Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property 452 Reviewer - Doctrines
Property 452 Reviewer - Doctrines
SIENNA FLORES
ARTICLE 415
STANDARD OIL OF NEW YORK VS. JARANILLA
Ministerial Duty of the Register of Deeds
After the mortgage was foreclosed because the plaintiffs were not able to pay,
they tendered payment to the sheriff but it was refused on the ground that
there is still a balance of 260 pesos representing publication in newspapers.
For purposes of notice to be given for the propertys sale and execution, the
house of Maranang, even if subject to a chattel mortgage, is considered as
real property.
The fact that the parties entered into a contract regarding the house and
treated the said property as personal property in their contract does not bind
the sheriff in advertising the propertys sale at public auction as personal
property.
Par. 1: Land, building, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil
LEUNG YEE VS. STRONG MACHINERY CO
Law not followed because of bad faith
The building was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to
have dealt w/ it separate and apart from the land on w/c it stood didnt
change its character as real property.
Although Art. 1473 says that the title of ownership that is 1 st recorded shall 1st
have preference, this must be understood on the basis of good faith. Leung
Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, hence such rule did not apply.
Par.2: Trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or
form an integral part of an immovable
SIBAL VS. VALDEZ
Growing crops are movable properties by anticipation
The rule in Article 415 paragraph 1 is that the inclusion of building means that
a building is by itself an immovable property. A building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on w/c it was built.
The second issue shows that the Issuance of Sales Patent by the Secretary of
Agriculture prohibiting the owner of the land to encumber the property makes
the second mortgage null and void.
Claro: The grantee under the Public Land Act is prohibited from encumbering the land.
The tools & equipment in this case (Welder Machines, Boring Machines,
Grinder and Hydraulic Press) are not essential and principal elements of the
business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are
merely incidental and used to improve its service. Even w/o such tools, its
business may be carried on. The transportation business could be carried on
the deed of chattel mortgage was valid based on the doctrine of estoppel, in
that the parties have so expressly agreed in the mortgage to consider the
house as chattel. However, this is good only insofar as the contracting parties
are concerned. But w/ respect to 3rd persons, it is considered as immovable.
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Par. 9:. Docks and structures which, though floating are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river lake or coast.
Even if the machineries tend to directly meet the needs of the said industry,
its construction should be done by the owner for it to be considered
immovable. Hence, the chattel mortgage over the sawmill is valid and
enforceable.
Buboy: WTF! There were 2 confusing provisions invoked by the SC, paragraphs 9 and 5
of Art 415. Par 5 talks about the property which is carried on in a building or on a piece
of land. Power barges, are floating! Moreover, barges are not intended to remain at a
fixed place because they have to move because they are vessels intended to transfer
oil from one point to another.
Sienna: WTS! (What the Shit?!) They cant use Par. 5 as a basis because power
barges, by their very nature, remain in the water. One of the requisites for Par. 5 to
apply is that the equipment must be carried on in a building or a piece of land. Water is
NEITHER a building nor a piece of land!
The party is estopped in denying that the drive motor seized is movable for he
executed a chattel mortgage. By executing this accessory contract, the Milling
Company accepts the validity and enforceability of the chattel mortgage.
Par. 10: Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
PRESBITERO VS. FERNANDEZ
Rights over sugar quota allocations are immovable properties
Sugar quotas are real property for they are considered real rights over
immovable property, just like servitudes & easements.
Under the Sugar Limitation Law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to
land, and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation.
ARTICLE 416
Vis--vis par 1 The poles are removable and attached to a square metal
frame by means of bolt, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled
and moved from place to place.
Paragraph 1
UNITED STATES VS. IGNACIO CARLOS
Electricity is a movable property
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Philippine Bills when taken out of the country are deemed to be taken out of
domestic circulation as legal tender, and therefore considered as commodity.
ARTICLE 417
Right/title of interest which a person may receive from a Milling Company can
be subject to a pledge
The 1987 Constitution bans corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. They are only allowed to hold them through lease.
The purpose of the law is to:
o
Prevent large landholdings w/c tend to create social unrest
o
Equitably diffuse land ownership
o
Encourage owner-cultivatorship
o
Transfer ownership of limited area of alienable land of public domain
to a qualified individual
o
Strengthen the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring
more than the allowed area of alienable land
Absent 2 official acts - a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable.
PEA may sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals, since there is no longer a statutory prohibition against such sales
and the constitutional ban doesnt apply to individuals. PEA however, cannot
sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. The legislative authority only benefits individuals. Private
corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed land.
Possession acquired in good faith doesnt lose its character except from the
moment facts exist w/c show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possess the thing improperly or wrongfully.
ARTICLE 419
ARTICLE 420
CRUZ VS. CRUZ VDA. DE NAEG
The applicants for the registration of title or for the confirmation of imperfect
title must prove that:
o
The land is alienable public land
o
Their open, continuous, exclusive & notorious possession &
occupation must be either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945
An applicant for registration under Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act must secure
a certification from the Government that the lands w/c he claims to have
possessed as owner for more than 30 years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim
by clear & convincing evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the
evidence of the oppositors.
A port is a place where the ships may anchor or tie up for the purpose of
shelter, repair, loading or discharge or cargo & other such activities connected
w/ water-borne commerce and including all land and water areas and
structures, equipment, and facilities related to these functions.
The warehouse in the case at bar may not be held as part of the port,
considering its separable nature as an improvement upon the port. The
warehouse is subject to taxation because exemption of public property doesnt
extend to improvements made thereon.
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Since the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion, it cannot
be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. The IFPC was
constructed by the State for public use and/or service, hence it cannot be
subject to execution or foreclosure sale. The reclaimed land on w/c the IFPC
was built cannot be the object of a private/public sale w/o congressional
authorization. This means that the City has to satisfy the tax delinquency
through other means other than the sale at public auction of the IFPC.
Accretions on the bank of a lake belong to the owners of the estate to w/c
they have been added, while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public
domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by
the government to be no longer needed for public use.
The shores are properties of public domain intended for public use, and
therefore not remittable. Portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters
and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
doesnt convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title
upon the registrant.
ownership, it follows that banks w/c form part of them are also of public
ownership.
A river is a compound concept consisting of 3 elements: the running waters,
the bed and the banks. All these constitute the river. Since a river is but one
compound concept, it should have only 1 nature it should be either totally
public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is
implicit that all 3 component elements be of the same nature also.
The City of Manila cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at Hilarios expense.
They were not responsible for the shifting of the River. It was due to natural
causes for w/c not one can be blamed. The government, through Hilario, may
have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.
RA 2056 states that any dam, dike or any other work that encroaches into any
public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other public navigable
waters or waterways, or that they are constructed in areas declared as
communal fishing grounds, shall be removed w/in 30 days.
In the case at bar, the 2nd requisite is missing. The area included a portion of
the Manila Bay area or coastal area, & is evidently navigable at high tide for
vessels of deeper draft. Hence, it is part of the waterways waterways w/c
are especially used by fishermen & fishpond owners to bring in their catch to
market. It is public property and not susceptible of appropriation by any
private individual, not only because it belongs to the state, but also because it
is a waterway.
The Compromise Agreement between the parties is null and void. The
stipulations contained therein partake of the nature of an adjudication of
ownership in favor of Maneclang of the fishpond, w/c was found as a creek
forming a tributary of the Agno River.
A creek is an arm extending from a river & participating in the ebb & flow of
the sea. It is property belonging to the public domain w/c is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens system in the name of any individual.
In leasing the said plaza to Rojas, the municipality exceeded its authority in
the exercise of its executing a contract over a thing w/c it could not dispose,
nor is it empowered to do. The contract is null and void, and the thing leased
cannot be the object of a contract.
Canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use are of public
ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons w/in private
lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.
The streams involved were artificially made & devoted to the exclusive use of
the hacienda owner.
The property involved in the case of Rojas was devoted to public use, and
therefore outside the commerce of man, while the property in the case at bar
is patrimonial in character.
All riverbanks are of public ownership including those formed when a river
leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. The
riverbank is part of the riverbed. Since all beds of rivers are of public
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The lease being valid, the reimbursement prayed for cannot be allowed. In
fact, the lessees benefited from the lease by constructing temporary stores
and buildings.
The defendants entered the parcel of land without the knowledge and consent
of the owner. The contract of lease given cannot grant them the right to claim
the disputed land as their own.
The mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public
property by the simple expedient of giving permits or executing leases.
purchase, if it was not intended as patrimonial, his purchase does not transfer
the ownership of the property to him.
When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built,
sowed, or planted on anothers land, but also on the part of the owner of the
latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith.
Roa constructed the building in bad faith for he had knowledge of the fact that
his grantor was not the owner thereof. There was bad faith on the part of the
Municipality since it allowed Roa to construct the building w/o any opposition
on its part and to so occupy it for 8 years. The rights of the parties must,
therefore, be determined as if they had both acted in good faith.
General Rule: When the lots began to wear away & when it was completely
submerged, they became a part of the public domain.
Exception: If government removed silt & the shore moved, the owner wouldnt
lose title over the property because it wasnt due to the natural ebb and flow
of the tide.
Cabangis could have protected their land by building a retaining wall when the
waters of the sea began to wear it away. Their failure to do so constituted
abandonment.
Accdg. to the Law of Waters Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of
works constructed by the State, or by provinces, pueblos, or private persons,
w/ proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing
such works.
Claro: the natural wearing away of the land is called natural expropriation and is not
subject to indemnity
ARTICLE 424
VIUDA DE TANTOCO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO
Properties devoted to public service are not subject to attachment
Property for public use of the State is not w/in the commerce of man, and
consequently is inalienable and not subject to prescription.
The parcel of lands separated by rivers and esteros, for commercial navigation
and fishing, are considered lands of public domain.
ARTICLE 425
BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS CA
Convincing proof is not needed for Bureau of Forestry to declare a land as agricultural
Lachica cannot acquire the land through prescription via the Civil Code.
Lachica applied for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title. This presumes that
the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain. Being land of
public domain, it cannot be acquire by prescription for no public land an be
acquired by private persons w/o any grant, express or implied, from the
government.
Agricultural
ARTICLE 422
MUNICIPALITY OF OAS VS ROA
Intended as Storage of Gov. Property; Statements made that pueblo owns the lot
The general rule is that a public property may only be sold to a private
individual when it becomes patrimonial. Even if ROA acquired the lot by
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Timber lands
Mineral lands
Claro: When the trial court applied prescription, it used the Civil Coe, but that applies
only to private property, not property of the public domain.
REPLEVIN (RULE 60)
SVs right over the land is premised on the certificate of title registered in its
name after it had purchased it. As the registered owner, it had the right of
possess of said land illegally occupied by another.
Claro: A certificate of title is a strong evidence of ownership. Possession is an
attribute of ownership.
JOVEN VS. CA
The ejectment case did not involve the question of title as this was the subject
of the annulment case before the RTC of Lucena City
TILLSON VS. CA
Replevin is a form of action w/c lies to regain the possession the possession of
personal chattels w/c have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully
When the trial court executed a Writ of Replevin in favor of Cooney, the sheriff
took possession of the yacht. The case is not removed from the operation of
Rule 60 by the fact that after the property was taken from Tillson, it was not
turned over to Cooney, but to the Coast Guard, on the instructions of the trial
court. It does not alter the reality of Tillsons loss of possession.
The present case is one for unlawful detainer because Del Rosario refused to
vacate the property upon demand & after her right to possess it had ceased to
be lawful.
But if prior possession be insisted, Pharma Industries actually had it before the
suit was filed. It acquired possession when Del Rosario executed in its favor
the Deed of Sale w/ right to repurchase over the land & title was confirmed
upon failure of Del Rosario to repurchase the property
What SV seeks in its complaint is the recovery of possession de jure & not
merely possession de facto. SVs complaint was one for accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC.
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The fact that Dennis father filed an action for quieting of title before the RTC
does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case
The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of
real property possession de facto and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can
prove a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even fro
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if
he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to
stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Petitioners action was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. It was
clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of possession de jure, if not one
of accion reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership over the land. Hence
it was correctly filed w/ the RTC
No demand was necessary for him to vacate the premises as this was
specifically provided for in the agreement that lessee Quemel should vacate
the leased premises w/o the necessity of further demand upon failure to
comply w/ the terms of the agreement.
The time limitation of 1 year w/in w/c to file an action for forcible entry and
detainer is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the defendant, but
from the time that his possession becomes unlawful.
The possession of Mabalot became unlawful only after Galvez died; such death
terminated the lease in his favor.
DE GUZMAN VS. CA
The right to file an action for forcible entry case has already prescribed. The
complaint dated 1988 alleged tat De Guzman entered the property in 1988.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes & the 1 year time
bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. The 1 year
period is counted from the time the entry by stealth was made by the
defendant.
After the lapse of the 1-year period, the remedy of the party dispossessed of a
land is to file an accion publiciana
Shell filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Dayao & a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Dayao argues that a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction can only be issued in cases of forcible
entry & not unlawful detainer. However:
Under Art. 1673 of the NCC, a lessor may judicially eject a lessee for violation
of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. Also Art. 1674 allows the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an unlawful
detainer case in the appellate court. It was designed to put an end to the
present state of the law w/c unjustly allows the lessee to continue in
possession during an appeal. Such provisions are applicable because of the
existing relationship of lessor-lessee between the parties.
Mere failure to pay rents or breach of contract to pay rents does not render
the possession of the lessee per se unlawful, nor may the action for his
ejectment from the land accrue upon such failure to breach
It is not the failure to pay rents as agreed upon in a contract, but the failure to
pay the rents after a demand therefore is made that entitles the lessor to
bring an action of unlawful detainer.
MUNOZ. VS CA
There was no mention that Nicolas was in prior possession of the property. it
was only stated that the property was presently tenanted. He also failed to
state the date of entry or possession, hence he failed to state when entry
through stealth was made. Such failure is FATAL, as this determines the start
of counting of the 1 year period for filing of summary action of forcible entry.
When the complaint fails to state when dispossession started, the proper
action would be accion publiciana/accion reivindicacion cognizable by the RTC.
ARTICLE 435
REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON
RULE 67
RA 8974
Commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint.
No need for legislative authorization to exercise eminent domain.
Outlines general procedure under w/c Covers expropriation proceedings intended
VILLEGAS VS. CA
PROPERTY DOCTRINES
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The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution
on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
2 conditions are imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila
1. the land must be private
2. the purpose must be public
If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law
The necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are
questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The
determination of those questions) belongs to the sovereign power; the
decision of the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts
have no power to review it.
when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be
taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the
courts
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in
a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
Claro: The courts may still step in when the legislature commits GADLEJ.
The Republic may exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain and
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court.
No cogent reason appears why the power of eminent domain may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession.
DE KNETCH VS. BAUTISTA
even though the state has the right to take private property for public use with
just compensation, it may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
property should be taken
REPUBLIC VS. DE KNETCH
The social impact factor which existed in the earlier case has disappeared. All
the residents in the area was relocated and was duly compensated, the EDSA
project is almost complete and only De Knecht, with her violent resistance,
stands in the way of the project of reducing the bottleneck traffic in EDSA and
also to solve the flood control problem in other area. Due to supervening
events, the SC found it proper to reverse the earlier decision.
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to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot refuse both to pay
for the building & to sell the land & compel the owner of the building to
remove it from the land. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
The trial courts decision fails to determine the value of the buildings & of the lot
where they are erected as well as the periods of time w/in w/c the option may
be exercised & payment should be made, these particulars having been left for
determination apparently after the judgment has become final. This procedure
is erroneous, for after the judgment has become final, no additions can be
made thereto & nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And
execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much,
& w/in what time may the option be exercised, & certainly no authority is
vested in him to settle these matters w/c involve exercise of judicial
discretion. Thus the appealed judgment has never become final, it having left
matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters
w/c remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case.
The report of the commissioners on the value of the condemned land is not
final. The judgment of the court is necessary to give effect to their estimated
value. Nor is the report of the commissioners conclusive so that the judgment
of the court is a mere detail or formality requisite to the proceedings.
The court may accept the commissioners report unreservedly; it may return
the report for additional facts; or it may set the report aside & appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part or reject it in part. Any one
of these methods of disposing of the report is available to and may be adopted
by the court according as they are deemed suited to secure the plaintiff the
necessary property and to the defendant just compensation.
The estimated value made by the appraisers is to be given great weight. Such
valuation must not be lightly set aside if there is a substantial testimony to
support it, unless error is plainly manifest, unless it is apparent that injustice
has been done, unless the commissioners have clearly gone astray or adopted
erroneous principles, or their award is grossly inadequate.
ARTICLE 448
IGNACIO VS. HILARIO
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is
entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building. The owner of the land has the option either to pay for the building or
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of malice & the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. It lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of
a superior claim, & absence of intention to overreach another.
Art. 448 of the CC refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by 2 or
more parties, 1 of whom has built some works, & not to a case where the
owner of the land is the builder who then later loses the ownership of the land
by sale or otherwise, for where the true owner himself is the builder of the
works on his own land, the issue of good faith/bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
TECNOGAS VS. CA
Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the
precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.
It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in
w/c it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case &
from the moment facts exist w/c show that the possessor is not unaware that
he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from
the moment the defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property the true owner.
The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner doesnt militate
against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith. in fact, the
landowners exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall
have come to know of the intrusion in short, when both parties shall have
become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise,
for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists
in regard to their property rights.
The settlement may have recognized the ownership of respondent but such
admission cannot be equated w/ bad faith. Petitioner was only trying to avoid
litigation, one reason for entering into an amicable settlement.
The obvious benefit to the builder is that, instead of being outrightly ejected
from the land, he can compel the landowner to make the choice between the 2
options. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option & compel
instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.
Petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller in regard to all
rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the
private respondent to exercise either of the 2 options.
ARTICLE 457
CUREG VS. IAC
Accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
w/c receives such accretion is covered by Torrens title. As such, it must also
be placed under the operation of the Torrens system.
VDA. DE NAZARENO VS. CA
Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property, requires the concurrence of these
requisites:
o
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual & imperceptible
o
it be the result of action of the waters of the river (or sea)
o
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of rivers
(or the sea coast)
These are called the rules on all alluvion, w/c if present in a case, give to the
owners of the land adjoining banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of
the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits
caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
Where land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of
the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct &
deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man made accretion and, as
such, part of public domain.
The dumping of boulders, soil & other filling materials into the creek & river
bounding the land, the same would still be part of the public domain.
In any case, Vda. De Nazareno is estopped from denying the public character of
the subject land. The mere filing of the Application by the late Nazareno
constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land,
having been the subject of the survey plan.
ARTICLES 449-450
DE VERA VS. CA
According to Art 449 & 450, the landowner has 3 alternatives:
o
appropriate w/c has been built w/o any obligation to pay indemnity
o
demand the builder to remove what he has built
o
compel the builder to pay the value of the land
In any event, the landowner is entitled to be indemnified by the builder in bad
faith.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is
called the riparian owner.
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal
waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Art. 457 of the CC, is automatically
owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen
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USUFRUCT
MORALIDAD VS. PERNES
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing 1 to enjoy anothers
property it is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another
temporarily, including both the just utendi & jus fruendi, w/ the owner
retaining the jus dispodendi or the power to alienate the same.
The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only 1 of the
bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold & retain possession of the thing
given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct
shall be considered terminated or extinguished.
Usufructuaries do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements
they may have introduced on the property. If the rule were otherwise, the
usufructuary might improve the owner out of his own property.
HEMEDES VS. CA
The annotation of usufructuary rights in a certificate of title in favor of another
does not impose upon the mortgagee the obligation to investigate the validity
of its mortgagors title.
The owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a 3 rd person & the
usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor, & should
the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the
owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by
reason thereof.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. CA
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term & under such conditions as
the parties deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct.
A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct. The owner of the property
must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as the
usufruct exists.
A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners interests a usufructuary
gives a right to enjoy the property of another w/ the obligation of preserving
its form & substance, unless the title constituting it or the law provides
otherwise.
PROPERTY DOCTRINES
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