NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY V.

IAC
FACTS:
On August 23, 1979, private respondent Leon Soriano offered to sell palay grains to NFA through William
Cabal, the provincial manager in Tuguegarao. The documents submitted were processed, and he was
given a quota of 2,640 cavans, which is the maximum number of cavans he may sell to NFA. On the
same day and on the following day, Soriano delivered 630 cavans, which were no rebagged, classified
and weighed. When he demanded payment, he was told that payment will be held in abeyance since Mr.
Cabal was still investigating on an information received that Soriano was not a bona fide farmer. Instead
of withdrawing the palay, Soriano insisted that the palay grains be delivered and paid. He filed a complaint
for specific performance. Petitioners contend that the delivery was merely made for the purpose of
offering it for sale because until the grains were rebagged, classified and weighed, they are not
considered sold.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a perfected sale
HELD:
Soriano initially offered to sell palay grains produced in his farmland to NFA. When the latter accepted the
offer by noting in Soriano's Farmer's Information Sheet a quota of 2,640 cavans, there was already a
meeting of the minds between the parties. The object of the contract, being the palay grains produced in
Soriano's farmland and the NFA was to pay the same depending upon its quality. The fact that the exact
number of cavans of palay to be delivered has not been determined does not affect the perfection of the
contract. Article 1349 of the New Civil Code provides: ". . .. The fact that the quantity is not determinate
shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same,
without the need of a new contract between the parties." In this case, there was no need for NFA and
Soriano to enter into a new contract to determine the exact number of cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano
can deliver so much of his produce as long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans. From the moment the
contract of sale is perfected, it is incumbent upon the parties to comply with their mutual obligations or
"the parties may reciprocally demand performance" thereof.

SCHUBACK & SONS VS. CA

FACTS:
On October 16, 1981, defendant submitted to plaintiff the list of bus spare parts he wanted to purchase to
its counterpart in Hamburg. Plaintiff sent an offer on the items listed. On December 4, 1981, defendant
informed plaintiff that he preferred genuine to replacement parts, and requested a 15% discount. On
December 17, plaintiff submitted its formal offer. On December 24, defendant submitted a purchase order,
and submitted the quantity on December 29. Plaintiff immediately ordered the items from Schuback
Hamburg, which thereafter ordered the same from NDK, a supplier in Germany. Plaintiff sent a pro-forma
invoice to be used in applying for letter of credit. On February 16, 1982, plaintiff reminded defendant to
open a letter of credit to avoid delay in shipment. Defendant mentioned the difficulty he was encountering
in procuring the same. Plaintiff continued receiving invoices and partial deliveries from NDK. On October
18, 1982, plaintiff again reminded the defendant to open a letter of credit. Defendant replied that he did
not make a valid purchase order and that there was no definite contract between him and the plaintiff.
Plaintiff sent a rejoinder explaining that there is a valid Purchase Order and suggesting that defendant
either proceed with the order and open a letter of credit or cancel the order and pay the cancellation fee of
30% of F.O.B. value, or plaintiff will endorse the case to its lawyers. Demand letters sent to defendant by
plaintiff's counsel dated March 22, 1983 and June 9, 1983 were to no avail. Consequently, petitioner filed

a complaint for recovery of actual or compensatory damages, unearned profits, interest, attorney's fees
and costs against private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of sale has been perfected between the parties
HELD:
Article 1319 of the Civil Code states: "Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter offer." The facts presented to us
indicate that consent on both sides has been manifested. The offer by petitioner was manifested on
December 17, 1981 when petitioner submitted its proposal containing the item number, quantity, part
number, description, the unit price and total to private respondent. On December 24, 1981, private
respondent informed petitioner of his desire to avail of the prices of the parts at that time and
simultaneously enclosed its Purchase Order. At this stage, a meeting of the minds between vendor and
vendee has occurred, the object of the contract: being the spare parts and the consideration, the price
stated in petitioner's offer dated December 17, 1981 and accepted by the respondent on December 24,
1981.

ALCANTARA-DAUS v. SPOUSES DE LEON

FACTS:
Spouses De Leon are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of San Manuel,
Pangasinan with an area of Four Thousand Two Hundred Twelve square meters more or less.
Respondent Hermoso De Leon inherited the said lot from his father Marcelino De Leon by virtue of a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Said lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22134 of the Land
Records of Pangasinan.
Sometime 1960s, Spouses De Leon engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of
the documents of their properties. They were asked to sign voluminous documents by the latter. After the
death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been
conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in
truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them. Furthermore, respondent found out
that his signature in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon
was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara
Spouses De Leon demanded the annulment of the document and re-conveyance but defendants refused.
Petitioner, Aurora Alcantara-Daus averred that she bought the land in question in good faith and for value
on December 1975 and that she has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the
same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone.
The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered its Decision in favor of herein petitioner. It ruled that
respondents claim was barred by laches, because more than 18 years had passed since the land was
sold. It further ruled that since it was a notarial document, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in favor of
Rodolfo de Leon was presumptively authentic.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute executed by Rodolfo De Leon over the land in question in favor of
petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein?

Whether or not the evidentiary weight of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, executed by
respondent Hermoso de Leon, Perlita de Leon and Carlota de Leon in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was
overcome by more than a preponderance of evidence of respondents?
HELD:
First Issue:
NO. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the
thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers nonownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract.
Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, its consummation by
delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of
ownership over the thing sold.
Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo De Leon was not the owner of the land he
delivered to petitioner. Thus, the consummation of the contract and the consequent transfer of ownership
would depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article
1434 of the Civil Code. Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity and the due execution
of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor.
Second Issue:
NO. As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must be reasonably established
before it may be admitted in evidence. Notarial documents, however, may be presented in evidence
without further proof of their authenticity, since the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence
of the execution of the instrument or document involved. To contradict facts in a notarial document and
the presumption of regularity in its favor, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
The CA ruled that the signature of Hermoso De Leon on the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim was
forged. However, this factual finding is in conflict with that of the RTC. While normally this Court does not
review factual issues, this rule does not apply when there is a conflict between the holdings of the CA and
those of the trial court, as in the present case.
After poring over the records, the SC finds no reason to reverse the factual finding of the appellate court.
A comparison of the genuine signatures of Hermoso De Leon with his purported signature on the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim will readily reveal that the latter is a forgery. As aptly held by the CA,
such variance cannot be attributed to the age or the mechanical acts of the person signing.

CONCHITA NOOL and GAUDENCIO ALMOJERA vs.CA

FACTS:
One lot formerly owned by Victorio Nool has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot previously owned by
Francisco Nool has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Spouses (plaintiffs) Conchita Nool and Gaudencio
Almojera alleged that they are the owners of the subject lands. They are in dire need of money, they
obtained a loan DBP , secured by a real estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which were still
registered in the names of Victorino and Francisco Nool, at the time, Since the plaintiffs failed to pay the
said loan, the mortgage was foreclosed; that within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted
Anacleto Nool for the latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP, which the latter did; and as a
result, the titles of the 2 parcels of land in question were transferred to Anacleto; that as part of their
arrangement or understanding, Anacleto agreed to buy from Conchita the 2 parcels of land , for a total
price of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid to Conchita, and upon payment of the balance

of P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were to regain possession of the 2 hectares of land, which amounts spouses
Anacleto Nool and Emilia Nebre failed to pay. Anacleto Nool signed the private writing, agreeing to return
subject lands when plaintiffs have the money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having been made
to believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said properties.
ISSUE: Is the purchase of the subject lands to Anacleto valid?
HELD:
Nono dat quod non habet, No one can give what he does not have; Contract of repurchase inoperative
thus void
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no
better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the sellers authority to sell. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that a person
can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the seller can legally transfer. No one can give what he does not have nono dat quod non habet.
In the present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the
property to the private respondents. Further, the contract of repurchase that the parties entered into
presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they sold to private respondents. As
petitioners sold nothing, it follows that they can also repurchase nothing. In this light, the contract of
repurchase is also inoperative and by the same analogy, void.