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Moi - Language and Attention - English 2015
Moi - Language and Attention - English 2015
Moi - Language and Attention - English 2015
Toril Moi
LANGUAGE AND ATTENTION
An edited and rewritten translation of
Sprk og oppmerksomhet (2013)
Introduction
On 22 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik detonated a bomb in Oslo which killed
eight people and injured over two hundred others. Then he drove to Utya, a small island in
the lake of Tyrifjorden where the Norwegian Labor Party was having its annual youth camp.
At Utya, he killed 69 persons one by one, at extremely close range: inches, not yards.
Almost all the victims at Utya were under twenty. Some were as young as fourteen.
If ordinary language philosophy teaches us anything, it is that when our sense of the
meaning of words disappears, so does our sense of reality. The terrorist of Utya turned out
to have written a manifesto, mostly made up of excerpts from conservative and racist
websites. For years he had been cutting and pasting, citing and recirculating other people's
words. His relationship to language was profoundly alienated. So was his relationship to
reality. To him, the callous killing of children was simply the "marketing operation" for his
manifesto.1 He had lost -- or maybe he never really had -- any sense of the weight of words.
Alvorlige forsk p bringe ord i samsvar med virkelighet blir ikke uten videre
avfeid som naive lenger. For mange har det vrt maktpliggende kunne si noe sant om det
som skjedde, i et sprk som kan vre dekkende bde saklig og emosjonelt. Anders
Johansen, Virkelighetssjokk, Prosa nr. 5, 2012: 18.
3
I would like to thank Trygve slund, who invited me to give a talk at Aschehougs
Summer Seminar in June 2012. Without his invitation the original essay this chapter is based
on would never have been written. But without Nora Campbells enthusiasm for the project, I
would never have considered turning the talk into a proper manuscript. Nora is an excellent
editor: her comments were always both challenging and inspiring. Nazneen Khan strem
helped to convince me that this ought to become a text in the Voices-series. Ane Farseths
deserves special gratitude, for she heroically agreed to read and comment on the original
lecture draft on one hours notice.
4
Ref. to David L. Paletz and Toril Moi op-ed in the New York Times. 2012.
2
Henry James, The Art of Fiction, Longmans Magazine 4 (oktober 1884): 510.
4
By attention I don't mean the vigilance of evil. I just said that I thought an attentive
gaze has to be a just and loving gaze. I hesitated for a long time before I decided to adopt
Iris Murdochs formulation. It is, after all, only too easy to take just and loving to mean
sentimental and moralizing. And the last thing I want is to imply that I am in favor of a
judgmental and saccharine gaze.
Attention comes from the Latin ad + tendere: to reach or stretch towards
something. Both in English and French the word gathers a whole cluster of meanings around
itself: to direct the mind or observant faculties, to listen, apply oneself; to watch over,
minister to, wait upon, follow, frequent; to wait for, await, expect. The idea of caring for, or
serving others here converges on the idea of listening, waiting, and watching.
Two women, one French and one British, have turned attention into a fascinating
philosophical concept. The first was the philosopher and mystic Simone Weil (190943),
who studied philosophy at the Sorbonne at the same time as Simone de Beauvoir. The second
was Iris Murdoch (1919-99). For Weil, to be attentif is to be waiting, watchful, open to what
may arise: Above all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready
I think of The unknown known, Errol Morriss film on Donald Rumsfeld, 2014, as a
great example of this.
5
Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God,
in Waiting for God, trans. Emma Crawfurd (New York: Harper Colophon, 1973), p. 112. Et
surtout la pense doit tre vide, en attente, ne rien chercher, mais tre prte recevoir dans sa
vrit nue lobjet qui va y pntrer. Simone Weil, Rflexion sur le bon usage des tudes
scolaires en vue de lamour de Dieu, i crits de Marseille (194042): Philosophie, science,
religion, questions politiques et sociales, redigert av Florence de Lussy, uvres compltes
(Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 260.
9
School Studies, 112; tudes scolaires, 260.
10
School Studies, 105; La prire est faite dattention, tudes scolaires, 255.
11
School Studies, 110; La joie dapprendre est aussi indispensable aux tudes que
la respiration aux coureurs. tudes scolaires, 259.
12
School Studies, 106; Jamais, en aucun cas, aucun effort dattention vritable
nest perdu. tudes scolaires, 256.
6
13
Cora Diamond has long been interested in attention: attention to particulars, attention
to and in literature; and attention in the sense of Murdoch's just and loving gaze. For her, as
for Weil and Murdoch, moral reflection is a specific kind of attention, a particular response to
the world, a way of seeing things (the world, other people, oneself).
For Diamond, moral philosophy -- moral thought -- has to focus on the particular
case, on the individual, the specific and the unique. She disagrees with the widespread idea
that moral reflection is always expressed through deliberation on clear-cut choices, or in
explicit evaluations: right, wrong, evil, good. Like Iris Murdoch, she thinks there are "moral
attitudes which emphasise the inexhaustible detail of the world, the endlessness of the task of
understanding."18 Deep insights can arise unexpected places, not least in literature. To show
what she means by attention, Diamond quotes the last stanza of "Ducks," a children's poem
by Walter de la Mare. Having described many different kinds of ducks, the poet concludes:
17
In this text, a perfectly ordinary duck is transformed into a creature of beauty and
dignity, deserving of respect and admiration. Diamond wants us to see that there is something
morally important about the quality of his attention. Lets call this an example of a just and
loving gaze.
Traditional moral philosophy, Diamond writes, takes a far too narrow view of what
counts as relevant insights and thoughts about morality. It takes for granted that moral
philosophy is only a matter of deciding what the right action is in situations where we have to
make a difficult choice. The famous trolley problem is the quintessential example of this
attitude. Here is one example from among the multitudes of different versions: A runaway
railway trolley comes down the railway line. If nothing is done, it will kill five workers
further down the track. I am standing on a bridge over the track, next to a very fat man.
Should I push this stranger down on the line in order to save the five workers? Versions of
the trolley problem has been used to get clear on everything from the influence of insomnia
on our capacity for moral deliberation, through gender differences in the moral domain, to
where to draw the limits between different moral doctrines.20
18
11
She regarded her state of distress as completely neurotic. She decided not to
give up her seat.
She got up and said to the standing lady Do sit down here, please. Im
not going very far, and Id much rather stand anyway.22
It turns out that the elderly lady already has a corner seat by the window in a different
carriage, and that she is only too pleased to change seats with Dora. Everyone in this
carriage was thinner, Dora thinks as she settles into her comfortable corner.23
21
12
24
In the case of morality, although there are sometimes rewards, the idea of a reward
is out of place. Murdoch, Sovereignty, 65.
13
I have always told this story in wonder, and people wonder at my wonder.
They say, okay, some persons are altruistic. We understand that; it doesnt
surprise us. The girl who helped you was one of those who likes to help. []
25
Ruth Klgers case shows that the right kind of attention isnt simply a cool, clinical
noting down of features of reality. It takes imagination and empathy to be able truly to get
inside the experiences of the other. I think this is what Simone de Beauvoir has in mind
when she speaks of being absorbed by a novel, to the point of feeling the taste of another
life.28 At the same time, however, we need to avoid what Murdoch calls fantasy.
According to Murdoch we engage in fantasy when we project our own proliferation of
26
29
16
33
This section draws on my essay on Little Eyolf, published in Chris Gray and Susan
Wolfs collection ADD REF.
34
I follow Ibsens habit of referring to male principal characters with their last names.
35
Noget, som kunde ligne en slags krlighed .Henrik Ibsen, Hundrersutgave:
Henrik Ibsens samlede verker, ed. Francis Bull, Halvdan Koht, and Didrik Arup Seip, 21
vols. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1928-57), bind 12: 266.
17
18
The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1910) are as different from Little Eyolf as it
is possible to be. Yet Rilke too is interested in the way egoism blocks the possibility of an
attentive gaze. The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge is a fiery defense of the modernist
understanding of writing. In order to grasp what is real, important, and necessary in an
alienated and alienating world, one must write. Through his writing, Malte questions
absolutely everything he has been told by others, everything he has learned and heard.
Writing is a counter-strategy to deception and inauthenticity. To write is to convey something
genuine, something true. A true writer needs to be able to see, to experience the world for
himself:
I am learning to see. Why, I cannot say, but all things enter more deeply into
me; nor do impressions remain at the level where they used to cease. There is
a place within me of which I knew nothing. Now all things tend that way. I do
not know what happens there.36
Rilke, Notebooks, Penguin Classics, p. 4. Ich lerne sehen. Ich wei nicht, woran es
liegt, es geht alles tiefer in mich ein und bleibt nicht an der Stelle stehen, wo es sonst immer
zu Ende war. Ich habe ein Inneres, von dem ich nicht wute. Alles geht jetzt dorthin. Ich
wei nicht, was dort geschieht. Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzechnungen des Malte Laurids
Brigge, vol. 5, Gesammelte Werke (Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1927), 9.
19
When he visited us, Dr. Jespersen had to content himself with being some sort
of private person; but that was precisely what he had never been. As long as
he could remember, he had been in the souls department. The soul was a
public institution, which he represented, and he contrived never to be off duty,
not in even in his relations with his wife, his modest, faithful Rebekka,
beatified by the bearing of children, as Lavater put it when writing of another
case.37
The passage reveals that Jespersens problem is that something that should be inner
the soul somehow has become something outer. This externalized innerness is clearly
37
Penguin edition p. 71.Dr. Jespersen mute sich bei uns darauf beschrnken, eine
Art von Privatmann zu sein; das gerade aber war er nie gewesen. Er war, soweit er denken
konnte, im Seelenfach angestellt. Die Seele war eine ffentliche Institution fr ihn, die er
vertrat, und er brachte es zuwege, niemals auer Dienst zu sein, selbst nicht im Umgang mit
20
Rereading A Room of Ones Own, I realize that Virginia Woolfs project actually is to
unite language and attention. (If that is true, then this chapter is also a homage to Woolfs
wonderful essay on women and literature.) The message is that women must write, not just
for their own sake, but for the sake of the world: When I ask you to write more books I am
urging you to do what will be for your good and for the good of the world at large. How to
justify this instinct or belief I do not know, for philosophic words, if one has not been
educated at a university are apt to play one false.39 But of course she goes on to justify her
instinct anyway.
In ordinary life, we only catch fleeting glimpses of reality. Usually we are far too
filled with superficial and selfish thoughts to realize what actually is there, around us. A
writer is privileged to live more than other people in the presence of this reality. It is his
business to find it and collect it and communicate it to the rest of us (Room, 108). (I find
Woolf a touch too Romantic here, just a shade too convinced that writers always have godgiven powers of insight, but I cant let that deter me. At least I agree that writers are
specialists in language and attention.) In modernity, a human being risks living her whole life
in a kind of unreality, unless she learns to see. To read texts like King Lear, Emma, or In
39
Virginia Woolf, A Room of Ones Own (New York: Harcourt, 2005), 108.
22
23
I have deliberately placed great emphasis on the importance of reading literary texts.
For me, the best literature gives us the most brilliant examples of attentive language. So I
have been quoting poetry, plays, novels, autobiographical testimony and non-fiction (if we
can call A Room of Ones Own non-fiction). But of course it is not necessary to have read a
single book in order to be able to look at others with a just and loving gaze. The value of
attention is certainly not something that must be learned from philosophy and literature.
40
(2008).
24
41
Se Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities
(Princeton og Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).
42
Cf. Sartre and Beauvoirs unveiling through writing.
25
Ane Farsethss recent book about contemporary Norwegian literature shows that in
the decade leading up to the 22 July 2011, much of the best Norwegian literature was haunted
by a sense of unreality. In this decade, Norwegian society, with its combination of oil-fueled
affluence and social-democratic traditions, appeared to breed a desire for reality in many of
its most talented artists.43 The postmodern fascination with performance and performativity
had lost much of its hold, and writers as well as characters often worried about authenticity,
veering between a fear of being seen and the wish to remain hidden.
In an essay in the Norwegian journal Samtiden, I wrote about the mass murderer of 22
July that He is the worst possible incarnation of a culture in search of reality.44 For at least
a generation, it has been chic to claim that language fails to grasp reality. This made us lose
any faith we may have had in the power of language to change reality.45 But if we lose faith
in language, the alternative is action. In Ibsen's Rosmersholm, Rebecca West throws herself
into the waterfall because she realizes that nothing she can say to Rosmer will overcome his
doubt in her, and in himself.46 To find reality is to find our faith in the power of language to
do something in the world. But there is no need to get melodramatic about it, to think
exclusively in large-scale terms. Even de la Mares insignificant little duck pushes our
43
27
28
47
48
Dommer Arntzen: Ogs dette med hvem som skal leve og hvem som skal d, er det
en beskrivelse av en vrangforestilling fordi det er s umoralsk?
Rettspsykiater Srheim: N ble jeg forvirret.
Arntzen: Dere sier at ingen kan bestemme hvem som skal d, men ingen kan vel i
moralsk forstand ha dette ansvaret.
Srheim: Snn som vi vet det, er det ingen enkeltindivider som har et ansvar for hvem
som skal leve og hvem som skal d.
Arntzen: Det er jo mange som har ansvaret for det i betydningen ddsstraff og krig.
Det er et fenomen som eksisterer.
Srheim: Ja, det har du selvflgelig rett i.
Arntzen: Men det fre det som en vrangforestilling. Er det fordi det er s umoralsk?
Srheim: Nei, jeg tenker de eksemplene du sa om krig og ved ilegge noen
ddsstraff, det er umulig at hvordan han p gutterommet skulle komme inn i en av de
kategoriene og mente han var i posisjon til finne ut hvem som skulle leve og d.
31
The very fact that Srheims reaction was to be confused by Arntzens clear
questions about morality and ideology, reveal that it is possible to practice psychiatry at the
highest level without ever engaging in moral reflection. Judge Arntzens questions, on the
other hand, show that the persons who actually were carrying the burden of deliberating
about the sanity or insanity of the mass murderer, to assess the degree of responsbility he had
for his actions, discovered that they simply couldnt do this from a purely positivistic
perspective.
The 22 July trial certainly demonstrated that a scientistic understanding of the soul is
neither infallible nor particularly interesting. But it wasnt just the trial that showed that we
need different concepts, a different gaze, a gaze that doesnt immediately reduce the
difficulty of reality to the simplistic and flattening categories on a questionnaire. The debate
raging around every aspect of what happened on 22 July has shown that we have to develop
our capacity to discuss moral questions about action and responsibility. This is why we need
a new focus on language and attention.
The mass murderer of 22 July is the product of a society in which nobody has
troubled themselves with the need for a just and loving gaze. He is a distorted caricature of
the worst in postmodern society. He is Gordon Gekko and Patrick Bateman rolled into one.51
Maybe this is even more striking in the case of the Norwegian terrorist, since his horrendous
actions, and his unspeakably chilling manifesto with its deadly marketing metaphors were put
together after the financial crisis, which mercilessly revealed how the same logic, and the
Arntzen: Ja, du har en overgang fra rettmessig drap og et spekter over [til] fullstendig
urettmessig. Terrorhandlinger kan vre ideologisk begrunnet, er ikke det et
selvopplevd kall s absurd det enn kan vre?
Srheim: Jeg tror vi tar et enklere utgangspunkt enn dommeren har anledning til ta.
Vrt utgangspunkt er at der satt han alene og i dypeste alvor brukte han r finne ut
hvem som mtte d. [...22/7-rettssaken: Ord-for-ord dag 38
51
Maybe I should add Jordan Belfort, so memorably portrayed by Leonardo di Caprio
in The Wolf of Wall Street (2013).
32
33