!6 Jul.
Keitel
Supplement, to Directive 48
82
Hitler
22/147
19.
80
T 222 C
PG 31755
16.
759
WD H
the Mediterranean
PG 31755
15.
79
.2 May WD H
the Mediterranean
22/147
13.
78
222 C
PG 31755
12.
76
Application
to
the
of Directive
40.
Crimea
iii
222 C
PG 31755
95
T 27 B
PG 32219
98
-68
IiASSI1E
L
Signature Date
Document
Reference
Pam
1242
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
31k.
35.
36.
Operations
in Southern Russia
Directive 51 -Defenses
West
Hitler
29 Oct. T 222 C
(28 Oct.)PG 31755
in the
Command Organization in Italy
98
T 222 C
Hitler
3 Nov.
PG 31755
99
Keitel
6 Nov. T 222 C
PG 31755
103
Rommelts Army Group for Special

Employment
Hitler
Naval Report in Connection with

Directive 51
Doenitz
Warfare against England
Hitler
222
6 Nov. PG 31755
T 222
13 Nov.
105
PG 31755
106
1 Dec. T 222 C
PG 31755
110
Preparations for Imminent LargeScale Battles in the West

Keitel
T 222 C
12 Dec. PG 31755
110
Reinforcement
115
of Threatened
Sectors
Keitel
T 222 C
27 Dec. PG 31755
Order Forbidding Withdrawals

of Personnel and Equipment
frbm the West
Keitel
28 Dec. PG 31755
Concerning Army Group B
EXeitel
222 C
117
12L4
1.
Jan.
222
PG 31755
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Combat Zones in the West
Hitler
Jodi
Fortresses in the West
17 Jan.
118
T 222 C
PG 31755
118
19 Jan. T 222 C
PG 31755
119
Command Authority in the
T 27 B
Southwest
Jodl
19 Jan. PG 32218
120
Supplies and Transports in

the Aegean Sea
Jodi
T,27 B
20 Jan. PG 32218
120
Battle for Rome
Hitler
28 Jan.
Order to Destroy U.S.

Army
T 27 B
PG 32218
T 27 B
5th
Jodl
14 Feb. PG 32218
Operations by Naval Forces in

Case of an Enemy Landing
Doenitz
19 Feb.
Channel Island Fortresses
Keitel
Fuebrer Order No. 11 Strongpoints
121
122 -
T 191 C
Hitler
3 Mar.
PG 48613
T
P(
1222
1222
C
31755
123
126
Mcar. PGI 31756
127
B-68
~~~k~SSIyrA
Signature Date
Document
11.
of
D'estruction
222
Keitel
23 Mar. PG 31756
129
Hitler
T 31 B
2 Apr. PG 32904
130
Operational Order No, 7 Operations on the Eastern

Front
13.
PBage
Hsrbors and Har-
bor Installations During

Evacuation
12.
Reference
Organization of Army Group
Jodi
26 Apr. T
222 C
PG 31756
132
14.
Bombardment of England
Keitel
16 May
15.
Directive for Operations of

the Task Force
Doenitz
27 May
T 191 C
PG 48613
Bormann
31
T 222 C
PG 31756
137
the Direction of Shipping
Hitler
12 Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31756
140
Maritime Shipping
Keitel
12 Jul.
16,
17.
18.
19.
Task of the Party in

an Invasion
Case
of
Order for the Navy to Take Over
21.
222 C
PG 31756
141
143
Hitler
13 Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31756
tions Area Within the Reich
Hitler
13
T 222 C
PG 31756
Emergency Situations
Keitel
.15 Jul.
Cooperation Between the Party

and the Armed Forces
20.
May
T 222 C
PG 31756
Command Authority in an OperaJul.
222 C
PG 31756
22.
23.
Keitel
15 Jul. PG 31756
147
for
Preparations
of the Reich
Keitel
19 Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31756
148
the
Defense
Preceding
Document
Annex to
of Civilian
Participation
Authorities
in
Repelling
Enemy Attacks
24.
Reorganization
26.
27.
Positions
the Alps
Supplement
Supplement
No. 11
in
to
Sep.
T'222 C
Keitel
1942
PG 31756
151
Hitler
23 Jul.
T 222 C
PG 31756
153
Hitler
27 Jul.
PG 31756
Jodl
29 -Jul.
of Command
Authority in the Area of the

Northern Army Group
25.
222 C
Reorganization of Command
Authority in Corps Area I
the Foothills
Above
Order
T 222 C
of
to Fuebrer Order
Guderian
1 Aug.
154
222 C
PG 31756
155
T 222 C
PG 31756
157
B-68
OHCLAIS
IFlD
Signature Date
Docur aent
Reference
Page
1244
28.
29.
30,
31.
32.
33.
Construction of Rear Defenses

in Northern Italy
Keitel
Preparations for Gas Warfare
Guderian
T 222
3 Aug. PG 31756
23 Aug, T 222 C
PG 31756
160
161
Reinforcement of the German

Western Position
Hitler
T 222 C
24 Aug. PG 31756
Preparations for War Between

Rumania and Germany
Keitel
26 Aug. PG 31756
163
Bight
Hitler
T 222 C
29 Aug. PG 31756
164
-Supplement to Above Order
Jodl
31 Aug.
Fortification
T 222
of the German
Westwall Defenses
Hitler
Sep.
T 222 C
PG 31756
Commahder
of
Crete
Fortress
Keitel
Annex-to Above Order
36.
Keitel
Further Warfare in the West
37.
Preparations for Gas Warfare
38.
Defenses in the West
Hitler
Machens
Warlimont
39.
Command Authority in the West
k0.
Command Authority in the West
Hitler
Hitler
PG 31756
168
6 Jun. T 222 C
PG 31756
171
3 Sep. T 222 C
PG 31756
172
T 222 C
PG 31756
174
4 Sep.
4 Sep.
T 222 C
PG 31756
175
7 Sep. T 222 C
PG 31756
176
9 Sep. T 222 C
T 222 C
and Occupied
in
Fortifications
the
Fighting
in
the
Jodl
10 Sep. PG 31756
178
Hitler
T 222 C
12 Sep. PG 31756
179
Jodi
16 Sep. T 222C
South-
east
k3.
West
PG 317536
44
if5.
177
Evacuation in the Allied,

Friendly,
Countries
42.
166
2 Sep. T ?22 C
PG 31756
41.
165
T 222 C
PG 31756
35.
157
Fortification
Defense
of
Zone in
the
German
Slovakia
Cooperation Between the Party

and Armed Forces Within the
Reich
T 222
181
Keitel
18 Sep. PG 31756
182
Hitler
T 222 C
19 Sep. PG 31756
183
8-68
Document
Signature
Date
Reference
Hitler
20 Sep. PG. 31756
Line
Jodl
30 Sep. PG 31756
Defense in the West
Keitel
30 Sep.
Page
1944
46..
47,'
48.
49,
Command Authority in an Operations

Area Within the Reich
Fortification
51.
52.
53.
of the Ems-Rhine
the West
Expansion of
Western Defenses
55.
56.'
T 222 C
PG 31756
188
Keitel
T 222 C
30 Sep. PG 31756
189
Keitel
8 Oct. T 222 C
PG 31756
190
Keitel
T 222 C
19 Oct. PG 31756
191
Defense of Cities and Villages

in the XVII and XVIII Corps
Areas
Keitel
T 222 C
22 Oct. PG 31756
192
Keitel
13 Nov. PG 31756
Jodl
23 Nov. PG 31756
Change in the Borders of the

VI, IX, X, and XI Corps
Additional Positions
Slovakia
in
222 C
Cooperation Between the Armed

Forces and the German Voikssturm
Himmler
Construction of Defenses
Jodi
Bratislava
res s
193
T 222 C
28 Nov.
Dec.
to be Made a Fort-
Jodl
5 Dec.
19ff
T 222 C
(23 Nov.)PG 31756
195
222C
PG 31756
57.
186
Command Area of the Commanding

General, Armed Forces, West
Areas
54.
185
T 222 C
Command Areas and Organization

in
50.
T 222 C
196
222 C
PG 31756
196
194 5
;1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
222 C
of the Commanders
Responsibility
to Report to the Fuebrer
Hitler
21 Jan.
PG 31756
198
Commitment of the Volkssturm
Hitler
28 Jan. T 222 C
PG 31756
199
31 Jan. T 222 C
PG 31756
199
Keitel
Construction of Defenses
Jodi
V-l and V-2 Operations
Command Organization in
Netherlands
31 Jan.
the
Coordination of Organizational
and Tactical Measures
T 222
PG 31756
200
Keitel
Feb.
T 222 C
PG 31756
200
Keitel
4 Feb.
T 222 C
PG 31756
201
vii
8-68
SPLASSFIEi)
Document
7.
8.
9.
Signature Date
Evacuee Transports from the

East
to
Denmark
Evacuation of
West
Personnel
in
222 C
Hitler
(4 Feb.) PG 31756
201
Keitel
T 222 C
21 Feb. PG 31756
202
Keitel
26 Feb. PG 31756
the
Withdrawals from Threatened

Areas Within the Reich
10.
Feb.
Reference
T 222 C
8 Mar.
Measures Against Desertion
T 222 C
(5 Mar.) PG 31756
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Soldiers Must Fight to the

Last
19.
20.
21.
205
Withdrawals From Threatened

Areas Within the Reich
Keitel
14 Mar. PG 31756
Evacuation
of the
Keitel
18 Mar. PG 31756
Keitel
18 Mar. PG 31756
208
Keitel
T 222 C
20 Mar. PG 31756
209
Hitler
20 Mar. T 222 C
(19 Mar.)PG 31756
210
of the Commanding General,

Armed Forces, West
Keitel
22 Mar. PG 31756
211
Prevention of an Enemy Landing

at Pola
Jod.l
T 340
24 Mar. PG 31746
212
Extension of the Command Area

Armed Forces, West
Keitel
T 222 C
27 Mar. PG 31756
213
of Personnel
Rhine
T 222 C
West
Principles for Evacuating

Personnel in the West
206
222 C
207
222 C
208
222 C
Commitment of Forces of the
Measures for Destruction

T
222 C
Command Authority of the ComT
222
Keitel
1 Apr. PG 31756
214
Armed Forces, West
Keitel
T 222 C
1 Apr. PG 31756
215
Destruction in the Reich Area
Keitel
4 Apr. T
West
23.
222 C
PG 31756
11 Mar. PG 31756
manding General, Armed Forces,
22.
Keitel
Within the Reich
18.
Mar.)
205

Armed Forces, West
Replacement Army and Other

Training and Replacement
Organizations
17.
8 Mar.
(5
204

222 C
PG 31756
viii
216
B-68
fn
Document
24.
25,
26,
IV,"m
Signature Date
Reorganization off Command

Authority in.the West'
Hitler
off the. Day to the Armed

Forces on the Eastern Front
Hitler,
Reference
222 C
7 Apr. PG 31756
Order
Command Authority in Case

Germany is Divided
Pame
217
222 C
219
15 Apr. PG 31756
German
15 Apr.Naval Staff
War Diary
Part A
27.
Order Appointing Doenitz Commander
220
German
20 Apr.Naval Staff
War .Diary
of the Northern Area
Part A
28.
29.
Evacuation from Northern

Norway
31.
Evacuation
Area
in
26 Apr.
Keitel
T 431
28 Apr. PG 31801 H 223
Keitel
29 Apr. PG 31801 J 223
32._ Necessity to Obey Commands
PG 31756
29 Apr.
Chief,
Naval Staff
Jodl
T 431
PG 31801
Doenitz Appointed Successor of
Admiral
Hitler
on
Special
Duty
J 224
29 Apr. T 431
PG 31801
33.
222
T 431
the Northern
Capitulation Rumors Denied
222C
Jodi
Command of Eastern
Theater.
Taken Over by Armed Forces
High Command
30.
221
J 224
30 Apr. British
Admiralty
Fuehrer
Conferences
1945 p.121 225
34.
Hamburg Not to be Defended
Jodl
2 May
35.
Kesseiring Authorized to Conclude Truce
Doenitz
4 May
Cease
Keitel
4 May
Doenitz Ready to Stop Fighting

in the West
Keitel
5 May
Keitel
5 May
PG 31801 M 228
Keitel
5 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 229
36.
37.
38.
39.
PG 31801 L 227
T
431
PG 31801 M 227
T.431
Order Prohibiting "Werwolf"
Truce With Montgomery
PG 31801 L 226
T 431
West,
Activity
40.
T 431
Fighting Against Montgomery to
Fighting to Stop in
in East
Continue
T 431
PG 31801 L 225
5 May T431
PG 31801 M 229
8-68
Document
Suture
Date
Reference
Page
1945
41.
Naval Command West
Jodi
5 May
T 431
PG 31801 J 229
12.
Destruction Forbidden
Doenitz
6 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 230
43.
Command Authority
Keitel
6 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 230
44.
45.
46.
Western Fortresses and Channel

Islands
Keitel
6 May
Capitulation Document for Holland, Northwestern Germany,

and Denmark
Naval
Staff
6 May
T 431
PG 31801 14 231
Unconditional
Naval
7 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 232
Surrender
Staff
47.
T 431
PG 31801 M 231
Evacuation of Refugees
Keitel
7 May
T 431
48.
Capitulation to Eisenhower
Keitel.
7 May
T 431
PG 31801 M4 233
49.
Negotiations With the AngloAmericans
Keitel
7 May
50.
Terms or Capitulation
Doenitz
7 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 234
'51.
Corrections to Above Order
Jodl
7 May
T 431
PG 31801 14 233
T 131
PG 31801 1
234
PG 31801 M 235
52.
Capitulation in Norway
53.
Destruction of Equipment
Forbidden
54.
Unconditional
Keitel
.....
Surrender
Doenitz
7 May
T 431
PG 31801 M 235
8 May
T 431
PG 31801 1
8 May
236.
T 431
PG 31801 1 236
B-68
The Fuebrer and Supreme Co

of the Armed Forces
Nr. 1/42 g,K
Rue Amt,
mnder
OKW/WFSt/Org.Wi
Fuebrer Headquarters, 10 Jan. 1942

No. 4 of 20 copies
urent
for 1942
Subjects
Top Secret
I,
In accordance with the changed war situation, the following guiding
principles will apply to armament in 1942:
The general objective will remain unchanged. It will consist of imNavy or te purpose of fighting the
Anglo-American powers. All armament plans and,preparatory measures will
1.
proving the Air Force and t
have to take this into consideration.
.The
strategic demands of 1942, however, make it impossible, for the time

beng, toattain this obJectve through a further decrease in the amount
of Army ordnance. Instead, the Army, is to be reinforced and resupplied
for the strategic tasks of 1942.
Armament material is to be used, therefore, for the time being

2.
minly to fill the increased needs of the Army.
The basis for allocations will be the entire amount of raw materials
available to the Armed Forces.
I therefore order the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command to distribute raw materials accordingly during the first half of 1942, wE ie
cuttin te alocations of the Nay and the Air Force if this is unavo
e.e
The Commissioner of the Four Years' Plan will issue the necessary orders
for the acquisition of additional raw materials, particularly of coal
and oil, since they form the foundation of all armament production.
3.
The necessary further equalization between the strategic demands
and the actual supplies which can be furnished on the basis of the raw
material situation must be achieved in the following ways:
a.
A more definite concentration, within the armament program
of each branch of the Armed Forces, on productc s which are essential
for strategic purposes,
Adjustment of production programs in order to overcome bottleb.
designs, and lowere
s, moadiied
necks, by means of substitute materaal
Lt~ards.
In this connection, everyone must realize that raw materials beyond

what have already been allotted or are earmarked for allotment will not
be available.
Adjustment and standardization of euipmnt with regard to
a.
lSute parts.
bottlenecks in producing individual parts an su
d.
Reallocation and the greatest possible limitation of stocks
B-68
on the basis of experience
during the ware
e,
Increased use of b
(oo
(equipment,
e
ammunition, and weapons)
especially for coastal defense everywhere.
'ammmunition,
All equipment, weapons,

and useless booty no longer fit for
use or capable of being repaired are to be scrapped.
Applications for
clearance for
weapons and ammunition (also captures weapons and ammunition) will have to be made to the Armed Forces, High Command,'War Economy and Armament Division, on the basis of inventory lists.
., Within the limits of the means put at their disposal and on the
basis of my requests, the Commanders in Chief of the various branches of
the Armed Forces direct their own armament on their own responsibility
II.
The following principles will apply to armament for the individual
branches of the Armed Forces and the special programs which are directly
connected with it:
5.
Army:
a.
Readiness of the Army, as planned by the Army High Command
and approved by myself, must be assured by supplies sufficient for about
4 months.
b.
The equipment of the forces will have to be adapted, as concerns mobility, striking power, anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense, and
the organization of supply, to the characteristics of the theaters of
war in which they are to serve and to the various tasks assigned to them.
in addition to a number of motorized units suited for use at various

fronts, those portions of the Army committed in the East will also have
to be mobile, and will have to have sufficient service troops
(Versorgungstruppen) at their disposal.
However, mobility is not required for the formations assigned to
coastal defense in the West (including Norway).
c.
Besides the first
full
allotment of ammunition, a backlog
amounting to six times the average monthly consumption of the campaign
in the East (based on Aug. 1941 and corrected for the number of weapons
which will be in use by the field army onl May 1942) is to be built.
up, sufficient for the main weapons, at least.
d.
The reorganization of the Army with the shift
motorized troos
e.
T he
of emphasis to
is to be continued as far as possible beyond 1 May
A rme
d (W a
fen
SS ) .
The tables of organization and equipment of the Army apply to

the various units of the Armed 3S also, and the SS units are to be supplied to the same extent as the Army is supplied.
I am still reserving my decision concerning the future table of organization in wartime of the motorized SS divisions.
The setting up of new units which would need additional German equip-
ment is out of the question.
The new table of organization for wartime
also applies to the SS Body Guard Regiment "Adolf Hitler"

"Adolf Hitler").
-2-
(Leibstandarte
B-68
t~~~~!d
tf
6.
Nav:
Within the limits

of' available
raw materials the main empasis is
to be given to building up and maintaining the submarine arm.
Moreover, the maintenance of the escort service and the security of
Norway as well as of the coastal zone will continue to be important.
The inevitable restrictions resulting from the allocation of raw materials
must be counteracted by improvisation, so far as the harbor construction
program and other projects are concerned.
The supplies of ammunition
on hand permit a curtailment in favor off Army production,
7.
Air Force:
The airplane
program are to be
of raw material,
gram will hae to
construction program and the anti-aircraft artillery

carried out to the extent permitted by the allocation
Any restriction of the anti-aircraft artillery probe approved by me.
A temporary curtailment off the production of ammunition and bombs in

all classifications whore a sufficient, supply exists must be expected as
'long as production 'is impaired owing to conversion to substitutes for
scarce non-ferrous metals,
All measures necessary for carrying out the petroleum program
8. a,
are to be moved forward with the greatest urgency.
nt programs in the fields of railroad and communicaThear

b,
tions services as well as the chemical production fauoh) plan are to
the program ffor motor
e carried out just as heretofore;
vehicles is to
be expanded.
In view of the great amount of ferrous and non-ferrous metals required
for the execution of these programs, production goals must be reached
through the most economical use of metals possible in wartime..
The improvement of the coastal defense along the entire Western
9.
o be continued, to the limit
Front, incling orway, an on Crete is
of our ability and of the means available.
gas of the various branches of the Armed Forces

pro
10.
The armament
Any
conformity with the preceding directives.
out
are to bed
Any necessary
important changes are to be submitted to me for approval.
further coordination will be worked out by the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces High Command,
in
III.
As far
as replacement
of personnel
is
concerned,
the Chief of Staff,
Command will balance military, and civilian requireArmed Forces Hgh

Minister of Armament and Ammunition
ments in agreement with the Re
a
he other ministerial
agencies
concerned.
Proposed organizational changes and the replacement program of the

branches of the Armed Forces are to be adbusted to production.
IV.
reMy instructions concerning armament, issued on 14 July 191l1, will
main in force in so far as they refer to general principles of an
economic or technical nature.
B- 68
INCLASSIF[H
Their importance is herewith increased, and they are not affected by

this directive.
signed:
Commander in Chief,
B.
Ni.
Navy
Ski. Qu.A. 350/12 Gkdos,
Adolf Hitler
Copy
Berlin,
20 January 1942
To Naval Staff Operations Division
Re:
Armament 1942
Reference:
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander

N'. 1/12 Gkdos. OKW/WSt/OrhWliRue Amt, 10 Jan. 192.
I.
The new Fuebrer directive referred to above results in additional

however, in the long run
temporary cuts in raw material allotments;
the aim remains to combat the Anglo-American forces by means of the
This aim must be kept in mind in making these
Navy and the Air Force.
in other words it
cuts and in utilizing the available raw materials;
must be assured that production or the items curtailed or discontinued
at the present time will be resumed later.
II. Further cuts in production are to be expected as the result of the
drafting or workers from the protected armament industries, in other
words also from the shipyards and their subcontractors.
III. In order to utilize the remaining personnel and materiel resources
correctly, I order the following basic directive for the time being:
a.
No further cuts should be made in:

Submarine repair
Submarine construction
Repair of torpedo recovery vessels
Construction of torpedo recovery vessels
Repair of light naval forces, including destroyers
b.
As few cuts as possible should be made in construction of the
following (in the order named):
PT boats
Motor mine sweepers
Destroyers
Torpedo boats
Mine sweepers
Mine detonating vessels
B-68
Escort vessels
Patrol vessels and
subehasers
As regards armament:
Antiaircraft guns
Coastal guns and equipment for
c.
Norway
Cuts are possible in the folloving:
Ship repair
Construction or conversion of auxiliary ships
Armament for other coastal sectors
Replacement armament for: ships, etc.

Ammunition, including torpedoes and mines
d.
The following may be discontinued
temporarily:
Construction of cruisers, aircraft carriers, scout cruisers,

supply ships, and tankers
The new construction program (though not explicitly) generally follows
The ordnance divisions must adjust production to posthese principles,
sible changes in ship construction.
IV.
An attempt must be made to absorb other cuts in raw materials in
projects other than ship construction, i.e., in bufldings, ammunition

production,
work,
preliminary factory
etc.
1,
The technical offices off Naval Ordnance will discuss possible
further reductions in ammunition and will submit suggestions.
2.
The Naval Construction Division will report as soon as possible
whether cuts in production will result from drafting of workers and how
The following is to be kept in mind:
production dates are affedted.
Repairs have precedence over new construction.
Submarine construction should not be curtailed any further.
Any necessary shifts in manpower are to be handled in such a
way that construction of surface forces in the above-mentioned order is
assured.
Furthermore, the Naval Construction and Ordnance Divisions are
3.
to report what other curtailments are feasible in building construction
and preliminary factory work, and are to report the consequences that
would result from such cuts.
signed:
I I~
-5-
Raeder
__ _~~ ~_
B-68
4. t.5Lsr4- H
Armed Forces High Command
N'. 55328/42 Gkdos. Chefs,
R
Fuehrer Headquarters
WFSt/Op.
12 February l912
No. 6 of 14 copies
Guiding Princi lea for Deco tion of the Enemy
The following guiding principles are to be followed in deceiving the
enemy with regard to our future plans in the East:
"Thge German High Command intends to launch a renewed attack against Moscow after the winter and muddy season have ended, concentrating strong
forces for the purpose, bringing up newly organized units, and exchanging fresh divisions from the West for exhausted ones in the East. Following this, the High Command intends to push ahead to the central Volga
and to capture the industrial area there.
The forces for this purpose are to be brought up in a surprise operation.
For this the capacity of the necessary railroad lines will be increased,
and not until this has been done will the forces ready at home and in
In the meantime strong forces, particularly
the west area be brought up.
of our allies, will have started a large-scale dummy operation against
Rostov for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
As far as Leningrad is concerned, the German High Command is of the opinion that this city will collapse of itself as soon as the ice on Lake
It is. not considered necessary to make further attacks
Ladoga melts.
here."
Reports of this sort are to be fed to the enemy intelligence service by
the Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command, starting very
soon.
German troops are to be deceived for the time being only to the extent
that the home units and those in-the West which are intended for the
East will be given corresponding geographic data and maps, etc., for the
no deceptive measures are to be undertaken for the Army
Moscow area;
in the East until after the defensive battle is ended.
The Army and the Air Force are requested to make further suggestions on
deception during this time to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations
Staff as soon as possible.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed:
- 6 -
Keitel
B-68
B
The Commander
and
Chief,
in
Naval
Chief,
N vi-
Berlin,
23 February 1942
Staff
1/Ski I m 275/42 Gkdos, Chefs.

Copy No. 3
To:
Naval Group South
Subject:
Operations
Re:
1.
2.
in
the
Top secret
Black Sea
Group South op kf /k2 Gkdos. Chefs, of 5 Feb.

Group South op 698 Gkdos. of 6 Feb.
The Russians, with 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders, 15 destroyers, and 41 submarines, as well as 3 torpedo boats, 4 mine layers,
minesweepers, patrol vessels, special duty and auxiliary vessels, posThis affords the Russians great
sess naval supremacy in the Black Seam
freedom of action, and means a constant threat to the southern flank of
the Army and to the necessary supply by sea, which is a prerequisite for
execution of the planned Army operations and which must start up again
It must not '5teorgotten that
as soon as the ice situation permits.
any transport of supplies by sea, even though only a small part of the
requirements of the Army, relieves the difficult land transport situation to a noticeable degree, and that the Army considers any increase in
sea transports, even if it is only small, as essential,
The Russians will continue with their well-known tenacity and ruthlessnesa to try to hold and improve their positions on the Crimea and to
prevent the Axis troops from pushing farther to the East. They will
The strength
rely in this to a greater extent on their naval forces.
of defense on our
of these forces, together with the lack of any sort
part, permits the enemy to go around our Army units stationed near the
This
sea and to launch attacks with strong forces behind our lines.
must be prevented by all possible means,
A main objective of our Army is to conquer the Crimea entirely as soon
It is prerequisite to the further offensive of the Army
as possible.
to the east or southeast that the Crimea be held with as few Army forces
as possible. To permit this it is necessary to block the Kerch Strait
against any penetration of Russian forces into the Sea of Azov.
Thus
there emerge clearly the following
main
tasks for the Navy in the
future:
a.
As soon as the ice situation permits it is necessary to start
up supply traffic by sea to the South Ukrainian ports and the ports on
the western Crimean coast, and also in the Sea of Azov from Genichesk
Depending on the advance of the Army operations supply
to the east.
transports must be carried out to ports on the eastern coast of the
Black Sea,
b.
Measures must be taken to secure this supply traffic.
c.
The Army must be supported in taking Sevastopol and the Kerch
.Peninsula and in occupying the Crimea.
d.
Russian landings behind the Army front
must
be prevented.
The Naval Staff agrees with Group South that the main tasks of the Navy
in the Black Sea are to execute and protect supply operations.. In order
to fulfill in the best- possible manner the expected transport require-
-7-
B-68
~~~L1$Z~
ED
ments it is necessary to find out on the spot all possibilities for

expediting the transports in the Russian harbors which are already occupied or which are still to be occupied. Any difficulties which appear
must be eliminated at once (e.g., confiscating all suitable vessels,
using every kind of improvisation, putting newly occupied harbors in
condition to receive supplies, etc.).
The Shipping and Transport Branch
of the Naval Staff
Quartermaster Division is sending additional
information with regard to creating the post of Shipping and Transport Officer,
Black Sea and setting up a mobile advance post with extensive powers.
Mines will be of particular importance in securing the transport routes
to the Dnieper and the harbors in the northwestern part of the Crimea,
including Eupatoria, later also those on the southern coast of the
Crimea and on the Kerch Strait,
In order to carry out the tasks listed from b. to d
we must prevent
Russian naval forces from operating undisturbed on the supply routes
and along the occupied coasts, or at least we must make it very difficult for them to do so. The most effective way to do this would be to
destroy the Russian means of combat, Up to now practically only the
Air Force has been able to combat the Russian naval forces, which form
the backbone of their operations.
The air forces on the Crimea have
been reinforced, to be sure, and the Commander in Chief, Air has expressly recognized the necessity of using them to combat Russian naval
forces and transports;
nevertheless it is probable that when the Army
offensive begins they will be used mainly to support the Army, and will
be available for attacking the Black Sea Fleet only occasionally,
Except for submarine operations on the west coast, it has hitherto. not
been observed that the Russian naval forces have tried to undertake operations beyond their direct escort and defense tasks in order to exercise naval supremacy in the whole Black Sea area.
Furthermore, to judge from our experience in the Baltic Sea, the Russian
Navy is immediately discouraged from its operations if it notices any
sort of countermeasures aimed to disturb its activities at sea,.or if it
has been unsuccessful in some way. Considering the fact that the Russians, for instance, did not repeat their bombardment of Constanta or
other Rumanian coastal localities after the MOSKVA was sunk, we would
seem to be justified in applying these experiences made in the Baltic
Sea to the Black Sea Fleet.
The evidently entirely inadequate preparations for the Russian landing in Eupatoria on 5 Jan. 1942, about which
the Group Command will receive more detailed information, point in the
same direction.
It is known that Group South has very inadequate means for carrying out
this sort of defense measure. The Naval Staff believes, however, that
there are still possibilities for preventing the enemy from keeping the
initiative everywhere entirely undisturbed, if the few means available
are.utilized to the very fullest and numerous improvisations are resorted
to.
Certain losses must be reckoned with. If our countermeasures succeed in paralyzing the activity of the Russian naval forces against the
occupied coasts, harbors, and supply routes, then these losses are absolutely justified in the face of the advantage won.
One possibility of this kind is the planned mining of Russian harbors
as suggested by Group South in communication op 698 Gkdos. Group South
calls these operations defensive and not very important, but they can
certainly be considered effective with a view to securing the main oper-
ations later.
8-68
Independent of these statements, Group South is requested to have the

advance posts investigate fur'ther possibilities, and to report its in-
tentions,
signed in draft forma
countersigned:
Raeder
(signature illegible)
C OPY,
Ob.d.M.
B.Nr. 6O5/42 Gkdos.
Chefs.
1k Mar.
1942
1.
Most of the reports about the British and American intentions agree
that the enemy considers it most important to maintain Russia's power,
of resistance by means of the largest possible amount of supplies of war
materiel and food, and in addition to set up a second front in Europe
in order to force us to withdraw forces from Russia. The regular,
heavy convoy traffic from Scotland to Murmansk or Archangel can serve
both purposes. Thus one can expect enemy landing operations on the
Arctic coast;
the enemy objective most dangerous for us and therefore
the most probable one is the nickel mines in northern Finland which are
vital for Germany.
2.1
For this reason it is necessary to cut the sea communications between the Anglo-Americans and Russia in the Arctic Ocean, which up to
the present time have been practically undisturbed, and to eliminate the
naval supremacy of the enemy, which reaches into our own coastal waters.
All available means must be employed in the battle in this sea area,
which at this time is more important than the area off the west African
coast.
3.
I order in. detail as follows:
a.
The Navy is to increase submarine operations in the Arctic
Ocean to such an extent that we can count on successes against the enemy
convoys in spite of difficulties brought on by the weather conditions
in the Arctic Ocean.
The Air Force is to increase the planes in the arctic area,
b.
particularly by using more long-range reconnaissance and bomber units.
The bulk of the torpedo plane squadrons is to be transferred far enough
to the north that they can be employed off the particularly endangered
arctic coast. The most important tasks of the Air Force are as follows:
To attack persistantly the enemy unloading ports on the Murman coast.
To increase reconnoitering of the area between Bear Island and the
Murman coast. To attack the convoys and enemy naval forces which are
reported, particularly enemy aircraft carriers.
Close cooperation between the Navy and the Air Force on the
c.
Norwegian-Finnish coast must be assured by combining the command staffs,
-9-
B-68
or at least by exchanging liaison officers.
Any technical difficulties
in communications are to be eliminated.

In order to reinforce the forces in the Arctic Ocean we will
d.
In particular sea reconnaishave to reduce operations in other areas.
sance in the Atlantic, the range of which is no longer adequate for subHowever
marine operations there in any case, must be greatly reduced.
blockade runners must be brought to and from the French west coast as
before.
The Army High Command, Lapland must constantly have sufficient
*e.
troops at its disposal on the arctic coast, in order to be prepared for
a large-scale enemy attack against the coast, particularly since troop
transfers via the Oulu-Petsamo highway take too much time and would
probably arrive too late.
The Commander in Chief, Navy; the Commander in Chief, Air; the
3.
and the Army High Command,
Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway;
Lapland are to report to me proposed measures via the Armed Forces High
Command.
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander,
Armed Forces
Adolf Hitler
signed:
OKW WFST Op. (V) Nr.
55493/42 Gkdos.
Chefs.
The above directive was instigated pri(Marginal note in handwriting:

in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer.)
Commander
the
of
marily by the report
Fuehrer Heacquarters, 23 Mar. 1942

of the Armed Forces
OKW/WSt/Op.
Nr.
No.
001031/42 g.Kdos
of 25 copies
Secret
No.
Directive
Subject:
I.
Command organization along
40
the coasts.
Main principles:
In the near future the European coasts will be exposed very seri-
ously to the danger
of enemy
anings.
of the enemy's landing attempts will not be dependent

Failures in other theaters
of war, obligations toward allies, and political considerations may
well prompt him to make decisions which would be regarded as improbable
from a purely military standpoint.
The time and
place
exclusively upon strategic considerations.
Even limited-objective
landing attempts, if the enemy should succeed in
S10
8-68
gaining a foc. hold on the coast, would interfere materially with our own
plans in any case. They would interrupt our shipping traffic along the
coast and would tie down strong forces of the Army and Air Force, thus
preventing us from employing them at decisive points.
It would be especially dangerous for us if, the enemy should succeed in gaining our
air iields for his use or in establishing air bases for himself in territory he has captured.
In addition, installations of military importance or of importance to
*the war economy which are located on or near the coast in considerable
numbers and which, in part, include especially valuable equipment are
an invitation to local surprise attacks.
Special attention should be given to British preparations for landings

on the open coast, for which they have at their
isposal numerous
armored landing craft suitable for carrying tanks and heavy weapons.
Parachute and airborne landing atte mts on a large scale must be reckoned
witha
so.
II.
General
tactical instructions for coastal defense:
1.
The defense of the coast is a task of the Armed Forces which
demands particularly close and un nterrupt-ed coopera on y
ranches
of the Armed Forces.
2.
The Intelligence Service, as well as the reconnaissance services of the Navy and the Air Force, must make every effort to recognize
in time the enemy's
re,. aerations for a landing attempt, his
state
of
readiness, his approach.
In such a case all suitable forces on the sea and in the air are to be
concentrated against the enemy's embarkation operations and against his
fleets of transports, for the purpose of destroying him as far from the
coast as possible.
However, since the enemy may be able to achieve complete surprise by
means of clever concealment and by taking advantage of a period of poor
visibility, all troo s which might be exposed to such surprise actions
must be on a fu
a ert status at all times.
One of the most important command duties will be to prevent any slackening in the alertness of the troops, since experience has shown that the
tendency to relax increases with the passing of time.
3.
Recent battle experiences have taught us that in the fighting
for the coast (this includes the coastal waters within the range of
medium coatal artillery) one man must ave
e sole, unrestricted
responsibility for preparing and executing the defense.

The responsible commander must make use of all available materiel and
personnel of the various branches of the Armed Forces, plus any available formations and units outside of the Armed Forces, as well as the
his purpose
personnel of German civilian offices present in the area;
is to destroy the enemy's means of transportation and bis landing
troops and to bring about the collapse of the attack - 'f the coast,
but after the coast has been reachd at the very latest.
if possible
Enemy forces that have succeeded in landing must be destroyed or thrown
into the sea by immediate counterattacks.
All men capable of bearing
arms, regardless of the branch of the Armed Forces or of the formation
outside of the Armed Forces to which they may belong are to be used
jointly for this purpose. At the same time, the supply installations
-11-
B-68
on land must be kept working, while the Air Force ground organization
and the anti-aircraft artillery at airfields must maintain a state of
combat readiness, unless they should become' involved in ground fighting
anyway.
No command post or unit is permitted to initiate a withdrawal under such
conditions. Where German men are employed on or near the coast, they
must be armed and trained for combat,
The enemy must be kept from establishing himself on any islands which,
if he had possession of them, would represent a danger to the mainland
and to coastal shipping.
1
The organization of forces and the imrovement of fortifications
are to be carried out in such a manner that the best-deffended coastal

sectors will be those which the enemy might use for landing places
(fortified areas).
Wherever any of the remaining coastal sectors are in danger or sudden
attack, even by small formations, a strongpoint type of defense is to
be set up, depending as much as possible upon the coastal batteries ror
support. All installations important from a military or an economic
point of' view are to be included in this strongpoint defense.
The same principles hold good for the islands of
the coast.
Less endangered coastal sectors will be patrolled.

The branches of the Armed Forces must come to a general agree5,
If necessary, the
ment concerning the distribution of coastal sectors.
final decision will be

III,
1.
made by the commaner in charge as per section
6.
The fortified areas and strongpoints must be in a position to
defend themselves for a long tie, even against superior enemy forces.
This is to be made possible through proportionate allocation of forces,
through improvements (all-round fortification) and adequate supplies.
Fortified areas and strongpoints are to be defended to the utmost. They
must never be forced to surrender because of a lack of ammunition, supor water.
plies,
7.
The commander in charge as per section III, 1 will issue instructions f'or patrolling the coast, and will guarantee that reconnaissance findings of all branches of the Armed Forces will be quickly evaluated and summarized, then transmitted to the proper command authorities
and civilian offices.
As soon as there are indications of a pending enemy operation, he is
authorized to lay down the necessary general directions for unified
and mutually complementary sea and air reconnaissance.
8.
Peacetime privileges will not be granted to the staffs and
units of the Armed Forces or to formations and units outside of the
Armed Forces stationed in the vicinity of' the coast. The nature of
their shelters, security measures and equipment, as well as; their state
of alert and the employement of the terrain are to be determined solely
by the necessity of opposing every enemy attack as quickly and as
strongly as possible. Where the military situation requires it, the
civilian population is to be evacuated at once.
12
B-68
III. Comand authority:

1.
The following authorities
and carrying out coastal defense wi
ill
i
be resonsible for preparing

a
m-controlled area:
a.
In the zone of operations in the East (Finland excluded)
the Army commanders designated by the Army High Command.
b.
In the coastal area of the Army High Command, Lapland,
the Commanding General, Army High Command, Lapland.

c.
In Norway, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway.
d.
In Denmark, the Commander of German Troops in Denmark.
e.
In the occupied area in the West (including the Netherlands), the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.
In matters of coastal defense the responsible commanders as per paragraphs d. and e. will be directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High
Command.
f.
In the Balkans (including the occupied islands), the Com-
manding General, Armed Forces, Balkans.

g.
In the Baltic countries and the Ukraine, the Commanding
General, Armed Forces, Baltic States and White Ruthenia, and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Ukraine.
h.
In the home theater, the commanding admirals.
2.
authorit
The commanders designated in paragraph III, 1 will have

as far as this task is concerned, over the staffs commanding
units of the branches of the Armed Forces, and over German
civilian offices and any formations and units not belonging to the Armed
Forces which are located in their areas.
various
In exercising this authority, they are to issue the necessary orders

concerning tactics, organization, and supply, and they are to make sure
that their orders are carried out. They will influence training as far
as is necessary for ground combat. The niecessary data is to be put at
their disposal.
3.
Among the instructions to be given and the measures to be
taken, the following should be given first place:

a.
Location of all installations important for military or
economic reasons, especially those of the Navy (submarine bases) and of
the Air Force, in fortified areas or strongpoints.
b.
Unified direction of the coastal patrol.
c.
Infantry defense of fortified areas and strongpoints.
d.
Infantry defense of all individual posts outside the
fortified areas and strongpoints, e.g., coastal patrol stations and air-
craft warning posts.

e.
Artillery defense against ground targets (in installing
new coastal batteries or converting those already present, the requirements of naval warfare will have first priority).
13
B-68
if. Preparedness 'off installations for defenste, ifpro ve tets

to them, and stocking them with supplies;. preparedness and adequacy off
supplies
in individual posts outside .;the installation s.
(This Includes
smns
sc
equipping with weapons 'ne66asaryfoi 'd'~s
nades, flame throwers, obstacle-building material, etc.)
g.
hand:,g'e'-~
Communications,
Testing alertness, 'and infantzy and artillery training

h.
with regard to specified defens ive duties. '
The same powers are given to the commanders of local headqarters, inso ar as they are made responsil a or the def'ense oV
casa sectors,
The commanders designated in paragraph III, 1 are to 'designate,.in gen1f.
eral, the commanders of the ArM& -dvisins conmiitted -to costal defence;
be designated in like
in Crete the "Fortress Cmaer
.
ee"will
manner.
In individual sectors or subdivisions off sectors, and especially in

those which are definitely air ,or naval strongpoints, the local commanders
of the Air Force or the Navy are to'be put, in charge -of the entire defense, so far as their other duties peiit.
warfare
-edintregc
ces eM5.
The naval forces and air
;
AirForce 'respctv
ciry
e
6iiand offt
will be un ertwih
However, during attacks on the coast they ill be obligated to comply
with the demands of' the commanders responsible for defense, as far as
they are tactically abler.' He ce theyr mtist be i ichtded in the communic.ations set-up .inpreparation ifor their employment later on. Close
contact must be kept with their lTnesaduarters
',
IV.
Special duties of the bandhs of 'the AI'med 'FoZ'ce" 'inthe field Toff
4,.
.--
coastsi 7defensert
1.
against
Navy'
a.:
Organization and protection '~ coatal shipping.
b.
Training arnd einjloytnent of 'the eiiirecoastal -aiellery
sea
targets.
c.
2.
'.
Employment of naval forces.
''-
Air Force:;
a.
AntiL-aircraft defense in the coastal- areas.
The bringing up, on orders from the local commanders responsible for defense, of available' ant-i-aircraft antill1ery' suited ifor defense 'against
enemy landings will, not be affected b~y this.
Improvement off the Air Force ground organization and its
b.
protection' against 'attach' t'ror the air and &gain't4surprise attacks on
the ground; -the latter' applies 'to such airifelds "as' at'e'' not: included in'
the coastal defense and therefore are not sufficiently defended on th&
ground.
c.
Use
of operational'air forcb~&.e
Occasional 'duplication
of command must be expected to result from these
-14-
--
6
8-68
special duties.
All previous orders and instructions not in agreement with this diV.
rective are cancelled starting 1 April 19k2.
All new combat directives based upon my directive which are issued by
the responsible commanders are to be submitted to me through the Armed
Forces High Command.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
Berlin, 27 March 1942

No. 31 of 48 copies
Commander in Chief, Navy

Skl.au.A. II 771/42 Gkdos.
Secret
Re:
Command Organization on the Coasts

Fuehrer Directive No. 40.
Fuehrer directive No. 40 is herewith brought to the attention of the

various commands.
I wish to add the following remarks in this
connection:
The constant enemy threat to the coasts of the occupied countries has
It is aimed at designating
caused the Fuehrer to issue this directive.
one responsible commander for each area and each coastal sector, chargConTin him with preparing and carrying out the defense of the coast.
trary to previous regulations, the respective commander will have the
command authority assigned him for this purpose at all times, and not
This wild et.na e a change in
only at the time of an enemy invasion.
command shortly prior to or during combat.
The enemy will launch landing operations at points along the coast which
are inadequately or not at all protected by coastal artillery. During
such operations he may also attempt to land paratroops in the rear of
our coastal artillery. We must reckon with the fact that the enemy may
in spots succeed in gaining a temporary foothold on the coast.
The Fuehrer directive takes care of this situation by concentrating the
main effort of our coastal defenses on land fighting and thus puts command in the hands of the Army (divisional commanders).
Even if the fight for the coast extends to the coastal areas within
reach of the medium coastal artillery (range of the Army coastal artillery), command over the bombardment of targets at sea remains in the
hands of the naval shore commanders, who have command over coastal artillery (inclusive of Army coastal artillery) in the sector for this
purpose. The naval shore commanders are under the operational command
of the respective divisional commander only in the fight for the coast;
15
B-68
aside from such defense activity their coastal artillery is under the
respective naval commander (for protection
or convoys, support of naval
forces, etc.).
The naval forces and other means of naval warfare (for example mines)
are under the sole and rsponsible command of the Navy also as regards
the defense of Tie coas.
cordng
to the directive,
the Armed Forces
commanders or their subordinate sectional commanders have the-right to
issue "directives for uniform and complete reconnaissance at aea and
,to request naval forces for specified tasks in the fight for the coast,
The decision as to their commitment, however, remains exclusively in
the hands of the naval
commanders,
The following questions bear further investigation:

a,
Integration of the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service
(Coastal) CVGAD(K)) into the coastal patrol service.
b.
The sectional division of the coast.
It should be examined especially how the present areas and tasks under
naval authority in the Netherlands and in Denmark can be made to conform
to the Fuehrer directive,
Tasks designated under III, 4 (last paragraph) should not be taken over
without my approval in each particular: case, since the naval commanders
and stations involved are also engaged in the tasks remaining under my
command in the coastal sectors.
signed:
countersigned:
Raeder
Stangenberg

of the Armed Forces
5 April 1942
OKW/WFSt Nr.
Top secret
No. 3 of 14 copies
55616/f 2 g.K.Chefs.
Directive No. 41
The outstanding
The winter campaign in Russia is nearing its close.
bravery and the self-sacrificing effort of our troops at the Eastern
Front have achieved a great defensive success.
The enemy suffered very severe losses in men and material.
In an at-
tempt to take advantage of what seemed to be initial successes, Russiduring the course of: the winter also expended the bulk of her reserves
intended for
future operations.
16 -
8-68
:;
<1
-b~
As soon as weather and terrain conditions are favorable, the superior

German command and German forces must take the initiative once again to
force the enemy to do our bidding.
is to wipe out the entire defense potential remaining to
The obj te ei
most imas far as possible from their
the Soviets a-taiui-fhem off
portant sources of supply.
For this purpose all available forces of Germany and our allies will be
brought up. At the same time, however, the occupied territories in
western and northern Europe, particularly the coasts, must remain adequately protected under all circumstances,
'i
General
Plan
IFIn keeping with the original plans for the eastern campaign, it is intended to hold the central part of the front, in the north to bring
about the fall
of Leningrad and effect
a junctures
tIhte Finns by land,\
and on the southernind of the Army front to force a breakthrough into
the Caucasus area,
Considering the situation at the end of the winter campaign, the forces
available, and the transport conditions, this objective can be attained
only in several stages.
Therefore to begin with all available forces are to be combined for the
main operation in the southern sector, the objective being to destroy
o gain the oil region in the Caucasian
or er
e enemy efore t e Don
area and to cross the Caucasus mountains.
In
As soon as the development of the situation in the.encircled area or the

release of other adequate forces permit, Leningrad is to be cut off altogether and the Leningrad area is to be captured.
II.
Conduct of
the Operations
The first task of the Army and the Air Force after the end of
A.
to reate the proper conditions for carrying out the
the muddy season is
main operation.
This requires that the situation on the entire Eastern Front and in the
rear areas must be mopped up andsecured, for the purpose of thus winning
as many orces as possible ror the main operation, but at the same time
being able to cope with any attack on the other fronts with the least
possible effort.
Whenever for this purpose offensive o erations with limited objectives
must be carried out in accordance with my orders, here also all poss le
offensive weapons of the Army and the Air Force must be used in an overOnly in
whelming attack, so as to achieve fast and decisive successes.
this way can the absolute confidence in victory of our troops be
strengthened before the great spring offensive, and only thus can we
drive home to the enemy his hopeless inferiority.
The next tasks in this connection are to mop up the Kerch
B.
Peninsula on the Crimea and to capture Sevastopo1. The Air Force and
in the Black Sea and
Navy are to tie up enemy suppiy
laterthe
in the Kerch Strait to the greatest possible extent in preparation for
these operations.
traffic
In the southern area the enemy who has penetrated our positions on both
to be cut off and annihilated along the Donets.
sides off Izyums
17
B-68
in the central and northern parts of the

Front cannot be finally decided upon until ater the present
The mopping up still necessary
Eastern
fighting and the muddy season are at an end.

The necessary forces, however, must be provided as soon as the situation permits by thinning out
the front lines.
C.
The Main Operation on the Eastern Front
The objective is, as already stated, to take the Caucasus

front, destroying the Russian forces from Voronezh to the south and west
and north of the Don,* Because of the manner in which the available
forces must be brought up, this operation can be carried out only in a
series of successive attacks, which, however, are in connection with

each other or supplement each other. Therefore they are-to be synchronized from north to south in such a manner that in every single one of
these attacks the greatest possible concentration of Army and especially
air forces can be assured at the decisive spots.
Considering that, as often enough demonstrated, the Russians are not
very vulnerable to large encirclements, we should strive particularly
to carry out the individual breakthroughs as separate pincer operations,
similar to the battle
of Vyazma-Bryansk.
We must avoid closing the pincers too late, thus ' giving the enemy the
possbiity of eadaping destruction.
It
must not happen that by advancing too swiftly and too far the tanks
anoorized forces lose connection with the infantry following them,
or that they lose the. possibility of assisting the infantry forces of

the Army pressing ahead, by direct attacks on the rear of the encircled
Russian Armies.
Therefore, aside from the over-all operational objective, in each separate case we must be absolutely sure to destroy the enemy by the method
.of the attack and the direction of our forces.
The whole operation will begin with a comprehensive attack or breakthrough from the area south of Orel toward Voronezh.** Of the two tank
and motorized forces forming the pincers, the northern one will be
The aim of thibreakthrough is to
stronger than the southern one.
capture Voronezh. While part of-the infantry divisions will have the
strong defensive front between Orel, the
task of building up at once
starting point of the attack, and Voronezh, the tank and motorized forces are to continue the attack with their left flank from Voronezh
toward the south along the Don in support of a second breakthrough,
which is to be launched from the general area of Kharkov toward the east.
Here also the primary objective is not to break the Russian front as
such, but-rather, in cooperation with the motorized forces advancing
down the Don, to destroy the Russian forces.
"a
Handwritten marginal note:
Voronezh - Rostov -
**
Front
-18-
Voronezh -
500- 1i.
200 km.
B-68
The third attack in the course of these operations is to be so conducted

that the units proceeding down the Don join the forces which advance out
of the Taganrog-Artemovsk area between the lower Don and Voroshilovgrad
These in turn should finally make conacross the Donets to the east.
nection with the panzer army adve ncing against Stalingrad.
If in the course of these operations there should arise opportunities
to form bridgeheads east or south of the Don, especially through capture
In any
of undamaged bridges, these opportunities should be utilized.
case we must try to reach Stalingrad or at least to subject this city
to bombardment of our heavy weapons to such an extent that it is elimincenter in the future.
ated as an armament and traffic
undesirable if we were able to capture either
It would be particularly
damaged bridges perhaps in Rostov itself, or other bridgeheads south of
the Don for later operations.
In order to prevent important parts of the Russian forces north of the
is essential
Don from escaping across the river toward the south,
that the right wing of the group advancing from the Taganrog area to the
east be reinforced by tanks and mobile forces, which if necessary should
be provided by improvised units.
Xt
Corresponding to the progress of these attacks we must not only provide

strong protection of the northeast flank of the attack operation, but
also we must begin at once with reinforcement of the positions along the
Don. In this matter particular attention is to be laid on very strong
The positions are to be selected from the very start
tank defenses.
from the standpoint of possibly having to use them in winter, and preparations for such use should be made in every way possible.
In the main, units of our allies will be used to occupy the Don front,
which in the course of this operation will become longer and longer.
German troops will be added as strong support between Orel and the Don
also several German divisions will reand in the Stalingrad sector;
main available as reserves behind the Don front.
The troops of our allies are mainly to be disposed so that the Hungarians
are farthest north, then the Italians, and the Rumanians are farthest
south.
In consideration of the season, we must be sure to provide for
D.
fast progress of the movements across the Don toward the south for attaining the operational objective.
III. Air Force
It is the task of the Air Force, besides directly supporting the Army,
to protect the assembly of troops in the area of the Southern Army Group
This applies especially to the railroad
by intensifying air defenses.
bridges across the Dnieper.

If assembly movements of the enemy are recognized, his main traffic"
roues and the railroads leading to the battle area are. constantly to
for this purpose particularly the
be disrupted far into the rear area;
railroad bridges across the Don are to be attacked.

In preparation for the operation the enem air force and its ground organization in the attack area are to a attacked and destroyed with con-
centrated forces.
and northern
of planes to the central
of a quick shift
The possibility
provided for, and the ground organization
zones of operation mus be
19 -
B- 68
necessary for this

IV.
must be retained as far as possible..
Navy
In the' Black Sea it is the main task of the Navy - insofar as our combat
and esc
Er rces
and our. tonnage permit - to assist in supplying the
Army and the Air Force,
Considering that the power of the Russian Black Sea fleet is still unbroken, it is particularly important to get the light naval forces to
be transferred to the Black Sea ready for operations there as soon as
possible.
The Baltic Sea is to be secured by cutting off the Russian naval forces
in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.
V.
My basic orders for preserving secrecy are to be issued once more
to all offices taking parts inthe preparations.
The procedure to be followed with our allies will be laid down in special regulations in connection with this directive.
VI. The branches of the Armed Forces are to report to me via the Armed
Forces High Command the preparations they intend to make, including
timetables.
signed:
Fuehrer Headquarters,
of the
The Chief of Staff
Ni.
55628A2 g.K.
Adolf Hitler
Chefs WFSt/Op.
Top secret
No.
of twenty five copies
Special Order No. 1 in connection with Directive No.

I.
5 April 19k2
4L
Security of information:
1.
The Fuehrer's "Basic Order" or 11 Jan. 1940 (copy with detailed
directions in the Armed Forces Countermeasures, Annual Order of 1940) is
to be the guiding principle
for security of information.
All officers and Armed Forces officials charged with working on preparabe reacquainted with these
tory measures for operation "Siegfried" will
orders.
2.
The number of persons working on the plans is to be kept to a
minimum. Before adding workers to this circle, the commanding officer
responsible is to give his written consent in each individual case. Also
those officers who are not directly involved are to consider it their
duty to observe strict discretion when possible operations are being
mentioned or discussed.
20
B-68
3.
In addition che.Fuehrer orders the following general directions
in connection with operation "Siegfried":
"Telephone calls to discuss preparations for and execution of this operation will nok e conducted beyond the headquarters of Army Groups, Air
Forces, and the VIlith Air Corps."
Orders and reports are to be put in writing and sent by courier. Any
points not understood will be cleared up in personal conferences or by
way of telegrams.
The vital points (e.g.,objective and time of attack)
in these telegrams, which must be kept from the personnel who handle
the messages, must be put in code.
4. Offices which, although not dii'ectly concerned with the operation as such, are entrusted with preparations which are connected with
the operation but which can be carried out without mention of place and
time (e.g., economic measures), are to refrain from all reference to
operational plans in their preparatory measures.
5.
In informing and conferring with our allies, no one is to reveal any more than is necessary - in any case not more than the assembly
area, if this is unavoidable.
6.
The Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command is making
preparations to stop long-distance communications with foreign countries.
temporarily.
II.
Propaganda:
In cooperation with the high Reich authorities concerned, the

i.
Armed Forces High Command, Propaganda Branch is to lay down the general
areare
to carry them out. In this
principles for propaganda and is to
Ciicasian population (which is
connection, the propaganda aimed at t
A special
to have full autonomy) is to be placed in the foreground.
order will be issued to fix~the date when this propaganda is to begin.
2.
Liaison officers will be assigned to the propaganda offices of
our allies. Besides ascertaining that the propaganda of the various
countries is coordinated, they are to see to it that no reports are
printed concerning operational plans of the German command at present,
and, when such reports do appear later on, that they are written along
the lines determined by the Armed Forces High Command.
signed:
Keitel
Berlin,
Naval High Command
11 Apr. 1912
B. 111. l.Skl. I Op. 8329/42 Gkdos.

Secret
Re:
Coastal defenses
No previous correspondence
I.
The experiences of St. Nazaire and Cape d'Antifer
21
showed that the
B-68
to
attack our extensive coastline more

are determined and able
British
frequently and on a larger
scale than heretofore.
The fact that the bulk of our Army and Air Force has been occupied in
the East for almost a year has enab1led the British to make considerable
preparations for
an offensive against
our coast, after
fortifying
the
British Isles, and since the threat of an invasion has been removed.
Moreover our air forces in-the coastal areashhave been weakened considerably and therefore the coastal defense is not as strong as heretofore.
First the British tried small raids at weak points in the Norwegian area.
Since then they have grown strong enough to make landings also at the
relatively strong French coast, These landings were thoroughly and careThe variety of the means and;
fully prepared and were boldly carried out.
methods used indicates that we must be prepared for any possible surprise
in the future,
It is difficult to say whether the enemy is at present ready not only for
similar limited landing operations but also for large-scale operations
In the west area such largeaimed at establishing new land fronts,
in Norway they are
scale operations seem unlikely at the present time;
possible probably only in the arctic and the Lofoten-Narvik area,
At,
any rate, however, we must expect that sooner or later the enemy will
We
have available the forces necessary for such large-scale operations.
must also keep in mind that developments in the East and the political
pressure exerted by Russia will force the British to undertake more or
less large-scale operations,
Fuebrer Directive f0 was issued as a result of this changed situation.
In addition, the experiences at Cape d'Antifer and-at St. Nazaire make
it necessary for us to-examine once more carefully the possibilities of
our Anglo-American enemies and our defense measures, in order. to make
sure that all possible means have been utilized to strengthen, perfect,
and improve our coastal defenses in every respect. We mustrevent the
us caii
attaks
enem from achieving even small successes in his
us considerable setbacks,
II.
of~_ enemy
Posssibilities
I.
landings.
West area
a.
French Atlantic
coast
The most important and most valuable objectives for limoperations are the submarine bases Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Brest.
shipyard faIn addition, Brest is of special importance because of its
surface forces.
and as a base for
cilities
ited
Besides these harbors, La Pallice-La Roehelle, Royen-Le Verdon,

Bayonne-Saint Jean de Luz, as bases for our defense forces, and
submarines and point of departure
Gironde as a base for Italian
with Spain and overseas,
and for our traffic
auxiliary cruisers
targets-for nuisance raids.
and
also the
our
for
are good
The spots suitable for establishing bridgeheads for large-scale operations are primarily the harbors in the Loire estuary and in the Gironde,
landing large numbers of
for
which provide the necessary facilities
points
starting
troops and equipment and are at the same time suitable
By a pincer
for
operations on land (swift advance to unoccupied France).
movement in Brittany
simultaneously from the north (St. Malo area) and
from the south (Lorient-Loire area), Brest could be out off completely.
For such an eventuality defenses against an attack from land must be
when building up the fortifications.
given special attention
b.
French Channel coast, Belgian-Dutch coast

Here Boulogne, Ostend, and Ijmuiden may be considered
-22-
B-68
especially endangered, as, bases of our PT boats. However, all other

harbors are likewise valuable targets for enemy attacks in view of their
significance for minesweeping, convo,
and escort service in the Channel,
especially Flushing, Dunkirk, Calais, Cherbourg, and Le Havre. An attack
on the Scheldt as far as Terneuzen,or perhaps even as far as Antwerp, as
well as a temporary occupation of Hook off Holland and a simultaneous advance toward Rotterdam, could strike a serious blow at our sea communica,tions,
In addition in this entire area along the coast, particularly however in
the Strait of Dover, there are numerous objectives of military importance, such as coastal-batteries, radar installations, airfields, etc.,
which the enemy might raid. In northeastern France, Belgium and Holland
there are also numerous installations close to the coast which are of
importance to the war effort, and which the enemy might consider worthwhile occupying temporarily and destroying.
Large-scale enemy operations might be expected in the Seine-Somme area
and in the Dutch area, particularly at Scheveningen and Hook of Holland.,
2.
Norway
Nuisance raids aimed merely at destroying coastal batteries

and other installations of importance, as well as at disrupting and
hampering coastal. shipping, are possible almost anywhere along the. Norwegian west and north coasts and in the polar area.
Large-scale operations with limited objectives may be expected especially
In Trondheim
against the bases of our surface forces and submarines.
and Bergen the shipyard and base installations, as well as the heavy and
However, also the other harlight forces are particularly good targets.
forces and as ports of call and
convoy and escort
bors being used for
in these places the entransshipment for supply traffic are endangered;
blow at
supplies for -Norway by dea serious
-emy would be, able to strike
stroying merchant ships and escort forces as well as transshipment facilities.
This applies especially to the terminal points of our supply traffic, Kirkenes, Petsamo, and Kristiansand-South, important in-between stations such as Tromsoe, and harbors, e.g., Stavanger, which have shipyard
and repair
facilities.
Large-scale enemy landings can be expected in the vicinity of Kirkenes
and Petsamo and in the Lofoten area. In the former area the objective
would be to establish a junction with the Russians in northern Finland
On the Lofoten islands, Harstad
and to capture the Petsamo nickel mines.
would be the base from which an attack could be launched against Narvik,
as was done as early as 19f0.
3.
Skagerrak, Kattegat, Jutland, German Bight
Also in these areas there are profitable and possible targets

for enemy operations, such as airfields, harbors, the coastal batteries'
of the coast of Jutland, especially the Hanstholm battery, Heligoland,
or the Frisian islands.
An operation with strong forces into the Skagerrak and the Kattegat, combined perhaps with a temporary occupation of Laesoe and Anholt and an advance toward Helsingoer and Copenhagen as well as into the Oslo Fjord,
could paralyze supply shipments to Norway temporarily and perhaps considerably reduce the number of our merchant ships and escort forces.
III. Reinforcement of coastal
Fuehrer Directive
4O
defenses
by the Navy
defines operations by naval forces and training and
23
B-68
use of the entire coastal a til.e

the Navy in coastal defense
ry
against sea targets
as the tasks of
Operations of naval, forces means use of all naval weapons.

even through Directive 4o does not mention this 'explicitly,
Consequently
the use of
mine., boom and net barrages., of radar against sea targets and submarines,
installation and " use of torpedo batteries and land-based depth charge
throwers as well as all other means of coastal defense, insofar as they
are used against the enemy prior to his landing, fall under the jurisdiction of the Navy. As regards coastal artillery, in addition to
training and use against sea targets, the Navy shares the responsibility
for installing new batteries and changing the positions of old ones,
since the requirements of naval warfare are of prime concern.
1.
Operation
of naval forces
As regards coastal defnse, the naval forces serve the purpose

of reconnaissance (to supplement air reconnaissance) and, insofar as
forces are available, of repelling enemy landing attempts.
In order to carry out these tasks, a continuous patrol service is necessary, at least in the vicinity of all especially endangered points, and
these patrol boats should be backed up by stronger forces lying in

readiness (destroyers and torpedo boats),
With
the forces available at present, such patrol service can be maintained only to a limited extent, since almost all patrol boats, minesweepers, and defense forces are being used for minesiweeping and escort
service, and are fully occupied with these tasks. Combat vessels to
back up the patrol boats are also lacking almost everywhere.
Thus
it becomes evident that every possibility to increase the available

forces must be utilized. Therefore a careful investigation should be
made as to whether all vessels suitable for defense tasks are being
used for this, purpose and not for less important tasks, and which vessels
could be put to better use by improving their armament and equipment.
Pertinent suggestions and
A report on this should be made by 1
Ma .
requests should be made at the same

2.
Minelayin
me or later.
and use of othermaval weapons at the
coast
a.
to mines.
The statements made concerning naval forces apply also

If the mine supplies were inexhaustible and ships enough
were
aailable to transport and lay mines, coastal defenses could be

reinforced and perfected by extensive use of mines much more than here-
tofore, Since this is by no means the case, however, it is necessary to

make the best possible use of the available means.
Therefore the Group Commands and the Commanding Admirals are requested
to examine thoroughly all mine plans. Perhaps entirely new possibilities
will become apparent (e.g., in areas where there is.a great difference
in high and low tide, ground mines could be buried or perhaps washed
under in the approaches to important harbors which are shallow or even
dry at low tide, but passable by enemy vessels at high tide.
b.
Local conditions will determine the
use
of net and boom
barrages as well as of other means of preventing enemy raids, and also

radar installations against sea targets and subthe use of additional,,
marines, and the emplacement of new torpedo batteries and depth charge
is
as this
tblowers, The Commanding Admirals are requested, insofar
not already being done, to see that experiences are exchanged and eval-.
uated in' their areas and that the subordinate commanders make a complete
B-68
evaluation of all
possibilities with the available
means.
Requests for
allocation of weapons, equipment, and materiel are to be made as soon
as possible in the order of urgency. All possible makeshifts are to be
utilized. Equipment available in the various sectors is to be utilized
fully, and possibly to be exchanged and supplemented from other sectors,
so as to make the greatest possible use of everything available in the
given command areas.
3.
Installation of new coastal batteries and shifting of old ones.
Requests and suggestions for reinforcement of coastal artillery

in the various areas will be fulfilled insofar as possible.
In addition, on the basis of the recent experiences it is necessary to
investigate whether the available batteries are well distributed and
emplaced. For example, while the areas of Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk,
and the coast of Flanders are amply supplied with coastal batteries,
Since the deadline for
there are considerable gaps in other areas.
it
might be justifiable temporoperation 1''Seeloewe" has been put off,
arily to withdraw some 'of the batteries,
The Commanding Admirals are requested thoroughly to examine the distribution and emplacement of the coastal batteries in their areas, at the
flT
seems necessary or advisable to s
,
Wherever it
by 15
latest
is could be done in a short time and without too much
batterisan
effort, pertinent proposals should be submitted at once in the case of
naval coastal batteries, and in the ease of Army coastal batteries the
necessary or advisable measures should be carried out in agreement with
the Armed Forces' or Army commands involved.
Ma
In investigating the distribution and emplacement of coastal batteries,

at
the
the German home territory
all
commands should keep in mind that
present time is almost completely devoid of coastal batteries, and
that it would be especially desirable to release batteries for the
An effort should be made to reinforce the defenses of
German coast.
the German coast by 1 Sep. 1942.
4+.
Special exueriences
a,
Every new enemy operation may bring new surprises. The
necessary exchange of experiences should not result in the fact that
defense measures in all areas are determined by the experiences gained
during the last enemy peration in one particular area. The means and
methods whiccf2an be used by the enemy are generally determined by the
local conditions. All coastal defense measures should therefore take
into consideration first of all the possibilities offered the enemy on
the spot and the fact that the enemy. is fully aware of them.
The lack of patrol boats, minesweepers, and escort forces
b.
service has been neglected as
has resulted in the fact that paPoo
Insofar as the few forces
compared to minesweeping and cot service
available permit, patrol service in the future must be given greater
consideration in view of its importance, as long as the convoy service
is not overly curtailed. Weather conditions and other circumstances
which may necessitate special measures must be taken into account in
each individual case,
example
to take
ditions
issued.
for the
for
During temporary absences of a commanding officer,
c.
because of sickness or leave, the actin commander must be able.
ie must be fillyfFamiliar with the confull responsibility,
in the area, with all tasks and all instructions and orders
If the officer who is to take over is not suitable or trained
task, the higher command must provide a proper substitute.
25
B-68
d.
The full readiness of the coastal defenses should be assured also during attacks from the air. All watch and look-out posts
must remain manned, and vigilance toward the sea must not be diminished
but increased.
The crews of the naval batteries as well as the naval
units assigned to infantry defense will remain at their stations in accordance with readiness regulations.
The command staffs are to evaluate
all incoming reports and ,observations.with special attention.
of exthat
there are large quantities
The possibility
e.
losives aboard enemy ships abandoned by their crews should always be
kpt in mind.
Prisoners should be use rutessly n searching such
ships and for the purpose of disposing of explosives discovered (for
example, prisoners should be detained aboard ship until they are ready
to talk or to cooperate voluntarily).
f.
The lack of patrol boats, minesweepers,
is equally evident in all areas.
At
and defense forces
the beginning of the year the Naval
Staff distributed all available forces in the various areas in accordance with the tasks to be performed. Until a fundamental change occurs
in the situation, there is no reason to change this distribution. This
all
means that each area must manage with the forces at its disposal;
commands must endeavor to utilize all makeshifts in their area, in accordance with paragraph III 1, in order to be able to carry out the
necessary tasks in spite of the lack of forces.
IV.
Naval, Army and Air Force coastal defenses can be reinforced, supplemented, and improved only to a very small extent by allocation of
for our resources are
additional forces, weapons, and equipment;
strained to the utmost on all fronts, and our means are limited. Rather
it is necessary to distribute and use all available means in the best
possible manner, to utilize all reserves, and to exploit all possibiliThis is particularly the task of the local comties and makeshifts.
I expect that all
maners. Thus they have a special responsibility.
naval stations are aware of this responsibility, and will not pass up
any opportunity to make the coastal defenses under the jurisdiction of
the Navy as efficient as possible with the limited means available.
signed:
countersigned:
_II
Raeder
Wagner
Captain
__
26 -
8-68
Nr. 5579/42 g.K. Chefs. WFSt/Op.
4 May 192
No.
5 of
20 copies
Top secret
the Mediterranean area
Planned operations in
Re:
During the conference between the Fuehrer and the Duce, the time schedule
and extent of the German part of the planned combined operations in the
Mediterranean area was determined.
Accordingly, the offensive in North Africa will be carried out at the
This operation will be
end of May, the beginning of June at the latest.
called "Theseus" (secret) for the purpose of communication among German
commands.
The first day of the attack will be known as R day.
Operation "Herkules" will be postponed until the middle of July, the

middle of August at the latest, in order to; keep the two operations from
The first day of the attack will be known
interfering with one another.
as L day.
Expanding previous plans, the Fuehrer has decided to use considerably
stronger forces for operation "Herkules", and has issued the following
orders:
I.
Participation of German forces:

A.
"Theseus":
The Panzer Army, Africa is
ments in the course of

1.
Army:
a.
1 battery of 210 mm.
without motor vehicle
b.
for
4/Artillery
howitzers
Regiment
Eight 15 cm. howitzers
Coastal Artillery Battalion 523.
nons 35
to receive the following reinforce-
Ma:
Also
(21 cm. Moerser 18)
115.
414 (f)
for rearming Army
the transfer of four
10 cm. can-
Ct) for the same purpose is to be speeded up.

c.
The smoke screen detachment requested by the Panzer
d.
6 anti-tank guns 7.62
Army.
2.
Cr) Sf1.;
later 6 more.
Air Force:
The 2 parachute battalions requested by the Panzer Army,

Africa cannot be supplied in view of their limited value for operation
"Theseus", and since all specialized troops available will have to be
assembled for operation "Herkules".
B.
"Herkules":
The following are to be made available
time
to be
specified by the Commander in
in
southern Italy at a
Chief, Armed Forces, South:
27 Pr-68
Air Force:
1.
parts
All
The Commander in
tions.
soon as the Commander in
of the 7th Airborne Division ready for operaChief, Air will report the forces available as
Chief, Armed Forces, South has set the date.
Army:
2.
a.
Approximately one battalion of engineers.
12 tanks IV with long tank guns (suitable for the

b.
tropics), 5 VK 1801 and 5 vK 1601, and all available captured heavy
Russian tanks, (at least 10, among them as many 43 and 52 ton tanks
as possible),
II.
Command
with crews.
organization:
"Herkules":
The Army units participating in this operation will be subordinated
The 7th
to the 7th Airborne Division upon arrival in the assembly area.
Airborne Division is under the Commander, Armed Forces, South, who in,
turn will handle cooperation with the Italians.

III.
Air Force:
The 2nd Air Force must be sufficiently strong in the MediterA.

ranean to assure air superiority during the operation together with the
Italian Air Force.
"Herkules" will
operation
for
planes
transport
The necessary
B.
be ordered by the Fuehrerdepending on the number of parachute units
available and in accordance with the requests to be submitted by the
Transport planes already in
Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South.
the Mediterranean area are to be prepared for parachute jumping insofar.
as possible., In addition, the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South
is to reach an agreement with the Italian Air Force about the utilizaThe results are to
tion of Italian air transport units for this task.
be reported to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.
IV.
Navy:
The Naval High Command will make available as many naval barges as possible and will order preparation of a sufficient number to transport the
tanks mentioned under I B 2 b.
If necessary, during operation "Herkules" the transport capacity in
other areas will have to be reduced temporarily (Aegean Sea, Black
In the Black Sea everything depends
(Handwritten marginal note:
Sea),
on the naval barges.)

signed:
Chief of Staff,
Keitel
28 8-68
The
Fuehr'
Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 55896/42 g.K.Chefs.
Headquarters,
29 May 1942
6th copy of original copy no. 5.
Top Secret
Directive No. 42
Guiding principles for operations against unoccupied France and the

Iberian Peninsula.
(formerly called
"Attila" and "Isabella")
Developments in the unoccupied part of France or the French posin North Africa may possibly make i. necessary to occupy the
entire French territory in the future.
I.
sessions
Likewise possible enemy attempts to seize the Iberian Peninsula must be

taken into consideration, as this will require immediate countermeasures
on our part.
II.
On account of the continual shifting of forces in the West and be-
cause of the fact that the state of operational readiness of the various
units is constantly changing, onlr general principles can be given for
carrying out these operations.
Likewise, the personnel and materiel sit-'
uation prevents us from holding forces and materiel in readiness at all
times specifically for these purposes.
Therefore the directives issued for operations "Attila" and "Isabella"
are, cancelled, effective immediately. However, preparations for
vising both operations are to be made in such a manner that it will always e possible to execute them on short notice.
impro-
III. Occupation of unoccupied France,

1.
in cooperation with Italian forces.
The aim of this operation is to break the power of resistance
of unoccupiedFrance and to talce possession of the country.

It will be important for the German forces to seize,. in a surprise move,
for defense,, and thus to eliminate the
objectives which are important
possibility of French resistance. This will have to be done with
quickly organized, extremely mobile forces, but without weakening the
It will be especially important to seize quickly the
coastal defense.
larger French garrisons, railway junctions, arms and ammunition dumps,
food depots, airfields, and Vichy, the seat of the government.
The task of the Italians will be to occupy - in addition to Corsica the French Mediterranean coast,and by blockading the naval bases, especially Toulon, to prevent the French home fleet and merchantmen in the
Mediterranean from going over to the enemy. In this they are to be
aided by German naval and air forces in the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, if the situation should require it, the Italians are to
The organization of a task force for this purpose
turn against Tunisia.
is in progress.
2.
all
The Army High Command (Army GrouDp
preparations as
far
as the forcesava
la e
will accordingly make
at any given time per-
mit.
-29-
B-68
Special units required for special missions in support of the Army (e.
g., seizure of air force establishments, elimination of signal corps
installations, sa.)Aage) are to be supplied by the branches of the
Armed Forces and the departments of the Armed Forces High Command upon
request of and in agreement with the Army High Command.
3.
The duties of the Air Force will be, besides supporting directly the Army's operations; elmnating in cooperation with the
Italians, those parts of the French air force which are in continental
France.
If opportunity affords and if the 7th Airborne Division and air transport groups are available, opportunities for airborne landings are to
be utilized.
The employment of the Air Force is to be prepared for at once as far as
possible, by setting up'the ground organization in occupied France.
IV.
First countermeasures against enemy seizure of the Iberian Peninsula.
(Code name "Ilona". (secret);
the day for crossing the border:
"I"
day)
1.
The first aim of our countermeasures must be to prepare for
later operaions by occupying the soutern exits of the Pyrenees passes.
Threats to the strategically important French Atlantic coast from Spain
are to be eliminated by securing the harbors on the northern Spanish
coast.
2.
Negotiations and advance discussions with the Spaniards and
other non-German authorities regarding these intentions are forbidden.
V.
The High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will report
by 10 June concerning
both operations as follows:
a.
The forces expected to be used.
b.
The intended operations, considered as a whole.
c.
The time required before the beginning of the operations.
d.
Things desired and requested of the Italians, as well as
opportunities to support. them (cf. III, 1, part 3).
The required discussions with the Italians will then be arranged by the
Armed Forces High Command.
signed:
30
Adolf Hitler
B-68
Copy of Rk. 7792 B
Decree of the Fuebrer concerning the appointment of a

Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping
30
May 19+2
I.
The' fullest utilization of available tonnage is made necessary by increasing demands for seagoing transports.
II.
The uniform planning of seagoing transports in accordance with the requirements of strategy
and of the war economy, as well as the procuring
and planned use of shipping space are of decisive importance, for the
war,
I am placing the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping in
charge of this task for the duration of the war. He is directly responsible to me.
III.
I appoint Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann as Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.
The office of the Reich Commissioner
will be located in Berlin.
IV.
The Reich Commissioner will have the task of handling the uniform planning of seagoing transports in collaboration with Reichsmarschall
Goering as head of the Four Years' Plan, the Armed Forces High Command,
and the appropriate Ministers.*, He is to have control of all shipping
space, except that in constant use in naval warfare or in troop transportation and is to keep seagoing shipping moving. He is to take care
of the day-to-day replacement and renewal of available tonnage, equipment and personnel, and he is to see that the capacity of harbors is
increased.
V.
With regard to transshipping in harbors and the intell-igent utilization
of shipping space, the appropriate harbor offices (civil as well as
military) will be subordinate to the Reich Commissioner.
VI.
The Office of Maritime Shipping of the Ministry of Transportation and
the offices subordinate to it will be at the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner for Maritime Shipping and will be governed by his directives.
"The Navy
is
evidently out of the picture'-
31 B-68
The Commissioner for the Four Years' Plan and the Reich Ministers, as
wel as all offices of the Party, the Armed Forces, and the Reich are to
support the Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping in the performance
of his duties.
Villa
The Reich Commissioner is authorized, the Armed Forces High Command concurring, to make all decisions .necessary for the performance of his
duties according to the degrees of priority established by myself. His
decisions will be binding for all concerned.
In cases of doubt he will
request my decision in a conference a wic
the Chief of Staff, Armed
a
High Command will also be present.'
The necessary directives will be issued by the Reich Commissioner for
in agreement with the Commissioner for the Four Years'
Plan, the Chief of Staff, Armed.Forces High Command, the Minister of
Transportation, and the Minister of Armament and War Production.
Maritime Shipping,
Fuehrer Headquarters, 30 May
1942
The Fuebrer
signed:
Adolf Hitler
Copy
The Fuebrer
30 June 19k2
My basic order of 11 Jan. 1910 concerning security, as well as the regulations for handling of secret documents, must be supreme law for all
officers.
The flight of two Air Force officers in winter 1939-40 carrying secret
orders for the planned operation in the west, which fell into enemy
hands as the result, caused me to issue a sharp warning.
Nevertheless a staff officer of a division, with the knowledge of his
commanding officer, flew to the front with a Fieseler Storeh,* taking
along operational orders without being authorized to do so.
He landed
in enemy territory and both he and his. pilot were killed.
It was possible to recover the bodies.
The secret orders, among them a report of
the commanding general concerning operational plans addressed to the
division commanders, evidently fell into enemy hands. This report contained the plans for all the units in the vicinity, thus covering much
A type of autogyro plane, Tr.NI.
-32-
8-68
more than the tasks of the particular corps and its subordinate divisions.
Consequently I have relieved the commanding general and the chief of
staff of the corps as well as the divisional commander of their commands,
effective
at once.
signed:
countersigned:
Adolf Hitler
Keitel
Fuebrer Headquarters, 3 Jul. 19 42
The Fuehrer
Secret
Subject:
Manpower needed for shipyards

(building and repair of warpriorities.
ships);
No.
of 6 copies
Reich Minister Speer

Staatsrat Blohm
Naval High Command
To:
In connection with the need for additional manpower for repairing, converting, and building warships, the following priority rating will
apply to the various projects:
1.
Submarine repair:
Required:
a.
b.
c.
d.
For shipyards in France

For shipyards in Norway
For shipyards in Germany
Later for shipyards in France
1,000 men
750 men
450 men
3,000. men
5,200 men
2.
Submarines to be built:
Required:
2,000 men
7,200 men
3..
7,200
For repair of surface vessels:

Required:
a.
b.
c.
d.
For shipyards
For shipyards
For shipyards
For the PRINZ
light naval
in Norway
in the Aegean Sea
in the Black Sea
EUGEN, later for
forces
600 men
300 men
100 men
800 men
1,b
men
1,800
B-68
33 -
4.
For resumption of work on light naval forces:

Required:
a.
b,
c.
--
For destroyers at tie Germania

and Desohimag shipyards
For torpedo boats at the
Schichau shipyard
For mine sweepers, motor mine
sweepers, PT boats, etc.,
at various shipyards
2,800 men
2,000 men
1,20 men
6,000 men
a.
b.
6.
7.
8.
For completion of the GRAF

ZEPPELIN
For conversion of the EUROPA
To increase submarine construction to 25 per

month, workers, to be increased by 1,.000 men
per month up to
6,000
1,555 men
1,118 men
2,673 men
2,673
10,000 men
10,000
For conversion of the SE DLITZ, POTSDAM, and

GNEISENAU into aircraft carriers
k,{ 8 2
For conversion of battleship GNlEISENAU
1,307 men
men
4,082
1,307
33,062
signed:
__
Fuehrer order
Adolf Hitler
sent by telegram
Jul.
1942
OKW/WFSt 551213/42 Gkdos. Chefs.

1/Ski. l296/42 Gkdos. Chefs.
Top secret
(Concerning the strengthening of defense measures in the West)*

1.
Our rapid and great victories may place Great Britain before the
alternative of either staging a large-scale invasion with the object of
opening a second front, or seeing Russia eliminated as a political and
military factor. It is therefore highly probable that enemy landings
will shortly take place in the area of the Commanding General Armed
Forces, West. The indications in detail are as follows:
a.
An increasing number of statements from agents to that effect,
For naval reaction see Naval Staff War Diary, Part A,
11 Jul. 1942.
B-68
and other data obtained by the Intelligence Service.

b.
Heavy concentration of ferrying vessels along the southern
coast of England.
c.
2.
Holding back of the R.A.F. during the last few days.
The following areas are to be regarded as particularly threatened:'
a..
In the first place, the Channel coast, the area between Dieppe
and Le Hiavre, and Normandy, since these sectors can be reached by enemy
fighter planes and also because they lie within range of a large portion
of the ferrying vessels.
b.
Next, the southern part of the Netherlands
coast and Brittany.
c.
The main transportation routes, airfields, and staff headquarters are in particular danger from paratroop and air-borne units as
well as from sabotage.
I therefore order that the following measures be carried out im3.
mediately:
a.
Army General Staff:
The available units of the SS Reich Division are to be

(1)
transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, without waiting to finish organization of the reinforced regiments, and before full
(See OKW/WFSt/op (H) Nr. 002199/42 G.K. of
mobility has been attained.
1 Jul.)
(2). The S5 Adolf Hitler Division is
West at once.
to be transferred to the
(3) The SS Motorized Command is to be organized speedily and

transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. All SS units
in the West, if possible also the Goering Brigade, are to be combined
under this
command.
(4)
For the time being the transfer of 1 regiment of the 23rd
Infantry Division to Denmark is postponed.
The Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the
b.
Replacement Army:
Three Walkuere II units are to be organized at once, and
(1)
arter brief training in the specified areas of home territory are to be
transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. The first
units of the division are to leave the training areas between 18 and 20
Jul. l942'. These units are to be concentrated primarily in the southwestern part of Holland and behind the Belgian coastal sector.
The transports designated for replacement of personnel
(2)
and materiel are to be sent to the West as quickly as possible.
c. _The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West directs the Armed
Forces Commanders, France and Belgium-Northern France to safeguard at
least one railroad line and one main highway to each of the especially
endangered areas as set forth under 2 a and 2 b, in order to avoid deIn the vicinity of important railroad stations
struction and sabotage.
and especially endangered traffic installations, hostages are to be
picked from among the nearby inhabitants, and it is to be announced
35
B-68
publicaly that these will answer with their lives for the safety of these
installations, if the inhabitants should participate in or tolerate
their destruction. All Dutch, Belgian, and French communities are required,under pain of very severe reprisals, to arrest and report at once
to the nearest military station any unknown person appearing in the community. The number of hostages is to be sufficient to accomplish the
purpose.
Near especially important and greatly endangered objectives,
personnel and equipment is to be held in readiness for quick repair.
4.
By agreement with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, the
Air Force will gather all available forces of the 7th Airborne Division
and of the Goering Brigade in their assembly areas and form them into
units for immediate
commitment;
the' Air Force will also transfer to
France two bomber groups from the eastern reserves of the Commander in
Chief, Air Force as per the latter's recommendation.
5.
The Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, the
Commanding General, Armed For~ces, West, and the Chief of Army Equipment
and Commanding General of the Replacement Army will report to me daily
at 0800 through the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff the
progress with regard to measures under paragraphs 3 and 4. These reports will set forth the state of affairs as of 1900 at the close of
the previous day.
In the event of an enemy landing I personally will proceed to the
6.
West and assume charge of operations from there.
signed in draft form:
Adolf Hitler
Handwritten note added by the Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, Naval

"I am of the opinion that in view of the
Staff Operations Division:
disastrous developments in Allied shipping the enemy feels forced to
eliminate our submarines and submarine bases in Germany as well as in
the west area by means of air attacks and landing operations of considOur first concern should
erable scope but with limited objective.
I believe that large-scale
therefore be to protect submarine bases,
Brest-Lorient, perhaps also
landing operations in Brittany aie a
It is not excluded that simulSt. Nazaire, are altogether possible.
taneously a smaller landing might be carried out in the Seine-Cherbourg
area for the purpose of-tying up our forces."
_ _ L_
36
L_
8-68
T~he
Fuehrer
Fuehrer
r. 51208
Headquarters,
11 Jul.
1942
No. 3 of 5 copies
2 g.K.Chefs.
Top Secret
Directive No. 43
Continuation of Operations in the Crimea.

1.
When the Kerch Peninsula has been mopped up and Sevastopol captured, it will be the next mission of the 11th Arm , while keeping the
Crimea secure, to make ala necessary
eparations
or the bulk of the
an the
of August,
Army to cross the Kerch Strait no later
with the objective of advancing to the southeast and east on both sides
of the western spurs of the Caucasus.
beginning
The code word "Bluecher" (secret) will be applied to the undertaking amn
the day of the landing will be called "Bl day".
2.
The following general directions are to be applied in carryin gout
the operation:
In accordance with the proposals of the 11th Army, the crossing is to
be planned with an eye to landing very strong units in the rear of the
enemy's coastal fortifications.
Then the high ground north of Novorossisk is to be taken. The harbors
ofAnapa and Novorossisk are to be captured, thus cutting off the enemy
fleet from these two naval bases.
After that the bulk of the operation is to be aimed in an easterly direction north of the Caucasus.
In this connection, it will be important
It will not be possible until later
to capture the area around Maikop.
to decide whether or not small units should also be employed along the
coastal highway on the Black Sea via Tuapse.
yiny
is to
For the purpose of carrying out this undertaking the 11th
keep the bulk of the light and medium flat trajectory gun batteries,
as well as high-angle gun batteries up to and including 21 cm. mortars,
and several of the chemical rocket projector detachments.
3.
The Nay will expedite all measures so that the shipping space required for the landing will be available when the Army requests it..
To meet this need suitable vessels will be chartered or bought from
Bulgaria and Rumania, in addition to those already available in the
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and those still to be brought up.
As for the undertaking itself, the Navy will support the landing force
and will protect landing operations against attacks from the enemy
fleet with the forces available.
While the crossing is going on, the naval forces carrying the invading
troops will be subordinate to the 11th Army.*
4.
As part of the preparatory measures, it will be the mission of the
Iandwritten marginal note:

sweepers, and submarines."
"But hardly the PT boats, motor mine
37
8-68
Air Force to put the enemy's harbors and naval forces

out of action to as great an extent as possible.
in the Black Sea
During the operation, in addition to giving direct support to the landing force, the Air Force is to do everything to prevent enemy naval forces
from interfering with the crossing:
Preparations are to be made for supplying the Army units landing on the
Tenryuk Peninsula from the air for several days.
The possibility of employing parachute and airborne troops is to be investigated. The 7th Airborne Division should if possible not-be used
It
for this purpose, in any event not more than a few of its units.
may be advisable to employ units of the 22nd Infantry Division as airborne troops.
preenin
to
An attempt is to be made to deceive the enemy by
5.
shift strong units of the 11th Army from the Crimea intot e area north
of the Sea of Azov. For this purpose a large-scale assembly movement
will be undertaken toward the north, while night marches are to screen
the initial assembly in connection with operation "Bluecher".
The Armed Forces High Command will take appropriate measures to help
mislead the enemy.
6.
The Army General Staff is to discuss the following preparatory

special missions directed by the Sabotage Section of the Intelligence
Armed Forces High Command (Amt Ausland/Ausvehr II) with
oion
is
that office, and if they are approved is to include them in operation
"Bluecher":
a.
Parachute jump of a squad in the area of Maikop to protect
the oil fields (operation "Schamil").
-b.
Sabotage mission against the railway triangle KrasnodarKropotkin-Tikhoretsk, as well as against the bridges over the Kuban
in that same area.
c.
Participation of a light engineer company of the Special
Duties Regiment "Brandenburg" (Lehrregiment) which was organized for
against enemy harbors and coastal injust
such missions, in the attack
stallations.
7.
In coordination with the Navy and the Air Force, the Army General
Staff will decide on the details of preparing and carrying out the oper-
ation.
I am to be kept informed through the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff as to the state of preparations (available shipping space)
and the forces to be employed.
signed:
38 -
Adolf Hitler
B-68
Fuehrer Directive concerning f'urther reinforcement of the African Panzer

Army (1/Ski 17069/4 Gkdos)*
(1)
The German Africa Corps, the 90th Light Division and the line
troops of the African Panzer Army are to be raised to their full strength
This
with respect to men and materiel and maintained at that level.
applies particularly to their complement of tanks and anti-tank weapons.
(2)
The following are to be furnished to the African Panzer Army
from the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast by air
transport if possible:
a,
The 433rd Infantry Regiment from the Salonika area:
The regiment is to be promptly supplied with additional anti-tank weapons,

particularly heavy guns, as well as armor-piercing ammunition to go with
A report is
them (hollow charge projectiles and stick hand grenades).
to be submitted concerning the amount of additional equipment received.
The staff of an artillery regiment (motorized). An artillery regib.
ment staff (motorized) from the Crete fortress division is being made
available for this purpose.
(3)
The requested organization offa corps headquarters staff and
In
2 divisions for the occupation of Egypt will not be carried out.
the event that such occupation troops become necessary they must be furnished by Italy.
The transport of the above is to be coordinated with the cur(4)
rent movement of supplies to the Panzer Army on a priority basis, by
arrangement with the Panzer Army.
21
Headquarters,
The Fuehrer
Fuehrer
p. Nr.55 -1275 42
0KW/WFS
Gkdos. Chefs.
No. 3 of eight copies
1942
Jul.
Top secret
Directive No.
44
Re: Warfare in Northern Finland.

1.
The operations against Timoshenko's armies, which are progressing
From Naval Staff War Diary, Part A, 13 July 1942,

*
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Special Item."
"Warfare in the
s-68
_39 -
more rapidly and more favorably than expected, are giving iise to the
hope that soon we may succeed in cutting off Soviet Russia from the
This would cut her off from her major oil source and from ore
Caucasus.
of the vital supply routes for British and American shipments.
Together with the loss of the entire Donets industry this would deal a
blow to the Soviet Union which would have immeasurable consequences.
Now it will be essential to cut the northern supply line as well,
2,
This is
which cortnects Soviet Russia wthtHe Anglo-American powers.
above all the Murman railroad, which carried the bulk of the materiel
nited States during the winter months. The
from Great Britain and he
importance of this supply route will increase again as soon as the season and the weather prevent successful operations against the convoys
in the north.
Therefore the 20th Mountain Army, in accordance with its proposal
3.
and in agreement with the 5th Air Force, is preparing to at\tack and
seize the Murman railroad near Kandalaksha in the fall.
We can count on the following in this connection:
Leningrad will be captured in September at 'the latest which
a.
will result in the release of Finnish forces.
The 5th Mountain Division will have been transferred to Finb.
land by the end of September.
The operation will be
attack will be called
given
the code name "Lachsfang" and the day of

L" day.
It will be desirable to combine a Finnish attack"against Belomorsk

with the offensive of the 20th Mountain rmy.
k.
The Liaison Staff, North, in agreement with the High Command of the 20th
Mountain Army, is to make the arrangements for this attack with the
Finnish Armed Forces Command.
Protection of the Finnish nickel production will remain the most
5.
important task of the 20th Mountain Army.
It must be stressed again with all seriousness that, should Finnish
nickel shipments cease, Germany could probably no longer manufacture
This
high-grade steel, above all for planes and submarine engines.
may have serious consequences for the outcome of the war.
Therefore the 20th Mountain Army must at any time be in a position to
send reinforcements needed by the Norway Mountain Corps for the fulfill-
ment of its
tasks.
Likewise the 5th Air Force, in case of an attack on the nickel area,
must concentrate all its efforts on defense, putting aside all other
tasks,
Operation "Wiesen rund" will not take place this year. However
6.
preparations are to be continued and stepped up so that the operation
can be carried out in the spring of 19+3 on short notice (o. 8 weeks).
Special attention should be given to the expansion and fortification
of air and supply bases, as the success of 'Wiesengrund",as well as the
defense against a large-scale enemy attack in the northern area depends
on them.
8-68
7.
The 20th Mountain Army and the Commander in Chief, Air will submit
their plans as soon as possible.
The Liaison Staff, North will report on Finnish plans with regard to
the attack against Belomorsk.
signed:
Fuehrer Headquarters,
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/ p.
Adolf Hitler
Nr.551288/42 g.K.Cheffs.
No. 3 of six
23 Jul.
1942
copies
Top secret
Directive No. 45
For the continuation of operation "Braunschweig"_
I.
In the course of a campaign of little more than 3 weeks, the farreaching objectives which I set for the southern.wing on the Eastern
Only a few small
Front have been attained to all intents and purposes.
forces of Timoshenkot's armies were able to evade encirclement and to
reach the southern bank of the Don. It is to be expected that they will
.be reinforced from the Caucasus area.
An additional enemy group is being assembled in the Stalingrad area,
where the enemy is evidently planning to put up a stiff defense.
II.
Objectives of further operations:

A.
Army:
1.
The next task of Army Group A will be to encircle and
annihilate the enemy forces south and'southeast of Rostov which escaped
across the Don.
For this purpose, strong, fast units from bridgeheads which are to be
established in the Konstantinovsk and Tsymlyansk areas are to be thrown
in in a general southwesterly direction, approximately at Tikhoretsk,
advance across
will
infantry, infantry, and mountain divisions
and light
the Don near Rostov.
In addition, as ordered previously, advanced units are to cut the rail
connection Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad.
Two tank units of Army Group A (among them the 24th Panzer Division) are
to be assigned to Army Group B in order to continue the operations to
the southeast.
B-68
Inffantry Division Grossdeutschland is not to advance further than the

Manych sector.
Preparations are to be made to transfer it to the west.
2.
After destro ing the enemmy forces south of the Don, it
will be the most important task of Aomy Group A to capture the entire
eastern coast of the Black Sea, and thus to eliminate the Black Sea harbors and the enemy Black Sea fleet,
For this purpose, the
assigned to this task
as the advance of the
proceed southeastward
parts of the 11th Army (Rumanian Mountain Corps)

are to be ferried across the Kerch Strait as soon
bulk of Army Group A becomes effective, and will
along the Black Sea coastal highway.
Another. force comprising all other mountain and light infantry divisions
is to fforce a crossing of the Kuban and to occupy the plateau of
Maikop and Armavir.
group, reinforced in time by the mountain
advance of this
In a further
units, toward and across the western part of the Caucasus, all pos ible
passes are to be utilized and the Black Sea coast is to be occupied in
cooperation with the 11th Army.
3..
At the same time a force to be formed mainly of fast
Grozny area, establishing flanking protection
units is to capture te
toward the east, and some of the forces are to block the highway from
Oretia to Grusier at the passes if possible.
Subsequently the Baku area is
Caspian Sea.
to be captured by an advance along the
The Army Group can expect the Italian

later.
Alpine Corps
to be brought up
This operation of Army Group A will be known by the cover name

"Edelweiss", classified as secret.
1+.
As previously mentioned, Arm
Group B has the task, in
y n a vance on Stalingrad
addition to establishing the Don defenses,
itself,
to smash the enemy forces being assembled there, occupy- the city
and block the land bridge between the Don and the Volga as well as the
river itself.,
Subsequently, fast units are to proceed along the Volga, with orders to
advance to Astrakhan, and to block the main branch of the Volga there
as well.
These operations of Army Group B will be known by the cover name
as secret.
"Fischreiher", classified
B.
Air Force:
The task of the Air Force consists primarily in supporting

with strong forces the Amy's crossing of the Don and the advance of
the eastern group along the railroad to Tikhoretsk, and in concentrating
its forces in order to annihilate the Timoshenko army group.
In addition, the operations of Army Group B against Stalingrad and the
Special importance
western part of Astrakhan are to be supported.
Furthermore,
should be given to destroying Stalingrad at an early date.
occasional air attacks should be launched against Astrakhan. Shipping
on the lower Volga should be disrupted by mines.
B-68
-42-2
Durin
further operations the Air Force should concentrate on cooperating

harbors,
Besides directly supporting the Army, the Air Force in cooperation with the Navy should prevent enemy naval forces from interfering.
with
forces advancing on the Black Sea
Also sufficient forces are to be provided to cooperate in the advance on

Baku via Grozny.
Because of the decisive importance of the petroleum production of the
Caucasus for the continuation of the war, air attacks should not be
carried out on the production centers and tank installations there as
well as on the ports of transshipment in the Black Sea unless this is
absolutely necessary for the Army operations.
In order to disrupt the
enemy's oil supply from the Caucasus as soon as possible, it is especially
important to cut the railroads and pipe lines still functioning, as well
as the shipping routes in the Caspian Sea, at an early date.
C.
Navy:
In addition to direct support of the Army in crossing the

Kerch Strait, it is the task of the Navy with the available Black Sea
forces to prevent interference of enemy naval forces with the operations
on the Black Sea coast.
In order to facilitate shipment of Army supplies, several naval barges
are to be brought through the Kerch Strait to the Don as soon as possible.
Furthermore, the 1Navy is making preparations to commit light naval forces in the Caspian Sea, in order to harass enemy sea communications
(oil transports and connection with the Anglo-American forces in Iran).
III. The local operations in the areas of the Central and Northern Arm
Grows should be carried out as quickly as possible. These operations
s ouX result in smashing and scattering the enemy commands and forces
to the greatest possible extent.
The Northern Army Group is preparing to capture Leningrad in the begin(Tr.N.: "Feuerzauber" is
of September, cover name 'Feuerzauber'
For this purcrossed out and replaced in the margin by "Nordlicht".)
pose 5 divisions of the 11th Army as well as heavy artillery and other
necessary Army troops are to be sent there as reinforcements.
ning
Two German and two Rumanian divisions are to be left in the Crimea for
the 22nd Division, as already ordered, is to be asthe time being;
signed to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast.
with
I.
I call attention to my order of 12 Jul. concerning securit
regard to the further handling of this directive and rela e or era
and instructions.
signed:
countersigned:
__
Adolf Hitler
Warlimont
+3
B-68
The
Fuehrer IHeadquarters, 18 Aug. 1942
Fuehrer
OARV W
No.
Q0
24 of thirty copies
Secret
Directive No. 46
General directions for the intensified
fight against banditry
in the
East.
A.
In
general:
I.
Banditry inthe East.has
in the last few months grown to an
unbearable went
and tea
ens
to become a serious menace to the supplying of the front and the economic exploitation of the country.
Before the onset of winter these bands must be practically routed out,
in order to bring peace to the rear areas in the East and to avoid serious consequeices for the strategy of the Armed Forces in winter.
The following will be required for this purpose:
1.
A quick, thoroughgoing, and vigorous campaign against the
bandits, using a concentration of all suitable military, SS,
and police
forces which can be released for this purpose.
2.
politics
The concentration of all means of propaganda, economics, and.

upon the needs of the campaign against banditry.
II. The following

ities concerned in
general principles are to be observed by all authortaking military, police, and economic measures:
1.
Combatting the bandits is as much a matter of strata
as
fighting the enemy at the front. This task
o
organized and led
by the same staffs provided for the front.
is
be
2.
The destruction of banditry .requires a vigorous cam ai n and
the harshest measures against all who have a
organz ng te
bands. or are guilty of aiding them. Detailed directions for combatting
banditry will follow.
3.
The necessary confidence of the population in German leadership has to be earned by strict
but just handling of the people.
1.
A prerequisite for the destruction of the bandits is
surance of a subsistence minimum for the population. If we do
ceed in this, and especially if we do not assure the equitable
bution of existing supplies, the consequence will be that more
,will join the bandits.
the asnot suc-
distrirecruits
5.
The cooperation of the inhabitants is indispensable in the
fight against banditry. Rewards for deserving persons must be generous;
On the other hand the punishments for
they must offer a real incentive.
any assistance to the bandits must be very harsh.
6.
Unwarranted confidence in members of the native population,
especially in those who are employed by the German authorities, is to
be discouraged in the strongest possible manner. Even though the bulk
of the population is opposed to the bandits we have to reckon everywhere
with, informers.
44-
B-68
B.
Command authority and responsibility:
1.
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police:
The Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police is

the central authority for the collection and evaluation of all information referring to the campaign against banditry.
Moreover, the Reichsfuehrer SS has sole responsibility for the campaign
against the bandits in German-occupied Russia, the "Reichskommissariate".
the duties
The Armed Forces theater commanders are to support himin
arising out of this through the coordination of their own activities,
as well as through putting at his disposal, if occasion arises, their
As far as military
command organizations, supplies, and equipment.
security duties,which are to be solved locally and as vigorously as possible, permit, high SS and police officials are also to be provided
with temporary reinforcements from the Armed Forces, should they be required.
Closest cooperation between high SS and police officials and the Armed
Forces theater commanders is the prerequisite of success.
2.
Army:
In the theater of operations the Chief of the Army General Staff has the sole responsibi 1 ity for combatting banditry. In the
performance of the ensuing tasks the police forces stationed in the
theater of operations are subordinated to the respective theater commanders, in addition to the forces assigned for this purpose by the
Army. The theater commanders are to entrust command in individual cases
either to Army officers or to high SS or police officials, according to
the situation, the forces used. and the available ranks.
C.
Forces:
1.
Forces of the Reichsfuehrer SS:
The available police and SS formations provided for

Their asfighting banditry are meant first of all for active combat.
signment for other security tasks is to be avoided. It is desirable to
augment the police and SS forces in the East and to transfer a considerable number of other organizations subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer
Formations still assigned to the front
SS to the imperiled regions.
but indispensable for fighting against banditry in the rear areas are
to be relieved by the Army as soon as possible and placed at the disposal of the Reichsfuehrer SS for duty in their proper area.
2.
Army forces:
To facilitate more intensive garrisoning of the vast

eastern territories behind the fighting front, I order the following:
At the time when German-occupied Poland (the
a.
Generalgouvernement) passes into the home theater, two reserve divisions
are to be transferred there.
A total of five reserve divisions are to be transb.
ferred by 15 Oct. 1942 to the spheres of the Commanding General, East
and the Commanding General, Ukraine.
All units, offices, establishments and schools of
o.
the field army are to be removed by 1 Oct. 1942 to the tReiohskonmmisariatel
6
-
15
9-68
or to the theater of operations, unless they pass into the jurisdiction

of the Commander off the Replacement Army. Where an exception is necessary, it
may be made only by permission of the Chief of Staff
of the
Armed Forces High Command.
e.
The orders required to carry out stipulations a.
to
d. will be issued by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Coimmand.
3.
Air forces:
To reinforce the occupation troops in the East, the

Commander in Chief, Air will have Air Force establishments transferred
territories.,
to' bandit-infested
4.
Local enlistments:
Locally enlisted personnel proved to be especially well

for fighting against-bandits may be maintained insofar as men
and are available ou a
dependable and eager to fight
who are absolutely
fitted
voluntary basis are used.

Their assignment at the front or the use of
emigrees or leaders of the former intelligentsia will continue to be
forbidden.
Insofar as this has not yet been done, the Army General Staff is to
work out for these units uniform stipulations concerning,status in the
service, rank, uniforms, and training similar to those prevailing for
the Turk formations,* and is to have them approved by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces High Command, German insignia of rank and national
insignia (Hoheitsabzeichen), as well as shoulder.straps of the Armed
Forces, are prohibited. Thedependents of these men are to be provided
for. The amount of money and supplies allotted is to. correspond with
the. amount of demonstrated active service.. Allotments of land on a preferential basis are to be handled according to directives and as generously as .possible.
5.
Additional Forces:
officials,
The Labor Service (RAD), railway workers, forest
and agricultural supervisors, etc., are to be better supplied with arms,
so far as this is still necessary. They are to be enabled to protect
themselves with the most effective weapons possible.
There must be no Germans left in the bandit-infested regions who are not
e aged either actively or passively in the fight against the bandits.
signed:
Certified as a
true copy:
Adolf Hitler
lauptmann
Personnel largely from Turkestan and the Caucasus with Qrman cadres.
46 -
B- 68
The above directive has been translated from the copy in the ofNote:
The same file contains a supplement, referring
fice files of Gen. Jodl.
to section 4, paragraph 1 and signed by Gen, Warlimont, (Armed Forces
High Commands, No. 002739/43 g.K./WFSt./Op., dated 23 June 1943) to the
effect that the Fuehrer has ordered that the locally enlisted personnel
not be further stre thened". The copy in the Jodl file already carries
the modified text.
FueBrer Headquarters,
The Fuebrer
oKWAI-WFSt/op.Nr.
03142/42 Gkdos,
No.
14 Sep.
942'
5 of 19 copies
Seeret
Re:
Reinforcement
of Crete and North Africa
Aside from strong reinforcements which Britain and America have

1.
there are also other into the Middle East recently,
been transporting
not only to maintain
dications that the enemy will make every effort
his positions in the Middle East but also to bring the entire Mediterranean once more under his control.
One of the first and most important objectives in accomplishing this
would be to reconquer Crete. Britain has recognized the present weakness of the occupation of Crete, as well as the great importance which
this island has for the eastern Mediterranean and for the fight in
Egypt.
A large-scale enemy attack on Crete must therefore be expected in the
near future, especially since it will not be easy for the enemy to conquer the strong positions of the German-Italian Panzer Army in Egypt,
and in all probability great sacrifices will be connected therewith.
2.
I therefore order:
a.
Crete:
The island should be strongly reinforced against a largeThe Commanding General,

scale attack from the air and from the sea.
Armed Forces, Southeast should make the necessary preparations with
The experiences gained during the
the greatest energy and dispatch.
British landing attempts in Norway and France should be taken into consideration. The latest experiences at Dieppe will be transmitted by
It must be expected that the heaviest
the Armed Forces High Command.
tanks (Churchill) will be used at all suitable points.
In order to reinforce the German troops, to begin with the 22nd Infantry
4-
B-68
47th
Division (without the

Infantry Regiment) is to be transferred to
Crete in its present organization, equipped with motor vehicles and'
armament suitable for Crete. Furthermore, three fortress infantry battalions are to be organized for use in Crete later,
For this purpose,
three of the five rifle battalions becoming available in Poland as the
result of the action of the Special. Duties Staff of the Armed Forces High
Command can be used. They will be ready for action on 1 Dec. Furthermore, the coastal artillery and the modern mobile anti-tank defenses are
to be reinforced.
Coastal sectors suitable for enemy landings, especially the harbors and
airfields, are to be reinforced quickly according to instructions issued
for the French west coast.
In order to carry out these instructions, three additional fully
equipped Army coastal artillery detachments and anti-invasion guns, the
latter without crews, are to be transferred to Crete after the 22nd
Infantry Division. Work on the positions should begin at once.
The Commander in Chief, Navy will report to me to what extent the coastal
artillery can be reinforced by the Navy.
47th
The
Infantry Regiment will remain at the disposal of the Commanding
General, Armed Forces, Southeast in the present area for the time being,
with its present equipment.
Transfer of reinforcements of personnel and equipment to Crete should
begin at once, and is to be increased as soon as the supply of the
German-Italian Panzer Army in North Africa has been sufficiently assured. At that time, some of the ships from the Africa traffic are to
be withdrawn for the shipments to Crete, unless by then some of the
ships ceded to us by the French have become available.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast will report the date
when the Army coastal artillery detachments should be ready for transfer
in Greece following transfer of the 22nd Infantry Division.
Plans for the reinforcement of the Crete fortifications are to be reported with schedules and exact maps by 15 Oct. according to instructions
Regardless of these
from the General of Engineers and Fortifications.
new fortification measures, present reinforcements are to be accelerated
with.all means and through increased use of civilian labor.
The Armed Forces High Command will reach an agreement with the Italian
High Command on the following points:
(a)
Transfer of usable Italian coastal artillery on special
ships.
(b)
Transfer of Italian construction-troops to speed up work
on fortifications.
(e)
The date for transferring to Crete the Italian troops
intended for this purpose.
b.
Africa:
Because of the revival of Malta as an air base and the

(1)
numerous sinkings in the Mediterranean, supplies for the 1st Panzer
Army have fallen far below normal requirements. Unless Malta is weakened
or paralyzed once more, this situation cannot be remedied. The Commander
in Chief, Air will report whether and when additional air forces can be
48
B-68
made available to the Commanding General, Armaed Forces, South.

(2)
No additional German units can be transferred to the
German-Italian Panzer Army at the present time.
Instead, the forces in North Africa at present are to receive additional
equipment.
I therefore order:
(a)
Army:
(i)
Transfer of additional anti-tank weapons.
(ii) Addition of light Army anti-aircraft guns.

(iii) Continuous addition of tanks to Africa, including the very heaviest.
(iv)
(b)
Further transfer
of large numbers' of mines.
Air Force:
The Air Force has already been ordered to provide

the new 8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns in as large numbers as possible for
North Africa, especially for anti-tank defense.
8.8 cm. anti-aircraft guns being used in North Africa especially for the
protection of the harbors can be handed over to the Italians, when the
necessary Italian crews have been trained.
This makes it possible to
reinforce the anti-aircraft defenses directly behind the front after
new equipment has been brought up.
signed:
The Fuebrer
OKW/WFS
r.
Adolf Hitler
I'OP
13 Oct. 1942
E5jTj3/42
g.K.Chefs.
No. 4 of five copies
Top secret
1.
In order to assure unified command in the Mediterranean, the'Commander in Chief, South assumes responsibility also for preparing and
carrying out defense measures on all coasts in the Mediterranean and
the Aegean Seas which are occupied by German troops (with the exception
of the German-Italian Panzer Army.), including.,fortress Crete.
The Commander in Chief, South is directly under my command in this
-9
8-68
matter
in
accordance
with directive
in
other matters to the Duce and in
in
Chief, Air.
40, regardless
of his
subordination
Air Force matters to the Commander
2.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces,. Southeast, with his subordinate commands and installations, will have to obey the directives of the
It is up to
Commanding General, Armed Forces, South in these matters.
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, SouthT5 etermine in which
coastal sectors
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast should
retain independent command.

The Commanding Generals, South and Southeast will agree upon transfer of
command.
The date is to be reported to me together with details of the
arrangements made.
3.
The Commanding General, Armed
Forces,
istration of the Greek area, inclusive

under Italy.
4.
Nothing is
changed in
Southeast retains the admin-
of Crete,
the administrative
insofar as
command of the
this is not
troops.
5.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command will issue
any necessary executive orders, as soon as the-new arrangement has gone
Any requests and experiences should be reported to me
into effect.
by 15 Nov. 1942 through the Armed Forces High Command.
signed:. Adolf
Fuebrer Headquarters
The Fuebrer
hr.
003830/42
Hitler
Gkdos./OKW/WFSt.
18 Oct.
194{2
Copy
Secret
1.
For some time now our enemies have been employing certain methods
Esof warfare which are not in accordance with the Geneva convention.
pecially brutal and underhanded are the methods of the so-called commandos,
which, as has been established, even include former criminals who have
Captured orders show that they are
been released in enemy countries.
instructed not onlyto tie prisoners, but ev.efn simply to kill defenseless prisoners when they find that these interfere in any way with their
Finally orders
missions.
as a matter of principle.
were found demanding. that prisoners be
killed
2.
Therefore it was announced following the Armed Forces communique of
that in the future Germany will resort to the same measures
7 Oct. 192
toward these sabotage troops of the British and their hirelings, which
means that the German troops. will ruthlessly annihilate them in battle
wherever they appear.
-50-
B-68
3.
Therefore I order:
From now on during all so-called commando raids in Europe and in Africa,
enemy forces encountered by German troops, even when they are soldiers
in uniform or demoqlition troops with or without- weapons, will be killed
to the last man in-battle or in flight.
It makes absolutely no difference
whether they landed by ship, plane, or parachute.
Even if these individuals appear to be trying to give themselves up, they should not be
spared as a matter of principle. A detailed report should be made to
the Armed Forces High Command in each case, so that it can be announced
in the Armed Forces communique.
4.
If members of such commando detachments fall into the hands of the
Armed Forces as agents, saboteurs, or in some other way, e.g., through
the police in countries occupied by us, they should be given over immediately to the SS secret police.
It is strictly forbidden to keep
them under military guard, e.g., in prisoner of war camps, etc., even
temporarily.
5.
This regulation does not apply to enemy soldiers who are taken
prisoner or surrender in the course of normal fighting (large-scale
attacks, large-scale landing operations, and large-scale paratroop landings).
Likewise these regulations do not apply to enemy personnel
captured following battles at sea or who try to save themselves by,
parachute jumps following air battles.
6.
All officers will be answerable, under threat of court martial, if

they fail to instruct their troops kbout this order or if they act contrary to it.
signed:

of the Armed Forces
Adolf Hitler
18 Oct.
19+2
Top secret
I have been forced to release a sharp order for the destruction of

enemy sabotage troops, and to announce severe punishment for not carryI feel that it is necessary to inform the various commanders
ing it out.
of the reasons behind this order.
As at no time in the past, methods have been developed in this' war for
disrupting rear communications, intimidating groups cooperating with
Germany, and destroying industrial installations in occupied territories
important to the war effort.
In the East this method took the form of partisan warfare which, starting last winter, has seriously affected our striking power, has cost
B-68
51 -
~P~P"iYZ~L
the lives of numerous German soldiers, railroad men, members of the Todt
Organization and of the Labor Service, etc., and has to an extreme degree
curtailed
transports
to the armed forces, often paralyzing them for
days.
If these activities continue or are intensified, they may cause a serious crisis at some sectors off the front. Many of our measures against
this cruel and underhanded sabotage activity are ineffective simply because the German officers and their men are unaware of the extent of the
danger and therefore do not take sufficiently decisive measures against
these partisans ,to help our front lines and thus the entire war effort.
Therefore it was necessary at some places in the East to organize German
units to cope with this danger, or to entrust special SS formations
with this task.
Only where the fight against the partisans was waged
with ruthless brutality were results achieved which relieved the troops
fighting at the front.
In the entire East area, therefore, the war against the

fight of extermination on both sides.
partisans is a
As soon as a unit has realized this fact, it has been able to dispose of
the partisans in short order.
Otherwise its efforts have resulted in
no decisive success, and are thus useless.
Britain and America have decided on the same methods, even though under
a different name.
While the Russians try to get partisans behind our
lines overland, and resort to air transport for landing troops and supplies only in exceptional cases, the British and Americans utilize primarily submarines, rubber boats and parachutes for landing sabotage
troops and agents. Basically, however, this method is no different from
Russian partisan warfare, since the task of these troops is as follows:
To organize a general spy system with the help of willing mem1.
bers of the local population.
2.
To organize terrorist groups and to equip them with the necessary weapons and explosives.
3.
To instigate sabotage acts which by constantly destroying
traffic installations not only disrupt our communications but could also
make troop movements entirely impossible in an emergency.
Finally these troops are to commit sabotage by blowing up key plants
according to scientifically worked out plans in order to paralyze entire industries.
I do not know
The consequences of such activities are extremely grave.
whether all commanders and officers are aware of the fact that the destruction of one single electric plant, for example, can deprive the
Air Force of many thousand tons of aluminum and thus of numerous planes
This can lead to the most serious damage
the front.
which are needed at
to the home territory and to very heavy losses among the soldiers at
the front.
At the same time this type of warfare is entirely without danger for the
since the sabotage troops are landed in uniform but are also
enemy;
provided with civilian clothes, they can appear as either soldiers or
While they themselves have orders ruthcivilians as the need arises.
lessly to eliminate German soldiers or even civilians of the occupied
countries who interfere with their activities, they run no real danger
of suffering serious losses themselves, since when worst comes to worst
they can surrender at once and thus consider that they theoretically
come under the regulations of the Geneva convention. There is no doubt
B-68
52 -
that this is the most serious misuse of the Geneva agreements, especially
since some of the persons involved are even criminals released from
prison who are to rehabilitate themselves through such actions.
Therefore Britain and America will have no difficulty in finding volunteers for such missions, as long as they are able to tell them that they
run no real danger of any kind. All they need to do is to carry out
their missions against people, communications, or other installations,
and then, if discovered, simply to surrender.
Unless German warfare is to suffer serious setbacks as the result of
such activities, the enemy must be given to understand that all sabotage
troops will be exterminated to the last man without exception. That
means that the chances of survival are nil.
Therefore it can in no case
be tolerated that sabotage, demolition or terrorist troops simply surrender, are taken prisoner, and are treated in accordance with the Geneva
convention. On the contrary, they must be annihilated under all circumstances.
The report which will appear in the Armed Forces communique will be
quite brief and laconic, stating that a sabotage, terror, or demolition
troop was discovered and annihilated to the last man.
Therefore I expect that all commanders will not only recognize the
necessity for such. procedure, but will do everything in their power to
carry out these orders. Any officers or non-commissioned officers who
fail to do so for any reason at all are to be reported at once regardless, or possibly, if it is dangerous to delay, are to be brought to
task at once. Both the home front and.the soldier in combat have a
right to expect that supplies of food and of weapons and ammunition are
maintained.
These are the reasons for my order.
If it should be necessary temporarily to spare one or two men for interrogation, they should be shot at once afterwards.
signed:
OKW/1FSt Nr. 552136/42 Gkdos. Chefs.
Adolf Hitler
Berlin,
k December 19+ 2
Top secret
Telegram sent by the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to the
Naval Staff and from-there to Naval Group West.
Re: Preliminary directive for the preparation off-the defenses of the'
coast of continental France.
riditerranean
A.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West is responsible for
53-
B- 68
preparation and execution of the deffenses
of the French Mediterranean
coast.
4th
Italian Army is under his operational command for this purB.

The
pose in agreement with the Italian High Command.
This does not affect
the administrative command of
the Italians.
The demarcation line between Army Group Felber and the
4th
Italian Army
Lyon
St. Julien (southwest of Geneva) (Italian);
is as follows:
the
(German);
the Rhone River as far as north of Avignon (German);
Durance River as far as north of Peyrolles en Provence, Peyrolles-Trets(Map 1:500,000.)
De La Ciotat (German).
Cuges Les Pins (Italian);
The highway and railroad on the eastern bank of the Rhone are at.the disposal of German transports and movements to the extent needed.
C.
General directives:
Directive
40
governs command authority,
organization,
fortifications,
and fighting procedure.

D.
The following special
1.
orders are issued:
Replacement by the
a.
The Italians
Italian
will
4th
Army:
take over
the area assigned
to them in
such a way that adequate occupation and defense are assured.
can land
b.
It must be provided that German air forces if necessary
Requests
on airfields in the Italian occupied area at any time.
of the Italian
4th
Army for German antiaircraft
occupied area can be
artillery
in
the Italian-
granted insofar as possible and advisable.
c.
All usable ships, including those in the area to be taken,
over by the Italians, are to be placed and used under German control for
Other ships are to be handed over to the Italians in the
the time being.
The naval arsenal at Toulon recourse of the transfer of the harbors.
The Armed Forces High Command will arrange the
mains in German hands.
matter with the Italians.
2.
Forces:
a.
The fact that divisions must be sent to the East, and the
necessity of keeping greater reserves available in the West, force us
to limit the forces on the southern coast in favor of the more endangered
Army, only 3
In addition to the Italian
north and west coasts.
4th
German inffantry divisions under Army Group Felber are to be assigned for
the defense of the southern coast for the time being.
A mobile force is to be formed from the 7th Panzer
(1)
b.
Division and additional forces according to the directive of the.Commaning General, Armed Forces, West, which is to be disposed in such a way
that it can be used to prevent landings on the Mediterranean coast and
on thxe southern sector of the Atlantic coast, and also be available for
"Gisela".
operation
The SS Deathshead Division and the 328th Infantry
(2)
Division are to be transferred back to the specified areas for rehabiliThe divisions are to remain in the area of the 1st Army as
tation.
planned, so they can be used for operation "Gisela" on short notice.

(3)
The special detachments .(Einsatzverbaende) of
the
B-68
54
reserve divisions are to be returned to these divisions to bring theme

the special detachments should be kept available for
up to strength;
possible other tasks.
3.
Coastal artillery:
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West is to report:
a.
How many batteries will be needed on the southern coast,
specifying separately how many crews are needed for French batteries,
and how many entire units are needed.
b.
How many of these batteries have been or can be supplied
by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West and the Navy, Army and
Navy batteries listed separately.
4.
8k-Fortification:
Field fortifications are to be constructed speedily, utilizFurther construcing the numerous available old French fortifications.
tion orders will be issued by the General of Engineers and Fortifications.
The Naval Staff
l/Skl. Ia 2606/i2 Gkdos.Chefs.
Secret
Fuehrer Headquarters, 5 Dec. 1942
No. 1 of three copies.
Circular Telegram:
Until the Fuehrer's detailed directive which is expected in the near

future regarding the questions of utilization and command of the
coastal artillery is issued, the following guiding principles concerning further improvement, based on the Fuehrer's oral statements, will
be observed:
1.
The basic principles of Directive No.
40
will remain in force.
All suitable batteries are to be utilized to oppose the enemy in the

forward area of the coast, which is of decisive importance. In this
the Navy will have sole command and controlling influence.
On the other hand, the Army will retain complete command in land
operations.
Only those coastal batteries which are absolutely unsuited for
2.
firing upon targets at sea, and which were previously set up as a temporary expedient, are to beset aside by the naval commanders and placed
at the disposal of the Army for other uses.
B-68
55 -
Batteries suitable for combatting both targets at sea and an enemy

3.
ashore are to be determined and set up by armed forces area commanders
or commanders in chief and the proper naval commanders in joint agreement. The mission of combatting targets at sea will have priority here.
If no agreement can be reached, the Fuebrer's decision is to be requested
through the Armed Forces High Command, both sides submitting the necessary data.
4.
Reports with reference to paragraph 2 and 3 are to be submitted by

1 Jan. 1943 to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command
WFSt/Op No. 004688/42 g.Kdos.
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 55273/42 Gkdos.Chefs.
28 Dec. 1942
No. 6 of 24 copies
Top secret
Directive No.
.47
Command organization and defense in the southeast area
The situation in the Mediterranean area permits the possibility of

I.
attacks on Crete and the German and Italian bases in the Aegean Sea and
on the Balkan peninsula in the near future.
These attacks will probably be supported by uprisings in the western
Balkan countries.
Increased influence of the Anglo-American powers
Turkey required greater attention.
situation
of this
On the basis
II.
General,
I charge the Commandi
fense of the southeast area,
on the attitude
of
and the developments in North Africa,

Armed Forces, Southeast with the de-
including the adjacent islands.
This com-
mander (Army Group R) will be directly under me.

Directive 40 applies to organization of coastal defense.
The Army forces of our allies will be placed under the tactical command
of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast only in case of an
enemy attack.
At such time the naval and air forces of our allies will be placed under
the tactical command of the German Navy and Air Force.
B-68
56 -
This command organzation will become effective by special order.

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast will have to make the
following preparations for this purpose:
1.
Preparation of coastal defenses, with emphasis on the Dodecarse
eloponnesos, were fortifications are to be
islands, Crete, and the
erected (with the exception of Mytilene and Chios).
Final cleaning up of the rear area and extermination of rebels
2.
and bands of all kinds in cooperation with the Italian 2nd Army.
3.
Preparation of all measures in agreement with the Bulgarian
High Command which will become necessary in case of an enemy attack on

the Balkans with the consent or support of Turkey.
In addition, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast will handle
the following measures for the German area:
Unified sea transports and their protection in the Aegean Sea, ineluding Crete.~g
Sea and land supplies for all German forces in the southeast area,
in accordance wither e r requirements and the available transport space.
Power of decision in all questions pertaining to unified transport

and communications o the three branches of the Armed Forces in the ocarea.
cupied southeast
III. Command organization:

A.
In the German area:

i.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast is the
highest representative of the Armed Forces in the southeast and is the

final authority in the territory occupied by German troops.
He has charge of the civil administration set up by the various
com-
manders, including that of Crete.

The subordination of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast to,
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will be cancelled on 1, Jan.
1943.
2.
The following will be under the Commanding General,
Forces, Southeast:
Armed.
a.
In the Croatian area, the "German General in Croatia"
ommander of Ger(aside from his capacity as Military Attache) and the
manTroops in Croatia".
Oen eSea,
b.
Serbia".
For the area of former Serbia,
the "Commanding
For the area of Salonika and the islands Lemnos,

c.
Mytilene, Chios, and Strati, as well as for the neutral zone near
Turkey in Thrace, the "Commander, Salonika-Aegean".
For the area of the harbor of Piraeus, the billets
d.
and area of the German troops in Attica, as well as the island of Melos,
the "Commander. Southern Greece".
e.
For the Crete area, "Fortress Commander, Crete".

8-68
57 -
f.
The
g.
The
"Admiral, Aegean
Sea"
in all matters of coastal
defense.
beyond those connected

As regards the
and the German
3.
"Military Attache, Sofia" as regards his tasks
with his immdate offfice as Attache,
Navy,
the previous division between Naval Group South

Naval Command, Italy
remains in effect.
Air Force:
a.
Aerial warfare:
(1) The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will

retain command over all aerial warfare in te entire Mediterranean area
with the exception or the southern French
aediterranean area.
He will
receive instructions as follows:
(a)
In the central Mediterranean from the
Italian High Command.

(b)
In the eastern Mediterranean and the
Balkan area from the Commander in Chief, Air according to my directives.
The Commander in Chief, Air and the Italian High Command will reach an
agreement on the basic objectives of aerial warfare.
(2)
In order to'assure unified warfare in the
eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan area, .especially in coastal defense, during combined operations, the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South is to designate a command post which is to cooperate with the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, East in matters of aerial warfare in
this area. This includes organization of the ground forces in the Balkan
area and preparations for cooperation with our allies in case of enemy
attacks.
b.
Air defenses:
(1)
Preparation and direction of air defenses in
the central Mediterranean is the task of the Commanding General, Armed
Forces, South under the Italian High Command.
In the Balkan area the Commanding General,
(2)
Armed Forces, Southeast is in charge of preparation and direction of
air defenses, according to the instructions of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South, in order to assure unified aerial warfare in the
eastern Mediterranean as well.
B.
Close cooperation with our allies is to assure the proper
preparations for warfare and mopping up operations within the areas in
question. -Liaison officers are to be exchanged if this has not been
done already.
The following guiding principles should be kept in mind:
1.
Italy:
a.
Army:
Regulations which seem necessary forthe Italian

area should be submitted to the Armed Forces High Command, which will
The latter will then issue
discuss them with the Italian High Command.
B-68
-
58
the necessary orders to the Italian forces in the southeast area.,

b.
Navy:
Instructions by the German Naval Group South intended for the Italian Admiral, Dodecanese should be submitted by Naval
Group South in draft form to the Naval Staff, which will discuss the
necessary orders with the Italian Naval High Command.
The Italian Naval
High Command will issue corresponding orders after procuring the consent
of the Italian
High Command.
c.
Air Force:
Regulations considered necessary for the Italian

Air Force in the southeast area are to be submitted to the Commanding
General, Armed Forces, South, who will discuss them with the Italian
Air Force, after procuring the approval of the Italian High Command,
and will have the necessary orders issued.
2.
Bulgria:
It is hoped to make similar arrangements with the Bulgarian armed forces (the result of the conferences with the Bulgarians is
not yet known).
3.
Croatia:
Cooperation with Croatia and commitment of the Croatian

armed forces will be handled as heretofore.
The
-Air
the
the
Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and German naval and

Force commands have the obligation to assure unified preparation of
defenses in the entire southeast area, and are entitled to examine
measures ordered for this purpose.
IV. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast exercises the command authorit
of a territorial commander as regards the three branches
a fen SS) in the German-occupied
SS
of
Armed Forces and the Arnie
parts of Croatia, Serbia, and Greece, including the Greek islands.
the
The areas occupied solely by German troops are considered operational

areas.
In these areas the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast
has f7inal authority through his subordinate commanders.
Also the parts of Croatia which are occupied 'by German troops, or in
which German troops are operating are considered operational areas.
In Italian-occupied areas in which German troops are quartered, the
Comraning General, Armed Forces, Southeast has military authority for
all branches of the Armed Forces insofar as required by the tasks of the
German Armed Forces.
See annex for the division of authority between the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast and the "Reich Deputy for
Greece"..
V.
Directive 31 of 9 Jun. 1941 and OKW/VWFSt/Op.Nr.55l73/12
of 13 Oct. 1942 are cancelled herewith.
signed:
g.K.
Chefs.
Adolf Hitler
8-68
-
59-
Annex to OKW/WFSt 552273/42 g.K.Chefs. of 28 Dec. 1942
Division of Authority Between the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
or Greee".
Southeast and the "Reich Deputy
I.
The relationship between the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast and the Reich Deputy for Greece, as well as the relationship
between these two and the Greek government are defined by the following:
A.
The Fuehrer order of
28 Apr. 1941
to the Reich Deputy for
Greece:
"1.
I appoint a Reich Deputy for Greece.
are at Athens.
His headquarters
2.
The Reich Deputy is to represent German political, economic,and cultural interests in Greece at the new Greek government until
formal diplomatic relations with Greece are resumed.
3.
The Reich Deputy furthermore is to maintain the contact
necessary for his
tasks with the
Italian occupational authorities."
B.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast exercises final
authority in German-occupied areas.
II. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast should support
the Reich Deputy and discuss his measures in Greece with him.
III. In
economic,
general the Reich Deputy, Greece will handle political
and cultural problems.
He will represent German interests
ithese~
ields in Greece.
The Reich Deputy, Greece will keep the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast informed about matters of foreign policy which are necessary
for military operations.
IV.
In plans of military nature, which may have foreign repercussions,
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast should reach an agreement ahead of time with the Reich Deputy for Greece insofar as the strategic situation permits.
rho aganda in Greece.,
The Foreign Office is in charge of directing
V.
the Armed
as far as it affects Germany, cooperating in this matter
Forces High Command (Propaganda Division).
with
-6 -
B-68
The Armed Forces High Command
Fuehrer
552344/42 g.K.Chefs. WFSt/Op.
3 Jan. 1943
Headquarters
No. 3 of ten copies

Top secret
Nr.
Ref.:
OKI/GenStdH/Op.Abt.(I)
(operations order No. 2.
421042/42 g.K.Chefs. of 28 Dec. 1942

Translator's note:
not included.)
The Fuehrer has issued the following order in supplement to the directive
for warfare on the southern sector of the Eastern Front:
1.
West-East movements:
As a result of the early transfer of mobile and infantry divisions from

the West to the East and to Tunisia, previously planned exchanges between
West and East are cancelled.
It is all the more necessary to transfer to the West as soon as possible
fatigued units from the East, which are only of limited value there, aid
to rehabilitate them in the West. For this purpose, in addition to the
st Panzer Division, first of all the personnel of at least two other
mobile forces should be transferred to the West as quickly as possible,
as well as the SS Police Division, as soon as it can be relieved.
In the West the "Kriemhilde" divisions (motorized) are to be equipped

speedily,. and the 26th Panzer Division is to be made ready for action
as quickly as possible.
The Special Duties General Command and the units belonging to it are
to be pulled out-of the southern wing of the Eastern Front during the
The same applies to the
withdrawing movements for transfer to Tunisia.
parts of the "Brandenburg" force still at Army Group A.
The Army General Staff is to report its plans pertaining to these matters, as well as pertaining to the transfer to the West of the 328th
Division.
2.
Securing and fortifying the communications across the Kerch Strait

a.
Armed Forces Transport Chief
This officer is to speed up the construction in progress on

the railroads leading from Krasnodar to the Kerch Strait and on the
connecting railroads in the Crimea.
b.
Air Force
The Commander in Chief, Air will station heavy antiaircraft

artillery at both sides of the Strait in order to safeguard supply traffic across the Kerch Strait and to block the entrances to the Sea of'
Azov.
c.
Navy
The Navy will provide additional shipping space for. the Kerch
Strait and protect it with all means available against action of enemy
naval forces (mines, sea patrols, also in the Sea of Azov).
B-68
61
Plans pertaining to a through e should be reported.
3.
The Maikop oil area
The supporting positions (of. part 6 of Army order mentioned as reference) are to be established in such a way that the Maikop oilfields can
be exploited further.
However it is to be assured that the oilfields can quickly be evacuated.
and thoroughly destroyed in accordance with the orders of the local commands at any time.
The Chief of Staff,
signed:
Keitel
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt Nr. b6 020/43 g.K.Chefs.
5 Jan. 1943
No. 6
of twenty.two copies
Top secret
It is not yet clear how the command of the German-Italian Panzer

I.
be arultimately
in the Tunesian area will
arrival
Army following its
It would be desirable to achieve a solution
ranged with the Italians.
the manner in which the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
as in Annex 1;
South controls unified command in the central Mediterranean is of lesser
(Translator's note: Annex I is not included. Essentially
importance.
it presents the same set-up as section II below.)
The two Armies uniting in the Tunesian area must be placed under one
commander in Tunesia, as soon as the supply troops of the German-Italian
Panzer Army cross the frontier of Tripolitania to the west.
Thus the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, as Commander in
II.
Chief of all German troops in the central Mediterranean, will have the
the Air Force General
the 2nd Air Force;
following forces under him:
the
the German Naval Command, Italy:;
Armed Forces;
at the Italian
the central
Armed Forces Headquarters;
German General at the Italian
,German command of the two armies in Tunisia in a form not yet determined;
Mediterother German troops and commands in the central
as well as all
ranean.
The administrative command of the units not belonging to the Air Force
is not affected thereby.
III.
The Staff of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is to be

B-68
62 -
reorganized into
expanded tasks:
an Armed Forces Staff
as follows in
accordance with its
i.
If the Commnanding General, Armed Forces, South and the Comander
of the 2nd Air Force remain the same, the staffs are to be separated according to the tasks.
2.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Commanding General, Armed
Forces,. South will be at the head of the Armed Forces Staff.
3.
The Staff of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is
to be composed as follows:
a.
perationssection composed of an Army group, a Navy
group, and an Air
group.
The directors of these groups will be
directly under the. Chief of the General Staff of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South.
Force
b.
Quartermaster section composed of Army, Navy, ad
Air
Force groups.
a
uartermas er
ice in Rome will furnish the cadre
for this section.
c.
Armed Forces transprt section, composed of an organization group, a seanpor
group an air ransport group, and the
Deputy Transport Officer (Bv.T.,.ro
The Africa Transport Section will furnish the cadre for the Armed Forces transport section.
4.
The subordinate quartermaster and transport offices are to be
reorganized in a similar manner. with representatives from each branch
of the Armed Forces.
IV.i
Speci
i.
ial
regulations~
The German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters
remains directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command in his

liaison capacity between the German Armed Forces High Command and the
Italian Armed Forces Headquarters, and in his tasks outside of the Medi-
terranean area.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue the service
to him.
regulations pertaining
2.
The Naval High Command will
naval warfare in the Mediterranean.
issue the basic directives
for
is the task of the Commanding General, Armed

Within this framework it
Forces, South to order operations of the German Naval Command Italy in
accordance with the changing situation.
The necessary officers should be taken from the existing comV.
1.
mands; any additional ones needed should be requested from the High
Commands of the various branches of the Armed Forces, and the Central
Division of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW/WZ)
should be informed.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, on the basis of
2.
the above directives, is to report when he assumes command and the resulting reorganization of'his staff.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
B-68
-
63

66071/43 g.L.Chefs.
WFSt/Op,
11
No.
Jan. 193
5 of seventeen copies
Top secret
Report on the results of the visit of

German
1.
the Bulgarian War Minister at
eadquarters
General attitude of Bulgaria
Bulgaria is ready to fight on the side of the Axis powers in case of an

attack on the Balkan area, and also to advance into Tbrace in order to
take the Dardanelles and the Bosporus in case the enemy powers violate
Turkish neutrality with Turkey's permission.
2.
Command uthority
A.
For
in Directive 4
a.
repation off the Balkan defenses the principles given
for
cooperation with
the
talians apply, that is:
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast is to

request the Bulgarian High Command via the Military Attache, Sofia for
the measures which are considered necessary for the Bulgarian area.
The Bulgarian High Command will then issue the necessary orders.
b.
Navy
Naval Group South will transmit to the Bulgarian High

Command drafts of directives for the Bulgarian Navy, which the Bulgarian
Navy will then issue.
e.
Air Force
The X Air Corps will submit to the Bulgarian High Command

drafts of orders considered necessary for the Bulgarian Air Force via
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and the Air Attache,
The Bulgarian High Command will then issue the necessary orders.
Sofia.
The High Command of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and the German
B.
Armed Forces High Command will arrange directly between themselves the
preparations which go beyond defense of the coasts and borders and eon-
ErI3
ithin the country.
In case of an enem attack the Bulgarian forces stationed on

C.
reinrorced 16th Infantry Division) will come under
the Aegean coas
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast without further orders.
The Bulgarian High Command and the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast will arrange the details of the demarcation line at the Bulgarian land front somewhere east of Dede Agach (Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast).
In this ease the Bulgarian naval and air forces can be placed under the
corresponding German commands (Naval Group South and the 10th Air Force)
after arrangement with the Bulgarian High Command.
It will not be decided until the time of an enemy attack whether further
B-68
_64_
Bulgarian army forces will be, placed under the Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southeast.
Except for coastal defense on the Aegean Sea and control within the territory, the Bulgarian army will carry on warfare under its own command
according to the basic principles agreed upon with the German Armed
Foroes High Command.
3.
Construction of fortifications
Construction of fortifications is progressing at the land front in

Thrace and at the Black Sea coast, and will be continued. The harbors of
.,urgas
and Varna are also sufficiently protected with coastal artillery.
Fortifications have not been reinforced at all on the Aegean coast, and
coastal artillery is also inadequate there. Reinforcement of the fortifications, particularly at the harbors, has been requested and approved.
It is important to reinforce Thrace in order to cut off Kavalla and to

cooperate with the Commanding General, Armed Forces Southeast
in reinorin
i
e pennsla. Heavy coastal batteries o over 15 cm.
are also desired or Thasos (Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast).
German advisory staffs for coastal fortifications and equipment for
coastal batteries have been promised to help reinforce the Aegean coast.
(The Army General Staff, Organizations Section will furnish the advisory
staff according to a special directive.
Operations Staff will allot the equipment for coastal batteries.)
1.
Coastal waters
It is difficult for Bulgaria to set up harbor or patrol flotillas be-
cause of a lack of vessels suited to this purpose.
An investigation
has been promised to see whether suitable vessels could be made available from Greece in case of a threatening attack (Naval High Command).
5.
Expansion of the Air Force ground organization
It was emphasized that it is of decisive importance to provide adequate

air
bases.
This is being done on a very limited scale, but extensive
German aid is necessary.
The Air Attache will
report
details
directly
to the Commander in Chief, Air (Air Force Operations Staff).
Air defenses and passive air defense are still 'veryweak.- Especially
little has been done for the civilian population. It is necessary to
help, particularly by delivering antiaircraft equipment (Air Force
Operations Staff).
Road construction, especially of roads leading to the Thrace front,
is progressing satisfactorily.
6.
The capacity of the railroads is very small and cannot be increased in
the near future.

7.
Gathering of intelligence is little developed and the results are
poor. Close exchange o finormation has been agreed upon.
The Armed
Forces Intelligence Division is to intensify cooperation in this field
still
further
(Armed Forces High Command Intelligence Division).
In the opinion of the Bulgarians the Demotika area is inadequately protected
and patrolled
especially
as regards intelligence.
The centers
of the enemy intelligence
organizations as well as the main connecting
links
with the enemy's foreign units are said to be in this area.
The
8-68
65
It is nesessary to increase German supervision considerably, and in addition to

police forces the use of units of the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control
Service (VGAD) should be considered (Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast and Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff).
Greek police. is supposedly supporting this type of activity.
8.
Training
Germany offered to send Bulgarian officers and noneommissioned personnel

of all branches of the armed forces to German schools, particularly for
offer
this
in handling equipment being furnished by Germany;
training
Corresponding requests will be made by the various
has been aceepted.
armed forces attaches of their particular branch.
The Bulgarians have asked to be kept informed of experiences made and
issued on the basis thereof, and this has been promised
new regulations
(Army General Staff, Training Division, Air Force Operations Staff,
Naval
9.
High Command).
Organization
The Bulgarian army and air force are set

time, but not for offense.
up for defense at the present
The Bulgarian army is to be equipped speedily in such a fashion that it

For this
be in a position successfully to repel a modern enemy.
will
is
It
purpose the antitank defenses must be improved first of all.
planned to expand 10 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division into
and the Bulgarian Tank Brigade into a
equipped offensive units,
fully
The remaining units are to be equipped for use as coastal
tank division.
defense and patrol forces.
The Bulgarian High Command will submit suggestions, with the planned
organization, wartime personnel and equipment.
be submitted
force will
expansion of the. Bulgarian air
Requests for
by the Air Attache to the Commander in Chief, Air (Air Force
separately
Operations Staff).
The Bulgarians have been promised that their requests for arms will be
met quickly and as fully as possible in view of the overall situation.
Details will be handled through special order of the Armed Forces High
Command Operations Staff (Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff
together with the War Economy Division and the branches of the Armed
Forces).
10.
Bulgarian operational plans
In addition to controlling the areas occupied by them, the Bulgarians

will for the time being.be able only to carry on defensive warfare, in
view of the equipment of their forces. They believe that if their antitank defenses, coastal artillery, and antiaircraft artillery are slightly
reinforced, they will be able to hold their frontiers even against a
strong enemy.
organizing 10 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, and 1 panzer
After
on, the Bulgarians believe that it will be possible to block the
isi
div
they are provided for
on Thrace, if
necessary by an atack
Straits if
air support as well as a German panzer corps
this purpose with strong
with 3 mobile units, approximately 10 heavy artillery detachments, and
AAbattaions,
corresponding operations plan is being
1 or 2 engineer
submitted by the Bulgarian Armed Forces High Command.
-66
6-68
It takes a long time, approximately 3 weeks, for the Bulgarian army to

It may take longer than that
if the railroads will be needed at the same time for German troop movements.
assemble in view of the railroad situation.
The Chief, of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

By direction
signed:
Note:
Jodl
The commands in parentheses indicate the authorities handling
the matters in question.
The Fuebrer
66111/k3 G..Chefs.OKW/WFSt/p.
14 Jan.
No.
1943
of seventeen copies
Top secret
Re:
Provision of Equipment for the
coming
months
of the Eastern Front forces us

in the southern part
The situation
I.
modern weapons and
speedily to provide a number of divisions with all
divisions.
thereby equip them as high-grade attack
the previous. schedule of allocations is
This can be done only if
II.
temporarily abandoned, and equipment produced, especially motor vehicles,
in
according to the requirements of the situation.
solely
is distributed
the various theaters.
III.
For this purpose I order:
In addition to the divisions which have already been ordered

1.
transferred from the West to the East, the 15th, 167th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions will be withdrawn from the area of the Commanding
General, Armed Forces, West to the Eastern Front.
No further divisions can be withdrawn from the Western Front.
and 26th Panzer Divisions must remain in the West.
2.
vehicles
The entire production of armament for the
Army
The 1st
and of motor
until
15 Mar. will be put at the disposal of the Eastern Army,

can be utilized. Such equipment can be given to other
insofar as it
absolutely necessary for- the
branches of the Armed Forces only if
southern part of the Eastern Front and for the tasks enumerated under
8-68
-67_-
"'-
III
,-
IwI
3.
3.
The following tasks are exceptions to this regulation, and
should be carried out on an equal basis with equipment of the attack
divisions in the East.
a.
Equipping of Air Force Field Divisions 11, 15, 16, 17,
18, and 19, which are not yet fully
supplied, as well of the Air Field
Regiments 501, 502, and 503, and the Hermann Goering Division.
b.
Supplementing the weapons of the 161st and the 328th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 26th Panzer Divisions.
These two
panzer divisions must be fully ready for operations with German tanks
by 1 Apr. 1943.
c.
Equipping of the 999th Brigade. The motor vehicles are

to be supplied in such a manner that the heavy weapons of the'brigade
will be fully mobile, and it can be transferred to Africa by 15 Feb.
d.
Equipping of the two S8 divisions to be organized in the
West with sufficient weapons and motor vehicles so that they can begin
The speedy allocation of the weapons
training on a full scale at once.
is to be assured. The artillery is to be equipped with captured Russian
guns.
To begin with hand weapons and machine guns can also be taken
from captured material.

The divisions are to be transferred to France by 15 Feb. and 1
Mar. 1943.
e.
The current needs of the two Africa armies are to be
kept filled, and the material needed to replenish the 21st Panzer Division and the parts of the German Africa Corps which are to return to
Tunisia should be supplied.
in January 20
The following tank reinforcements should be supplied:
tanks, in February 30 tanks and 40 heavy antitank guns, in March 50
tanks and assault guns and 40 heavy anti-tank guns.
Only as much armament and equipment should be stored in southern Italy
as can be shipped to Tunisia within a reasonable time.
4f.
The regulations outlined in paragraph 2 do not affect the
The allocation of coastal artillery and Army artillery in
following:
the West, which is to be mobilized only to a limited degree for thetime being;
shipments of armament to Italy for the Dodecanese islands
and the Peloponnesos,
and to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey in the amounts
agreed upon.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
B- 68
-
68 -
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt Nr. 00284/13 g.Kdos.
15 Jan.
19143
Secret
1.
Field Marshal General Milch is ordered by me to assure the supply
of the 6th Army in Stalingrad.
2.
In order to carry out this task the Field Marshal, effective' at
once, has the authority to issue orders and regulations for me to all
commands of the branches of the Armed Forces.
3.
Any such orders and regulations affecting the operation of Army

Group Don are to be issued by agreement with the Commander of this Army
Group.
In cases of doubt my decision should be requested.
.14.
Field Marshal Milch should report directly to me.

signed:
countersigned:
----
Christian
Lieutenant Colonel of the
General Staff
-I
Naval Staff
l.Skl.
Adolf Hitler
Berlin,
11 Feb.
19213
i 1466/213 gKdos.Chefs.
Top secret
Re:
Treatment of saboteurs
of
From the memorandum of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/skl)
1 Feb. 19213 it can be seen that in the offices concerned of the Army
General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff an erroneous impression
A telephone inquiry at
prevails concerning the treatment of saboteurs.
the Naval Staff Intelligence Division showed that this office is likeHowever, paragraph 6 of the Fuehrer order of
wise incorrectly informed.
gKdos. of 28 Oct. 1912)
I op 26 367/2
18 Oct. 1912 (annex to l.Skl.
threatens all commanders and officers with court-martial proceedings
who have neglected their duty in instructing the troops about the order
The document justifying the first
concerning treatment of saboteurs.
Fuebrer order on this subject of 18 Oct. 1912 (annex to l.Skl. I op
only betop secret
of 27 Oct. 1912) is classified
2108/12 gKdos.Chefs.
cause it states as follows:
According to the Fuehrer's opinion, the increasing military sabo1.
tage activity in the East and West may have disastrous consequences for
us.
8-68
-
69 -
2.
Uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be shot even
after they surrender voluntarily and ask to be spared..
On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage troops in battle is not
-to be kept secret at all, but should even be published in the Armed
Forces communiques.
The purpose of this procedure, i.e., to discourage
enemy sabotage operations, cannot be accomplished if the enemy commando
troops do not learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits
them. Since the saboteurs are to be exterminated at once unless for
military reasons they are needed for a short time for interrogation,
this office believes that it is necessary to inform not only all members
of the Armed Forces at the front but also all offices at home dealing,
with such problems that all saboteurs of this type should be annihilated
.even if
in uniform.
It may be difficult in practice to decide just what is included under
sabotage troops. *The extermination order contained in paragraph 5 of
the Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 1942 is not to be applied to personnel par-
ticipating in
large-scale landing operations and lrge-scale airborne
landings.
The difference :is that in this case it
a ques ion of open
warfare, while for example ten or more people landed by ship, plane, or
parachute, not for open warfare but in order to destroy a factory, a
bridge, or railroad installations, would come under the extermination
order.
It can be assumed that the Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Counterespionage Section (Abwehr III) is familiar with the
Fuehrer directive and therefore can answer the objections of the Army
General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff accordingly. As regards
the Navy, it must be investigated whether the incident should not be
used, following a conference with the Commander in Chief, Navy, to make
sure that all offices and commands concerned are quite clear about how
commando troops are to be treated.
Naval Staff Operations Division,
Law and Prizes
International
Section
(l.Skl
i)
8- 68
70 -
The Commander in Chief, Navy and

Chief, Naval 'Staff
1/k
Op. 5023
Berlin, 19 Feb. 1943
g.Kdos.Chefs.
Top secret
Re:
Operations of naval surface forces*
I.
Tasks and distribution of the surface forces
1.
The heavy ships, destroyers, and torpedo boats will have the
following tasks during the coming spring and summer:
In the North Area the most important task remains as heretofore the 2rotetion
Norway and northern Finland.
The surface forces must do
o1'
everything
possible to repel enemy-landing attempts.
As soon as conditions are favorable, the surface forces should lend

support to the submarines and Air Force in their fight against enemy
ship traffic in the
Arctic Ocean.
Our forces should keep on tying up heavy enemy
necessary to escort them in
the
area or
ships
the break
and the light forces

ough routes to the
North Atlantic and in the Arctic Ocean, in order to prevent forces as

long as possible from becoming available for reinforcing submarine defenses and for use at other places.
In the West Area, also light surface forces should be used to protect
the blocade runners arriving during the coming month with very important cargoes, in order to supplement submarines and air forces which
may,not be available in sufficient numbers because of other tasks.
It is a task of ever-increasing importance for the torpedo boats to assist the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West in keeping
open. the departure and approach routes of the submarines.
In the Baltic Sea surface forces may be needed to prevent Russian naval
forces from breaking out of the Gulf of Finland.
The strength of our naval forces in the Baltic Sea will be a factor in
Sweden',s attitude if the situation in the East develops unfavorably and
if enemy landings in Scandinavia are successful.
2.
The naval forces are being distributed with these tasks in mind:
The TIRPITZ will remain in Norway until further notice.

The LUETZOW arn
the NUERRBERG are to return to Germany, so that they will be ready to
take on cadets there on 1 Jul.
The PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER will become training ships on 1 Apr. The SCHARNHORST remains in the Baltic
Sea for the time being.
On 30 Jan. 2943 Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander in
* Footnote:
Chief, Navy. The above directive is of special interest since differconcerning the function of.
ences in opinion between Hitler and Raeder
(See Documents
the surface forces culminated in Raeder's resignation.
Related to the Resignation of the German Commander in Chief- Navy,
Grand Adra
aeder an
o e ecommission
o the
rman
.
Seas Fleet, Office or Naval Intelgence, Washngon,
8-68
-
71
The destroyers
are now distributed approximately evenly between the North

Areas.
It is planned to transfer the destroyers from the
West back to Norway in May, in order to compensate for the weakness
and tie
West
created there by the withdrawal of the LUETZOW and the NUERNBERG.

The
to
torpedo
boats, with the exception of those that are being detailed

school, will be at the disposal of Group West until far-
thetorpedo
ther notice.
II.
Directives
for. the operations of the
The surface forces

tional, and
1.
should
surface
forces
operate only on the basis
of strategic,
opera-
tactical considerations.
In the North Area the main task, defense of Norway and northern
Finland against enemy lanings,

is in the foreground.
For this purpose
it is necessary to consolidate the few available ships in the North Area
into a combat group.
The areas threatened most by an enemy landing are at the present time
primarily Kirkenes-Petsamio and secondly Narvik-Bodoe,
The surface forces can be used to best advantage from the Alta Fjord to repulse enemy
landings in the two areas mentioned.
In
repulsing enemy landings
the task
of the surface
forces
will consist
primarily in destroying enemy transport and supply ships.

The mobst
suitable and most promising operations of the naval forces for this purpose will be
The basic
to attack from the outside.
principles for operations of naval forces
in
repelling enemy
landings are to be laid down in a directive by Group North.

All ships
committed in the North Area must be informed of the plans concerning
operations of naval forces
ticular
tasks
to
be carried
in repelling enemy landings, and of the parout

by them.
of
the
surface
forwith
the
importance
of
this
main task
In accordance
ces in the North Area, these forces should be fully committed when repelling enemy landings on a considerable scale.
2.
Favorable conditions for successful operations of the surface
forces against enemy traffic in the Arctic Ocean will exist only rarely,
since as shown by previous experience the enemy will use such strong
forces to escort his convoys that these will definitely be superior to
Nevertheless there may be occasion to attack unescorted
our forces.
ships or single ships and parts of convoys which are inadequately protected.
Whenever such an opportunity presents itself it should be utilized, while observing the basic tactical principles.
Attacks on heavily escorted convoys requiring full commitment of our for-
ces may be considered and ordered if the cargoes

important and their destruction might be
all situation.
involved
of decisive value
are especially
for the
over-
It should be kept in mind as regards our surface forces in the Arctic

Ocean that each operation, even if not highly successful, generally will
protect
his
be forced
to
since
the
enemy will
have strategiceffects,
convoys with
superior
forces because of the proved striking power of our
naval forces and the determination of our commanders.

Occasional transfers
of our naval forces will
serve
the
same purpose.
I shall make the decisions concerning operations of surface forces in

the Arctic Ocean. Naval Group North should consider whether the given
72
B-68
operation will be worth while and advisable in view of the ratio of

The task force commanders themselves should be concerned only
forces.
with carrying out the given task.
3.
In the West Area the most important task at the present time,
in addition to submarine warfare,is protection of incoming blockade
In order to
Our means for this purpose are inadequate.
runners.
strengt en them as much as possible, destro ers are now being transferred
to the West Area.
The greatest danger
for the
lockade runners begins
at the outer limit of normal British air reconnaissance at approximately

The torpedo boats used as
180 West and further south at 160 to 150 West,
escorts so far and the air cover can protect the blockade runners only
The use of destroyers could extend
as far as approximately 80 West,
protection further west.
surface forces which
The main danger for the blockade runners are enem
So far the enemy has
are brought to the scene by air recfnnaissance.
It
occasionally used single cruisers or destroyers for this purpose.
is possible that when our destroyers first appear in this area the enemy will not at once have forces available which are superior to our
destroyers.
Therefore
the possibility exists for our destroyers to
protect the first blockade runner and perhaps
several more,
The cargoes carried by the returning blockade runners are indispensible

The naval commanders and crews involved must be
for our war economy.
Full commitaware of the importance of bringing the cargoes in safely.
ment of the escorting forces is justified as long as the possibility exists that loss of the ship being escorted can be prevented.
4.
to the
5.
time.
The torpedo boats should be committed

judgement of Group West.
In
the Baltic Sea
Until escort
forces
as heretofore
the SCHARNHORST is available at
according
the present
are made available, a decision may have to
be requested from the Naval Staff for using vessels

the testing stations.
of the
schools
and
We must expect to use also the training vessels in the Baltic Sea in
case of an emergency. Cadet training therefore should insofar as possible be arranged in such a manner that shortly after embarkation of the
cadets the ships will achieve and maintain a certain degree of operational readiness.
These directives for operations of naval surface forces should be made
Provisions should be made
known to the captains of the ships involved.
also to inform newly-appointed captains and captains of ships which
will become ready for operations in the future.
I expect the naval commanders- to lead their forces with decision and
determination in accordance with these directives.
signed:
-73-
Doenitz
-68
(vorg.St.)
OKEI/GenSt.d.H./Op Abt
13 March 1943
Nr. 430 163/43 g.Kdos. Chefs.
Top secret
Operations
(Directive for
Warfare
Order No.
during the Coming Months)
It is to be expected that the Russians will continue

the end of the winter and the muddy season and after
itated and reinforced their forces to some extent.
their attacks at
they have rehabil-
Therefore it is important for us to take the. initiative at certain sectors of the front if possible before they do, so as to be able to dictate their actions at least at one sector, as is the case at the present
time at the front of the Southern Army Group.
At other sectors we must ward off the Russian attacks until they have
In these places our defenses must be made especially
spent their strength.
strong by means of heavy defense weapons, additional fortifications,
strategic minefields, supporting positions, and mobile reserves.
Preparations to this effect must get under way at once at all Army
The assault forces, especially, should be improved both as reGroups.
gards equipment and physical condition and training of the personnel,
and every possible effort should be made to strengthen the defense front.
Since the muddy season will end earlier this year than usual, every day
The Army Groups are to
counts and systematic procedure is essential.
The
report the progress of their preparations every week (on Monday).
Army High Command will send the necessary men and equipment as well as
the heavy defense weapons.
Specifically I
1.As
order as follows:
Army Group A
soon as the weather
permits, the
"Gotenkopf"
positions
are to be
con-
tracted as planned so as to free forces for the Southern Army Group.

Army Group A must realize that its main though not very conspicuous
task consists in making forces available for use elsewhere. The more
*forces can be made available and the quicker this is done, the better.
All possible ways and means should be utilized to transport these troops
elsewhere.
Thereafter it is the task of Army Group A to hold the Crimea and the
Crimean coastal defenses
"Gotenkopf" positions under any circumstances.
must be strengthened with all available means so as to provide the
greatest possible protection against
the West.
2.
Southern
enemy landings, as
is
the case in
Army Group
The defenses along the entire Mius front, the remainder of the eastern
front, as well as the Donets front must be made as effective as possible.
Areas especially suitable for tank attacks must be especially well protected with anti-tank defenses.
B-68
74 -
The main line of resistance should be directly along the sector.

emy must not be permitted to have any bridgeheads on our shore.
The en-
On the northern wing of the Army Group a strong panzer army should be set
up at once which must be ready by the middle of April so as to be prepared
to launch an attack
prior to the Russians at the end of the muddy season.
It will
be the aim of-Mth
offensive to destroy the enemy forces in front
of the 2nd Army through an advance northward from the vicinity
of Khar1Dv
in cooperation with an assault group from the area of the 2nd Panzer Army.
Separate orders will be issued covering the details of the attack, command authority, and the forces to be brought up.
3.
Central Army Group
For the time being the mopping-up operations between the 2nd Army and,
the 2nd Panzer Army are to continue and the defense fronts should be further strengthened and systematically equipped with antitank defenses.
The tip at Kirov, and the areas north and northwest of Smolensk as well
as west of Velikie Luki are especially important in this connection.
In
addition an assault group is to be formed which will attack in conjuncThe forces for
with the northern wing of the Southern Army Group.
tion
this group are to be obtained from the "Bueffelbewegung".*
Details will
Likewise special orders will be issued
be covered by separate orders.
to determine which forces from the hlBuffelbewegungt are to be made
available
as Army High Command reserves.
4.
Northern Army Group
Since no large-scale offensive is planned at the Northern Army Group
during the first halfof the summer, all efforts should be concentrated
on defense. The entire front must be made as strong as possible. Sectors which so far had to be neglected must be strengthened at great speed.
The divisions which have become available through giving up the Demyanak
valley should be used to strengthen the defense front and be held as reThe strong artillery
serves. The units should again be organized.
groups should be expanded further and equipped with ammunition. Mobile
It
artillery reserves should be held in readiness for quick transfers.
is especially important to strengthen the southern wing of the Northern
Army Group at Staraya Russa and in the entire area south and southeast
of Leningrad, since enemy offensives may be expected against Pskov for
the purpose of cutting off the Army Group, and near Leningrad in order
to eliminate the threat to that city.
During the second half of the summer
panne
to
aunc
an ofensive aait
begin
earl
nin a .
in July) it is
available artillery
weapto be concentrated for tis purpose, an the most modern assault

Preparations to bring up the necessary artillery and
ons will be used.
Other details will be
ammunition should get under way at an early date.
covered by separate orders.
is
The Army Groups will receive separate instructions pertaining to personnel, weapons and other equipment to be brought up and divisions and troops
I refer to my order no. 8 as regards construction
to be transferred.
of supporting positions. Maps showing the line along which these positions should be located will be sent to the Army Groups (translator's
note:
not included).
The Army Groups are to report their plans by 25 Mar. They should submit
progress reports every Monday.
Adolf Hitler
signed:
for -a retreat movement of the Central Army Group during the

spring and sumer of 1943, consisting in burning villages and following
other scorched earth practices.
*Code name
8-68
-
75 -
Fuehrer
66 62/43 g.K.Chefs. WFSt
17 Mar. 1943
.p.
Headquarters
No. 3 of ten copies
Top secret
OKH/Gen.St.D.H./Op.Abt.Ia
Ref.:
Nr, k30l63/k3
g.K.Chefs.
of 13 Mar.
(operations order no. 5)
The Fuehrer has issued the following orders supplementary to the directive for warfare in the East during the coming months:
I.
The following forces will be transferred from the West in the near
future in order further to reinforce the Eastern Front:
38th Infantry Division, transfer to begin approximately on 20
Mar.
257th Infantry Division and 17th Infantry Division, the former to be

transferred first, immediately following the 38th Infantry Division, if
possible.
Units of the.Brandenburg force will be transferred according to special
plan.
II.
The following will be withdrawn from the Eastern Front:

1.
As
Amed
Forces
High
Command
reserve:
The 7th Airbone Division

The Army General Staff should withdraw this division as soon
as possible, and, in agreement with the Commander in Chief, Air, put it
at the disposal of the Fuehrer in the area of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, West (Brittany).
The Commander in Chief, Air will arrange for reequipping this force as
a parachute division. In addition, the division must at all times be
ready and equipped to repulse enemy landing attempts at the coast or
from the air in the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.
Plans for carrying out this operation, with accompanying timetable,
should be reported via the Commander in Chief, Air.
2.
For transfer to the Commanding General,

east:
Armed Forces
South-
The 1st Mountain Division

The division should be withdrawn as quickly as possible and
transferred to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, so that
it will reach the Nish area by the end of April. Transfer from the
Crimea is to begin approximately on 26 Mar.
3.
The 295th Division
Separate orders will be issued concerning distribution and organization of this division, the bulk of which will be transferred to
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, and parts to the 20th
P-68
76 -
Mountain Army and the Comnanding General,
4.
For transfer to the Commandin

The287th
Armed Forces, Southeast.

General
Armed Forces
South:
Sp~ecial Unit
This unit likewise should be withdrawn as quickly as possible,

and be transferred first to a troops training center in Germany for rehabilitation purposes.
III. The final character of the "Gotenkopt" positions will depend on
sea trans orts across the Kerch Strait as well as on the southern coast
e ea o
zov.
o
the r ea..an in
Shipping space suitable for the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov is,
limited, and does not permit maintaining simultaneously large ferrying
traffic and considerable transports of troops and equipment from the
"Gotenkopf" positions to harbors in the northern part of the- Sea of Azov.
The Army and the Navy directly will arrange for coordination of these
transports, which should be concentrated on the tasks designated by the
Army. Results should be reported.
The Air Force will have to provide air escort for sea transports
the Sea of Azov.
across
IV.
Only the basic allotment off 108,500 cbm of fuel can be expected
for
the months of May, June, and July.
In all probability no special allocations can be made, since it was impossible to accumulate any amount of Armed Forces High Command reserve
supplies because of increased consumption during the winter. The Army
General Stff therefore will have to provide the necessary reserves
from the current allotment.
Plans should be reported.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command'
signed:
Keitel
8-68
77 -
The Naval High-Command
Berlin, 24 Apr. 1943
Ski Qu A II Mob a 1000/143 g.Kdos.

Secret
To:
Naval Command West
Re:
Expansion of naval bases
Ref.: Communication from the Commanding Admiral, Group West 2028/43

g.Kdos. of 9 Mar. 193 (Translator's note: not included).
The Commander in Chief, Navy has decided as follows about the request
mentioned above:
1.
Fuehrer directive 40 has fixed the responsibility for preparing
and waging the war for the coast (land warfare). The Commander in Chief,
Navy does not intend to ask for a change in directive 40 for the purpose of taking over responsibility in some sectors (e.g., in the naval
bases) where it has not already been given to the Navy by the abovementioned directive (at the German North Sea and Baltis Sea coasts).
In the area of Naval Group West previous regulations remain in force
according to which preparation and waging of war for the coast is in
the hands of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, who delegates
the command authority invested in him by Fuebrer directive 40 down to
the subordinate divisional commanders of the Army. The Commander in
Chief, Navy considers this the best guarantee for the protection of the
naval bases.
In matters pertaining to the fight for the coast (land fighting),
2.
the naval shore commanders and their areas are under the operational
command of the divisional commanders, as the responsible sectional commanders designated by Fuehrer directive O.
Integration of sub-sectional commanders into the organization for coastal
defense is being clarified at the present time with the Armed Forces
High Command. The decision will be made known at the proper time.
The naval shore commanders should make a list of naval construction
3.
plans in their areas and present them according to their importance and
urgency to the responsible commanders designated by Fuebrer directive
40 (generally the divisional commanders). The naval shore commanders
as the responsible area commanders must in this respect safeguard the
interests of naval warfare, especially in the naval bases, and if important needs are disregarded they should report this promptly through the
proper channels.
By direction
signed:
Meisel
B-68
-
78
-up
Copy
12 May 1943
Telegram KR GWASL Mr. 0957

Nr. 0022 67/43.
Re: Defense of Corsica
The Fuehrer has decided:
1.
Plans are to be made to transfer
to Corsica a German combat unit in
be issued'
Special orders will
the strength of a reinforced regiment.
A regiment of the lst Paratroop Division may be
about the transfer.
considered for the task. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South
will report how the group should be organized, especially the number
of assault guns, antiaircraft guns, antitank weapa s and engineers
needed.
2.
Regardless of later decisions concerning the transfer, two monthe4
supplies for a combat force of the type desired should be stored at once
in Corsica under German supervision and control by agreement with the
This measure should not be permitted to interfere
High Command.
Italian
with the ordered reinforcement and provisioning of Sardinia, which is
of primary importance.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will decide whether'stocks
of scarce ammunition should be established in advance, or whether such
ammunition should be provided only when the combat force is actually
transferred.
By direction
signed:
Warlimont
(OKW/WFST/Op
_C
~_
~_
(H) Nr.223367/43 GHdos)
__
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 661055/43 g.Kdos.Chefa.
12 May l94f3
Top secret
Telegram
1.
Following the impending end of fighting in Tunesia, it is to be
expected that the Anglo-Americans will try to continue the operations

in the Mediterranean in quick succession. Preparations for this purpose must in general be considered concluded, The following are most
endangered:
A.
in the western Mediterranean Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily.
In the eastern Mediterranean the Peleponnesos and the DodeeB.

anese islands.
B- 68
-
79
2.
I expect that all German commands and offices which are concerned
with the defenses in the Mediterranean will cooperate very closely and
quickly to utilize all forces and equipment to strengthen as much as
possible the defenses in these particularly endangered areas during the
short time which is probably left to us.
Measures regarding Sardinia and the Peloponnesos take precedence over
everything else.
OKW/WFSt/Op. NIr.
2. Ang.
661055/1 3 g.Kdos.Chefs.
13 May 1943
Top secret
Telegram
Re.:
Re:
OKW/WFSt/Op.
Ni.
661055/43 of 12 May 1943
Reinforcement of defenses in the Mediterranean
When the order referred to above was submitted to the Fuebrer, he

called attention particularly to the following points:
1.
The best possible use should be made of the time still available
by starting the ship transports, on a large scale at once, utilizing
German and insofar as possible also Italian light naval forces as transThe distribution of the escort vessels in the central
port vessels.
and eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea is to be examined. Plans
in this connection should be reported.
2.
Protection of harbors:
To facilitate loading and unloading, pri-
marily the antiaircraft defenses (fighters and antiaircraft artillery)

of the harbors should be assured, if necessary temporarily drawing on
German antiaircraft artillery in northern Italy. Antiaircraft guns,
the .ground organization for fighter forces, the plane reporting service,
and the trucks for hauling the cargoes from the harbor areas should be
integrated into the ship transport movements.
3.
Strengthening the defenses:

A.
General:
(1) After the transports mentioned under 2. have been carried

out, it is important to reinforce the antitank defenses, in addition to
In addition to transferring
laying in supplies with all available means.
the German antitank units, the weapons delivered to the Italians should
be taken over quickly and used at the threatened coasts.
-80
6-68
(2)
in addition, large numbers of mines must be brought up
and used quickly at the endangered spots, if necessary with the help ef
German engineer troops which are to be sent ahead. Plans or measures
taken should be reported together with information concerning the weapons
delivered to the Italians.
(3)
The information available to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff conoerning the defense of the threatened sectors
is no longer sufficient in the present situation,
High Coammand and the Messersohmidt
In cooperation with the Italian
Staff, detailed information concerning number of troops, state of fortification construction, and armament of the most endangered sectors should
be obtained and submitted.
Information concerning the following is especially important at the present time:
a.
The Italian islands
(Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica).
b.
Rhodes and the Peloponnesos
of Araxos and Kalamata).
B.
(especially the sectors
Tactical:
(1) The defenses of the air fields against attack from land
and from the air should be further strengthened in cooperation with the
Italian authorities.
(2)
In the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
Southeast the reconnaissance, bomber,-and fighter forces must be reinforced. The Commander in Chief; Air is requested to report his plans.
The suggestions of the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
(3)
Southeast concerning commitment on Rhodes of the 117th Light Infantry
0th
Division, the 11th Air Force Field Division, and parts.of the
Infantry Regiment, and commitment on the Peloponnesos of the parts of
the 999th AfricaDivision first to arrive, with the resulting temporary
weakening of Lemnos, are approved.
4f
Construction of fortifications on Lemnos and laying in of supplies there

The Armed Forces High Command will have
must continue at full speed.
additional parts of the 999th Africa Division brought up soon.
signed:
-81-
Keitel
B-68
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander

of the Armed Forces
1 Jun. 191 f3
OKW/WFSt/ (Op) Nr. 552273/ gK.Chefs.
No. 10 of twenty-four copies
II Mg
Top secret
Changes in Directive No.
f7
Since the X Air Corps Command was reorganized into Air Force CommandD
Southeast, directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief, AirhDirective
No. 47
"Command Organization and Defense in the Southeast Area
is
changed as follows:
Paragraph III A 3 will be replaeed by the following text:

3.
Air Force
a.
Aerial Warfare
aa., Aerial warfare will be conducted in the eastern

Mediterranean and in the Balkans by Air Force Command, Southeast.
The
latter receives orders from the Commander in Chief, Air in accordance
with my directives.
bb.
To assure a uniform air strategy in the Mediterranean,
the Commander in Chief, Air and the Commando Supremo will coordinate
their plans.
cc.
Close cooperation is required between Air Force
Command, Southeast and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to
assure that the aerial warfare in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean
can be carried on smoothly and without friction.
b.
Air Defense
In the Balkan area Air Force Command Southeast is responsible for preparing and carrying out the air defense measures according
close cooperation
to the directives of the Commander in Chief, Air i
with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast.
Paragraph IIIB 1 c will remain in full effect.

By direction
signed:
Keitel
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
8-68
82 -
13 July 1943
Telegram
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr.661553/43
The Fuebrer has issued the following directive for further warfare in
Sicily:
1.
After the bulk of the Italian forces are eliminated, the German
forces alone, even if grouped together, are no longer sufficient in

order to push the invading enemy forces back into the sea. In addition,
further enemy landings in the west of the island must be expected.
2.
It will now be the task of our forces to dela7 the enemy advance
as much as possible and to bring it to a halt in front of the Aetna
along a defense line running approximately from San Stefano via Adrano
to Catania, following the river valleys and main roads. All supplies
west and south of this line should be removed at once.
3.
The XIV Panzer Corps is to be transferred to Sicily at once to

take up positions along this line. Command and sectors should be organized in such a way that the remaining Italian units will be integrated
into the German forces. Special orders will follow.
4. For the time being only the entire 1st Paratroop DiviLsion will be
brought up in addition. The transfer of the 29th Armored Infantry Division depends on the amount of German supplies in the bridgehead,
which the XIV Panzer Corps is to investigate and to report via the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, as well as on the possibility of
safely maintaining traffic across the Strait of Messina. The 29th
Armored Infantry Division is first to be brought up to the Reggio area
and there to await possible transfer.
5.
In addition to bringing its present units up to strength, the
Commander in Chief, Air will reinforce the 2nd Air Force with two groups
of the 100th Bomber Wing and with one fast night bomber group from the
West, as well as with one fighter and one bomber group from the Southeast.
signed:
83
Keitel
-68
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op.
26 Jul.
1913
Nr.
661637/13 g.K.Chefs.
No. 1 of seventeen copies
Top secret
Directive No.
18
Concerning Command Organization and Defense

In the Southeast Area
I.
The enemy measures in the Eastern Mediterranean in connection yith
the attack on Sicily lead us to expect landing operations against the
defense front in the Aegean Sea along a line Peloponnesos-Crete-Rhodes,
and against the Greek vest coast and the lonian islands in front of it.
In case enemy operations advance from Sicily to the mainland of southern
Italy, we must expect an attack likewise against the eastern. coast of
the Adriatic Sea north of the Strait of Otranto.
The enemy leaders are also basing their plans on systematically organized
.guerrilla activity within the southeastern area.
Turkey's neutrality is beyond question at the present time but bears
watching as heretofore.
II.
In view of this situation command authority in the southeastern
the following principles in agreement
area is reorganized according to
wIM
h
our Italian allies:

A.
Army
1.
On 27 July 1913 at 0000 the Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southeast takes over command of the Italian 11th Army.
2.
The Italian 11th Army and commands designated by it will
have tactical command of the German forces at the present time in its
area or sush German forces as will be transferred there, provided that
the German LXVIII Corps will have unified command of all German and.
Italian forces on the Peloponnesos, and the Italian VIII Army Corps is
transferred to the area north of the Corinth Canal.
German forces directly committed to coastal defense are under the command of the Italian divisional command in that area.
3.
German forces temporarily committed in Albania, Montenegro,
and in Italian-occupied Croatian areas near the coast will
be under the
tactical command of the Italian Army Group, East and of the Italian
2nd Army.
B.
Navy and Air Force
Previous directives obtain as regards the role .of the Navy

and the Air Force in our relations with our allies.
In this connection
the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea will see to it that German principles
are adhered to in all matters of coastal defense in the area of the
Italian 11th Army in which the Navy is concerned.
III. The most important task of the Commanding General. Armed Forces
Southeast is to prepare the coastal defenses on the Greek Islands
-8
B-68
mainland. For this purpose it is important to open up the necessary supply routes, especially the main railroad lines, by eliminating the
guerrillas in Greece, Serbia, and Croatia, and to
safeguard our positions
from the rear.

Only the German principles are applicable to coastal defense as regards
garrisoning and fortifications even when Italian troops are involved.
German fortification battalions and if these are not sufficient also
parts of the German divisions which are being held in reserve should be
stationed at or near the coast in order to aid the Italians in coastal
sectors threatened most. Likewise it is to be demanded that important
Italian coastal batteries or other key positions be reinforced by
German personnel.
If insufficient German reserve forces are available, the Italian troops
held in readiness for this purpose should be placed under German command
and interspersed with German troops.
Airfields near the coast should be protected by German forces.
The expected enemy air superiority should be kept in mind when plans are
made for constructing defense installations, for choosing positions, and
for assembling and concentrating troops.
In the rear area the most important task of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast is to annihilate the guerrilla bands in Serbia
and Croatia, especially along the routes to Greece.
Through close sooperation with the Italian Army Group,East and the
Italian 2nd Army and by making available the necessary German forces,
guerrillas must be annihilated, also in-the Italian-occupied areas and
especially in the coastal areas where they would be particularly dangerous in case of an enemy landing. In addition, the Army Group must
constantly be prepared to. intervene with as strong German forces as possible in the coastal defense in the Italian area if the situation should
so require.
IV. .The distribution of forces suggested by the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast on 26 Jul. 1943 is approved as such. Details
will be arranged by separate orders.
An order will follow concerning additional Army troops.
Furthermore it is planned to assemble an operations arm' during the
-Larissa,consisting of 2 tank
coming months along the railroad Belrade
or armored infantry divisions, 2 mountain divisions, and 2 light infantry divisions, which will be transferred from the East.
Further arrangements will be ordered separately.
A.
V.
Bulgarian
Thrace is
Southeast
gate this
The Greek area occupied by German troops and by the

1.
7th Division, including the islands and the neutral zone in
The Commanding General, Armed Forces,
an operationsarea.
has command authority in this area, and has the right to deleauthority to the Military Commander, Greece.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue special service
instructions concerning this command authority -to the effect that according to the military situation all German stations which are now or
will be in Greece other than Armed Forces stations will be under the
Commanding'General, Armed Forces, Southeast, and are to be integrated
8-68
_
85
into the staff of the Military Commander, Greece.. This does not interfere with the right of the government authorities to issue directives
in their particular fields, but the proper channels go through the
Military Commander, Greece.
2.
The Reich Deputy at the Greek Government and Minister
Neubacher are excepted-from this ruling until final settlement with the
Foreign Office, and for the time being their status
remains unchanged.
The service regulations for the Military
Commander are to provide for
closest cooperation between that officer and the above-mentioned persons.
3.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast should
influence the military administration of the Italian-occupied areas only
insofar as the military situation requires.
If no agreement can be
reached with the local Italian commands, requests pertaining to these
matters should be directed to the Armed Forces High Command.
B.
1.
In the operations area in Serbia and Croatia the CommandGeneral
Armed Forces
Southeast delegates his command author3?tft
Comm aner, Sout eas , w o for this purpose in Croatia utilizes the Commander of the German Troops in Croatia.
in
ey
2.
The great importance of the Serbian area for warfare in
the entire southeast requires that all German offices be closely coordinated.
Therefore the non-military offices in Serbia are subordinated to
the Military Commander, Southeast and are integrated into his staff.
This does not interfere with the right of the government authorities to
issue directives in their particular fields, but the proper channels
go through the Military Commander.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command will issue the service
regulations.
3.
The Commander of the German Troops in, Croatia and the
German Deputy General in Croatia retain their previous tasks and authority.
VI. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command at my direction will
issue the necessary instructions concerning the reorganization of
staffs and commands as well as of the supply organization.
Directives differing from these are hereby cancelled.
signed:
-86-
Adolf Hitler
B-68
Copy
OKW/WFSt Nr.66171 f6/1 3 g.LChef..
1 Aug. 1943
Telegram
1.
When code word
taken at once:
a.
"Achse" is
given the following
By the Commanding General ,Armed Forces,

Execution of operations
b.
measures
are to be
West:.
"Kopenhagen" and "Siegfried".*
By the Commanding G3eneral,
Armed Forces, South:
Execution of operation "Sehwarz" (Student),**

Evacuation of Sicily, and Sardinia;
transfer of forces from Sardinia to
Corsica, where the Commander of the 90th,Armored Infantry Division will
transfer of the X V and
take over command and defense of the island;
LUCVI Panzer Corps to the north, as soon as it is sure that the withdrawal of the forces from Sicily is covered (according to the general
directives of Army Group B).
G. B
command for
Army Group B, which on code word "Achse" will take over top
all or Italy and will have full freedom of movement:
Swift capture of the most, endangered sectors Genoa-Livorno and Venicealso of the passes across the Apennines between'Livorno and
Trieste,
Ancona.
2.
Tasks of the Navy:
Execution of the evacuation transports from Sicily and Sardinia and of

setting up of
sea traffic to Corsica, also from non-French harbors;
coastal traffic along the Italian mainland according to the requirements
taking over of the
taking over of Toulon;
of the-land operations;
naval duties involved in coastal defense in the sector of the 4th Italian
taking over of the Italian war and merchant ships and prevention
Army;
of their going over to the enemy by use of submarines and PT boat.
3.
Tasks of the Air Force:
Assured cooperation between Army Group B and the 2nd Air Force;
here
the most'important task is to combat enemy landings which threaten the:

rear of our troops in southern or even central Italy, and by means of
naval forces from going
the special squadrons to prevent the Italian
over to
-the
enemy.
Capture of the Italian
Operations
ground organization in northern Italy,
and,
in-
Siegfried" and "Kopenhagen" involved taking over certain
areas in southern France previously held by Italian forces.

Operation "Schwarz"
**
Sardinia and transferring
(or "Student")
the forces
and
involved clearing Sicily
from Sardinia to Corsica.
B-68
-
87-
sofar as this is necessary, transfer to airfields in southern France or

in the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast;
taking
over of German antiaircraft
equipment and prevention of misuse of Italian
plane and antiaircraft
equipment.
. The Chief of Armed Forces Communications and the Chief of Armed

Forces Transportaton will do everythng necessary for. ta cng over he
Italian
5.
ra
instllations
in
areas of the German troops.
Attitude towards the Italian
ordered in a spesial proclamation
armed forces and populationt

o
signed:
yill
be
e troops.
Kitel
Copy
1 Aug. l94f3
OX/WFSt Nr. 661747/43 g.L-Chefs.
Top.secret
Telegram
Code word
"Aehse
according to the telegraphie order OKW/WFSt Op.r.
661686/43 g.K. Chefs. of 28 Jul. 1943 (translator's note:
not ineluded)
Ineonspieuous preparatory
will probably be released, in the near future.
measures which will serve to accelerate the operations can be undertaken
nov.
Tasks ofthhaNvy:
To take over all Italian war and merchant ships and prevent their going
over to the enemy;
to maintain vital sea traffic;. to take over naval
tasks in the defense of the coastal sectors occupied by the Italians

up to nov.
Tasks of the Air Force:
To take over aerial warfare and aerial defense in the entire southeast
area;
to prepare for receiving units of the 2nd Air Force, insofar as
necessary.
To take over the German antiaircraft equipment and prevent
misuse of.Italian
plane and antiaircraft equipment.
Attitude towards the Italian
armed forces and population will be regu-
ated by a special proclamation to te troops.

signed:
Keitel
8-68
S88
Copy
24 Aug. 1943
1.
Directive No.
48
(oKW/WPt/p.N'.66i637/4
set up unified command and
g..Chefs.
of 26 Jul.)
administration for the Southeast Area;
here-
with the post of Special Deputy of the Foreign Office for the Southeast
Area with headquarters in Belgrade is established, with the task of @oordinating matters of foreign policy in this-area in accordance with the
instructions
of the German Foreign Minister.
2.
The Special Deputy will,.inform the
military c-
uds in the South-
east Area of foreign policy plans and measures, as veil as of instructions of the Foreign Office which are of importance to the military command or administration in the Southeast Area.
3.
Likewise the competent military authorities
in the Southeast Area
are to inform the Special Deputy about military plans which are important
for
foreign policy.
I require very close cooperation between the Special Deputy and
the military
authorities in thb Southeast Area,
4.
5.
I appoint Minister ticubacher as Special Deputy of the Foreign Of-
fice for the Southeast Area.

this appointment.
His previous tasks are not affected by
6.
In case of combat activity on a larger scale in the Southeast Area,

I may make other arrangements.
signed:
1/Ski 2686/43 Gkdos.Chefs.

Copy of telegram to Naval
Adolf Hitler
of 6 Sep. 1943
Group South
Subsequent to 1/Ski Ia 24973 Gkds.Chefsaohe of 6 Sep.,, the text of the

Fuebrer directive is transmitted:
To Army Group A:
In order to free forces for other tasks, I have decided to evacuate
the Kuban bridgehead and to withdraw the 17th Army across the Kerch
Strait to the Crimea.
The Commander of Army'Group A is charged with preparing and carrying
out the evacuation and demolition, and with setting
up the necessary,
defenses in the Crimea. His orders are binding for all stations, including non-Army stations, in the Kuban bridgehead and on the Kerch
89-
B-68
peninsula.
Separate staffs are to be made responsible for the evacuation, the demolition, and the construction of defenses in the Crimea, to which repre-
sentatives of the Air Force, the Navy, Organization Todt, etc., should
also be appointed.
All these measures must be carried out by the beginning or the muddy
season. They must remain hidden from the enemy as long as possible.
I am especially interested in the following:

1.
Evacuation
a.
b.
sally.
a.
No weapons, supplies, or equipment must fall into enemy hands.

All supplies, weapons, and equipment must be removed systemati-
All civilians must be returned to the Crimea.
All other land supplies, such as vehicles,

d.
etc., must be taken to the Crimea.
cattle, vessels,
No further planting should be undertaken.

2.
Demolition
All installations, quarters, roads, dams, etc., which could be

a.
used by the enemy must be thoroughly destroyed.
All railroads and field railroads must be dismantled or comb.
pletely destroyed.
c.
All corduroy roads should be eliminated.
d.
All oil wells in the Kuban bridgehead must be completely de-
stroyed.
The harbororf Novorossisk should be destroyed and mined to
c.
such an extent that it cannot be used by the Russian fleet for a long
time.
Destruction includes the extensive use of mines, also those
f.
with timing devices, etc.
The enemy must rind a territory which is absolutely useless
g.
and uninhabitable for a long time, and where mines will be exploding
for months.
3.
Defense of the Crimea
All labor and material becoming available for the construction

a.
Construction should be directed
of the Crimean defenses should be used.
in such a way that the sectors especially endangered are fortified first
(Kerch Peninsula, Feodosia, Sudak, etc.). The greatest speed is necessary.
As soon as possible the field fortifications of the Crimean
b.
up first should be replaced with permanent
defenses which are built
fortifications.
B- 68
90
It is to be assured that the civilian population is ruthlessly

o.
utilized for this purpose without any false softness, and is quickly organized into construction battalions (also women).
d.
As part of the Crimean derenses all means must be used to prevent Russian ships under all circumstances from getting through the
Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov. Thererore the necessary steps are to
be taken soon to close and mine this strait and to control it with sufficient artillery.
Army Group A will report its plans by 10 Sep. with a timetable for the
evacuation and demolition, and for the Crimean defenses, under the assumption that 3 or 4 German divisions are to be released.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
Gen.St.d.H./Op.Abt.(I S/A)
00O
586/43 Gkdos.Chefs.
Aide to the Chief of the Army General Staff

g.K.Chefs.
Nr. 382/43
Headquarters
8 Sep. 1943
Copy of telegram
Top secret,
Marshal Badoglio has confirmed the correctness of Anglo-American radio

Code word "Achee" therereports concerning the Italian capitulation.
fore becomes effective at once.
signed by direction:
Jodi
OKW/WFSt Nr. 662236/43 g.K.Chefs.
B-68
-
91
OKW/WFSt/Op.
(H)
ir.662307/43
19 Sep. 1943
g.K.Chefs.
Top secret
Telegram
1.
Enemy.landing operations in the area or Army Group B are not expected in the near future. There is much greater danger of an enemy attack against the Aegean or the Adriatic coasts, particularly at spots
where strong guerrilla bands are in possession of the coast.
2.
Therefore the time during which the Anglo-American forces are still
tied up by the 10th Army must be utilized with decision in order to accomplish the following:
a.
Entirely quash the strong revolts in Istria.
b.
Get the Croatian coast fully
in
German hands.
3.
For this purpose Army Group B is to concentrate such strong forces
in Istria under the command of the SS that the revolts there are quickly
and completely quelled.
In addition to the reinforced 71st Division,
the 24th Panzer Division and large parts of the
Division, later
also the SS Brigade of the Reichsfuehrer SS, can be considered for this
task.
The 162nd (Turk) Division will also be transported to Istria after
22 Sep.
44th
By concentric attacks of our forces we must prevent the guerrillas from

being pushed back towards northwest Croatia. All troops involved should
be ordered to proceed relentlessly in dealing with the guerrillas.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is reporting what

ntans and armored cars he can turn over to the Commanding General,
Italian
4.
A large part of these vehicles are not suited

Armed Forcbs, Southeast.
to fighting against the Anglo-Americans, in any ease, but are very valuable for combatting guerrillas.
The Commandins
General, Southeast, in addition to his urgent tasks.
anian coast and capturing the
of entrey occupying the a matian-A
islands off the Gulf of Patras, is to use the forces available to support the operations of Army Group B in Istria, particularly by cutting
off the road connections between Istria and Croatia, insofar as these
are in his area. It is planned to shift forees from Istria to Croatia
at a later date.
5.
6.
Details
Group B n
of cooperation are
to be arranged directly
between Army
omnigGeneral, Armed Forces, Southeast.
Parts of
the area of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast are temporarily to be included in the operations of Army Group B, if this is necesthe forces of the Commanding
sary in annihilating the enemy in Istria;
General, Armed Forces, Southeast used in this area are to be placed
under Army Group B during the operations.
7.
Arm Group B will
report
at once plans and forces to be used,
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast.
agreement w
signed:
after
Keitel
8-68
-
92 -
The Fuehrer
FueBrer H eadquarters
28 Sep. 1943
orW/wst/Op,
r.
662375/43 g.K,Ch.
No, 3
of ten copies
Top secret
Directive
No. 50
for Preparation of the Transfer of the 20th Mountain Army
Northern Finand
and
Back
to
Norhern Norway
1.
The situation at the Northern Army Group has been consolidated completely, and it is not planned to move the front back. The most endangered sector at Velikie Luki is, being strengthened considerably. Never=
theless at the present time a second line is being built behind Lake
Peipus and the Narva in case of unfavorable developments, especially in
Finland.
2.
We are obliged to take into consideration the possibility that
Finland might be eliminated from the war or might collapse.
3.
In such a case it would be the task of the 20th Mountain Army for
the time being to continue to hold the northern area, whieh is of such
great importance to us., by pulling back the Army front along the line
The
Karesuando-Ivalo and the present area of the XIX Mountain Corps,
230th and the 270th Infantry Divisions would be subordinated to the
20th Mountain Army for this purpose at the proper time.
It would then become especially important to protect against air and
land attacks the Kolosjoki nickel mine, which would be particularly endangered.
How long it will be possible to carry out this task cannotbe foreseen
at the present time.
4.
The exceptionally great difficulties involved in the movements and

warfare becoming necessary under such circumstances require that the
time-consuming preparations be started at once. They should include
the following:
a.
The routes needed should be built and kept open and resting
places provided,
b.
Supplies for the withdrawing army\ should be prepared.
c.
Preparations should be made to destroy installations in the
area being evacuated which would be of importance to the enemy.
d,
The supplies should be shifted,
e.
Quarters should be prepared in the future operations areas of
the withdrawing parts of the Army.

f.
Communications should be prepared.
The arrangements to be made in direct agreement between the 20th

Mountain Army and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway should
be made to fit any season and the most unfavorable circumstances, i.e.,
the eventuality that it may not be possible to withdraw by sea from
B-68
-93
Finnish harbors the parts of the Army not needed for holding the northern
area.
5.
If the ordered measures cannot be carried out entirely inconspicuOusly, they should be explained to our troops and the Finns as undertaken exclusively for the purpose of improving communications between
Finland and Norway.
The improvements are being made in order to be
able to transfer reserves of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway
The number of persons
to Finland even in winter in case of necessity.
reasons for the preparations should be kept as
informed of the further
small as possible.
If correspondence or oral conferences become necessary between the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway and the 20th
Mountain Army, they must be routed through Germany and not through
Sweden.
Armed
6.
The 20th Mountain Army is to submit to the Operations Staff,
Forces High Command a brief memorandum about the plans for future warfare, with special consideration for the supply problem.
The 30th Mountain Army and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway
are to report the progress of the preparations ordered in segtion k
by 1 Dec..l9k3.
signed:
Directive
No.
Adolf Hitler
49
"Directive k9 was not isHandwritten note of 7 Oct. in naval files:

It referred to measures in connection with operation "Alarich",
sued.
etc.
Instead of the directive, several separate orders were issued."
(Translator's note:
not
located.)
B-68
- 9k
Copy
The Fuebrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
3 Oct. 1943
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 00584k7/3 g.Kdos.

,,Secret
Re:
Application of Directive 40 to Italy
In Italy the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and the Commander
in Chief of Army Group B are charged with preparation and execution of
coastal defense in their areas in accordance with directive 40.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 662109/43 g.K.Chefs.

Telegram of 4 Oct. received by the Naval High Command on 5 Oct. 1943.
Re:
Conduct of the war by the Commanding General, Armed Forees, South

and Army Group B.
A.
I expect that the enemy will direct his main operation from Italy
against the southeast area, perhaps also with some. forces from Africa.
However, it cannot yet be determined whether the enemy will turn from
southern Italy toward Albania, Montenegro, and southern Croatia, or
whether he will first try to push the German forces in Italy further
north in order to create for himself a basis in oentral Italy for attacking northern Croatia, and Istria.
B.
I order as follows for further warfare:
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will fight a

a.
1.
delaying action only as far as the line Gaeta-Ortona. This line is to
The time necessary for organizing the defenses and for bringbe held.
ing up the infantry divisions must be won by the delaying action in
front
of the line.
5 divisions, including the two infantry divisions (305th
b.
are to be. use4 at the Gaeta-Ortona front. One division is
to be kept in reserve behind each of the two wings.
and 65th),
The other divisions are to be deployed to defend the coastal sectors in

the rear and the area around Rome, especially the western coast of Italy.
The divisions which have suffered the most are to be used farthest
B-68
95 -
to the north.
c.
The regrouping necessitated by this order should be utilized to reunite all divisions according to the table of organization.
My approval must be obtained if any units are split up.
d.
For the eventuality that the enemy does not continue his
attack towards the north, or continues it only with small forces in order to attack the Balkans from the area south of the defense position,
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South should draw up a plan for
an attack against Apulia.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South
should report his plans in this regard, including the ground and air
forces needed, the time required for reorganization, and the necessary
supplies.
e.
Elba will continue to be occupied by one fortification
regiment consisting of two fortification battalions.
The task of Army Group B consists of the following:
a.
Pacification of its territory;
as strong foroes as possible should be used to quell the uprising in Istria and Slovenia.
b.
Protection of the rear communications and the deep coastal
flanks of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, especially along
the Ligurian Sea.
c.
Organization of the defense in northern Italy;
for this
purpose a defense position should be established in the Apennines and
along the adjoining coasts, especially at the Ligurian coast. The forces to be used are the divisions of the Commanding General, Armed Forces,
South and Army Group B.
'In this case it may be expected that 2 or 3 divisions will be withdrawn to the southeast area.
Since no large-scale enemy operations are expected in the near future
against the coastal sectors of Army Group. B, the coastal defenses must
be concentrated at the most important sectors and at the harbors, so
that strong infantry forces can be'withdrawn for Istria and Slovenia.
Therefore, insofar as possible the entire 44th Infantry Division and the
162nd Division are to be used there, and the 90th Armored Infantry Division, which must be reorganized in any case, will take over the defense and patrol duties of the 44th Infantry Division. The parts of
SS Armored Infantry Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" are to be returned to their division after Istria has been mopped up, especially
since panzer units are only of limited value for fighting guerrillas..
The 44th, 71st, and 162nd Divisions, on the other hand, are to be
equipped as plentifully as possible from Italian captured material for
combat in mountain terrain. The 901st Armored Infantry Regiment and
the 1st Panzer Regiment of the I Corps will remain under the command
of Army-Group B until the conclusion of the present operations. rlans
pertaining to points a, b, and c are to be reported.
C.
Transfer of forces
the 24th Panzer Division for

Army Group B relinquishes:
a.
the 305th and 65th Divisions to the Comanding Genthe Eastern Front;
eral, Armed Forces, South. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South
should equip the 305th Infantry Division for fighting in mountain terrain, and Army Group B should equip the 65th Infantry Division likewise.
The 764&th Artillery Battalion (17 cm. cannons), the 450th Artillery
Battalion (heavy field howitzers),
and the 56th Projector Regiment of
8-68
96 -
the I Corps are to be transferred at once to the Commanding General,

It is planned to bring up the remaining parts of
Armed Forces, South.
the 56th Projector Regiment from the West,
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South relinquishes:
b.
the 90th Armored Infantry Division when it arrives on the continent and
the 4 fortress battalions not deployed on Elba, with all weapons belonging to these units. Landing Engineer Battalion UUQ is to return to
Germany for rehabilitation purposes after carrying out its present
assignment;
it is planned to assign it to the- Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast thereafter0
c.
Army Group B receives the 371st Infantry Division from
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.
d.
Two parachute divisions are being organized in the Padua
The Assault Brigade of the Reicksfuebrer SS, which is
and Venice areas.
to the
to be transferred
to be the nucleus of a new 33 division,is
Laibach area for this purpose. The 361st and 362nd Infantry Divisions.
are to be stationed in suitable areas in the Po valley (visinity of
Verona)..
All details will be subject to separate orders.- The

e.
parts of the 305th and 371st Divisions which are to be used for setting
up new units are to remain with Army Group B and the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, West.
D.
Navy
The Navy will support Army operations with all available means, especially as regards coastal defense for the purpose of repulsing enemy
it will maintain coastal shipping,
landings in the rear of our front;
which may become of decisive importance in case the enemy succeeds in
disrupting railroad traffic along the Italian east and west coasts; and
it will commit naval forces to attack enemy shipping.
E.
Air Force
The main task of the Air Force in Italy continues to consist in attacking enemy ships, especially in case of further enemy landing operations
in the rear of the 10th Army or at the Adriatic coast of the Balkans.
In addition it must support Army operations, at least in case of strong
enemy attacks, protect larger troop movements of our own, and safeguard
the most important supply routes. Preparations should be made in cooperation with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South for action in
support of an offensive and of the defense operations which will be required shortly to repulse the enemy.
signed:
Adolf Hitler
B-68
-
97
Secret
To:
Army Group A
Copy of telegram of 23 Oc't. 1943 to the Army General Staff:

"Considering the particular importance of the Crimea as the cornerstone
of the Eastern Front, I order that the command authority invested in
the Commanding General of Army Group A over other Armed Forces commands
and civilian authorities with reference to coastal areas in accordance
with directive 40 be extended to the entire area of fortress Crimea. The
Commanding General of Army Group A has
ie right to delegate this extended command authority to the Commanding General of the 17th Army.
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
signed:
Adolf Hitler
OKW/WFSt/Op (H) 05176/43 geh."
OKH Gen.St.d.H. (Op.Abt.I)

430684 Gdos.Chefs (28 Oct.
1943)
Telegram of 29 Oct. 1943
Top secret
1.
I have transferred divisions to the East from the South and the
West so that they may smash the enemy forces which have crossed the
Dniepr below Kremenohuk by means of a counterattack which it may be possible to launch by 10 Nov.
This attack will bring a decisive change in
the situation for the entire southern sector of the front.
2.
Until 10 Nov. we must strive under all circumstances to maintain
the conditions necessary to assure the success of this counterattack.
and to cope with the critical situation.
3.
The conditions necessary for the attack are as follows:
a.
The 1st Panzer Army must remain in the projecting bend of
the Dniepr until the time of the attack, and may withdraw only locally,
if absolutely necessary. This is the only way in which the enemy can
be prevented from widening the breach on the western bank of the Dniepr,
and only then will our available forces be sufficient for a successful
counterattack.
b.
Army Group A must protect the southern flank of the 1st"Panzer
Army so that it will be impossible to threaten the rear of that army
northward across the Dniepr.
For this purpose the 6th Army must hold
98
B-68
the positions it is planning to take during the night of 28 Oct. as

long as at all possible. If this becomes impossible, the 6th Army
should withdraw gradually along the line Gromovka, east of Berislav,
Dniepr, bridgehead Nikopol, but the northern wing must hold the northern
fringe of Byelyenkoye under all circumstances. The connection with the
Crimea across the Perekop isthmus must be maintained. The isthmuses of
Genichesk and Chungar must be blocked.
If today's attack by the XL
Panzer Corps contiiues to roll, it is planned to use this corps temporarily for a brief relief attack from the Nikopol area.
1.
My previous decision obtains concerning the evacuation of the
Crimea.
5.
The new line of demarcation between Army Group A and the Southern
Army Group runs as follows (1:300,000):
Troitskoye (A), Shirokoye
Southern), Apostolovo (Southern), Marganets-Gorodishhe (A), Byelyenkoye
(A), Zherebyets (Southern).
signed:
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op.
662656/3 g.L.Chefs
Adolf Hitler
3 Nov. l1943
No. 8 of twenty-seven
copies
Top secret
Directive No. 51
The fierce
and costly
fight
against
Bolshevism has occupied our military
resources and energy to the utmost during the past two years and a
half.
This was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger and the
situation as a whole.
However, this situation has changed in the meantime.
The danger in the East remains, but a greater one is looming up
in the West:
an Anglo-American landing.
In the East the territories
involved are so large that in the worst case loss of a considerable
area can be tolerated without seriously endangering Germany.
In the West it is different, however.
If the enemy succeeds in penetrating our defensesathere on a broad front, it is difficult to predict
the consequences in a short time.
There are all indications that the
enemy is planning to attack the European vest front by spring at the
latest but perhaps even earlier.
Consequently I cannot tolerate it any longer that the West is weakened
any further for the benefit of-other theaters of war. Therefore I have
decided to strengthen the western defenses especially in those localities
from which we will launch the long-range attack on England. For that is
8-68
S99 -
where the enemy must and will attack, and where, unless all indications
are misleading, the decisive invasion battle will be fought.
Binding and diversionary attacks may be expected at other fronts.. A
From the navigaattack
on Denmark may even be expected.
large-scale
tional
view point such an undertaking would be more difficult,
and it
However, the pocould not be supported as effectively
from the air,
if
successful, would
litical and operational effects of such an attack,
be the greatest.
At the beginning of this battle the entire force of the enemy attack will
by necessity be directed against the troops along the coast. In the
short time that is probably left to us we can hope to reinforce our
coastal defenses only by utilizing all possible manpower and material
in Germany as well as in the oeeupied countries to speed up the construction of fortifications.
The fixed weapons which will be sent to Denmark and the occupied western
areas in the near future (heavy antitank guns, immobile tanks which are
to be dug into the ground, coastal artillery, anti-invasion guns, mines,
etc.), are to be concentrated in the coastal sectors which are-endangered
most. This will mean that the defenses of less endangered sectors cannot be strengthened in the near future.
If the enemy should nevertheless succeed in making a landing by concentrating all his forces, we must strike back with a powerful counterattack. We shall have to prevent the enemy from expanding his bridgehead
and must throw him back into the sea by means of the large forces stationed in the area, which will by that time have been transformed into
first-rate mobile assault troops through intensive training and additional men and equipment.
In addition, as the result of careful planining, it must be possible to
utilize every makeshift to throw all available resources from Germany
and other coastal sectors which are not threatened against the invading
enemy.
The-Air Force and the Navy must utilize all their forces to the fullest
extent to oppose the expected attack from the air and at, sea.
For this reason I issue the following orders:
A.
Army
The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General
1.
of the Panzer Troops will submit to me as soon as possible a plan conweapons, tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles, and ammunierninge
tion to be distributed during the next three months.
conform to the new situation.
This plan should
In drawing up this plan the following should be kept in mind:

All Panzer and armored infantry divisions in the West
a.
mobile; each should1 be equipped with 93 Panzer
should be sufficiently
weapons by the
guns, as well as with strong antitank
assault
IV or
end of December.
The 20th Air Force Field Division should quickly be reorganized into an
effective mobile reserve force equipped with assault guns and be ready
by the end of l53.

The SS Hitler
Jugend
Division, the 21st Panzer Division, and the infantry
B- 68
-
100
and reserve divisions stationed in Jutland should be brought up to*

strength as quickly as possible.
b.
The reserve tank divisions in the West and in Denmark as
well as the assault-gun training battalions in Denmark should receive
additional Panzer IVts, assault guns, and heavy antitank guns.
c.
Both in November and in December 100 heavy antitank 40
and 43 guns (half of them mobile) Should be provided in addition to the
heavy antitank guns needed for the units being newly organized in the
West and in Denmark.
d.
A large number of weapons (including approximately 1,000
machine guns) should be provided to improve the equipment of the static
divisions in the coastal defenses of the West and of Denmark,'as well
as to arm uniformly the troops which will be withdrawn from the sectors
not under attack.
e.
The units in the threatened sectors should be equipped
with large numbers of close-combat antitank weapons.
f.
The units stationed in Denmark and those engaged in
coastal defense in the occupied west area should receive additional
artillery and antitank weapons, and the Army artillery should be increased.
2.
The troops and units stationed in the West and in Denmark, as
well as the panzer, assault-gunand antitank units which are to be organized in the West cannot be transferred to other fronts without my
permission.
The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General of the
Panzer Troops will report to me through the Armed Forces High Command
Operations Staff when the panzer, assault-gun, and antitank battalions
and companies are fully equipped.
3.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West will set the dates
for bringing up forces in much greater
numbers than eretofore from
the sectors which are not threatened. These forces, provisionally

equipped as assault forces, are to be brought up on the pretense of maneuvers and exercises.
I demand that for this purpose all troops, with
the exception of small patrol forces, be withdrawn frobi the sectors
Security and patrol forces should be made
which are not endangered.
available from security and alarm units for the areas from which reserves are withdrawn. Likewise construction units making use of the
civilian population as much as possible, should be held in readiness
in order to keep open the lines of communication which will probably be
destroyed by the enemy air force.
4.
The Commander of the German troops in Denmark will
his area the measures stipulated in paragraph 3.
take in'
5.
The Chief of Army Equipment and Commanding General of the Replacement Training Army will make available combat groups in the
strength of regiments, security battalions, and engineer construction
battalions organized from demonstration and training troops, schools,
and convalescent troops in the home zone, which are to be ready for
transport 48 hours after being called up.
In addition, other available personnel is to be organized into personnel
replacement transfer battalions and equipped with available weapons so
that possible heavy losses may be replaced rapidly.
B-68
101 -
umiin
B.
Air Force
The offensive and defensive power of the air forces in the west area and
in Denmark should be reinforced to meet the new situation.
Therefore
steps should be taken to release all available flying forces and mobile
antiaircraft detachments suitable for aefense from home defense, and
from schools and training establishments of the home area for use in
the West and in Denmark,
The ground installations
in southern Norway, Denmark, northwestern
Germany and the west area are to be organized and provisioned in such a
way that
our forces can be removed from the range of the enemy bombers
at
the beginning of a large-scale
attack,
and the effect'
of the enemy's
offensive power -ean be broken up.
This applies especially to our
fighter forces, the operational possibilities of which must be increased
through numerous advanced airfields.
Special emphasis should be placed
on effective camouflage.
Here likewise I expect all forces to be made
available without hesitation from less endangered areas.
C.
Navy
The
Navy will make available the strongest possible forces suitable for
attacking the enemy landing fleets.
Coastal defense installations in
the process of being constructed should be finished speedily, and the
possibility
of setting
up additional
coastal batteries
and laying further
flanking minefields should be investigated.
All personnel in training units, schools, or other land stations which
are suitable for land fighting should be made ready in such a way that
they can be used on very short notice in the areas of enemy landing operations
at least as security forces.
In making preparations to reinforce the defenses in the west area, the
Navy should keep in mind especially the possibility of having to repulse
enemy landings in Norway or Denmark. In this respect I believe that it
is particularly important to provide numerous submarines for the northern
area, even if this means temporarily decreasing their number in the
Atlantic.
D.
The SS
The Reichsfuehrer SS will

investigate
which SS (Waffen) and police forces can be made available for combat, security, and patrol tasks.
Combat and security units should be formed from personnel taken from training establishments, replacement and convalescent units, schools and other
stations in the home area.
E.
The Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces;
the
Reichsfuehrer SB;
the Chief of the Army General Staff; the Commanding
the Chief of Army Equipment and CommandGeneral, Armed Forces, West;
ing General of the Replacement Training Army;
the Inspector General of
the Panzer Troops;
and the Commander of the German Troops in Denmark
will report to me by 15 Nov. the preparations made and planned.
I expect thatall commands and stations will utilize the time available
to the fullest possible extent for making the preparations for the expected decisive battle in the West.
All persons of authority will guard against wasting time and energy in
useless quibbling about jurisdictional matters and will direct all efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power.
signed:
Adolf
Hitler
B-68
102
OKW/WFSt/Op. Ni'.
006123/4f3 gK.
Copy of telegram of 6 Nov.
1943
Secret
The Fuebrer has issued the following orders for command organization
in Italy.
1.
When the Bernhard line is reached, which must definitely be held,
it will be necessary to combine all forces in Italy under one unified

command. Field Marshal Kesselring is designated for this purpose, and
he will make the necessary preparations with Army Group B for taking
over command. The time for taking over command is to be reported by
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, and a special order will
then be issued to that effect,
2.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will be designated as
Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest (Army Group B) after taking
over command.
3.
When the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest takes over
command, the following command organization will go into effect:
A.
The following are subordinate to the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southwest:
a.
All forces of the three branches
and the SS engaged in ground fighting.
-of the
Armed Forces
b.
The deputy in the Mediterranean for the Reich Commissioner
of Maritime Shipping in all matters pertaining to warfare.
c.
The parts of the Todt Organization in the Italian area.
B.
The German Naval Command, Italy and the 2nd Air Force are directly under the operational command of the Commanders in Chief, Navy
and Air, respectively. They will keep the Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southwest informed about their plans.
In all matters pertaining to warfare on the mainland and coastal defense, they are bound by the directives of the Commanding General, Armed
Forces, Southwest. In case of imminent danger, the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southwest, has the right to issue binding orders to the
German Naval Command, Italy'and the 2nd Air Force, informing the Armed
Forces High Command Operations Staff and the Commanders in Chief, Navy
and Air Force thereof at once.
C.
The Deputy General of the German Armed Forces in Italy is
bound by the directives of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest in all matters pertaining to the tasks of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southwest, or which directly or indirectly affect warfare
by this commander. The demarkation of command will be defined in detail.
D.
The Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest will have
command authority in the Italian operations areas according to the stipulations of OKW/WFSt/Qu (Verw) Nr. 00 5995/43 gKdos. of 10 Oct. 1943.
4.
Assignment for the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest:
B-68
103 -
The directive for warfare by the Commanding General, Ar'med Forces, South
and Army Group B issued on
Oct. 19 4 3 remains effective for the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southwest. Consequently he has the following
tasks:
A.
Ortona.
Defense
of
the central
Italian area along the line Gaeta-
B.
Protection of the coasts of the Tyrrhenian, Ligurian, and
Adriatic Seas, especially of the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Gulf of Genoa.
C.
Pacification of the parts of northeast Italy which are still
in revolt. For this purpose especially the railroad and eable line
Willach-Tarvin-Udine-Trieste must be protected, as well as the LaibachFiume railroad for bringing up supplies for the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, Southeast, The guerrilla bands are to be prevented from
entering German territory.
D.
Plans should be prepared for an attack on Apulia in case enemy plans to attack the Balkans from the area south of the defense line
Gaeta-Ortona should become apparent.
The line of demarkation between the Commanding General, Armed For5.
ces, Southwest and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West remains
as heretofore. The dividing line from the Commanding General, Armed
the Italian-Croatian border of 1941
Forces, Southeast is as follows:
the island KRR (Veglia) to the Commanding General,
on the mainland;
Sv
.Southwest; 'Prvic island to the Commanding.General, Southwest;
Rab island to the CommandGrgur to the Commanding General, Southeast;
Cherso to the Commanding General, Southwest;
ing General, Southeast;
Asinello to the CommandLussino to the Commanding General, Southwest;
ing General, Southwest.
The Army General Staff and the Army Personnel Division are to carry
6.
out the following changes in staffs:
A.
Expansion of the present staff of the Commanding General,
Armed Forces, South in accordance with the new tasks as requested by
the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South directly from the Army General Staff in agreement with the other. branches of the Armed Forces.
Organization of an operations staff from the present Army
B.
A special order will be issued for
Group B for Field Marshal Rommel.
the tasks of this staff.
Organization of the new 14th Army in northern Italy from the
C.
present Army Group B.
The transfer of command is to be handled in such a way that there
7.
will be no interruption.
The order establishing command organization in Italy up to the
8.
Nr. 00 5058/43 gxdos. of 7 Sep. 1943) is
present time (OKW/FSt/Op (H)
herewith cancelled.
signed:
Keitel
8-68
-
104

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y~VES

GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

This is the second of two volumes of top-level directives issued

Armament for 194 2

Armament for 1942

Deception of the Enemy

Operations in the Black Sea

Operations in the North

Directive 40 - Command Organization on the Coasts

Directive 41 - Eastern Front

Command Organization on the

tion with Directive 41

Operations in the Mediterranean

Regulations for Handling Secret

Manpower Needed for Shipyards

Special Order No. 1 i

Reinforcement of the African

Jul., Naval Staff

Directive 144 - Warfare in

Directive 46 - Fight Against

Reinforcement of Crete and

Destruction of Sabotage Troops

Motivation for Above Order

Defense of the French Mediterranean Coast

Defense Measures for the

Equipment for the Coming

Operations of Naval Surface

Operations Order No. 5

Warfare in the East

Expansion of Naval Bases

Directive 48 - Command Organization and Defense in the

Directive 50 - Transfer of the

Note on Directive 4f9

Armed Forces, South

Command Organization in Italy

Rommelts Army Group for Special

Naval Report in Connection with

Warfare against England

Preparations for Imminent LargeScale Battles in the West

Order Forbidding Withdrawals

Concerning Army Group B

Combat Zones in the West

Fortresses in the West

Command Authority in the

Supplies and Transports in

Battle for Rome

Order to Destroy U.S.

Operations by Naval Forces in

Channel Island Fortresses

Fuebrer Order No. 11 Strongpoints

Mcar. PGI 31756

Operational Order No, 7 Operations on the Eastern

Hsrbors and Har-

bor Installations During

Organization of Army Group

Directive for Operations of

the Direction of Shipping

Task of the Party in

Order for the Navy to Take Over

tions Area Within the Reich

Cooperation Between the Party

Command Authority in an OperaJul.

Authority in the Area of the

Construction of Rear Defenses