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Brittish Defence White Paper 2006
Brittish Defence White Paper 2006
Presented to Parliament by
The Secretary of State for Defence
and
The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
By Command of Her Majesty
December 2006
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Contents
Foreword 5
Executive Summary 6
The primary responsibility of any government is to ensure I believe it is crucial that, for the foreseeable future, British
the safety and security of its citizens. For 50 years our Prime Ministers have the necessary assurance that no
independent nuclear deterrent has provided the ultimate aggressor can escalate a crisis beyond UK control. An
assurance of our national security. For most of that time, independent deterrent ensures our vital interests will
during the Cold War, its purpose was clear, though never be safeguarded. But as before, it will be the minimum
without controversy. necessary. We already have the smallest stockpile
Today’s world is different. Many of the old certainties of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear
and divisions of the Cold War are gone. We cannot predict weapons States, and are the only one to have reduced
the way the world will look in 30 or 50 years time. For now, to a single deterrent system. In this White Paper we are
some of the old realities remain. Major countries, which announcing a further 20 per cent cut in our operationally
pose no threat to the UK today, retain large arsenals some available warheads. This leaves the deterrent fully
of which are being modernised or increased. None of functioning, with fewer than 160 warheads, but it means
the present recognised nuclear weapons States intends Britain continues to set an example for others to follow
to renounce nuclear weapons, in the absence of an in our commitment to work towards a peaceful, fairer
agreement to disarm multilaterally, and we cannot be sure and safer world without nuclear weapons. Our decision
that a major nuclear threat to our vital interests will not to maintain the deterrent is fully compatible with all our
emerge over the longer term. international legal obligations.
We also have to face new threats, particularly of Our nuclear deterrent is of course only one part of our
regional powers developing nuclear weapons for the first overall military capability. We are, as before, committed to
time which present a threat to us. Despite our best efforts, ensuring that the investment required to maintain it will not
the number of states with nuclear weapons continues to come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our
grow, and may grow further. We are already trying to armed forces need.
counter the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea and by Some argue that we should put off this decision. But
the nuclear ambitions of Iran. And we need to factor in the one is necessary because the present submarines will start
requirement to deter countries which might in the future to leave service in the early 2020s, and we have to decide
seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism from their soil. We must now whether we want to replace them. Delaying a decision
assume that the global struggle in which we are engaged would risk a future break in our deterrent protection.
today between moderation and extremism will continue These are not decisions a government takes lightly. The
for a generation or more. financial costs are substantial. We would not want to have
Those who question this decision need to explain why available the terrifying power of these weapons unless we
disarmament by the UK would help our security. They would believed that to be necessary to deter a future aggressor.
need to prove that such a gesture would change the minds The Government’s decision followed a careful review
of hardliners and extremists in countries which are developing of all the issues and options, which are set out in full in the
these nuclear capabilities. They would need to show that White Paper. We now look forward to a substantial period
terrorists would be less likely to conspire against us with of public and parliamentary debate in which the issues
hostile governments because we had given up our nuclear can be aired freely. But I am confident that that debate
weapons. They would need to argue that the UK would be will only confirm that maintaining our nuclear deterrent is in
safer by giving up the deterrent and that our capacity to act the best interests of the country’s future security.
would not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by others.
The Government believes that now, as in the Cold War, such
an argument is misguided. We believe that an independent British
nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our insurance against the
uncertainties and risks of the future. We have therefore decided
to maintain our deterrent system beyond the life of the Vanguards
with a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines. We
will also extend the life of the Trident D5 missile.
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Executive Summary
The UK is committed to helping to secure The threat has now changed – but the
international peace and security. global context does not justify complete UK
Since 1956, the nuclear deterrent has nuclear disarmament:
underpinned our ability to do so even in the
most challenging circumstances. Over the - significant nuclear arsenals remain,
last 50 years, it has been used only to deter some of which are being modernised
acts of aggression against our vital interests, and expanded;
never to coerce others. - the number of states possessing nuclear
weapons has continued to grow, as
Why do we need to take demonstrated most recently by North
decisions now? Korea’s attempted nuclear test in
October this year.
At the 2005 General Election our manifesto
made a commitment to retain the UK’s Ballistic missile technology has also
independent nuclear deterrent. Even with continued to proliferate and most
an extension to their lives, the Vanguard industrialised countries have the capability
class submarines are likely to start to develop chemical and biological
leaving service from the early 2020s. We weapons.
estimate that it will take around 17 years
to design, manufacture and commission It is not possible accurately to predict the
a replacement submarine. So we need to global security environment over the next
take decisions now on whether to retain this 20 to 50 years. On our current analysis,
capability in the longer term. we cannot rule out the risk either that a
major direct nuclear threat to the UK’s vital
Why should we retain our nuclear interests will re-emerge or that new states
deterrent? will emerge that possess a more limited
nuclear capability, but one that could pose
The Government’s primary responsibility a grave threat to our vital interests. Equally
is for the security of current and future there is a risk that some countries might in
UK citizens. The UK’s security position future seek to sponsor nuclear terrorism from
has changed from the Cold War, and their soil. We must not allow such states to
this change was reflected in the sharp threaten our national security, or to deter
reductions in the scale and readiness of our us and the international community from
nuclear forces that were set out in the 1998 taking the action required to maintain
Strategic Defence Review. regional and global security.
We can only deter such threats in future We have also decided to participate in
through the continued possession the US life extension programme for the
of nuclear weapons. Conventional Trident D5 missile, which will enable us to
capabilities cannot have the same retain that missile in-service until the early
deterrent effect. We therefore see an 2040s. Our existing nuclear warhead design
enduring role for the UK’s nuclear forces will last into the 2020s. We do not yet have
as an essential part of our capability sufficient information to know whether it
for deterring blackmail and acts of can, with some refurbishment, be extended
aggression against our vital interests beyond that point or whether we will need
by nuclear-armed opponents. to develop a replacement warhead: a
decision is likely to be necessary in the next
We have thus decided to take the steps Parliament.
necessary to sustain a credible deterrent
capability in the 2020s and beyond. What will this cost?
How should we maintain our The costs of this programme will be refined
nuclear deterrent? as we engage in detailed discussion
with industry. Our current estimate is
Our review of the available options has that the procurement costs of the new
demonstrated that retaining a submarine- submarines and associated equipment
based system provides the most effective and infrastructure will be in the region
deterrent; and that no credible alternative of £15-20 billion (at 2006/07 prices) for a
is cheaper. Submarines are far more four-boat fleet. The costs will fall principally
difficult to detect and track and so are less in the period between 2012 and 2027.
vulnerable to attack than the other options. The investment required to maintain our
Ballistic missiles are more effective than deterrent will not come at the expense
cruise missiles because they have much of the conventional capabilities our
greater range and payload, and are far armed forces need. Decisions on the
harder to intercept. level of investments in nuclear and
conventional capability will be taken in the
We have therefore decided to maintain Comprehensive Spending Review, the results
our nuclear deterrent by building a new of which will be announced next year.
class of submarines. Currently we require In-service costs for the deterrent over the
a fleet of four submarines to maintain period between 2020 and 2050 will remain
one continuously on patrol and retaining broadly similar to the current position.
this posture is essential to assure the
invulnerability of the deterrent. We will What are our international
investigate fully whether there is scope to obligations?
make sufficiently radical changes to the
design of the new submarines, and their Renewing our minimum nuclear deterrent
operating, manning, training and support capability is fully consistent with all our
arrangements, to enable us to maintain international obligations. It is also consistent
these continuous deterrent patrols with with our continuing commitment to work
a fleet of only three submarines. A final towards a safer world in which there is no
decision on whether we require three or four requirement for nuclear weapons. We
submarines will be taken when we know have taken a leading role in a wide range
more about their detailed design. of multilateral initiatives in support of the
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 1:
Maintaining our
Nuclear Deterrent
1-1. The United Kingdom is committed
to helping to secure international peace
and security. Since 1956, the UK’s nuclear
deterrent has underpinned our ability
so to do, even in the most challenging
circumstances. Throughout, the UK
has proved itself a responsible steward
of nuclear weapons, reducing our
capability as circumstances have allowed.
Consistently we have employed our nuclear
forces strictly as a means to deter acts of
aggression against our vital interests and
have never sought to use them to coerce
others.
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
10
1-9. Unless we participate in that life
extension programme, it will not be possible
to retain our existing Trident D5 missiles in
service much beyond 2020, except at much
greater cost and technical risk. Decisions on
whether or not we should participate are
required by 2007.
The Warhead
11
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 2:
The Policy Context
2-1. Section 1 set out why decisions have now decided to make a further
on the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent reduction in the number of operationally
are needed now. Given the implications of available warheads. This will be reduced
those decisions, we considered that it was from the present position of fewer than
appropriate also to reassess our policy in this 200 to fewer than 160. Also, we will make
area. a corresponding 20% reduction in the size
of our overall warhead stockpile, which
2-2. Our over-arching policy on includes a small margin to sustain the
nuclear weapons remains as set out in the operationally available warheads.
December 2003 Defence White Paper
(Command 6041-1 Paragraph 3.11): 2-4. These further reductions will mean
that, since coming to power in 1997, we
We are committed to working towards will have reduced the upper limit on the
a safer world in which there is no number of operationally available UK
requirement for nuclear weapons nuclear warheads by nearly half. Since
and continue to play a full role in the end of the Cold War, the UK will have
international efforts to strengthen arms reduced the overall explosive power of its
control and prevent the proliferation nuclear arsenal by around 75%. The UK’s
of chemical, biological and nuclear nuclear deterrent now accounts for less
weapons. However, the continuing than 1% of the global inventory of nuclear
risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and our stockpile is the smallest
weapons, and the certainty that a of those owned by the five nuclear weapon
number of other countries will retain States recognised under the Nuclear Non-
substantial nuclear arsenals, mean Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
that our minimum nuclear deterrent
capability, currently represented by 2-5. In the 1998 Strategic Defence
Trident, is likely to remain a necessary Review we announced that we had by
element of our security. then purchased 58 Trident D5 missiles.
Subsequently, we decided not to take up
Disarmament an option to purchase an additional seven
missiles. As a result of a number of test firings,
2-3. We have taken a series of our current holding has reduced to 50. We
measures (see Box 2-1) to reduce the scale believe that no further procurement of
and readiness of our nuclear forces to Trident D5 missiles will be necessary through
ensure they are the minimum necessary its planned in-service life.
to achieve our deterrent objectives. We
12
Box 2-1: on board. That submarine is normally at
UK Progress on Nuclear several days ‘notice to fire’. Its missiles
Disarmament are not targeted at any country.
2-6. Through the NPT and a wide between the United States and Russia, and
range of fora, including the Conference are encouraging both sides to make further
on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament reductions.
Commission, we continue to work
multilaterally to help and encourage others Counter-Proliferation
to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. In 1998
we ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban 2-7. We have made further efforts
Treaty. We call on other states to do likewise. to counter proliferation of nuclear,
Repeatedly, we have called for negotiations chemical, biological and radiological
to begin immediately and without weapons (see Annex A). We have put
preconditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off in place a comprehensive multilateral
Treaty. Such a treaty would put a global cap strategy to strengthen legally-binding
on the amount of fissile material available to obligations on states to strengthen export
be turned into nuclear weapons. We have controls, to combat supply chains,
supported the significant reductions in the and to prevent old or unused materials
numbers of nuclear weapons achieved from falling into the wrong hands.
by the bilateral arms control initiatives
13
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
14
Conclusions there would need to be much greater
progress, first towards reductions in existing
2-12. We see no reason to change the nuclear stockpiles, and second in securing
judgement reached in the 2003 Defence global adherence to obligations not to
White Paper that the conditions for proliferate nuclear weapons or related
complete UK nuclear disarmament do not technology, under the NPT and other
yet exist. For this judgement to change, treaties and export control regimes.
15
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
strategic ballistic missile and, potentially number of nuclear weapons. North Korea
nuclear-capable, cruise missiles. has short and medium range ballistic
missiles in service and, with the launch of
Other States the Taepo Dong-1 as a satellite launch
vehicle in August 1998, demonstrated
India conducted its first nuclear test in some of the key technologies required
1974 and in 1998 both India and Pakistan for long range multi-stage missiles. The
conducted tests. They are now capable much larger Taepo Dong-2, which
of delivering nuclear weapons by fixed- could be configured either as a satellite
wing aircraft and land-based ballistic launch vehicle or as a ballistic missile,
missiles. Development work on warheads was launched in July 2006 but suffered
and delivery systems continues in both an early in-flight failure. If developed
countries. Both countries are working on successfully, the Taepo Dong-2 would
cruise missiles and India is developing have the capability to reach Europe.
a submarine-launched ballistic missile
capability, which could eventually be Israel is not a signatory of the NPT and
nuclear-armed. is believed to have a nuclear weapons
capability. Israel possesses short and
North Korea attempted a nuclear intermediate range missiles which are
test in October 2006 and is assessed to believed to be capable of delivering
have enough fissile material for a small nuclear warheads.
16
Section 3:
Nuclear Deterrence
in the 21st Century
3-1. Section 2 concluded that, despite a uniquely terrible threat and consequently
our best efforts, the conditions have not yet have a capability to deter acts of
been met to enable the UK to give up its aggression that is of a completely different
nuclear deterrent. This section sets out in more scale to any other form of deterrence.
detail the reasons for retaining a deterrent. Nuclear weapons remain a necessary
element of the capability we need to deter
The Original Rationale for the UK’s threats from others possessing nuclear
Nuclear Deterrent weapons.
3-2. During the Cold War, the UK’s 3-4. Five enduring principles underpin
nuclear deterrent was intended to address on the UK’s approach to nuclear deterrence:
the threat to the UK’s vital interests from the
Soviet Union. NATO did not possess sufficient • our focus is on preventing nuclear attack.
conventional military forces to be confident The UK’s nuclear weapons are not
of defeating an attack by the Warsaw Pact, designed for military use during conflict
and there were significant concerns that but instead to deter and prevent nuclear
the Soviet Union might have considered that blackmail and acts of aggression
the potential advantages of a conventional against our vital interests that cannot be
and chemical attack on Western Europe countered by other means.
outweighed the military risks. Furthermore,
this threat from the Warsaw Pact was backed • the UK will retain only the minimum
up by a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, amount of destructive power required
against which conventional military forces to achieve our deterrence objectives.
could not have hoped to prevail. Since then, Since 1997, the Government has made
successive governments have felt it important a series of reductions in the scale and
to retain an independent deterrent as an readiness of our nuclear forces in line
essential contribution to our security. with changes in the global security
environment. We are now taking further
The UK Approach to Nuclear measures to reduce the scale of our
Deterrence deterrent. We are reducing the number
of operationally available warheads
3-3. The fundamental principles relevant from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160,
to nuclear deterrence have not changed and making a corresponding reduction
since the end of the Cold War, and are in the size of our overall stockpile.
unlikely to change in future. In terms of their
destructive power, nuclear weapons pose
17
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
18
3-8. Currently no state has both the State-Sponsored Terrorism
intent to threaten our vital interests and the
capability to do so with nuclear weapons. 3-11. We know that international terrorists
However, the fact that such a conjunction are trying to acquire radiological weapons.
does not exist today is not a reliable guide In future, there are risks that they may try
to the future. The risks set out above raise to aquire nuclear weapons. While our
the possibility that, at some stage in the nuclear deterrent is not designed to deter
future, nuclear capabilities and hostile intent non-state actors, it should influence the
will become dangerously aligned. We can decision-making of any state that might
foresee nuclear risks in three specific areas: consider transferring nuclear weapons or
nuclear technology to terrorists. We make
Re-emergence of a Major no distinction between the means by which
Nuclear Threat a state might choose to deliver a nuclear
warhead, whether, for example, by missile
3-9. There are risks that, over the next 20 or sponsored terrorists. Any state that we
to 50 years, a major direct nuclear threat to can hold responsible for assisting a nuclear
the UK or our NATO Allies might re-emerge. attack on our vital interests can expect that
A state’s intent in relation to the use or threat this would lead to a proportionate response.
of use of existing capabilities could change
relatively quickly: for example, there was 3-12. A key element of our ability to
little prior warning of the collapse of the exercise effective deterrence in such
Soviet Union. We will continue to work circumstances is our capability precisely
actively with all our friends and partners to determine the source of material
to enhance mutual trust and security, but employed in any nuclear device. We will
we cannot rule out, over the 2020-2050 retain and strengthen the world-leading
timescale, a major shift in the international forensic capability at the Atomic Weapons
security situation which puts us under threat. Establishment, Aldermaston in this area.
We will also continue to work to strengthen
Emerging Nuclear States international expertise in this field.
19
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
20
might miscalculate the degree of in this White Paper. They should be
US commitment to the defence and regarded as complementary to
security of Europe. An independent other forms of defence or response,
deterrent provides the assurance that potentially reinforcing nuclear
it can be used to deter attacks on our deterrence rather than superseding it.
vital interests. An independent centre
of nuclear decision-making in the UK 9. All the UK needs is a dormant
also reinforces the overall deterrent nuclear weapons capability,
effect of allied nuclear forces and from which we could re-establish
thus enhances our security and that a deterrent if and when specific
of NATO allies. threats emerge. Any UK decision to
give up an active credible nuclear
7. Replacing Trident is illegal. deterrent system would, for political
Maintaining a minimum nuclear and cost reasons, be extremely
deterrent is fully consistent with all difficult to reverse. In practice, the
our international legal obligations, timeframe for re-establishing a
including those under the NPT (as set credible minimum deterrent would
out in paragraphs 2-9 to 2-11). probably be longer than the likely
warning of any change in intent of
8. Ballistic missile defence could an established nuclear power or any
take the place of the UK’s nuclear covert programme elsewhere to
deterrent. Ballistic missile defences develop nuclear weapons. Also, any
are only designed to be able to move from a dormant programme
defend against limited missile towards an active one could be seen
attacks. They do not, on their own, as escalatory, and thus potentially
provide a complete defence destabilising, in a crisis.
against the full range of risks set out
21
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 4:
Ensuring Effective
Deterrence
4-1. If they are to have the required and covertly, to increase or decrease its
deterrent effect, our nuclear forces need to readiness thereby giving the Government
continue to be credible against the range of maximum flexibility in terms of setting and
risks and threats described in Section 3. This adjusting our nuclear deterrent posture: this
section describes the key characteristics that is especially important during a crisis.
are necessary to establish this credibility.
Range
Invulnerability and Readiness
4-4. There is increasing uncertainty
4-2. A deterrent system must be able about the nature of future risks and
to function irrespective of any pre-emptive challenges to UK security. Whereas
action that might be taken by a potential during the Cold War the likely source of
aggressor. Also, it is important for safety threats was well established, the position
and security reasons that our nuclear is more uncertain now and may be
forces are protected properly at all times even less clear by the 2020s. Therefore
against actions ranging from a full scale we believe that our nuclear deterrent
strategic nuclear strike to a terrorist attack. should retain our existing capability to
There are a number of ways in which deter threats anywhere in the world.
this might be achieved: by making the
system invulnerable to attack; by having a 4-5. Closely linked to the range of our
sufficiently large capability that even a full nuclear capability is the question of whether
scale attack would not prevent the launch we should plan on simultaneously or near
of an effective counter strike; by making the simultaneously having to deter more than
system difficult to target, most obviously by one threat against our vital interests. While
making it undetectable; and by holding the it is theoretically possible to envisage some
system continuously at a sufficiently high eventualities where this question might arise,
level of readiness that it could be launched we do not believe that this factor should
before any pre-emptive strike takes effect. determine either the nature or scale of our
deterrent system.
4-3. Our preference is for an
invulnerable and undetectable system, Independence
which allows us to maintain it at a minimum
level of scale and readiness, but we believe 4-6. The UK’s nuclear forces must remain
that it should also be capable of being fully operationally independent if they are
held at high readiness for extended periods to be a credible deterrent. It is essential that
of time. It should be possible, both overtly we have the necessary degree of assurance
22
that we can employ our deterrent to defend Scale
our vital interests. The UK’s current nuclear
deterrent is fully operationally independent 4-9. We need to make a judgement
of the US: on the minimum destructive capability
necessary to provide an effective
• decision-making and use of the system deterrent posture. This judgement requires
remains entirely sovereign to the UK; an assessment of the decision-making
• only the Prime Minister can authorise processes of future potential aggressors,
the use of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, and an analysis of the effectiveness of the
even if the missiles are to be fired as part defensive measures that they might employ.
of a NATO response; Retaining some degree of uncertainty over
• the instruction to fire would be the nature and scale of our response to
transmitted to the submarine using only any particular set of circumstances is an
UK codes and UK equipment; important part of our overall deterrence
• all the command and control posture. However, we believe that our
procedures are fully independent; and existing capability to deploy up to 48
• the Vanguard-class submarines can warheads on the submarine on deterrent
operate readily without the Global patrol is sufficient. As with our current
Positioning by Satellite (GPS) system and deterrent, the ability to vary the numbers
the Trident D5 missile does not use GPS of missiles and warheads which might be
at all: it has an inertial guidance system. employed, coupled with the continued
There is nothing in the planned Trident availability of a lower yield from our
D5 life extension programme that will warhead, can make our nuclear forces a
change this position. more credible deterrent against smaller
nuclear threats.
4-7. We continue to believe that the
costs of developing a nuclear deterrent
relying solely on UK sources outweigh
the benefits. We do not see a good case
for making what would be a substantial
additional investment in our nuclear
deterrent purely to insure against a, highly
unlikely, deep and enduring breakdown in
relations with the US. We therefore believe
that it makes sense to continue to procure
elements of the system from the US.
23
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 5:
Deterrent Options,
Solutions and Costs
5-1. The previous two sections have with ballistic missiles. Table 5-1 shows their
described why we wish to retain a nuclear relative through-life costs.
deterrent, and the key attributes we believe
that it should continue to have. This section 5-3. The process by which these options
sets out the various options that we have were identified, and the details of our
considered and the extent to which each assessment of them, is set out in Annex B. We
option meets our requirements. It also sets rejected the large aircraft option primarily
out our proposed solution and how much because of vulnerability to pre-emptive
this will cost. attacks and because of the costs involved
in procuring new large aircraft and the
The Options supporting refuelling tankers, providing new
infrastructure, and designing and procuring
5-2. Four generic options were a new cruise missile. Silo-based systems
subjected to detailed assessment and in the UK could be a credible deterrent
comparative costing: a large aircraft only against states with a limited nuclear
equipped with cruise missiles; silo-based capability, and even then there would be
ballistic missiles; and both surface and significant additional costs compared to
sub-surface maritime platforms equipped a submarine-based system capable of
3
Relative
Through Life
Costs
0
Submarine Surface Ship Silo Aircraft
24
deterring all credible threats. A deterrent shortly to commence detailed concept work.
based on surface ships would be less We believe this programme will be sufficiently
capable, more vulnerable and no less mature for us to place a contract for their
expensive than a submarine-based solution. detailed design by around 2012 to 2014.
5-4. We considered the relative merits 5-6. We have started to consider some
of deploying cruise or ballistic missiles on of the fundamental design issues. We
a submarine. Any programme to develop believe that the new submarines will need
and manufacture a new cruise missile to be nuclear powered, as conventional
would cost far more than retaining the propulsion systems cannot currently
Trident D5 missile. In capability terms, generate sufficient power and endurance
cruise missiles are much less effective than to meet our requirements. We envisage that
a ballistic missile (see Box 5-1). Therefore the design of the new SSBNs will maximise
it was clear that, in terms of both cost the degree of commonality with other
and capability, retaining the Trident D5 in-service submarines where this can be
missile is by far the best approach. done in a cost-effective manner. The scope
for this will be determined during the next
Next Steps phase of work. However, some changes to
the design of the Vanguard-class will be
5-5. We have decided to maintain our required, to take account of equipment
existing nuclear deterrent capability by obsolescence, the need to continue to
replacing the Vanguard-class submarines meet modern safety standards and to
with a new class of submarines and we plan maximise the scope to make the new SSBNs
25
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
26
over the timescales involved but the the next decade the costs of AWE are likely
procurement costs are likely on average – at their peak – to be the equivalent of
to be the equivalent of around 3% of the about 3% of the current defence budget
current defence budget over the main (compared to about 2.5% today).
period of expenditure. This is around
the same as for the Trident programme. 5-14. Once the new fleet of SSBNs comes
In meeting our public spending into service, we expect that the in-service
commitments, the MOD continues to costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which
pursue a high level of efficiency savings will include AWE’s costs, will be similar to
today (around 5-6% of the defence budget).
5-13. We will continue the programme
of investment in sustaining capabilities 5-15. The investment required to
at the Atomic Weapons Establishment maintain our deterrent will not come at the
(AWE), both to ensure we can maintain expense of the conventional capabilities
the existing warhead for as long as our armed forces need. Decisions on the
necessary and to enable us to develop a level of our investments in nuclear and
replacement warhead if that is required. conventional capability will be taken in the
Additional investment averaging £350 Comprehensive Spending Review, the results
million per annum over the years 2005/06 to of which will be announced next year.
2007/08 was announced last year. Further
investment will be necessary, and early in
27
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 6:
Industrial Aspects
6.1 Designing and building new SSBNs, 6.2 In our Defence Industrial Strategy,
and integrating them with other elements published in December 2005, we explained
of the overall system, will be a significant that the UK’s fleet of nuclear powered
technical challenge for the Ministry of submarines requires a specialist subset
Defence and for industry. Nuclear powered of skills within the maritime industry.
submarines carrying ballistic missiles Over many years the UK has developed
represent, in engineering terms, one of the a high level of expertise in the design,
most complex and technically demanding manufacture and maintenance of nuclear
systems in existence. powered submarines. The early stages of
the programme to build the new Astute-
class conventional role submarines were,
however, difficult, in part due to less than
optimal industrial and design arrangements,
resulting in a submarine design that could
not initially be built at planned cost. Lessons
have been learnt from that programme.
Nevertheless, more change is needed
for industry to be able to deliver a new
programme on time and at an acceptable
cost. We believe that the imperative for
change is well recognised.
28
6.4 For the replacement SSBN Disposal Policy
programme we expect that there will be a
much greater collaborative effort between 6.7 The disposal of the Vanguard-
the MOD and industry than has been the class submarines is still some way off, and
case in the recent past. it is therefore too early to estimate the
possible decommissioning costs. When the
6.5 The current industrial structure limits Vanguard submarines leave naval service,
the scope for system-level competition they will be subject to a process known as
in the UK. Therefore a key to successful Defuel, De-equip and Lay-up Preparation,
procurement in the UK would be to work which will involve spent nuclear fuel and
closely with industry right down the other materials being removed for storage
supply chain to put in place sustainable at Sellafield, and any remaining irradiated
collaborative arrangements that run material being secured within the reactor
through the life of the platform. This is compartment. In line with current practice
important for driving down the whole-life for other submarines now leaving service,
costs of the programme. We will also seek the submarines themselves with then be
to bear down on the costs by sourcing stored afloat at Devonport, pending final
some sub-system elements from overseas in disposal. Afloat storage has proved to be a
line with the policy set out in the Defence safe arrangement for over 20 years.
Industrial Strategy.
6.8 We are examining options for the
Safety and Regulation disposal of defuelled nuclear powered
submarines, including future storage of the
6.6 Safety will be a key element resulting intermediate level radioactive
of the design and operation of the material. This work is linked closely to the
replacement SSBNs. The operation of our work of the Committee on Radioactive
nuclear-powered submarines is regulated Waste Management, which has recently
by independent safety authorities within reported on the wider question of the
the MOD, whilst the Nuclear Installations storage of UK nuclear waste. We are also
Inspectorate license facilities for reactor working with industry to ensure that any
construction and deep maintenance. A future nuclear submarine is designed to
fundamental principle applied by those facilitate the safe decommissioning and
authorities is that successful safety risk storage of nuclear materials.
management is founded in a proper
understanding of nuclear technologies.
29
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Section 7:
Future Decisions
Submarine
Trident
D5 Missile Life Extension Possible D5 Successor
Missile
30
we may need to refurbish or replace this a successor to the life extended D5 missile,
warhead are likely to be necessary in the and what form any successor might take,
next Parliament. In order to inform these are unlikely to be necessary until the 2020s.
decisions, we will undertake a detailed
review of the optimum life of the existing 7-6. We have sought, and received,
warhead stockpile and analyse the range assurances from the US Government that,
of replacement options that might be in the event they decide to develop a
available. This will include a number of successor to the D5 missile, the UK will
activities to be undertaken with the United have the option of participating in such
States under the 1958 UK-US Agreement for a programme. We have also received an
Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy assurance that any successor to the D5
for Mutual Defence Purposes. should be compatible, or can be made
compatible, with the launch system to be
The Delivery System installed in our new SSBNs. These and other
assurances will be set out in an exchange of
7-5. We expect that the new class of letters between the Prime Minister and the
SSBNs will have a design life of at least 25 President of the United States, the texts of
years. On this basis, the new SSBNs would be which will be published.
unlikely to start going out of service until the
2050s, which will go beyond the planned life 7-7. These agreements will ensure that,
of the Trident D5 missile, even when its life if future UK Governments wish, they will have
is extended out to the early 2040s. Further the option of retaining a nuclear deterrent
investment will be necessary if we wish to capability throughout the lives of the new
sustain an effective nuclear delivery system class of SSBNs.
throughout the life of the new submarines.
Decisions on whether we wish to acquire
31
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Annex A:
The UK’s Non-Proliferation
Efforts
International Atomic Energy Agency UNSCR 1540: The UK was one of the
(IAEA): The UK is working closely with the leading proponents of UN Security Council
IAEA to develop assurances of supply Resolution 1540, which established legally-
for nuclear fuel, which provide energy binding obligations on all UN Member
security without the need for proliferation States to take steps to combat proliferation
of sensitive enrichment technology. of weapons of mass destruction through
Our latest “enrichment bond” proposal, national legislation, co-operative action,
involving advance consent for exports of development of effective export controls
low enriched uranium, has been very well and physical protection of WMD related
received. We also continue to press for materials. In September 2004, the UK
agreement to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol was one of the first states to comply with
to be made a condition of supply before the national implementation reporting
a state can receive any sensitive nuclear requirements of UNSCR 1540.
technology. We have agreed an Additional
Protocol to our Safeguards Agreements Libya/AQ Khan: The UK played a key role in
with the IAEA, and all UK enrichment and the process that led to Libya’s announcement,
reprocessing facilities are now liable to in December 2003, that it would eliminate
international safeguards inspections. its chemical, biological and nuclear
programmes and limit its missile projects. This
Iran/IAEA: Since 2003, the UK, France and process contributed to the discovery and
Germany have been leading international dismantling of the proliferation activities being
diplomatic efforts to convince Iran fully to pursued by the AQ Khan network.
co-operate with the IAEA over international
concerns about its nuclear programme. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):
Latterly, this has involved working closely The UK has been involved actively in driving
with the US, Russia and China in the UN forward the PSI, which aims to prevent the
Security Council. This led, in July this year, to acquisition and development of chemical,
the adoption of UNSCR 1696. biological, radiological and nuclear
weapons by states of concern and non-state
Middle East WMD Free Zone: The UK actors, together with those who supply such
continues to support the creation of programmes through trafficking in sensitive
an effective and verifiable chemical, materials, equipment and technology.
biological, radiological and nuclear-free
zone in the Middle East, in keeping with the Export Control Regimes: The UK is a
resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT leading and active member of the Nuclear
Review and Extension Conference. Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the
32
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Presidents of the United States and
the Zangger Committee - arrangements Russia in July this year. The initiative calls for
which aim to minimise the risk of assisting co-operation in efforts directed at, among
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and other things, improving control of nuclear
Nuclear weapons and ballistic missile materials, and detecting and suppressing
proliferation through more effective national illicit trafficking of such materials.
level export licensing measures.
Norwegian 7 Country Initiative: The
G8 Global Partnership Co-operative UK is an active member of the 7 Country
Threat Reduction: The UK has committed up Initiative, which aims to foster fresh
to $750 million over ten years to this work and thinking on how we can take forward
currently supports projects to help dismantle the three pillars of the NPT – access
old Russian nuclear submarines, dispose of 34 to nuclear technology for exclusively
tonnes of plutonium in Russia, destroy Russia’s peaceful purposes, non-proliferation and
stocks of chemical weapons (a total of 40,000 disarmament.
tonnes) and create new employment for
former Soviet weapons scientists. Such efforts Chemical Weapons Convention
prevent the materials used to make chemical, (CWC)/Biological and Toxin Weapons
biological, radiological and nuclear Convention: We are working with the
weapons, and the weapons themselves, from European Union to encourage and help all
falling into the wrong hands. countries accede to both treaties and to
implement fully their obligations. In the last
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 5 years over 20 additional countries have
Terrorism (GICNT): The UK is an Initial joined the CWC.
Partner Nation of the GICNT, unveiled by
33
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Annex B:
Options Assessment
Process
B-1. Before arriving at decisions, we B-3. We rejected mobile land-based
undertook a thorough review of the widest systems because of the serious concerns
possible range of options to replace the at the technological risks involved with
Vanguard-class submarines. We then used developing such systems, given that
a detailed assessment process to narrow no such capability is currently readily
the range of options under consideration available from reliable sources. We also
to four generic options: a large aircraft perceived major vulnerability and security
equipped with cruise missiles; silo-based difficulties in operating any such system
ballistic missiles; and both surface and within a relatively small and densely
sub-surface maritime platforms equipped populated island such as the UK.
with ballistic missiles. Some flexibility was
included within these options to enable B-4. The only ballistic missile which we
trade-offs to be made between potential considered in any detail in the analysis was
costs and capability. There was also the Trident D5 missile. In capability terms, this
scope to consider variants between the missile meets all our likely future operational
four options: for example, although cruise requirements. And the costs of retaining
missiles were considered as part of the air- this missile in service out to the early 2040s
launched option, the analysis also enabled are greatly exceeded by the potential
consideration of the possibility of delivering costs and technical risks associated with
cruise missiles from a submarine or surface any programme to acquire an alternative
ship. ballistic missile system. There would be some
costs and risks associated with adapting
B-2. We discarded some of the other the Trident D5 missile for use in a surface
possible options for the following reasons. ship or silo because of the likely need for an
We rejected the possibilities of employing extensive engineering and test programme.
short- and medium-range aircraft operating But adapting the Trident D5 missile would still
from the UK or overseas, or short- or be likely to represent, by some way, the most
medium-range land-based missiles, on the cost-effective delivery system for any UK silo-
grounds that these options lacked sufficient or surface ship-based deterrent.
range. Even aircraft launched from aircraft-
carriers would not meet our range criteria.
Furthermore, these options would be
vulnerable to pre-emptive attacks whilst on
the ground or at sea, or to interception by
air defence systems whilst in the air.
34
The Four Generic Options Operational Posture:
• Impracticable to sustain continuous
B-5 We undertook a cost and airborne deterrent patrols
capability-based assessment of the • Aircraft normally retained at high alert
four generic options against the basic on the ground
requirements for our nuclear deterrent
described in Section 4. The conclusions of B-6 Assessment: The combination
this analysis are as follows: of a long-range aircraft armed with
cruise missiles suffers from several major
Option 1: drawbacks. The whole system would
A long-range aircraft be vulnerable particularly to pre-
equipped with cruise missiles emptive attacks: whilst on the ground, to
conventional and nuclear missile threats,
and to terrorist attacks, and once airborne,
to surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.
Similar concerns would also apply to the
airborne refuelling tankers, which would
be essential if the aircraft were to be
able to meet the requirement to be able
to deter threats anywhere in the world.
Cruise missiles are also significantly more
vulnerable to being intercepted than
ballistic missiles because they fly at much
lower speed and altitude.
Airbus A350
B-7 Even with a fleet of 20 large aircraft,
Platform: we would also face a major challenge in
• 20 large converted civil aircraft plus 20 terms of guaranteeing a sufficient capability
refuelling aircraft to establish an effective deterrence
• Range (with refuelling) in excess of posture. Also we had concerns about
20,000km meeting readiness requirements: measures
• Capacity to carry four large cruise to increase the readiness of aircraft on
missiles the ground would be visible and therefore
potentially escalatory in a crisis.
Delivery system:
• Subsonic cruise missile (new B-8 Finally, in terms of costs, assuming a
development or off-the-shelf purchase) fleet of 20 aircraft, this option was the most
• Range up to 3,000 km expensive of the four generic options, with
• New nuclear warhead through-life costs more than double those
of a submarine option, the main cost drivers
Infrastructure and Support: being procurement of the new aircraft
• Two large main operating bases (one and delivery system and the extensive new
new, one a modified existing base) infrastructure requirements. Overall, this was
• New nuclear storage facilities and the most expensive and by some distance
command and control system the least capable option.
• Extensive new training burden
35
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Delivery System:
• Adapted Trident D5 missile
Operational Posture:
• Continuous at sea deterrent patrols Test firing a Minuteman III missile (picture
courtesy of the US Department of Defense)
B-9 Assessment: We concluded that
the option of developing large surface ships Platform:
able to launch ballistic missiles suffered • Two silo fields, each with 16 widely
from serious drawbacks, primarily relating dispersed silos
to vulnerability and security. Compared
to a submarine, a large surface ship is Delivery system:
easier to detect and track, including from • adapted Trident D5 missile
space-based systems, and also is rather
easier to attack, whether from the air or Infrastructure and Support:
by a submarine. Continuous at sea patrols • Acquisition of new land: each silo
probably could be sustained with a fleet of field covering several hundred square
only three ships (compared to four for the kilometres
36
• Construction of the silos plus associated E Warren Air Base in Wyoming, with a total
command and control bunkers of 150 silos, is dispersed across an area of
• Hardened communications link to 12,600 square miles, one and a half times
political decision-makers to enable very the size of Wales. Such an approach is
high readiness entirely impractical in the UK. Clustering silos
• New infrastructure to transport the together in a small area, for example within
missiles from the manufacturer to the silos the existing boundaries of an RAF base
in the UK, would leave them vulnerable
Operational Posture: to being destroyed by a single incoming
• Continuous deterrent capability, with nuclear-armed missile.
the ability to hold very high readiness
levels for extended periods of time B-11 The option was considered of
holding ground-based missiles at sufficiently
high readiness to be launched before
any incoming missile reached the target.
However, this would not be an effective
deterrent posture, as it is possible that there
would only be a few minutes warning of a
ballistic missile attack on the UK, leaving
very little time to make decisions, and it
would require an extremely expensive and
Area of Warren Air Force Base complex command and control system
= 12,600 2 miles
to retain political control over the launch
procedure in such circumstances. Holding
Area of Great Britain
= 80,800 2 miles our nuclear forces at such high readiness
could be highly destabilising in a crisis.
37
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent
Infrastructure:
• Some modernisation of submarine
infrastructure at Faslane and Coulport
Operational Posture:
• Continuous at sea deterrent patrols
38
B-15 A submarine-based solution
equipped with ballistic missiles also meets
our other key requirements. It can be
deployed covertly and achieve deterrent
effect anywhere in the world. We can also
change its readiness state either covertly
or, if required as a demonstration of intent,
overtly, for example by announcing the
deployment of a second SSBN.
Conclusion
39
The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent