Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cerification LNG Terminal
Cerification LNG Terminal
November 2005
Guidance Note
NI 518 DT R00 E
MARINE DIVISION
GENERAL CONDITIONS
! " "#
% ! " ',- % ' # $
' %"
%
"
. ! "
"
3 2 %% #
' " .. "
' "2 !#
"#
! "
$ $
%&#
)
.
" !"
+ ' ", & # "# . '1
' '. ' & "
$
' % ' " $
'
& .. #
' $ $ .'
" ,-
"#
" 0
$
$
" '3
$
% $
$
' ."
% 0 "#
'
! '"
)!
0
% "#
% "# $ % 0 '!
/
$
" " "#
) . $ 0 '" % "#
! "
!
'" ' " ' .
$
% "#
" $ %
! " ' %/ .
-
' .
)
%! " '
! "
2
#
! "
) & "# !
/ . '"8
! ' !"
)
!.
'"
)
$
0 "
2 !" '3
' " !" '
! 0 '" $
'"
% !.
* -
+
,
$
/ ,
- -
/
+
,
-
- , *
,
$,
.
*
*
$
2
+
*
2
*4
-
%5 6 6 ,6 6 6 (
*
$ *
.. !. 0
"
$
'" " "#
! " ' & " '3 & "# ' "#
0 '"# % "#
" & # ' "#
)! &
$$.
* % . " - "#
" & # ' "# ) '" & # !#
.
' %&
% " 1' & ' "
"# / . '"2 ' ' !. 0 & # !# ' " $
'"
# ..
0 & )
'
. " .
9
7
4
" %
.
-
)!
$
5
"
$
$ 8
7
"#
#
# !.
3 '" " "# ! '! '
' " ' "# $ )
" % %% !" % "# ' " !
!! '3 " = #
) ' " !. > #
'
#
)!
% "#
') ! ' "#
0
0
,
.
)
4
! "%! "
0 ' ) . '" .
!" " ! 0$ . '! & "# 9
5
% "#
.#
0 '" % %
$ ' ! $"
*
$ *
. $
9
#
! 0 '" '
" $ )
"
$ $
"#
! " %
'% 0 " ' ) . . " "#
! " 2
" "
! '% '" . ? & ) 5
/ . '" # )
!!
" "#
" "#
# ) $ )
" "#
! " '
!. % ! " ' % "#
' " % "# 02 " "#
! ' " '3
! " % ! " & # !# # )
'$ $
" ' "0
"#
! " % "# !.
! $ % "#
! 0 '" 0
) . . % "# !. % ! " ' % "#
'"
$ " ! '
# '
) " ' "#
/ . %! " '
! "
0
! " ' %/ . %! " ' ! " * / - '!
% "# ' "; " ' %
"#
" . " ) " "# ) . " ' % "#
3 " 2 " "# !.
$ ' ' '
"# ' "
$
'" /
!! '3 " "#
! " ' & 1 '3 . 8
"# ! " % ! " 2 ! 0 '" ' '% 0 " ' . " ) " "#
' " !.
&
) &
'3 /
" '
!.
$ '
% "# ! '! '
3 ) '0 '" . "# "
% /
" # ) '3
!" '
#
! 0 '" '
"
!" " % . 0 ' 3 0 '" $ . '
"
) ! 2 ' "#
'3
%
)
%! " '
' % )
% "#
% !. 8
" "#
"#
$
%
$ " '
% "# ' " 8
. .
)
'" ' " ' .
)
" "
"# "#
! " 0
3 ) '0 '" . '"
6
$ % 0 '! % "
)!
"#
! "
' "# ! '" . % "#
! " # ..
0
'!
% ) 3 '3 $ ' '
'3
! " 0
3 ' " ' "#
% "
)
( 3 0 '" % " !# ' ! . ' "
"#
! " " "#
)! % "
'
)
'3 % 0 '
' ""
2 "#
0 ""
( $ "
) "#
)! !
"
. 3 " ' % 6 ) '0 '"
& "# ' "#
1 % "# $ $ . ! . 3 0 '" & "# "# " " 2 '" ' " ' . / ') '" ' ' ' " ' . .
( $ "
'3 " % "# $ 0 '" % "#
! " ; ') !
"# / . '"
0 "" " "#
/
" % 7 '" 2 '!
.#
:
$
2
$
*
*
, *$
*
,
*
993
$
$
.
*
$
* *$ -
$
*$
% 0 &
*
$
& # !# &
*
$,
6
'
.
# "! 0 '3 ' "#
) '" ' "
' . %
.
!# % ! '" !"
$
-
- ,
,
%5 ,6 6 6 (
"#
)
)
*
)
)!
$1
. #
"# ! % "#
.
" "
$ ,
"
! '
. " % "#
! "
& "# "
$
* $
'
$ '
"#
ARTICLE 9
* /
/ 00 ""
! 0 '"
.
" !.
" '
3
3
#
' "$ )
3 .
7
7
-
)
#
)!
% "#
! " ! '' " ! " '
.3 " '
'3 ' "#
! "
! ' "" " '
&
'" % $ $
$ " '2
' ' $
'" " ' " % "# ' "#
. 2 % ' ' "2 4 $ 0 '"
0 !# ' 2 ! 0$ "
%"&
% '
"
"# ! 0$
. ! '! $ " "# " #
'
!" " '
)
"#
! "
- ,
+
*
,
$
-,
$
*
:
$
* ,
2
# 0
)
# ') . " % '
0
" $ . " ' % "# $
) . " % "#
0 ' '3 $ ) '
#
%'" ' #
' " 1 $ ! '! )
'
0
$$
' "#
! 0 '"
"#
! "
,
' & " '3
0 " . 3
'" 6 ' . / ' " '
%'" '
) '3 "#
0 '"
' " %% !" "#
0 $ $
& # !#
NI 518 DT R00 E
November 2005
NI 518
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
CONTENT
1
GENERALITIES....................................................................................................................................7
1.1
SCOPE...........................................................................................................................................7
1.2
GENERAL ......................................................................................................................................7
1.3
DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................8
1.4
1.5
1.6
NOTATIONS ..................................................................................................................................9
1.7
1.8
1.9
GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................14
2.2
SCOPE.........................................................................................................................................14
2.3
DEFINITIONS ..............................................................................................................................14
2.4
2.5
GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................17
3.2
3.3
GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................21
4.2
4.3
4.4
GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................33
5.2
5.3
6.2
6.3
6.4
PIPING SYSTEMS.......................................................................................................................46
6.5
6.6
6.7
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
NI 518
6.8
6.9
GENERAL ................................................................................................................................... 52
7.2
7.3
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION.................................................................................................... 59
UTILITIES........................................................................................................................................... 60
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
SECURITY .................................................................................................................................. 60
FIRE PROTECTION........................................................................................................................... 61
9.1
GENERALITIES .......................................................................................................................... 61
9.2
9.3
9.4
FIRE PROTECTION.................................................................................................................... 62
9.5
INSTRUMENTATION.................................................................................................................. 63
9.6
SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................ 64
10.2
10.3
GENERAL ................................................................................................................................... 72
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
COMMISSIONING ACTIVITIES.................................................................................................. 75
12 APPENDIX 1:
12.1
BASIC RULES............................................................................................................................. 77
12.2
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Foreword
The present guidance note is summarizing a set of recommendations and guidelines applicable to the
classification and/or certification of Offshore Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals.
It has been built based on some specific documents such as: Bureau Veritas Rules for the Classification
of Offshore Units (NR 445); Bureau Veritas Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships,
API
Recommended Practice 2A WSD - for the Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore
Platforms Working Stress Design, IMO IGC code (including 1994, 1996 and 2000 amendments), and
NFPA 59A, the National Fire Protection Association Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling
of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG).
It is to be considered as an initial document to be used during the construction of such terminals. It
summarizes the experience and technical background existing, on one hand, for up-stream activities,
regarding the construction of onshore LNG terminals, for either the liquefaction of the natural gas, its
storage and offloading onto shuttle carriers, or for down-stream terminals, covering the activities of
offloading the LNG from shuttle vessels to the re-gasification LNG near shore terminals, before its final
use. On the other hand, it is associating the experience of the Society in the field of classification and
certification of offshore units, based on fixed or floating installations, covering the multiple purposes that
could be concerned for the oil and gas production activities.
The present guidance note is not intended to supersede the existing rules issued by the Society or by
National and International Organizations that could apply in case of the construction of offshore LNG
terminals, but it is to be used as a reference document, which points out some additional requirements
and important aspects to be considered, when dealing with the classification and/or certification of such
kind of installations.
Two distinct families of offshore LNG terminals are covered within the scope of the present guidance
note: the first one regarding the Gravity Based offshore LNG terminals (GB LNG units) and the second
one considering the Floating LNG terminals (F LNG installations). These two families, from a historical
point of view, could be identified by considering the chronological evolution of the state of the art for the
construction of LNG production units, departuring from its original achievements for the case of onshore
installations, which have been formely adapted to permit the implementation of offshore LNG fixed
installations, to converge to the concept of offshore LNG floating terminals.
Assuming the innovating approach to make possible the design and the construction of offshore LNG
units, especially those of floating type, it is recommended for such new developments, at an advanced
stage of the design, to systematically perform complementary risk analysis studies, focusing the most
sensitive components, for example, those of the containment system, the liquefaction production units,
and regarding the transfer of the cryogenic fluids.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
NI 518
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
1
1.1
GENERALITIES
SCOPE
This Guidance Note published by the Society gives requirements and recommendations to be
considered for the classification and/or certification activities regarding the offshore LNG terminals,
including, both Gravity Based Structures (GBS) and Floating Installations (FLNG).
Four typical configurations for LNG offshore terminals, as described under [1.8.1], are covered by this
document, for steel and concrete based structures.
Requirements of the present Guidance Note are to be complied with by offshore LNG terminals to be
classed or certified by Bureau Veritas, called also in the following the Society.
The terminal has to comply with the Bureau Veritas Rules for the Classification of Offshore Units and the
relevant additional standards, that are to be adopted in the scope of each specific project.
The Class and Marks notations for LNG offshore terminals are those described under [1.6].
The classification and/or certification of LNG terminals of special type, not included in the above listed
features, will be considered by the Society on a case by case basis.
The general conditions of classification and/or certification are laid down in the Marine Division General
Conditions.
Different parts of the present guide are covering the following:
Classification, Certification and Surveys
General arrangement assessment
Safety Assessment
Global structure and Stability
Machinery and Systems
Materials and Welding
Service Notations applying to offshore LNG terminals, for both, gravity-based and floating units.
1.2
GENERAL
The present Guidance note considers offshore gas production wells located in remote areas from the
energy demanding centres, therefore, the global LNG chain will be mainly including:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Transport via a pipeline is not considered inside of this document (pipe in pipe techniques, to convoy
cryogenic liquids)
A LNG terminal covered by the present guidance note will include various items of the above list and will
correspond to one of the service notations as defined in [1.6].
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
NI 518
1.3
DEFINITIONS
1.4
Safety design aspects are a fundamental part of the overall design of an offshore Liquefied Natural Gas
terminal and are among the major engineering tasks to be carried out in the scope of this kind of
project.
The safety assessment of an offshore LNG terminal in accordance with this Guidance Note is to be
achieved by:
a) Enforcing the strict compliance of the LNG project to selected rules (codes, standards,
regulations ) that already proved to adequately address the relevant issues on the matter.
Reference is made to requirements, codes and recommended practices described in the present
Guidance.
b) Proposing alternative solutions deviating from the conventional rules requirements that will
achieve:
At least an equivalent level of performance required by the acceptable/prescriptive
solutions
A level of performance that is agreed by the Administration, or a recognised Authority
c) Adopting a combination of both, a) and b) approaches.
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
The risk based approach is then to be considered, according to this Guidance, as an alternative or as a
complement to conventional design rules to support the adoption of deviations or modifications from
these rules requirements.
This alternative approach is authorized and encouraged as far as the class and/or the certification are/is
concerned, under reserve of the agreement of the Owner to accept any deviation from the Rules.
In case of application of statutory requirements, attention is drawn upon the necessary agreement of the
flag and/or coastal Authorities.
The use of prescriptive rules is not contradictory with the use in parallel of risk analysis methods, as they
can be complementary, and as the rules are resulting from large collection of data and analysis of past
experience.
The classification covers the verification of the compliance to the Society Rules for floating units.
The certification covers the verification of the compliance to the Society Rules and/or to relevant National
codes and recognised standards for the case of fixed units and components.
The application of any BV rules and documents referred to in this guidance note is to be made for the
applicable parts and possibly adapted to the intended use of the terminal in agreement with the Society.
1.5
Fixed units and floating units, as well, operating in national waters are to comply with the Administration
rules in addition to the Society rules.
In case of disagreement between rules, the Administration rules will prevail on the Society rules, except
when the later provide a higher safety level. In this case, decision will be taken in agreement between
the Society and the Owner, on a case by case basis.
1.6
NOTATIONS
According to [1.8.1], and considering both concepts of Gravity-Based and Floating structures, the
following class notations are considered:
The terminal notation is composed by a type notation, a service notation and a material notation.
The type notations are:
GB
LNG-PE
LNG-R
LNG-S
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
NI 518
The material notations are:
Steel
Concrete
Composite
1.7
DOCUMENT TO BE SUBMITTED
The documents to be submitted to the Society for classification are classed in three categories:
1.8
Plans and documents to be submitted for approval. They are to be supplemented by further
documentation which depends on the service notation and, possibly, the additional class notation
to be assigned to the terminal. Structural plans are to show details of connections of the various
parts and, in general, are to specify the materials used, including their manufacturing processes,
welded procedures and heat treatments.
Plans and documents to be submitted for appraisal. They are directly linked with the terminal
structural or operational safety, but they are not referring to compulsory requirements. The
reviewed plans and documents may be the subject of remarks from the Society which may
impact the approval of submitted plans or documents.
Plans and documents to be submitted for information: Documents not directly concerned by
classification or certification rules, but providing information necessary for the appraisal or
approval of the submitted plans and documents. They could include plans and documents such
as, for example: general arrangement, capacity plan, etc. Moreover, when direct calculation
analyses are carried out by the Designer according to the rule requirements, they are to be
submitted to the Society. These documents are not subjected to any assessment by the Society.
10
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Based upon terminal general arrangement, the following items could apply:
Fixed steel structures (Jacket, accommodation, bridges, etc.),
Fixed concrete structures (tanks, etc.),
Floating steel structures,
Floating concrete structures,
Facilities :
Gas processing and production, liquefaction, storage, offloading facilities.
o When the terminal receives well gas, process it and
liquefies the natural gas and condensate for storage and
offloading (configurations 1) or 2), here above)
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
11
NI 518
1.9
Some specific problems arise when dealing with LNG offshore terminals. They are mostly related to the
fact that past experience with onshore installations are concerning sheltered water locations, have large
areas for the implantation of production and storage installations, making easy the respect of the
minimum safety distances between critical areas, without major confinement problems encountered in
case of offshore terminal units.
12
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Some of these aspects to be dealt with, which remain a major hazard concern, are pointed out hereafter:
Safety management of the eventual combination of oil/condensate and LNG storage in one
single unit
Adaptation of the LNG production facilities to operate in remote offshore locations
Review of possible layout configurations to completely integrate oil/condensate production and
LNG liquefaction facilities, keeping in mind that safety requirements are to be met.
Mode of LNG carrier berthing, to be either in a side-by-side arrangement (in case of relatively
benign environmental conditions), or in a tandem mooring arrangement (in case of harsher
weather conditions)
Design of dynamic loading/offloading LNG systems, suitable for prevailing offshore metocean
conditions. To enable a safe and efficient transfer of cryogenic product in open sea conditions,
on a routine basis, loading/offloading systems have to be duly tested for the site conditions.
Structural damage and loss of stability of the offshore terminal, caused by important leakages of
LNG from the containment system, and subsequent discharge of LNG into the sea. Risk
analysis studies have to demonstrate that ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) level is
achieved.
Logistical and emergency support at site, and land based support
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
13
NI 518
2
2.1
GENERAL
The risk based approach may be used as a complementary study to conventional design rules to
support application for deviations or modifications from these rules requirements. Hazard analysis, risk
analysis and environmental impact analysis are usually carried out under request either of local
Authorities or of the Owner of the offshore unit. It can be also motivated by the need to know the
influence of some additional risk factors, related to:
This alternative approach is authorized and encouraged as far as the class is concerned, under reserve
of the agreement of the Owner to accept any deviation from the Rules.
The use of prescriptive rules is not contradictory with the use in parallel of risk analysis methods, as they
can be complementary, and as the rules are resulting from large collection of data and analysis of past
experience.
In case of application of statutory requirements, attention is drawn upon the necessary agreement of the
flag and/or coastal Authorities.
2.2
SCOPE
The equipment confinement, and the choice of liquefaction technology, refrigerant types and line-up, are
to be assessed with respect to their influence on the occurrence of hazardous situations, that could lead
to eventual explosion overpressure generation.
A good understanding of the mitigation measures is required to minimize overpressures, and incident
escalation to other parts of the topsides and the storage systems. It can be at the origin of HAZID and
Concept QRA studies.
Two types of analyses are identified in case of LNG offshore installations, as follows:
2.3
Hazard and Risk analysis, when eventual harms caused on the installation and its environment
are resulting from accidental events
Health Safety and Environmental (HSE) study, when eventual harms caused on the installation
and its environment are resulting from normal operating conditions
DEFINITIONS
Some concepts and definitions concerning risk analysis techniques are hereafter recalled:
ACCIDENT: within the context of Hazard and Risk analysis, an accident is any unwanted
specific event, or more generally a chain of events, having a detrimental effect on health, safety, asset
integrity or the Environment.
HAZARD: refers to any characteristic of a system, a process or a situation which is capable of
causing an accident or contributing thereto.
14
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
RISK: risk is a measure of a hazard, in term of the probability, or the frequency, of an accident it
can generate or to which it can contribute, and of the gravity of such an accident.
RESIDUAL RISK: is the risk that remains after a risk ranked as unacceptable had been
reduced to an acceptable level.
ALARP risk level: As Low As Reasonably Practicable acceptance criterion.
2.4
2.4.1 TARGET
Main drivers leading to the performance of such kind of analysis can be of quite different nature. Most
commonly encountered are:
Assess that the installation will remain for operational conditions below a specified level of risk
Assess environmental impact of the installation
Give a rational basis for Safety Management System implementation
Assess the effect of a significant change in the process or in the general installation in term of
implied possible risk increase
Assess residual risk level to be monitored via RCM or RBI
Compare effectiveness (eventually cost effectiveness) of two possible technical options during
design or following an in-service modification
The risk levels obtained by the arrangement resulting from the analysis are to be as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP), as defined by the interested parties and agreed by the Administration.
2.4.2 APPROACH
From a methodological point of view, any risk analysis will be involving the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
2.5
Data gathering
Process description (as necessary for hazard analysis purposes)
Hazard identification
Scenarios of accidents
Frequency analysis
Consequence analysis
Acceptance criteria
Risk reduction measures
Management of residual risk
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
15
NI 518
16
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
3
3.1
GENERAL
It is the responsibility of the Party applying for the classification to specify the data on which the structural
design of the unit is based, for each condition of operation, as follows:
Working conditions
Severe storm condition
Transit condition
Any additional condition
These data are to include, for each condition, a description of:
The general configuration of the unit
Environmental conditions
Any other relevant data
Environmental data required for the structural design of the unit are to be specified by the party applying
for classification. Environmental data are to include:
Data for extreme condition (for example, severe storm)
Data for the threshold environmental conditions, for the applicable limit states of the unit (working
condition, transit condition, if applicable, and any relevant design condition)
The long term distribution of environmental data, to be used for fatigue design
Data for any other particular design condition
It remains under the responsibility of the party applying for the classification to ascertain that the
environmental parameters are correct and complete.
Loads are to be specified by the party applying for classification, covering, at least, the following
categories of loads: fixed, operational, environmental, accidental, testing and temporary construction
loads.
3.2
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
17
NI 518
3.3
DESIGN LOADS
3.3.1 GENERAL
The following categories of loads are considered: fixed, operational, environmental, accidental, testing
and temporary construction loads.
piping;
deckings, walkways and stairways;
fittings;
spare parts;
furniture.
The light weight includes the weight of all permanent ballast and other liquids, such as lubricating oil and
water in the boilers, to their normal working level but excludes the weight of liquids or other fluids
contained in supply, reserve or storage tanks or vessels.
18
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
wind;
tides;
waves;
current;
sea floor, when relevant
ice and snow where relevant;
earthquake where relevant.
Accidental loads also include loads resulting of such event (damaged situations), or of other exceptional
conditions to be determined with regard to the activities of the unit.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
19
NI 518
The risk of accidental damage is normally minimised by suitable preventive and protective measures
such as:
a) Adequate operation and maintenance of structures and equipment. Procedures are to specify
operational limits and related limiting environmental conditions.
b) Appropriate safety requirements for visiting vessels and aircraft with respect to the limiting
environmental conditions, the communication and survey procedures for berthing, landing,
stowage and disconnection.
c) Adequate arrangement of structure and facilities.
d) Adequate protective arrangements such as guarding, fendering, weak links, quick release
mechanisms, shut-off means for high pressure piping systems, etc.
20
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
4
4.1
GENERAL
4.1.1 SCOPE
The present chapter applies to floating units, except for the section [4.4.3], which is also dedicated to
fixed units.
4.1.4
An inclining test is to be carried out on each unit at the time of construction or following conversion, to
determine accurately the light unit data (weight and position of centre of gravity).
The inclining test is to take place, when the unit is as near as possible to completion, in the presence and
to the satisfaction of the attending Surveyor. The testing programme is required to be submitted to the
Surveyor prior to being carried out.
The results of the inclining test are to be submitted to the Society for appraisal.
A deadweight survey is to be conducted at intervals not exceeding 5 years. An inclining test is to be
carried out in the following cases:
where the deadweight survey indicates a change from the calculated light unit displacement in
excess of 1 % of the displacement in working condition or
where this survey indicates a change from the longitudinal position of the unit centre of gravity in
excess of 1 % of the unit'
s length.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
21
NI 518
For successive units of a design or for units undergoing only minor alterations, the Society may, at its
discretion, waive the above requirements and accept the light unit data of the first unit of the series in lieu
of an inclining test, provided that, notwithstanding minor differences in machinery, outfitting or equipment,
both following conditions are fulfilled:
the deadweight survey indicates a change from the light ship displacement calculated for the first
of the series less than 1 % of the displacement in working condition, and
this survey indicates a change from the longitudinal position of the unit centre of gravity as
determined for the first of the series less than 1 % of the unit'
s length.
4.2
STABILITY CALCULATIONS
4.2.1 GENERAL
Stability calculations are to be carried out and submitted to the Society for review for the following cases:
a) Transit departure and arrival conditions, anchors to be on board and with the maximum related
deck loads.
b) Normal working at maximum draught with the maximum deck loads and equipment in the most
unfavourable positions.
c) Severe storm condition assuming the same weight distribution as in a) above except for the
necessary ballast adjustments to bring the unit to the survival draught and for the possible
dumping of variable deck load if such is specified in the operating procedures.
d) Severe storm condition assuming the same weight distribution as in b) above with the necessary
ballast adjustments to place the unit in the survival draught configuration. In this condition:
equipment liable to be disconnected, such as marine riser of drilling units, is assumed
disconnected;
equipment liable to be disconnected and stored on deck, such as stinger of a pipelaying unit, is
assumed disconnected and secured on deck;
equipment having a rest position, such as crane booms, is assumed in rest position;
the maximum amount of loads is assumed to be stored on deck. Account may be taken of dumping of
variable deck load if specified.
22
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
4.3
STABILITY CRITERIA
For surface units the area under the righting moment curve to the second intercept, or the angle
of downflooding, whichever is less, is not to be less than 40 % in excess of the area under the
wind heeling moment curve to the same limiting angle.
For semi-submersible units the area under the righting moment curve to the second intercept, or
the angle of downflooding, whichever is less, is not to be less than 30 % in excess of the area
under the wind heeling moment curve to the same limiting angle.
The righting moment curve is to be positive over the entire range of angles from upright to the
second intercept.
The procedures recommended and the approximate length of time required to attain severe storm
condition, considering both working and transit conditions, are to be contained in the Operating Manual.
It is to be possible to achieve the severe storm condition without the removal or relocation of solid
consumables or other variable loads. However, the Society may accept that a unit is loaded past the
point at which solid consumables would have to be removed or relocated to go severe storm condition
under the following conditions, provided the allowable KG requirement is not exceeded:
a) In a geographic location where weather conditions annually or seasonally do not become
sufficiently severe to require a unit to go to severe storm condition.
b) Or, where a unit is required to support extra deckload for a short period of time that falls well within
a period for which the weather forecast is favourable.
The geographic locations, weather conditions and loading conditions in which this is permitted are to be
identified in the Operating Manual.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
23
NI 518
environmental conditions representing realistic winds (including gusts) and waves appropriate for
world-service in various modes of operation;
dynamic response of the unit. Analysis is to include the results of wind tunnel tests, wave tank
model tests, and non-linear simulation, where appropriate. Any wind and wave spectra used are to
cover sufficient frequency ranges to ensure that critical motion responses are obtained;
24
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
25
NI 518
Where damage of a lesser extent than defined in a) and b), here above, results in a more severe
condition, such lesser extent is to be assumed.
Piping, ventilation systems, trunks, etc., within the extent of damage referred to in a) and b), here above,
are to be assumed to be damaged; positive means of closure are to be provided, in accordance with
[4.4.2], at watertight boundaries to preclude the progressive flooding of other spaces which are intended
to be intact.
Only those columns, underwater hulls and braces on the periphery of the unit are to be assumed
to be damaged and the damage is to be assumed in the exposed outer portions of columns,
underwater hulls and braces;
Notes:
the outer portions of a member are defined as portions located outboard of a line drawn through the centres of the
peripheral columns of the unit;
special consideration will be given to units of particular design and to units provided with efficient fendering.
b)
Columns and braces are to be assumed to be flooded by damage having a vertical extent of 3 m
occurring at any level between 5 m above working draught and 3 m below transit draught.
Where a watertight flat is located within this region, the damage is to be assumed to have
occurred in both compartments above and below the watertight flat in question.
Lesser distances above or below the draughts may be applied to the satisfaction of the Society,
taking into account the actual conditions of operation. However, the required damage region is to
extend at least 1,5 m above and below the draught specified in the Operating Manual.
c)
d)
e)
Underwater hull or footings are to be assumed to be damaged when the unit is in a transit
condition in the same manner as indicated in a), b), d) and either c) or f), having regard to their
shape.
f) Piping, ventilation systems, trunks, etc., within the extent of damage are to be assumed to be
damaged; positive means of closure are to be provided, in accordance with [4.4.2], at watertight
boundaries to preclude the progressive flooding of other spaces which are intended to be intact.
26
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
4.4
4.4.1 GENERAL
4.4.1.1 DEFINITIONS
A closing appliance is said to be watertight if it remains tight and is capable of withstanding the
hydrostatic pressure under service and damage conditions defined in [4.3.2]. The waterhead under
damage conditions is to account for the sinkage and inclinations of the unit induced by the combined
effect of wind and flooding.
A closing appliance is said to be weathertight if it is capable, under any sea conditions, of preventing the
penetration of water into the unit. A weathertight closing appliance is not required to remain tight under
the hydrostatic pressure occurring after damage.
A manually operated closing appliance meeting the requirements of one of the two previous paragraphs
is not to be considered water or weathertight unless, simultaneously:
a) The closing appliance is unambiguously required in the Operating Manual to be closed in a
particular mode of operation of the unit.
b) The closure of the appliance has been ascertained by the party applying for classification to be
fully practicable and compatible with the particular mode of operation of the unit.
A buoyant space is a space the buoyancy of which is taken into account in the stability calculations.
A weathertight enclosure is a decked structure above a buoyant space with enclosing bulkheads of
adequate strength with any opening fitted with weathertight closing appliances. Enclosed superstructures
meeting the requirements of the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 are considered as
weathertight enclosures.
Exposed herein means directly exposed to or not protected from the effect of the sea, spray and rain by
a weathertight enclosure.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
27
NI 518
4.4.2.3 OVERFLOWS
Overflow pipes are to be located giving due regard to damage stability and to the location of the worst
damage waterline. Overflow pipes which could cause progressive flooding are to be avoided unless
special consideration has been taken in the damage stability review.
In cases where overflow pipes terminate externally or in spaces assumed flooded, the corresponding
tanks are also to be considered flooded. In cases where tanks are considered damaged, the spaces in
which their overflows terminate are also to be considered flooded.
28
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Overflows from tanks not considered flooded as a result of damage and located above the final
immersion line may require to be fitted with automatic means of closing.
Where overflows from tanks intended to contain the same liquid or different ones are connected to a
common main, provision is to be made to prevent any risk of inter-communication between the various
tanks in the course of movements of liquid when emptying or filling.
The openings of overflow pipes discharging overboard are generally to be placed above the load
waterline; they are to be fitted where necessary with non-return valves on the plating, or any other device
of similar efficiency.
A notice is to be affixed to each closing appliance stating that it is to be kept closed while the unit
is afloat.
Note: the present requirement is not applicable to manholes fitted with watertight bolted covers.
b)
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
29
NI 518
30
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Any exposed portion of air pipes to ballast or other tanks considered buoyant in the intact stability
calculation is to be of substantial construction and is to be provided with permanently attached
weathertight closing appliances. Their height from the exposed deck to the point where water may have
access below is to be at least 760 mm on the deck of a buoyant space and 450 mm on the deck of a
weathertight enclosure. Lower heights may be accepted by the Society after examination in each case
taking into consideration the stability calculations.
Openings to machinery spaces are to be protected by weathertight enclosures or steel casings of
equivalent strength and weathertightness. The prescription 3) , under [4.3.2.1] is applicable to machinery
spaces with emergency equipment.
The lower deck: air gap is to be duly considered to take into account the maximum wave height
and freak waves occurrence, when relevant.
Ventilator areas.
Some specific requirements related to the above listed items are presented here after, as follows:
1) Weathertight boundaries and closing appliances fitted to exposed decks and bulkheads of a space
or enclosure are to comply with the relevant strength requirements of Part B Ch 9 of the "Rules
and Regulations for the Classification of Ships".
Note: the present requirement concerns particularly the doors, hatchways covers, machinery casings
and ventilators coamings.
2) All access openings in exposed bulkheads of weathertight enclosures are to be fitted with doors of
steel or other equivalent material so arranged that they can be operated from both sides of the
bulkhead. The means of securing these doors weathertight are to consist of gaskets and clamping
devices or other equivalent means permanently attached to the bulkhead or to the doors
themselves. Unless otherwise specified the height of the sills of access openings in exposed
bulkheads is not to be less than 380 mm above the deck.
3) Hatchways and other openings in exposed decks of a space or enclosure are to be provided with
coamings and weathertight steel covers or other equivalent material fitted with gaskets and
clamping devices. The height of coamings is generally required to be not less than 600 mm but
may be reduced, or the coamings omitted entirely, subject to the approval of the Society, in each
particular case, taking into consideration the structural type and stability characteristics of the unit,
the space to which the opening leads, its size and location.
4) Manholes and flush scuttles located on exposed decks or within enclosures not considered
weathertight are to be closed by substantial covers capable of being made watertight. Unless
secured by closely spaced bolts, the covers are to be permanently attached.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
31
NI 518
32
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
5
5.1
GENERAL
5.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The main structure of the terminal, named the platform, is the main structural part of the installation,
designed to accommodate the majority of main components of the LNG terminal, such as, the main
containment system, the gas pre-treating facilities, the liquefaction production installations, piping and
loading/offloading systems, power generation units, electrical and safety equipment and topsides.
In case of gravity based structures the main containment structure is in general to be considered as an
integral part of the main structure of the terminal.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
33
NI 518
According to this standard, the level to be used for platform categorization is the more restrictive level for
either life-safety or consequence of failure. Platform categorization should be revised over the life of the
structure as a result of changes in factors affecting life-safety or consequence of failure.
5.2
DESIGN APPROACH
The ultimate limit states (ULS) that correspond, in general, to the maximum resistance to
applied actions;
The serviceability limit states (SLS) that correspond to the criteria governing normal functional
use;
Fatigue limit states (FLS) that correspond to the accumulated effect of cyclic actions;
The accidental limit states (ALS) that correspond to the situation where damage to
components has occurred due to an accidental event.
Structural design with respect to the ALS shall involve consideration of resistance of the structure to a
relevant accidental event, and resistance in the structural condition resulting from the accidental event.
34
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
5.3
5.3.1 GENERAL
The design review concerns relevant drawings, calculations notes and other documents covering naval
architecture and main structural components of the terminal, developed by the Designer and submitted to
the Society for approval, appraisal and information.
At the satisfactory conclusion of evaluations, a Certificate of Design Approval is issued, which expresses
the opinion of the Society as regards the compliance with the present Guidance Note and the applicable
requirements of the reference documents as defined in [5.3.4].
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
35
NI 518
A detailed non exhaustive list of relevant rules and standards is given in [12] for reference.
Basic engineering documents, specifications of the installation, and other Owners documents
including General Arrangement.
Specific technical documents (for example, soil report and metocean report)
Drawings
Supporting calculations as necessary to fully demonstrate the adequacy of proposed design for the
relevant conditions.
Documents to be received are to be identified prior to starting the design review, from supplied lists
defined in agreement with the Society on the basis of [5.3.4].
In any case, the Owner shall submit himself, or make submit, any other documents relevant to the scope
of classification/certification. Besides, the Society may request any document found relevant, should the
need arise along the course of the Design Review.
36
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
5.3.6.1 METOCEAN
Reports of environmental conditions are examined for appraisal as to the availability of all data which
are necessary to perform unit design, including :
Extreme conditions
Long term distribution, for fatigue evaluation
Background reports and studies for information are examined for their support of proposed design
data.
Site data
Design conditions resulting from Owners operating requirements (e.g. limit condition for a
given situation of the unit)
Output of safety assessment study (e.g. requirements for integrity under fire and blast
conditions) and other design activities.
However, it is understood that amendments or complements may arise with the progress of design.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
37
NI 518
38
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
5.3.6.9 MOORING
The design of mooring systems is reviewed for approval, including:
design procedures, wind tunnel test data, and model basin test (specification and report.
design calculations of mooring system
arrangement
strength of anchors and other particular components
5.3.6.10
MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
39
NI 518
6
6.1
6.1.2 METERING
Flow metering can be required for fiscal, custody transfer or material balance purposes. The accuracy of
the metering systems have to be demonstrated as being sufficient for the purpose.
6.2
LIQUEFACTION UNIT
6.2.1 GENERAL
The purpose of liquefaction process is to extract sensible and latent heat from natural gas to transform it
from gaseous state at high temperature to liquid phase under a cryogenic temperature of about -162 C,
and under a pressure close to the atmospheric pressure.
The selection of the most suitable liquefaction cycle for an offshore installation will be mainly depending
on factors such as:
Machinery configuration and available drivers
Power requirements
Heat exchanger type and surface area
Ease of operation/start-up/shutdown
Space and weight requirements
In case of floating units, the process sensitivity to motions and accelerations
Among a variety of liquefaction process, three main types of refrigeration cycle could be mentioned for
LNG offshore units:
Cascade refrigerant cycle: the natural gas is cooled, condensed and sub-cooled in three discrete
stages, by using a combined propane, ethylene, methane refrigerant system.
Mixed refrigerant cycle (MRC): uses a single mixed refrigerant, comprising nitrogen and
hydrocarbons.
Expander cycle: combines compression and work-expansion of gas to provide refrigeration in a
closed cycle. It uses either nitrogen or methane as the refrigerant cycle gas.
The liquefaction plant, cold box, cooling fluids and insulation materials are to be duly selected and
designed to make sure produced LNG quantities will be stored and maintained within the acceptable
range of pressure and temperature.
40
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Special attention is to be drawn to offshore terminal motions, in case of floating units, to make sure
allowable operating conditions are respected to motion sensitive process equipment. Whenever it is
possible, these sensitive equipment should be located close to the centre of gravity of the floating
structure.
6.3
6.3.1 GENERAL
The following prescriptions will apply for both categories of storage tanks previously mentioned under
[1.8.3.2]. However, these general principles are to be adapted under a case-by-case basis for each of
these 2 categories of storage tank.
6.3.3 LOADS
The following categories of loads acting on the storage vessel are to be considered and provided for
information:
Permanent actions: corresponding to time independent actions resulting from nominal use of the
tank and from permanent interactions of tanks with their surrounding. Permanent actions are
including:
o Weights (own weight, weight of connected items)
o Gaseous pressure
o Pre-stress, if any
o Pressure from insulation material (example, from perlite)
o Permanent differential settlements
o Permanent temperature gradients
o Mechanical and thermal reactions from connected pipes
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
41
NI 518
Both permanent and transient actions as defined hereabove are considered as normal actions, and will
be referred to as such in the following.
Accidental actions: corresponding to low probability transient actions caused either by abnormal
operating conditions or upsets, or by extreme external conditions. They are including:
o Overpressures, for example, caused by a roll-over
o Underpressure
o Overfilling
o Leakage of primary containment, if relevant
o Extreme seismic action (SSE)
o Missile impact
o Radiation produced by an external fire
o External blast
o Pump drop during maintenance operations
Lists of loads(actions) presented hereabove are not exhaustive. The exact definition of the
actions to be considered during the design is to be submitted to BV for consideration. Whenever
possible, these actions should match results from hazard/risk analyses.
Actions are to be combined according to their likelihood of occurrence. Unless otherwise
specified, combination as defined by EN 1473 is applicable.
It is acknowledge that detailed safety objectives and acceptance criteria are dependent upon the
design codes selected. However the following principles are to be applied in any case:
o Occurrence of normal actions must not result in safety nor operability impairment
o In case of accidental actions, it is acceptable that operability could be temporary altered,
provided that safety is maintained.
Non-conventional design principles such as, for example, Leak before Break concept, can be
considered provided that suitable justification is given.
42
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
43
NI 518
Liquid level: it is recommended to use high accuracy and independent measurement level
devices allowing for a continuous measurement, and for a high level detection to initiating ESD.
Pressure: each tank shall be fitted with pressure gauges, suitably located, enabling to:
o
o
o
o
Temperature: each tank has to be fitted with properly located temperature sensors allowing to
measure:
o Temperature at different depths (every two meters, as a minimum)
o Gaseous phase temperature
o Primary and secondary tank wall and bottom temperature
Density: LNG density should be monitored throughout the whole liquid depth (unless otherwise
specified)
Limited reliability of measuring devices are to be managed by the use of appropriate redundancy
system.
All measurements shall be transmitted to control room and/or to ESD, whenever an emergency
action is to be automatically taken.
Alarms are to be transmitted directly to the designated operator.
44
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
For bottom filling, at least one of the features here below shall be provided:
o Jet nozzles placed at the bottom of the tank and oriented toward the surface
o Vertical pipe perforated for part or for its whole length
o Jet breaker located at the extremity of a pipe for spray filling.
A recirculation system
A boil-off monitoring system
A temperature/density measurement system.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
45
NI 518
6.3.9.10
Low temperature thermal detector of the straight-line type. Within hazardous areas such as
those of, manifold and valves at lower tank, it is recommended to provide a TV-monitoring
system.
Gas detector for locations presenting a particularly high risk of leakage, like areas of manifolds.
Such detectors shall always be placed under cone-shaped collectors.
6.4
PIPING SYSTEMS
6.4.1 GENERAL
Prescriptions given under this chapter will be applying to piping items of:
the main process system,
the auxiliary system,
utilities
and fire protection systems
Design of pipes, fabrication and installations should comply with specific recognised codes/standards.
Pipes are to be arranged either on piperacks or pipeways.
Material in permanent contact with LNG: in this case, materials are to be suitable for cryogenic
use.
Material in accidental contact with LNG: in this case, the pipe will be provided with suitable
insulation or with any equivalent protective measure.
6.4.3 SUPPORTS
Supports are to be designed in such a way that stresses induced by pipe displacements caused by
thermal expansion or contraction remain within acceptable limits.
Moreover, special attention is to be drawn with respect to design of the supports, to allow a proper
behavior of the pipes under earthquake, wind and wave loads, is applicable.
6.4.4 CORROSION
Pipes will be designed so as to prevent any leak due to corrosion or pitting during the lifetime of the
plant. The material selection and corrosion allowances will be made according to the operating and
environmental conditions. Whenever necessary, special measures, such as cathodic protection or
special coating, are to be enforced.
46
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
6.5
LOADING/OFFLOADING SYSTEMS
6.5.1 GENERAL
The LNG transfer system is to be duly designed to ensure safe and reliable transfer of LNG offshore to
and from LNG carriers, taking into consideration the combination of containment integrity requirements
and site environmental conditions, maximum significant wave heights, and subsequent range of relative
motions between the terminal and the shuttle.
Several relative positions of terminal and shuttle tanker have to be considered, to cover different
waterdepth and environmental conditions, and always keeping in mind the need of high availability of the
system, and also the suitability to receive a variety of shuttle vessels. Depending on the site conditions,
either the concept of a side-by-side LNG transfer or a tandem mode should be considered, the latter
being adapted to more severe site weather conditions.
6.5.3
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
47
NI 518
4. to control, based on real time measurements and computer devices, relative motions between
shuttle and terminal (PMS: Position Monitoring System)
5. to follow the low frequency motions caused by horizontal relative motions of the LNG carrier
6. stop important LNG leakages in case of accidents during the transfer operations (levels 1 and 2
ESD systems(*), with both options, for automatic and manual control)
7. allow easy access to all system parts for inspection and maintenance, provide adapted means
for efficient repairs or replacements
(*) NOTA: ESD1 is the emergency shut down system which stops transfer operation when initiated from
ship or terminal, whereas the ESD2 is the one which disconnects transfer lines by both: 1) closing valves
(limiting liquid spills) and 2) powering the coupling apart.
6.6
Every pump and compressor shall be provided with a local or remote control system. Explosion-proof
light signals showing whether the component is in service shall be provided locally or transmitted to
control room.
Every pump and compressor shall be provided with the following:
Fluid transfer piping systems are to be designed so as to incorporate a sufficient number of valves to
prevent huge fluid spillage in case of a rupture.
Such valves are to be provided with both local and remote control devices.
Valves shall be designed to operate at minimum service temperature and shall be provided with suitable
protection against possible icing during unloading phases.
48
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
6.7
6.7.1 GENERAL
*
Heated Vaporizers in which heat is provided by the combustion of fuel, electric power, exhaust
gas from boiler or waste heat from internal combustion engines
Integral Heat Vaporizers for which the heat source is integral to the actual vaporizing exchanger.
This type includes the so-called submerged combustion vaporizers.
Remote Heated Vaporizers corresponding to cases where the heat source is separated from the
actual vaporizing exchanger and an intermediate fluid (water, steam, iso-pentane, glycol) is used
as the heat transport medium.
Ambient Vaporizers using natural sources such as the atmosphere, seawater, or geothermal
waters.
Process Vaporizers in which heat is provided from another thermodynamic or chemical process
or in such a way to conserve or to utilize the refrigeration from the LNG.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
49
NI 518
6.8
6.8.1 GENERAL
Each plant shall be provided with a boil-off recovery system in such a way to collect boil-off product, to
reliquefy, recompress, to flare or to release it to the atmosphere in a controlled way.
These systems generally comprise:
Boil-off collection system (pipework)
Systems of gas transfer to/from the tanker
Boil-off gas compressors
Flares and vents
6.8.5 COMPRESSORS
Compressors shall be fitted with devices suitable to limit downstream pressure to the Maximum
Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of equipment installed downstream.
They shall be equipped with a shut down system capable to isolate them in case of an emergency.
Compressors handling flammable gas shall be provided with collected vents.
50
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
6.8.6 FLARE/VENTS
Flare/vents shall be designed according to the maximum flow rate they are intended to convey.
This flow rate can result of the following working circumstances:
Unloading of an LNG carrier without gas return
Stop of boil-off recovery compressor(s)
Operation of a submerged pump in full recycle
Cool down of LNG carrier tanks (for exporting terminals)
Usually, several types of flow rates are defined:
Nominal flow rate, and
Accidental flow rate,
These flow rates should be considered separately.
Flare lay out shall be chosen as to account for site specific wind direction distribution to minimize the risk
of a fammable gas cloud reaching a source of ignition. Snuffing and cooling devices can be used as last
resort.
6.9
MODULARIZATION CONCEPTS
When the design of the terminal is based upon the assemblage of several dedicated modules,
constructed apart, by one or several constructors, particular attention is to be given to:
Eventual interface problems, to ensure a safe, reliable and maintenable connection between
modules
The respect of minimum required distance between equipment. The final layout of the
installation is to consider a detailed disposition of equipment inside of modules, and their
arrangement on the terminal itself.
Accessibility into modules for inspection, maintenance and repair after installation.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
51
NI 518
7.1
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
GENERAL
7.1.1 APPLICATION
The requirements in this chapter apply, in addition to those contained in Bureau Veritas Rules for the
Classification of Steel Ships Part C, Ch 2, to gas carriers, more specifically:
Section 12, [7.15]
Section 11, [5]
Section 3, [10]
Requirements in this chapter, which are given immediately after a reference to the IGC code are to be
understood as being complementary requirements to the IGC code.
a) direct current:
two-wire insulated
b) alternating current:
single-phase, two-wire insulated
three-phase, three-wire insulated.
In insulated distribution systems, no current carrying part is to be earthed, other than:
a) through an insulation level monitoring device
b) through components used for the suppression of interference in radio circuits.
52
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
53
NI 518
7.2
Electrical installations in spaces protected by air-locks are to be of a certified safe type unless
arranged to be de-energised upon loss of overpressure in the space.
54
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Hazar
dous
area
N
Zone 0
Electrical equipment
Description
IGC CODE REFERENCE:
Ch. 10, 10.2.2
Cargo containment systems
Zone 0
b)
c)
d)
Zone 1
a)
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
55
NI 518
Hazar
dous
area
Spaces
Electrical equipment
Description
f)
Zone 1
Zone 1
56
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Hazar
dous
area
Spaces
Electrical equipment
Description
f)
Zone 1
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
57
NI 518
Hazar
dous
area
Spaces
Electrical equipment
Description
Zones within 2,4 m of the
outer surface of a cargo
containment system where
such surface is exposed to
the weather
Zone 1
Zone 1
Compartments
hoses
Zone 1
for
Enclosed or semi-enclosed
spaces
in
which
pipes
containing
cargoes
are
located
Zone 2
Zone 2
58
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
diethyl ether
vinyl ethyl ether
ethylene oxide
propylene oxide
mixtures of ethylene oxide and propylene oxide.
7.3
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION
Temperature class
Explosion group
Methane
T2
II A
In case of any other product, reference is made to BV Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships, Part D,
Ch 9, Sec 10, [Tab 2] .
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
59
NI 518
8
8.1
UTILITIES
NITROGEN SUPPLY
Nitrogen is mainly used for gas treatment (adjustment of calorific value), pressurization, LNG tank
insulation space and piping purging , drying and inerting, rapid extinction of flares, vents and furnaces,
cooling, refrigerant cycle make up.
Nitrogen should be of cryogenic quality. It can be produced on site or delivered by ship under pressure
or liquefied.
Liquified nitrogen pipework shall use cryogenic materials selected in accordance with specific standards
(for example, EN 1160).
8.2
Compressed air circuits generally include air instrument, air service and air breathing. As far as air
instrument is concerned, it is recommended that:
The air be dried before delivery
A minimum redundancy of two compressors be provided, each being able to supply the total
demand.
8.3
WASTE TREATMENTS
Special care should be given for secure storage and recycling of toxic wastes, in particular those
containing mercury.
8.4
Living and technical quarters shall be designed and built according to recognized standards, complying
with the local regulations concerning safety for the public, based on environmental conditions, including
earthquake analysis, if applicable.
When no local regulations exist, API RP-2A will be applied.
8.5
8.6
SECURITY
The operator of the facility shall provide a security system aimed at restricting the access to some
specific reserved areas of site to authorised persons, only.
Access (arrivals and derpartures) should be strictly controlled at access gates to the terminal.
60
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
9
9.1
FIRE PROTECTION
GENERALITIES
The fire hazard remains the major risk for this kind of installations. The main objective of the safety code
is then to reduce the probability of occurrence of any accident of this type, keeping in mind the huge
confined quantity of LNG to be stored, processed, loaded and/or offloaded in offshore LNG terminals.
The probability that a person in or adjacent to the terminal will be exposed to an unacceptable safety
hazard as a result of the design and construction of the terminal, has to be reduced to very low levels, to
be decided in agreement with the Administration.
The implementation of the fire safety system must take into account this major objective of reducing the
probability of injury of any person in the terminal or in adjacent areas, caused by any fire accident.
These risks of injury due to fire are addressed here after, as being those caused by:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
In case of floating structures, reference is made in general to Part D, Ch 9, Section 11, of the Rules for
the Classification of Steel Ships.
9.2
PASSIVE PROTECTION
9.2.1 GENERAL
While in a confined area, the rise in LNG temperature will result in the rise of vapour tension. In open air,
a considerable amount of gas (600 liters of gas for 1 liter of liquid) is released, which is liable to quickly
form an explosive gas/air mixture.
To prevent major accidents, four passive protection measures are therefore recommended, as follows:
1. Prevention and detection of liquid leaks of gas
2. Limitation of evaporated amount of LNG, in case of a leak, by confining the leak within bonds
(compartmented areas, and liquefied gas recovery system).
3. Removal of ignition sources from possible leakage areas, to locate them at minimum safe
distances from these sites
4. Passive fire protection structures
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
61
NI 518
The concept of safety distance shall be duly observed, specially between LNG storage tanks, and others
hydrocarbon storage tanks, as well. This safety distance concept is aimed at preventing fire to escalate
from one tank to another. The determination of suitable distances are subject to specific justification ,
including regulatory requirements, codes and standard recommendations, as well as, results from risk /
hazard analysis.
9.3
9.4
FIRE PROTECTION
62
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
9.5
INSTRUMENTATION
9.6
PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL
In addition to protective isotherm clothing, personnel shall be protected against radiant heat by means of
screesns fitted in suitable locations, especially in the axis of pathways located in the vicinity of storage
tanks.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
63
NI 518
64
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
10.2.4.1
the general arrangement & layout of the passive safety systems including, but not be limited
to:
marine environment
risk segregation
safety equipment.
the classification of the units areas versus:
sources of hazards
extent of hazardous areas
the passive fire protection with respect to:
structural integrity
fire partitions
materials fire resisting characteristics
locations of fire divisions
fire protection of living quarters
the liquefied natural gas storage systems with respect to, but not be limited to:
the capacity of systems to ensure the safe containment of LNG
the safe internal and offloading transfer
the prevention of the formation of flammable mixtures as well as the presence of ignition
sources
the suitability of mechanical and electrical equipment
the safety control systems
the ship piping systems with respect to:
bilge & ballast
venting and sounding
the escape routes
the active safety systems
the ventilation with respect to:
the general arrangement
the natural ventilation (particularly applicable to open modules concept)
the mechanical ventilation systems
the segregation
the fire & gas detection systems with respect to:
the design review objectives
the detection philosophy
the voting system(s)
the activation of alarm & safety functions
the power supplies
the active fire protection with respect to:
the general arrangement
the fire water systems
the total flooding systems
the other systems
the life saving appliances (lsa) for appraisal of the adequacy to meet applicable requirements
with respect to:
the unit life saving crafts
the unit individual life saving appliances
the safety plan
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
65
NI 518
10.2.4.2
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
10.2.4.3
The design review will give emphasis to the items as defined in [10.2.4.3.1 to 10.2.4.3.2] hereunder.
66
Electrical equipment
1. Operating temperatures with respect to the ignition temperature of gases or vapours
which may be released at a given location.
2. Safety type of protection, according to agreed standards.
3. Lighting fixtures
4. Wiring design to ascertain compliance with the following :
protection against damage,
suitability for use under emergency/upset conditions (geographical) segregation of
network),
suitability for use hazardous areas.
Other equipment
1. Gas turbines including :
turbine room classification accounting for air renewal, differential pressure under
operating conditions with adjacent hazardous areas or with turbines acoustic hood,
alarms
location and protection of auxiliary equipment : valves, piping branches, piping, gas
supply etc...
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
10.2.4.4
The review will cover the following areas as defined in [10.2.4.4.1 to 10.2.4.4.3].
Piping mechanical
Layout of piping with regard to areas segregation, mechanical damages possibly sustained,
fire, flow, condition, etc...
Check of design computation in accordance with applicable Codes/Standard.
Verification that stresses induced by hammer effects, if applicable, have been accounted
for.
Verification of adequacy of materials, conformity with applicable codes fabrication testing
procedures.
Check of corrosion protection design.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
67
NI 518
The review will include :
gas and fire detection/protection systems as well as emergency power system already dealt
with in the preceding sections,
liquid containing systems to collect and safely dispose of released liquid hydrocarbons, to
initiate alarms and shutdowns,
emergency shutdown (E.S.D.) systems to enable partial or total shut-down, either manually
or automatically, of the plant activities,
Platform safety
Review of the platform safety analysis performed for each process component under worst
input/output conditions to be later integrated in the entire process flow stream.
Review of the two (primary and secondary) levels of protection : independence of control
devices (for birth monitoring and shut-down unless otherwise accepted), functional
difference between the two levels of protection, total coverage by each level of protection of
possible configurations and consequences of a given failure, etc...
Review of logic diagram and cause and effect chart.
Review of the choice of protection systems and devices :
Shutdown valves
The review will bear upon :
check of location in relation to process flow schematics and operating parameters,
check of isolating valves location with regards to fire protection system,
check of valves design, particularly of fire resisting properties.
68
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
GENERAL
Control devices shall fulfil their function under any normal conditions of service and shall be arranged so
as to permit their monitoring and maintenance.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
69
NI 518
10.3.4.2
Control devices for main components of the terminal system shall be designed to automatically switch
over to fail-safe system in the event of power failure (fail-safe design).
Control devices with electric power supply shall be supplied by two independent sources of power.
Whenever auxiliary generators are provided as the emergency power source, their location shall be such
that they can operate in the event of major damage to any part of the system.
10.3.4.3
10.3.4.4
70
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Alarm device shall be provided at control station and inside of the concerned building.
triggered off when the gas concentration reaches 25 % of the Lower Limit of Flammability.
It shall be
Sensors required in this chapter should trigger off alarms when critical levels are reached.
Such alarms include, in particular, light and sound signals displayed at control room.
Morever, the nature and location of potential danger, pointed out by alarms, shall be clearly indicated.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
71
NI 518
at the beginning of the construction, appraisal of the procedure defining the content of the
manufacturing record book,
during construction, inspection of the significant main phases of the construction, survey of
testing of equipment and systems,
commissioning witness.
72
Fabrication procedures
Concrete fabrication
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Fabrication standards
11.3.1 PRELIMINARY
A quality audit is performed by the Society to check the QA system of the Contractor and to demonstrate
that the procedures needed to obtain the required quality are existing. The way these procedures are
implemented is also checked.
Materials
Material traceability
Main fit-ups
Preheating
Welding consumables
Welding parameters
Visual random checks on weld aspects and fillet weld throats dimensions.
Contractor'
s Site queries
Contractor'
s Non conformity reports
Contractor'
s Modifications / changes
Contractor'
s release notes
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
73
NI 518
Piping systems
H.V.A.C.
74
Generators/Motors
Switchboards
Transformers
Batteries
Cables
Grounding
Electrical instrumentation
Fire and Gas detection and protection (Alarms and public address, Navigation
aids)
Emergency Supplies
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
Review of certificates of passive fire protection materials (wall/ceiling panels, fire bats, doors,
windows, deck insulation, surface lining, paint systems, floor covering, etc. ...)
Check installation of passive fire protection materials in accordance with approved drawings
and specifications.
the certificate of inspection at works of the anodes and the storage conditions.
that the electrical continuity with the protected structures is ensured if the anodes are clamped
and not welded (resistivity tests should have been done by the builder).
that the number and location of the anodes are in accordance with the approved design.
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
75
NI 518
11.6.1 SCOPE
As the commissioning of systems or parts of systems will be completed at the construction site, a
reduced commissioning programme limited to the outstanding items will be carried out offshore.
The commissioning is associated with operating the plants and includes:
where possible, the checking of the protection devices (the adjustment being made previously to
the commissioning period),
checking of the remote control devices including the alarm system running,
76
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
12 APPENDIX 1:
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
Ref. N
NR 445 DTO
NR 446 DTO
NR 447 DTO
NR 448 DTO
NR 449 DTO
NR 450 DTO
NR 451 DTO
NR 453 DTO
NR 454 DTO
NR 456 DTO
NR 183 DNC
NR 184 DNC
NI 189 DNC
NR 216 DNC
NR 266 DNC
NI 299 DNC
NI 393 DSM
NI 409 DNC
NR 423 DTO
NR 424 DNC
NI 425 DNC
NR 426 DTO
NR 428 DTO
NI 432 DTO
NR 458 DTO
NR 459 DTO
NR 460 DTO
NI 493 DTM
77
NI 518
IMO Regulations
SOLAS
MARPOL
ILCC
MODU CODE
COLREG
78
Bureau Veritas
November 2005
NI 518
November 2005
Bureau Veritas
79
NI 518
CONCRETE
Euro Code 2 Unified Code on Concrete
Euro Code 8 Code on Earthquake Engineering
ISO CD 19903 Fixed Concrete Structures
BS-8110 Structural Use of Concrete
th
NS3473 Concrete Structures, 4 Edition Norwegian Council for Building Standardisation, Nov
1992
CSA S474-94 Concrete Structures, Part IV of the Code for the Design, Construction and
Installation of Fixed Offshore Structures, 1994
ACI 213R Guide for Structural Lightweight Aggregate Concrete
ACI 301 Specifications for Structural Concrete
ACI 311.4R Guide for Concrete Inspection Programs
ACI 318 Building Code Requirement for Structural Concrete
ACI 357R-84 Guide for the Design and Construction of Fixed Offshore Concrete Structures
ACI 357.2R-88 State-of-the-Art Report on Barge-like Concrete Structures
ASTM C330 Specification for Lightweight Aggregates for Structural Concrete
ACMC-ICCMC Asian Concrete Model Code 2001
LNG
NFPA 59A Standard for the production, storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 2001
edition
NFPA 59 Standard for the storage and handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases at utility gas plants,
1995 edition
BS-7777 Flat-bottomed, vertical, cylindrical storage tanks for low temperature service
EN 1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas Design of onshore installations
LIGHTING AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION
IALA Regulations
LOADING/OFFLOADING SYSTEMS
OCIMF Design and Construction Specification for Marine Loading Arms, 1987
EN 1474 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design and testing of
loading/unloading arms
SIGITTO Gas transfer guide and Gas handling procedures
80
Bureau Veritas
November 2005