highly consolidated core of traditional prime

contractors working wit

Despite the pace of glohighly consolidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is susbal technological chan
ge, the United States military-industrial complex may never be truly disrupted. We
need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
highly consolidated core of
highly consolidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis

ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sus
highly consolidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsivenhighly consolidated core of traditional p
rime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanchighly consolidated
core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanchighly consolidated
core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t

ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely

public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sused munitions. And we n
eed the defense base that can build them that highly consolidated core of traditi
onal prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
highly consolidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire hig
hly consolidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sushighly consolidated co

re of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sushighly consolidated co
re of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munihighly conso
lidated core of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sushighly consolidated co
re of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w

e need the defense base that can build them

that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sushighly consolidated co
re of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sushighly consolidated co
re of traditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed

eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustions. And we need the
defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of traditional pri
me
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is susfederal enterprise. Th
e federal acquisition system is not just a national security liability, but also
a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sus
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sused munitions. And we n
eed the defense base that can build them that highly consolidated core of traditi
onal prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is susess of government. The
concept of acquisition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently
captures the associated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustraditional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te

chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t

ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is suscontractors working wi
thin a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller, more agile non-tradit
ional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is susactors working within
a system that has provenDespite the pace of global technological change, the Uni
ted States military-industrial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it to
o much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working wit
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g

rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
actors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global technol
ogical change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be truly d
isrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working witas does the defense industrial base that operates within
it. Despite a storied history of game-changing innovations in the post-World War
II era, weapons system cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty

could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace

LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil
actors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global technol
ogical change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be truly d
isrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working wit
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil
nearly impervious to smaller, more agile
those in Silicon Valley.

non-traditional

companies, particularly

Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security

implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to

responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil

Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of

risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co

mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g

rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved