Argentina's fifty years

of crisis
Jim Levy
As if in a recurrent nightm are, the
A rgentine people seem trap p ed in an
unending cycle of disaster. The latest episodes
followed upon each o th er w ith frightening
alacrity: hum iliation in the M alvinas, the
forced resignation o f G eneral G altieri, the
sordid internecine struggle for pow er in the
w ake of defeat, and failure at M adrid of the
once w orld-cham pion soccer team . A rgentina
is a com m unity und er alm ost unbearable
pressure in every facet of its existence: a state
w ithout legitim acy, politicians unable and
unw illing to establish a w orkable consensus,
an econom y in sham bles, a m ilitary, b rutal
and brutalised ap p aren tly beyond any
constraints, a civilian p o p u latio n largely
te r r o r is e d , s u b m is s iv e , c o n fu s e d a n d
dem oralised.
To the dispassionate observer, the invasion
of the M alvinas, w hatever the legitimacy of
A rgentina's claim , m ight seem quixotic,
bizarre. In this day, it represents crude
irredentism , a terribly m istaken adventure to
achieve sovereignty over som e rem ote islands
sparsely populated w ith anglophiles in the
S outh A tlantic. T hose w ho u n d erto o k the
enterprise staked not only their own careers
but also the n atio n 's prestige on an illconceived, poorly planned m ilitary operation
w hich closed off any possibilities of
diplom atic solution before an intransigent,
better-arm ed enemy. The u tter failure of the
m ilitary governm ent to achieve any of its

objectives dem onstrates yet again the

b ankruptcy of its leaders and thus condem ns
A rgentina to further political instability,
econom ic failure and social conflict.
It is these failures which partly explain why
the m ilitary decided to ab an d o n negotiations
over the M alvinas and to invade. Increasing
pressure from civilian politicians, organised
labor, industrialists and the constituency
form ed aro u n d "the disappeared" had already
forced m ost elem ents w ithin the arm ed forces
to concede the need for a limited political
opening. M uch of the political pressure
resulted from m onetarist policies which, in
the nam e of liberating "m arket forces" (the
only liberation know n to have occurred in
A rgentina since
1976), have inflicted
enorm ous dam age upon local industry and its
e m p lo y e e s . W h ile th e e x p o r te r s o f
agricultural produce flourished and, with
them , the traditional oligarchy of estancieros
(cattle barons), the m ajority of Argentines
have witnessed a very serious drop in their
standard of living. Thus, the m ilitary which
pledged in 1976 to end "subversion" and to
build an econom y capable of sustained
grow th, needed to find p o pular support in the
face of its econom ic failures, or at least to
deflect its responsibility for them. Now the
m ilitary confronts a m uch deeper crisis.
Why has this country, endowed with all
m anner of resources, failed to develop along
lines followed by A ustralia or C anada? W hy

Argentina

49

w anting but also believed th a t only they

possessed the abnegation to p u t the nation's
interest above personal gain. Elem ents of
fascist thought, adm ired w ithin certain
m ilitary circles, surfaced in the rhetoric and,
to a lesser degree, in the actions of the
governm ent: the them es of discipline,
au th o rity , loyalty to th e patria, repudiation of
liberal values, and rejection of those w ho
adhered to them , all came to the fore.
A lthough this governm ent lasted only little
m ore th an a year, it is a precursor. In 1932 a
frau d u len t election produced a governm ent
whose econom ic policies and political
conduct rem ained faithful to the pre-1930
norm s; outw ardly, A rgentina returned to the
status quo ante.

did social conflict grow to the point where, by

1974-75, the co u n try was on the brink of civil
w a r? W hy h a v e d e m o c r a tic a n d
representative in stitutions so disintegrated
that the m ilitary has intervened at least seven
times since 1930 an d the last elected president
to com plete a full term in office was Ju a n
Peron (1946-52)? W hy have the bonds of this
society so eroded th a t since 1976 its selfa p p o in te d g u a rd ia n s " d is a p p e a re d "
som ew here betw een 6,000 an d 15,000 of
their fellow citizens, m urdered thousands
more an d terrorised m any of the rem ainder
in to s ile n c e , e x ile , s u b m is s io n o r
acquiescence? Is there any connection
betw een the crisis over the S outh A tlantic
islands and A rgentina's past and present
dom estic situation?
The A rgentine p ro b 'em becam e m anifest in
1930 w h en th e a rm y o v e rth re w an
incom petent and co rru p t but dem ocratically
elected constitu tio n al governm ent. The
justification for arm y intervention sounded
om inous: the econom ic and political situation
dem anded strong, idealistic governm ent. The
m ilitary leaders n o t only found dem ocracy

A ppearances deceive. A fter 1930, the

m ilitary becam e the m ajor political force in
A rgentina, unable to extract itself from
politics even when it has wanted to (and this
desire has surfaced on several occasions). The
reasons are com plex: m any officers do believe
sincerely th at the m ilitary is the repository of
selfless patriotism to defend the nation's
sovereignty and the A rgentine "way of life'' on
behalf of which life itself may be sacrificed.
N um erous A rgentines accepted this view, at
least until 1955; it would be a m istake to deny
the popularity of the military.
A t the same time, los que m andan (those
who rule), som e of whose ranks are filled by
m ilitary officers, have em ployed the arm y
w ithout qualm to accom plish n atio n al tasks
from elim inating the indigenous people
occupying the rich pam pas in the 1880s to
term inating "subversion", w hatever the cost,
in the late 1970s. Industrialisation also has
draw n the arm ed forces deeply into politics.
They encouraged the grow th of heavy
industries partly in the nam e o f national
security during the 1940s; then they m anaged
them and profited from them . Thus, the
m ilitary is as deeply im plicated in the nation's
political and econom ic failures as the civilians
they replace. A fter each attem p t at rule the
arm ed forces' chiefs emerge divided w ithin
and obviously as incom petent and venal as
their civilian predecessors. They are also far
m ore brutal.

50

ALR

The Argentine economic riddle

The econom ic riddle is why A rgentina has
grow n at such a slow rate since the 1920s. It
m ight come as a surprise to A ustralians to
know th at in 1914 A rgentina enjoyed a per
capita income higher than th at received here.
Based upon the cultivation and export of
agricultural produce wool, w heat, beef
A rgentina had achieved a stan d ard of living
equal to that of A ustralia on the eve of W orld
W ar I. But by the 1920s, from the evidence, it
is clear that A rgentina began to lag behind
C anada and A ustralia: both agricultural
p roduction and exports the basis of the
whole econom y dropped off.
At first, the econom ic collapse of 1930
rocked A rgentina no less th an all the other
com parable countries. In econom ic policy,
the governm ents of the 1930s attem pted to
restore trade relations by assuring themselves
of the traditional ex p o rt m arket (G reat
Britain) via agreem ents that blatan tly favored
the ex p ort-oriented oligarchy and British
interests in A rgentina. This policy, despite its
political and social im plications, resulted in
the partial recovery of the ex p o rt sector and,
surprisingly, the developm ent of A rgentine
industry. O utw ardly, A rgentina's econom y
survived the depression well.
But the political and social bonds were
loosening. At no tim e p rior to o r during the
1930s had the small group which dom inated
A rgentina seriously addressed the problem s
of social injustice or political fraud,
co rru p tio n and repression. Indeed, the
A rg e n tin e o lig arch y e n d u re d precisely
because it refused to do so. The developm ent
of the labor m ovem ent was met with
repression and coercion, som etim es savagely.
W hat little social legislation em erged from the
C ongress was sim ply not enforced. The
Congress, itself com posed of m en often
fraudulently elected, faithfully represented
the oligarchy which it served. The state
becam e little m ore than a vast patronage
agency in which interests, as petty as th a t of
the ja n ito r in need of w ork and as pow erful as
Royal D utch Shell in search of concessions,
were reconciled at the expense of the public. A

gap broadened and deepened between a huge

mass of the unrepresented and the urban
middle and upper class consum ers unbridged
by trade unions, but adequate educational
facilities, by a spirit of com prom ise, or even
by noblesse oblige. In such circum stances,
nationalism emerged as A rgentina's p o litic a l'
and social m ortar.
In c re a s in g ly d u r in g th e 1920s, the
Argentines (with other Latin Americans)
reacted against the econom ic and cultural
hegem ony exercised prim arily by E urope,
and to a lesser extend by the United States.
British control of the railroads and m eat
packing (the latter shared with US interests),
and the great British influence over finance
and tran sp o rt (am ong other econom ic
activities) constantly rem inded A rgentines
that, despite the level o f developm ent, they
lived in an econom ic colony. M anufacturing
industry was precarious. W hen im ports were
cut off as occurred betw een 1914-1918, the
A rgentine econom y revealed an extrem ely
u n h e a lth y d e p e n d e n c e on im p o r te d
m anufactured goods and on such raw
m aterials as coal.
N ationalists advanced the need for greater
A rgentine control over the economy. But
nationalism did not react to capital alone; it
also reacted to the huge num ber of m igrants
who brought their skills, labor, religions and
la n g u a g e s to A rg e n tin a . N a tio n a lis m
essentially is anti-toreign. Nevertheless, in
19th century Europe it functioned to bring
into the political system the disfranchised
lower and m iddle classes thus constituting a
progressive force. However, in the 20th
century, nationalism has w orked to frustrate
th at process and to divert energy tow ards
constructing ever larger symbolic differences
between states and other large groups.
Currents of Argentine nationalism
T hus, by 1930, one of the frightening
currents w ithin A rgentine nationalism ,
ascribed to by m any of the officers and their
civilian supporters, was an openly fascistic
ad o ratio n of an au th o ritarian , largely selfsufficient state. Econom ically, it m eant the

Argentina

51
The econom ic requirem ents determ ined by
the depression did not perm it econom ic
nationalism in the 1930s. A return to fraud
and corru p tio n behind the facade of
dem ocratic governm ent forestalled the
im m ediate im position of authoritarianism .
S teadfast resistance to claims for social justice
and continued repression of the labor
m ovem ent substituted for the kind of
v oluntary discipline hoped for by the right;
culturally, the nationalists m ade great
headway.
Even before they emerged triu m p h an t in
1943, the nationalists m anaged to establish
A rgentina's neutrality during the war. In fact,
n eutrality m ade good econom ic sense (the
G erm ans did not torpedo A rgentine ships
carrying food for the British), but it was also a
victory fo r the pro-A xis forces and is evidence
of the increasing influence of rightist,
a u th o ritaria n nationalism w ithin A rgentina.

developm ent of heavy industry and control of

foreign capital; politically, it involved the
m aintenance of a m odern well-equipped arm y
to protect the state and to advance its
interests; socially, it required discipline; and
culturally, it exalted allegedly orth o d o x
C hristian values (supposedly once dom inant
in pre-British A rgentina) and denigrated
anything and anyone seen to deviate from
these. T hus, pluralism , Jew s, com m unism ,
liberalism , m ost Italians, certainly English
Protestants and hosts of other people and
ideas were to be driven from the temple.
This curren t w ithin A rgentine nationalism
enjoyed little p o p u lar su p p o rt in 1930, but it
was to com e to the surface on several
occasions and is today a very pow erful force.
Its significance, then as now , is th at it
obscures serious econom ic, political and
social divisions, and th a t m any powerful
figures, especially in the m ilitary, adhere to it.
These nationalists, m any of w hom come from
the A rgentine elite, did not envision in 1930,
nor do they in 1982, the kind of state in which
social conflict can at least be attenuated
through a m ore equitable distribution of
production a n d a m ore effective participation
in politics.

Byzantine politics
The byzantine politics of the years 1943-45
take their significance prim arily (but not
exclusively) from the emergence of Ju a n
P eron. Before discussing the relationship of
P eron to the present situation, how ever, it
should be rem em bered that A rgentine
nationalism had taken a nasty tu rn based
upon an econom y losing its dynam ism and
within a polity which had forfeited m uch of its
legitimacy.
The first Peron era lasted from 1945 to
1955. D uring these ten years Peron blended
the various nationalist them es, and added
im p o rtan t new elements. Above all, he
provided A rgentine nationalism w ith a
profoundly po pular base far too p o p u lar to
the m inds of m ost of the A rgentine oligarchy.
This was achieved partly th ro u g h a m ajor
reorientation of the econom y aw ay from the
d om inant role played by foreign trade and
foreign capital to the developm ent of heavy
industry based upon the m obilisation of
national capital from private and public
sources.
Peron made agriculture, the
econom ic foundation of the oligarchy, pay for
industry. Sound econom ic argum ents can be

ALR
a d v a n c e d in P e r o n 's d e fe n c e . A r g e n t i n a w as
far to o dep en dent on e x p o rts of p rim ary
products;
th e
export
sector was
not
c o m p e t i n g su c ces sfu lly w ith A u s t r a l i a a n d
C a n a d a ( a m o n g -other n a t i o n s e x p o r t i n g
food); A rg en tin a possessed a d e q u a te h u m a n
r e s o u r c e s to s u s ta in in d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ; a n d the
size o f th e i n t e r n a l m a r k e t a ll o w e d fo r th e
p u r c h a s e o f local m a n u f a c t u r e s .

Impressive
In fact, the perform ance was im pressive at
least until 1948-49. Then the rot became
increasingly manifest: p o o r agricultural
production or p o o r trade results o r a
com bination of b o th (depending on the year)
caused frequent im balances of trade and
paym ents with the inevitable squeeze on
f o r e ig n e x c h a n g e . H a v in g d e c la r e d
A rgentina's econom ic independence in 1947,
P eron did not welcome foreign capital, and
although he was forced to reconsider this
policy in 1953, A rgentina now revealed the
chronic econom ic difficulties from which it
continues to suffer: stagflation or boom or
bust, but not steady grow th. W hen Peron fell
in 1955, A rgentina was an industrialised
nation but a t a substantial price paid
p r im a rily by th e a g r ic u ltu r a l s e c to r.
A gricultural production, on which exports
depended, stagnated or declined. This
represented a m ajor change in the nation's
eco n o m y and tra u m a tic p o litic a l
repercussions resulted.
A g a in s t th e a t t a c k s o f p o w e r f u l
agricultural interests, m any of which were
linked to foreign capital, Peron m oved with
consum m ate skill and speed. T o create a
political force loyal only to him self he
virtually created, organised and then co
opted a massive labor m ovem ent by granting
all m anner of econom ic and political favors.
In 1943, before he becam e President, Peron
began to mobilise the A rgentine masses for
the first time in the nation's history. As
President, he tau g h t them th a t the state had
responsibilities to assure social justice, and
was rew arded m any times until his death in
1974 with alm ost unquestioned political
support. U ntil 1955, with th a t support he

could take on and defeat m ost challenges

throw n up by the oligarchy. But it would be a
serious erro r to believe th a t Peron merely
handed out turkeys (o r beef steaks) in
exchange for votes. To the contrary: even
when the goodies ran out (certainly by 1952 or
before) he m aintained the loyalty of the
masses. (T hroughout his career Peron
skilfully m anipulated nationalism to create a
half-baked ideology which was
easily
understood and extrem ely popular.)

Economic nationalism
F i r s t , P e r o n e x p lo ite d e c o n o m ic
nationalism . He bought the British-owned
railroads, declared the nation's independence
of foreign capital, nationalised activities such
as telecom m unications, deemed to be
essential to national security, and em ployed
state capital to develop heavy industries some
of which, like th a t of steel, became enterprises
owned and run prim arily by the military. N ot
only did the symbols of econom ic nationalism
appeal to the masses and to nationalists of the
left and the right, but the rapid grow th of state
econom ic activity in both production and
services led to an enorm ous increase in people
econom ically dependent on the state. These
enterprises, their employees and their
suppliers constitute an econom ic and political
fact of the greatest im portance in A rgentina
today. Thus, P eron gained additional support
f ro m w h ite c o lla r b u r e a u c r a t s a n d
technocrats as well as from the industrialists.
The case for the old econom y could be heard
only within increasingly limited circles, even
when conditions began to deteriorate.
Political opposition to Peron came from
elements antagonised by his close association
with pro-A xis groups before 1944, by his
participation in the 1930 and 1943 coups and
opponents concerned ab o u t his possible
dictatorial am bitions. Peron responded to
these criticisms with consum m ate skill. He
linked the oligarchy with the old state,
recalling its decadence, corruption and a n ti
dem ocratic practices. Few could disagree
with m uch of his critique. In 1945, he con
fronted reform ed elem ents of the co rru p t but

Argentina

E V A 'S BODY LY IN G IN STATE (1952)

53

m ovem ent dependent upon and loyal to one

m an.
The strands within A rgentine nationalism ,
w hich exalted Catholicism , insisted upon
religious instruction in the public schools, and
claim ed both cultural and racial superiority
w ithin Latin A m erica, were integrated with
great subtlety into this populism . P eron never
proclaim ed the m ost xenophobic elem ents of
A rgentine nationalism he refrained from
open anti-Sem itism , for exam ple but he
went far enough to co-opt substantial
num bers especially during the good times.
W ith reference to the present crisis, Peron
m obilised m uch support w ithin A rgentina by
attem pting to export Peronism to the areas
deem ed by the A rgentines to be the less
fortu n ate countries of Latin Am erica,
especially to Bolivia and to Chile.

constitutional regime in w hat m any observers

believe was the m ost honest election in
A rgentina's history. He w on, and proceeded
to open up political p articip atio n still further
by gaining the vote for w om en in 1947 and by
encouraging organisations a t the base. He
attacked the com m unists and favored the
m ilitary thus keeping the support of the
au th o rita ria n nationalists. N ationalism not
only gained a p o p u lar base but also endow ed
the state with a legitim acy am ong the masses
it had never before enjoyed.
P ero n 's econom ic policies and political
strategies found their com plem ent in his
social program . In a variety of ways
including, for exam ple, the acceptance and
encouragem ent of the lab o r movem ent
(provided th a t it rem ained loyal to him), the
im plem entation of a vast array of welfare
m easures and b latan t dem agogy he forged
a kind of social pact acceptable to the urban
com m ercial and industrial bourgeoisie. An
anath em a to the elite of the ancien regime,
which also opposed P ero n 's econom ic
strategy and p o p u lar nationalism , this policy
resulted in vastly heightened econom ic
expectations am ong the mass and its
organisation into a cohesive political

The whole P eronist edifice contained at

least two basic weaknesses: it depended on
one m an, and it rested 'on a weakening
econom ic fou n d atio n as the agro-export
sector continued its relative decline, as
industry dem anded m ore and m ore capital
and as the state had to meet its increasing
econom ic, political and social obligations. By
1955, a m otley coalition possessed the
strength to challenge Peron. It included
elem ents of the old agro-exporting elite,
liberal dem ocrats opposed to Peron's
in c r e a s in g ly d ic ta to r ia l m e th o d s ,
entrepreneurial elem ents suffering from the
econom ic crisis, xenophobes angry at P eron's
backsliding on a variety of issues, and a large
sector of the bourgeoisie frightened by the
appearance and influence of organised labor.
In substantial num bers, both the C hurch and
the m ilitary enlisted in the cause. On
Septem ber 19, 1955, P eron, ra th e r th a n face
the prospect of a civil w ar which could have
easily become a class w ar, to o k refuge on a
P arag u ay an gunboat anchored in the R io de
la P la ta, n o t to set foot again in A rgentina
until 1973.
Traumatic
P eron's decade had been trau m atic in at
least three ways: the m obilisation of the mass;

54

ALR

industrialisation; and the grow th of the state.

These facts were irreversible. W hether or not
the various political forces th a t now occupied
the C asa R osada wished to tu rn back the
clock was irrelevant. They were dealing with a
new thesis. The u tter and tragic failure of
A rgentina to achieve an econom ic, political
and social m o d u s vivendi testifies to the depth
of the problem s left by Peron, deepened still
fu rth er by each day o f confusion, inflation,
co rru p tio n , repression and violence.
Initially, the victorious attem pted to
obliterate Peronist politics, to proscribe
Peronism as if such a thing were possible!
In the a ttem p t to reassem ble H um pty
D um pty, the new leadership ruthlessly
censored, im prisoned and ignored the masses
and even held elections with the intention of
restoring civilian, dem ocratic governm ent
disallow ing the participation of the Peronists.
Given all th at passed before, how could the
s ta te a c h ie v e le g itim a c y u n d e r su ch
circum stances? W hat possible m eaning could
dem ocracy have? But institutional politics
constituted only part of the problem .
Econom ic problems
The stru ctu ral problem s w ithin the
econom y continued. Led by the ag ro
exporters, m any A rgentines argued th at the
co u n try ought to return to w hat m ade it once
wealthy: the export of agricultural products.
Industrialists, directors of state enterprises,
lab o r and econom ic nationalists refused to
accept this solution. The failure to agree on a
coherent econom ic policy has resulted in the
sto p -start p attern , characterised by m om ents
of raging inflation and speculation. In the
m eantim e, foreign capital m ade impressive
gains, especially in the industrial sector.
A lthough the econom y grew durin g the
1960s, it did so unevenly over tim e and am ong
sectors. The absence of consensus over
political and econom ic directions, com bined
w ith the form al proscription of the nation's
largest and m ost cohesive political force,
encouraged the proliferation of splinter
groups and parties from extrem e right to
extrem e left. Peron, from splendid exile in

M adrid, w atched as the m ilitary intervened in

1962 and in 1966 to prevent the Peronists
from returning to power. He also w atched the
m ilitary fail to develop or to im pose a
successful econom ic policy. And he watched
the people of C o rd o b a go to the barricades
against the m ilitary dictatorship in M ay 1969.
This revolt dem onstrated dram atically the
degree to which the nation had become
fragm ented and bitterly divided. Slowly, it
daw ned on some of the m ore sophisticated
m ilitary leaders th at there could be no
consensus w ithout Peron, th a t the longer they
rem ained in pow er the m ore w dely they
would be held responsible for th-' situation
and, not least im portant, th a t the exercise of
pow er was itself dividing the m ilitary and
creating potentially debilitating internal
conflicts.
Finally, G eneral A lejandro Lanusse, who
him self had been jailed by P eron, undertook
to guide A rgentina through the ultim ate
hum iliation the return to pow er of Peron
himself. In a to rtu o u s political process this
occurred and, on O ctober 12,1973, the ageing
general accepted the presidential sash. There
was not to be a blank cheque, however:
Lanusse and his colleagues had insisted th at
the grow ing left, especially the revolutionary
m arxists and reform ists w ithin Peronism , be
firmly controlled. Indeed, it was alm ost
certainly P eron's hope to reconstitute the old
coalition of industrialists, those dependent on
the state sector, the co-opted union leadership
and nationalists w herever they m ight be
found to relive the heady days from 1945 to
1949. D espite the euphoria, facts would not
conform . H um pty D um pty cannot be put
together again. Im m ediately the cracks
appeared.
Organised left
First, by 1974 an organised left existed.
A lthough small num erically, it attracted the
frustrated and idealistic am ong professionals
and students who saw A rgentina's prom ise
pass them by. Second, within organised labor,
an im portant sector had broken with Peron
and Peronism . M ostly m arxist oriented, this

55

Argentina

higher standard of living than those who now

struggle in El Salvador. The m iserable in
A rgentina are proportionately far fewer. The
space for political debate and for social
reform was then much greater th an in El
Salvador.
N o one can understand A rgentina w ithout
som e com prehension of the strains under
which the com m unity has lived at least since
1930 and the bitterness, frustration and anger
they have bred. The bizarre strands within
A rgentine nationalism reflect rather than
reconcile the social divisions; they are
evidence of the hatred and fear which,
through nationalism , have gained legitim ate
expression. This occurred in E urope during
the 1920s and 1930s.
Undeclared civil war
R ELA XIN G IN PARIS

sector criticised the corru p tio n , opportunism

and co llab o ratio n of their brothers. It drew
much num erical strength from interior
industrial cities such as C ordoba and
Rosario. T hird, P eronist labor, expecting a
rerun, established dem ands unacceptable to
the now pow erful industrialists whose
support of P ero n was necessarily conditional
on his ability to m aintain labor discipline, and
on an acceptable econom ic policy. F ourth,
and perhaps m ost critical, P eron lacked the
support of the military.
Even if the old general had not died of heart
failure on July 1, 1974, the house of cards
would have caved in. His inability to realise
the dream s of his followers was obvious from
the first day of his adm inistration; in fact, his
left and rightw ing follow ers were already at
war, a conflict exacerbated by the increasing
activity of the m arxist guerrilla.
It is this resort to violence which em bodies
the A rgentine tragedy. Given the not
insignificant achievem ents of th a t society, it is
difficult to explain. A rgentina was not, in
1975, n o r is it now , El Salvador. Those who
went to w ar in the streets of Buenos Aires and
in the hills of T ucum an enjoyed an infinitely

By the time in 1976 that the m ilitary

overthrew Isabel Peron w ho, as vicepresident, had succeeded her husband,
A rgentina was sliding tow ards civil w ar in the
midst of raging inflation. The tenuous bonds
of society were coming ap art in a celebration
of violence. D eclaring a "dirty w ar" on its own
citizens, the m ilitary unleashed virtually its
total force on a largely unarm ed and
unprepared society. The slaughter was
indiscrim inate and prolonged. Unlike the case
of Chile where the terro r was relatively brief
and guided from a central point, in A rgentina
the central governm ent presided over, but
often could not control, a violent cam paign of
four years' duration. Any crime, any atrocity,
could be freely com m itted because the
m ilitary had declared war, and in w ar
innocents are hurt.
N o one know s the exact toll, but the
estim ates of Amnesty International are
know n, and they refer to those w ho have
disappeared. Add to them a large num ber
who were m urdered. Travellers recently
r e tu r n e d , jo u r n a lis ts an d A rg e n tin e s
themselves all agree th at no family rem ains
untouched. Yet, in addition to the m urdered,
the to rtu red , the maimed and the disappeared
there exists a society which still hates, and a
society which still fears; a society which is

56 ALR
flush w ith victory and a society which is b itter
and silent in its defeat and anguish.
The justification for such savagery sounds
fam iliar: to elim inate subversion, to sanitise
A rgentine politics, to restore A rgentina's
dem ocratic and C hristian(!) heritage, to
straighten out the econom ic mess. Indeed,
that econom ic mess was worse th a n ever as
A rgentines lost all confidence in the m ayhem
of 1965-76. The m ilitary then turned the
econom y over to a representative of the a g ro
ex p o rt sector, Jose A lfredo M artinez de Hoz,
whose function it was to restore the nation's
g ran d eu r by an explicit and consistent policy
of favoring agriculture and the ex p o rt of its
products a t the expense of the over-protected,
inefficient and expensive industrial sector.
T h at m eant low ering tariffs, encouraging the
investm ent of foreigners, reducing the
bloated, unproductive state sector. If such
m easures m eant, in turn, unem ploym ent as
industrial firms closed dow n, an d the anger of
the industrialists, then so be it. The m ilitary
was determ ined to establish a consistent
policy.
M artinez de H oz did achieve som e of his
goals: th an k s to high dem and for the kinds of
p r o d u c t s A r g e n ti n a c o u ld p r o v id e ,
agricultural p roduction increased, prices
rem ained high and A rgentina's trad e and
paym ents balances reflected strength. But the
dom estic econom y suffered as industry,
predictably, underw ent a serious crisis (which
continues to deepen) due to the rapid surge of
c h e a p e r im p o rte d m a n u f a c tu r e s .
U nem ploym ent appeared and inflation,
chronic in A rgentina, continued at high rates.
This is the recipe for social discontent.
Increasingly, the econom y depended on the
ex p o rt of agricultural p ro d u cts to the
E uropean C om m on M ark et countries, and to
its ideological adversary, the U SSR .
As m ight be expected, these policies
exposed an d deepened serious contradictions.
The su p p o rt of the ag ro -ex p o rt sector and of
foreign capital antagonised n ationalists and
labor. The problem was (and is) m ade
infinitely m ore com plex by the fact th a t m ost
of the m ilitary consider them selves econom ic

nationalists fiercely jealous of A rgentina's

industrial base as a m atter of national
security. F urtherm ore, b o th on this ground
and on the need of patronage, the state-ow ned
industrial enterprises were n o t to be served up
to the interests of the agro-export elite for the
sa k e o f e ffic ie n c y a n d c o m p a ra tiv e
advantage'. Stim ulated by a bloated m ilitary
budget, governm ent deficits continued to
grow. The political interests w ithin and
outside Peronism which reflected the views
of the econom ically victimised became
restive. Econom ic policy emerged as the
platform from which tentative com plaints
were launched against the exclusion of the
political parties.
A society in crisis
The m ilitary ju n ta responded to the
w orsening industrial crisis by once again
m odifying policy and, am ong other m easures,
drastically devalued a cruelly over-valued
peso thus causing fu rther inflation. The
reader can detect by now a recurrence of the
pattern: no m atter how idealistic and resolute
the m ilitary, no degree of force can restore
H um pty to his form er self. As General
Galtieri pondered the options before he (or
his colleagues) ordered the invasion of the
M alvinas, he had to cope with these facts: 1)
the m ilitary governm ent lacked p o p ular
support; 2) the politicians exploited this to
dem and a political opening; 3) the econom y,
or particularly the industrial sector, is in a
sham bles; 4) the parents, relatives and friends
of the disappeared continue to dem and
inform ation from the governm ent; 5) the
m ilitary is itself deeply divided over the
p roper policies to solve these (and m any
other) difficulties.
O f all these facts, the econom ic crisis is
undoubtedly the m ost serious. A lthough the
agricultural sector continues to perform
adequately, industry is sinking deeper into a
terrible depression. In 1981, the G D P
declined 6.1% from the previous year
according to official figures, and was only
2.1% higher th an th at of 1974. In the last
q u arter of 1981, the G D P was 10.1% lower
th an fo r the sam e q u arter o f 1980. A private

Argentina

57

research group reported th a t, during 1981,

em ploym ent was nearly 30% lower than
during 1974, adm ittedly a boom year. But real
wages fo r skilled w orkers declined by 16%
and for the unskilled by 18% during 1981.
Industrial p ro d u ctio n decreased by over 15%
during 1981. D uring the first tw o m onths of
1982, vehicle sales fell by 58% over the same
two m onths of 1981. Inflation continues at a
rate of well over 100 percent. U nder such
conditions, even the control of subversion,
now largely accom plished, seems rath er
expensive. The industrialists and labor
leaders have had enough.
A w are of their grow ing unpopularity, even
am ong sectors willing to go along with
repression, the m ilitary has debated the
possibilities of opening up governm ent to

acceptable political groups. These debates are

acrim onious because not all officers of th*,
arm ed forces would agree that their mission is
accom plished, th at their dirty w ar is over.
M any fear reprisals for atrocities com m itted
if civilians return to governm ent and m any
fear the loss o f privileges or budget cuts.
Given the recent history of A rgentina and
the present situation, the explanation of the
Falklands or M alvinas policy is perhaps m ore
understandable. The nation has been, for the
last fifty years, under enorm ous pressure as
d e m o n s t r a t e d by i n c r e a s i n g s o c i a l
disintegration, political failure and the
legitim isation of a xenophobic nationalism .
Its f u tu r e , b a rr in g a n u n p re d ic ta b le
revolution of its basic structures, would
appear to be tragic.

Visions of a thaw
in the
Cold War
Peter Ormonde
English historian E.P. Thom pson is a m ajor fo rc e in the British an d European peace
m ovem ents. His latest b o o k Z ero O ption, due f o r A ustralian release later this year, is a
collection o f essays, articles a n d p a m p h lets fr o m the last two years. The topics range fr o m
Thom pson's analysis o f international relations, through polem ics against conservative
academics a n d politicians, to a scathing piece on the recent war in the So uth A tlantic the War
o f Thatcher's Face.
The b o o k is p u b lish e d by the M erlin Press. Below, Peter O rm onde gives an outline o f
Thom pson's ideas on disarm am ent a nd politics.