Alvarez vs.

CFI
64 Phil. 33 (1937)
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David
a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts,
chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation
of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was
based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable
source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez
house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different
documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the
custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the
Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be
returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the AntiUsury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for
further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez
elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the
order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared
null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the
affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant
but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person
whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of
General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies
that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in
such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held

liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of
the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in
which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the
practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The
Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the
presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
Prudente vs Dayrit Case Digest
By maechmedina
NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
LawPhils Full Text
link:http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/gr_82870_1989.html

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant
for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of
witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of result of our
continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from
verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as

ammunitions arent licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the
premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.

Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the

Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the
office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the
President.

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:

1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions
and answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant
failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday, urgent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.

RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation
of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable
cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before
issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and

answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the

complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the
phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. Reformed to ammunitions and
explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of
illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search
Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of
such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent)

issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill
et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the
petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to
seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the

offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or

intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in
the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents
and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the
deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative
of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the
warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation
cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to
the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid
and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and
things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of
search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general
search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the
illegality of its seizure.

Held:

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were
seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.

II

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probablecause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners

persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be
particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the
elimination of general warrants.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against
the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other
effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that
the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twentynine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner

v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent

Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose
Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return
immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been
illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI
agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel
Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case
for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety
and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft
Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and
served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the
presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of
the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of
documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct
offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in
contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing
that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October
27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to
return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken
thereunder. Without costs.

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an
application for search warrant. The search warrant wassought for in connection
with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents were
seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion
for Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant
and the validityof which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served notonly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial
region of the issuing court.
ISSUE:
W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorialboundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction
HELD:
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process.

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction asan order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him tosearch for personal property and bring it before the
court.
5

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It

isa special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity.A judicial process is defined as a writ,

warrant
, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore,
that a searchwarrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond
only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, orin
anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal
action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expresslyor impliedly provides
a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our
jurisdiction, no period is provided for theenforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a
return thereon mustbe made to the issuing judge,

said warrant does not become

functus officio
but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. The following
are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the
criminal case is pending in one court and the searchwarrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary
jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case.
An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under
extreme and compelling circumstances that theapplicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues
the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, withoutprejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate
higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
All grounds andobjections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwisethey
shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed
in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court
wherethe criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein forsaid purpose.
Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation,
a motion to quash a search warrant and amotion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shallconsequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during theproceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court

on the motion tosuppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies
the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
furtherproceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall
forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case ispending, with
the necessary safeguards and documentation therefore These guidelines shall
likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed intwo or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case
shall have beenresolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminalcase.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED
Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive
group who forcibly recruited him and based on this information, the police went to
arrest the suspect. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his
field.
Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact.
Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of
the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D)
and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called
Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any
firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a
gun was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the
officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that
the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was

possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the wife of
Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect
that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal
report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a
crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips
of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily
also tainted.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of
firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularlymethamphetamine or
shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and
seizure of an undetermined quantity ofmethamphetamine and its paraphernalias,
an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure
of the shabu, its paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant
must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to
be seized that the warrant determined was themethamphetamine and the
paraphernalias therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. SAYCON [236 SCRA 325; G.R. NO. 110995; 5 SEPT 1994]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard
personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a
suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV
Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt
of the information, the Coastguard chiefofficer CPO Tolin, instructed them to
intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine
Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior
Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves
at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning
at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black
bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where
he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then
invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with
them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the
latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside
that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu".
When police officerWinifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack
containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then
Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office
forbooking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have
a warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had
conducted an examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens
weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of methamphetaminehydrochloride, more
widely known as "shabu."

Issue: Whether or Not the warrantless search was valid.

Held: The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor
vehicle. There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying
prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought
methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported
that the accused would be arriving on boardthe vessel and
carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about
their trade with some external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited
drugs. This must be taken into account in determining probable cause.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
(173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro

Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought
the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority
to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of
the Constitution.

II.

THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes
a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other

areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence
in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within

reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 216 SCRA 431, December 11, 1992

"Heard gunshots therefore an offense is being committed"

Waiver of right is the consent given in entering the house, resulting to seizure of
evidence in plain view.
The peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and they proceeded to
investigate the matter. This incident is considered an offense and "an offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND
PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."

While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine Constabulary officer patrolling

heard gunfire within the vicinity. When they came upon the source, Rosillo
was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo
prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the house, the
patrol saw appellants, Evaristo and Carillo, who were drunk. Inquiring as to
the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol were told that he had already
escaped.

Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillos waist and subsequently frisked him

revealing .38 caliber revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a
member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm,
the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.

Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for entry into the latters house to
search for Rosillo and Evaristo consented.

Upon entry they found various firearms, paraphernalia, and other effects,
which became the basis for the charge of illegal possession of firearms.

For their part, the appellants alleged that they were forcibly taken into
custody. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms,
contending that these were planted in their possession by the prosecution
witnesses and other police authorities.

Whether the firearms are considered illegally seized evidence? NO.

The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of evidence in plain view, objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a the right to be
in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
introduced as evidence.

In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to

enter his house. The officer's purpose was to catch Rosillo whom he saw had
sought refuge inside. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was
not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his
discovery of the firearms as accidental. The plain view doctrine will apply to
the seizure of the firearms and effects because their discovery was
unintentional.

The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in
evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Valid warrantless arrests

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the second circumstance an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it is applicable. The peace officers,
while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the
matter. This incident is considered an offense and "an offense is committed in
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,

although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY

AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."

As for the existence of personal knowledge, the gunfire, the bulge in Carillos
waist, and the peace officers professional instinct are more than sufficient to
grant him personal knowledge of the facts of the crime that has just been
committed. Consequently, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have
been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.

139 scra 153

180 phil 69
22 scra 857
234 scra 246 gamay ra
342 scra 565