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Dorion Cairns - Conversations With Husserl and Fink
Dorion Cairns - Conversations With Husserl and Fink
Dorion Cairns - Conversations With Husserl and Fink
PHAENOMENOLOGICA-
'
E DES CENTRES DAl(CHIVES-HUSSERL
PATROBAG
DORION CAIRNS
IN LOUVA11\.
WITH A FOREWORD BY
RICHARD M. ZANER
DQRIQN (jAIRI\
|
EDITEIJ RY THE1-{USSERL-ARC'IIIVli5
IN LOUVAIN.
WITH A FOREWORD BY
RICHARD M. ZANER
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Foreword
TABLE OF CONTENTS
13.18/31
27)6!3I
Editor's preface
I.
II.
III.
V.
IV.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
X.
IX.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XXII.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XX.
XIX.
XXI.
afwfar
ZZI9/31
239!3I
17/9lsI
IIf9f3I
If9f3I
XXIII.
XV.
XXIV.
"-lU\UJNN
11
I6
I7
2o
24
27
28
30
31
32
32
33
34
36
37
37
38
4I
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
Conversation with
XXVII
XL
XXXIX
XXXVIII
XXXVII
XX XVI
XXXV
XXXIV
XXXIII
XXXII
XXXI
XXX.
XXIX.
XXVIII
XLI
XLII
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
XLIII
XLIX
XL VIII
XLVII
XLVI
XLV.
XLIV
LI
XL
LI II
Husserl, 1311132
Fink, 1811132
Fink, 2011132
Husserl and Fink, 2611132
Husserl and Fink, 2911132
Husserl, 313132
Husserl, 713132
Husserl, 1113132
LII
with
with
with
with
with
with
with
with
LV
1516132
2316132
1517132
2019132
Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 25110132
LIV.
LVI
LVII
LVIX
LVIII
LX
LXI
LXII.
LXIII.
LXIV.
LXV.
LXVI
LXVII
TABLE or CONTENTS
v11
Appendix
1. Topics, Husserl conversation, 2416131
11. Conversation with Husserl, 2516131
111. Conversation with Husserl, 2716131
109
107
103
104
105
99
100
Index 01 names
III
Index of subjects
FOREWORD
mund Husserl first from 1924 to 1926, then from I931 to 1932
- Dorion Cairns had become immensely impressed with the striking philosophical quality of I-lusserls conversations with his
students and co-workers. Not unlike his daily writing (five to six
hours a day was not uncommon, as Husserl reports herein, the
nature of which was a continuous searching, reassessing, modifying, advancing and even rejecting of former views}, Husserls
conversations, especially evidenced from Cairns's record, were
remarkable for their depth and probing character. Because of
this, and because of the important light they threw on I-IusserI's
written and published works, Cairns had early resolved to set
1 Cairnss lectures between 1956 and 1964 are especially important. He addressed
himself to such topics as: Hl1sserl's Theory of lntenticmality {a tour-semester
FOREWORD
body of work required that one begin ones studies with those
works which were written at the peak of Husserls philosophical
powers, and then one could sensibly turn to the rest of the corpus, always reading it, however, in the light of the former. This order, Cairns maintained, placed the Cartesian Meditation-$2 first, followed by the Formal and Tra-nscemieatal Logic,'3 only after mastering these, could one meaningfully study Ideas, I4 (with a focus
on Part II, since t-lusserl rightly had serious reservations about
Part l, which he regarded as too unclear). After this, one could
then turn to the largely pre-philosophical (and certainly pretranscendental) Logical Irioesti'gati'or-is,5 and then the rest of
Husser1s works, published and unpublished. The present Conversations confirm precisely this interpretation, and moreover
give the rationale for it: as is amply clear herein, it was only in
the light of his labors in the r92os culminating in the first two
works mentioned above, that Husserl came to a level of genuine
philosophical maturity from the perspective of which the earlier
studies and inquiries could be viewed systematically and assessed
as to their approximation to, or failure fully to achieve, a genuinely philosophical significance. Hence, if for no other reason,
these Corwersah'ons have both historical and systematic importance for understanding llusserl's own views of his work. Coming
3 Edmund Husserl, Carcsiam'sri;e .-lfetiritatitmen mid Parriscr I'ortr&gc. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Prof. llr. S. Slrasser. Hnsserliana Band I. Hang: Martinus
Nijhoff, I950. Eng. tr. by Dorion Cairns. The. I-lagne: Marliiius Nijhoff, I960.
3 Edmund Husserl, Formals and trait-szcndentale Logiic. Vrrsuch eincr Kritik def
Iogischm Vrrrmm. Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, I929. ling. tr. by Dorion Cairns.
The Hague: Martinus Nijliuff, 1969.
4 Edmund Husserl, Idem zu einer reimm 1' Iaa11onie:mngi: and piiiiuomcsmiogilscken
Pkilosophie. lirstes Buch: Allgenieine lilinltihrung in die reine Phanornenologie. Herausgegeben von Walter lliemel. Husserliaiia Band lil. Hang: l\-Iartinus Nijhofi, 1950.
5 Edmunrl l~ll1sserl,Logisr:.Fze L-ntersacJ;:m_.r,'m. Hnlle: f\lH.X Niemeyer Verlag, 1900,
or {Vierte Auflage, 1:325). ling. tr. by _I. N. Findlay {in two volumes], from the 2nd
edition of I913. Ne\v York: The llunianities Press, 1970.
'5 Such as "Philosophie als strenge Wissensel-rail, Logos, 1 {191o1911}, pp. 289341 (Eng. tr. by Quentin Lauer, published along with another of Husserl's articles
under the title: II1sn-nrncnology and the Crisis of Ihi-fosopky. New York: Harper
Torchbooks, The Academy Library, 1965, pp. _71:47]. Other works by llusserl have
been carefully edited and p11lJli5hP(l under the auspices of the Husserl Archives, in the
series entitled Husserliana, published by Marlinlis Nijhofi.
These other works, Cairns often insisted, must he read in the light of the Formal
and Transcendmtal I.o;;,-ic and the ffartesian .~'l-feditatrfmi-s; especially is this the ease
with Erlalirimg and L-lrtsil, R'n's:'s o'er zuropaiscken lrl"i$$'n$t;kafi6B mid die transzerr
dentafc Pkrinoriicnologic, and all the studies left unpublished by Husserl during his
lifetime.
FOREVVORD
XI
soon after the completion of his seminal Formal and Transcendental Logic, and his lectures in France, the present volume records
his substantial effort to find a clear way of presenting this basic
conception of phenomenology, his evident concern to set his earlier studies in their proper context, as well as what he sees as the
major thrust of his immediately forthcoming work. Thus, not
only the major themes of the logic and their extension in further
logical studies, but also an important extension to the Cartesian
Mzdiitatziorz-s (in as many as three additional Meditations, as
mentioned in this work), and some of the important themes later to
be taken up in the Crisis, are all addressed herein. One of the most
striking features of Husserls lifelong effort to establish a truly
foundational discipline of philosophical criticism is here exhibited
quite dramatically and often to both Cairnss and Fink's surprise, if not dismay. Hardly any insight or result is regarded by
Husserl, even at this late date in his career, as definitively establi shed: He [and perforce his readers), finds it necessary continually to re-examine, research again and again, terrain which most
of his followers and critics would like to regard as Husserls established views, but which Husserl himself is never wont to
accept as established and closed to further discussion. Thus, not
only his views of the ego, constitution, embodiment, intersubjectivity, time-consciousness, Passiv-ia't, and other well known
themes, but even intentionality itself are submitted to renewed
and probing questioning in these Conversations. Nothing as he
emphasizes again and again can be taken as definitive; in the
words of the Formal and Trait-scerideuia! Logic, the j>oss1Tbiliy
of deception is inherent in the evidence of experience and does not
annul either its fundamental character or its effect . . ." Indeed,
he quite explicitly denies that evidence of any kinds can yield
an absolute security against deceptions . . .9 The present Corioersai-ioas give ample evidence that Husserl meant precisely what
he said: every effort, and claim, to know inherently require phenomenological explicative criticism, and that itself necessitates
continuous transcerrdenial self-criticism.
This volume is the last which Cairns had himself prepared for
XII
FOREWORD
cal tradition.
RICHARD M. ZANER
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, Texas
january, I975
EDITOR'S PREFACE
In I968 the manuscript of the present work reached the HusserlArchives owing to the good offices of Professor H. Spiegelberg.
To prepare the manuscript for press we then, in agreement with
the author, assumed the responsibility for carrying out all the indispensable editorial compilation. Unfortunately Dorion Cairns
was not granted the scrutinizing of the submitted wording nor
the elaboration of his projected preface.
As with Cairnss G-aide for translating Hasserl the editors aimed
XIV
EDITOR'S PREFACE
etc.
II
lranszamierxlalz Logik.
CONVERSATIONS
Apparently he was seeing Husserl for the first time since the
V
III
bl Cairns.
' The original German text was published in I950 as the first volume of Ilusserl's
Collected Works. At the time Cairns met Husserl, only a French translation by
G. Pfeiffer and E. Lvinas had been published. See index oi Husserl's works mentioned
Husserl proceeded to develop his idea of kinaesthesis. The constitution of an object in perception depends not only upon a certain Verlauf (course, flow) of sensationalhyletic data, but also
upon a certain correlation with a certain type of kinaesthesis. The
latter is not primordially grasped as revelatory of motion. Motion
CONVERSATIONS
differs from Einpfindnng (sensation) by having an intimate relation to subjective potentiality. The I can works directly on or
with kinaesthesis, and brings about sensational and hence objective changes only indirectly. The identity of an object depends
on a certain relation to the "ich kann (I can).
The body constitutes itself through perceptions of itself, and
the constitution of the body as a real object is a necessary condition for the constitution of a real world beyond the body.
I asked Husserl whether, if, were it impossible for the body to
have reflex perception of itself (one hand touch the other, the
eye see the hand, etc.) there would then be the possibility of the
constitution of a world, or of a body. If, e.g., our only sense organ
was the eye, would we have any sort of world? He answered no.
I told him about Becker's recent lectures, wherein he contrasted
what he stated to be Husserls notion of possibility, as "pure
possibility alone, with Heideggers7 notion of possibility as
potentiality, Vermogen (ability). Naturally Husserl was astonished that anyone could attempt a distinction between him and
Heidegger along this line. For fifteen years at least, he had been
operating with the notion of Mogliciikeit als I/'ermo'gen (possibility
as ability) - he had even been using the term Vermfiglichkeii
(facultative possibility) to express the egos free potentiality.
He spoke of phenomenology as the attempt to make understandable that which presents itself as brute fact, by making
evident its (rational) constitution. This in the end will give man
I930. rt volumes were published. Co-editors were Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pliinder,
serls philosophical seminary from 1916 until 1922, editor of Vart.-zsungen zur Platinumenologie a'es irmeran Zeitbewutseins, co-editor of I-lusser|s jaltrbnck.
3 jakrbuck Mr P.-hlosofikie and phanomwsoiogrische Forscimng: this Annual for
philosophy and phenomenological research" was edited by Husserl from 1913 until
Adolf Reinach and Max Schelcr. These were later on substituted or joined by Martin
Heidegger and Oskar Becker.
VI
I began by stating that I was not clear about the nature of kinaesthesis, and this started Husserl on an analysis of perception,
much of which was familiar. To the perception of a physical object
there is necessary not only the constitution of a certain Einsiim-
interconnection).
CONVERSATIONS
VII
I have a world.
These analyses, or something connected with this general problem, Husserl wanted to give as Beilage II (supplement II) (Really
as Beiiage I) to the Log-ische Untersnchungen but he saw that the
analysis of kinaesthesia was insufficient and accordingly he suppressed the Beifage. The other Beiiage had already been printed,
and hence it stands as "Beilage 1 though there is in fact no
further Be-ilage. (In fact it has no number. Husserl got things a
bit twisted here. Really the thing that had already been printed
and that stands in the 2d edn. as a footnote (II, p. 364) [was]
convsnsnrrons
- [and] by Hergesheimenlz
IO
CONVERSATIONS
21 Franz Brentano (r8381gr7), 1-Iusserls teacher in Vienna, exerted a great influence upen Husserl and inspired his theory of iutentionality.
*2 George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), British psychologist and philosopher.
II
IX
tation.
I2
CONVERSATIONS
I3
14
convnnsarrons
I5
I14 f-
This Problem seems opportune because of the stress Heidegger puts upon the
awareness of wholes.
25 cf lags I14~9:
16
convnnsarrons
gations.
The difficulty of seeing the place of the earlier time-lectures in
the whole system is the chief source of Husserls dissatisfaction
with their publication at the time with Heideggers insufficient
introduction.
X
Conuersat-ion- with Husserl and Fink, 17/8/31
After talking together, Fink and I called for Husserl, who expressed approval when told we had been talking about the deepening of the understanding of the phenomenological reduction*.
Fink supplied the information that we had gone out from the
problem of the reduction of non-doxic acts, such as decisions.
A decision, said Husserl, is one of many volitional modi. There
is a volitional "doubt", and there are degrees of volitional "certainty. All such modi are closely connected with the doxic modi.
I do not remember how he went on from this point. The conversation turned to the nature of habitus, and to the nature of an
originally establishing act. Husserl looked for an example. At
first he took a mountain, but rejected it because it was a particular
object, and hence not a good instance of what he wanted to show.
Instead he said, suppose I see an albatross for the first time and
learn the nature of the bird for the first time as albatross. Ever
after I see albatrosses when I come upon such individuals.
Again the thread of the conversation escapes my memory.
* Insight into the nature of phenomenology, constitution, fills us with wonder, yet
not vulgar wonder, since we have insight. The phenomenological problems present
themselves as riddles, but it is the essence of :1 riddle to have the clue to its answer
in itself. l\'o impossible riddles.
I7
XI
2,
-. .
.
I
burg Gmchl Mlyk (born 1895), Japanese philosopher, a student of Husserl at Frei-
2? 1-Clntersnbjeetivity
. .
_
,
_
_
:8
the constitution
of the objective
world".
arteswamsclie Medztatwncn, 44-47, pp_ ;;>4_135_
I8
CONVERSATIONS
I9
accord) of one sort constitutes A spekte (aspects), and Ei-nstimmgken! of aspects, objects. His errors and oscillations were due to a
complicated problem, not to some fortuitous stupidity. Nothing's
fortuitous.)
The synthetic system of possible points of rest, as all outside
of each other and correlated with the various synthetic systems,
founds the oriented space.
My body is the null-oriented object. When an object is attached
to my body (as when I carry it, or it me) it maintains with me a
null orientation as I may perambulate space. Similarly, parts of
my body may take on perspective when cut off. (Problem of losing
the whole body bit by bit until all is gone.) Then [there is] no basis
for a psychophysical apperception of the sensation and kinaesthetic systems as Grenzf-all (borderline case). Assimilating an
object to my body (giving same null orientation), moving with it
etc., as all processes founded in certain kinaesthetic syntheses.
Perception is a bodily activity, involving kinaesthesis.
Problem of phantasying myself in another place [is] quite difficult, but its solution [is] an important step in making understandable that analogizing association which makes intelligible the experience of other minds. Association is by likeness. I here, and
another body there, is not sufficient unless I have phantasied myself as there.
But such phantasy may be itself based on experience of others,
it will be objected. Such would seem certainly to be the case when
one sees a mirrored reflection as of oneself. These questions indicate [the] difficulty of problems here.
After one has analyzed the constitution of the other mind
in general one may proceed to consider the higher, founded,
structures of intersubjectivity and the various forms of social relation - marriage, family, etc. in Wese-asallgerrie-miaeit (eidetic universality) ; then the problems of abnormalities, of non-human subjects, blind, deaf, idiots, etc., and the problems of a ge-rmine life
under ethical laws. Each problem in its place.
Birth and death we know only on the basis of intersubjectivity.
Death appears as a pause in other life. In this it is analogous to
20
CONVERSATIONS
Fink tells me the manuscript I had of the Mditations Camisiennes is an exact duplicate of the one from which the French
was done. If so the translators are guilty of errors and omissions,
as I have indicated in my copy at the beginning of the 5th Mediration.
XII
Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 22/8/31
I had sent Husserl on the previous day a list of the worst omissions
and errors I had found in the early part of the French translation
of the Fifth fldeditation. So thats the way the two translations
are, he said in effect. They will be hindrances rather than helps
to an understanding in England and France.
He then passed on to speaking of what he had recently been
doing. The morning he had spent in putting his recent manuscripts
in order. He gets into an A rbeitsfieber (work fever) and does not
even number his pages so that afterwards he has a job straightening them out.
Recently he has been working on a problem which he developed
as follows. Starting from the fully concrete situation one comes
through abbauende Analytik (unbuiiding analyses) and then the
oppositely directed synthetic or constitutional work to distinguish
several Sckichten (strata) in the structure of the concrete phenomenon. Assuming, for example, that we have come always from
the concrete! to consider the fields of sensation as lowest
levels of constitution of objects, we may isolate, say, the field of
vision as a synthetic unity through association. We may further
abstract from all systems of kinaesthesis save the system belonging (in apperception) to ".4ugenbewegung (eye-movements).
We may then observe how, other kinaesthetic systems being held
still, there constitute themselves unities within the field of vision,
correlated with the eye-kinaesthesia. In general thereis constituted
an "A ugmbewegungsraum (space of eye-movements). Then there
constitute themselves identical plane surfaces within that space
identical, however the eye-kinaesthesis may take place. In the
simplest case we have the constitution of a stationary surface,
but there can also be constituted identical surfaces as moving, as
2I
changing their shapes and colors. Within this simple space there
22
CONVERSATIONS
motion.
The problem of transcendental constitution, said Husserl in
23
effect, is, as I have said to Herrn Dr. Fink, none other than the
problem of how God created the absolute world, and continues
to create it, even as the transcendental intersubjectivity creates
its world". The phenomenological form of the ontological argument is the conclusion from the absolute constitutive consciousness. (The last stage of the process of relativization of objects
which Husserl spoke of at the outset.)
But all these are last questions, questions of such great interest,
that one is tempted to go into metaphysics in an "Aarfsci1wung
(soaring) a phrase by which Scheler31 actually characterized
metaphysics. However one must creep before one can fly; one
must do a lot of dirty work (schmutzige Arbert) on the ground
before one can get into ones airplane and fly.
The earlier problems of phenomenology are much the most
complicated.
Husserls dirty work was largely done in the Logische Uutersuckrmgen and the first workings out of the rough outline of the
constitution of the objective world.
In Giittingen it was fine the way the students discussed and
developed their phenomenological problems albeit they got a
bit too solidly settled in a Hei-mwelt (familiar world) of their own
so that they would listen not to anything which was strange to
it, such as the lectures Husserl gave at the time.
By 1907-8 (P) when he came to give a certain series of lectures
(on phenomenology as a whole?), he was surprised to see how
wide and systematic a knowledge of the field he had already
gained.
24
CONVERSATIONS
25
as Moritz Schlick (1382-1036), Gernzrau philosopher, leader of the group of neoP5lll"'i-~l-5 Wllich came to belknown as the Vienna Circle.
26
CONVERSATIONS
XIV
27
first naivet of the natural attitude, only leads us first into a new
naivet, that of simple descriptive act analysis. This in turn must
be overcome by progress to the deeper constitutional analysis.
Constitutional analysis is not the same as descriptive analysis.
In the latter, one explicates objective moments of the object, its
28
convnnsarrons
29
how far the acts of which Heidegger speaks are essential ways of
30
CONVERSATIONS
lation of the coming German Meditations would be a better introduction for English and American readers than any I might
write, and Husserl agreed with me. He said that for years he had
been under the illusion that it would be a comparatively easy
matter to write a popular introduction, but that in reality his
constant attempts throughout the last ten years, attempts which
resulted in the London and Paris lectures and the Fae-nan Meditations, had all been without satisfatory results. He hopes, however,
that the German MeaT:Ttat.ions will be more successful. He thinks
such mediating work as Salmon did in his study of Hume, work
on the tradition of British empiricism, would be of greatest value
in introducing phenomenology to the English-speaking public.
XVI
Conoersaz'on with Husserl, 6,-lg/31
Husserl, instead of directly answering a question I asked about
the evidence of recollection, began an exposition of the primitive
phenomenological situation, the awareness of something, of the
ego as attentive to something i11 a Gcgemoart (present) with a
certain doxic modus. The ego as actively attentive is anonymous,
and we are aware of it only in reflection as not active but as
objectified, still as the same as the active ego. The rays (Straklen)
of attention are multiple in time, but the ego is not thereby multiplied. Hence we speak of a single, anonymous Ego-pole behind the
entire stromende Gegenwart (flowing present). In the Gegenzoari
we have, however, Aits-n-tzTonsstrakZe-n (rays of attention) which
relate back to a "past". There are a variety of modi of attention,
of which the simple immediate directedness to the present perceived is the Urmodo:-.s (primitive mode). Then there is not only
a simple dropping from attention, but also phenomena such as
the attention being called away by some other stimulus. Further,
there is the abstractive focusing of attention upon a certain aspect
of an attended object, whereby the latter is still attended, but in
the modus of secondary attention. Again there is the paying
attention still to a thing but holding it still in attention, and
3 Christopher Verney Salmon (horn rigor], British philosopher, took his doctor's
degree under Husserl in 1928 at Freiburg.
3I
XVII
32
CONVERSATIONS
world.
This is a course of analyses which Husserl has hardly carried
out in detail. But to suppose that the pre-human physical world
was ever constituted as a present for some spirit is quite gratuitous, and to absolutize it is quite erroneous. It has its highly
complicated structure as a past constituted for the present.
Husserl compared the simple obviousness of the earliest steps
of transcendental phenomenology (an d correlatively, of intentional
psychology) to the simple obviousness of the earliest steps of
mathematics. One must begin with such trivialities as a +1 = I +a
and proceed patiently step by step.
XVIII
Co-nversation with Fink, I6/9/3;" (P)
Husserl had been inclined to proceed with a large logic after
finishing the Formals mid transzendeataie Logik, but Fink says he
persuaded him rather to undertake the sketching of a whole phenomenology, since such a sketch is absolutely necessary to making
Husserls Einzelanalysen <single analyses) in (manuscripts) intelligible.
XIX
Conversation with Hosserl and Fink, I7/9/31'
Upon my arrival Husserl asked me what I had been doing, and
I replied that I had been working on the first part of the Logik.
He asked if I had difficulties there, and I told him no. Then you
are quite advanced, he said. He proceeded to say that he no longer
remembered what was there, that he always had to have Fink
tell him what was in his books.
XX
33
Finks Entwmf <project, plan, draft) for a new rst Meditation did
stitution.
He warned against taking literally Husserls phrases on Geburt
and Tod <birth and death) in the transcendental sphere; Husserl
34
CONVERSATIONS
further. Fink said that the most interesting question we had considered was that of the relation of the transcendental ego to the
psychological ego.
The exercising of the phenomenological epoch is indubitably
an act of the transcendental ego, yet I may say, X exercised the
35
" "For know, dear ones, that every one of us is undoubtedly responsible for all
men and everything on earth, not merely through the general sinfulness of creation,
hut each one personally for all mankind and for every individual man. This knowledge
15 the crown of life for the monk and for every man. For monks are not a special sort
of me", but only what all men ought to be. Only through that knowledge, our heart
EYOWS soft with infinite, inexhaustible love." The Brothers Kommazov, Part II,
36
CONVERSATIONS
XXII
Conversation with Hnssenl and Fink, 28/9/31
Husserl has been working on what he calls the Doppel-Zeitignng
(double temporalization) of the Eriebnisstrom (stream of mental
processes). In the first place we have the objective temporalization,
in the hyletic data and the objects which appear through them.
37
XXIII
XXIV
Husserl has again changed his plan for the publication of the
Meditat-ionen. He now suggests that Fink as editor publish the
text from which was made the French translation, and that any
Changes be in the form of expansion or notes. There is to be added
an introduction and two further meditations. The First M'edizfa-non is, furthermore, to be changed, at least if Fink has his way.
The time-lectures are then to be published as they stand, with
38
33
cexvxnsarrexs
convsnsarrons
an introduction
intreductien by Fink, showing
shewing where they stand. The whole
whele
te be ready for
fer the printer by the first week in Mareh.*
March.*
is to
ef the I905
r9e5 tirneiecturc5
time-iectures he had
Husserl said that at the time of
net yet come
ceme upon
upen the phenomenological
phenemenelegical reduction,
reductien, but that
not
en to
te think of
ef the phenomenophenemenethese lectures were what urged him on
legical reduction.
reductien. This first came to
te paper
- in a primitive form
ferm
logical
fellewing summer in Seefeld. He spoke
speke of
ef publishing the
the following
five lectures ef
of 19e8
I908 in the next but ene
one ef
of the issues ef
of the
jehrlateh.
jahrbncii.
questien of
ef publication
publicatien he said he had been
After leaving the question
aleng the following
fellewing line: The individual in the
thinking recently along
phenemenelegical Einsteiinng
Eeestelferrg (attitude) has his world
werld there
phenomenological
fer him and has himself likewise as in the world"
werld as a being
for
whe has a world".
werld. He has furthermore
furthermere his fellow
fellew men, not
net only
enly
who
werld but as, like himself, transcendental egos.
eges.
as beings in the world
Frem the point
peint of
ef view of
ef psychology
psvchelegy one
ene has a similar situation
sit uatien
From
ege has his Vorstelinng
Ve-rsisihseg ((mental)
<(mental) objectivation)
ehjectivatien> of
ef the
since each ego
world
werld and the other
ether egos
eges appear in each Vorsteiin-ng
Verstsll-it-eg as beings,
each of
ef which has his Vorsteiiung
Verstsllaut-g of
ef the world
werld (including his
fellew men etc.). On the naive psychological
psvchelegical level one
ene distinguishfellow
es between the world
werld as created by
lijv man, i.e., as made up of
ef
cultural qualities, and the world
werld as it is in itself, in the transcendental reduction
reductien one
ene sees that the world
werld in itself has its consticenstitutien.
tution.
XXV
Conversation
Ceueersef-fee with
taith Husserl
Heisssrl and
arid Fink,
Fats, I2/rr/31
I2firf31
Husserl has been looking
leeking over
ever manuscripts from
frem the year 1918 and
ef himself to
te see how
hew he lost
lest track of
ef some
seme
says he is ashamed of
of
ef what was already started in the Ideen,
Ideas, notably,
netably, I gather, the
doctrine
dectrine of
ef the pertinence of
ef constitutional
censtitutienal analysis to
te the nature
* He spoke
spelte of
ei publishing the Berlin lecture"
lecture in the jelirlm-:31,
jelirh-ash, instead of,
ef, as promispremis-
LL
km
Herttsltirlisn.
ed, in the Kantsticdiem.
5
5 The Berlin lecture, Pknormznoiogie
Phrinereruelegie and
an-ti Anthropologie,
Ant.-Erepeiegis, was held _]u.ue
June 10,
t, I931
in the liiantgesellschaft
liautgesellschaft Berlin". The typewritten text is available at the HusserlArchives at Louvain
Leuvain (classification:
{cIassificatien: M
hi II 1).
1]. It was published in Philosophy
Fhilesephy MI-4
EH5
Phenomenological
Pesaemreelegieai Research, II (:94:-1942},
[1941-1 5-as}, pp. 1-14.
39
of
gf logical
Iegical {and experiential?) evidence. He attributes this retroretregressien to
te the effect of
ef the war upon
upen him, or
er rather the effect
gression
of
ef Germanys defeat. He says he was able at the time to
te work
werk
enly on
en isolated
iselated problems,
prehlems, not
net on
en the larger aspects of
ef phenomenophenemeneonly
lggy. Only after I920
Igae was he able to
te treat these fruitfully once
ence
logy.
mere. But he spoke
speke of
ef a feeling of
ef inadequacy to
te his task as having
more.
(even
{even before
befere 1918?) made it impossible
impessible for
fer him to
te finish the
secend volume
velume of
ef the Ideen.
Ideas. (Often he is disquieted about
abeut the
second
velume, but Fink, he says, reassures him. Otherwise he
first volume,
vveeld not
net have permitted the publishing of
ef an English transwould
latien.} He turned to
te problems
preblems of
ef the nature of
ef personality
persenalitjv and
lation.)
of
ef society.
secietv.
VVhen
llien Husserl asked me if I had any questions
questiens I brought
breught up
questien of
ef how
hew convincing
cenvincing a mot-ioation
:.wef-ieetieat to
te the performance
perfermance
the question
ef the phenomenological
phenemenelegical epoch
epeche can be before
hsfere that epoch
epech itself
of
and the development
develepment of
ef phenomenology
phenemeneleg}; itself, with its insight
inte the nature of
ef evidence.
into
develuping certain considerations
censideratiens which can
Husserl replied by developing
eccupv us in the natural attitude: I am in the world,
werld, the world
werld
occupy
appears to
te me in a multitude of
ef experiences and other
ether acts, and
what the world
werld is for
fer me is always
alwajvs a world
werld which is valid
{gsffseal} in my own
ewn subjectivity. Existence of
ef objects
ebjects in them(geitenal)
ef validity for
fer me through
threugh certain experiences
selves is itself a kind of
ef the object
ebject which is, as so
se experienced, said to
te exist in itself.
of
This leads us to
te the realization
realisatien that all being is constituted
censtituted for
fer
a subject, and to
te the consideration
censideratien of
ef objects
ebjects as so
se constituted
censtituted
witheut preliminary consideration
censideratien of
ef the nature of
ef evidence.
without
en to
te outline
eutline the motivation
metivatien as I have been working
werking it
I went on
out
eut recently:
recentlv: the way from
frem the consideration
censideratien that objects
ebjects are,
strictly, largely preientions.
prssetier-rs. Fink carried it immediately
iirunediately through:
threugh:
ebject with pretended existence, pretended other
ether
The physical object
dimensions;
dimensiens; the given surface itself as pretended enduring unill =1 The given as a "kernel"
kernel of
ef hyle
l1}l'lE: with these pretensions
pretensiens variousvarieusty;
ly
ljv about
abeut it. He doubted
deubted that one
ene could
ceuld come
ceme directly
rlirectljv to
te a phepomenological
Hemenelegical reduction
reductien in this way. He characterized
characterised it as a way
ber die
irt
ti-is Psj-'ckologie
Psj-'eIre.Zegi's" (via
<via or
er through
th reugh psychology).
psvehelegj. But I pointed
peinted
out
eut that the psychic itself could
ceuld be subjected to
te such a reduction.
reductien.
Theugh it is not
net given in /lbsciiotinngen
Ahsehettteegse (adumbrations)
<adumbratiens> it is
Though
nevertheless given as the object
ebject of
ef a reflective act, and as such
40
CONVERSATIONS
41
stream, of identifiable psychic states. Then, wonderfully, it constitutes geltende objects outside itself, for itself!
Earlier in the conversation, when, in fact, I first spoke of evidence, Husserl spoke, as often before, of the importance of the
phe1'10I11enOn of "Fortgeltung" (continuing acceptance, continuing
phenomenon
validity>, that what I hold valid today, or this minute, continues
in validity the next minute. Or can be returned to as valid.
The motivation through a critique of the Cartesian method oi
doubt was also mentioned as another, more historically bound
way to the transcendental Einstelirmg (attitude).
XXVI
Husserl had been thinking of the problem of what binds one when
one undertakes a "free" variation. The variation of the given
object is the traversing in phantasy of a range of possibilities. By
virtue of habituality we have the object given, not only as it is
but as standing under a genus, indirectly, as exemplification
of one of several species, subordinate to the genus. There is thus
a horizon of possibilities about each actuality. These given possibilities are, like the given actuality, essentially the deposits of
Urstifungen <primal institutions). As such they may be spoken
of as "factual" possibilities and are to be distinguished then from
the range of pure possibilities. Fink suggested that, since the pure
possibilities are not the deposit (Sedime-nt-iemng) of Urstiftungen,
we may speak of them as "innate". Husserl then said there was
nothing worse than a recourse to the innate.
Various other senses of possibility were considered during the
course of the conversation. Husserl spoke of the as yet nonactual future as the field of volit-icmal possibilities. He also considered the general relation of possibility to futurity, asking
whether all possibility were not really a temporal matter. A past
Possibility, it could have been otherwise than it was, is, for
Bxmple, given by a thinking back in time to the moment from
which the event in question was not actual, when there was still
3- Sfeitum <open range, scope) of possibility.
Again Husserl pointed out that the ego, the self, figures as being
42
couvnnsarrous
couvensarrons
in the world and acting in the world so as to determine the realization of certain possibilities. But the very constitution of the
world (phenomenological constitution) betrays at every step a
certain Interesstertne-it
Interessierthe-it (interestedness, interest) on the part of
the self, and a corresponding selectively.
Toward the end of the conversation Husserl pointed out to me
the general method of making coarse distinctions and rening
upon them. This he said was of general applicability.
Fink spoke to me alone of the Fornmte
Formals nnd
and Tmnszenztentale
Tmnszendentale
Logik as having been intended as an introduction to the Logtsche
Logische
Studien, but as having outgrown that function. The manuscript
Stndten,
of the Logische Stndten
Studrle-n is practically complete.
When Husserl was speaking of a horizon of possibilities about
the actual object of perception he took occasion to point out that
there were other sorts of horizons. One example was the horizon
of further determinations that the object would be experienced
as having in case it were to be seen from nearer or further away.
Another horizon is that of aspects which it would present if it
were turned around or if I went around it.
XXVII
43
(unauthentic) being.
I repeated to Husserl that Kaufmann had treated the phenomenological reduction as if it were primarily or exclusively a means
of getting an apodictically necessary realm of being. Husserl replied that this was rather an interpretation of the reduction. Of
course it had a grain of truth in it. But the apodicticity of the
transcendental consciousness is not the same as mundane apodicticity. He said that neither Heidegger nor Becker nor Kaufmarm
Kanfmarm
understood the phenomenological reduction. Of Heideggers analysis of the Se-in ales Setenafen
Seiendm (being of what exists) he said that
he was tempted to use Kant's title, of a Discovery Which Is
Supposed to Make the Transcendental Philosophy Unnecessary"
(?)*. But it is his conviction that the most important thing about
his whole philosophy is the transcendentalreduction. lie repeated
what Fink had told me before, that the phenomenological reduction is something which must be continually repeated in phenomenological work.
Fink observed that it (the following) had been a criticism based
upon the assumption that the search for apodicticity determined
the phenomenological reduction: Husserl sacrifices the most
fundamental for the sake of the most certain. Whereas of course
the we-tnes
we-nes Bewnsstset-n
Bewusstsei-n (pure consciousness) is likewise the most
fundamental, in that all other being is constituted in it.
I asked what he meant day before yesterday, when he spoke
of the Interesstertke-it
Interessiertize-it (interestedness, interest) of the ego playing a role in every Schick-t der Konstitnt-ion
Konstitut-ion (stratum of constitution).
tion>.
He began an analysis of givenness with its horizons. The l1oriZOTIS may be geweckt (awakened) or not. The Week-1-tn-g
zons
Week-1-m-g (awakening) is a matter of Habitual-itzit
Habitual-Mt (habituality>,
(habituality), of
oi I-nteressiertheit
I-nieressiertheit
<interestedness, interest>.
<interestcdness,
interest).
Husserl spoke of the paradoxical fact that though each individual consciousness, as made worldly, undergoes birth and death,
and though each particular society likewise comes into and goes
1 Ulnar
Uber zine Entdecfeung,
Entdecleung, mack tier nth:
ails new Kritik tier
de.=' reinen
rsimm Vcmuuft
Vcmunft dnrch cine
aim:
oc tare enlbekrtr-ck
entbekrh-ck gemeclit
gemocht rnerdem
warden sott,
soil, was Kants title.
44
CONVERSATIONS
45
i51'[1 has failed to remove the paradox. Idealists have seer: that
the transcendent must be somehow "in" the immanent; all of
them have maintained that for them reality in the ordinary sense
was not lost. But this claim has never been substantiated; they
have never shown how the transcendent is in the immanent. The
reason for this shortcoming is that idealists have never understood the nature of the phenomenological reduction. But when
this is understood, it is also understood in what sense the world
is constituted in consciousness. The human being himself, his
psyche included, is likewise constituted as phenomenon along
couvnnsanons
by the individual.
Husserl also spoke of the deeper sense in which the world is
innite: not only is the world as already "there" unlimited, but
through our new experiences, our new insights, our decisions, our
activity, new reality is being constantly and forever created.
46
transcendental constitution of man. Man as identical intentional
pole of various noemata of transccndcntally reduced "acts" directed to man the acts of self-perception, self-phantasying,
remembering, valuing, etc. which give "man" to the transcendental consciousness as a psychic (conscious, intentional, active
- knowing, willing etc.) "person" with a necessary relation to
"body," to a world and to other persons given him through
Einftihltmg (empathy). In principle then the answer is of the
same sort as the answer to the phenomenological question, "What
is the table? Only the intentional structure of the acts whose
objective sense refers to the ontic kernel man is more complicated than the intentional structure of the acts which mean the
"table".
All sciences which are not developed in the phenomenological
Eiustellung (attitude) are abstract sciences logic is abstract,
physics is abstract, descriptive anatomy is abstract. They are abstract because they abstract irom the subjective Leistmtg (production, performance) by virtue of which their subject matters
are there for the scientists. As abstract they are naive. Only
phenomenology is a concrete science - the concrete science. All
phenomenology is furthermore metaphysics.
Husserl pointed out that strictly we do not have the acts
(which are the acts of the man) in the phenomenological Einsteiltmg (attitude). The "acts" which we study are not anything
which can be posited, since they are neutralized.
Afterwards, when the conversation became more general (Frau
Husserl and Margaret came in), Husserl said that at the age of
within a given infinitude. These infinitudes it is our duty to examine with respect to their constitution.
To recur to the more general later remarks, I add that he said
he had early (at I3 or I4 P) rejected dogmatic religion.
The first philosopher he had ever read was Schopenhauer. In
his rst semesters at the university he had read Berkeley, and
remembers how he had defended Berkely against the other
students. Still he feels that Berkeley, for all his primitiveness, is
not taken seriously enough. ]3iichners42 Kraft mid Staff 1 which
13 or I4 he had been deeply concerned concerning religious questions not konfessionelle (confessional) questions, but such
questions as that as to the existence of God. (Earlier in the evening he had illustrated the hopelessness of gaining a radical understanding short of the phenomenological E-instelltmg had illustrated this by describing the progressive development of the conception of God. First many gods, and then one, but first and last
gods or God is in the world as are human beings, only unseeable.
God is conceived as more and more tenuous, is spoken of then 9.5
outside the world, but outside and inside are mundane conceptions and a being outside the world either means something
which is really a part of the world (inside it) or else is without
48
CONVERSATIONS
doctrine of evolution.
piricism and phenomenalism.
45 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), British philosopher, formulated an "evolutionist"
philosophy of nature.
*5 Wilhelm Max Wundt {1332rgzo), German psychologist, founder of the first
4" "I think that I think etc."
4- [?l
that there were others which, like it, seemed to lead to paralogisms.
50
CONVERSATIONS
under Husserl
I-lusserl in I926.
52 Zngrundegel:-an
Zngrundegei:-an nieans
Ineans ordinarily: to go to ruin, perisli, be shipwrecked or suffl
shipwreck. In :1a philosophical context, however, it can be used as meaning: to go 110
the basis or foundation (G1/amd)
{G1/imd) of something.
51
But in the end he holds these views of his own to be, like Hus5er1s optimism, unjustified by phenomenological investigations.
He spoke of the pathos of phenomenology as a philosophy subordinated to the ideal of cooperative labor toward a goal which
must be beyond the range of every finite and any finite
nite social
continuity. Every phenomenologist must always, qua phenomenologist, be able clearly to distinguish between his "scientific"
work and his personal speculations. Yet the Einzeluntersuchungm
(single, detailed investigations) of philosophy have in themselves
no sense, save as guided by the larger, "speculative" ideals. Philosophy is essentially a speculation inhibited by the urge to E1'nzeluntersuchu-ngen. Unless we assume a speculative urge, the painful
working over and over of seemingly trivial points which has occupied years of Husserls
Husserl's life, would be psychologically inexplicable as well as pointless.
pointiess. It is not always those who speak most
of "em'ste?tzielle
"exi'stenzie.Je Ergrffem'ieit" (existential state of being moved,
touched by something or someone) who are most ergriffen (moved,
touched).
XXX
52
CONVERSATIONS
executing acts that one can abide by. This means, on the one
hand, the constitution of an enduring world (of being, of values,
of purposes), on the other hand, a self-preservation of the individual who executes acts.
The higher levels of phenomenological analysis lead us to problems of phenomenological construction, the construction of phenomenological hypotkeses. These are, however, to be distinguished
from the undisciplined constructions of non-phenomenological
ness, e.g., in the cases of the study of the mind of the child or of
the study of death. Husserl also drew an analogy between phe-
nornenological hypotheses and the hypotheses of science as indicators of the line of further investigation.
Animals he characterized as Vorsiiifen dew Mensckheif (preliminary stages of mankind).
logic.
He emphasized the fact that reality is an eternal becoming, and
the constitution of reality is therein a continuous process, a
XXXI
XXXII
53
association.
This launched Husserl on an exposition of the nature of association, and of passivity in general. Every active comparison of
two objects presupposes a passive association of the two. In the
activity of following this association I may become aware of
similarity and difference. I asked whether one were to understand
the difference between activity and passivity as an absolute or
relative difference, and in trying to make myself clear I spoke of
the intensity of activity. Husserl said that there were such variations of activity as are indicated by the phrase striving, but that
one ought to be very careful in determining the place of striving in
relation to activity in general.
The difference between activity and passivity is present on the
level of perception. I am affected by certain things, they stimulate
me, and I answer them with an active attention. Before that the
objects are given as on the border (korizomfmriss-ig) of the active
54
CONVERSATIONS
constitution of the self-identity of a phase of inner time as abgeschatief (adumbrated) in a retention and a retention of the
first retention.
Hnsserl said that in the first place it must not he forgotten that
Husserl
the iirspr-iingiiches
W575?-iingiiches Zeitbcwicsstsein (original consciousness of time)
is a coiiiimmm,
coniimmm, and secondly that identity can never mean only
identity throughout phases of a continuum. Identity is essentially a quality only of intentional objects. There is no identity
in the flux.
{Apparently the answer to my question is that intentionality,
but not activity, is necessary to the constitution of identity. I had
been assuming unconsciously that it was the fact that the ego
meant the same object in two different Ersche-inimgeii
Ersche-immgen (appearances) of the object which constituted the identity of the obohject. But now it appears that Husserl
Husscrl considers the ego activity
non-essential thereto.)
l-Iusserl recalled his statement i11 the Ialeen,
Husserl
Irieen, to the effect that
Erieb-m'sse sckmften
sckmfrferi sick nickt
ii.-ickt ab"-55. The Irteen,
Ideen, he said, take no
account of the iirsprii-iigiiciies
ursprii-rigiiciies Zeitbewusstsein (original consciousness of time) in which Eriebiiisse
Eriebnisse (mental processes or occurrences)
are, through passive intentionality (retentionality), constituted
in a sense through Absckattimgen
Absckattungen (adurnbrations).
Later, Fink (Husserl we left at his house) pointed out the difference between the problem of identity throughout a series of
Urimpressionen (Dane-r) (originary impressions (durati0n))
Urimpressiomm
(duration)) and
the problem of identity throughout a series of retentional modifications (self-identity while sinking ever further into the past).
The former is at least a matter of qualitative Erfiiliimg (fulfilment) of protention.
He spoke of the constitution of
oi simultaneity and advanced the
view that there is nrspr-iin-giicke
rirspr-iin-giicke (original) sinlultaneity
simultaneity only
where the two hyletic
hylctic data koiifigiir-riereii
kO1t]'igt?"i6?6?t sick (are configurated).
The simultaucity
simultaneity of a tone and a color is a fiirtiier
fwtiier Leisiimg (production, performance) beyond the urspriingiiche
ursjzriingiiche Sim-iiltaneitdt
(Original simultaneity).
He pointed out the necessity of following the tirsprii-iigiickes
ursprii-ngiickes
Zeitbeteiissisein (original time-consciousness) through for all levels
Zeitbewiissisein
56
convnnsarrons
stratum.
Husserls use of a tone instead of a color as example of a constituted hyle is motivated by an awareness of the temporality
of a tone. But the reduction of the tone is not so clear as the reduction of the color, and again, the examples almost everywhere
else are visual rather than auditory.
He questioned the possibility of an adequate motivation to the
transcendental reduction, since in any case what is found is other
than what the natural man seeks.
Nevertheless he thought that the way from an explication of
the essence of man, with his essential boundness by the idea of
his own incompleteness, or his own shortcoming, was a better way
than Husserls preferred one from the idea of science.
XXXIII
XXXIV
XXXV
XXXVI
I asked what Fink would say to a person who agreed that phenomenology was the only truly scientific philosophy and who saw
that on this road he would never come to a solution of ethical
problems, but who, in spite of this, felt that he must attempt
some sort of solution of such problems.
5 Ludwig Lanclgrebe {born 1902}, studied and took his doctc-rs degree under
Hl-155BT1, was his assistant until 1930, edited Erfaimmg and Urteii, and collaborated
intimately and extensively with Husserl in ordering, transcribing and editing his
manuscripts,
58
convnnsarrons
XXXVII
Conversation with Husserl and Fink, 22/12]31
(I920 P) anwesend.P5"
5" E. Perl Welch {born 1905), American philosopher, author of works about Husserls philosophy.
5 William Tudor Jones (1865ro46), a Unitarian minister born in Wales, lecturer,
author of works about German philosophy.
Husserl has undertaken for many years, towards laying :1 solid foundation for a genl1'
ine psychology {a purely intentional psychology), further of a systematic, fundamel-31
work in which the method and problernaties of a phenomenological phil050PhY 5-T9
l-0 be set forth. Before that presmnably in Summer r932 --, a Gerrnan enlarged
"Was Mr. Tudor Joues present at the London Lecture of rgaz [1920 ?) ?" - In th
preface to his book, Contemporary Tkongka of Gernrrmy, Tudor Jones refers to rllies
6o
CONVERSATIONS
transcendental observer is already established before the phenomenological reduction, one is left with absolutely nothing, since
the acts in which the acts are given are reduced too, i.e., the acts
all become phenomena oi acts in which phenomena of acts are
intended. Husserl replied that he sought, in describing the steps
of the reduction, to show how, at the same time as the reduction
tial" problems have been of primary interest to him too. Nevertheless Schopenhauer and the earliest writings of Nietzsche
XXXIX
Crmversat-ion with Hassert and oz-hers, 26/I2/31'
One of a group at Husserls for Christmas asked him how he went
about it to write a book. Although he writes a tremendous amount
almost all day every day , the smallest part is written with any
book in mind. Rather is the product in the form of rneditat-ions
not destined for other eyes. After the pauses at noon or in the
6I
the previous working period anew, so that the manuscripts contain many repetitions. These meditations he reads over many
times, whenever the same subject arises again, and on re-reading
he often corrects the earlier manuscripts. The subjects of the
meditations are always determined by his own current interest,
which is largely undetermined by what interests other people.
Vifhen it is a matter of writing a book he brushes aside all these
manuscripts and writes freely and uninterruptedly, in a sort of
trance. Thus the Idem and the Form-ale and tmnszendentale
Logik were each written in six weeks. Certain additions to the
Idem were made in proof, and Husserl can see today that these
XL
Husserl said he has been working on the carrying out of a universal voluntarism. He objects to regarding such classifications
of acts as Brentano:-a as representing true iundamentai distinctions. Every act as carried out by the ego is a decision, a Bejnkung,
(affirmation) and there is furthermore a volitional aspect in the
background phenomena of the mind. There is a sort of Hintergrundsentsciieiriung (background decision>, which is not a full
ego-decision.
As elsewhere in phenomenology, so here the method is one of
description of the most obvious phenomena of the sort one is
interested in and Riickfmge (asking back, regressive inquiry) to
their constitution. Disregarding the phenomenological reduction
one may say that we live continuously in an already constituted
world of reality, and that we are continuously mixing into this
world, changing it, as a result of voluntary decisions. The world
or rather some part of it is given as really so-and-so. We decide to
make it otherwise. When we make such a decision the desired
state schwebt nor HMSEU as a practical possibility which by a vol-
62
couvnasarrons
63
XLI
men. Husserl said that although the phrase might have a good
confirmation).
XLII
empiriocriticism.
64
convnnsarrons
tution of objects. The child has, over and against the hyletic
flux, a more or less organized kinaesthetic flux which evinces
correlations with the kinaesthetic* flux. Though originally
uncontrolled, the kinaesthesia is essentially a subjective, volitional matter. What Husserl means by kinaesthesia is not the
bodily sensations accompanying movement or muscular tension, or the inner sensations, but rather something volitional or
quasi-volitional that remains when one abstracts from such sen-
XLIII
65
XLIV
Husserl would not let Fink and me come in, nor would he come
66
convansarrons
67
XLV
tween Vorsteitang and Weft-an sick (world-in-itself), the distinction is within a Vorstetinng, and the alleged We.-It-an-sick is a
XLVI
68
CONVERSATIONS
semble an ancestor who has died before the child's birth and of
whom he never hears directly or indirectly. This would seem
to be a direct awakening of that dead individuals tradition.
Husserl pointed out that these considerations were in themselves
merely indications for a direction in which one may work further,
through concrete analyses revealing essential possibilities and
XLVIII
Useful object
Spoiled object (useless)
Useless object
Law of absorption
Goods of utility
Laws of [P]
XLIX
Husserl said that what he had told me at our last meeting was
nt 0Cl- When I am tired I fall back into old ways of thinking."
7O
CONVERSATIONS
I told Husserl how Levinas'5*5 begins his book, namely by distinguishing between (I) the givenness of natural objects through
Absckattnn-g (adumbration), a fact which determines the kind of
being peculiar to natural objects, and (2) the givenness of acts
in reflection without the multiplicity of Abschaiiung, as objects
which have absolute being.
Husserl observed that omitting consideration of the Zeitbe~
rvnsstsein (time-consciousness) in the Ideen had been dangerous,
and that when one took into consideration the temporal modalizations of acts one had in deed something like Abschaitung, an identity throughout a multiplicity of disparate moments.
The thread of the conversation escapes me.
He spoke, however, of an idealization present in all scientific
description, an idealization which was a Log-ifiziemng (logicizing),
which brought in the infinite. I suggested that arithmetic as applied when I count, e.g., leaves, was not a11 idealization in the
same way that the application of geometry was. He replied that,
to be sure, the latter involved the notion of a limit, whereas that
was not the case with the application of arithmetic. However,
not every idealization involves the notion of a limit. The application of arithmetic is an idealization and involves the infinite.
Every one involves the infinite. (Infinite reiterability of the
this, and must inquire further.) He spoke of every finite object as
being primarily a limitation of the infinite, and of every free
variation as involving the infinite.
_\
-. .r_9,-'_-;
LI
71
Fink was absent - that he would study it through, but the book
LII
Husserl read to me from a stenographic manuscript on the constitution of natural objects in perception, primarily on their
constitution in visual perception. The first portion considered the
series of appearances of an object, as nearer or further away.
Each appearence of the object as further away is not only
H11 appearance of the object but also an appearance of the
3-Ppearance of the object as nearer. Thus there is, in the series in
question, an analogy with the series of temporal instants in in-
72
CONVERSATIONS
ner time, each of which is not only itself but also a retention of
each of its predecessors. The series of appearances of the object
has (I) a distant limit, beyond which the object no longer appears
at all, i.e., beyond which there are no more appearances, and (2)
a near limit, the limit of optimal clarity and distinctness. The
latter is a factual limit primarily, and not an ideal one. It is
conceivable that the object appear as still nearer, i.e., clearer,
than it does at the point where it is factually maximally clear.
Microscopes are instruments for bringing the object even "nearer".
Now all the appearances in such a series are appearances of the
object, and the object itself is the ideal to which they approach or shall we say that there is no object, no ideal limit? Husserl
rejects the latter, presumably because, as each appearance gives
itself as an appearance of, there is an object, not itself giveable in
the same way, but rather precisely as a Kantian ideal.
The second portion undertook to distinguish between objects
which are constituted in our immediate environment through
series of appearances as far and near, and objects which are
constituted without such variety in their appearances, e.g., the
heavenly bodies. We assimilate the latter to the type constituted
in our immediate environment, and think of a factually impossible
but conceivable approach (of the body to us, or of ourselves to the
body) which would give the body more clearly and distinctly
which would give it as nearer.* In the case of the sun, moon, and
planets, this approach is actually effected with telescopes.
A distant mountain is constituted for us in essentially the same
way; unless we go great distances, there is no change in the appearance, or rather no change of the sort which approach brings
about in the appearances of near objects. But still great distances
travelled (lo bring about such changes, and so here the important
.-_.,_.,. _
73
(as between red and blue, or between rough and smooth) ; hence
they may coalesce in an object. {It may be red and smooth in one
place, but not red and blue.)
LIII
Husserl had intended to go on with the manuscripts on the constitution of nature, but never got beyond the introductory remarks, because of my interruptions.
I asked him if it were not so that on the primordial level one
could carry out all the idealizations necessary to the constitution
of the region with which physical science deals. He questioned the
convnnsarrons
75
74
possibility of constituting infinite time on the primordial level.
The recourse to earlier and earlier memories brings a diminution
in the content, and moreover does not bring any guarantee that
we can go back without limit. Rather does the style of our life
indicate that there has been a finite number of Urstiftungm
(primal institutions). {Here I may be more precise than Husserl.)
Vtfhen we pass to the higher levels of intersubjectivity, first to the
LIV
level of contemporaries, then to the level of predecessors, we widen the temporal horizon of world-constitution. I objected that
this finite extension availed nothing i11 the way of gaining an infinite time. The whole thing remains obscure to me.
When talking about animals Husserl distinguished Menschew
tiers (man's animals), e.g., dogs and elephants, from e-igemtiiche
Tiers (authentic animals), as differing degrees of abnormality,
and spoke of a continuous decrease of the possibility of Einfiikiimg (empathy) as one descends the scale. I asked, VVhat
about plants? Can we say that we have Einfiililimg here, or is
the plant merely a special sort of pliysimi object, not a psychophysical? To begin with, replied Husserl, one must distinguish
two sorts of physical unities, those in which the form remains the
same but the material may change and those in which the identity
of material constitutes the unity. The latter is the fundamental
unity of physical science, the basis for its idealizations. Physical
science tries to explain unities of the other sort (I think Husserl
spoke of these as typical unities) according to causal laws of
the behavior of unities of the other sort. Plants are typical unities,
as are men and animals. I interpolated that a waterfall was also
a unity of the same sort, to which Husserl agreed.
In the end I got no clear idea whether l-lusserl thinks of plants
as limiting cases of Einfiililung, or not. Though he did say perhaps Leibniz was right in saying that the only conceivable being
was spiritual being, and that the things of the world are really
sleeping monads.
He also touched again on the problem of heredity, which I have
recorded in an earlier report.
ophy.
76
CONVERSATIONS
LV
tion, it may change its configuration (may grow, shrink, be distorted, divide), or change any one of its perceived qualities. But
we shall consider first the null state, unchangingness. As unchanging the objcct is perceived as having a surface and an inner. The
inner is not apparent {Ap1>m'enz), but is the possibility of the
73
CONVERSATIONS
79
schattimg of the movement of a visual object. But this is the possibility of a certain kinaesthetic flow.
Negatively, we may say that, but for kinaesthesis (changing or
constant), the hyletic flow would exhibit its own qualitative
changes but never possibly be grasped as A bschattn-rig of an ident-
however, not with the hyletic flow which is grasped as Absolutitimg of the object-appearance in question, but rather with the
hyletic flow which is grasped as A bscliattmig of the appearance
of my body, more particularly, with the change (in the Absc!iatdung of my bodily appearance) which is t.aken as the Absckattmzg
of locomotion. This latter connection gives ine the basis for grasping space as the continuum of loci my body can occupy, and then
as the loci of other things with reference to my body.
There are further steps that must be analyzed here. Indeed I
have tilled in the analysis so that here and there it is fuller than
Husserl gave it_
8o
convansarrons
in the case of the real object, of which the phansis is but an appearance). The possibility is left open that what is now a Derekgangsse-iemies <a transitional being) was, at some earlier genetic
era, a telos, i.e. that at that time e.g. constitution did not go
beyond the constitution of the phansis.
Husserl regards the present exposition as better than that in
Idem II, as it clearly shows the respective roles always played
by kinaesthesis and by the changes in hyle at all levels of constitution. Everything that "goes beyond" hyle we can attribute to
noesis, to mind.
After we left Husserl, Fink attacked Husserls tendency to
explicate the constitution of space purely as a function of the
spatiality of objects, and his neglect of all but solid bodies in his
analysis of nature air, and light especially. Space as the Spielnmm (open range) of bodies, their medium ("light as a medium
too?) is, says Fink, the condition for the spatiality of objects,
their loci and configurations. He spoke of Stills <stil1ness,
silence, quietness) as, analogously, the condition, the Spielmum
for sound. I gather that "Spe3mum in general, as openness to
perception of objects of a given region, l1e regards as the intentional correlate of the psychic state of being awake in some, or all
fields. (So we may say, perhaps, the blind man is visually asleep, though, if once he was not blind he may now dream
visually, i.e. phantasy visually while he is "awake", open to
impressions in other fields.)
LVI
Conversation saith Hassent, 2/6/32
Husserl asked me what I thought of the Entw-urf (draft) for the
Ist Meditation that I have been reading. The conversation took
the form of a discussion as to the relative value of a motivation
under the guidance of the ideal of science, as we find it phenomenologically the ideal of factual scientific activity, and [on the
other hand] a motivation under the guidance of the ideal of
Hedi.-l:al <radical) knowledge, as each individual may find it in
his own factual knowledge activity, whether or not he stands in a
81
82
convunsarrons
5-_l|u_
83
LVIII
84
convsnsarrons
P.M.
cal" with the way in which the retained and recollected past is
given. Whereas the past is given directly, the future is given in a
representation. The past is an intentional modification of a present; the future is an intentional modification of a past, i.e. a
phenomena of interest.
As basic mode of the flow of hyle, and of its simultaneous con-
'
'r
-"=-;:-* ;-'
1*. .
if I
85
time or space
concept of similarity. The change may be quite gradual, but nevertheless (in comparison with other processes?) more or less rapid.
e.g.
"pinkness"
or thus:
86
or several maximal
convnusarrons
_lL_|_|_
Here likewise we have an Abgehobe-nlzeit (outstandingness, salicncy, contrast).
Now, every Abgelzobe-nheit as such exercises an affective power
on the ego, in waking life. It commands interest. And every
Abgekobe-eke-it that is paired with it (all the other peaks) gains
likewise an affective power. Once it has gained that interest, it
receives thereby an accretion of power. In dreamless sleep the
passive constitution of A bgehoben-he-riten must be said to continue,
but the affective power of the Abgehobeu (what is made outstanding or salient) is lessenened or reduced to zero, so that only 3-
which they then receive, the sedimented details then come into
consciousness, until a timi-n-e they become intuitive, "presentative' '
memories. Whereas the process of sedimentation, of retention,
LX
83
couvessarrous
reading. Fink said Landgrebe was inclined to see passive constitution as absolutely passive, whereas the original time~constitution
must be regarded as an ego-activity in a wide sense of activity.
He mentioned this as a view of Kants also. Husserls recent manuscripts on Jebendiger Gegenwart (living present), he said, justify
this attitude.
Nevertheless, when Husserl joined us there was nothing in what
he said to strengthen Finks view; rather the contrary.
He went on with the theme of two days previous. The passively
constituted "object" exercises a "R-le (stimulus) upon the
ego, by virtue of the objects Abgehobmke-it (saliency, contrast),
etc. The ego is then, in the waking state, affected and replies with
an interest in the object. Just as two days ago he spoke of the
power of the stimulus, so today he spoke of the energy of the interest. This energy may vary in amount in various cogitationes.
It may in a given temporal stretch of a given cogito increase, in
another decrease. The interest may be modalized as a dropping
of the object from attention, which is a mode of still attending it.
In sleep the passively constituted "ob}ects still exercise their
stimuli, but the ego is not affected, and has no interest.
VVhen one tries to fall asleep one drops ones thematic interest,
diminishes the energy of interest as much as possible. (Thematic
interest operates as a principle of selection among the passively
associated Abgehobe-nkeiten which stimulate the ego, call its attention, when once the ego has paid attention to one among them.
The ego does not freely associate, but follows a line determined
by his dominant interest, attending only those associates which
are relevant to it. This is a further principle ~ beyond passive association ~ of affection.)
But letting one's "mind" wander, so far as possible thernelessly,
(and shutting out visual, tactual, auditory Abgehobenheiten by
lying still in a quiet place with closed eyes) is not enough to fall
asleep. VVhat more is needed?
Even more difficult is the problem of awakening. How, once
interest has sunk to null, and the ego is no longer affected, does it
ever awaken? (Husserl assumes, perhaps uncritically, that there
is an absoiute sleep.)
One factor in the situation, at least, has been unconsideredi
ego instincts, which possibly arise in the ego spontaneously (an <1,
89
LXI
90
CONVERSATIONS
QI
LXII
LXIII
93
CONVERSATIONS
sional manifold.
This extraordinary account awoke lively objections from both
Fink and me.
LXIV
Coiwersation with Husserl and Fink, I5/7/32
Husserl is inclined to give up calling the innertime constitution
"intentionality. Intentionality is ego-activity, either original or
modalized. The kinaesthetic processes are ego-activities, and every
transcendent objectivity, beginning with such things as patches
constituted oculomotorally are achievements of ego-activity.
Genetically these no longer grasped objectivities have grown out of
a stage in the development of consciousness when they were actually grasped. What Husserl calls secondary passivity is indeed a
modalization of active intentionality. The kinaesthetic process is
an ego-activity even when it is not a direct willing but a habit.
Ego-activity produces all objectification. In the activity of reflecting, the innnanent sphere and pre-world objectivities become objectified, have conferred upon them identity and being.
In the activity of tmascemicntal reflection the immanent has conferred upon it transcendental being; the already objectied
worldly and preworldly receive a modication of their being, as
phenomenal. But the reflection itself receives being only when it
becomes the object of another reflection.
The stream oi immanent time, original "now" and retained
93
LXV
Fink outlined the problem of the mundanization of phenomenology. Essentially phenomenology is a product of the transcendental subject, whereas science in the ordinary sense is a product of
the mundane subject. Yet phenomenology necessarily appears
as the product of the mundane subject.
Scientific activity in the ordinary sense is directed upon absolute knowledge as a goal, but achieves and can achieve only
relative knowledge, subject to further correction according to the
further development in time of the irrational element essential to
mundane facticity, and according to the corresponding extension
oi the factual society of scientists. This es.=:e-ntimf relativity is lacking in the case of phenomenological science-.*
Yet it has its place where it "appears" in a culture, and in the
life of the individual phenomenologist. In spite of the fact that
no mumdane motivation is adequate to the transgressing of the
world that takes place in the transcendental reduction, and in
the asking back into transcendental constitutional horizons (as
opposed to mundane horizons).
The problem then receives clarification through the clarification of the essential transcendental necessity of the transcendental ego coming to self-consciousness (i.e. developing phenomenology, which is the achievement of the transcendental subject) in
and through a mundane subject, just as first it necessarily loses
itself in the world which it creates a11d alone in the creating of
which lies its own transcendental being.
Husserl had contributed to the above the exposition of the
94
convnnsnrrons
95
lem also of telepathy as a conceivable or inconceivable phenomenon is a problem for the future.
In general, the solid results at any level of phenomenological
science open up horizons of future problems, concerning which we
often cannot decide whether they are genuine or absurd, but to
the rationally motivated rejection of which as absurd or the rational formulation of which, a way is clearly indicated by the
present solidly established results.
LXVI
96
CONVERSATIONS
there. The situation of a person who is awake and can hear but
hears nothing is, e.g., different from that of a person who is
asleep. He does not interpret the difference between waking and
sleeping as a difference in ability on the part of sensations to
reach the conscious consciousness, but rather as a difference between presence and absence of sensation, whether conscious or
unconscious. (The sleeping person is not a person oblivious to
what his ears tell him, but a person whose ears tell him nothing.)
This seems to me to be contrary to empirical evidence.
the eidos, but cuts the already constituted eidos free from the
rest of the concretion. The latter he regards as always individual.
He rejects the idea of a concrete eidos.
But in the case of ideation exercised on transcendental consciousness, he considers the activity as strictly creative of the
eidos. This seems to me part of his more general theory that there
is no I/orgegebenheit (prior givenness) of transcendental consciousness. Which I doubt.
He has been developing in his Entwnrf (draft) for the Sixth
zlfeditat-1'0-n a program of phenomenology of the transcendental
observer. How does the transcendental observer, who "springs
full armed from the transcendental reduction, get its "arms",
its reason, its logic, its ability to explicate the transcendental
phenomenon and the world-constituting ego? It takes them over
from the latter, but they are employed by the latter in constituting and knowing the world. Yet the transcendental observer
uses them not at all to constitute, and employs them to know not
the world but the world phenomenon and the transcendental ego
that posits the world. What about this change? And the problem
of the transcendental observer's habituality?
Husserl himself probably intended in this Sixth 1/Ieditation
rather to criticize the evidence of recollection and other methods
of transcendental reflection. But this belongs in the transcendental Elementariehre (elementary theory) (the theory of the world
phenomenon and the transcendental ego as positing it) rather than
to the theory of the transcendental observer.
Fink has long been working on a Hegel interpretation, particularly of the youthful works, couched in Fichtean-Schellingian
language but with a new content.
LXVII
sees that the object itself is, in its being and determinations, corre-
98
CONVERSATIONS
Q9
this in the case of the auditory horizon, where the mere "container he calls Stills (stillness, sile11ce> and contrasts it with
Lani (sound) and Laullosigkeit" (soundlessness> as positive
and negative contents.
Ad Coiwersalion with Husserl, 25/Io/32: Speaking of the realists
contention that one can regard all knowledge as hypothetical,
Husserl said that every hypothesis presupposes a non-hypothetical foundation outside itself. If I have an hypothesis that the spatiotemporal world stretches beyond the hie et nunc, the latter,
this bit of ground I stand on now, is no hypothesis but an evident
certainty.
LXVIII
I00
CONVERSATIONS
IOI
I02
CONVERSATIONS
APPENDIX
Newspapers.
Epoche and Epoch.
Hartmannl immer sogar als Phanomenologe angesehen.
Sehr gescheite Vorlesun g. Alles hineingenommen. Nicht besucht.
Utitzs auch Brentanos SCl'llllEI".
Sympatisch. Andere.
lnnenminister(?).
Fragen.
Frl. Stein 69 hat vieles ausgesehrieben.
Rainer
Spatere Arbeit - ob es publiziert sein wird?
War lang bei Landgrebe.
Heidegger. Hat den II. Band der Ideen (Husserl wusste nicht,
wo es war) nicht genau studiert, sonst hatte er nicht solche Einwan de (gemacht).
Schwierigkeiten der Meditations Cartsiennes: besonders 5.
Meditation. Appartenance" auf Deutsch (Eigenheit). Nicht gerade fur das deutsche Publikum bestimmt. Fink arbeitet an der
deutschen Bearbeitung. Hat das eine Manuskript.
5" Edith Stein (1891-1942), studied and took her doctor's degree under Husserl,
was his assistant from 1916 until 1913, prepared (among other things) the text of
Voriesungsn zur Pllanomenologie ass inneren Z.-a-ilbewusslssins (later published under
the editorial responsibility of M. Heidegger}.
104
APPENDIX
Weitere Untersuehungen.
Husserl hat Sche1ersche und andere Biicher seiner Horer gelesen.
Niemeyerm pessirnistisch. 200 Abbonierte ~ oder 300?
Weitere Zeitvorlesungen zu publizieren.
Ieh bin fr den 25. eingeladen.
Husserl 24 jane.
lie er gezwu ngen war, imlner Lan dkarten zu rnachen, und hat
die einzelnen Untersuclmngen nicht ausarbeiten und ver6ffentlichen konnen. Wollte den ersten Band. der Ideen sogar nicht
publizieren.
II
Conversation with Husserl, 25/6/31
Kant
deutscher Idealismus
Mill
Kiilpell hat zu Husserl einmal gesagt, wir tun nichts anderes
als die Log-ischen U-ntersnch-angen studjeren. Darnals war Bi'1h1er?2
sein Assistent unrl war dabei. Jetzt gibt er diese Abhngigkeit
nicht zu.
i{raus73 behauptet, class Brentano die Logisehen Untersnehnngen nie gelesen habe. Dagegen hat Brentano I909 (?) mit Husserl
lmllptsiichliell ber die Logischen Un-tersnehiingen gesproehen.
Aueh hat Utitz Husserl gesagt, dass Brentano aueh spiter (I913 ?)
APPENDIX
I05
lasses unbefriedigt.
Es wiire moglieh, von der Psychologie ans zu einer transzendentalen Phinomenologie zu kommen. U.a. muss ich die Beziehung zwischen Phinomenologie und Psychologie studieren.
Heidegger viel gelehrter als Husserl, aber man muss den ende-
gischen Untersnchangen.
Lebensentscheidung: Galilei. (Explanation, August 30, I940:
who decide for it now will have a place in history analogous to that of
III
I06
APPENDIX
mythos.
Stuart Cl1aniberlain'l4. Ernstere Studenten studieren Heidegger.
jetzt studiert er sein Publikum und bercksichtigt es in seinen
Schriften.
Das hat or abcr in der Formalen und transzendentalen Log-ih noch
nicht getan_
Frher hat er fr er weiss nicht wen geschrieben.
Cassire1"75 nicht (mehr) produktiv. Keine Gcfahr.
H 7 Houston Stuart Chamberlain (r88519za], English author, formulated a racist
th'331"Y , which was iufltlential upon Ila/.i ideology.
*5 hrnst Casslrer (1374-1945), German philosopher, one of the chief representatives
of the neo-1-zantian trend.
APPENDIX.
I07
Dutch Heidegger spricht der Erdgeist". Seine Art (ist), immer ursprnglichere Bedeutungen durchklingen zu lassen: Wortzauberci. Wortentartung: Ent-fernun g.
Hat Heidegger auch neulich (fr seine Vortrage) genau studiert.
Becker hat sehr interessantes (und verstandnisvolles bis zu
einem gewissen Grade) in den Kant-Studien ber Husserl geschrieben . 75
Hat kurz nach dern Kricg in Frankreich und England gespro-
chen.
Icleen zu eincr reinen Phanomenologie und pharmmenolngischen Pliilosophie, 2nd vol. (known by
Cairns only in manuscript form), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952 (Husscrliana vol. IV).
Philosophie als strange Wissenschaft, Logos I
(Io: 1), pp. 289-341 (re-edited Frankfurt am Main:
Klosterinann, 1955).
rr)5o).
Logos article
Time lectures
Logih
Nijhoff, 1974).
French Meditations
Vrin, 1947).
German Mfeditations
1'
~
Hergesheimer, Joseph, 9
Vvertheimer, Max, 9
Whitehead, Alfred North, Io
Fundt, Wilhelm, 48
\Velch, E. Parl, 53
Levinas, Emmanuel, 7o
Locke, 7, I04
Mach, Ernst, 45
McGill, Vivian jerauld, 50
Mill, johrl Stuart, 68, 104
INDEX OF NAMES
Aristotle, 5, 75f.
Augustine, 71
Avenarius, Richard, 6 3
Becker, Oskar, :f., 4, 43, 1o5f.
Berkeley, 47, 104
Brentano, Franz, I0, 61, 1o4f.
Biichner, Ludwig, 47
Biihler, Karl, 104
Cassirer, Ernst, 106
Chamberlain, Stuart, 106
Descartes, 71, 104
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 9
Dostoievsky, 35
Eckehart [Meistcr], 91
Einstein, Albert, 100
Fichte, 22, 37, 96, 106
Galileo, 105
Gelb, Adhmar, 9
Gorgias, 71
Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich, 48
I-Iartmann, Nicolai, 103
Hegel, 22, 25, 5o, 52, 96f.
Heidegger, Martin, 4i., 9, I6, 18, 25,
28., 42f., 63, 89, Io3.
Heraclitus, 75
Hume, 30, 4o, 104
Husserl, Malvine, 8, 10, 46
Huxley, Aldous Leonard 9
Illeman, \Verner, go
_]ames, Wliam, 1o, 36, 63
Kant, 15, 22, 37, 43, 45, 88,98, 104
Kauimann, Fritz, 2, 425., I05
Kierkegaard, 25
Kraus, Oskar, 1041'.
Explication (Auslsgung), 54
Finitude, 47
99
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
ego-a., 92f.
461 83
II2
9?"'99
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
finify. 97~Qs
84$.
II3
36
Teleology, 51f.
Ternporalization (Ze!1'gm1g), 90; t. of
the ego, 34; double t. of the stream
of mental processes (Eebnisstrom),
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Retention, 87
Science: abstract character of s.s, 46;
scientific knowledge, 75{., goals oi
scientic activity, S1, 93; relativity
of mundane s., 93f.
Sedimentation, S7
Selfapperception, 59
Sensation: cf. Hyle; fields oi s.s, 14f.,
84-87; sensory field as the lowest
level of constitution, 2of.; openness
of consciousness to s., 95f.
Similarity: origin of the concept of s..
Simultaneity, 55
Skepticism, 71, 75f.
Sleep, 19, 37, 8Si., 96; dreamlcss s., Sol.
Space, 17f., 4gi.; infinite s., 15; oculomotoric s., 2oi., 24.; s., (mental) objectivation of s., orientation-s., 66f.
s. as open range, So
Stimulus {Ruiz} : cf. Affection
Subject: cf. Ego, Consciousness
Synthesisi cf. Activity. Association,
Passivity
Technic: t. and culture, Sf.