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Dr.
Ram
ManoharLohiya
University, Lucknow

National

Law

Political Science
TOPIC:
The naxalite movement, the growth of the
communist philosophy and the support from China,
Pakistan and Nepal.
Submitted by :to:Devraj Singh
Srivastava
Roll No - 49
Science)

Submitted

Ms.

Monica
(Political

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Index
S.No Topic
.

Page
No.

Introduction
History
The Chinese Support

India-China Power Game

in Nepal and the
Consequences
Growth of Naxalism
Conclusion

7-9

Bibliography

18

2
3
4.

5.
7.

8.

4
5-6

10-16
17

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Introduction
In a development that could have far reaching implication not only for Bihar and
Jharkhand but also for other States, the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the
Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War) merged in the united formation, the
Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPI-Maoist, in September 2004. Both the groups have been
the most powerful ones, accounting for about 88 percent of the countrywide Naxalite violence
and 90 percent of the resultant deaths. The merger has resulted in further escalation in the level
of Naxalite violence in these two States. For example, Bihar, where Maoists are active in
approximately 30 out of 38 districts, was the worst affected States in 2004, with 155 Naxaliterelated killing between January and November 30, 2004. Jharkhand, where Maoists are active in
18 out of 22 districts, ranked second, with 150 deaths as against 117 in 2003. The unification of
Naxalite groups, largely interpreted as the beginning of a new phase in Naxalite movement in
India, has also been influenced by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal and activities of
several front organizations in the last few years.
An attempt has been made in this project to map the trajectory of Naxalite movement in
Bihar and Jharkhand in the light of current developments, historical experience and complex
interplay of factors that have shaped the course of the movement. The paper argues that the
course of the Naxalite movement in these two States would depend, to a great extent, on how it
manages contradictions emerging out of complex interplay of the ideological commitment and
various factors that have influenced the behavior of these groups at the grassroots level.

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History
The term comes from Naxalbari a small village in West Bengal, where a section of
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a
violent uprising in 1967, trying to develop a "revolutionary opposition" in opposition to the
CPI(M) leadership. The insurrection started on May 25, 1967 in Naxalbari village when a
peasant was attacked by hired hands over a land dispute. Local peasants retaliated by attacking
the local landlords and the violence escalated. Majumdar greatly admired Mao Zedong of China
and advocated that Indian peasants and lower classes must follow in his footsteps and overthrow
the government and upper classes whom he held responsible for their plight. He engendered the
Naxalite movement through his writings, the most famous being the 'Historic Eight Documents'
which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology. In 1967 'Naxalites' organized the All India
Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), and later broke away from
CPI (M). Uprisings were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969 AICCCR gave birth
to Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).
Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate tendency from the
beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh-group.
MCC later fused with People's War Group to form Communist Party of India (Maoist). A third
tendency is that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, which was mainly presented by
UCCRI (ML), following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy. That tendency broke with
AICCCR at an early stage. During the 1970s the movement was fragmented into several
disputing factions. By 1980 it was estimated that around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a
combined membership of 30 000.[4] A 2004 home ministry estimate puts numbers at that time as
"9,300 hardcore underground cadre [holding] around 6,500 regular weapons beside a large
number of unlicensed country-made arms".[5] According to Judith Vidal-Hall (2006), "More
recent figures put the strength of the movement at 15,000, and claim the guerrillas control an
estimated one fifth of India's forests, as well as being active in 160 of the country's 604
administrative districts."
Today some groups have become legal organizations participating in parliamentary elections,
such as Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation. Others, such as Communist
Party of India (Maoist) and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti, are engaged
in armed guerrilla struggles

Page | 5

The Chinese Support

On a grander geopolitical level, the Naxalites can be viewed through the prism of Chinese-Indian
rivalry. The Naxalites adopted the ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolutionary and leader
who converted China to communism and who had just begun the Cultural Revolution there in
1966. In the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was mutual rhetorical support between
the Maoist regime in China and the Naxalites in India. While there was little evidence of material
support (and there is no indication of such support today), the advent and growth of the Naxalite
movement certainly did serve Chinas goal of weakening its largest neighbour to the south.
India was able to dampen the Naxalite movement significantly in 1971, but the regional belief
that the government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of their land in eastern India
persisted. The Naxalite movement continued in a somewhat dormant phase throughout the
1970s, 80s and early 90s. Violence resumed again in the late 90s and has been escalating in the
years since.
The CPI (M)'s relationship with the North-East insurgent groups must be juxtaposed with the
external support these groups receive. The on-going court proceedings in Bangladesh over the
2004 clandestine import of 10 truckloads of light and medium arms and ammunition reveal a
wide
network
running
through
three
countries.
The case now involves top officers of the two most powerful Bangladesh intelligence agencies,
the NSI and the DGFI. They were working with some top leaders of the then BNP-Jamaat-eIslami (JEI) government. The ULFA Commander-in-Chief Paresh Barua, who was in Dhaka till
recently running the outfit's command centre from the capital city, was involved at every stage of
this
plan.
Pakistan's ISI, from the level of Director General was running these covert operations.
Underworld criminal Dawood Ibrahim, who lives in Karachi under ISI protection, was roped in.
A communication and television company, ARY, based in Dubai became an active facilitator.
ARY is owned by a Pakistani and known to have worked with ISI in supporting Al Qaeda and
Taliban
networks
in
the
past.
Finally, one of the NSI senior officers confessed to interrogators earlier in June that the entire
consignment of arms and ammunitions was procured from China. It is a well established fact that
ULFA and NSCN (I/M) leaders visit Kunming in China periodically to procure arms,
ammunition and communication equipment. To travel abroad ULFA and NSCN leaders are given
Bangladeshi passports under assumed names by the NSI. This was a most devastating terrorist
plan
to
destabilize
India.

Page | 6

The discovery of the consignment at the Chittagong port was purely fortuitous. Even then, the
case was kept under cover by the BNP-JEI government. The new Awami League government,
led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina re-opened it in order to wipe out terrorism from the
country.
If the Indian Maoists are in an alliance with the North-East insurgents, it is highly likely they
would be directly or indirectly in touch with the mentors of these insurgents. The Laskar-eToiba's (LET) king pin in Nepal, Mohammad Omar Madani, who is currently in Indian custody,
has confessed that his task was to win over Naxal activists and send them to Pakistan for military
and terrorist training. He had a substantial amount of money at his disposal for the job.

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India-China Power Game in Nepal and

the Consequences
A month after the visit to Nepal by Shyam Saran as special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister, a
delegation of 21 senior Chinese leaders led by He Yong, vice-premier and secretary at the
secretariat of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, arrived in
Kathmandu on September 11, 2010 on a six-day visit.
This is the highest-level Chinese delegation to visit Nepal since the beginning of the peace
process. The visit also coincided with news about a controversial audio tape purportedly
containing a conversation between Krishna Bahadur Mahara, International Bureau Chief of the
Unified CPN-Maoist, and an unknown Chinese, in which Mahara is heard asking for 500 million
rupees to buy off 50 lawmakers required to form the government under Prachandas leadership.
This tape brought China into the internal political debate of Nepal for the first time. As of now, it
is not known whether the tape is genuine or not. If it is genuine, then it indicates a serious shift in
Chinas policy towards Nepal. It can be seen as the beginning of Chinese interference in Nepals
internal affairs.
The Chinese have always adopted a pro-establishment policy towards Nepal. Experts emphasize
that Nepal-China relations are based on the Five Principles, or Panchsheel, according to which
China will not intervene in Nepal's domestic politics and Nepal will respect China's sovereignty
and territorial integrity with respect to Tibet and Taiwan.
But the controversial audio tape violates the principle that China will not intervene in Nepals
domestic politics. It also indicates that China seems to have adopted a proactive policy towards
Nepal. China had always gained good faith in the Nepalese mind by pointing at Indian
interference in Nepals internal affairs. The current visit of the Chinese delegation, coming close
on the heels of the audio tape controversy, also indicates that China may involve itself more
actively in Nepalese affairs and serve as a check on interference in Nepals internal matters by
any other external powers (India).
These events are also taking place at a time when there is a souring of relations between China
and India due to the denial of visa to the Indian Army's Chief of Northern Command Lt. Gen. B.
S. Jaswal. There is also tension between India and China on the issue of stapled visas being
issued to Kashmiris, the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the issue of Dalai Lama, and so
on. Thus, one can argue that China is taking such actions in Nepal to confront and counterbalance India and will continue to act similarly in other countries in Indias neighbourhood.

Page | 8

The Maoists have always looked towards China for help and support. But China had made it
clear to them so far that it could help only if they are in government because of their proestablishment policy. But in the past few months, it seems that the Maoist have been able to
convince the Chinese that they would not come to power until Indian interference continues in
Nepal. This may explain the new Chinese behaviour.
China has always been worried about chronic political instability in Nepal and the possibility of
external powers using Nepal against its strategic interests. China viewed the monarchy as the
most stable, credible and dependable partner and the mainstream political parties as pro-India.
The King always played the China card effectively to counter Indian influence. Chinese
security interests, which have been Chinas prime concern in Nepal, were also served by the
King in the past. The King wielded tremendous power as the Commander-in-Chief of the army.
After Nepal became a republic, China lost its most reliable partner (Monarchy). It realized that it
has to choose between two major political forces in Nepal, i.e., the democratic parties, which
were mostly pro-India, and the Maoists, a large party with anti-India and anti-US sentiments.
While the Chinese were looking for a durable and dependable force in Nepal, the Maoists,
looking for support from a strong power in the neighbourhood, approached China for help. The
Maoists looked at China with sympathy due to their ideological affinities. Significantly, the
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) promised in its election manifesto to set up
eight new national highways linking Nepal to China. Interestingly, China did not support the
Maoist party until they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly election
of April 2008. In fact, China was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to suppress
the Maoist insurgents when India, the US and the UK had refused to provide any such help.
China also found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists because of the growing tensions in Tibet,
particularly after the March 2008 uprising. China wanted to curb the underground activities of
some 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. As is well-known, Nepal is the most easily
accessible entry point to Tibet and it has the second largest Tibetan refugee community in the
world. China has traditionally alleged that international forces are conducting operations against
China, through Tibetans based in Nepal. In this context, China was deeply concerned when six
Nepalese Parliamentarians visited Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in February 2009. Only after this
did China start establishing good relations with other political parties like the Communist Party
of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Madhesi Peoples Rights Forum apart
from the CPN-Maoist.
It is well-known that even though Maoist leaders are posing themselves as anti-Indian, most are
aware that at the end of the day they will have to deal with India, and that they cannot wish away
the geographical, historical, cultural and socio-economic linkages between the two countries. It
is almost certain that they will temper their policies towards India once they come to power.
However, for the moment, the Indian policy of preventing Maoists from coming to power and the
Maoist counter-tactic of mobilising popular opinion on the basis of growing anti-India

Page | 9

sentiments in Nepal, seem to be pushing the Himalayan country deeper into uncertainty, which
will not serve the interests of either country.
Interestingly, China and India have been competing for influence along the Nepal-China border.
Soon after India provided development assistance of Rs. 100 million for the remote hill region of
Mustang, China responded with financial assistance worth Rs. 10 million for construction of a
library, science laboratory and school building with computers in Chhoser village (adjoining
Jhongwasen district of Tibet) in the same region to counter Indian influence. The ambassadors of
both countries have visited the area. China is also opening China Study Centres in Nepal along
the Indo-Nepal border. Out of a total of eleven China Study Centres that China has built in Nepal
so far, seven are along the Indo-Nepal border.
In response to the Chinese attempt to extend the railway link from Tibet till the Nepalese border,
India is also planning to extend its rail links to Nepal along the border. India has announced
assistance worth Rs. 10.88 billion for the expansion of railway service in five places along the
India-Nepal border. The first phase of expansion is scheduled to start from Birjung of Nepal
which is about 350 kilometres south of Tatopani, the place to be connected by China through
railways. The power-game between China and India is thus slowly unfolding in Nepal.
In this context, the controversial audio tape incident has had its effect. It has benefited the antiMaoist forces the most. The leak seems to have stopped the Madhesi parties from supporting
Prachandas candidature as PM in the seventh round of voting. At a time when the Nepalese
media was in overdrive to nail the Indian Embassy for its alleged intervention in Nepalese
politics, the tape controversy has successfully diverted popular attention towards China.
Whether the audio tape is genuine or fake, it will affect the contour of Nepalese politics in the
days to come. If China decides to play a proactive role in Nepal, it will definitely have serious
implications for Indias security. The win-win situation for both India and China lies in
respecting the buffer-status of Nepal between them. This will also ensure political stability.
After being in denial mode for months, the Nepalese Maoists have said they are extending "full
support and cooperation" to the Naxalites in India, days after Home Minister P Chidambaram
mentioned about a possible supply of arms from them.
Admitting that exchanges exist between the Maoists and the Naxals in India, a senior Standing
Committee member of the UCPN-M CP Gajurel was quoted on Tuesday by Rajdhani daily as
saying, "We have extended our full support and cooperation to the Indian Maoists, who are
launching armed revolt." Talking to pro-Maoist journalists in Bara district of southern Nepal on
Sunday. Gajurel, however, did not elaborate on what type of support they have extended to the
Naxals.
Chidambaram had recently mentioned about the possible supply of arms from Nepalese Maoists
to the Naxals in India.

P a g e | 10

The same newspaper had earlier carried a report that a Maoist leader had met Indian Maoist
leader Kishenji at an undisclosed place in October.

Growth of Naxalism
Emergence of Organizations
Even a cursory glance at the trajectory of Naxalite movement in Bihar and Jharkhand
would reveal that though it developed in the backdrop of rich tradition of peasant and tribal
movementsboth during British and post-independence period it grew through its complex
interaction with a number of local issues, which have defined the course of the movement. The
basic demand of Naxalite movement during the early phase revolved around the issue of land
relations, self-respect, respect for their women and payment of minimum wages. The
organizations which espoused these demands could not evolve a common understanding on
various strategic, tactical and organizational issues. Thus, we find the emergence of a number of
Naxalite groups in the undivided Bihar.
The movement, which originated in the small town of Naxalbari in Darjeeling district,
West Bengal had a direct impact on the undivided Bihar. Leading the movement in the State was
the nine-member Bihar State Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, which began spreading
its activities in various parts of the undivided Bihar. The Communist Party of India, MarxistLeninist (CPI-ML) came into existence in 1969. In early 1970s, some CPI-ML leaders began to
establish contacts in Jehanabad and Palamu areas, but many of them were arrested during the
emergency period in 1975. When these leaders were released during the Janata government in
1977, some of them organized themselves into CPI-ML (Unity Organization) in 1978. The same
year, the Mazdur Kisan Sangram Samity (MKSS) was formed.
During the 1980s, three groups had major impact on Naxalite movement in Bihar: the
CPI-ML (Liberation), the CPI-ML (Party Unity) and the MCCI. As early as 1982, the Bihar
government in its Notes on Extremist activities-affected areas reported that as many as 47 out of
a total of 857 blocks, spread over 14 districts were affected by the left wing extremist movement.
The CPI-ML (Liberation), which political party in 1992. It was stated that the party does not
rule out the possibility under a set of exceptional national and international circumstances, the
balance of social and economic forces may even permit peaceful transfer of central power to
revolutionary forces. It was, however, added that the party must prepare itself for winning the
ultimate decisive victory through an armed struggle, though it had a formidable presence in the
central parts of undivided Bihar, decided to function as an over ground admitted that the situation
was not ripe for such a movement. Reports suggest that it still maintains underground squad in

P a g e | 11

some regions. The party also has a string of organizations to mobilize students, women and
workers. They are: All India Students Association, Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha, All India
Coordination Committee of Trade Unions, All India Progressive Women's Association and Jan
Sanskritik Manch.
Another prominent Naxal group, which emerged during the 1980s, was the CPI-ML
(Party Unity). It tried to organize the peasantry as the main force of democratic revolution. They
adopted the twin strategy of selective annihilation and economic blockade of landowners. In a
major effort at the consolidation of left-wing activity, the CPI-ML (Party Unity) merged with the
People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh in 1998, to constitute the CPI-ML (People's War).
However, one Naxalite groups which had maximum impact on the course of Naxalite
movement in Bihar, and in many sense represents the true character of the movement is the
Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). The group, earlier known as the Dakshin Desh, was
active, during the initial days in West Bengal and Gaya and Hazaribagh districts of undivided
Bihar. In the perception of the MCCI, the struggle is fundamentally a movement for
appropriating political power. Thus, the political education of the peasants reaches its completion
when the peasants uphold the fact that fights for land is only a means to launch a war to capture
of power.
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the MCCI concentrated its strength in Bihar; and with
the perspective of building up peoples army and base area, the Bihar-Bengal Area Committee
was set up. The emergency period suppressed their activities, but in 1978-79, they once again
began to mobilize the peasants. Till 1982, the MCC was mostly underground. Gradually, the
group began to operate through these mass fronts. In Bihar and Jharkhand, it maintained a string
of front organizations, including the Naujawan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch, Krantikari
Budhijivi Sangh, Krantikari Sanskritik Sangh, Krantikari Chhatra League, Communist Yuva
League, Naari Mukti Sangh and Mazdoor Mukti Sangh.
The MCC disagreed with the CPI-MLs approach of class annihilation. It accepted action
against the class enemies. It advocated mass action in which conscious people enraged by class
hatred would spontaneously participate in the annihilation of class enemies. But it was
vehemently opposed to secret and indiscriminate killings by the squad. It carried out a number of
massacres in the central parts of undivided Bihar. On October 7, 1986, the MCC killed 11
persons belonging to the upper caste Rajput community in Darmia village Aurangabad district in
Bihar. On May 29, 1987, the MCC massacred 42 persons belonging to an upper caste Rajput
family at Dalelchak-Baghaura village in Aurangabad district, Bihar. On February 12, 1992, the
MCC massacred 37 members of the landowing upper caste Bhumihar community at Bara village,
Gaya district in Bihar. On March 18, 1999, the MCC massacred over 34 upper caste Bhumihars
in Senari village, Jehanabad in Bihar. On November 18, 1999, the MCC killed 12 persons in Latu

P a g e | 12

village, Palamu in Jharkhand. On April 14, 2001, the MCC killed 14 persons at Belpu village,
Hazaribagh district in Jharkhand.
One of the features of the Naxalite movement during that phase was bitter internecine
clashes among these groups. The clashes between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (Party Unity)
resulted in the death of hundreds of cadres of both the organizations in central and southern parts
of undivided Bihar. After the rapprochement between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (PW), the main
rivalry remains between the latter and the CPI-ML (Liberation), which after eschewing the path
of armed revolution is increasingly finding it difficult to maintain its turf in its strongholds
particularly Bhojpur and Patna districts of Bihar. The PWs growing influence in these districts
has caused serious problems for the Liberation group. According to sociologist and former
Naxalite, Mr. Sashibhushan, the Liberation, after giving up the annihilation line, has no solid
means to cash in on the anger of the people against exploitation. Apart from ideological factors,
these organizations were locked in bitter war of supremacy in a particular area.
Caste Dynamics and Sena Phenomenon
Apart from internal dissension and internecine clashes, the caste dynamics also
influenced the movement since the 1980s. The polarization along the caste line deepened, when
the dalits were mobilized by the left wing extremists and increasingly stereotyped as Naxalites
by the upper castes who banded together. The result was a closing of ranks, not only among the
richer and landowners, but also along caste lines that embraced every rung of the social ladder,
down to the poorest of the caste men. It affected the organizational structure, mobilization
strategy and activities of Naxalite groups at the grassroots level. If we examine the pattern of
violence in Central parts of undivided Bihar, the entire confrontation was moulded by caste
factor and not by class ideology. The Naxalite leaders also recognized the importance of caste in
mobilization. As Dipankar Bhattacharya of the CPI-ML (Liberation) says that we can not afford
to completely ignore the role of caste. Sometimes class struggles do overlap with caste war while
on some other occasions class struggle relegated to background and caste violence does take
place.
This complex pattern of Naxalite mobilization and counter mobilization on the basis of
caste gave rise to what is generally called the Sena (private army of landowners) phenomenon in
Bihar. Though armed gangs have been part of feudal history of rural India, Bihar is the only State
in post-independence India where private armies of landowners exist. Most of these private
armies emerged in late 1970s, and 1980s as a feudal response to the growth of Naxalite groups.
Since then, an estimated 15 private armies have existed at various points of time in the State,
including prominently: the Kuer Sena, the Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bramharshi
Sena, Kisan Sangh, Gram Suraksha Parishad and the Ranvir Sena.

P a g e | 13

Most of these Senas, with a limited cadre strength and area of operation, could not sustain
their existence for long and eventually withered away. However, among all these, the Ranvir
Sena emerged as the most dreaded and ruthless group. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena extended
its influence to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur districts,
mobilizing the landed caste groups in these districts against the various left-wing extremist
organisations. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena carried out a number of massacres in Central
Bihar. On June 16, 2000, its cadres killed 34 persons at Miapur village, Aurangabad district. On
April 21, 1999, 12 persons were killed at Sendani village, Gaya district. On February 20, 1999,
11 persons were killed at Narayanpur village, Jehanabad district. On January 25, 1999, 23
persons were massacred in Sankarbigha village, Jehanabad district. On December 1, 1997, 58
persons were massacred at Lakshmanpur-Bathe village, Jehanabad district. On April 10, 1997, 10
persons were killed at Ekbari village, Jehanabad. And on March 23, 1997, Ranvir Sena cadres
killed 10 persons at Habispur village, Patna district. Though the Ranvir Sena claimed to have
targeted only Naxalites, its victim, by and large, have been landless and poor peasants of the
most backward castes.
The context of the Senas activities has been conditioned by an extreme polarization of
State politics and the bureaucracy on the basis of caste. It had linkage with many top level
politicians on the sole basis of caste loyalties. Since the landowner groups constituted a
powerful political lobby entrenched in the government, the police and the bureaucracy, the
pattern of state intervention and even the government approach to the conflict were conditioned
selectively by these linkages.
However, in the last few years, the Sena has been sufficiently weakened particularly after
the arrest of its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh at Patna on August 29, 2002. Reports also indicate
that the Ranvir Sena has been at the receiving end for some time now, and has lost much of its
earlier influence among upper caste land owners. One of the reasons is the increasing
criminalization of the outfit.
Linkage with Mainstream Politics
Linkage with political parties has also conditioned the behaviour of Naxalite groups and
this is reflected in their behaviour during elections and their relationship with mainstream
political parties. Though these groups have been insisting on election boycott to wean people
away from parliamentary politics, there has been a palpable change in their attitude towards
elections. The behaviour of Naxalite groups during elections have suggested that their stated
objectives have little role to play as far as grassroots mobilization of electoral support is
concerned. In Bihar, during the recent State Assembly elections in February 2005, though the
CPI-Maoists officially declared that the continuance in power of the ruling RJD is against the
interest of the party, it, at the same time, admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD share the same
social base. It has also reportedly alleged that Laloo Prasad Yadav has been trying to bribe its

P a g e | 14

cadre and activists through Government contracts and projects. Alleging a nexus between the
MCC and RJD, the CPI-ML (Liberation) says, MCC used to extend its support to the RJD in
Bihar and JMM in Jharkhand during earlier elections. In the last elections some of their
commanders were seen openly canvassing for the RJD candidates in Bihar. According to Saibal
Gupta, secretary of the Asian Development Research Institute: "I won't say they are hand in
hand. Because the social base of the RJD and MCC is the same, there is a natural coalition.''
Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these states and the enormous clout
wielded by Naxalite groups at the grassroots level has been one of the crucial instruments of
influence in the electoral process. In Jharkhand, according to one estimate, the Naxalites are
capable of influencing the election process in some 54 of the 81 Assembly constituencies.
Unsurprisingly, Naxalite groups often use their influence to support candidates or political
formations which provide them a favourable context for operation in the post election phase.
Therefore, it is not surprising that their violence or threat of poll boycott never result in active
boycott or a decline in vote percentage. Thus, for instance, during the April 2004 Parliamentary
Election in Jharkhand, where the pre-poll campaign was marred by a series of attacks on security
force personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at 55.71 per cent. Even in some of the worstaffected districts, including Palamu, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout
ranged between 49 and 60 per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar registered
an impressive voter turn out.
There are reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves contested the elections
through proxies. For example, during the Panchayat (Village Council) elections in 2001, activists
of both the PWG and MCCI contested in Jehanabad district. In the Parliamentary Elections of
April 2004, a former 'sub-zonal commander' of the MCCI, Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat,
contested as an independent candidate from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies,
Chatra in Jharkhand, and the voter turnout in some of the worst-affected Assembly segments
recorded their highest turnout in the last 20 years. Clearly, despite the announcement of the
unification, the factors that have historically influenced the behaviour of Naxalite groups still
remain operative, and will continue to have a considerable influence during the election process.
Financial Incentives and growing criminalisation
Their muscle power, enormous presence at the grassroots and a collusive arrangement
with a section of politicians, government officials and contractors offer huge financial incentive
to these groups. And this is facilitated by inability of the state to enforce its writ in Naxalaffected areas. These groups are able to hold jan adalats (kangaroo courts) and administer instant
justice, leaving the administration gaping.The extremists impose levy on government projects.
The collection ranges from forest contractors, businessmen, civil contractors, villagers and
government officials including police in some areas. The Naxalites have also threatened the
Golden Quadrilateral project in their areas of influence. As a result, progress in these areas is

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probably the slowest of the GQ stretches. In fact, the Naxal fear is not restricted to this area or to
the PM highway alone. They have also threatened companies such as Steel Authority of India
Limited-run iron ore mines at Megahahatburu. Although, the Naxalites claim that they are
fighting an ideological war, they are basically involved in making money. Smuggling of woods,
taking cut from government officials from development fund and extortion have become main
business of Naxalites.
The dwindling role of ideology and financial incentive has led to growing criminalization
of the outfit. In many cases, the local commanders due to lack of proper ideological
indoctrination and lure of money behave like ordinary criminals. Stories of deviations and
degeneration of Naxalite groups appear regularly in media. Degeneration in Naxalite movement
resulted in emergence of protection racket. Moreover, a number of persons with criminal
backgrounds have joined the movement to secure some safety from the law. In addition, there
are a number of examples of land having been captured by Naxalite outfits.

State Response
One of the important factors that have sustained this self-sustaining dynamics of Naxalite
violence in Bihar and Jharkhand is the lack of proper state response and failure of the
administrative machinery at the grassroots level. As a result, in many areas government officials
do not even attend their offices due to the threat posed by Naxalites. In these areas, development
works are executed more often than not on paper. In August 1999, special House Committee of
the Bihar Legislative Council which was asked to study the chain of violence and counter
violence in Central Bihar, said the lack of political will and determination on the part of State in
tackling extremism head on, its failure to set up agencies unafraid to step into the disturbed
regions and political affiliations of the extremist groups with mainline parties are some of the
reasons for the aggravating extremist violence in Bihar.
No proper attempt has been made to equip police force properly to deal with the threat.
Even in Jharkhand, where the successive governments relied heavily on police operations to
neutralize the armed groups, proper attention was not paid to this aspect. The police operations
suffer due to lack of adequate and appropriate equipment - including basics such as automatic
weapons, landmine detectors, transport and communications; a proper intelligence network at the
grassroots level; and better protection to police officers and personnel in the Naxalite affected
areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite large-scale arrests under the POTA, the
government was not able to contain the violence. In Bihar also, lack of resources is a major
handicap. The extremist groups on the other hand, are well trained and possess even
sophisticated arms. On April 16, 2003, the then Director General of Police, DP Ojha, made an
official statement before the Press that the State police were not equipped well enough to prevent

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extremist violence in Bihar. He said. How can one expect the police force to contain the
extremists? They dont have even matching fire power, lack standardised police pickets and are
deprived of state-of-art communication system besides bullet-proof vehicles and mines-protected
vehicles?
The surrender policy announced by the government has not had desired results. Apart
from poor implementation of the scheme, the fear of retribution by Naxals is the reason for poor
records in surrender. Maoists have been ruthless in dealing with the deserters and any activist
who felt tempted by the surrender package must be ready to face the consequences.
Another important reason for the growth of Naxalite movement has been the
governments inability to implement land reforms. The village economy supports nearly threefourths of the States population, yet it remains one of the most exploitative in the world. The
landowners were politically very influential and were largely responsible for poor
implementation of the policy.

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Conclusion
I would like to conclude this project by saying that it was a great learning experience for me. The
project gave me a chance to build upon my existing knowledge. I came across several cases
related to the topic and thus got a chance to appreciate various great events.
This project of mine gives a summary of almost all laws related to naxal movement and
communism.
This project explores the vastness of the problem and the need therefore to take steps to counter
the problem as soon as possible.
The project pervades the space of the help to the naxals, their movement and the spread.
It highlights all related topics in the light of recent events.

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Bibliography
I would like to thank the web designers from whose sites I have taken material for my project.
They are:

Websites/URls:

http://naxalwatch.blogspot.com/http://www.airwebworld.com/articles/inde

x.php?article=1202

http://qna.rediff.com/questions-and-answers/does-china-support-naxalites-

and-n-e-terrorists/16159968/answers
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/we-support-the-indian-naxals-concede-

nepal/536712/
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/We-support-the-Indian-naxals-

concede-Nepal-Maoists/536712/
http://sify.com/news/who-helps-the-naxals-news-features-jgzpnneehee.html
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/25/when-will-india-attend-to-naxalism/

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