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Sidgwick, Henry
Bart Schultz

Life and Outlook

Henry Sidgwick (18381900) spent his entire collegiate and professional life at
Trinity College, Cambridge University, from 1883 as Knightbridge Professor of
Moral Philosophy.
As an undergraduate, he had been elected to the Apostles, the secret but influential
Cambridge discussion society; allegiance to this group and the free and open inquiry
for which it stood helped form his philosophical outlook. The 1860s, which he
described as his years of religious storm and stress when he lost his Anglican faith,
were also the years in which his identity as an academic liberal took shape, and he got
caught up in fighting for better and broader educational opportunities, greater academic professionalism, and wider religious freedom. He famously resigned his fellowship in 1869 because he could not in good conscience subscribe to the Thirty-Nine
Articles of the Church of England. As explained in his pamphlet on the issue, The
Ethics of Conformity and Subscription: we only accept authority of a particular
sort; the authority, namely, that is formed and maintained by the unconstrained
agreement of individual thinkers, each of whom we believe to be seeking truth with
single-mindedness and sincerity, and declaring what he has found with scrupulous
veracity, and the greatest attainable exactness and precision (Sidgwick 1870: 1415).
Sidgwicks masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics, was first published in 1874, and
according to the conventional wisdom it marks the culmination of the classical and
nontheological utilitarian tradition the tradition of Jeremy Bentham and the two
Mills (see bentham, jeremy; mill, john stuart), which held the greatest happiness
of the greatest number as the fundamental normative demand. Sidgwicks account
of that position is indeed canonical, but the Methods has also served as a general
model for how to do academic ethical theory, providing systematic, historically
informed comparisons between utilitarianism and leading alternatives. Although
Sidgwick did personally favor the utilitarian view, his arguments were heavily
qualified and nuanced, and he allowed that he had not conclusively defended that
position. Consequently, both critics and defenders of utilitarianism for example,
John Rawls (see rawls, john) and Peter Singer have found support in Sidgwicks
work. C. D. Broad went so far as to say Sidgwicks Methods of Ethics seems to me to
be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to
be one of the English philosophical classics (1930: 143).
Sidgwick was not only a preeminent moral philosopher, but also an
accomplished epistemologist, classicist, economist, political theorist, political
historian, literary critic, parapsychologist, and educational theorist. With his
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 48884897.
2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee320

wife, Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick, ne Balfour, he was a founder of both the British
Society for Psychical Research (Gauld 1968) and Newnham College, Cambridge,
one of the first womens colleges (Tullberg 1998). He was also, with Alfred
Marshall, a founder of the Cambridge school of economics and, with such colleagues as Oscar Browning and Sir John Seeley, of the Cambridge school of
political theory. During his lifetime, hepublished two other major treatises, The
Principles of Political Economy (1883) andThe Elements of Politics (1891), a short
introduction to the history of ethics, a collection of short pieces on Practical
Ethics (1898), and many essays and reviews. Some important works appeared
posthumously.

Ethics
The Methods is best understood in the context of Sidgwicks theological concerns
and his sense of the history of ethical and political controversy.
On the latter, in Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (1886),
Sidgwick provided an historical sketch of the subject to which the Methods was a
contribution. As in the Methods, he begins with an overview of the work as a whole
and a confession that he hopes to achieve a more impartial standpoint on the subject,
rather than press any particular approach. As he sums it up:
the subject of Ethics, most comprehensively understood, includes (1) an investigation
of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered
individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature
and particular species of (a) Virtues or (b) Pleasure, and the chief means of realizing
these ends; (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or
the Moral Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue); (3) some inquiry into the
nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized and, more generally, into
the part taken by Intellect in human action, and its relation to various kinds of Desire
and Aversion; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. (1886: 1011)

Sidgwick conducts a concise review of the historical contingencies that have brought
one or another element of ethics so construed to the fore in one context or another.
He urges that there is a divide between ancient and modern ethics, with the latter,
more jural approach construing ethics as concerned primarily with the general
rules of Duty or Right Action sometimes called the Moral Code viewed as
absolutely binding on every man, and properly to be obeyed by him without regard
to his personal interests; the relation of duty to the agents private happiness being
regarded as a matter of secondary concern from an ethical point of view (Sidgwick
1886: 6). This construction of the conflict between an ancient, attractive notion of
ethics, with the good taking priority, and a modern imperative or jural notion of
ethics, with the right taking priority (and the issue of Conscience coming to the
fore), has been the subject of intense debate (Larmore 1996). Although Sidgwicks
own theory appropriates much from the ancients, in the end it falls decidedly in the
modern camp.

The Methods is narrower in scope than Sidgwicks general definition of the subject
of ethics might suggest, and it is difficult to see how he could have thought it did
justice to all the important methods of ethics and related issues. Thus, he dismisses
concern with the moral faculty and moral psychology, arguing that, whatever its
source, in any given situation, there is something that one ought to do that is right,
and this is the proper sphere of ethics. The basic concept of morality is this unique,
irreducible, and highly general notion of ought or right that is sui generis, and
moral approbation is inseparably bound up with the conviction, implicit or explicit,
that the conduct approved is really right that is, that it cannot without error, be
disapproved by any other mind (1907: 27). His later student G. E. Moore was consequently willing to declare the Methods free of the naturalistic fallacy of defining right or good in terms of natural properties (see moore, g. e.).
As Schneewind (1977) has stressed, the Methods is less a defense of utilitarianism
than an attempt to consider that position in a more (albeit not fully) impartial way,
by comparing it with such leading alternatives as rational egoism and the intuitionism
characteristic of the Cambridge Moralists, particularly William Whewell (see
whewell, william). Sidgwick rejected the utilitarian tradition on many counts,
including its characteristic empiricism, psychological egoism, and associationism.
Although he certainly claimed Bentham and Mill as major influences, he claimed
many others as well, including Clarke and Cumberland, Butler, Kant, Whewell, and,
among the ancients, Plato and Aristotle. With Clarke and Whewell, he held that
ethics needed to be grounded on fundamental cognitive intuitions; with Butler, he
held that humans were capable of genuinely disinterested and benevolent action.
Moreover, Sidgwick was far more concerned with private ethics, good or right
conduct attainable by individual action, in addition to political philosophy and
legislation. And for all his doubts, he had far more developed religious sympathies
than either Bentham or Mill, and these informed his overall philosophical outlook
in ways that are less than immediately apparent from the Methods itself.
The book itself repeatedly affirms that its aim is less practice than knowledge, to
expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of Ethics
that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning; to point out their mutual
relations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much as possible
(Sidgwick 1907: vi), The model for this approach is not Bentham or Mill, but
Aristotle, whose Ethics gave us the Common Sense Morality of Greece, reduced to
consistency by careful comparison: given not as something external to him but as
what we he and others think, ascertained by reflection (Sidgwick 1907: xix).
How this squares with Sidgwicks intuitionism, and whether it also amounts to
something akin to Rawlsian reflective equilibrium have been long debated (Schultz
1992; Shaver, 1999; Skelton 2007).
The influence that Kant and Kantianism and the Cambridge Moralists exercised
on Sidgwick is patent, but the Methods deviated from some stock features of such
views, rejecting the issue of free will as largely irrelevant to ethical theory and taking
a compatibilist stance. As Schneewind explains, the central thought of the Methods
of Ethics is that morality is the embodiment of the demands reason makes on practice

under the conditions of human life (1977: 303). But Sidgwick rejects the whole
apparatus of the Kantian critical philosophy, and in refusing to base morality on
pure reason alone, moreover, he moves decisively away from Kant, as is shown by
his very un-Kantian hedonistic and teleological conclusions (Schneewind 1977:
41920).
In some respects, Sidgwicks approach is quite historically distant, reflecting its
Victorian Cambridge context. His notion of a method of ethics is not the same as
an ethical principle, ethical theory, or even ethical decision procedure, though it is
more like an abstract and purified version of the latter. A method is a way of
obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done and thus it might
reflect an ethical principle or principles as the ultimate ground of ones determination
of what one has most reason to do, while allowing that one might ordinarily be
reasoning from such principles either directly or indirectly (1907: v). Thus, one
might, with theological utilitarians, hold that the moral order of the universe is
utilitarian, with God willing the greatest happiness of the greatest number, while
also holding that the appropriate guide for practical reason is enlightened selfinterest, since utilitarian calculations are Gods business and God has ordered the
cosmos to insure that enlightened self-interest conduces to the greatest happiness.
In this case, ones method of ethics would be rational egoism, but the ultimate
philosophical justification for this method would appeal to utilitarian principles.
Yet despite this emphasis on the idealized reasoning process between principles and
practical conclusions, Sidgwick does seek a defense of the ultimate principles of
practical reason.
And Sidgwick does deploy a hedonistic theory of the good for two out of the three
methods with which he is chiefly concerned namely, egoistic hedonism (or rational
egoism) and universal hedonism (or utilitarianism). The other method is variously
called dogmatic or intuitional morality, which is somewhat ambiguously construed
as either commonsense moral duties or the refined versions of these set out in the
intuitionisms of Whewell or Henry Calderwood. On this method, conformity to such
moral duties as truth-telling, promise-keeping, temperance, and so on is held to be
the practically ultimate end of moral actions (Sidgwick 1907: 96). These duties are
unconditionally prescribed and discernible with really clear and finally valid intuition, though it is the job of the moral theorist to set them out with proper precision
and to arrange the results as systematically as possible, and by proper definitions and
explanations to remove vagueness and prevent conflict (Sidgwick 1907: 101).
But intuitionism figures in both the second method of ethics, and, in a more
philosophical form, in the treatment of all the methods of ethics, particularly in the
discussion of fundamental principles. Thus, Sidgwick explains that although some
might think that conscience delivers immediate judgments on particular acts,
reflective persons, in proportion to their reflectiveness, come to appeal to general
rules, more firmly established on a basis of common consent (1907: 100). Hence we
have dogmatic intuitional morality, which is taken to cover both more deontological
views and those non-hedonistic teleological ones taking virtue as simply the thing to
be done, whatever the consequences. But there is another phase of intuitionism.

Without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be right is so,
we may yet require some deeper explanation why it is so (1907: 102). Philosophical
intuitionism, while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound,
still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer: to get one
or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which
the current rules might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or
with slight modifications and rectifications (1907: 102).
The ascent to philosophical intuitionism is evident in the treatment of
commonsense or intuitional morality, where, despite Sidgwicks claims that this
morality is his morality too, the relentless critical reflection has the utilitarian
repeatedly demonstrating to the dogmatic intuitionist
that the principles of Truth, Justice, etc. have only a dependent and subordinate
validity: arguing either that the principle is really only affirmed by Common-Sense
as a general rule admitting of exceptions and qualifications, as in the case of Truth,
and that we require some further principle for systematising these exceptions and
qualifications; or that the fundamental notion is vague and needs further
determination, as in the case of Justice; and further, that the different rules are liable
to conflict with each other, and that we require some higher principle to decide the
issue thus raised; and again, that the rules are differently formulated by different
persons, and that these differences admit of no Intuitional solution, while they show
the vagueness and ambiguity of the common moral notions to which the Intuitionist
appeals. (1907: 421)

Common sense thus collapses into utilitarian thinking, or is shown to presuppose it,
or is revealed as requiring something very like it. This is not to deny that there are
better candidate intuitions. But these, Sidgwick holds, are at a more abstract and
general level than those of the dogmatic intuitionist, and in part provide the precise
axioms of the utilitarian position needed to straighten out confused common sense.
Such axioms allow that the good of one is no more important than the good of
another, that future good is as important as present good, that what is right for one
must be right for anyone similarly circumstanced, and that it is right to promote the
good generally. The difference here between right and good concerns how
judgments of ultimate good do not in themselves involve definite precepts to act.
Furthermore, for Sidgwick, that pleasurable consciousness is the good is an
informative, non-tautological claim. Without some such metric as the hedonistic
one, how could we weigh one virtue or perfection or duty against another? Still, he
admitted that the hedonistic account of ultimate good was scarcely self-evident and
there were feasible alternatives.
Sidgwicks reconciliation of intuitional morality and utilitarianism relies on a
fallibilistic form of intuitionist epistemology with four criteria or conditions, the
complete fulfillment of which would establish a significant proposition, apparently
self-evident, in the highest degree of certainty attainable (1907: 338). The first,
Cartesian Criterion, insists that the terms of the proposition must be clear and
precise, and the second requires that the self-evidence of the proposition must be

ascertained by careful reflection, which is especially important in ethics because any

strong sentiment, however purely subjective, is apt to transform itself into the semblance of an intuition; and it requires careful contemplation to detect the illusion
(1907: 339). The third, coherence, has it that the propositions accepted as self-evident
must be mutually consistent, since it is obvious that any collision between two intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, or in both (1907: 341). And the
fourth, consensus of experts, is also crucial, since: it is implied in the very notion of
Truth that it is essentially the same for all minds, the denial by another of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence in its validity (1907:
3412). In more purely epistemological works, Sidgwick collapsed the first two conditions into one, and was also apt to explain that these conditions only afforded the best
means for reducing the risk of error, rather than establishing indubitable truth.
Sidgwicks critique and assimilation of commonsense moral rules thus went far
beyond the efforts of J. S. Mill and reflected an intuitionistic epistemology that the
earlier utilitarians had mostly rejected. Yet in many respects, it has served as a model
for utilitarian analysis ever since, not least in casting utilitarian conclusions as imperatives of impartial moral reason and defending what today would be called a substantive, non-reductive moral realism. And like so many utilitarians, Sidgwick allowed
the moral standing of nonhuman animals, took intention as covering all foreseen
consequences, rejected retributivist forms of punishment, and held a cosmopolitan
(rather than nationalistic) outlook. The problem of justice for futuregenerations and
optimal population growth also came from him (1907:41516).
Of course, such views can scarcely be called uncontroversial, and the fertility of the
Methods in sparking valuable philosophical controversy seems to grow with the years.
Critics have argued that Sidgwick begged the question against Whewellian intutionism, missing how it could be improved in its own terms (Donagan 1992); also that he
was prejudiced in his treatment of perfectionism (Hurka 2001) and of Aristotle and of
the idealism of his friend T. H. Green, allowing his utilitarian sympathies and a fixation on the determinacy of practical reason to mislead him(Irwin 1992, 2007, 2009).
Although Rawls emulated Sidgwicks comparative approach, he pitted his own theory
of justice as fairness against Sidgwicks utilitarianism and his Kantian constructivism
against Sidgwicks rational intuitionism, claiming that the Methods failed to grasp
Kants best insights (Rawls 1971, 1999; Parfit 2011). Rawls also claimed that Sidgwick
characterizes a persons future good on the whole as what he would now desire and
seek if the consequences of all the various courses of conduct open to him were, at the
present point of time, accurately foreseen by him and adequately realized in imagination (1971: 366). But Sidgwick allowed that some desires, however informed, may be
rejected as irrational or unreasonable (Schneewind 1977; Parfit 1984, 2011).
Although it is not always easy to apply the (anachronistic) classification of act or
rule utilitarianism to Sidgwick, he plainly defended an indirect form of
utilitarianism, even defending the possibility of utilitarianism entailing a self-effacing,
even esoteric morality: a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles,
that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that
the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable

indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results
in their hands (Sidgwick 1907: 490). This contradicts the Kantian insistence on the
publicity of fundamental moral principles, though it may reflect a consistent
interpretation of the different levels of moral thinking, critical versus everyday.
Williams charged that in this Sidgwick was a Government House utilitarian whose
views comported well with colonialism, and Korsgaard has argued that Sidgwick
could not distinguish genuine communication from spin (Williams 1995; Korsgaard
2009). But Parfit (1984) has treated self-effacing theories very seriously, and Schultz
(2004) has explored some of the contexts in which esoteric morality has carried
weight, notably in areas of sexual ethics and with oppressed minorities. And in a
remarkably bold and direct challenge to the Kantian publicity criterion that goes to
the heart of these debates, Singer and De Lazari-Radek (2010) have maintained that
Sidgwicks indirect consequentialist approach to esoteric morality is in fact defensible.
But the single most important issue in Sidgwick studies, and for Sidgwick himself,
is what has been called the dualism of the practical reason. On Sidgwicks view,
rational egoism, unlike intuitional morality, could not be reconciled with
utilitarianism. The first edition of the Methods concluded that rational egoism and
utilitarianism end up in a stand-off, and that, as a result, there is a fundamental
contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct such that
the Cosmos of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos, and the prolonged effort of
the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been
foredoomed to inevitable failure (1874: 473). Later editions of the work put the
point more gently, but it was the same point.
Sidgwick considered two possible solutions to the problem: a weakening of epistemological standards or a theistic postulate about the coherent moral government
of the universe. First,
[If] we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are
commonly taken to be universally true, which seem to rest on no other ground than that
we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the
systematic coherence of our beliefs, it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported
assumption in ethics, without opening the door to universal scepticism. (1907: 509)

Second,
[If] we may assume the existence of such a Being, as God, by the consensus of theologians, is conceived to be, it seems that Utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence
of Divine sanctions to the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis; and
such sanctions would, of course, suffice to make it always every ones interest to
promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge. (1907: 506)

Sidgwick devoted more energy to the second possible solution hence the importance of his theological interests but what he said about the first pointed to the
possibility of developing his epistemology in a more holistic way, with a still greater
role for consensus and coherence.

In other works, Sidgwick often departed from the careful language of the Methods,
simply explaining that along with
(a) a fundamental moral conviction that I ought to sacrifice my own happiness, if by so
doing I can increase the happiness of others to a greater extent than I diminish my
own, I find also (b) a conviction which it would be paradoxical to call moral, but
which is none the less fundamental that it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion
of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated
by an equivalent addition to my own happiness. (1889: 483)

Each of these convictions has as much clarity and certainty as the process of introspective can give and finds wide assent in the common sense of mankind (1889: 483).
Sidgwicks dualism has led some recent commentators to urge that he is better
termed a dualist or dual-source theorist or two standpoints theorist than a utilitarian, and Crisp (2002, 2006) has defended not only such a dualism but aspects of
Sidgwicks intuitionism and hedonism as well. Skorupski (2001) has forcefully argued
that there is no dualism of the pure practical reason, which is agent neutral, but
there are many such conflicts in the larger field of less than pure practical reason, not
merely a conflict with egoistic reasons. Parfit (2011) has also argued that Sidgwick
failed to see how egoistic reasons might nonetheless be weaker than omnipersonal
ones, but Smith (2009) has defended Sidgwicks construal of the problem.
For his part, Sidgwick in his private writings made it clear that his devotion to free
and open inquiry had not yielded results that he found satisfactory, and that this
dualism motivated him to pursue both other philosophical inquiries and
parapsychological research, in the hope that he might find evidence to support a
theistic argument. This broader view of Sidgwicks project has inspired a great deal
of original work in recent years (Schultz 2004; Bucolo et al. 2007, 2011).
See also: bentham, jeremy; egoism; intuitionism; mill, john stuart;
moore, g. e.; rawls, john; utilitarianism; whewell, william
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Bucolo, Placido, Roger Crisp, and Bart Schultz (eds.) 2011. Proceedings of the World Congress
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Crisp, Roger 2002. Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism, in P. Stratton-Lake (ed.),
Ethical Intuitionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Donagan, Alan 1992. Sidgwick and Whewellian Intuitionism: Some Enigmas, in Bart Schultz
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Gauld, Alan 1968. The Founders of Psychical Research. New York: Schocken Books.
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Irwin, T. H. 2007. A Fundamental Misunderstanding, Utilitas, vol. 19, pp. 7890.
Irwin, T. H. 2009. The Development of Ethics, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine 2009. Self-Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Larmore, Charles 1996. The Morals of Modernity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Parfit, Derek 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, Derek 2011. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John 1971. A Theory of Justice, rev. ed.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John 1999. Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
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Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwicks Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon
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Schultz, Bart 1992. Essays on Henry Sidgwick. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schultz, Bart 2004. Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. New York: Cambridge University
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Shaver, Rob 1999. Rational Egoism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sidgwick, Henry 1870. The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription. London: Williams &
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Sidgwick, Henry 1886. Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers. London: Macmillan.
Sidgwick, Henry 1889. Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies, Mind, vol. 56, pp. 47387.
Sidgwick, Henry 1898. Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays. London: Swan
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Sidgwick, Henry 1907 [1874]. The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. London: Macmillan.
Singer, Peter, and Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek 2010. Secrecy in Consequentialism: A Defense
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Tullberg, Rita McWilliams 1998. Women at Cambridge. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Williams, Bernard 1995. The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of
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FURTHER READINGS
Sidgwick, E. M., and A. Sidgwick 1906. Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir. London: Macmillan.
Sidgwick, Henry 2000. Essays on Ethics and Method, ed. Marcus G. Singer. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.