MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by
R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified
norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to
mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not
place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such
passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and
in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the
Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will
be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the
proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The
child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge
of Florentinos insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking
the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the childs
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private
contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms
of the insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic
social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the
child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with
this countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify
the offended party P30,000.00 for moral damages, 1 the accused GUILLERMO CASIPIT
y RADAM appeals to us insisting on his innocence.
The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a sixth grader, while appellant
was 22. They were neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical checkup, the father of
Myra entrusted her to the parents of Guillermo. On the same day, Guillermo invited
Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice and bananas. When they reached
the poblacion, he told her that they should buy in Dagupan instead because the prices
were cheaper. She agreed. Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited Myra to
watch a Movie. They watched the movie until six o'clock in the evening, after which,
they took a ride for Alaminos arriving there at eight o'clock. They took their dinner in
Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay Victoria. On their way home it rained
hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside
the hut, Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid down. After a few minutes, he told her
to lie down with him and rest. Then he went near her. He removed her panties, poked a
knife at her neck and warned her not to shout. She resisted appellant, kicked him twice,
but was helpless to subdue him as he tied her hands behind her nape. Moreover, he
opened her legs, went on top of her, and the inevitable had to come. He mounted an
assault on her chastity until he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She
could not stop him as he was big and strong. After the sexual encounter, she felt pain
and could not
sleep. 2
After waking up the following morning, they proceeded home. On their way, he told her
to proceed ahead. When she reached home, she was observed to be walking
abnormally (bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit, her cousin-in-law. When her aunt, Nenita
Rabadon, learned about it, she called for her and asked her what happened. She then
narrated everything to her. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay captain,
Bruno Carambas, and reported the incident to him. The barangay official then called for
Guillermo but he denied having raped Myra.

While inside the house of the barangay captain, the victim was examined by her sisterin-law Susan Cabigas and Elsa Carambas, wife of the barangay captain, who both
found the victim's private part reddish and her panties stained with blood. 3
The following afternoon, Myra, accompanied by an uncle, went to the police station of
Alaminos to report the rape and then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital
where she was examined by Dr. Fideliz Ochave. The medical findings of Dr. Ochave
showed no external sign of physical injuries but noted the presence of first degree fresh
healing laceration at the perineum and of
the hymen at six o'clock position. The laboratory result was negative for spermatozoa. 4
On 26 September 1986, Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a criminal
complaint against Guillermo. 5
The version of Guillermo, on the other hand, is that long before the incident, he and
Myra were sweethearts. On 19 September 1986, they agreed to watch the movie
"Cabarlo" so they went to Dagupan City. They entered the moviehouse at noon and left
at six o'clock in the evening. While watching the show, he placed his arm on the
shoulder of Myra and she did not object. He kissed her several times; she kissed him as
many times. They talked about their love for each other. After the movie, they went
home. However, when they reached Alaminos, it rained hard so they sought shelter in a
hut. They removed their wet clothes. He embraced her and she liked it. Then he
lowered her panties and she did not resist. He laid her down on the floor and she
consented. He joined her on the floor. He placed himself on top of her and sexual
intercourse followed as a matter of course. They stayed inside the hut the whole night.
They went home together the following morning. After the love tryst, he went to look for
a job in San Juan, Metro Manila. He was arrested in July 1987. He contended that the
victim was probably induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case. 6
After the trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found appellant guilty of
raping Myra by means of force and intimidation.
Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses while disregarding his and worse, for finding him guilty instead.
He maintains that the victim's story contained many flaws: firstly, even as she had
testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice, the doctor who examined her
found no external physical injuries on her body; secondly, the fact that the victim agreed
to have a movie date with him shows that she liked him and was attracted to him; and,
thirdly, the victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning, which is an
unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.
We cannot sustain the accused; hence, we affirm his conviction. We cannot argue
against the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that
appellant poked a knife at her neck and sexually abused her despite her resistance as
he was stronger and bigger than she who was only 14 years old. Considering the
physical condition of the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated, which

was in an isolated hut in an open field, it was not difficult for the accused to subdue the
victim and coerce her into submission.
These factual findings of the trial court appear to be borne by the records, and we
cannot have any justification to hold otherwise. When the question of credence arises
between the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense on the commission
of rape, the answer of the trial court is generally viewed as correct, hence entitled to the
highest respect, because it is more competent to so conclude having closely observed
the witnesses when they testified, their deportment, and the peculiar manner in which
they gave their testimonies and other evidence in court. 7
The argument that the absence of external injuries on the body of the victim belies her
claim that she struggled with appellant to prevent him from raping her is devoid of merit.
The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of
rape. Proof of injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential element of the
crime. 8 This does not mean however that no force or intimidation was used on the
victim to consummate the act. The force or intimidation required in rape is relative. It is
viewed in the light of the victim's perception and not by any hard and fast rule. It need
not be overpowering or irresistible but necessary only to achieve its purpose. Aside from
applying force, the appellant used intimidation by threatening the victim with a knife.
The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no indication that she already
agreed to have sex with him. Her actuation is understandable as she is a close relative
of appellant, according to his grandfather. 9 Hence, it is not improbable that the victim
placed her trust on appellant by letting him accompany her to the movie. It should be
emphasized that she was then only fourteen years old, an innocent barrio lass. Records
are bereft of evidence that she was a woman of ill-repute, or of a flirtatious nature to
incite or provoke appellant to have sex with her.
The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were sweethearts cannot be given
weight. For, if that was true, she would not have immediately disclosed to her family and
to the authorities the sexual assault done to her. 10 After all, nobody else but the two of
them knew what happened between them in the loneliness of an isolated hut in an open
field. The fact that Myra lost no time in immediately reporting the violation of her honor
and submitting herself to medical examination bolsters her credibility and reflects the
truthfulness and spontaneity of her account of the incident. If she had voluntarily
consented to the sexual act with appellant, her most natural reaction would have been
to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and reputation as
well as to her family. Her unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates
consent. 11
Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend credence to the testimonies
of victims who are of tender years regarding their versions of what transpired since the
State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves. 12

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT

y RADAM guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the indemnity in favor of MYRA REYNALDO is increased to
P50,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties.
Central Bank extendedloans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless,
Genbank failed to recover.

1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held
with the Lucio TanGroup winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza,
representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.

1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos, his family andcronies.

1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami
sila). In relation to thiscase, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the respondents bytaking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.

Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents.

1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his

participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the
properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered fromthe Lucion Tan group. PCGG
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did

not take an adverseposition to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendozas
appearance as counsel was beyondthe 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.
Issue:

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza

Held:

No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank
on how toproceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter
involved in thePCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.

The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The
role of Mendoza inthe liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.

SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion
to disqualify Mendoza.Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against
Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate

Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will
make it harder for thegovernment to get good lawyers in the future to work for them
because of the prohibition of acceptingcases in the future that were related to ones work as a
government counsel.Concurring Opinions:

Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period

Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor
General, no Rule 6.03 yet)

Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive periodand if applied retroactivelyNotes:

Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer
represents a clientin private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed with thegovernment and the interests of the current and former are
adverse

Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not
involve conflicts ata l l , a s i t p r o h i b i t s l a w ye r s f r o m r e p r e s e n t i n g a p r i v a t e
p e r s o n e v e n i f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e f o r m e r government client and the new client are
entirely parallel

Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct

involving a particularsituation and specific party

Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others

ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the
IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he
was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the
vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However,
IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal
process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case
filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an
Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent
IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no
longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not
waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international
organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in
the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on
"Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?

Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held
to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of
their functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying
that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered
under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of
Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties
because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said
lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the
property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest
money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the
P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the
motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering
into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted

principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the
laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of
nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that
diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus
exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and
sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can
be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is nonpropriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and
its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal)
character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot
evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were
dismissed accordingly.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning
units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The
agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The
respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was
unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic
of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued
as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have
waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance
Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of
the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when
it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered
into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

USA and Bradford v. Hon. Reyes and Montoya [219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
Facts:

Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an

identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States
Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford]
also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an activity manager. There was an incident on 22
January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoyas person and belongings searched in
front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a
suit for damages.

Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign
sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in
the complaint; and

2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at

JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the
performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military
Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as
amended.
Montoya argued that:
(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings
outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had
committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a
Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having
exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of
the public petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts
are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian
employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military
Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual

circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted

within or outside the scope of her authority.

The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.

Doctrine of State Immunity:

The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs.
Court of Appeals, thus:

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
expressed in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the
generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as
part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision
merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the
rules of the international community.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without
its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has
not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is
not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his

capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of

government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.

In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the

decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the
Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo,
does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be
proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the
action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government
which he represents.

Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held that:

. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have

adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official
proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity,
then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be
invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit
against such a functionary had to be instituted because of
his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute

appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or

petitioner. . . . .

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in
Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. [footnotes omitted]

In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the
scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail of immunity.

She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity

exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions (Emphasis supplied).

Disposition:
Petition was dismissed.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)

Second Division
Buena, March 16, 2001
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity
Facts:

In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS

Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property
along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of
Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the
housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units

By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG,
Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World,
Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of
the housing units

Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around
"2/3 of each housing unit"

Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the

completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal
promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas
that additional funds will be available and forthcoming

Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63

Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst.
Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be
based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the
Commission on Audit (COA)

In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December

20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the
petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303

In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money
claims to the DPWH

In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied
the subject money claims

Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to
order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and
attorney's fees.

Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997

Issue:
1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then
Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1. Yes.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in
view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements,
it still finds merit in the instant petition
o

The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express

declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality

"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be

compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit

Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their
compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of
the money claims

2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility
against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
o
The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

Dept. of Education, Albay vs. Onate

Facts:
Spouses Claro Onate and Gregoria Los Banos owns the disputed lot Lot No. 6849
(27,907 sqm) registered under the Torrens System of land registration with an Original
Certificate of Title (OCT). This lot was already settled through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and Cession in 1991, in favor of respondent as his three sisters
waived their rights to the property. It turns out that the same land was where the Daraga
North Central Elementary School was built and had been operating since 1940, then
named Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga. The Municipality of Daraga gave
that land to Dept. of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), now Dept. of Education
(DepEd) through a Deed of Donation, confident that the municipality owned the land
through buying it from Claro Onate, the respondents grandfather, sometime in 1940.
Respondent testified that he only knew of the dispute on 1973, from which he took
possession of the lot the same year; that he knew only of the schools occupation on a
portion of the land on 1991 and knew of the Deed of Donation on 1992. The petitioner
then claimed that respondent was guilty of laches.
Issue: Is the respondent guilty of laches? Will it be applied to him in this case? Is the
State immune from this case? Can DECS be sued independently from the State?
Ruling:
YES. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, or an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlier. Elements of
laches have set in: 1) disputed land has been used for public education since 1940, 2)
respondent failed to prove that him and his predecessors undertook steps to regain the
use of their land, to protest the building of the school as early as 1940, 3) petitioner
DECS did not anticipate that their occupancy of the land would be later questioned, and
4) preliminary facts show grave prejudice to the petitioner DECS as they have made
major changes in construction and expansion of the school. The laches, however, apply
only to disputed Lot No. 6849-A. By virtue of laches, respondent Onate cannot claim Lot
No. 6849-A anymore.
NO. DECS can be sued as a result of being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by
the Municipality of Daraga (as its recipient) over disputed property. By giving its consent
to the donation, it brings DECS down to level of ordinary citizen.
YES, DECS can be sued independently from the State as it gave its authority to
continue with the donation, which carries with it the full responsibility of suing or being
sued.
Therefore, DepEd (formerly DECS) now has the rights of possession and property over
Lot No. 6849-A. Onarte cannot sell, mortgage or encumber said Lot while still being

used by DepEd. The lots rights will be returned to respondents the moment DECS no
longer needs it. DECS being nonsuable has become moot.

G.R. No. 129406 March 6,

2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO.
FACTS:
The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities
and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private
respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or
majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the
properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227
shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private respondent. As
sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the
monthly membership
fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale.

Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic

and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which
contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the
sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private
respondents capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and
the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner
that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion
for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered

Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically
released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties
Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be

put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to
deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to
comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability,
petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity.

HELD: NO. In fact, by entering into a CompromiseAgreement with private respondent

Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in
the
same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or
agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and
obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent,
precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the
citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from
the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1959REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE VICENTE A.

HIDALGO,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37
FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or r e c o v e r y
of ownership and possession a p r o p e r t y a g a i n s t t h e
R e p u b l i c o f t h e Philippinesin the RTC of Manila. I t i s a l s o
k n o w n a s t h e Arlegui Residence w h i c h h o u s e d t w o
P h i l i p p i n e presidents and which now holds the Office of the Press
Secretary and the News Information Bureau. The case was initially dismissed by
thepresiding Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35 )on the ground of state immunity. The
case wasre-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with r e s p o n d e n t V i c e n t e A.
H i d a l g o a s p r e s i d i n g Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the R e p u b l i c
in default for failure of Solicitor G a b r i e l F r a n c i s c o R a m i r e z ,
t h e h a n d l i n g solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in
his motion for extension. I t i s c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e
v i o l a t e d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e fundamental rule that
government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused
the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic.
ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunityfrom suit.
HELD: It is settled that when the State gives i t s c o n s e n t t o b e s u e d , i t
does not thereby n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s e n t t o a n u n r e s t r a i n e d
execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
effect, i s t o g i v e t h e o t h e r p a r t y a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o prove, if it can, that the
state has a liability. T h e f u n c t i o n s a n d p u b l i c s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d b y
t h e S t a t e c a n n o t b e a l l o w e d t o p a r a l yz e d o r d i s r u p t e d b y t h e
d i v e r s i o n o f public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

CASE DIGEST OF NHA VS. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO

Topic: Execution/Garnishment
NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo
Facts:
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the
land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.
The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners
power to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to
expropriate the properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who
ascertain the just compensation of the said properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per
square meter.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and
19 as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial court issued an
omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioners motion and of
just compensation.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a
motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as
modified by the omnibus order.
The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of
partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed
to appeal.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. The
courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution
and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
1.

Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue
with its inherent power of eminent domain.
2.
Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches
applies to government.
3.
Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state
in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve
public use or purpose
Ruling:
The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power
of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken.
After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldnt be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.
The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to
expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.
Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in
character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate
expropriation proceedings that seize a private owners property.
Petition was DENIED and the trial courts decision denying petitioners motion to dismiss
expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy and
garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary
Restraining Order was LIFTED.

REPUBLIC VS UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS

March 9, 2007
FACTS:
The Bureau of Customs (BOC) seized and forfeited the shipment owned by UNIMEX
Micro-Electronics. When the latter filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), the forfeiture decree was reversed and the court ordered the release of the
goods. However, respondents counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce
the CTA decision. When respondent asked for release of its shipment, BOC could no
longer find subject shipment in its warehouses. The CTA ordered the BOC to pay
UNIMEX the commercial value of the goods with interest. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the decision of the CTA in
the SC. One of its grounds was that the government funds cannot be charged with
respondents claim without a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by
mere judicial order.
ISSUE:
Can the government be held for actual damages?
HELD:
Although the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the government,
and that under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for
governmental acts (jusimperil), the court still holds that petitioner cannot escape its
liability. The circumstances of the case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the
state immunity doctrine. The court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC s ineptitude and
gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondents goods. The situation does not allow
us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity.
The doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this
prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against
it. The SC, as the staunch guardian of the peoples rights and welfare, cannot sanction
an injustice so patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration
thereof. Courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now
demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.
Assailed decision of the CTA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION

G.R. No. 176628

March 19, 2012

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is
to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI)
for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a
contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred
Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).
On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven
Million Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos
(P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf course.
Despite the RTCs liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time,
PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a
judgment of default.
On July 11, 2005, PTA filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment was premised on the argument
that the gross negligence of PTAs counsel prevented the presentation of evidence
before the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of
merit.
Issue:
Whether or not PTA, as a government entity, should be bound by the inactions or
negligence of its counsel.
Ruling:
PTA was acting in a proprietary character

PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The
application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign
transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in
entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.
Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary
character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial
liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.