OccurenceReport UPI6208

Islamic Republic of IRAN
Civil Aviation Organization
Accident Final Report
State File Number:
A13880431UPI6208
Type of Occurrence:
Accident
Date of Occurrence:
July 22th 2009
Place of Occurrence:
I.R.IRAN - Mashhad
Safety & Accident
Aircraft Type:
IL-62M
Registration:
UP-I6208
Investigation Department
Operator:
Aria
Islamic Republic Of Iran

Civil Aviation Organization
Aircraft Accident Investigation Department
Final Report
Basic Information
Type of occurrence:
Accident
Date:
24.Jul.2009
Location:
Mashhad International Airport/ I.R of Iran
Aircraft:
Airplane
Model:
IL-62M
Registration:
UP-I6208
Owner:
DETA Airline
Operator:
ARIA Airline
Date of Issue:
05 Jun 2010
Civil Aviation Organization of I.R. of Iran

Aircraft Accident Investigation Department
Mehrabad International Airport
PBO: 13445-1795 Tehran/Iran
Fax: + 98 21 6601 8659
Tel.: + 98 21 6604 7965
E-mail: AIG@cao.ir
http://www.cao.ir
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreword:
Civil Aviation Organization is responsible for supervision on correct
implementation of laws and regulations and flight standards in civil Aviation industries of
the country, according to international commitments and domestic laws of the Islamic
Republic of Iran; in this respect, the accidents are investigated , in order to identify
threaten resources of safety ratio of flights, based on international regulations and
compiled guidelines of International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO (annex 13).
After identifying main causes and contributive factors of the accident, safety
recommendations are issued in order to consider flight standards and regulations, as well
as more attention to flight safety for preventing the same accidents.
Written matters in annex 13 of ICAO and relevant appendixes emphasize on this matter
that The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the
prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion
blame or liability
The main objective of investigating accidents is to achieve main causes and roots for
preventing similar accidents in the future.
About IL-62M airplane accident, owned by DETA Airline, Kazakhstan, (leased by Aria
Airline) in July 24, 2009, at 08:05 local time (13:35 UTC) on Shahid Hasheminejad
International Airport/ Mashhad, The Accident Investigation Team was attended in the
place of accident immediately and gathered information; this team receives FDR and
CVR of the plane, in order to analyze them.
In this direction, there has been taken necessary actions for correct investigation of
technical operational documents and study about the accident site and body of the plane
in order to identify main and contributive causes of this accident and issue safety
recommendations for preventing such same occurrences.
The accident investigation team however appreciates Interstate Aviation
Commission (IAC) for mutual cooperation in the investigation of accident involving IL62M with registration, UP-I6208 and preparing final report of this accident.
Synopsis:
Type of the aircraft
Illyushin, model IL-62M
Registration mark
UP-I6208
Owner
DETA Airline, Kazakhstan
Operator
Aria Airline
Date of accident
July 24,2009
Time of accident
18:05 local time (13:35 UTC)
Place of accident
End of left band of Mashhad International

Airport
Damage to airplane
Destroyed
No of passengers
156 person
No of crews
17 persons& one additional crews group
No of fatal
16 persons
No of injured person
31persons
Responsible for accident
Aircraft accident investigation &safety
investigation
Dept.
Foreign cooperator
(IAC) Interstate Aviation
commission
Committee/(Russia Kazakhstan Civil
I.R of Iran
Aviation Authority
Main cause of accident
crews mistakes
1. Factual Information
1.1 History of the flight:
At July 24, 2009, Ilyushin aircraft, model IL-62M of DETA Airline
with registration, UP-I6208 and flight no. IRX.1525 of Aria Airline flight
with 169 passengers from Mehrabad International Airport/ Tehran, and it
has landed at 18:05 local time on RWY 13 L in Mashhad International
Airport; then it has run off from end of the runway, without considerable
reduction in aircraft speed and it collided with wall of the airport and it was
stopped after approximately 185 m.
The mentioned aircraft has been leased by Aria Airline as ACMI,
according to contract No. 002/IL-62M/ACMI.
Subsequently, the ground safety unit of the airport has attended in place of
occurring accident, by breaking protective fences and barbed wires of the
airport, and then they evacuated passengers and extinguished fire outside of
aircraft by carrying out necessary actions.
1.2
Injuries to persons:
Injured persons of this accident were carried to hospitals of Mashhad
city, after search and rescue operation, bodies of victims were transferred
to the legal medicine. The following table shows overview of body injuries
to passengers of this aircraft:
1.3
Injuries
Crew
Passenger
Others
Fatal
11
Serious Injuries
Minor
28
None
122
Total
17
156
Damage to aircraft:
The aircraft fuselage destroyed totally due to impact to wall of the

airport and it caused destroying cockpit and nose section airframe and it
can't be reconstructed.
1.4
Other Damage:
Due to impact of aircraft landing gears with net barrier in shoulder of

RWY 13L, it has major damages on it and some damages to PAPI light in
beginning of RWY 31R.
1.5 Personnel Information:
1.5.1 Pilot in Command :( PF)

Birth year
1957
Kind of certificate and validity date
Total flight hours
Class one validity date

28/OCT/09
Without medicine limitation and
it is valid until 28/Aug/09
14200
Total flight hours with IL-62
1500
Date and place of last simulator
10/Mar/09 Russia
Prior accident
None
License for international flight
ok
License for radio communication
ok
Entrance date to Iran
19 July 2009
Date of first flight in Iran
24 July 2009
No of flight in Iran
6 flights
Medicine condition
According to available documents, he has done Radio communication

but the level of his English conversation was not suitable.
1-5-2 Copilot:
Date of Birth
1962
Kind of certificate and validity date Class 2 validity date24/Feb/2010

Medical condition
Total flight hours
Without medical limitation and it

is valid until 24/Feb/2010
8294
Total flight hours with IL-62
1319
10/MAY/2009 Russia
Prior accident
none
ok
ok
19 July 2009
24 July 2009
6 flights
1-5-3 Flight Engineer:

Date of Birth
1957
Kind of certificate and validity date
Total flight hours
Class 1 validity
date28/OCT/09
Without medicine limitation
and it is valid until
28/0CT/09
8747
Total flight hours with IL-62airline
1697
10/MAY/09 Russia
Prior accident
None
ok
ok
July , 17,2009
July , 23,2009
6 flights
Medical condition
1.6 Aircraft Information:

The Ilyushin aircraft IL-62M with S/N: 1951525 have been
manufactured at 09.06.1989 in Ilyushin Aircraft Factory, and its owner is
DETA Air Company, Kazakhstan. It has been registered at June 16, 2008
with UP-U6208, by Civil Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan. It has also
received its last certificate of Airworthiness at Jan. 28, 2009 from this state,
which it was valid until Jan. 28, 2010.
This airplane has been exploited after upgrading its navigation and
telecommunication, as well as installing its passenger oxygen system for
flight operation in Iran.
This airplane has been arrived in I.R of Iran Territory , due to
agreement No. 002/ IL-62M/ACMI, dated on Nov. 16, 2008 as "wet lease
agreement (ACMI) for aircraft IL-62M, between DETA Air, as Lesser and
Aria Airline as Lessee at Jan. 17, 2007.
State registry number
UP-I6208
Manufacture number
1951525
Owners
Eugeny V. Zhigayev
Ibragim A. Paskachev
Operator
ARIA airline. The aircraft owned by D.E.T.A.

AIR airline was leased under an agreement and
operated by the airline ARIA AIR (IR of
Iran).
Date of release
09 June 1989
State registration certificate
No.538 dated 16 June 2008
Airworthiness aircraft certificate
(Kazakhstan)Republic)
No.0538
dated January 28, 2009 valid till
Assigned life time and service life
January 28, 2010

35000 hours, 7500 landings., 20 years
(Bulletin No.1440-),
Bulletin No. 291-62M was fulfilled on January
20, 2009, so in accordance with the bulletin the
assigned service life was extended to 20 years 4
months, till September 29 2009.
10200 hours, 2700 landings (Bulletin No.1399
Overhaul life and service time
), 14 years
Operating time since new(TSN)
13573 hours, 3987 landings
Operating time since the last overhaul(TSO)
7876 hours, 2458 flights
Number of overhauls, date of the last overhaul
One overhaul, September 29, 1995
Overhaul life rest
2384 hours, 242 landings
Last periodic technical maintenance
According to the logbook March 29, 2009,

form -1 with operating time 7666 hours and
Last periodic maintenance
2338 landings, maintenance sheet 9

Form 15 July 2009, maintenance sheet
Fuelling
51, Teheran
20 tons
Fuel type
Jet -A1
Insurance certificate
Kazakhinstrakh, Insurance agreement No.

17/303/08/891
Engines installed in the aircraft:

Engine type
D-30KU-2
D-30KU-2
D-30KU-2
D-30KU
Serial
51148802221
51248802214
51219002225
0304022212226
Manufacturer
JSC Rybinskiye
JSC Rybinskiye
JSC Rybinskiye
JSC Rybinskiye
motory
motory
motory
motory
Date of
22 November1988
26 October1988
11 March1990
30 April1982
Operating
time
manufacture
7261 hours,
7425 hours,
7307 hours,
14046 hours,
since new
1836 cycles
1890 cycles
1729 cycles
3536 cycles
Place of the
JSC NPO Saturn
JSC NPO Saturn
JSC NPO Saturn
JSC NPO Saturn
30 December 1999 23 October 2001
14 May 2002
30 March 2000.
Operating time
3574 hours
3119 hours
1806 hours
3567 hours
since the last
928 cycles
779 cycles
438 cycles
925 cycles
Overhaul life
3637 hours
3330 hours
3000 hours
3627 hours
time
Overhaul life
901 cycles
63 hours,
767 cycles
210 hours,
543 cycles
1194 hours,
898 cycles
60 hours,
time rest
-27 cycles
-12 cycles
105 cycles
-27 cycles
last overhaul
Date of the
last overhaul
overhaul
Engines, APU TA-6A, units and assembly parts were operated in

compliance with the effective operating regulations.
All four engines had sufficient life times in operation hours to perform
flights. According to bulletins No. 1770 and No. 1844 of the engine
manufacture JSC NPO Saturn, effective dates February 08, 2002 and June
29, 2007, the first, second and fourth engines had exceeded life time in
cycles (27, 16(12), 27 correspondingly). Life times were extended by the
JSC Aerotechservice (Nikolayev, Ukraine) and JSC Engine (Perm).
10
Engine maintenance performed:

APU
Periodical maintenance
Current maintenance
PU 1
-1 21 April 2009
19 July 2009
PU 2
-1 29 April 2009
16 July 2009
PU 3
-1 - 29 April 2009
15 July 2009
PU 4
-1 21 April 2009
19 July 2009
The airframe, assemblies and units has life time sufficient to perform flight
tasks except for the cycle life time for AP units 1, 2, 4. The aircraft had no
malfunctions before the accident flight on July 24, 2009.
No complaints were made on technique functioning during the flight.
According to information of the flight date recorders, engine and aircraft
system operating parameters were in compliance with the assigned modes.
1.7 Meteorological information:

According to the meteorological office report, status of the current air
(METAR), in the accident time in Mashhad International Airport (Shahid
Hasheminejad) at 24.07.2009 was according to the following table:
ICAO ID:OIMM
Time
Wind
Pressure
TEMP/DEW
UTC
LMT
11:50
02:61
DIRECTION
(DEG)
SPEED(KT(
Visibility

Cloud
RH
Density
altitude
HPA INCH
(feet)
60
12
53/M05
CAVOK
1013
62.91
6299
1012
29.89
6235
1012
29.90
6124
7.52 %
34/M03
12:50
17:20
80
14
CAVOK
13:50
18:20
60
14
CAVOK
9.24 %
33/M04
9.06 %
11
There were not any effective metrological factors that could affect on
operation of the aircraft.
1.8 Aids to navigation:

Mashhad international airport is equipped with aid to navigation
systems as below:
NDB
385KHZ
DVOR/DME
11400 MHZ
LLZ
109.900MHZ
ILSGP
333.800MHZ
ILS/DME
CH36X
According to available
documents at accident time, all navigational
systems operations were normal
1.9 Communication:
Mashhad international airport equipped to communication system as
below:
APP:
TWR:
ATIS (INFO)
Frequency
Time
127.300 MHZ
121.500 MHZ
H24
H24
353.800 MHZ
H24
118.100 MHZ
121.700 MHZ
121.900 MHZ
257.800 MHZ
243.000 MHZ
H24
H24
H24
H24
H24
Notes
Emergency
frequency
Military frequency
Stand by For all VHF

UDF, Military
Aircraft Military
Emergency
126.400 MHZ
Communication and conversation from the flight control units & CVR of
aircraft have shown the correct operation of these systems.
12
1.10 Aerodrome information:

Mashhad international Airport of (OIMM) has aerodrome reference
point with geographical coordination 361403N 0593842E in MAG 312 Deg
with elevation of 3226 FT RWY 13L threshold.
Its direction and distance is as East and 3 Km from Mashhad, its height
from sea level is 3263 ft, and its temperature degree reference is 34.1 C.
There are permission IFR/VFR flights in this airport. Fire fighting
facilities of Mashhad INTL Airport is in CAT7. It has two Runways in
direction of 13/31 L, R with 3811 * 45 m dimension. About this accident,
there werent any faults in this regard.
1.11 Flight Recorders:
FDR
The aircraft was equipped with flight data recorders MSRP-64 and MSRP12-96. A tripartite recorder K3-63 was not installed in the aircraft. The
recorders were retrieved from the accident site by Iranian accident
investigation team. Data readout was carried out at a facility of the PARS
Aviation Service company. The information from the MSRP-12-96
recorder was not downloaded. The cassette KS-13 of the accumulator KBN
as well as the magnetic tape of the tape media MLP-14-5 of the onboard
recorder MSRP-64 were in satisfactory condition and had the parametric
accident flight data recorded on them. On the pictures below some readout
results are shown:
13
30
20
10
5400
5200
5000
4800
-4
IAS
50
AS760
GPWS
VHFkey
RA.Glid+
GV!
Alt.radi
[m]
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
4200
4000
3800
3600
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
AFCS.Rol AFCS.Pit
Stab.p
LG-ToExt
GHLFai
GHRFai
RA.Locz+
Elv.l+
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
[km/h]
-2
4400
4600
[deg]
Stabzr
10
[deg]
[deg]
Spoil.l
Flaps.l
6400
5600
-2
6600
Spoil.r
5800
6800
0.4
20
7000
30
7200
0.6
Flaps.r
7400
0.8
6000
10
1.2
[g]
VertAcc
-15
-10
-5
13:21:00
Alt.radi: Radio altitude
13:22:00
IAS: Indicated airspeed
AS760: Altimeter setting 760
Stabzr: Stabilizer position
Flaps.l: Flaps (left)
Flaps.r: Flaps (right)
AFCS.Pit: AFCS pitch channel ON
514
-0.6
4.4
Spoil.l: Spoiler (left)

AFCS.Rol: AFCS roll channel ON
Spoil.r: Spoiler (right)
Pitch: Pitch angle
AOA: Angle of attack
1.00
13:23:00
793.3
-1.44
13:24:00
13:25:00
4.0
0.6
-1.00
13:26:00
571
13:27:00
479
3000.0
-2.79
8.8
13:29:00
13:30:00
Landing gears actuator to extend
3388.9
13:28:00
3833.3
24.2
24.0
1.17
-6.3
Pic.1.1. Aircraft IL-62M UP-I6208 24.07.2009 at Mahrabad accident FDR (MSRP-64) flight parameters. (Preliminary)
0.0
0.2
-1.0
-0.3
Elev: Elevator position
CCP: Control column position
VHF keying
VertAcc: Vertical acceleration
10 Alt.pr 9538.5
6200
12
7600
-150
8600
7800
-100
8800
[deg]
-50
9000
8000
9200
Pitch
50
9400
AOA
100
9600
8200
150
8400
[deg]
[mm]
[m]
9800
15
Elev
CCP
WinArm32 INTERSTATE AVIATION COMITTEE Printed: 02.08.2009 22:57:22 #11 User: Zayko (#3)
Alt.pr
13:31:00
Alt.pr
-0.7
8.4
13:32:00
2200.0
Alt.radi
793.3
664.7
30.0
13:33:00
364
15.6
20.9
22.1
9.0
7.1
6.8
-7.8
Left gyro horizon failure
3.2
1.23
-1.83
0.0
Stab.p
Time UTC
279
276
13:35:00
87.5
325
GPWS
-5.60
GV malfunction
Right gyro horizon failure
265.6
13:34:00
1.00
-8.6
13.8
A/C type:IL-62M Reg.No.:UP-I6208 Date:24.07.09 Flight:1525
Touchdown
14
100
100
50
-50
-100
-150
6000
5800
5600
5400
5200
5000
60
[m]
800
750
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
-50
4600
4400
4200
4000
3800
3600
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
[km/h]
IAS
20
40
80
4800 Alt.radi
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
150
280
6200
-0.2
6800
[deg]
260
7000
-20
GMH
[mkA]
0.2
7200
-10
6400
0.4
30
[deg]
6600 LocDev
0.6
8000 LatAcc
7400
-10
8200
7600
10
8400
[g]
20
10
8600
Roll
20
7800
Ail.l: Aileron position (left)
CWP: Wheel position

Ail.r: Aileron position (right)
514
82.9
13:21:00
13:22:00
AFCS.Rol: AFCS roll channel ON
1.9
0.01
1.5
13:23:00
793.3
-18.4
GMH: Magnetic heading
LocDev: Localiser deviation
LatAcc: Lateral acceleration
Roll_ri: Roll angle (right FD)
Roll: Roll angle Roll_le: Roll angle (left FD)
Rudder: Rudder position
-2.5 Alt.pr 9538.5
8800
9400
Roll_le
-20
9600
[deg]
-10
9800
2.5
9000
10000
-5
10
10200
[deg]
Roll_ri
20
10400
Ail.l
9200 Rudder
[deg]
[m]
Ail.r
-30
CWP
0.0
13:25:00
62.9
13:26:00
571
13:27:00
3388.9
13:28:00
3833.3
114.1
24.5
13:29:00
479
3000.0
140.0
-30.0
8.1
9.6
13:30:00
-38.3
7.6
13:24:00
0.0
Alt.pr
Alt.pr
13:31:00
-28.9
0.0
13:32:00
2200.0
Alt.radi
-33.5
13:33:00
364
793.3
121.4
664.7
5.8
13:34:00
265.6
0.01
0.0
-2.1
130.0
Time UTC
279
276
13:35:00
87.5
325
127.1
115.6
0.13
-17.0
21.9
-2.9
37.7
Touchdown
15
16
10
EGT2
EGT1
[deg]
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
Cab/Atm
0.6 Ubus22A
0.4 Ubus21A
0.2
7800
7600
7400
7200
7000
6800
6600
6400
6200
6000
5800
5600 [kgf/sm2]
0.8
8000
5400
5200
5000
4800
4600
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
DVibr
RevShut1
EngFire
HSP<
IAS
[m]
3600
VHFkey LG-ToExt
LOP
CIO!
FMmin RevShut4
Fire
BagSMK
AC1+
AC2+
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
[km/h]
27.5
Alt.radi
3800
28
4200
4000
28.5
4400
29
[V]
15
20
[mm/sec]
VibRm1
VibRm2
VibRm3
VibRm4
20
40
60
80
100
[%]
N1.1
8200
20
9000
N1.2
N1.3
EGT3
40
9200
8400
[deg]
9400
340
13:21:00
13:22:00
Ubus21A: Bus 21A voltage
Ubus22A: Bus 22A voltage
13:23:00
793.3
28.2
28.3
Cab/Atm: Cabin/atmosphere pressure ratio
VibRm4: Engine rear mount vibration ratio # 4

0.50
13:25:00
13:26:00
571
355
398
46.3
48.6
13:27:00
0.8
7.0
13:28:00
13:29:00
13:30:00
Landing gears actuator to extend
56.5
28.3
28.2
793.3
13:33:00
364
664.7
35.0
30.6
39.7
13:34:00
265.6
435
487
0.0
-41.8
Time UTC
279
276
345
366
570
13:35:00
87.5
325
435
497
13.8
605
30.3
33.8
82.7
-41.8
-34.2
83.3
16.6
26.8
121.1122.9
RevShut1
115.0113.3
RevShut4
Alt.radi
13:32:00
2200.0
3.1
7.9
70.9
74.5
13.9
86.0
0.11
60.0
66.7
Alt.pr
420
477
13:31:00
41.1
50.3
63.2
57.3
62.4
13:24:00
1.6
7.9
N1.1: Low pressure compressor rate 1
VibRm3: Engine rear mount vibration ratio # 3
EGT1: Exhausted gaz temp. 1
16.6
23.7
Throt1: Throttle position 1
VHF keying
514
0.61
2.4
11.3
500
526
72.7
77.0
65.8
N1.4 Alt.pr 9538.5
Throt1
9600
EGT4
Throt2
9800
8600
Throt3
[m]
8800
Throt4
Alt.pr
Touchdown
0.6
0.4
0.2
Spoil.l
[deg]
15
10
-4
-6
Stabzr
[deg]
280
260 Alt.radi: Radio altitude
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
GPWS
Stab.p
VHFkey
GHLFai
GHRFai
RA.Glid+
RA.Locz+
Elv.l+
GV!
300
100
50.0
GPWS
13:34:45
71.9
325
320
110
100.0
IAS
[km/h]
[m]
Stabzr: Stabilizer position
-2.2
Pitch: Pitch angle
318
AOA: Angle of attack
VertAcc: Vertical acceleration
Elev: Elevator position
CCP: Control column position
Alt.radi
-6
-4
-2
Spoil.r
-2
0.8
1.2
[deg]
10
1.4
AOA
12
1.6
Pitch
[g]
VertAcc
-15
-150
-5
50
-10
10
100
-50
15
-100
[deg]
150
13:34:50
31.3
-0.6
1.00
Thrshould passing
[mm]
-5.60
2.5
13:34:55
3.2
13:35:05
0.0
-67.3
13:35:10
13.8
Stab.p
13:35:15
279
13:35:20
6.8
-1.83
13:35:25
13:35:30
GV malfunction
13:35:35
VHF keying
Left gyro horizon failure

Right gyro horizon failure
7.1
13:35:00
276
2.6
6.8
1.23
-8.6
Touchdown
Elev
206
-1.7
13:35:40
186
-2.2
-6.1
-234.7
17.0
7.8
13:35:45
111
Time UTC
-7.0
13:35:50
129
-7.8
1.77
16.0
End of the RWY
CCP
Ditch
17
-2.5
-5
-10
-20
-30
-5
-10
-15
0.4
-10
-20
200
150
10
[mkA]
250
20
30
-0.2
LocDev
[deg]
0.2 Rudder
-10
[g]
IAS
[km/h]
350
325
300
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
Alt.radi
[m]
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
120
125
130
135
[deg]
GMH
50
100
Roll: Roll angle
Ail.r: Aileron position (right)

CWP: Wheel position
Ail.l: Aileron position (left)
13:34:45
50.0
87.5
325
GMH: Magnetic heading
LocDev: Localiser deviation
13:34:50
31.3
318
59.3
13:34:55
127.1
Roll_le: Roll angle (left FD)
127.1
Rudder: Rudder position
LatAcc: Lateral acceleration
-5 Roll_ri: Roll angle (right FD)
10
LatAcc
Roll
[deg]
[deg]
Roll_ri
2.5
Roll_le
10
Spoil.l
[deg]
20
Spoil.r
Ail.l
Threshould passing
[deg]
276
13:35:05
0.0
115.6
12.7
13:35:10
13:35:15
-2.5
279
13:35:20
115.6
6.6
-3.3
31.7
-2.1
13:35:25
7.1
-5.6
-1.0
37.7
130.0
6.8
-5.2
-0.6
37.7
13:35:30
13:35:00
-3.8
0.0
0.6
3.8
Touchdown
Ail.r
13:35:35
-18.9
4.2
-18.0
0.14
-2.1
21.9
6.9
3.9
13:35:40
206
19.3
3.2
-1.2
0.6
9.4
-16.5
13:35:45
186
-0.36
13:35:50
2.9
Time UTC
111
End of the RWY
CWP
Ditch
18
[%]
120
100
80
60
40 N1.4: Low pressure compressor rate 4
EGT4
EGT3
EGT2
EGT1
[deg]
25
20
300
250
320
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
VHFkey
LOP
RevShut1
RevShut4
Fire
BagSMK
HSP<
AC1+
AC2+
[km/h]
[m]
110
Alt.radi
24
26
28
30
32
IAS
Ubus21A
[V]
Ubus22A
10
15
VibRm1
450
[mm/sec]
VibRm2
500
350
VibRm3
550
400
VibRm4
600
20
N1.1
20
13:34:45
50.0
87.5
325
Bus 21A voltage
Bus 22A voltage
Engine rear mount vibration ratio # 4
Engine rear mount vibration ratio # 2
13:34:50
31.3
318
Threshould passing
650
N1.2
40
N1.3
[deg]
N1.4
Throt1
Throt2
Throt3
13:34:55
28.2
2.0
5.0
3.1
28.2
13:35:05
0.0
13:35:10
-41.8
-34.2
121.4
128.7
602
18.8
11.4
13:35:20
366
345
279
28.1
570
13:35:15
82.7
83.3
121.1
115.0
1.8
13:35:25
13:35:30
13:35:35
VHF keying
91.6
Low oil pressure in any engine
24.7
-0.8
13:35:00
276
497
435
30.3
33.8
16.6
26.8
RevShut1
Touchdown
RevShut4
206
13:35:40
-41.8
113.3
122.9
359
238
339
4.2
186
13:35:45
13:35:50
139
Time UTC
111
Hydraulic system oil pressure is low
249
6.0
2.0
61.1
End of the RWY
Throt4
Ditch
19
N1.3
N1.2
N1.1
[%]
60
40
20
400
380
360
340 IAS: Indicated airspeed
320
300
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
80
420
80
100
440
85
460
90
-5
480
95
13:34:45
50.0
500
100
325
IAS
[km/h]
[m]
87.5
Crew: Switching on.
Alt.radi
200
250
300
350
NAV: Kilometer
400
GPWS: Pull up.
450
: Minimum, minimum.
500
Crew: Is the idle on?
550
31.3
318
13:34:50
NAV: 40 meters
600
13:34:55
3.1
435
497
20 N1.1: Low pressure compressor rate 1
40
[deg]
NAV: 20
650
33.8
30.3
60
EGT1
16.6
26.8
EGT2
GPWS: Pull up.

NAV: 15 FE: ... eversed.
80
NAV: 12
NAV: 10
NAV: 8
NAV: 6
EGT3
NAV: 5
100
NAV: 3
NAV: 2
EGT4
120
N1.4
[deg]
NAV: 4
Throt1
NAV: 30
NAV: 25
RWY threshould
Crew: (Reverse)(?)
276
13:35:00
NAV: 1
NAV: ...270
NAV: 270 speed.
13:35:10
602
570
13:35:15
82.7
83.3
345
366
279
121.1
11.4
115.0
13:35:20
: Emergent.
91.6
NAV: Emergent breaking!
13:35:25
13:35:30
13:35:35
VHF keying
Low oil pressure in any engine
FO: What's up? Why reverse don't switch?
FO: Did you turn on the reverse?
NAV: 260
NAV: landing, speed 26 270.
Pic.3.3.1. Aircraft IL-62M UP-I6208 24.07.2009 at Mashhad accident FDR (MSRP-64) flight parameters. (Preliminary)
13:35:05
0.0
-41.8
-34.2
121.4
NAV: Speed is increasing, speed is increasing!

Crew: Turned on.
128.7
FE: Thrust reversal ...

NAV: Speed is increasing!
RevShut1
Pax: Berast, bersat (Pers.)
Throt2
Pax: Berast, bersat (Pers.)

FO: Go around, let's go around!
Throt3
Pax: Right, right, right.
RevShut4
206
13:35:40
-41.8
113.3
122.9
359
238
339
23.1
186
13:35:45
13:35:50
139
Time Relative
121
Hydraulic system oil pressure is low
249
6.0
11.1
61.1
Impact with a wall.
Printed: 03.09.2009 14:57:41 #44 User: (#3)
NAV: about 0.5 meter

Toushdown
FE: Because there was no thrust reversal displacement.
WinArm32
Ditch
Throt4
End of the RWY
NAV: Turn to the left. To the left!

Noize at the cabine.
20
NAV: Turn to the left.
21
13:28:00.0
WinArm32
13:29:00.0
13:30:00.0
13:33:00.0
8nm
6nm
4nm
2nm
2nm
4nm
6nm
8nm
10nm
13:34:00.0
13:31:00.0
User:
13:35:00.0
d:\up-i6208.-62..2009\map\up-i6208_1b.tra
Pic. 5b. Aircraft IL-62M UP-I6208 on 24.07.2009 at Mashhad airport flight path (FDR data). (Preliminary)
13:32:00.0
:IL-62M :UP-I6208 :24.07.09 :1525
CVR:
The aircraft IL-62M was equipped with a CVR MARS-BM with a
total record time of 30 minutes. The recorder was retrieved from the
accident place by Iranian accident investigation team. The information
readout was performed at a facility of PARS-Aviation Service Company.
The magnetic tape of the recorder was in a satisfactory condition so the
accident flight data was recorded. Preliminary download of the cockpit
conversation and voice identification was also conducted by representatives
of Kazakhstan Civil Aviation Committee and D.E.T.A. AIR airline. The
final transcript of cockpit radio communication with time synchronization
was made by the Air Accident Investigation Scientific and Technical
Support Commission of the IAC.
1.12 Wreckage and Impact information:

Accident site inspection revealed that the aircraft position had coordinates
N 36,218 E 59,666, at a road in the vicinity of the aerodrome, 1km away
from the RWY-31R threshold (130 MH or 133, 5 TH) of the Mashhad
airport with the azimuth of 125 (true).
Power line along the road was destroyed by the right aircraft wing. Wing
fuel tanks of the right wing were damaged evidenced by fuel leaking. Main
and emergency exits were open. An inflatable slide was dropped down from
the port side. No evidences of fire on board and at the accident site were
found.
First tracks of intensive braking (black tire tracks) were found at the
concrete at a distance of 550 m from the departure threshold of RWY31R.
The track of the main gear wheels was going along the RWY in its left part,
and diverging further to the right beyond the departure threshold. At about
100m away from the threshold at the end portion of the braking way, a net
barrier was found (textile aerodrome emergency braking unit).
22
The aircraft ran over the RWY when moving along the right side of the
stop way, 300m long. Beyond the end of the RWY landing gear wheels track
could be clearly seen passing over a rough partly grassed surface, and
crossing a dirt road. At a distance of 100m from the RWY end, where the
right gear crossed the road, a destroyed tire tube was found, which
presumably belonged to the right gear front wheel.
At a distance of 160m from the RWY end smashed approach lights were
found, and after that point the gear wheel track started to diverge to the left
from the RWY centerline. The front gear wheel track further merged with
the left gear wheel track and extended joining the forward airframe track. At
a distance of 320 m from the RWY end another line of broken approach
lights were found. Airframe structures were found before the approach lights
(along the aircraft way). From that point small aircraft structure pieces were
found along the whole aircraft path. 40m past the destroyed approach lights
line a ditch of 0,51m in depth was found (with an underground pipeline)
which was crossing this area from the south to the north.
The south-eastern part of the aerodrome was fenced with a brick wall of
2,5m high and 0,4m thick with a concrete strip foundation. It went along the
RWY there. The aircraft collided with the fence at a distance of 820m from
the departure threshold (520m past the stop way end) with a heading of 105
degrees. The fence was destroyed throughout 70m.
Debris of the nose part of the airframe, cockpit, passenger seats, aircraft
cabin parts were found behind the fence. Earlier aerodrome employees,
police and medical services found at the site and evacuated crew bodies, as
well as killed and injured passengers. After the collision with the fence the
aircraft kept moving for 160 m with a heading of 105 degrees and came to a
stop at the road.
Layout of accident site:
23
Detailed description of aircraft, systems and engines damage
24
After landing at the RWY13 the aircraft ran over the RWY at a high
speed. The aircraft passed the RWY end with breaking the protective net
barrier. Further the aircraft moved along the stop way deviating to the right
and then to the left at a soil road. There were tracks of aircraft movement at
the soil road after running over the RWY. The tracks looked like tracks from
the front, left and right landing gear wheels.
Photo 1. Tracks of aircraft movement over the dirt road after running over the RWY
Photo 2. Tracks of aircraft movement over the dirt road after running over the RWY
25
Due to emergency braking after running over the RWY the front right wheel
of the right main gear was destroyed. The aircraft ran over the RWY at a
speed of about 200 km per hour.
The aircraft moved to the right and broke several approach lights at a
concrete footing. When moving over a rough terrain due to a high speed,
the aircraft front gear was broken. At a distance of 350m from the
runway , there was a ditch 2m wide and 1m in depth. As the aircraft got
into the ditch at a speed of about 185 km per hour the front gear was
completely broken. Further the left main gear got into the ditch followed
by aircraft turning to the left. As the front gear was broken the aircraft
moved on sliding on the airframe nose. Further the aircraft hit the brick
wall concrete base 2,5 m high at a speed of 120 km per hour. This
resulted in destruction of the cockpit and the airframe up to frame 22 (6 th
seat row). The distance from the RWY end to the place of the collision
with the fence was 880m. Then the aircraft moved 160m more and came
to stop. There was no fire on board.
Wires of the power line passing outside the aerodrome were ruptured by
airframe structure elements.
The aircraft leaned on the tail part of the airframe with a little bank to the port
side. The flaps were fully extended, spoilers retracted, reverse flaps open; the
stabilizer was set 1,8 degrees pitch up.
26
Photo 3. Aircraft post-accident overall view
During the accident the aircraft got sever damage as follows:

- The cockpit and the cabin up to the frame 22 (the 6th seat row) were
totally wrecked.
- The nose part and lower wing panels were heavily damaged.
- The right flaps (inner and outer) were sheared off.
- The left flap had got substantial damage.
- The front gear was torn out from the attachment points, between main
gears, between frames 58 and 62.
- The right main gear flap was sheared off.
- Main gears had major damage and the right gear front right wheel was
wrecked.
- Lower flaps of power units 1 and 4 and flap control elements had
significant damage.
- Control linkage was totally destroyed up to the airframe nose destruction
line; beyond this no damage found.
27
Photo 4. Airframe nose (destroyed up to frame 22)
Photo 5. Left wing structures damage
28
Photo 6. Right wing structures damage
Photo 7. Right (outer) flaps damage
29
Photo 8. Front right gear (torn out of attachment points), destroyed right inner flap
Photo 9. Right main gear flap sheared off
30
Photo 10. Right main gear destroyed wheel
Photo 11. Power unit 1 reverse flaps
31
Photo 12. Power unit 4 reverse flaps
Photo 13. Power unit 4 front power lever
32
Photo 14. Power unit 4 rudder shackle of padlock
As the cockpit was completely destroyed it appeared not possible to

determine throttle positions, instrument data and switches positions.
All structure damages occurred once after the aircraft had run over the RWY,
when it was moving over terrain, and resulted from the collision with
obstacles (the ditch, lights concrete footing and brick wall). There were no
tracks of destruction resulting from fatigue.
No evidences of ailerons, rudders and elevator jamming were found. Spoilers
were in the retracted position. The flaps were fully extended.
The aft fuselage had no visible damage. The stabilizer setting was
changed by the crew during the landing run from 5,6 degrees pitch up to
1,8 degrees pitch up (according to the MSRP64). The rudders were not
fixed. There was no stabilizer position indication on the fin.
33
Photo 15. Stabilizer position 1,8 degrees
1.13 Medical and pathological information:

Crew of this flight has valid medical license from Kazakhstan civil
Aviation Authority and they had not medical problem for the flight.
By considering to collision the airplane with the wall, flight crew and
front passengers have been injured by hitting it, and they have been dead,
because of this collision. After transferring bodies to the forensic medicine
of Mashhad, necessary pathological test were carry out ,and samplings
from the flight crew was done, and it was determined that they don't have
an especial deficiencies about using drugs and alcohol.
34
1.14 Fire:
After this accident, the ground safety of Mashhad Airport sent fire
extinguish vehicles to the site of this accident immediately, but they only
extinguished a small fire in plants and thorns of around the airplane caused
by friction, because there wasn't observed a considerable fire in the airplane.
As wreckage of the airplane has been located near the flammable gas line,
these vehicles have remained in this site until carrying out it to a safe place,
in order to prevent fire and explosion of the pipe.
1.15 Survival aspects:

After this accident, ground security and research & rescue units of
Shahid Hashemijejad Airport (Mashhad) began their efforts, in order to
allocate place of accident, to rescue passengers and crew. By considering to
condition of the region and location of the airplane outside of the airport,
there were taken necessary actions by cooperating ground safety and
extinguish staffs, and other research and rescue organs; the passengers were
evacuated from aircraft wreckage, and injured persons were transferred to
hospitals of Mashhad.
35
1.16 Test and Research:

None
1.17 Organizational and management information:
According to contents ATC records of Shahid Hashemijejad Airport
(Mashhad), after this accident, the control tower in Mashhad Airport has
reported this accident to the relevant authorizations, which there have been
taken necessary actions, in order to initiate search and rescue operation.
There have been carried out all actions about search and rescue,
transferring bodies to the forensic medicine of Mashhad and identify their
identity, flight crew and passengers.
1.19 Useful or effective investigation Techniques:
The standard and normal techniques were applied.
36
2. ANALYSIS:
After joining landing course the flight altitude was 7000 ft, distance from
the RWY end 22 km. The aircraft was preceded by another aircraft
approaching to land, which had been cleared to land earlier. Being instructed
by a controller to reduce speed due to the proceeding traffic, approaching to
land, the captain decided to make left orbit and informed the crew about that.
Upon a navigators request the controller cleared to perform left orbit
maintaining 7000 ft.
No evidences of task sharing regarding flying the aircraft before
descending from the FL to approach to land were recorded. By some
navigators words one can judge that it was the captain who was the flying
pilot: Kolya, 7000, climb, climb Kolya!.
The aircraft landing weight was 93.7 tons. Data on the landing weight,
landing approach speed, approach chosen, and alternate aerodrome were not
voiced during the pre-landing preparation (not proceeding check list). After
joining landing course the controller cleared to descend to 6000 ft, at a
distance of 13 km from the RWY end. As the aircraft approached to the
RWY the navigator reported the distance: Distance 6, distance 5, flying
above. After crossing the 5 km distance the navigator without a captains
command read out the checklist: landing gear down, brakes, spoilers, altitude
selector. No answers to the voiced checklist points were recorded.
Further the navigator goes on counting distance: distance 2 km,
distance 1, altitude 40m. When passed distance 1 km, the co-pilot gave a
command (which was supposed to be given by the PIC) to set idle: Idle.
The flight engineer confirmed: Idle, but according to the MSRP-64 data
idle was set before the command. Flight speed along the glide path was 325
km/h, which was 50 km/h more than the assigned speed for a landing weight
of 93 tons. The rate of descent was 10 m/sec. During the descent the GPWS
37
warning activated several times. The RWY end was crossed at a height of 31
m and at a speed of 310 km/h.
At a height of 22m the flight engineer shifted trust reverses to a reverse
thrust position without a captains command. No report Lever latched
lights on about the shift was made. The landing was performed (according
to the calculation made) at a distance of 1000 m from the RWY threshold at
a speed of 275 km/h (instrument speed).
According to the MSRP record before landing the flight engineer
shifted engines 1 and 4 trust reversers to the forward thrust. After landing
and extending the front gear down, the co-pilot (it is a captain who should
give command) gave the command Reverse, without any monitoring by
either of them of engine trust reversers position indication at the instrument
panel. The flight engineer without checking out the thrust reverse lever
position and trust reversers position indication and reading back (roger,
reverse on) set throttles of engines 1 and 4 at the maximum trust.
Note: It should be noted that as for that aircraft type, if the reverse lever is
in the Reverse position, throttles cannot, due to their design, be set at a
position over the Nominal mode (8090 degrees according to thrust
mode indicator).
The actual record of the MSRP-64 contained record of the flight mode
implied on engines 1 and 4, which is possible only in case reverse thrust
lever is set at the forward thrust mode. There was no reporting reverse
engaged.
38
No command was given to activate spoilers, which were not extended

upon landing. The co-pilot set the stabilizer from 5, 6 degrees pitch up to 1, 8
degrees pitch up.
Just at the same time upon landing (2 seconds later) inner engines were
shut down by the flight engineer. Nevertheless the aircraft did not brake as
the trust reversers were shifted to forward thrust. The mode was maintained
for 12 seconds. According to navigators reports, which were consistent with
the MSRP record, the speed began to increase. The navigator informed the
crew about increase of speed. According to the MSRP a speed of 280
km/hour was reached. After the navigator informed about increase of the
speed, the flight engineer shut down engines no. 1 and 4.
The MARS-BM record contains crew members voices record: Co-pilot
Leaving, Navigator Brakes, Co-pilot Why isnt reverse
functioning? the PIC because flaps are not shifted, Navigator
Emergency braking.
MSRP-64 record contains multiple change of throttle position of
engines 2-3 and 1-4 before the flight mode, as well as shifting trust reversers,
but it was done with engines disengaged. Crews actions, engine parameters,
flaps position are consistent with the readout chart.
It should be noted that crews actions when landing did not comply with
the Crew Interaction and Procedure Instruction for the case of landing with
reverse engaged, under the Operating Manual of the IL-62 type (Tab 4.1).
Wheel Braking, including emergency braking, was not effective. The
aircraft ran over the RWY at a speed of 200 km/hour, deviated to the right
after the front right wheel tire of the front right gear blew out. Further on, it
broke some approach lights, with a concrete base, crossed the net barrier had
its front gear broken and then at a speed of 185 km/hour got into the ditch,
up to 1 m in depth and 2m in width, which traversed the aircrafts path at an
angle, had its front gear broken down. Then due to its left gear getting into
39
the ditch as well, turned to the left facing the brick wall with a concrete
foundation. As the front gear was broken, the aircraft moved on its forward
fuselage and at a speed of 120 km/hour collided with the concrete foundation
of the brick wall 2,5 m high. As a result of the front impact the cockpit and
airframe up to frame 22 (6th seat row) were totally ruined. The crew and
some passengers, who were in the first cabin, were killed.
The aircraft moved on over the dirt for 160m, broke the power line and
came to a stop. There was no fire on the aircraft after the stop.
It should be noted that several accidents with aircraft IL62M took
place before, which occurred due to the lack of accurate interaction
between captain and crew during landing with thrust reverse involved.
In most cases these accidents were a result of non-authorized flight
engineers actions to shift engine trust reversers at heights more than these
recommended in the FM, followed by their shifting to forward thrust and
setting engines 1 and 4 at the flight mode. Another cause was an
unmonitored thrust lever position (not latched) and position of engine trust
reversers indication before setting engines at the maximum braking mode,
which resulted in running over the RWY.
Table 4.1. Il-62M crew interaction checklist to be fulfilled at landing

with thrust reverse engaged
Flight
At the command of captain Idle, read it back and reduce
engineer
engine power to idle.
PIC
By the end of flaring at the idle mode give the command: Shift
flaps (with a glide path angle under 3 degrees 30 min. At a
height of no more than 5 m give the command Shift flaps
(with a glide path angle no more than 3 degrees 30 min)
Flight
At the captains command Shift flaps read it back. Shift the
engineer
reverse control lever of engines 1-2 from the position
40
REVERSE OFF to the position REVERSE ON. Check by

the indication display whether the reverse flaps are shifted and
report Lever latched lights on.
PIC
At a height of 1-2m, if necessary, give the command

Reverse. By the end of flaring prevent increase of pitch angle
and touch down the RWY by the main wheels. Upon landing
manipulating the rudder, match the aircraft axis with the RWY
centre line, put down at the RWY the front gear (in 2-3
seconds), give the command Reverse (if reverse was not
engaged earlier) and activate the front gear control. Fix the
control column in the Push position; give the command
Spoilers.
Flight
On the captains command Reverse read it back, set engines
engineer
1 and 4 throttles at the maximum reverse thrust mode (to the

Reverse stop) and report: Reverse engaged.
Upon the captains command Spoilers read it back, extend
spoilers to the maximum angle and report: Spoilers extended.
Make sure that the engines 1 and 4 parameters are consistent
with the reverse thrust mode.
41
THROTTLES AND THRUST REVERSE LEVER CONTROL

SYSTEM
Thrust reverse
lever
Nominal mode
stops
42
Middle thrust
reverse lever
position latch
43
3. CONCLUSIONS:
3-1 Findings:
The crew was not trained &acquainted with flight conditions in
the Iran territory with an Iranian instructor pilot and the operation
unit of Aria Airline has acted so weak regarding those mentioned
subjects.
The approach speed of aircraft was higher than recommended
available airport charts & aircraft weight, however it was
controllable if the crew could proceed to land correctively.
The crew had not done correct procedure according to the aircraft
Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) to use related check lists.
(Descend-Approach-Landing)
There was lack of precise coordination between flight crew on
their self responsibility during the approach and landing.
The flight crew did not pay attention to EGPWS warning, and did
not take corrective action.
The crew did not use engine reverser and spoiler systems correctly
to reduce aircraft speed during the landing and consequently it
caused to loose long Runway distance.
The flight crew had not good English language proficiency. And
they were poor in England language conversation.
The Capitan of the aircraft as the pilot in command had not
sufficient force and efficient management in the cockpit.( lack of
Cockpit Resource Management).
There were unauthorized actions of flight engineer for shifting

engine reversers as well as lack of mutual oversight by crew
members in checklist accomplishment during approach and landing.
The crew has had disagreement about Go around due to
unsuitable landing situations.
Presence of General Director of airline in the cockpit had adverse
psychological effect on crew efficiency behaviors.
44
The DETA airline did not use correct procedure to extend engines
No; 1-2-4 life time from Ukrainian company (Aerotechservice
co.) and the technical manager of ARIA airline did not control and
supervise the matter accordingly.
3-2 Main Cause
Considering those items in factual information and analysis, the main cause
of this accident is weak Cockpit management between the crew to use
correct landing techniques same as releasing Engine trust reversers
Engine shut down in unsuitable time - .
3-3 Contributive Factors :
Some of contributive factors for this accident occurrence are noted as:
The copilot and the flight engineer had self activity& decision without
the (PIC) coordination.
The cockpit crew was careless and not paying proper attention toward
EGPWS warning.
Psychological adverse effect on cockpit crew because of presence of
General Director of Aria airline
3-4 Violation &other deficiencies:
The accident investigation team encountered some violations and
deficiencies with ICAO Standards and Iran Local Authority regulation
(CAO) which are descript as:
Poor and in-sufficient supervision controlled of operation &technical
manger of Aria Airline.
The DETA airline has not used proper procedure to receive life time
extension of engine and has not passed necessary information to
Iranian and Kazakhstan Authorities.
It has not been designed a headset for flight engineer to make more
coordination between the crew, by the aircraft design bureau.
The crew was not familiar with Iranian AIP completely.
The total on board persons was not according to written load sheet.
45
4- SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS:
In order to prevent the similar events, the Aircraft Accident Instigation
&Safety of IRI CAO recommends:
.A special working group (Board) between Iranian airlines which used
Russian leased aircraft and Russian airlines, be established and study
how to obtain life extensions and modifications from Russian
authorities as a state of design & manufacture.
Those Iranian airliners that are willing to have foreign pilots shall
provide training courses, such as Iran routs and necessary
arrangements for crew members just before beginning of their flights.
All foreign pilots should be checked by a related instructor pilot or a
CAO designee pilot.
The IL-62 cockpit should be equipped with flight engineer headset by
the ILYUSHIN Design Bureau.
The ILYUSHIN Design Bureau should study and investigate why
ELT has not activated by the sever impact.
Presence and entering passengers or any other persons than crew
should really be forbidden during landing and take off by airlines.
The Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) and Aircraft Accident
Investigation Department of IRI CAO should deliver notified findings
of this accident to related airlines.
It is recommended that a correct procedure of foreign pilot operation
in the Iran territory should be defined by operation department of IRI
CAO with cooperation of airlines.
All airlines that are willing to use leased aircrafts should have
sufficient supervision just before to start operation, should check and

accomplish the written MOU between authorities and also consider
those items in "Art 83 Bis ".
46

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Islamic Republic of IRAN

Civil Aviation Organization

Accident Final Report

State File Number:

July 22th 2009

Safety & Accident

Islamic Republic Of Iran

Mashhad International Airport/ I.R of Iran

Civil Aviation Organization of I.R. of Iran

Type of the aircraft

Illyushin, model IL-62M

DETA Airline, Kazakhstan

18:05 local time (13:35 UTC)

End of left band of Mashhad International

17 persons& one additional crews group

Responsible for accident

Aircraft accident investigation &safety

(IAC) Interstate Aviation

Committee/(Russia Kazakhstan Civil

The aircraft fuselage destroyed totally due to impact to wall of the

Due to impact of aircraft landing gears with net barrier in shoulder of

1.5 Personnel Information:

1.5.1 Pilot in Command :( PF)

Kind of certificate and validity date

Total flight hours

Class one validity date

Total flight hours with IL-62

Date and place of last simulator

License for international flight

License for radio communication

Entrance date to Iran

Date of first flight in Iran

According to available documents, he has done Radio communication

Kind of certificate and validity date Class 2 validity date24/Feb/2010

Without medical limitation and it

Total flight hours with IL-62

Date and place of last simulator

License for international flight

License for radio communication

Entrance date to Iran

Date of first flight in Iran

1-5-3 Flight Engineer:

Kind of certificate and validity date

Total flight hours

Total flight hours with IL-62airline

Date and place of last simulator

License for international flight

License for radio communication

Entrance date to Iran

Date of first flight in Iran

1.6 Aircraft Information:

ARIA airline. The aircraft owned by D.E.T.A.

State registration certificate

No.538 dated 16 June 2008

Airworthiness aircraft certificate

Assigned life time and service life

January 28, 2010

Overhaul life and service time