A.M. No.

P-13-3126
February 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3273-P)
VERONICA F. GALINDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A court stenographer who defrauded a litigant by soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a
legal proceeding in the court is guilty of the most serious administrative offense of grave
misconduct. Her dismissal from the service is fully warranted.
Antecedents
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit dated October 12, 2009 filed
by Veronica F. Galindez (Galindez) against Court Stenographer Zosima Susbilla-De Vera
(Susbilla-De Vera) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, in Olongapo City.
In her complaint-affidavit, Galindez averred that sometime in July 2008, she had
approached Susbilla-De Vera, her school batchmate and a court employee, to inquire where
any petition for the adoption of her nephew and niece had already been filed, pending, or
approved by the Family Court, as she was interested in filing such a petition herself; that
after several follow-ups, Susbilla-De Vera had reported to her that she could not locate any
adoption petition involving the intended adoptees in the Family Court; that Susbilla-De Vera
had then volunteered that she could handle the adoption process for her by coordinating
with a lawyer, and that she could help in the fast-tracking of the petition; that Susbilla-De
Vera had even boasted that it would take only three months for the entire process, and that
there would be no need to follow up or to hire a lawyer to handle the petition; that SusbillaDe Vera had told her that the cost for the adoption process would be P130,000.00, half of
which should be paid as down payment; that Susbilla-De Vera had followed up with her on
the proposal; that because she could raise only P20,000.00 as down payment, Susbilla-De
Vera had told her that the P20,000.00 would be acceptable, and that she would just talk to a
certain Atty. Nini, the handling lawyer; that she had paid theP20,000.00 to Susbilla-De Vera;
that after a week, Susbilla-De Vera had called her to ask for the balance of the down
payment; that she had willingly given the balance on two separate occasions, the first the
amount ofP30,000.00 and the second the amount of P15,000.00 a week later; that SusbillaDe Vera had handed her a receipt for the full amount of P65,000.00, with the assurance that
everything would be handled well, and she had made follow-ups on the progress of the
adoption proceedings, and Susbilla-De Vera had informed her that publication had already
been done but that there would be other papers that needed to be located; that because of
her refusal to divulge the name of the lawyer she had visited Susbilla-De Vera's office to ask
the latter to facilitate a meeting with the engaged counsel; that Susbilla-De Vera had instead
brought her to the Family Court (Branch 73) to look into the logbook to find out if the
previous adoption had been in fact completely processed; that by the actuations of Susbilla1

De Vera had given her cause to doubt, and she had then gone to the Farinas Law Office
herself to inquire on the status of the adoption petition; that the legal secretary of the law
office had told her that the adoption had already been completed with her brother as the
petitioner; that because of that information, she had demanded from Susbilla-De Vera to
return the money but Susbilla-De Vera had replied that the money had been delivered to the
lawyer; that she had offered to personally see the lawyer about the return of the down
payment, but Susbilla-De Vera had insisted to do it herself; that after a few days, SusbillaDe Vera had informed her that the lawyer would be returning the money in two installments;
and that she had not received any reimbursement by Susbilla-De Vera as of the filing of the
complaint-affdiavit.
2

On October 26, 2009, acting on the administrative complaint, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) directed Susbilla-De Vera to submit her comment within ten days from
receipt.
3

When the OCA did not receive her comment thereafter, it sent another directive dated
January 22, 2010 to Susbilla-De Vera for her to comply with the previous order to submit
her comment.
4

Upon the recommendation of Court Administrator Jose Midas P Marquez, the Court directed
Susbilla-De Vera to submit her comment within five days with a warning that the Court
would decide the administrative complaint on the basis of the record; and to show cause
within ten days why she should not be held administratively liable for not complying with the
two directives from the OCA.
5

But Susbilla-De Vera still did not comply with the order for her to submit her comment.
Hence, the Court deemed the case submitted for decision based on the records on file; and
referred it to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
6

Findings and Recommendations of the OCA

In the memorandum dated September 12, 2011, the OCA rendered its findings, and
recommended dismissal from the service as the disciplinary action to be taken against
Susbilla-De Vera, to wit:
7

xxxx
Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that "court personnel shall
not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit on any or explicit or implicit understanding that
such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official functions" while Section 1 thereof
provides that "court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others."
In the case at bar, respondent violated these provisions as she took advantage of her
official position in receiving the amount of P65,000.00 from Complainant for the alleged
hiring of a counsel in the filing of a petition for adoption which did not materialize as the
minors to be adopted were already the subject in a decided adoption case and, thus,

committed grave misconduct. Moreover, she manifested her defiance with the directives of
the OCA.
xxxx
Grave Misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense with
disqualification from employment in any government office and forfeiture of benefits, except
for accrued leaves under Sec. 52 (A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service and Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, as amended by
Section 52(A), paragraphs 1 and 3 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No.
19, Series of 1999.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended, for approval of this Honorable
Court, that:
xxxx
2. For Grave Misconduct and Disrespect and Indifference to this Court's Resolutions, Ms.
Zosima R. Susbilla-de Vera be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual and absolute disqualification
from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government owned or controlled corporations.
Ruling of the Court
We find the findings of the OCA to be substantiated by the evidence on record, and the
recommendation of dismissal from the service to be conformable to the law and pertinent
jurisprudence.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the principle that a public office is a
public trust. It mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the
people, must at all times be accountable to them, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
1wphi1

To enforce this constitutional tenet, the Court has incessantly reminded officials and
employees involved in the administration of justice to faithfully adhere to their mandated
duties and responsibilities. Any act of impropriety -whether committed by the highest judicial
official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce -can greatly erode the people's
confidence in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct of its personnel. It is the personnel's constant duty, therefore, to maintain the good
name and standing of the court as a true temple of justice.
8

To deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have
her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead
others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to

influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts and actuations did not live up to the
expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had deliberately and
fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the adoption of her niece
and nephew. For one, if there would be such a case, she could not make such assurance to
the complainant because the handling court would independently and objectively handle
and decide the case based on its merits. She was also aware that her representations to
the complainant about no other adoption petition being yet filed in the Family Court, and
about her working together with a lawyer to advance the legal matter for the complainant
were both false, for there had already been another petition for adoption initiated by the
complainant's own brother, and there had been no lawyer working with her to assist the
complainant.
Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct or Court Personnel has enjoined all court
personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Susbilla-De
Vera thus violated her sacred oath as a court employee to serve the Judiciary with utmost
loyalty and to preserve the integrity and reputation of the Judiciary as an institution
dispensing justice to all. Her violation was made worse by her committing it in exchange for
easy money. She was thereby guilty of corruption. She compounded her guilt by disobeying
the orders of the Court requiring her to explain herself.
Under the circumstances, she committed grave misconduct, which the Court has described
in Velasco v. Baterbonia as follows:
9

In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,

clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee
who unlawfully or wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for
herself or for another, contrary to the rights of others. x x x
Grave misconduct is punishable by the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service. This
is pursuant to Section 46 A of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service Series of 2011 to wit:
Section 46. Classification of Offenses. -Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties
are classified into grave less grave or light depending on their gravity or depravity and
effects on the government service.
A The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
1. Serious Dishonesty;
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
3. Grave Misconduct;
xxxx

In Dela Cruz v. Malunao, we dismissed an erring employee of the R TC in Nueva Vizcaya

who had solicited money from litigants in exchange for favorable decisions. For sure the
acts of Susbilla-De Vera were of the same nature and gravity.
10

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. FINDS Court Stenographer ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA guilty of GROSS
MISCONDUCT; and DISMISSES her from the service effective immediately with
prejudice to her re-employment in the Government including government-owned or
-controlled corporations and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits;
2. DIRECTS the Employees Leave Division Office of the Administrative Services to
determine the balance of ZOSIMA SUSBILLA-DE VERA s earned leave credits; and
3. ORDER ZOSIMA SUSBILLA DE VERA to return to complainant Veronica F.
Galindez the amount of P65 000.00.
SO ORDERED.
-----------------------------A.M. No. P-08-2521
February 13, 2009
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2329-P)
CHRISTOPHER D. MANAOG, Complainant,
vs.
ARNEL JOSE A. RUBIO and EDGAR C. SURTIDA II, both Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Naga City,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant controversy arose from a Complaint dated November 14, 2005 and docketed as
OCA I.P.I No. 05-2329-P for misconduct, unethical behavior, verbal abuse, manhandling,
grave threat, grave/serious oral defamation, harassment, abuse and usurpation of judicial
power by Christopher D. Manaog against Arnel Jose A. Rubio and Edgar C. Surtida, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Naga City.
In a Resolution1 dated February 27, 2008, the Third Division of the Court referred the
complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC at Naga City2 for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), also for evaluation, report and recommendation. 3
As summarized by the Investigating Judge, the facts are as follows:

The complainant, on October 21, 2005, went to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC,
Naga City to secure information on ownership of certain parcels of land, which had been
transferred to others allegedly through fraud. He was inquiring at the information counter in
the lobby of the Hall of Justice, when respondent Rubio approached him and said, "Digdi"
(Its here) after the former saw the documents he had brought with him. The complainant
claims the respondent told him that the person whose signature appeared on the said
documents was already dead, and whatever records the complainant was looking for were
already gone. A discussion followed, culminating in a verbal tussle between them.
The complainant avers that the respondent summoned the guard-on-duty at the Hall of
Justice and instructed the latter: "Guard, pahaleon mo ang hayop na taong ini" (Guard,
send away this beast!). The respondent proceeded to hurl invectives at the complainant,
statements like "Dae ka tatao makipag-olay, hayup ka" (You do not know how to ask for a
favor, you beast!). Respondent Surtida, who was unknown to the complainant at the time,
also joined the fray, telling the complainant, "Magdigdi ka ta titirahon ta kang di, puta kang
hayop ka" (Come here and I will hit you, you vile beast!).
The complainant avers that on October 26, 2005, together with his brother, he returned to
the Hall of Justice to verify the identity of the other employee (respondent Surtida) who had
joined respondent Rubio in verbally abusing him. While on their way to the office of RTC
Branch 25, respondent Rubio shouted at him and said, "Hoy, hoy, ano nakua mo na ang
daga mo" (Hey, hey, have you found your land?)? The complainant avers that he merely
ignored the taunts from respondent Rubio. The latter, however, refused to keep silent and,
in the presence of the court employees, told the complainant, "Maski ka pa mo, raot garo an
payo mo" (Whatever, you appear to be a nutcase). The complainants brother responded,
"UP graduate man lang kami" (We are just UP graduates), which statement apparently drew
the ire of respondent Rubio, making him retort with the following remark: "Ano man daa
yang UP? Siguro raot an payo kan mga nagkaklase dyan. Maski pa kamo magsurog na
duwa, papatulan ko kamo" (What is that UP? I think the students there are also nutcases.
Even if both of you would help each other, I will fight you).
In his June 30, 2008 Report, Executive Judge Jaime E. Contreras, RTC, Naga City, found
respondents Sheriffs Jose Arnel Rubio and Edgar C. Surtida II liable for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. Judge Contreras recommended the penalty of suspension
for one (1) month for Sheriff Rubio and reprimand for Sheriff Surtida, a recommendation
joined by the OCA.
The Court agrees with the report of the Executive Judge and OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility which court
officials and employees are mandated to perform. They are constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions
must be avoided. This is so because the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored
in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Thus, court
employees have been requested to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in order to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true temple of
justice.4

This Court, speaking in Pizarro v. Villegas,5 held that:

We stress that the conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the courts they
serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true
temple of justice x x x.
Respondents Rubio and Surtida failed to meet these exacting standards. They have shown
lack of decorum, propriety, and respect in their dealing with other people. Their actuations
also debased the publics regard for the very institution they represent, thereby warranting
administrative sanction. Any conduct that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence
reposed in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. 6
The Investigating Judge correctly observed that the respondents failed to exercise the
necessary prudence in dealing with the complainant. A court employee, even in the face of
boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a
gentleman and an officer of the court. Suffice it to say, respondents did not accord the
complainant the respect due him. Respondents Rubio and Surtida could have easily
avoided the heated discussion with the complainant had they simply referred him to the
OCC.
Respondents Rubio and Surtida should be held liable for conduct unbecoming court
employees. Their acts of provoking the complainant constitute behavior wholly unexpected
from those in the judicial service. They should be reminded that government service is
people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice, civility is never a sign of
weakness, and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Impatience and rudeness
have no place in government service in which personnel are enjoined to act with selfrestraint and civility at all times.7
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Sheriff Jose Arnel Rubio GUILTY of simple misconduct for
which he is SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall
be dealt with more severely. The Court also finds Sheriff Edgar C. Surtida II GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming a court employee for which he is REPRIMANDED with the STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
----------------A.M. Nos. P-13-3116 & P-13-3112

November 12, 2013

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
MS. ROSA A. ACAMPADO, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, TAFT,
EASTERN SAMAR,Respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
"Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest
clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility." Court personnel
are expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Medical treatment of a sick husband
does not excuse the actions of the respondent who repeatedly deceived this Court by
misusing court funds, falsifying public documents, and failing to comply with orders.
1

For resolution are two consolidated administrative cases where the respondent is charged
with failing to submit the documents required by the Fiscal Monitoring Division of this Court;
failing to remit her collections on time; and submitting falsified bank deposit slips. A.M. No.
P-13-3116 (Formerly A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC) pertains to the Report on the Noncompliance of respondent Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk II, Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern
Samar, to submit additional documents for financial audit. A.M. No. P-13-3112 (Formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3164-P) pertains to the Report on the Financial Audit conducted on
the books of account of Rosa A. Acampado and Jean Gladys N. Lobina of the Municipal
Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar.
Then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao in her Memorandum informed
this Court that Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk II, failed to submit to the Fiscal Monitoring Division,
Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, the additional documents
required to finalize the audit examination of her books of accounts. Respondent Acampado
failed to comply despite several warnings and follow-up communications sent by the Office
of the Court Administrator. Senior Deputy Court Administrator Elepao then requested that
the salaries, allowances, and other monetary benefits of respondent Acampado be withheld
until compliance is made.
2

Consequently, in a Resolution dated December 12, 2007, this Court withheld respondent
Acampados salaries, allowances, and other monetary benefits until compliance was duly
effected as an exception to Administrative Circular No. 2-2000 to avoid misuse of
government funds and to protect this Courts interest. This Court also noted the
Memorandum dated October 31, 2007 of the Office of the Court Administrator.
6

In a Memorandum dated February 19, 2009, the Financial Audit Team headed by Ms. Cielo
D. Calonia submitted a report to then Court Administrator and now Associate Justice of this
Court, Jose P. Perez. The audit team found that Clerk of Court II, Ms. Rosa Acampado, who
was then in charge of the collections of the court, incurred cash shortages in her books of
accounts and falsified or tampered bank deposit slips. The team found shortages amounting
to One Hundred Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-eight Pesos and Thirty-Three Centavos
(P100,478.33). According to the audit team:
8

It is clear that she committed gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty and even
malversation of public funds when she failed to turn over on time her collections (JDF, SAJF,
MF, Fiduciary fund) and altered/tampered deposit slips and official receipts to cover-up
collections. x x x.
xxxx

There is no question that Ms. Rosa A. Acampado committed the act of dishonesty in
unreported collections of cash bond under Official Receipt Numbers 5581801 to 5581823
totalling to Sixty-Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P65,560.00) and altering
deposit slips and official receipts during her accountability period.
10

In a Resolution dated April 15, 2009, this Court treated the Memorandum dated February
19, 2009 of the Office of the Court Administrator as an administrative charge for gross
neglect of duty and dishonesty. This Court also consolidated A.M. No. 09-3-41-MTC
(Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Ms. Rosa A.
Acampado and Ms. Jean Gladys N. Lobina of the Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern
Samar) with A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC ( Report on the Non-Compliance of Ms. Rosa A.
Acampado, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court [MTC], Taft, Eastern Samar to Submit
Additional Documents for Financial Audit). In the same Resolution, Hon. Chita A. Umil,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar, was directed to: (1)
investigate the extent of respondent Acampados responsibilities in relation to the tampered
deposit slips and falsification of official receipts for Fiduciary Fund and submit her report
and recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice; and (2) monitor and
advise the Officer-in-Charge to strictly follow the Supreme Court Circulars on the proper
handling of Judiciary funds.
11

12

13

Respondent Acampados salaries and allowances were withheld from February 2008 to
April 15, 2009 but were subsequently released by this Court for humanitarian
considerations. The release was subject to the condition that Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) would be "retained/set aside" to answer for whatever penalty this Court may
impose upon her.
14

15

In a Letter dated June 10, 2009, Judge Umil asked that she be relieved from the task of
investigating respondent Acampado to maintain the harmonious atmosphere in her office
and to maintain neutrality. After granting Judge Umils request to inhibit herself, this Court
referred the matter to Judge Renato Noel C. Echague, Metropolitan Trial Court, Can-avid,
Eastern Samar, for investigation, report, and recommendation. Judge Echague then
submitted his Findings and Recommendations dated July 15, 2010 to the Office of the Court
Administrator.
16

17

The Office of the Court Administrator submitted its evaluation, report, and recommendation
on Judge Echagues findings on February 9, 2011.
In an Indorsement dated September 3, 2012, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
resolved to refer for appropriate action the case against respondent Acampado for
Malversation of Public Funds and deemed the case closed and terminated in so far as the
Office of the Ombudsman was concerned.
18

The issues for resolution in this case are:

I. Whether respondent Acampado is guilty of gross misconduct and gross neglect of
duty;
II. Whether respondent Acampado should be dismissed from service; and

III. Whether mitigating circumstances should be considered in this case.

Findings and Recommendations of the Investigating Judge
Judge Echague found that respondent Acampado incurred the following cash shortages in
her collections: (1)P23,712.53 for the Judiciary Development Fund; (2) P58,285.80 for the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund; and (3) P5,000.00 for the Mediation Fund,
amounting to a total of Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight Pesos and Thirtythree Centavos (P86,998.33).
19

After hearing respondent Acampados admission that she under-remitted Judiciary funds
and falsified bank deposit slips, Judge Echague found her guilty of gross misconduct and
gross neglect of duty punishable by dismissal from service for failing to turn over cash on
time. She is also guilty of dishonesty and falsification of public documents for falsifying bank
deposit slips. For failing to submit the additional documents, she is guilty of simple neglect
of duty.
However, in view of mitigating circumstances, such as respondent Acampados admission,
remorse, length of service, and the fact that this is her first administrative case, Judge
Echague recommended that she be given the following penalties:
1. In A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC (Failure of Ms. Acampado to submit additional
documents needed for financial audit), she is guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Accordingly, it is recommended that she be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
2. In A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3164-P (Report on the Financial Audit on the books
of account of MTC, Taft, Eastern Samar), Ms. Acampado is guilty of gross
misconduct and gross neglect of duty for her failure to remit on time her collections.
Ms. Acampado is likewise guilty of dishonesty and falsification of public documents
for falsifying bank deposit slips. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that for
these two infractions, she be fined an amount equivalent to six (6) months of her
salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
20

Respondents Arguments
In the hearing which she requested and in lieu of her Comment, respondent Acampado
asked this Court for forgiveness. She explained that the shortages were due to underremittance. She was tempted to use the money for the medical check-ups and medication
of her husband who was insulin-dependent due to diabetes and who had been undergoing
dialysis treatment.
21

22

She also admitted that she falsified 19 Land Bank of the Philippines deposit slips as well as
additional 20 bank deposit slips. She prepared the bank deposit slips but failed to go to the
bank. She was rattled by the presence of the audit team, and she just surrendered the
falsified slips to the team. Respondent Acampado also stated that she already fully
restituted the cash shortages in the amount of Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninetyeight Pesos and Thirty-three Centavos (P86,998.33). On her non-compliance to submit
23

additional records needed to finalize the audit, she explained that these records were
damaged by water used to put out a fire that had gutted a portion of the municipal hall.

24

This Court referred the Findings and Recommendations dated July 15, 2010 of Judge
Echague to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.
Office of the Court Administrators Report and Recommendations
The Office of the Court Administrator adopted the findings of the investigating judge with
modification. According to the Office of the Court Administrator, a clerk of courts failure to
make a timely turnover of cash deposited with him or her constitutes not only gross
negligence in the performance of duty but also gross dishonesty, if not malversation. The
Office of the Court Administrator said that misappropriation of Judiciary funds amounts to a
serious misconduct. It is "a grave offense punishable by dismissal." Restitution of the total
cash shortages will not erase his or her liability.
25

26

27

The Office of the Court Administrator also said that "falsification of bank deposit slips is
patent dishonesty." Dishonesty, as a grave offense, "carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government
service." However, the Office of the Court Administrator considered certain mitigating
circumstances in this case. The Office of the Court Administrator noted how respondent
Acampado readily acknowledged the offenses and offered her sincerest apologies. This is
also the first time that she was charged with an administrative case. Lastly, the length of
service of respondent Acampado, which was more than thirty years (30), was also
considered.
28

29

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that:

xxxx
2. respondent Rosa A. Acampado be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty in A.M.
No. 07-11-299-MTC (failure of Ms. Acampado to submit additional documents
needed for financial audit) and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (
5,000.00); and likewise be found GUILTY of: (a) gross misconduct and gross neglect
of duty for her failure to remit on time her collections; and (b) dishonesty and
falsification of public documents for falsifying bank deposit slips in A.M. OCA IPI No.
09-3164-P (Report on the Financial Audit on the books of account of MTC, Taft,
Eastern Samar); that she be FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) year of her
salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits; and
3. the Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar, be DIRECTED
to MONITOR all financial transactions of the court in strict adherence to the
issuances of the Court on the proper finding of all judiciary funds, otherwise, he/she
shall be equally liable for the infractions committed by the employees under his/her
command and supervision.
30

We agree with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator regarding
respondent Acampados liabilities. However, we disagree with the recommended penalty to
be imposed on her.
This is not the first time that this Court has disciplined an erring and dishonest court
employee for misappropriating Judiciary funds and falsifying public documents under his or
her control. In Rojas, Jr. v. Mina, we found the respondent guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty for stealing and encashing Special Allowance for Judges and Justices checks
payable to several trial court judges without their consent. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Elumbaring, we held that the respondent was guilty of dishonesty for failing
to remit the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
collections in full and on time. Similarly, in Court Administrator v. Abdullahi, we said that
falsification of Daily Time Records amounts to dishonesty, and dismissal from service is
proper even if the offense was committed for the first time.
31

32

33

The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prescribes the norms of conduct which are
specific to personnel employed in the Judiciary. The specificity of these norms is due to
"the special nature of court personnels duties and responsibilities."
34

35

36

Respondent Acampado violated the following provisions of the Code:

CANON I
FIDELITY OF DUTY
xxxx
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official
custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and
regulatory guidelines or procedures.
CANON IV
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of
their office during working hours.
xxxx
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not alter, falsify, destroy or mutilate any record within
their control.
This provision does not prohibit amendment, correction or expungement of records or
documents pursuant to a court order.
xxxx

In A.M. No. P-13-3116, respondent Acampado continued to disregard the Orders of this
Court to submit additional documents required to complete the financial audit of her books
of accounts. Her non-compliance even resulted in the withholding of her salaries,
allowances, and other monetary benefits.
37

38

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the "failure to give proper attention to a required task. It
signifies disregard of duty due to carelessness or indifference." Respondent Acampado
disregarded the directives sent to her on several occasions by this Court through the Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court of the Administrator. She merely alleged that
she could not produce on time the booklet of official receipts required from her since the
booklet was among the documents damaged by water when a portion of the court had been
gutted by fire. We said before that the failure of a respondent to comply with the Office of
the Court Administrators directives manifests his or her "indifference to the lawful
directives" of this Court.
39

40

41

For respondent Acampados failure to submit the additional documents required for
completion of the financial audit, the Office of the Court Administrator correctly
recommended that she be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and should, therefore, be
fined the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Under Rule 10, Section 46 (D) (1) of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a
less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense. Section
49 (b) of the same Rule provides that the minimum of the penalty shall be imposed when no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present. Submission of the required
documents belatedly neither exculpates nor mitigates respondent Acampados liability.
42

However, the payment of a fine in lieu of suspension is available in grave, less grave, and
light offenses when the penalty imposed is suspension for six (6) months or less. This
Court has deemed it proper to impose the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) on
erring court employees who committed simple neglect of duty. We impose the same
penalty on respondent Acampado for disregarding her duty to turn over the required
documents due to indifference in the face of several court directives.
43

44

In A.M. No. P-13-3112, respondent Acampado already admitted the acts charged by the
Office of the Court Administrator which included the misappropriation of Judiciary funds and
the falsification of bank deposit slips. For these, the Office of the Court Administrator found
respondent Acampado guilty of gross dishonesty and serious misconduct punishable by
dismissal:
45

46

x x x Misappropriation of judiciary funds is a serious misconduct, a grave offense

punishable by dismissal. Although, respondent Rosa A. Acampado was able to fully restitute
the shortages, such act will not in any way erase her culpability.
xxxx
Falsification of bank deposit slips is patent dishonesty. x x x Dishonesty, being a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from re-

employment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no

place in the Judiciary.
47

Despite the pronouncements made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding
respondent Acampados actions and her failure to meet the high ethical standards expected
of court employees, the Office of the Court Administrator still considered certain allegedly
mitigating circumstances. According to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
Acampados ready acknowledgment of her actions, her sincerest apologies, her length of
service in the Judiciary, and the fact that this is the first time she committed the offenses
may be considered as extenuating circumstances. Consequently, the Office of the Court
Administrator reduced its recommended penalty from dismissal to a fine in the amount
equivalent to one (1) year of her salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
48

We disagree with the Office of the Court Administrators recommendation to mitigate the
respondents liability and lower the penalty to be imposed.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the acts of underremitting funds of the Judiciary, remitting cash beyond the reglementary period, and
falsifying bank deposits are grave offenses that merit the most severe penalty of dismissal
from service.
49

Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct

Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts "funds and revenues, records, properties,
and premises." They are "liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment" of those
entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance "constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held
administratively liable."
50

51

52

Respondent Acampado committed gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct when she
failed to turn over the funds of the Judiciary that were placed in her custody within the
period required by law. We said in Office of the Court Administrator v. Fueconcillo that
undue delay by itself in remitting collections, keeping the amounts, and spending it for the
respondents "family consumption, and fraudulently withdrawing amounts from the judiciary
funds, collectively constitute gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty." Such behavior
should not be tolerated as it denigrates this Courts image and integrity.
53

Serious Dishonesty
Dishonesty is defined as the:
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray.
54

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty is
a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service even if the offense was committed for
the first time.
55

Respondent Acampados actions of misappropriating Judiciary funds and incurring cash

shortages in the amounts of 1) Twenty-three Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos and
Fiftythree Centavos (P23,712.53) for the Judiciary Development Fund; 2) Fifty-eight
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-five Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P58,285.80) for the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary; and 3) Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the
Mediation Fund (MF), totaling to Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight Pesos and
Thirty-three Centavos (P86,998.33) are serious acts of dishonesty that betrayed the
institution tasked to uphold justice and integrity for all. Moreover, respondent Acampados
act of repeatedly falsifying bank deposit slips is patent dishonesty that should not be
tolerated by this Court. Restitution of the missing amounts will not relieve respondent
Acampado of her liability.
56

Those in the Judiciary "serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in
it." The institution demands "the best possible individuals in the service." "This Court will
not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an effective
and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."
57

58

59

We said in Office of the Court Administrator v. Bernardino that:

60

We have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. This Court had never and will never
tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability,
and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
61

Again, this Court does not agree with the Office of the Court Administrators
recommendations of imposing the penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1) years salary to be
deducted from her retirement benefits, instead of dismissal from service as the law requires.
Dismissal from service is the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent Acampado.
Under Rule 10, Section 52 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, "the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking
civil service examinations." In addition, Section 49 of Rule 10 in the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that:
if the respondent is guilty of two 2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed
should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered
as aggravating circumstances.
In this case, respondent Acampado is found guilty of more than two charges, which are
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct, and serious dishonesty. All offenses are grave
offenses that merit dismissal from service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rosa A. Acampado is found GUILTY of the following:
i. SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY in A.M. No. P-13-3116 for failing to submit the
additional documents required for financial audit and is FINED the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00);

ii. GRAVE MISCONDUCT and GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY in A.M. No. P-13-3112
for failing to remit on time her collections and SERIOUS DISHONESTY for
misappropriating funds of the Judiciary and falsifying bank deposit slips. She is
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar, is DIRECTED to
MONITOR all financial transactions of the court in strict adherence to the issuances of this
Court on the proper handling of all Judiciary funds. He or she shall be equally liable for the
infractions committed by the employees under his or her command and supervision.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------

A.C. No. 9608

November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of
the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times
subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.1
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint 2 for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn
Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002
stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime
in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years
of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38)
years old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San
Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted

that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June
2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for
the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION
for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October
2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the
Department of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending
resolution by the Department of Justice.
xxxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the
herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly
constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or
SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement 3 that sometime in December 2001, at around
midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when respondent
entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her
panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents
poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with
him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter,
respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had
happened or he would kill her and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep
in his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan
National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she
was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and
shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the
house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm,
respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria,
respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts
proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect

that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed.
Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the
allegation that she was 13 years.
xxxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the
complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave
money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having sex
with complainant once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with
mutual agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex
with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral
conduct.
xxxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law
Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a
grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative
Case is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance
against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law
Office of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna,
the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded
from respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of
P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made
good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape
did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura
sent word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In
effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she can get even
with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the
Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And
Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in
putting down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her
biological daughter and she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable

reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria
Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
xxxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully
submits that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount
to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall
invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit 6 which he submitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with
her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors
that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March
19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house.
Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money.
When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest
that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone, and
he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is a common
thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She
casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a
lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm,
respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he could use the latters hut. The farm
worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent
did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that
they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the
complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told
her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay
motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the
money he gave because she needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her
any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between them was the first and
the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is no longer a
virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction. 7 The charge of rape, however, was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the
dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was
denied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public
prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. 8 Complainant stated that
what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent

before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed. 9
In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the
practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will
merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the
victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victims guardians and for being a married
man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5)
years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty
imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She
contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have
sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took
advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then staying
at respondents residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity
considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior
renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege which his license
confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be imposed. 12
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the IBP Resolution. He
asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the
sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants
mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondents house only until February
2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the
first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the
penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public
or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent
himself, we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of
his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction.
Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed
no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly
agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a
woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage
and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a
very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a
13-year-old minor,19who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual
encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters
consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and
highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among
others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme
Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the
lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. 20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, 22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is
of no moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the
instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case,
but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the
acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue
as a member of the Bar.23
1wphi1

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances. 24 In this case, respondents gross
misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his
moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of
the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary
action.25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.26 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let
copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for
Gross Immoral Conduct.
1

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R.
Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the
sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
2

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted

another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in
full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first
marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is
still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.
4

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of
the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the

Court, in a Resolution dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his
comment on the complaint against him.
5

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the
same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
7

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an

administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since
other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this
Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to
frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able
to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is
occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent
further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same
was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger
sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the
complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to
prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed
that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at
least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed
that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the
complaint.
In a Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish
respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service;
and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
8

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt
No. 2167.
9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite
receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's
Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that
Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
11

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a
copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to
respondent.
12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act
to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
13

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.
14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause
Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd.
under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig
to submit the correct and present address of respondent.
15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in
his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil
Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao
City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8,
Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."
16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City.
17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in
the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a
FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said
fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 by filing the comment required thereon.
18

In a Resolution dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with
the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1)
DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the
arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated
June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court
likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
19

20

However, the Return of Warrant dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M.
Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent
cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao,
Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e.,
No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished
building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no
leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
21

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley
View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite
several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by
respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take
any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather
an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous
notices.
22

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.
23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a

second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio
Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the
Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as

evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary
the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note
that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to
Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time
respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section
7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible
in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the
first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into
by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence
given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to
prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.
24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution

requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In
the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's
compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of
and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing
respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted
any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his
failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show
cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that
indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he
could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards
this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be
given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous
affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade;
sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office
and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to
reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive
the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared.
In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of
the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial
process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court,
which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the
orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held
that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to
comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof."
26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the
lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.
1wphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
----------------------------

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336 July 25, 1996

JOCELYN TALENS-DABON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
Once again, this Court must strike hard at an erring member of the Judiciary.
The case before us stemmed from a sworn-complaint filed by Jocelyn C. TalensDabon, Clerk of Court V of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga,
charging Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Executive Judge thereat with gross
misconduct. The complaint was later amended to include immorality. Judge Arceo
filed his answer with counter-complaint to the main complaint and his answer to the
amended complaint. He likewise submit the affidavits of his witnesses.
After considering the answers, we issued a Resolution dated February 1, 1996
referring the case to Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the same time,
placing Judge Arceo under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation (p. 61, Rollo).
After request for postponement from both parties, hearings were held on March 4,
19, 20, 21, 22, and on April 1, 8, 10 and 18, 1996. Both parties presented their
respective witnesses. Except for Atty. Arnel Santos and Prosecutor Ramon S.
Razon, all of Judge Arceo's witnesses were court employees assigned at either the

Office of the Clerk of Court or Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga.
In due time, the Investigating Justice submitted her Report and Recommendation
with the following findings:
The evidence shows that complainant Atty. Jocelyn "Joy" C. Talens-Dabon,
29, a resident of Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga, is the Assistant Clerk of
Court of the RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga which item she assumed on
August 10, 1995, after working for more than a year as Branch Clerk of Court
of RTC Kalookan City under Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. At the time of her
assumption to office, she was about to get married to Atty. Dabon, a lawyer
who works at the Court of Appeals. She is a Methodist, the same religion as
that of respondent's wife and family.
Respondent Judge Hermin E. Arceo, 54, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan is
the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 43 in San Fernando, Pampanga. He
was newly designated Executive Judge therein vice Judge Teodoro Bay who
transferred to Quezon City. His wife is ailing and on dialysis, and has been
residing in the U.S. with their daughter since 1989. His family is in the printing
business and his translations of some laws and books have been published
(Exhs. 15-23). He has pursued further legal studies abroad either as
participant or guest. He is President of the Pampanga-Angeles City RTC
Judges Association and was designated Presidential Assistant for Operations
of the Philippine Judges Association (PJA).
Three days after complainant first reported at the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Elenita Quinsay, she was summoned by respondent. He was typing
when she came in and at this first meeting, she was surprised that without
even looking up at her, he asked her in a loud voice what she wanted. When
he did look at her she was bothered by the way he looked at her from head to
foot "as if he were undressing her". Respondent told her that she was going
to be detailed to his office as his assistant, a situation which she did not
welcome having heard of respondent's reputation in the office as "bastos" and
"maniakis" prompting her to work for her transfer to Branch 45 under Judge
Adelaida Ala-Medina.
On August 21, 1995, complainant received respondent's Executive Order No.
001-95 (Exh. H) requiring her to report to the office of the Executive Judge
effective August 28, 1995. Her work was to draft and file memos and
circulars, pay telephone and electric bills and other clerical duties assigned to
her by respondent. At one time she was designated to act as Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 43 in the absence of OIC Bernardo Taruc. She observed
respondent to be rude and disrespectful to her and the other court personnel.
He talked in a loud and shouted at them; used offensive words such as
"walang isip", "tanga"; told green jokes and stories; made harsh and negative
comments about court personnel in the presence of others. Whenever he had
the opportunity he would make bodily contact ("chancing") with her and

certain female employees. Twice as she was about to go out the door
respondent would approach it in big strides so that his body would be in
contact with hers and he would press the lower part of his body against her
respondent asked her why she was playing with her forefinger, at the same
time gesturing with his to signify sexual intercourse. Sometime in November
1995, respondent kissed complainant on the cheek, a fact admitted by him in
his testimony. He also admitted kissing witnesses Marilyn Leander, Ester
Galicia and other female employees.
Sometime in October 1995, the Courts of San Fernando transferred to the
Greenfields Country Club due to the inundation of their regular offices with
lahar. Ester Galicia whose house was also affected was allowed to house her
appliances in the staff room of RTC Branch 43. These included a VCR on
which, as testified by witness Bernardo Taruc, a VHS tape entitled "Illegal in
Blue" brought by respondent was played at respondent's bidding. The tape
contained explicit sex scenes and during its showing respondent would come
out of his chamber and tease the female employees about it. Taruc further
related that at one time respondent brought and showed to the employees a
picture which when held in some way showed figures in coital position.
Adding to complainant's apprehensions about respondent's sexual
predilection were the revelations of Marilyn Senapilo-Leander, 23, a
stenographer of Branch 43. Testifying on her own experiences with
respondent, Leander stated that respondent wrote a love poem to her (Exh.
A) and that many times while taking dictation from respondent in his
chambers, he would suddenly dictate love letters or poems addressed to her
as if courting her (Exhs. B to E). He kissed her several times, pointedly stared
at her lower parts when she wore tight pants and made body contacts
("chancing"). At one point bursting into tears which prompted this
Investigator to suspend her testimony; she was so agitated Leander
testified of the time that respondent summoned her to his chamber and she
found him clad only in briefs. When she turned around to flee, respondent
called after her saying "why are you afraid. After all, this is for you".
Leander took into her confidence the most senior employee in Branch 43,
OIC Clerk of Court Bernardo Taruc who then took it upon himself to
accompany Leander in respondent's office whenever he could or ask other
female employees to accompany her. Taruc asked Leander to report the
matter to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez but Leander
expressed fear of retribution from respondent. When Leander's wedding was
set in late 1995, respondent taunted her by saying "Ikay, ang dami ko pa
namang balak sa'yo, kinuha pa naman kita ng bahay sa isang subdivision,
tapos sinayang mo lang, tanga ka kasi!" This is admitted by respondent who
said it was only a joke. Asked why she did not file any complaint against the
respondent for sexually harassing her, Marilyn Leander explained:
I am afraid considering that I am just an ordinary employee.
And I know for a fact that Judge Hermin Arceo is a very

influential person, he is very rich. I know he has lots of friends

in Pampanga like the Governor. I know I cannot fight by myself
alone." (TSN, March 20, 1966, p. 30).
For the complainant, these personal and vicarious experiences hit bottom
with the incident that happened in the afternoon of December 6, 1995. As
testified by complainant, corroborated in parts by Bernardo Taruc, Yolanda
Valencia and Rosanna Garcia, complainant was summoned at about 1:30
p.m. to respondent's temporary chamber at Greenfields Country Club by
respondent who himself came to the Staff room. By this time, only the Office
of the Clerk of Court and RTC Branch 43 had been left at Greenfields; the
other RTC branches had returned to their usual offices at the Hall of Justice.
The Sangguniang Panglalawigan which had also occupied Greenfields had
likewise vacated the building only the day before.
At his temporary chamber at Greenfields, respondent occupied two (2) small
adjoining rooms while the personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court and
RTC Branch 43 occupied a bigger room called the Maple Room (Please see
Exhs. "J", "K", and "2"). In respondent's Floor Plan marked Exhibit "2" it
appears that from respondent's chamber, one had to pass a chapel and bar
lounge before reaching the staff room. The door to the outer room of the
chamber was equipped with a knob and an automatic door closer. When
locked from inside, it could not be opened outside except with a key. Since
there was no airconditioner, this door was usually held open for ventilation by
a chair or a small table. The outer room had filing cabinets and sack of rice
lined up on two (2) sides of the wall. The inner room also had a door but
without a knob. Respondent had his desk here. The window in this room
opened to the lawn of the Country Club.
Amid this backdrop in what may have been a somnolent afternoon at
Greenfields, complainant entered respondent's office. Already made cautious
by respondent's reputation and Mrs. Leander's experience, she took care to
check the outer door and noted the chair which prevented it from closing. Her
apprehension increased because the hallway was clear of people and only
the personnel of Branch 43 and the Office of the Clerk of Court were left
holding office there. She entered the inner room, and sat on a chair infront of
respondent's desk. They talked about the impending construction of the Hall
of Justice. Their conversion was interrupted when Bernardo Taruc dropped by
to tell respondent of a phone call for him. Respondent left the room but told
complainant to remain for the signing of her Certificate of Service which she
was then bringing. After a few minutes respondent returned and they
resumed their conversation. When the talk veered to his wife, complainant
became uneasy and directed respondent's attention to her unsigned
Certificate of Service. After respondent signed it, complainant prepared to
leave the room. At this juncture, respondent handed to her a folded yellow
paper containing his handwritten poem (Exh. M; p. 22, Record).

Hereunder quoted is the poem and complainant's interpretation of it as

contained in her Memorandum:
Dumating ka sa buhay ko isang araw ng Agosto
Ang baon mo ay 'yong ganda at talinong
abogado
Ang tamis ng 'yong ngiti ang bumihag sa puso ko
Malakas na pampalubag sa mainit kong ulo.
Indeed, the last two lines of the first stanza are consistent with complainant's
claim regarding respondent's rude manner and erratic mood swings.
The second stanza of respondent's poem also jibes with his own testimony
that he would often look for complainant whenever he would not see her, and
with complainant's testimony that respondent's behavior towards her his
propensity to utter remarks with sexual connotations, his acts of making
physical contact with her, among others
Ang akala ko'y gayong lamang magiging
pagtingin sa iyo
Ako itong amo at ikaw ang emplayado
Bakit habang tumatagal isip ko'y nagugulo
Pag di ka nakikita'y langing nagagalit ako.
The third stanza is most descriptive of respondent's attitude towards
complainant which complainant and her witnesses described as rude. It is
also consistent with the testimonies of witnesses that respondent would shout
at complainant and would crack green jokes towards her:
Damdamin kong sumusupling pilit kong itinatago
Sa malakas na mga tinig asik at mga biro
Ngunit kung nag-iisa puso ko'y nagdurugo
Hinahanap ng puso ko ang maganda mong anyo.
The fifth stanza jibes with complainant's testimony that respondent gave her
an unexpected kiss on at least two occasions:
Bawat patak ng luha ko'y mga butil ng pag-ibig
Na siya kong kalasag sa pagnanakaw ng halik
Sa pisngi mo aking mahal, aking nilalangit
Patak ng ulan sa buhay kong tigang ang
nakakawangis.
Finally, the fourth and last paragraphs of the poem provides the context of the
lascivious acts committed by respondent against complainant on 6 December
1995:

Sawimpalad na pag-ibig nabigong pangarap

Na ikaw ay maangkin, mahagkan at mayakap
Pag-ibig mo'y ibinigay sa higit na mapalad
Ako ngayo'y naririto bigong-bigong umiiyak.
Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik
Sa ngayon o bukas pagkat di mo ibig
Aangkinin kita kahit sa panaginip
Gano'n kita kamahal Joy, aking pag-ibig.
(Complainant's Memorandum pp. 32-33)
Complainant found the poem repulsive (obscene) particularly the line saying
"Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik sa ngayon at bukas pagkat di mo
ibig." In her testimony, complainant said she considered the poem malicious
because they were both married persons, and he was a judge and she was
his subordinate. Although outraged, complainant respectfully asked
permission to leave while putting the poem in the pocket of her blazer. She
then proceeded towards the outer room where she was surprised to find the
door closed and the chair holding it open now barricaded it. The knob's button
was now in a vertical position signifying that door was locked.
Complainant was removing the chair when respondent walked to her in big
strides asking her for a kiss. Seconds later he was embracing her and trying
to kiss her. Complainant evaded and struggled and pushed respondent away.
Then panicking, she ran in the direction of the filing cabinets. Respondent
caught up with her, embraced her again, pinned her against the filing cabinets
and pressed the lower of his body against hers. Complainant screamed for
help while resisting and pushing respondent. Then she ran for the open
windows of the inner room. But before she could reach it respondent again
caught her. In the ensuing struggle, complainant slipped and fell on the floor,
her elbows supporting the upper part of her body while her legs were
outstretched between respondent's feet. Respondent then bent knees in a
somewhat sitting (squatting) position, placed his palms on either side of her
head and kissed her on the mouth with his mouth open and his tongue
sticking out. As complainant continued to struggle, respondent suddenly
stopped and sat on the chair nearest the door of the inner room with his face
red and breathing heavily. Complainant angrily shouted "maniac, demonyo,
bastos, napakawalanghiya ninyo". Respondent kept muttering "I love you"
and was very apologetic offering for his driver to take her home. Complainant
headed for the Maple Room where, when she entered, she was observed by
Bernardo Taruc and Yolanda Valencia to be flushed in the face and with her
hair disheveled. Yolanda particularly found surprising complainant's
disheveled hair because complainant considered her (long straight) hair one
of her assets and was always arranging it. Rosanna Garcia in her testimony
observed that complainant was really angry as shown by the way she
grabbed her bag "talagang galit."

It is to be noted that Mrs. Rosanna Garcia, 36, was a most reluctant witness.
When first subpoenaed, she did not appear and sent a medical certificate (p.
120, Record) that she was suffering from hypertension. She testified that she
was asked by respondent to sign an affidavit (Exh. F, pp. 56-57, Record)
prepared by him and that eventually, she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay in
her own handwriting (Exh. G) wherein she stated that some of the statements
in her earlier affidavit were false and that she was only forced to sign because
respondent shouted at her when she refused; that she was afraid of
respondent who was her boos. She corroborated complainant's declaration
that respondent went to the door of the Maple Room in order to call her
(complainant), adding that his call could not be made from his office because
he could not be heard as his office was far from the Maple Room. This is in
direct contrast to respondent's testimony that he did not summon complainant
but she came to him to get the poem that she asked him to make for her.
When complainant angrily left the Maple Room, Yolanda Valencia followed
and walked with her outside. On the road, complainant told Valencia
"napakawalanghiya ni Judge, bastos, demonyo" and vowed that she would
tell her family about what respondent did to her so that her father would maul
him. As testified by Yolanda Valencia, complainant was so angry
"nagdadabog talaga siya" (TSN, March 19, 1996, p. 194). But as they were
already on the road, complainant did not tell Valencia what happened.
The next day complainant related her experience to Bernardo Taruc with
whom she rode to the office. As testified by Taruc:
A. She was telling me about the incident which
happened that afternoon of December 6, 1995.
Q. Can you tell us what she told you about the
December 6, 1995 incident?
A. She told me that she was kissed by the Judge
inside his office.
Q. What else did she tell you, if any?
A. She said that she was pushed on the floor and
she was very disorganized in relating the incident
it was as if she was trying to say all things at the
same time. But what I got from her was that she
was kissed by the Judge in the office on
December 6 on the lips and she was fuming
mad.
Q. What was your reaction when you heard that
from Atty. Talens-Dabot?

A. I was . . . I was shocked . . . I don't know the

proper term. I was shocked.
Q. What did you say or do upon learning the
incident?
A. When she later on was pacified, she asked
me, "what am I doing to do? Am I doing to press
charges?"
Q. What did you say?
A. I told her it is up to her and before doing it she
has to weigh all thing, the consequences if she
would file a case.
Q. Was that the end of the conversation?
A. No, she kept on retelling it all over again till we
reach the office.
(TSN, March 20, 1966, pp. 127-128).
Complainant also related what happened to witness Atty. Elenita Quinsay but,
as testified by Atty. Quinsay, complainant did not want anybody (else) to know
about the kissing incident at that point. Atty. Quinsay advised complainant to
talk with respondent and ask for a transfer.
On December 12, 1995 complainant went to the Hall of Justice where
respondent was, and as he was about to board his car, approached him and
verbally broached her request for transfer. He acceded. Thus in the morning
of December 18, 1995, complainant brought her written request for transfer
dated December 12, 1995 (Exh. N) for respondent's signature, reminding him
of his earlier verbal approval. He refused saying he needed her for two (2)
administrative cases that he was investigating. When she insisted, he
shouted at her saying it was his decision and had to be obeyed. However, he
eventually signed the memorandum (Exh. O) transferring her later that
morning.
Two days later, on December 20, 1995, complainant, after consulting her
family, reported the matter to the police and filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness (Exh.
3), Violation of Anti-Sexual Harassment Law (Exh. 5) and this administrative
case the following day.
For his part, respondent mostly denied complainant's allegations. He
presented his version of some specific incidents or conduct such as that he
was merely imitating complainant's gesture with her forefinger as she

nervously introduced her boyfriend to him . He admitted that he kissed her

("November incident was not the first but it was the last") and other female
employees; admitted the pre-wedding incident where he told Mrs. Leander
"tanga ka kasi" but said it was only a joke; admitted that his voice is louder
than others but he does not shout; admitted that he tells green but "never
vulgar" jokes. Denying Marilyn Leander's allegations and disclaiming any
knowledge of Exhs. A to E, he described Leander as a "very young funny
person, always laughing." In his testimony he never showed why Marilyn
Leander, Rosanna Garcia or Yolanda Valencia would testify against him to
corroborate complainant's testimony, reserving his venom for Bernardo Taruc.
He said Taruc's research work were "not usable". He insinuated that Taruc
perjured himself because he was jealous about Marilyn Leander with whom
he (Taruc) has a relationship.
He declared that nothing happened on December 6, that it was complainant
who entered his room to get the poem she herself asked him to make. He
called the December 6 incident a "mere fabrication" of complainant in
vengeful retaliation of four (4) incident that he either scolded or humiliated her
namely: in September 1995 when he reminded, but did not scold, her to
report to Branch 43; in November 1995 when he reproached her for not
reflecting in her Certificate of Service that she had gone to Hongkong; in the
first week of December 1995 when she committed an error in the notice for a
judges' meeting; and finally on December 18, 1995, when he scolded her for
insisting to allow her to return to the Office of the Clerk of Court. He asserted
that he never noticed any change of complainant's behavior towards him and
that he was never attracted to her.
He dismissed the poem marked Exhibit "M" as nothing more than an
intellectual creation "too apocryphal to be true", that it was exaggerated and
meant only to praise and entertain complainant. He declared that he had in
fact written other poems (Exhs. 25 to 30) including the one published through
a certain Fred Roxas (Exh. 25). Belying the kissing incident, he contended
that there had been a gardener working at 3:00 to 5:00 that afternoon on the
lawn just outside the window of his office, implying that if indeed complainant
had screamed, it would have been heard by the gardener. But it is to be noted
that this alleged gardener was never presented.
(pp. 11-31, Report and Recommendation)
Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice made the following
conclusions: a) that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that
respondent committed the acts complained of, especially the violent kissing incident
which transpired last December 6, 1995; b) that complainant and her witnesses are
credible witnesses who have no ulterior motive or bias to falsely testify against
respondent; c) that respondent's denials can not prevail over the weight and
probative value of the affirmative assertions of complainant and her witnesses; d)
that respondent's poem had dammed him, being documented proof of his sexual
intentions towards the complainant; e) that by filing her charges imputing to

respondent a crime against chastity and with her background as a lawyer and a court
employee, complainant was well-aware that her honor would itself be on trial; f) that
it is unbelievable that complainant, a demure newly-married lady and a religious
person, would fabricate a story with such severe implications on respondent's
professional and personal life just to get even with respondent for an alleged simple
scolding incident; and g) that by doing the acts complained of, respondent has
tempted the morals of not only complainant but also the other court employees over
whom he exercised power and influence as Executive Judge. The Investigating
Justice thereupon, recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service
with prejudice to re-appointment in any other government position and with forfeiture
of all benefits and privileges appertaining him, if any.
The Court has reviewed the record of this case and has thereby satisfied itself that
the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in truth adequately
supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles. The
Court agrees and adopts such findings and recommendations.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people
who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply
the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the
people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the
people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be
proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable
moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, we have the
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartially of the judiciary.
The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency
which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA
248 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private

morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225
SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise
possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 SCRA 493 [1981]), the
Court laid down the rationale why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be
beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people
in the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who
dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity
and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral
integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.
(at p. 504)
In Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991]), it was emphasized that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by
his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life
can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public
service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of his official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.
(at p. 93.)
Respondent has failed to measure up these exacting standards. He has behave in a
manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed
the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the
judiciary in general.
We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by respondent
judge in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The
audacity under which the same were committed and the seeming impunity with
which they were perpetrated shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the
conclusion that respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote

confidence in the judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity
of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less
than the severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of
his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the
executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out
his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking
advantage of his superior position.
Noteworthy then is the following observation of the Investigating Justice:
But the very act of forcing himself upon a married woman, being himself of a
married man, clearly diverts from the standard of morality expected of a man
of less than his standing in society. This is exacerbated by the fact that by
doing the acts complained of, he has tempted the morals not only the
complainant but also the young Mrs. Marilyn Leander and the other
employees in the court over whom he exercised power and influence as
Executive Judge.
(pp. 36-37.)
Respondent may indeed be a legally competent person as evidenced by his
published law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and his legal studies
abroad, but he has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without any
hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanctiondismissal
from the service.
As a reminder to all judges, it is fitting to reiterate one of the mandates of the Court in
its Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, to wit:
Finally, all trial judges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictly in
accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Ethics
that they be exemplars in the communities and the living personification of
justice and the Rule of Law.
WHEREFORE, Judge Hermin E. Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
----------------------Adm. Case No. 8383

December 11, 2012

AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment 1 against Atty. Ramon Raeses filed on
March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently
Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation on
the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation 2 dated
September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated
December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution 4 and
the records of the case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Raeses to
represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno
paid Atty. Raeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him
P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer
fee paid.
Atty. Raeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On
several occasions, Atty. Raeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Raeses asked for P10,000.00. This
amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil
Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Raeses told Bueno not to tell
anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the
demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Raeses.

According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December
1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her
sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to
Atty. Raeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Raeses to comment on the
adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty.
Raeses failed to comply with the courts directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses
concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived
sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Raeses office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty.
Raeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court
records that Atty. Raeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990.
When she confronted Atty. Raeses about her discovery and showed him a court-issued
certification, Atty. Raeses simply denied any knowledge of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Raeses asked his
client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Raeses allegedly asked her
to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello.
He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena purportedly
asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses went to Bellos residence two weeks later. In her
(Buenos) presence, Bello paid Atty. Raeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty.
Raeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a
receipt for sums received from them.
Atty. Raeses never filed an answer against Buenos complaint. He repeatedly failed to
attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May
11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner
Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty. Raeses in default. Bueno presented her
evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the
Complaint and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Raeses.
Atty. Raeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime
in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for
copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been
furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga
scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 2000 12
Atty. Raeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing,
Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty. Raeses claim that
he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another
clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Raeses failed to appear,

the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant submits her
memorandum.13
Atty. Raeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day,
Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the
complainants submission of her memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled
another hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were
present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Raeses
asking for the hearings resetting because he had prior commitments. The records,
however, showed that Atty. Raeses never filed an answer and the case had already been
submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order 16 directing
Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence and her documentary evidence, together with
her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Buenos Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any
formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments
to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioners Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that
Atty. Raeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting
money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and
certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have proven
that Atty. Raeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these
documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco
concluded that he would only be left with Buenos bare allegations which could not support
a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Buenos allegation that Atty. Raeses solicited
money to bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of
soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno
had consistently affirmed her statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Raeses did nothing to
refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Raeses even made a false claim before the
investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for Copies of
the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint against him, a
fact belied by the registry receipt card evidencing his receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Raeses be disbarred for failure to
maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.19
The Courts Ruling
The Court approves the IBPs findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Raeses from the practice
of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingcos recommendation and based on our
own observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve
their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the
other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them." 20 A client is entitled to
the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his
lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses. 21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsels failure to file an
appellants brief amounts to inexcusable negligence. 22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court even
found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of
appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed
period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.
In this case, Atty. Raeses alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse partys offer of
evidence and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to negligence.
However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with
court documents that she could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Buenos
bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty. Raeses negligence. We support the
Board of Governors ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a
favorable decision for his client. He visited the judges office several times and persistently
called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his clients case. The Court found that
the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from
any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was
suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In this case, Atty. Raeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he
committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the
Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the
investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of
the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Buenos allegations is her own word, the Investigating
Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating
Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take
place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Raeses and complainant Bueno privy to it.
Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her
allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners.
Respondent Atty. Raeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the
complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation. 25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Raeses to the investigating commissioners reveals
his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Buenos affidavits
depict him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Raeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes
that Atty. Raeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the
multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be
what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyers relations to the client, to the court and to the
Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is
false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Raeses in fact lost the case. It is
fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond
these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases
are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means a decidedly black mark against
the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Raeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his
cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
1wphi1

From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the
"take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court
cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a
signal to one and all to all lawyers, their clients and the general public that the Court will
not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public,
of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not
compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Raeses is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Costs against the respondent.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
----------------

A.C. No. 9091

December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,

SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan. n 4
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid P35,000.000 for all
the lots that would be sold in the subdivision. For that purpose, they executed a Pecial
Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of
land and to sign those agreements on their behalf.
1

Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to
accout for the titles to the subdivided land. Complainants also found that he had sold a
number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them.
Neither were complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.
4

Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously
executed in his favor.
6

Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of P10,000,000,
but the latter again failed to pay them.
7

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting
them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.
8

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions

against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of
legal services, in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance
fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under
the contract, complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of
the properties. In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared
and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants
to at least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.
9

10

A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse
Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.
11

The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to
him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced
complainants to agree to another settlement.
12

Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10
July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles,
and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13
October 2006.
13

Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the
services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June
2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.
14

Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC,
alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done
with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of
Attorneys Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.
15

16

When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint, he filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Reconsideration.
17

18

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the
formers allegation of collusion, complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of
respondent through a Complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
14 November 2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged,
and could not taste the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now
clothed with legal problems" brought about by respondent.
19

20

21

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01, 1.03, 1.04, 12.02, 15.05, 18.04, and 20.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It
suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a
champertous agreement.
22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this
Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as
respondents second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any
of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants
only filed the instant complaint against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to
recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of P10,000,000 a measly
amount compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay

complainants the amount of P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to
protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.
31

Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under
the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a
lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of
complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid
at their door rather than at that of respondent. He was never informed that they had held in
abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable
settlement between complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while
complainants received various amounts as loans from respondent from August 2006 to
June 2007, they could not spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case.
We shall discuss this more below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch
up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latters Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not convince
Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.
32

33

Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of
their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in
a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the
discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. We
recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their
charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI, we granted counsels motion to intervene in the case after
petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding
that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we
ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent fees. Thus,
the determination of whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the
discretion of the court before which the lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for
professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not only to
guarantee that the fees they charge remain reasonable and commensurate with the
services they have actually rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession as well.
34

35

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services.

36

That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for
disciplinary action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed,
we find that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the
nature of a champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay
the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain
to have a part of the thing in dispute.
37

Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent.
38

39

They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice,

they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client.
A reading of the contract for legal services shows that respondent agreed to pay for at
least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for
the recording of complainants adverse claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary
expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to safeguard their clients rights, it is
imperative that the advances be subject to reimbrusement. The purpose is to avoid a
situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably,
nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation
advanced by respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.
40

41

In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact,
he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to
complainants.
42

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients
interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding
circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the
needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve
the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Baez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the
litigation expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of
reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Baez, Jr.
SO ORDERED.