Shaftesbury - Sensus Communis, An Essay On The Freedom of Wit and Humour)

An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour
a letter to a friend
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury
Copyright 20102015 all rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small dots enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates
the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are
reported between brackets in normal-sized type.This work is the second of the five Treatises in Shaftesburys
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Its title fits less than half its content; there are all sorts of
other good things on offer here.
First launched: March 2011.
Freedom of wit and humour
Contents
Part I
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
1
2
3
4
5
6
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1
1
1
2
3
5
6
Part II
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
8
12
13
Part III
Section
Section
Section
Section
15
15
16
18
20
1
2
3
4
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Part IV
22
Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
glossary
affection: In the early modern period, affection could mean
fondness, as it does today; but it was also often used to
cover desires, approvals, likings, disapprovals, dislikings,
etc. In this work it is mainly used to refer to pro-feelings,
but the negative ones may be hovering in the background.
animal spirits: This stuff was supposed to be matter that is
even more finely divided than air, able to move extremely fast
and seep into tiny crevices. and (this being Shaftesburys
point on page 4) continuously active. his other mentions of
spirits in this work are to mental items.
education: In early modern times this word had a somewhat
broader meaning than it does today. It wouldnt have been
misleading to replace it by upbringing on almost every
occasion
formality: On page 6 this refers to intellectual conduct that
is stiff, rule-governed, prim.
generous: It had todays sense of free in giving but also
the sense of noble-minded, magnanimous, rich in positive
emotions etc.
genius: Sometimes used to mean nothing much more than
intellect; more often meaning (the possessor of) very highlevel intellect. In early modern times genius wasnt given
the very strong meaning it has today.
humour: In ancient Greek medicine it was held that the
human body contains four basic kinds of fluid (humours),
the proportions of which in a given body settled that persons
physical and mental qualities. By the early modern period
this theory was dead; but the use of humours to refer to
bodily states, character-traits, moods, lingered on. In the
present work (including its title), Shaftesbury uses the word

mainly in our present sense.
imposture: Willful and fraudulent deception.
luxury: This meant something like: extreme or inordinate
indulgence in sensual pleasures.
magistrate: In this work, as in general in early modern
times, a magistrate is anyone with an official role in government; the magistrate usually means the government or
the ruler. The magistracy is also just the government, or
the collective of all the senior officials in the government.
mixed company: On page 6 Shaftesbury uses this to mean
company comprising people of different backgrounds or
characters, not in its more usual sense of company containing both men and women.
moral: In early modern times, moral could mean roughly
what it does today, but also had a use in which it meant
having to do with intentional human action. On page 25 its
use is even broader than that: Shaftesbury is saying that the
beauty and significance of fine works of art comes from their
bearing on the human conditionhow they affect peoples
feelings and thoughts.
passive obedience: The doctrine that anything short of or
other than absolute obedience to the monarch is sinful.
peculiar: Individual, pertaining exclusively to one individual.
On page 27 the requirement that a work of visual or literary
art not contain anything peculiar or distinct means that it
is not to have any features that mark off what is represented
in a highly individual way that would, Shaftesbury thinks,
be distracting.
performer: In early modern times, a performance could

be the writing of a book, the composing of an opera, or the
like. The performers referred to on page 25 are poets and
composers rather than actors and singers and violinists.
popular: It means of the people; in early modern times it
seldom means liked by the people.
prince: As was common in his day, Shaftesbury uses prince
to mean ruler or chief of government. It doesnt stand for
a rank that would distinguish prince from king or indeed
from commoner.
principle: In a few places Shaftesbury uses this word in
a once-common but now-obsolete sense in which it means
source, cause, driver, energizer, or the like.
raillery: Good-humoured witty ridicule or teasing, done with
a light touch. Engaging in raillery is rallying.
science: In early modern times this word applied to any
body of knowledge or theory that is (perhaps) axiomatised
and (certainly) conceptually highly organised.
selfish: In the paragraph It is the height of wisdom. . .

on page 20 Shaftesbury is using the word to mean merely
self-ish, i.e. self-related or concerned with ones own
interests. Most of his uses of the word make it mean also
. . . to the exclusion of proper care for the interests of others.
speculation: This has nothing to do with guess-work. It
means an intellectual pursuit that doesnt involve morality.
ethics is a practical discipline, chemistry is a speculative
one.
vice, vicious: Morally wrong conduct, not necessarily of
the special kind that we reserve vice for these days, or the
different special kind that we label as vicious.
vulgar: Applied to people who have no social rank, are
not much educated, and (the suggestion often is) not very
intelligent.
wit: This often meant about the same as intelligence; but in
Shaftesbury and some other writers it usually carries some
suggestion of todays meaninge.g. in the works title and
in the link on page 1 between wit and raillery.
I/2
Part I
Section 1
viewed in order to evaluate them thoroughly is ridicule itself,

i.e. the form of test through which we discover whatever is
vulnerable to fair raillery in any subject.. . . .
So I want you to know fully what my views are regarding
this, so that you can judge whether I was sincere the other
day in defending raillery, and can still plead for those able
friends of ours who are often criticised for their humour of
this kind, and for the freedom they take in this airy way of
conversing and writing.
When in conversation the other day I spoke in defence of

raillery [see Glossary], you were surprised; and I have been
thinking about why. Is it possible that you have supposed
me to be such a grave [= solemn] person that I would dislike
all conversation of this kind? Or were you afraid that if you
put me to the test by the use of raillery I would fail?
I must confess that you had reason enough for your
caution if you thought me to be basically such a true zealot
that I couldnt bear the least raillery on my own opinions. I
know there are many people like that. Anything that they
think is grave or solemn must, they hold, be treated only in
a grave and solemn way; though they dont mind treating
differently anything that others thinkthey are eager to try
the edge of ridicule against any opinions except their own.
Section 2
Seriously, thinking about how this species of wit is sometimes employed, and how excessively some of our contemporaries have been using it lately, one may be a little confused
and unsure what to think of the practice or where this
rallying frame of mind will eventually take us. It has passed
from the men of pleasure to the men of business. Politicians
have been infected with it, so that grave affairs of state have
been treated with an air of irony and banter. The ablest
negotiators have been known as the most notable clowns;
the most celebrated authors have shown themselves as the
greatest masters of burlesque.
There is indeed a kind of defensive raillery (if I may so
call it) which I am willing enough to allowin affairs of any
kindwhen the spirit of inquiry would force a discovery of
more truth than can conveniently be told, and the raillery is
a device for heading off inquiry. In some contexts the worst
harm we can do to truth is to discover too much of it. Its the
same with understandings as with eyes: for a given size
and structure just so much light is necessary, and no more;
Is it fair for them to take this attitude? Isnt it just and

reasonable to handle our own opinions as freely as we do
other peoples? To be sparing with our own opinions may be
regarded as a piece of selfishness. We might be accused of
willful ignorance and blind idolatry, for having taken opinions
on trust and consecrated in ourselves certain idol-notions
that we wont allow to be unveiled or seen in day light. [For
idol notions see Bacons New Organon, aphorism 1:39.] The items
that we carefully tuck away in some dark corner of our
minds may be monsters rather than divinities or sacred
truths; the spectres can impose on us if we refuse to turn
them every way and view their shapes and complexions in
every light. Something that can be shown only in a certain
light is questionable. Truth, they say, can stand any light;
and one of the principal lights. . . .by which things are to be
1
anything beyond that brings darkness and confusion.

It is real humanity and kindness to hide strong truths
from tender eyes. And it is easier and more civil to do this by
pleasant humour than by a harsh denial or by remarkable
reserve [= by conspicuously buttoning your lip]. But to work at
confusing men by creating mysteries, and getting advantage
or pleasure from the perplexity you are throwing them into
by such uncertain talk, is as mean when it is done through
raillery as when it is done with the greatest seriousness in
a solemn attempt to deceive. It may still be necessary, as
it was long ago, for wise men to speak in parables with a
double meaning, so that the enemy will be confused and only
those who have ears to hear will hear. [This echoes Matthew 13:9
I/3
company; there are only a few signs of it in the country; and

it seems at last to have been restricted to the schools, as
the chief entertainment of teachers and their pupils. Other
kinds of wit will also improve in our hands, and humour
will refine itself, as long as we take care not to tamper
with it and hold it down by severe discipline and rigorous
prohibitions. Everything that is civilised in conversation is
due to liberty: we polish one another, and rub off our corners
and rough sides by a sort of friendly collision. To restrain
this is inevitably to cause mens understandings to rust. It
is to destroy civility, good breeding, and even charity itself,
under a pretence of maintaining it. [Here charity seems to mean,
roughly, kindness.]
where Jesus, after presenting a parable, says Who hath ears to hear, let
But it is certainly a mean, impotent, and dull sort

of wit that confuses everyone and leaves even ones friends
unsure what ones real opinions are on the topic in question.
This is the crude sort of raillery that is so offensive in good
company. And indeed theres as much difference between the
two sorts of raillery as between fair-dealing and hypocrisy,
or between the most genteel wit and the most scurrilous
clowning. But this illiberal kind of wit will lose its crediti.e.
will be exposed for the low device that it isby freedom of
conversation. That is because wit is its own remedy; its true
value is settled by free trade in it; the only danger is setting
up an embargo. The same thing happens here as in the case
of trade: tariffs and restrictions reduce trade to a low ebb;
nothing is as advantageous to it as a free port.
We have seen in our own time the decline and ruin of a
false sort of wit that delighted our ancestors so much that
their poems and plays, as well as their sermons, were full
of it. All humour involved some sort of play on words; the
very language of the royal court was full of puns. But now
such word-play is banished from the town and from all good
him hear.]
Section 3
To describe true raillery would be as difficult and perhaps as
pointless as defining good manners.
Shaftesburys next sentence: None can understand the spec-
ulation, besides those who have the practice.

meaning: To understand what true raillery is, you have to
know how to engage in it. To understand what good manners

are, you have to be well-mannered.
Yet everyone thinks himself well-mannered; and the most
dry and rigid pedant imagines that he can rally with a
good grace and humour. I have known cases where an
author has been criticised for defending the use of raillery
by some of those grave gentlemen who at the same time
have constantly used that weapon themselves, though they
had no gift for it. I think this can be seen in the case of
many zealots who have taken it upon themselves to answer
our modern free-writers [= writers who are free-thinkers = writers
who are atheists or anyway dont shrink in horror from atheism]. When
2
these severe gentlemen, with the grim look of true inquisitors,

condescend to leave their austerity and deal in a joking and
pleasant manner with an adversary whom they would prefer
to treat very differently, they dont do it gracefully. To do
them justice, Im sure that if they had their way their conduct
and tone would be pretty much the same all through; they
would probably give up occasional farce and stay with
continuous tragedy! But as things are, theres nothing so
ridiculous as the two-faced performance of writers who with
one face force a smile and with another show nothing but
rage and fury. Having signed up for the tournament and
agreed to the fair laws of combat by wit and argument, they
have no sooner tried their weapon than you hear them crying
aloud for help and delivering their adversary over to the
secular arm. [That is a joke. At some times and places, when a court of
I/4
current, their answers to them can hardly make their way

into the world or be taken the least notice of. Pedantry and
bigotry are millstones that can sink the best book if it carries
the least part of their dead weight. The temperament of the
pedagogue doesnt suit the times, and the world may be
willing to learn but it isnt willing to be tutored. When a
philosopher speaks, men hear him willingly as long as he
keeps to his philosophy. A Christian is heard as long as
he keeps to his professed charity and meekness. And in
a gentleman we allow of joking and raillery as long as it is
managed with good manners and is never crude or clownish.
But if a mere academic scholarimpersonating all these
characters and in his writings bouncing back and forth from
one to anotherappears over-all to be as little able to keep
the temperament of Christianity as to use the reason of a
philosopher or the raillery of a well-mannered gentleman, is
it any wonder if the monstrous product of such a jumbled
brain strikes the world as ridiculous?
If you think, my friend, that by this description I have
done wrong to these zealot-writers in religious controversy,
just read a few pages in any one of them. . . .and then
pronounce.
some Church found a person guilty of a crime for which it was unwilling
or legally unable to enforce punishment, it would ask the secular arm
of government to do the punishing.]
There cant be a more preposterous sight than an executioner and a clown acting their part upon the same stage! But
Im convinced that anyone will find this to be the real picture
of certain modern zealots in their controversial writings. They
are no more masters of solemnity than they are of good
humour, always running into harsh severity on one side
and awkward buffoonery on the other. Between anger and
pleasure, zeal and joking, their writing is about as graceful
as the play of cantankerous children who at the same instant
are both peevish and wild, and can laugh and cry almost in
the same breath.
Theres no need for me to explain how agreeable such
writings are like to be, and what effect theyll have towards
winning over or convincing those who are supposed to be
in error! Its not surprising to hear the zealots publicly
lamenting the fact that while their adversaries books are so
Section 4
Now that I have said this much about authors and writings,
youll hear my thoughts (which you asked for) on the subject
of conversation, and especially a recent free-ranging conversation that I had with some friends of yours whom you
thought I should have very solemnly condemned.
It was, I must admit, a very entertaining conversation,
despite its ending as abruptly as it did and in a confusion
that almost annihilated everything that had been said. Some
details of this conversation oughtnt to be recorded on paper,
3
I think. It will be enough if I remind you of the general

lines of how the conversation went. Many fine schemes
were destroyed; many grave reasonings were overturned:
but because this was done without offence to the parties
concerned and with improvement to the good humour of
the company, it gave us a still keener appetite for such
conversations. And Im convinced that if Reason herself
were asked to judge how her own interests fared in this
conversation, she would answer that she received more
advantage in the main from that easy and familiar way
of conversing than from the usual stiff adherence to one
particular opinion.
Perhaps you are still in the frame of mind of not believing
me to be in earnest about this. You may continue to tell me
that I am merely trying to be paradoxical when I commend as
advantageous to reason a conversation that ended in such
total uncertainty concerning things that had seemingly been
so well established.
I answer that according to my notion of reason, one cant
learn how to use it from the written treatises of the learned
or from the set lectures of the eloquent. The only way
someone can be made a reasoner is through the habit of
reasoning. And men can never be better invited into the
habit than when they find pleasure in it. Now, the only way
for such speculative [see Glossary] conversations to be at all
agreeable is for them to have
a freedom of raillery,
a liberty in decent language to question everything,
and
permission to unravel or refute any argument without
giving offence to the arguer.
The fact is that conversations on theoretical matters have
been made burdensome to mankind by the strictness of the
laws laid down for them, and by the prevailing pedantry and
I/4
bigotry of those who reign in them and assume themselves

to be dictators in these provinces.
The ancient the satirists complaint in poetryMust I
always be only a listener?is an equally natural complaint
in theology, in morals, and in philosophy. Taking turns is a
mighty law of discourse, and mightily longed for by mankind.
In matters of reason, more is done in a minute or two of
question and reply than is achieved by hours of continuous
discourse. Orations are fit only to move the passions; and
the power of rhetoric is to terrify, exalt, enchant or delight,
rather than to satisfy or instruct. A free conversation is a
close fight, compared with which the other waythe lecture
or orationis merely a waving of weapons in the air. So
being obstructed and manacled in conferences, and being
restricted to hearing orations on certain subjects, is bound
to give us a distaste for those subjects, making themwhen
managed in that wayas disagreeable to us as the managers
are. Men would rather reason about trifles if they can
reason freely and without the imposition of authority than
reason about the best and most useful subjects in the world
when they are held under restraint and fear.
And its no wonder that men are generally such weak
reasoners who dont much care for strict argument in conversations on minor topics, given that theyre afraid to exert
their reason in greater matters, and are forced to argue
feebly in contexts where they need the greatest activity and
strength. What happens here is like what happens in strong
and healthy bodies that are debarred from their natural
exercise and confined in a narrow space. They are forced
to use odd gestures and contortions. They have a sort of
action; they do still move; but they do it utterly ungracefully.
That happens because the animal spirits [see Glossary] in such
sound and active limbs cant lie dead, i.e. unemployed. And
in the same way the natural free mental spirits of clever
4
I/5
Section 5
men, if they are imprisoned and controlled, will discover

other ways of acting so as to relieve themselves in their
constraint. . . .
I really think that thats why the ancients exhibit so little of

this spirit, and why in all the writings of the more polished
ages theres hardly a sign of mere burlesque or anything like
it. Their treatment of the very gravest subjects was indeed
somewhat different from ours: their treatises were generally
written in a free and familiar style; they chose to represent
real discourse and conversation by treating their subjects in
the manner of dialogue and free debate. . . . The usual wit
and humour of their real discourses appeared in the ones
that they composed; and this was fair, because without wit
and humour reason can hardly be tested, or be identified as
such. The magisterial voice and high strain of the pedagogue
commands reverence and awe; it is admirably fitted to keep
understandings at a distance and out of reach; whereas the
other manner gives the fairest hold, and allows an antagonist
to use his full strength hand to hand, on level ground. . . .
If men are forbidden to speak their minds seriously on

certain subjects, theyll do it ironically. If they are forbidden
to speak at all on such subjects, or if they think it really
dangerous to do so, they will then redouble their disguise,
wrap themselves in mystery, and talk in such a way that
theyll hardly be understood. . . .by people who are disposed
to do them harm. Thus raillery comes more into fashion,
and goes to extremes. The persecuting spirit has aroused
the bantering one; and lack of liberty may account for the
lack of true civilisedness, and for the corruption or wrong
use of joking and humour.
[In the next sentence, the italicised words come from the Latin urbs
If in this respect we go beyond

the limits of what we call urbanity and are apt sometimes to
behave in a buffooning rustic manner, we have the ridiculous
solemnity and sour mood of our pedagogues to thank for this;
or, rather, they can thank themselves if they in particular
meet with the heaviest of this kind of treatment. For it will
naturally fall heaviest where the constraint has been the
severest. The greater the weight is, the more bitter will be
the satire. . . .
= city and rus = countryside.]
But some gentlemen are so full of the spirit of bigotry

and false zeal that when they hear principles [see Glossary]
examined, sciences and arts inquired into, and matters of
importance treated with this frank kind of humour, they
quickly conclude that all the professions must collapse,
all establishments come to ruin, and nothing orderly or
decent be left standing in the world. They fearor say they
dothat religion itself will be endangered by this free way
of discussing things; so they are as much alarmed by this
liberty when it occurs in private conversation and under
prudent management as if it were crudely used in public
company or before the most solemn assembly. But I see the
situation very differently. For you have to remember, my
friend, that I am writing to you in defence only of the liberty
of the clubthe sort of freedom that is employed among
gentlemen and friends who know one another perfectly well.
To see that this really is so, look at the countries where

spiritual tyranny is highest. The greatest of buffoons are the
Italians. In their writings, in their freer sort of conversations,
on their stages and in their streets buffoonery and burlesque
are in the highest vogue. Its the only way the poor cramped
wretches can express a free thought. We have to concede
that they are better than us at this sort of wit. And its not
surprising that we who have more liberty are less nimble in
that gross kind of raillery and ridicule?
5
I/6
That it is natural for me to defend liberty with this restriction

can be inferred from the very notion I have of liberty itself.
Section 6
It is surely a violation of the freedom of public assemblies

for anyone to take the chair without having been called or
invited to it. To raise questions or steer debates that offend
the public ear is to be lacking in the respect that is due to
common society. In public such subjects should be treated
either not at all or in a manner that doesnt lead to scandal
or disturbance. The public is not on any account to be
laughed at to its face, or scolded for its follies in such a
way that it thinks it is being treated with contempt. And
what is contrary to good manners in this way is equally
contrary to liberty. Coming across as superior to the
vulgar [see Glossary] and as despising the multitudethats
the conduct of men of slavish principles [Shaftesburys phrase].
Men who love mankind will respect and honour gatherings
and societies of men. And in mixed company [see Glossary],
and in places where men have unselectively come together
for amusement or for business, it is an imposition and a
hardship to force them to hear what they dislike, and to
discuss matters in a dialect that is unfamiliar to many of
them. Its a breach of the harmony of public conversation
to say things in a way that is above the common reach and
silences others, robbing them of their turn. But in private
society. . . .where friends meet knowingly, and with the actual
intention of exercising their wit and looking freely into all
subjects, I see no basis for anyone to claim to be offended at
the way of raillery and humour, which is the very life of such
conversationsthe only thing that makes good company,
and frees it from the formality of business and the tutorial
dogmaticness of the schools.
To return now to our argument. If the best of our modern

conversations are apt to be chiefly concerned with trifles;
if rational discourses. . . .have become discredited and disgraced because of their formality [see Glossary]; then theres
all the more reason to allow humour and gaiety. An easier
way of treating these subjects will make them more agreeable
and familiar. Disagreeing about them will be like disagreeing
about other matters; they neednt spoil good company, or
detract from the ease or pleasure of a civilised conversation;
and the oftener these conversations are renewed the better
will be their effect. Well become better reasoners by reasoning in a pleasant and relaxed fashion, taking up or laying
down these subjects, as we please. So I admit that I cant be
scandalized by the raillery that you took notice of, or by its
effect on our company. The humour was agreeable, and the
pleasant confusion in which the conversation ended pleases
me as I look back on it, when I realise that instead of being
discouraged from resuming the debate we were so much the
readier to meet again at any time and disagree about the
same subjects, perhaps even with more ease and satisfaction
than before.
As you know, we had been occupying ourselves for a
long time with the subject of morality and religion. Among
different opinions presented and maintained with great life
and ingenuity by various participants, every now and then
someone would appeal to common sense. Everyone allowed
the appeal, and was willing to have his views put to that
test, because everyone was sure that common sense would
justify him. But when the hearing was conductedthe issue
examined in the court of common senseno judgment could
be given. This, however, didnt inhibit the debaters from
renewing the appeal to common sense on the next occasion
6
when it seemed relevant to do so. No-one ventured to call
I/6
one sect regards as an inconceivable mystery is easy

for another sect to grasp; what is absurd to one is
rigorously proved for another.
(2) As for policy: there is equally a question as
what sense or whose sense could be called common.
If plain British or Dutch sense is right, Turkish and
French sense must be very wrong. And although
passive obedience [see Glossary] strikes us as mere
nonsense, we have found it to be the common sense
of a large party among ourselves, a larger party in
Europe, and perhaps the greatest part of all the world
besides.
(3) As for morals; the difference is still wider, if that
is possible. Setting aside the opinions and customs
of the many barbarous and illiterate nations, and
attending only to the few nations that have achieved
literature and philosophy, even they havent yet been
able to agree on one single system, or acknowledge the
same moral principles. And some of our most admired
modern philosophers, even, have told us flatly that
virtue and vice have no other law or standard than
mere fashion and vogue.
the authority of the court into question, until a gentleman

whose good understanding had never been brought in doubt
very gravely asked the company to tell him what common
sense was. he said:
If by the word sense we understand opinion and
judgment, and by the word common we mean what
is true of all mankind or of any considerable part of it,
it will be hard to discover what the subject of common
sense could be! For anything that accords with the
sense of one part of mankind clashes with the sense
of another. And if the content of common sense were
settled by majority vote, it would change as often
as men change, and something that squares with
common sense today will clash with it tomorrow or
soon thereafter.
But despite the different judgments of mankind on most
topics, it was thought by the members of our conversational
group that they agreed on some. The question then arose
as to what those subjects were. The questioner said:
It is thought that any topic that matters much will be
in the categories of (1) religion, (2) policy [here = abstract
political theory] or (3) morals.
(1) Theres no need to say anything about differences in religion; the situation is fully known to
everyone, and feelingly understood by Christians, in
particular, among themselves. They have taken turns
in applying rigorous tests to one another. When any
party happened to have the power of the state, it
did everything it possibly could to make its private
sense the public one; but it never succeededand
common sense was as hard to pin down as catholic
or orthodox when these are taken as general terms,
not the names of two branches of Christianity. What
It might have seemed unfair in our friends if they had treated

only the graver subjects in this manner, and allowed the
lighter ones to escape; for our follies in the gayer part of
life are as solemn as our follies in the most serious. The
fault is that we take the laugh only half-way: we ridicule
the false pronouncement but leave uncriticised the false
joke, which becomes as utterly deceitful as the other. Our
entertainments, our plays, our amusements become solemn.
We dream of happinesses and possessions and enjoyments
regarding which we have no understanding, dont know
anything for certain; and yet we pursue these as though
they were the best known and most certain things in the
7
world. Theres nothing so foolish and deluding as a partial

scepticism; for while the doubt is cast only on one side, the
certainty grows so much stronger on the other. While only
one face of folly appears ridiculous, the other grows more
solemn and deceiving.
But thats not how things stood with our friends. They
seemed better critics, and more intellectually able and fair
II/1
in their way of questioning accepted opinions and exposing

the ridiculousness of things. If youll allow me to continue in
the tone they adopted, Ill conduct an experiment: theres a
way of going about things that you thought made assured
knowledge impossible and introduced endless scepticism;
I want to discover whether by proceeding in that very same
way we can get that assured knowledge back.
Part II
Section 1
common dress of the Europeans, happens to see someone

with no mask and in his normal clothing; and this makes him
laugh as much as ever. By a silly presumption he is taking
nature for mere art, and mistaking a sober and sensible man
for one of those ridiculous amateur actors! Isnt he making
himself ridiculous by carrying the joke too far?
If an Ethiopian were suddenly transported into Europe and

placed either in Paris or Venice at a time of Carnival, when
almost everyone wears a mask, he would probably be at a
loss for some time until he discovered the cheat; because at
first it wouldnt enter his head that a whole people could be so
wild as to agree at an appointed time to transform themselves
by changing their clothing and wearing masks and making
a serious solemn practice of deceiving one another by this
universal confusion of characters and persons. He might
at first have looked on this with a serious eye, but once he
discovered what was going on hed have found it hard to keep
a straight face. The Europeans might laugh back, mocking
his simplicity. But our Ethiopian would have better reason
for laughter. Its easy to see which of the two would be more
ridiculous: someone who laughs and is himself ridiculous
bears a double share of ridicule. But then this might happen:
Our Ethiopian, still in fits of laughter with his head full of
masks, and knowing nothing of the fair complexion and
[In this paragraph and the next, Shaftesbury is talking about (i) ways
in which truth has been disguised in terms of (ii) the wearing of masks
and fooling around at Carnival. Sometimes he uses the language of (ii)
There was a
time when men were accountable only for their actions and
behaviour [Shaftesburys phrase]. Their opinions were left to
themselves. They were free to differ in these, as in their
faces! everyone acquired the manner and look that was
natural for him. But in the course of time it came to be
thought decent to correct mens faces and to make their
intellectual complexions uniform and of one sort. Thus
the magistrate [see Glossary] became a dresser, and after he
had given up his power to a new order of clothiers, he in
when really he is talking only about (i); read alertly!]
turn was dressed as he deserved! But although. . . .it was

agreed that only one manner of dress was correct, and only
one particular manner of behaving to which all people must
conform, the misery was that neither the magistrate nor the
clothiers themselves could settle which of the various styles
and manners was the exactly true one. Imagine now what
the effect must be when men came to be persecuted from
all sides about their manner and appearance, and had to
struggle and improvise in attempts to adjust and compose
their facial expressions according to the right mode; when a
thousand patterns of dress were current, and kept altering
according to fashion and the mood of the times! Judge
whether mens faces werent likely to show strain, and the
natural face of mankind distorted, convulsed, and made
hardly recognisable.
But although the general face of things has been made
unnatural or artificial by this unhappy concern for dress and
over-tenderness for the safety of complexions, we mustnt
be led by this to think that all faces are alike besmeared
or plastered, that its all a matter of rouge and varnish,
or that the face of truth is any less beautiful under all
the counterfeit faces that have been put on her. We must
remember the Carnival: what has led to this wild jumble
of people, who started it, and why men were pushed into
this pastime. We may have a good laugh at the original
deception, and if pity doesnt stop us we can have fun at
the expense of the folly and madness of those who are thus
caught and manipulated by these impostures [see Glossary].
But we should remember our Ethiopian, and beware lest by
taking plain nature for a mask we become more ridiculous
than the people we are ridiculing. Now, if a misplaced joke
or ridicule can lead the judgment so far astray, its probable
that an excess of fear or horror may have the same result.
II/1
[The Magi referred to here are mythical creatures with magical powers who are supposed to have created a kingdom in Persia (here called
Asia). When Shaftesbury compares them with the Knights Templars
whom he calls a body of conjurers he is expressing his contempt for
If, my friend,
you had chanced to live in Asia at the time when the Magi
by a wicked imposture got possession of the empire, no
doubt you would have detested that act; and it might have
happened that the very persons of the men, after all the
cheats and abuses they had committed, became so odious to
you that you would have seen them killed with as relentless
an eye as our later European ancestors saw the destruction
of the Knights Templarsa similar body of conjurers who
had almost become an over-match for the civil sovereign.
Your indignation might have led you to propose the razing
of all monuments and memorials of those magicians. You
might have resolved not to leave so much as their houses
standing. But if it had happened that these magicians when
they were in power had made any collection of books, or
written any themselves, treating of philosophy, or morals, or
any other science [see Glossary] or branch of learning, would
you have carried your resentment so far as to destroy
these also and to condemn every opinion or doctrine the
Magi had espoused, simply because they had espoused
it? Hardly a Scythian, a Tatar, or a Goth would act or
reason so absurdly. Much less would you, my friend, have
carried out this. . . .priest-massacre with such a barbarous
zeal. Seriously, destroying a philosophy out of hatred for a
man shows thinking as wildly barbaric as murdering a man
in order to plunder his wit and get the inheritance of his
understanding!
the supposed magic powers of the supposed Magi.]
I must admit that if all the institutions, statutes, and regulations of this ancient hierarchy, the Magi, had resembled
the basic law of the order itself, it might have been right to
9
suppress them, for one cant read that law of theirs

a Magus must be born of a mother and her son
without some abhorrence. But the conjurers (which is
what they were, not magicians) thought that their principles
should look as good as possible to the world so as better
to conceal their practice; so they found it to be highly in
their interests to accept some excellent moral rules and to
establish the very best maxims of this kind. They may have
thought at the outset that it would be to their advantage to
recommend the greatest purity of religion, and the greatest
integrity of life and manners. Perhaps they also preached up
charity and good-will. And they may have presented to the
world the fairest face of human nature and, together with
their laws and political institutions, have interwoven the
most honest morals with best doctrine in the world.
So how should we have behaved towards them? How
should we have carried ourselves towards this order of men
at the time of the discovery of their cheat and ruin of their
empire? Should we have started to work instantly on their
systems, struck indiscriminately at all their opinions and
doctrines, and erected a contrary philosophy in defiance
of them? Should we have attacked every religious and
moral principle, denied every natural and social affection,
and made men as much like wolves to one another as was
possible for them, while describing them as wolves and
trying to make them see themselves as far more monstrous
and corrupt than with the worst intentions it was ever
possible for the worst of them to become? No doubt youll
think that this would have been a very preposterous line to
take, which could have been followed only by mean spirits
1
II/1
who had held in awe and overfrightened by the Magi.

Yet an able and witty philosopher of our nation was
recently so possessed with a horror of this kind that he
directly acted in this spirit of massacrewith respect both
to politics and to morals.1 The fright he got from seeing the
then-governing powers, who had unjustly taken authority
over the people, gave him such a horror of all popular
[see Glossary] government, and of the very notion of liberty
itself, that to extinguish it for ever he recommends the
extinguishing of books, and urges princes [see Glossary] not to
spare so much as an ancient Roman or Greek historian. Isnt
this in truth somewhat gothic? And doesnt our philosopher
look rather like a savage in treating philosophy and learning
in the way the Scythians are said to have treated Anacharsis
and others as punishment for having visited the wise of
Greece and learned the manners of a civilised people?
His quarrel with religion was the same as his quarrel
with liberty: the events during his lifetime gave him the
same terror of each. All he could see were the ravages of
enthusiasm [here = fanaticism] and the tricks of the people
who created and then steered that spirit. And this good
sociable mansavage and unsociable as he tried to make
himself and all mankind appear by his philosophyexposed
himself to great hostility during his life, and took great
pains that after his death we might be spared the kinds of
events that led to these terrors. He tried to show us that
Both in religion and in morals we are imposed on
by our governors; there is nothing which by nature
inclines us either way, nothing that naturally draws
us to the love of anything beyond ourselves;
Hobbes, who expresses himself thus: By reading these Greek and Latin authors, men have from their childhood fallen into a habit (under a false
show of liberty) of favouring riots, and of licentiously controlling the actions of their sovereigns. (Leviathan II.21). By this reasoning, it should follow
that there can never be any riots or deposing of sovereigns at Constantinople, or in the Mughal empire. In other passages he expresses his view about
this destruction of ancient literature in favour of his Leviathan hypothesis and new philosophy.
10
although his love for such great truths and sovereign maxims
as he imagined these to be made him the most laborious of
all men in composing systems of this kind for our use; and
forced him, despite his natural fear, to run continually the
highest risk of being a martyr for our deliverance.
So let me head off your anxieties and assure you that
theres no such mighty danger as we are apt to imagine from
these fierce prosecutors of superstition, who are so down
on every religious or moral principle. Whatever savages
they may appear to be in philosophy, they are in their
ordinary lives as civilised as one could wish. Their freedom
in communicating their principles is a witness on their
behalf: its the height of sociableness to be friendly and
communicative in that way.
If their principles were concealed from us and made a
mystery, they might indeed become considerable [= become
something that we had to reckon with]. Things are often made
considerable by being kept as secrets of a sect or party;
and nothing helps this more than the hostility and anxiety
of a contrary party. If hearing maxims that are thought
to be poisonous immediately pushes us into horrors and
consternation, were in no state to use the familiar and easy
part of reason that is the best antidote. The only poison to
reason is passion, for false reasoning is soon corrected when
passion is removed. But if merely hearing a philosophical
proposition is enough to move us into a passion, its clear
that the poison already has a grip on us and we are effectively
prevented from using our reasoning faculty.
If it werent for prejudices of this kind, why shouldnt we
entertain ourselves with the fancy of one of these modern
reformers we have been speaking of? What should we say to
one of these anti-zealots who, with all the zeal of such a cool
philosophy, should earnestly assure us:
II/1
You are the most mistaken men in the world, to

imagine that theres any such thing as natural faith
or justice. What is right is determined by force and
power. Theres no such thing in reality as virtue; no
principle [see Glossary] of order in things in heaven or
on earth; no secret charm or force of nature by which
everyone is made to work willingly or unwillingly
towards public good, and is punished and tormented
if he does otherwise.
Isnt this the very charm itself? Isnt the gentleman at this
instant under the power of it? The next paragraph is what
we could say to him.
Sir! the philosophy you have condescended to reveal to
us is most extraordinary. We are indebted to you for your
instruction. But please tell us: this zeal of yours on our
behalfwhere does it come from? What are we to you? Are
you our father? And even if you were, why this concern for
us? Is there then such a thing as natural affection? If not,
then why all this industry and danger on our account? Why
not keep this secret to yourself? What good does it do you to
deliver us from the cheat? The more that are taken in by it,
the better. Its directly against your interests to undeceive
us, and let us know that you are governed only by private
interest, and that nothing nobler or broader should govern
us whom you converse with. Leave us to ourselves and to
that notable art by which we are happily tamed and made as
mild and sheepish as we are. Its not fit that we should know
that by nature we are all wolves. Is it possible that someone
who has really discovered himself to be a wolf should work
hard to communicate such a discovery?
11
Section 2
II/2
an implicit faith. But if each of us supposes all the others

to be by nature outright savages, well take care to come
less into one anothers power; and, taking it that everyone
is insatiably hungry for power, well build better defences
against the evil of malign powernot by putting everything
into one hand (as Hobbes, the champion of this cause,
wants us to do), but on the contrary by a proper division
and balance of power, and by the restraint of good laws and
limitations that can secure the public liberty.
You may want to ask me Do you really think these
gentlemen are fully convinced of the principles they so often
advance in company? My answer is as follows (it runs to the
end of the paragraph). I wouldnt absolutely question the
gentlemens sincerity, but there is something of a mystery
about their conduct, more than has been suspected. Perhaps
the reason why men of wit delight so much in espousing
these paradoxical theories is not that they are fully satisfied
with them, but that they want to make a better job of
opposing some other theories whose fair appearance has
helped (they think) to bring mankind under subjection. They
think that by the general scepticism that they want to
introduce theyll better deal with the dogmatic spirit that
prevails in some subjects. And when they have accustomed
men to putting up with being contradicted and hearing the
nature of things being argue over in a general way, it may
be safer (they conclude) to argue separately about certain
matters of detail over which they arent quite so well satisfied.
From this you may get a better sense of why in conversation
the spirit of raillery prevails so much, and notions are taken
up for no reason except that they are odd and out of the way.
In reality, my friend, theres nothing to frown at here, when

were being challenged to defend common honesty by fair
honest gentlemen who are so different in practice from how
they want to appear in theory. I know that some people
are knaves in notion and principle as well as in practice:
they think all honesty as well as all religion is a mere
cheat, and so in consistency they have resolved deliberately
to use whatever force or skill they have for their private
advantage. But men like that never open themselves in
friendship to others. They have no such passion for truth,
or love for mankind. They have no quarrel with religion or
morals, but they know what use to make of both when the
opportunity arises. If they ever reveal their principles, it is
never intentionally; they are sure to preach honesty, and go
to church.
On the other hand, the gentlemen whose side I am taking
cant be called hypocrites. They speak as ill of themselves
as they possibly can. If they have hard thoughts of human
nature, its still a proof of their humanity that they give such
a warning to the world. If they represent men as being by
nature treacherous and wild, they do this out of care for
mankind, to help them not to be caught easily through being
too tame and trusting.
Impostors naturally speak the best of human nature, to
make it easier for them to manipulate it. These gentlemen
whom I am defending, on the other hand, speak the worst;
and they would rather be censured along with the rest than
allow a few impostors to prevail over the many. Its the
opinion that men are good that makes it easy for them to
trust one another; and its through trust that we are betrayed
and put at the mercy of power, with our very reason being
captured by those in whom we have gradually come to have
12
Section 3
happened in morals. Not satisfied with showing the natural advantages of honesty and virtue, men have actually
lessened these in order (they thought) to advance another
foundation for virtue. They have made virtue such a
mercenary thing, and have talked so much about its rewards,
that one can hardly tell what there is in virtue that is worth
rewarding; for theres not much honesty or value in being
bribed or terrified into behaving honestly. . . .
But, speaking for myself, I have no worries about this

sceptical kind of wit. Men may in a serious way be so pushed
and puzzled by different ways of thinking, different systems
and schemes imposed by authority, that lose all notion or
comprehension of truth. I can easily grasp the effect that awe
has over mens understandings. I can very well suppose men
may be frightened out of their wits, but I dont see that they
can be laughed out of them! I can hardly imagine that in
pleasant conversation they should ever be talked out of their
love for society, or reasoned out of humanity and common
sense. Wit framed by good manners cant hurt any cause or
interest that I care about; and philosophical speculations,
managed in a civilised way, surely cant ever make mankind
more unsociable or uncivilized. Thats not the direction from
which I can expect an invasion of savageness and barbarity.
What I have found is that virtue never suffers as much from
being contested as it does from being betrayed. My fear
is not so much from virtues witty antagonists, who give it
exercise defending itself, as from its tender nurses, who are
apt to smother it in blankets and kill it by their excess of
care!
If the love of doing good is not in itself a good and right

inclination, I dont know how there can possibly be such a
thing as goodness or virtue. And if the inclination is right, we
are perverting it if we think of it solely in terms of the reward
for it, conceiving such wonders of the grace and favour that
virtue will bring, when so little is shown of the intrinsic worth
or value of the thing itself.
Im almost tempted to think that the true reason why
some of the most heroic virtues have so little notice taken of
them in our holy religion is that if they had been entitled to a
share of the infinite reward that providence has by revelation
assigned to other duties there would have been no room
left for disinterestedness. [This seems to mean: there would have
been no reward left over for disinterestedness, but Shaftesbury cant have
meant that, because it is too obvious that an infinite reward is not an
I have known a building that was tilting in one direction

and was then so thoroughly fixed that it leaned and fell
in the opposite direction. Something like that may have
2
II/3
Private friendship and (ii) zeal for the

public and for our country are purely voluntary virtues for a
Christian.2 They arent essential parts of his charity. He isnt
exhaustible quantity.] (i)
No fair reader can think that by private friendship I mean the common benevolence and charity that every Christian is obliged to show towards all
men, and in particular towards his fellow-Christians, his neighbour, his brother, his more or less closely related kindred; but the special relation that
is formed by a consent and harmony of minds, by mutual esteem, and reciprocal tenderness and affectionwhat we emphatically call a friendship.
Thats what there was between the two Jewish heroes that I shall mention shortly, whose love and tenderness surpassed that of women (2 Samuel, ch.
1). Such were the friendships, described so often by poets, between Pylades and Orestes, Theseus and Pirithous, and many others. Such were those
between philosophers, heroes, and the greatest of menbetween Socrates and Antisthenes, Plato and Dion, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Cato and
Brutus. . . . And such there may have been more recently, and perhaps even in our own age, though envy prevents the few examples of this kind from
being mentioned in public. [This very long footnote continues with Shaftesburys response to critics of what he has said about the status of friendship
in the system of Christian virtues, a response based largely on what the learned and pious Bishop Taylor wrote in his Treatise of Friendship.]
13
so tied to the affairs of this life; nor is he obliged to involve

himself in this lower world in ways that wont help him to
acquire a better world in the after-life. His real concerns
are in heaven, and he has no occasion for any extra cares or
embarrassments here on earth that may obstruct his way to
heaven or hold him back in the careful task of working out
his own salvation. But if any portion of reward is reserved
hereafter for the generous part of (ii) a patriot, or that of (i) a
thorough friend, this is still behind the curtain and happily
concealed from us, so that we may be the more deserving of
it when it comes.
It seems indeed that in the Jewish scheme of things each
of these virtues had its illustrious examples, and was in some
manner recommended to us as honourable and deserving
to be imitated. Even Saulwho is presented to us as a bad
princeappears to have been respected and praised, before
his death and after, for his love of his native country. And
the remarkable love between his son Jonathan and his
successor David gives us a noble view of a disinterested
II/3
friendship, at least on one side. But the heroic virtue of these

persons had only the common reward of praise attributed to
it, and couldnt claim a future reward under a religion that
didnt teach any future state and didnt present any rewards
or punishments except this-worldly ones in accordance with
the written law.
And thus the Jews as well as the heathens were left to be
instructed by their philosophy in the sublime part of virtue,
and induced by reason to do what they had never been
commanded to do. No premium or penalty being enforced
in these cases, the disinterested part stood alone, the virtue
was a free choice, and the magnanimity of the act was left
entire. Someone who wanted to be generous, had the means
to do so. Someone who fully wanted to serve his friend or
his country, even at the cost of his life,3 could do it on fair
terms. his sole reason was that Dulce et decorum estit was
inviting and becoming, or sweet and fitting. It was good
and honest. And Ill try to convince you that this is still a
good reason, and one that squares with common sense. . . .
Perhaps, says the holy apostle Paul, for a good man some would even dare to die (Romans 5:7) He judiciously supposes this to belong to human
nature; though he is so far from basing any precept on it that he introduces his private opinion with a very dubious perhaps.
14
III/1
Part III
Section 1
So our poet seems to be not so immoderate in his censure

if we take him to be criticising the heart rather than the head.
Reflecting on the education [see Glossary] that a court will offer
he thinks its not likely to raise any affection towards a
country. He sees young princes and lords as the young
masters of the world: being indulged in all their passions,
and trained up in all sorts of licentiousness, they have a
thorough contempt and disregard of mankind. (And mankind
in a way deserves this, when it permits arbitrary power and
adores tyranny!). . . .
A public spirit can only come from a social feeling, or
a sense of partnership with human kind. Now, there are
none so far from being partners in this sense, or sharers
in this common affection, as those who scarcely know an
equal and dont regard themselves as subject to any law of
fellowship or community. That is how morality and good
government go together. Theres is no real love of virtue
without the knowledge of public good; and where absolute
power is, there is no public.
Those who live under a tyranny, and have learned to
admire its power as sacred and divine, are perverted as
much in their religion as in their morals. According to their
way of thinking, public good isnt the standard or rule of
government for the universe any more than it is for the state.
They have almost no notion of what is good or just other than
what mere will and power have determined. Omnipotence,
they think, would hardly be omnipotence if it werent free to
dispense with the laws of fairness and change the standard
of moral rectitude just as it pleased.
But despite prejudices and corruptions of this kind,
there clearly is still something of a public principle [see
The Roman satirist Juvenal may be thought more than

ordinarily satirical when, speaking of the nobility and the
court, he is so far from allowing them to be the standard of
politeness and good sense that he makes them in a way the
reverse: Common-sense is rare in men of that rank. Some
of the ablest commentators, however, interpret this very
differently from how it is ordinarily understood: they give
the poets common sense a Greek derivation through which
it stands for
a sense of public good and of the common interest;
love of the community or society, natural affection,
humanity, obligingness, or the sort of civility that
comes from a sound sense of the common rights of
mankind and the natural equality there is among
those of the same species.
And if we think carefully about this, it must seem rather hard
or unkind in the poet to have denied wit or ability to a court
such as that of Rome, even under a Tiberius or a Nero. But
it didnt take any deep satire to question whether humanity
or a sense of public good and of the common interest of
mankind was properly the spirit of a court! It was hard to
see what community there was among courtiers; or what
public there was containing an absolute prince [see Glossary]
and his slave-subjects. As for real society, there couldnt
be any between people whose only sense of good was their
sense of their own individual welfare. [Shaftesbury attaches to
this paragraph an enormous footnote giving details of the battles among
the commentators on how that line of Juvenals should be understood.]
15
Glossary], even where it is most perverted and depressed.

The worst of governmentsthe despotic kindcan show
sufficient instances of zeal and affection towards it. Where no
other government is known, a despotic government usually
receives the allegiance and duty that is owing to a better
form. The eastern countries and many barbarous nations
have been and still are examples of this kind. The personal
love they bear their prince [see Glossary], however severe he is
towards them, may be evidence of what a natural affection
mankind have towards government. If men really have no
public parent, no magistrate in common to cherish and
protect them, they will still imagine they have one; and
like new-born creatures who have never seen their mother
they will imagine one for themselves, and (as if prompted
by nature) apply for favour and protection to something of
about the right shape. Lacking a true foster-father and chief,
they will follow a false one; and lacking a legal government
and just prince, they will obey even a tyrant, and endure a
whole series of tyrants in the same family line.
As for us Britons, thank heaven, we have a better sense
of government passed down to us from our ancestors. We
have the notion of a public, and a constitution; and how
a legislature and an executive should be structured. We
understand weight and measure in these matters, and can
reason soundly about the balance of power and property.
The maxims we draw from our reasoning are as evident
as conclusions in mathematics. Our increasing knowledge
shows us every day, more and more, what common sense is
in politics: and this is bound to lead us to understand a like
sense in morals, which is the foundation of politics.
It is ridiculous to say that theres an obligation on man
to act sociably or honestly in a formed government but not
in what is commonly called the state of nature. To put it
in the fashionable language of our modern philosophy:
III/2
Society being founded on a compact, the surrender

that every man makes of his private unlimited right
into the hands of the majority, or whoever is appointed
by the majority, is freely chosen and based on a
promise.
Now, this promise was made in the state of nature; and
whatever can make a promise obligatory in the state of
nature must make all other acts of humanity as much our
real duty. . . . Thus faith, justice, honesty, and virtue must
all have been as early as the state of nature, or they could
never have been at all. The civil union or confederacy could
never make right or wrong if right and wrong didnt exist
already. Someone who was free to perform any villainy before
his contract will and should dispose as freely of his contract
when it suits him to do so. . . .
A man is obliged to keep his word.
Why?
Because he has given his word to keep it.
What a striking account of the origin of moral justice and
the rise of civil government and allegiance!
Section 2
But setting aside these complaints against a philosophy that
says so much about nature and means so little, we can
surely accept this as a principle:
If anything is natural in any creature or any kind
of creature, its whatever tends to preserve the kind
itself and conduces to its welfare and support.
If in original and pure nature it is wrong to break a promise
or to be treacherous, it is as truly wrong to be in any respect
inhuman, or in any way lacking in our natural part towards
human kind. [Those last seven words are Shaftesburys.] If eating
and drinking are natural, so is herding [i.e. coming together in
16
a herd].
If any appetite or sense is natural, so is the sense

of fellowship. If theres anything natural in the affection
between the sexes, the affection towards the consequent offspring is equally natural; and so again between the offspring
themselves, as kindred and companions brought up under
the same discipline in the same household. Thats how a
clan or tribe is gradually formed, a public is recognised; and
besides the pleasure found in social entertainment, language,
and conversation there is such an obvious necessity for
continuing this good set of relationships that having no
sense or feeling of this kind, no love of country, community,
or anything in common, would be the same as having so
sense even of the most obvious means of self-preservation
and the most necessary condition of self-enjoyment.
I dont know how the wit of man could puzzle away at
this and come up with the answer that civil government
and society are a kind of invention, a skilful contrivance.
My own view is that this herding principle, this inclination
to associate, is so natural and strong in most men that its
violence might easily be blamed for much of the disorder that
has arisen in the general society of mankind.
Universal goodthe interests of the world in generalis a
kind of remote philosophical object. That greater community
(the world in general) is hard to see; and the interests of a
nation or of a whole people or body politic arent easy to get
hold of either. In smaller groups men can know one another
personally, they can get a better taste of society, and enjoy
the common good and interests of a smaller public. They
see right across and around their community, and see and
individually know those whom they serve, and know what
the purpose is of their associating and working together. All
men naturally have their share of this drive to come together;
and those whose faculties are the most lively and active have
such a large share of it that unless it is properly directed
III/2
by right reason it cant find things to do in such a remote

sphere as that of the body politic at large. For here one may
not even know by sight one in a thousand of those whose
interests are concerned. No visible band is formed, no strict
alliance; the relations are all with different persons, orders,
and ranks of mennot men that one meets and talks to, but
men of whom one has some idea according to the general
view or notion of a state or commonwealth.
Thus the social aim is disturbed for lack of definite scope.
The virtue of feeling what others feel and working together
is apt to get lost for lack of direction in such a wide field.
And the passion for herding together is nowhere as strongly
felt or vigorously exerted as in actual joint action or war,
in which the highest geniuses [see Glossary] are often known
to be the readiest to take part. That is because the most
generous [see Glossary] spirits are the most combining: they
delight most to move in harmony with others, and feel (if I
can put it this way) in the strongest manner the force of the
confederating charm.
Its strange to think that war, which of all things appears
the most savage, should be the passion of the most heroic
spirits. But its in war that the knot of fellowship is pulled
tightest. Its in war that mutual help is most given, mutual
danger run, and common affection most exerted and employed. For heroism and philanthropy are almost the same
thing. To turn a lover of mankind into a ravager, a hero and
deliverer into an oppressor and destroyer, all it takes is a
small misguidance of the affection.
Hence other divisions amongst men. Hence, blocking
peace and civil government, the love of party and of subdivision by cabal. For sedition is a kind of cantonizingi.e.
splitting into sub-groupsthat has already begun within
the state. When a society grows vast and bulky, it is natural
to cantonize; and powerful states have found that sending
17
III/3
onesare true men of moderation. They have too much

self-knowledge and self-control to be in danger of entering
warmly into any cause or engaging deeply with any side or
faction.
colonies abroad brings other advantages than merely having

elbow-room at home, or extending their dominion into distant
countries. Vast empires are unnatural in many respects, but
especially in the fact that in such an empire, however well
it is constituted, the affairs of many must be in the hands
of very few; and the relation between the magistrate and
people is less visiblein a way it is lostin a body that is so
unwieldy in its limbs, and whose limbs lie so far from one
another and from the head.
It is in bodies like this that strong factions are most likely
to arise. What happens is that the associating spirits, lacking
exercise, form new movements within which they can have
a narrower sphere of activity because they cant get action
in a greater. Thus we have wheels within wheels. And
some nations are structured in such a way that, absurd as
this is as a matter of political theory, we have one empire
within another. Nothing is as delightful as incorporatingi.e.
forming bodies or groups.
All sorts of distinctions are invented.
Religious societies are formed.
Orders are set up. and their interests espoused and
served with the utmost zeal and passion.
Theres never any lack of founders and patrons of this sort.
Wonders are performed in this wrong social spirit by the
members of separate societies. Mans associating genius is
never better proved than in the societies that are formed in
opposition to the general society of mankind, and to the
real interests of the state.
In short, the very spirit of faction seems mainly to be
nothing but the misuse or irregularity of the social love
and common affection that is natural to mankind. Thats
because the opposite of sociableness is selfishness; and of all
characters the thoroughly selfish one is the least ready to join
any group or faction. The men of this sorti.e. the selfish
Section 3
As you know, it is commonly said that self-interest governs
the world. But I think that anyone who looks closely into the
affairs of the human world will find that passion, humour,
caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs that go
against self-interest have as large a role in the movements of
this machine as self-interest does. There are more wheels
and balances in this engine than are easily imagined. It is
too complex to fall under one simple view, or be explained in
a word or two. Those who study this mechanism must have a
very selective eye to overlook all other motions besides those
of the lowest and narrowest range. In the plan or description
of this clockwork, it is hard that no wheel or balance should
be allowed on the side of the better and broader affections;
that nothing should be understood to be done in kindness
or generosity, nothing in pure good-nature or friendship or
through any social or natural affection of any kind, given
that the main springs of this machine may well turn out to
be either these very natural affections themselves or some
compound kind containing them and retaining more than
one half of their nature.
But dont expect me to draw you up a formal blueprint
of the passions or to claim to show you their genealogy and
inter-relationshow they are interwoven with one another,
or how they interfere with our happiness and interest. To
devise a sound plan or model that would enable you to
see how much of the load in this architectural structure
is carried by the friendly and natural affections would be
18
beyond the scope and above the level of a letter like this.
Modern designers, I know, would willingly get these
natural materials off their hands, so that they could build
in a more uniform way. They would like to new-frame the
human heart, and intensely want to reduce all its motions,
balances and weights to one principle and foundationcool
and deliberate selfishness. Men, it seems, are unwilling to
think they can be outwitted and imposed on by nature so
as to be made to serve her purposes, rather than their own.
Theyre ashamed to be drawn out of themselves in this way,
and forced away from what they regard as their true interest.
There have always been narrow-minded philosophers who
have thought to set this difference to rights [= to put and end
to this struggle [between man and nature]] by conquering nature in
themselves. A father and founder among these [Epicurus] saw
well this power of nature, and he understood it so far that
he urged his followers not to have children or to serve their
country. There was no dealing with nature, it seems, while
these alluring objects stood in the way! He saw clearly that
relatives,
friends,
countrymen,
laws,
political constitutions,
the beauty of order and government, and
the interests of society and mankind
were objects that would naturally create stronger affections
than any that were grounded on the narrow base of mere self.
So his advice not to marry or engage at all in the service of
the public was wise, and suitable to his design. The only
way to be truly a disciple of this philosophy was to leave
family, friends, country, and society, and cling to it. . . .
4
III/3
But the modern revivers of this philosophy seem to be of a

lower genius. They seem to have understood less of this force
of nature, and have thought to alter the thing by changing
a name. They give an account of all the social passions and
natural affections that puts them all in the selfish category.
Thus civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers or
people in distress, is only a more deliberate selfishness.
An honest heart is only a more cunning one; and honesty
and good-nature are a more deliberate or better-regulated
self-love. The love of relative, children and posterity is purely
love of self and of ones own immediate blood; as if, by
this calculation all mankind were not included, because
they are all of one blood, and joined by inter-marriages
and alliances!. . . . Thus, love of ones country and love of
mankind must also be self-love. Magnanimity and courage,
no doubt, are also versions of this universal self-love! For
courage (says our modern philosopher) is constant anger.4
And all men (says a witty poet [Lord Rochester] would be
cowards if they dared to.
We can accept without argument that the poet and the
philosopher were both cowards; they may have reported what
they knew about themselves. But true courage has so little
to do with anger that the strongest evidence that someone is
not brave is that he is very angry. True courage is the cool
and calm sort. The bravest of men have the least of a brutal
bullying insolence, and are found to be the most serene,
pleasant, and free in the very time of danger. We know that
rage can make a coward forget himself and fight. But what is
done in fury or anger cant be attributed to courage. If that
were not so, womankind might claim to be the braver sex,
because their hatred and anger have always been known to
be stronger and more lasting than mens.
Sudden courage, says Hobbes, is anger. Therefore courage considered as constant and belonging to a character must on his account be defined as
constant anger or anger constantly returning.
19
[Shaftesbury writes harshly of still lower writers who

use word-play and cheap jokes to propagate the idea that
self-interest is the only basic human motivation. He continues:] If these gentlemen who delight so much in the play of
words but shy away from definitions would simply tell us
what self-interest is, and pin down what happiness and good
are, that would put an end to this enigmatical wit. We will all
agree that happiness is to be pursued, and in fact is always
sought after; but whether it is to be found in
following nature, and giving way to common affection,
or rather in
suppressing nature and turning every passion towards private advantage. . . .or the preservation of
mere life,
that is something we could debate about. The question would
not be Who loves himself and who doesnt? but rather Who
loves and serves himself in the most right and true manner?"
It is the height of wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly selfish
[see Glossary]. And to value life, as far as life is good, belongs
as much to courage as to discretion. But a wretched life is
no wise mans wish. To be without honesty is in effect to be
without natural affection or sociableness of any kind. And
a life without natural affection, friendship, or sociableness
would be found a wretched one if it were tried. The value
of self-interest depends on the intrinsic value and worth of
these feelings and affections. What makes a man himself is,
more than anything else, his temperament and the nature of
his passions and affections. If he loses what is manly and
worthy in these, he is as much lost to himself as when he
loses his memory and understanding. The least step into
villainy or baseness changes the character and value of a
life. Someone who is willing to preserve his life at any cost is
abusing himself more than anyone else can abuse him. And
if life is not a dear thing indeed [here = utterly beyond any price],
III/4
someone who refused to live as a villain and preferred death

to a base action was a gainer by the bargain.
Section 4
Its as well for you, my friend, that in your education you
havent had much to do with the philosophy or the philosophers of our days. A good poet and an honest historian
can provide enough learning for a gentleman. And when a
gentleman reads these authors for pleasure, hell get the feel
of them and understand them better than will a pedant, with
all his labours and the aid of his volumes of commentators.
Im aware that it used to be the custom to send the youth
of highest quality to philosophers to be formed. It was in
their schools, in their company, and by their precepts and
example that the illustrious pupils became used to hardship
and were exercised in the severest courses of temperance and
self-denial. By such an early discipline they were equipped
to command others,
to maintain their countrys honour in war,
to rule wisely in the state, and
to fight against luxury and corruption in times of
prosperity and peace.
If any of these arts [here = skills] are included in university
learning, thats good; but some universities these days
are shaped in such a way that they seem not to be very
effective for these purposes, and not to make a good job of
preparing the young for right conduct in the world or sound
knowledge of men and things. If you had been thoroughly
educated in the ethics or politics of the schools, I would
never have thought of writing a word to you about common
sense or the love of mankind. I wouldnt have quoted the
poets dulce & decorum. . . . Our philosophy these days runs
20
along the lines of the able sophister who said Skin for skin:
all that a man has he will give for his life. [This able but
tricky reasoner was Satan addressing God in Job 2:4.] According to
some men it is orthodox theology and sound philosophy to
value lives in terms of the number and exquisiteness of the
pleasing sensations they contain. They constantly set these
sensations in opposition to dry virtue and honesty. And
upon this basis they see fit to call a fool anyone who would
risk his life for anything, or part with any of these pleasing
sensations unless he could later get them backbe repaid
in the same coinwith interest. So it seems that we are to
learn virtue through money-lending, and to be wise and live
well by raising the value of life and of the pleasures of sense!
III/4
If he pressed on by asking What if I had a cold? or What

if I naturally lacked a delicate sense of smell? I might answer
that I cared as little to see myself nasty as that others should
see me in that condition. But what if it were in the dark?
Even then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my sense of
the matter would still be the same; my nature would rebel
at the thought of what was sordid: or if it didnt, that would
show that I had a wretched nature indeed and hated myself
for being a beast. I could never honour myself while I had no
better a sense of what I owed myself, and what was fitting
for me as a human creature.
In much the same way have heard it asked Why should
a man be honest in the dark? I wont say what sort of man
would ask this question; but I wouldnt much want to know
him or spend time in his companyor in the company of
anyone whose best reason for being honest was his fear of
the gallows or a jail. . . .
I know very well that many services to the public are
done merely for the sake of reward; and that informers in
particular are to be taken care of, and sometimes given state
pensions; but let me have my particular thoughts of these
gentlemens merit. Thinking of all the people who contribute
to solving and prosecuting crimes, I shall never give my
esteem to paid informers, or to anyone but the voluntary
discoverers of villainy and the vigorous prosecutors of their
countrys interests. And in this respect I dont know of
anything greater or nobler than undertaking and managing
an important accusation through which some high criminal
of state, or some organised body of conspirators against the
public, can be arraigned and brought to punishment through
the honest zeal and public affection of a private man.
I know that the mere vulgar [see Glossary] of mankind
often need a correctional object such as the gallows before
their eyes. But I dont believe that any man with a liberal
But you, my friend, are stubborn about this. Instead of

being led to think mournfully of death, or to bewail the loss
of anything you may sometimes have risked by your honesty,
you can laugh at such maxims as these, and be entertained
by the improved selfishness and philosophical cowardice of
these fashionable moralists! You wont be taught to value
life in terms of their price-scale, or degrade honesty as they
do who make it only a name. You are convinced that theres
something more in the thing than fashion or applause; that
worth and merit are substantial, and dont depend on what
men imagine or what they want; and that honour is as much
itself when acting by itself and unseen as when seen and
applauded by all the world.
If someone who looked like a gentleman were to ask me
Why should I avoid being nasty when no-one else is present?,
my first thought would be that someone who could ask this
question must himself be a very nasty gentleman, and that
it would be hard to make him conceive what true cleanliness
is. Still, I might settle for giving him a slight answer, saying
Because you have a nose.
21
educationor any man with common honestyever needed

to bring this idea into his mind in order to restrain himself
from acting as a knave. And if a saint had no virtue
except what was raised in him by the thought of reward
IV/1
and punishment in the after-life, I dont know whose love or

esteem he might gain, but I would never think him worthy of
mine. . . .
Part IV
Section 1
real bravery or generosity into ridicule. A glutton or mere

sensualist is as ridiculous as the other two charactersthe
cowardly and the money-hungry ones. And unaffected
temperance cant be made the subject of contempt by any but
the grossest and most contemptible of mankind. Now, these
three ingredientsbravery, generosity, temperancemake
up a virtuous character, as the contrary three make up
a vicious one. So how can we possibly make a joke of
honesty? To laugh both ways is nonsensical. And if there
really is something ridiculous about sottishness, avarice,
and cowardice, you can see what follows: it would take a
thoroughly ridiculous person to muster all his wit to ridicule
wisdom or laugh at honesty or good manners.
I hope you are now convinced that as I am in earnest in

defending raillery so also I can be sober too in the use of
it. [The most recent occurrence of the word raillery was at the end of
Part II section 2, but some of the intervening material has had a little of
the teasing tone that defines it.] It really is hard work learning
to temper and regulate the humour that nature has given
us so that it works as a more lenitive remedy against vice
[see Glossary] and a kind of specific against superstition and
melancholy delusion. [In that sentence, the italicised expressions
are medical terms.] Theres a big difference between trying to
raise a laugh from everything and trying to discover in each
thing what there is that can fairly be laughed at. For nothing
is ridiculous except what is deformed; and theres no defence
against raillery except being handsome and just. So it would
be the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the
use of this weapon, which can never cut into honesty itself
and can cut into everything that is contrary to it.
If we take our lead from the Italian stage-buffoons, we
can learn from them that in their lowest and most scurrilous
kind of wit theres no better target than the passions of
cowardice and avarice. No-one in the world could turn
A man of thorough good breeding, whatever else he

may be, is incapable of acting in a crude or brutal [here
= animal-like] manner. He doesnt wonder whether to act in
such a way or consider the matter by prudential rules of
self-interest and advantage. He acts from his naturein a
way necessarilyand without reflection; and if he didnt,
he wouldnt be a well-bred man, not one who could be
relied on to be such in all circumstances. Its the same
with the honest man: he cant think about whether to act
22
IV/1
the passions and affections brought under obedience
in a plainly villainous manner. . . . Anyone who wants to

enjoy a freedom of mind, and to be truly in command of
himself, must be above the thought of stooping to anything
villainous or base. And anyone who is capable of stooping in
that way must give up the thought of manliness, resolution,
friendship, merit, and a good character in his own eyes
and the eyes of others. To pretend to have these enjoyments
and advantages together with the privileges of a licentious
principle [see Glossary]to pretend to enjoy society and a free
mind while having a knavish heartis as ridiculous as the
conduct of children who eat their cake and then cry for it.
When men begin to deliberate about dishonesty, find that
the thought of it doesnt make them sick, and ask slyly Why
should I stick at a good piece of knavery if theres a good
sum to be earned by it?, they should be told like children
that they cant eat their cake and have it.
When men have become accomplished knaves, they are
past crying for their cake. They know themselves, and
mankind knows them. These are not the ones who are
so much envied or admired; we are more attracted by the
moderate kind of knave. But if we had good sense we would
think of the thoroughly profligate knave, the very complete
unnatural villain, as the honest mans only competitor for
happiness. True self-interest is wholly on one side or the
otherthe complete knave or the honest manand everything between these is inconsistency, indecision, remorse,
vexation, and something like a fit of malaria:
from hot to cold,
from one passion to the opposite one,
a perpetual discord of life, and
an alternate disquiet and self-dislike.
The only rest or repose must be through
one settled, considered resolution, which when once
taken must be courageously kept,
to it,
the temperament steeled and hardened to the mind,
i.e. the disposition hardened to the judgment.
Temperament and judgment must agree; otherwise theres
nothing but disturbance and confusion. To allow oneself
the secret but serious thought Why shouldnt I do this little
villainy, or commit this one treacheryjust once? is the
most ridiculous thing in the world, and contrary to common
sense. A common honest man, not disturbed by philosophy
and subtle reasonings about his interests, has no answer to
the thought of villainy except that he cant find in his heart
to try to conquer his natural aversion to it. . . .
The fact is that in the present state of thinking about
morals in the world, honesty is not likely to gain much by
philosophy or deep speculations of any kind. In the main its
best to stick to common sense and go no further. In moral
questions mens first thoughts are generally better than their
second; their natural notions better than the ones refined
by study or consultation with casuists [= specialists in applied
morality]. Theres a common saying that expresses common
sense, namely that honesty is the best policy; but according
to refined sense, the only people who conduct themselves
intelligently in this world are arrant knaves; the only ones
who serve themselves serve their passions and indulge their
loosest appetites and desires. So much for the wise and the
wisdom of this world!
An ordinary man talking in a commonsensical way about
a vile action says naturally and heartily I wouldnt be guilty
of that for the whole world. But speculative menmen who
are interested in theories find many qualifications and
special cases: many ways of evasion; many remedies; many
alleviations. One wrong action may be made up for (they
think) by
23
a good gift to the right person,

a right method of applying for a pardon,
good alms-houses and charitable foundations erected
IV/2
who fly to ridicule as a protection and launch successful

counter-attacks from that quarterwhy shouldnt someone
who is only a volunteer in this cause be allowed to engage
the adversary on his own terms and expose himself willingly
to such counter-attacks as long as he is allowed fair play of
the same kind?
By gentlemen of fashion I mean those to whom a natural
good genius or the force of good education [see Glossary] has
given a sense of what is naturally graceful and appropriate.
Some of them by mere nature, others by art and practice,
are masters of
an ear in music,
an eye in painting,
an imagination in ordinary matters of ornament and
grace,
a judgment about proportions of all kinds, and
a general good taste in most of the subjects that
provide the worlds abler people with amusement and
delight.
However wild such gentlemen as these may be, however
irregular in their morals, they must at the same time discover
their inconsistency and live at variance with themselves and
in contradiction to the principle on which they base their
highest pleasure and entertainment.
Of all the beauties that connoisseurs pursue, poets celebrate, musicians sing, and architects or artists of all kinds
describe or create, the most delightfulthe most engaging
and movingis that which is drawn from real life and from
the passions. Nothing affects the heart like what comes
purely from the heart and expresses its own nature: the
beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the flavour of
characters, and the proportions and features of a human
mind. We can learn this lesson of philosophy even from a
romance, a poem, or a play, when the fable-spinning author
for right worshippers, and

zeal shown for the right belief
especially when the action is one that increases the mans

power (as they say) to do good and serve the true cause.
Many a good estate, many a high position, has been
gained through something like this. Some crowns may also
have been purchased on these terms; and I think that some
great emperors in the past were much assisted by these
principles or ones like them, and later showed themselves
grateful to the cause and party that had assisted them. Those
who forged such morals have been enriched, and the world
has paid a large price for this philosophy: the original plain
principles of humanity, and the simple honest precepts of
peace and mutual love, have by a sort of spiritual chemistry
been transformed into the highest corrosives. . . .yielding the
strongest spirit of mutual hatred and malignant persecution.
Section 2
But we arent the sort of people, my friend, who are given
to melancholy reflections. Let the solemn reprovers of vice
proceed in the manner most suitable to their genius and
character; Im ready to celebrate with them the successes
they have achieved in the authoritative way that is allowed
to them. But I dont know why others cant be allowed
to ridicule folly, and recommend wisdom and virtue (if
they can) through humour and jokes. I dont know why
poets, or others who chiefly to entertain themselves and
others, cant be allowed this privilege. And if our standing
reformers complain that they arent heard so well by the
gentlemen of fashionif they exclaim against the airy wits
24
leads us with such pleasure through the labyrinth of the

affections and gets us to care, whether or not we want to,
IV/2
the effect of all those outward charms, and rob the fair one
of her power, even though she has all the right armament of
features and complexion? We may imagine what we please
about beauty as something substantial and solid; but a really
thorough investigation of this matter would reveal that what
we most admire even in a persons outward features is only
a mysterious expressiona kind of shadowof something
inward in the temperament. [Shaftesbury develops this point
in some detail, adding colour rather than content to what he
has to say.]
Nor can the men of cooler passions and more deliberate
pursuits withstand the force of beauty in others. Everyone
is a connoisseur at his own level; everyone pursues a grace
and courts a Venus of one kind or another. Whatever
is handsome, honest, fitting in things will force its way.
about the passions of his heroes and heroines. . . .

Let poets or the men of harmony deny if they can this
force of nature, or withstand this moral [see Glossary] magic.
And they carry a double portion of this charm about them.
(i) The very passion that inspires them is itself the love of
harmony, decency and proportion; and this inspiration isnt
narrow or selfish (for nobody composes for himself!) but
works for the pleasure and good of others, even down to
posterity and future ages. (ii) It is evident in these performers
[see Glossary] that their chief theme and subjectwhat raises
their genius the most, and by which they so effectively move
othersis purely manners and the moral part [Shaftesburys
phrase]. For the effect of their art, and also its beauty, is this:
in vocal measures of syllables and sounds, to express
the harmony and rhythms of an inward kind; and
represent the beauties of a human soul by proper
settings and contrasts, which serve as grace-notes
making this music of the passions more powerful and
enchanting.
The admirers of beauty in the fair sex might laugh to
hear of a moral part in their amours. Yet what a fuss is
made about a heart! What an intricate search of sentiments
and tender thoughts! What praises of a humour, a sense, a
je-ne-sais-quoi of wit, and all those graces of mind that these
virtuoso-loversthese connoisseurs of the arts who are also
lovers of womendelight to celebrate! Let them settle this
matter among themselves, and regulate as they think fit the
proportions that these different beauties hold one to another;
but they must allow that there is a beauty of the mind,
and that it is essential to the beauty they care about. Why
else is an air of foolishness enough to stop a lover in his
tracks? Why does the look and manner of an idiot destroy
[Shaftesbury gives those adjectives in Latin, which enables him to use

venustum for handsome.] Those who refuse to give this scope in
the nobler subjects of a rational and moral kind will find that
it is prevalent elsewhere, in a lower order of things. Those
who overlook the main springs of action, and despise the
thought of harmony and proportion in everyday life, will still
be preoccupied with lower forms of them in their care for the
common arts, or in the care and development of merely
mechanical beauties. The models of houses, buildings,
and their accompanying ornaments; the plans of gardens,
and their compartments; the ordering of walks, plantations,
avenues; and a thousand other symmetries, will occupy the
mental space that in some people is occupied by symmetry
and order of a happier and higher sort. . . .
[In this paragraph, harmony and dissonances are used metaphorically, referring to order and disorder in the moral realm.] The men of
pleasure, who seem the greatest despisers of this philosophical beauty, are often forced to confess its charms. They can
commend honesty as heartily as anyone, and are as much
25
IV/3
when we find that through luxury and in the service
struck with the beauty of a generous act. They admire the

thing itself though not the means. They would like if they
could to make honesty and luxury [see Glossary] agree, but
the rules of harmony wont permit it; the dissonances are
too strong. Still, attempts of this kind are not unpleasant to
observe. Some voluptuous people are indeed sordid pleaders
for baseness and corruption of every sort; but others having
better characters try to keep in step with honesty, and having
a better understanding of pleasure want to bring it under
some rule. They condemn this style and praise that. It was
good up to here, but then it went wrong. Such-and-such a
case was allowable, but this other one is not to be admitted.
They introduce a justice and an order into their pleasures.
They would like reason to be on their side, to account in some
way for their lives, and to shape themselves into some kind of
consistency and agreement. And if they found they couldnt
do this, they would choose to sacrifice their own pleasures to
the pleasures that arise from generous behaviour, regularity
of conduct, and a consistency of life and manners. . . .
There are other spurs to this thought; but the main
one is a strong view of merit in a generous character as
contrasted with some detestably vile one. That is why
among poets the satirists seldom fail to do justice to virtue;
and none of the nobler poets are false to this cause either.
Even modern wits whose taste runs towards elegance and
pleasure, when bare-faced villainy stands in their way and
brings the contrary species in view, can sing in passionate
strains the praises of plain honesty.
When we are highly friends with the world, successful
with the fair, and prosperous in the possession of other
beautiful things, we mayand usually dodespise this sober
mistress, plain honesty. But
when we see what wildness and excess naturally
produce in the world, and
of vile interests knaves are advanced above us, and

the vilest of men are preferred over the most honest,
then we see virtue in a new light, and with the assistance of
this setting we can discern the beauty of honesty, and the
reality of the charms that we hadnt previously understood
to be either natural or powerful.
Section 3
And thus, after all, the most natural beauty in the world
is honesty and moral truth, for all beauty is truth. True
features make the beauty of a face; true proportions make
the beauty of architecture, and true measures make the
beauty of music. In poetry, which is all fable, truth still is
the perfection. And anyone who is scholar enough to read the
ancient Philosopher (or his modern followers) regarding the
nature of a dramatic and epic poem will easily understand
this account of truth.
A painter, if he has any genius, understands the truth
and unity of design, and knows that if he follows nature
too closely and strictly copies life he is doing something
unnatural. For his art doesnt allow him to bring all of
nature into his piece, but only a part of it. But if his piece is
to be beautiful and to carry truth, it must be
a whole by itself, complete, independent, and yet as
great and comprehensive as he can make it.
For this to be achieved, the particulars must defer to the
general design: everything must be subservient to the main
thing, namely a certain easiness of sight of the piecea simple, clear, united view that would be broken and disturbed by
26
the expression of anything peculiar [see Glossary] or distinct.5

Natures variety is such as to distinguish every natural
thing by a peculiar basic character; and if this is strictly
represented in a work of visual or literary art it will make
the subject appear unlike anything else in the world. That is
something a good poet or painter tried very hard to prevent.
They hate minuteness, and are afraid of singularity, which
would make their images or characters appear capricious
and fantastical. Its true that a mere face-painter has little
in common with the poet; like the mere historian, he copies
what he sees, and minutely traces every feature and odd
mark. But it is otherwise with the men of invention and
design. Those geniuses [see Glossary] develop the idea of their
work from the many objects of nature, not from a particular
one. Thus the best artists are said to have been tireless
in studying the best statues, regarding them as a better
rule [here = as better models] than the most perfect human
bodies could provide. Similarly, some considerable wits
have recommended the best poems as preferable to the best
histories for lessons in the truth of characters and nature of
mankind.
Dont think that I am pitching things too high. Although
few artists confine themselves to these rules, few are un5
IV/3
aware of them. Whatever allowances we may make for our

immoral poets or other composers of clumsy and short-lived
works, we know very well that the enduring pieces of good
artists must be constructed in a more uniform way. Every
sound work of theirs obeys those natural rules of proportion
and truth. The creature of their brain must be like one
formed by nature, with all its parts in the right proportions
to one another. Otherwise, even the vulgar will criticize the
work: theyll see that it doesnt make a satisfactory whole,
and will regard its makerhowever detailed and exact he is
about particularsto be in the main a mere bungler.
Such is poetical truth; and such is (if I may so call it)
graphical or plastic truth. Narrative or historical truth
must be highly estimable, especially when we consider how
mankind, who have become so deeply interested in the
subject, have suffered by the lack of clearness in it. It is a
part of moral truth; to be a judge in one you need also to
have judgment in the other. The morals, the character, and
the genius of an author must be thoroughly considered; and
the historian, i.e. the relater of things important to mankind,
must earn our approval in many ways if we are to we are to be
bound to take anything on his authorityapproval in respect
of his judgment, candor, and disinterestedness. As for
[Shaftesbury has a long footnote here, in which he offers his own restatement of a passage in Aristotles Poetics:] The beautiful or sublime in poetry
and painting comes from the expression of greatness with orderi.e. exhibiting the works main subject in the very largest proportions in which it
can be viewed. For when it is gigantic, it is in a way out of sight, and cant be taken in in that simple and united view. And when on the other hand
a piece is of the miniature kindwhen it runs into the detail, and delicate delineation of every little particularit is as it were invisible, for the same
reason, namely that the whole thing cant be comprehended in one united view, so that the beauty is broken and lost by the necessary attraction of
the eye to every small and subordinate part. In a work of poetry, memory must be paid the same respect as the eye is in painting. The dramatic kind
is confined within the convenient and proper time of a spectacle. The epic kind is left more at large. Each work, however, must aim at vastness, and
be as great and of as long duration as is possible, consistent with its main lines being easy to grasp within one easy glance or retrospect of memory.
And this is what the Philosopher [always referring to Aristotle] calls the beautiful. That is the best I can do by way of translating the passage in
question, but its impossible to do justice to this treatise in English. . . . Id like to add a remark of my own, which may interest scholars of sculpture
and painting, namely: the greatest of the ancient as well as the modern artists were always inclined to follow this rule of the Philosopher; and when
they erred it was on the side of too large rather than too detailed. Examples of this are provided by Michelangelo, the great beginner and founder
among the moderns, and by Zeuxis, who had the same status among the ancients. . . .
27
critical truth, i.e. the judgment and determination of what

commentators, translators, paraphrasers, grammarians, and
others have delivered to us in a given text: in the midst of
such variety of style,
such different readings,
such interpolations and corruptions in the originals,
such mistakes of copyists, transcribers, editors,
and a hundred such events to which ancient books are
subject, the critical truth becomes, a matter of high-level theorising, especially when you consider that even if the reader
is an able linguist he must also get help from chronology,
natural philosophy, geography, and other sciences.
Thus, many previous truths have to be examined and
understood if we are to judge rightly regarding historical
truth, and regarding the past actions and circumstances
of mankind as delivered to us by ancient authors of different nations, ages, times, characters and interests. But
some moral and philosophical truths are so evident in
themselvesmatters of natural knowledge, fundamental
reason, and common sensethat it would be easier to
imagine half of mankind to have run mad and settled on
precisely one species of folly than to accept anything that
contradicted them
I have mentioned this because some modern zealots seem
to have no better knowledge of truth, and no better manner
of judging it, than by counting noses. By this rule, if they
can. . . .produce a set of Lancashire noddles [= fools], remote
provincial thinkers, or little visionary crowds, to attest
a story of a witch on a broomstick flying in the air, they
triumph in the solid proof of their new marvel and cry Great
is truth and it will prevail!.
Religion is much indebted to these men of marvels, who
in this discerning age want to set her on the foot of popular
tradition, and make her sail in the same boat as village-tales
IV/3
and gossiping stories of imps, goblins, and demoniacal

pranks, invented to frighten children or provide work for
common exorcists. . . .
And now, my friend, I see that its time to put an end to
these reflections. If I tried to expound things any further,
I would risk being drawn out of my way of humour into a
deep solemn treatment of these subjects. If you find that I
have moralized in a tolerable manner, according to common
sense and without spouting nonsense, Ill be satisfied with
my performance, such as it is, without worrying about what
disturbance I might give to some of todays formal censors
whose discourses and writings have a different tone. I have
taken the liberty, you see, to laugh sometimes; and if I have
either laughed wrongly or been inappropriately serious, I can
be content to be laughed at in my turn. And if on the other
hand I am scolded, I can laugh at that too, and with fresh
advantage to my cause. For although nothing could be less
a laughing matter than the provoked rage, ill-will, and fury
of certain zealous gentlemen, if they were still armed as they
were known to be not long ago, the magistrate has recently
taken care to clip their talons, so that theres nothing very
terrible about going up against them. On the contrary, there
is something comical in the case. [He compares these men
with gargoyles on medieval churches: supposedly fierce and
protective, actually funny and powerless. And then he signs
off.]
*****
Theres an irresistible temptation to present a different take
on the famous words Dulce et decorum est that Shaftesbury
quotes on page 14 (expecting his readers to know what comes
after them). It was the Latin poet Horace who wrote that it is
28
sweet and fitting to die for ones countrydulce et decorum

est pro patria mori. Two thousand years later, the English
poet Wilfrid Owen absorbed that into a stunning poem of
his own: after describing in horrible detail a man choking to
death after a gas attack, he tells a rabble-rousing journalist
that if he saw this for himself. . .

. . . you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.
29
IV/3

Shaftesbury - Sensus Communis, An Essay On The Freedom of Wit and Humour)

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An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour

Copyright 20102015 all rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

present work (including its title), Shaftesbury uses the word

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

performer: In early modern times, a performance could

selfish: In the paragraph It is the height of wisdom. . .

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

viewed in order to evaluate them thoroughly is ridicule itself,

When in conversation the other day I spoke in defence of

Is it fair for them to take this attitude? Isnt it just and

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

anything beyond that brings darkness and confusion.

company; there are only a few signs of it in the country; and

But it is certainly a mean, impotent, and dull sort

ulation, besides those who have the practice.

know how to engage in it. To understand what good manners

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

these severe gentlemen, with the grim look of true inquisitors,

current, their answers to them can hardly make their way

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

I think. It will be enough if I remind you of the general

bigotry of those who reign in them and assume themselves

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

men, if they are imprisoned and controlled, will discover

I really think that thats why the ancients exhibit so little of

If men are forbidden to speak their minds seriously on

If in this respect we go beyond

But some gentlemen are so full of the spirit of bigotry

To see that this really is so, look at the countries where

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

That it is natural for me to defend liberty with this restriction

It is surely a violation of the freedom of public assemblies

To return now to our argument. If the best of our modern

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

when it seemed relevant to do so. No-one ventured to call

one sect regards as an inconceivable mystery is easy

the authority of the court into question, until a gentleman

It might have seemed unfair in our friends if they had treated

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

world. Theres nothing so foolish and deluding as a partial

in their way of questioning accepted opinions and exposing

common dress of the Europeans, happens to see someone

If an Ethiopian were suddenly transported into Europe and

when really he is talking only about (i); read alertly!]

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

turn was dressed as he deserved! But although. . . .it was

Freedom of wit and humour

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

suppress them, for one cant read that law of theirs