XI.

INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

1. General and Particular Use of Words

Matuguina Wood vs CA [1996]
Refresher: encroachment blamed upon person who used to be major
stockholder of co. her new company was asked to pay up. But new
company was never party to old case.
Doctrine: no transfer of liability. corporation has distinct personality.
interpretation of the word transfer should be that it includes only
obligations arising from general duties not personal obligations [i.e.
transgressions of the law]

Tan v People
In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words/phrases
should be given their plain, ordinary & common usage meaning
o Thus, Sec 68 makes no distinction between raw of processed
lumber
Bernardo v Bernardo

Refresher: This case is about a land dispute where one was asserting that
he has more right to avail of the land because the law favors "bona fide"
settlers over the lessor.
Doctrine: "Actual" & "bona fide" settlers are not synonymous. Bona fide
means good faith. While Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" &
solely used "bona fide" occupants" thereby emphasizing the requirement
that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with
legitimate tenure.
Malanyaon vs. Lising
Refresher: Malanyaon filed a petition to declare illegal the disbursement
made by Goleta as municipal treasurer to the wife of Mayor Pontanal. The
said mayor was charged of violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. The
interpretation of the word acquitted is the issue here.
Doctrine: Acquitted means that after due hearing and consideration of
evidence against a person, the court is of the opinion that his guilt is not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal does not show the defendant
is not guilty. Only time dismissal is the same as acquittal is when the
prosecution presented all pieces of evidence and court dismisses the case
on the ground that the evidence failed to show beyond reasonable doubt
that defendant is guilty.

2. Associated Words
Noscitur a sociis
* sir said that this doesnt require an enumeration; construe the statute as
a whole
Aisporna v CA
Refresher: Rodolfo Aisporna w/ the active participation of Mapalad
Aisporna, his wife, issued a Personal Accident Policy for Ana Isidro. TC
found Mapalad guilty for violating the Insurance Act. Though she
contended that being Rodolfos wife, she naturally helped in his work &
that it was merely a renewal & she didnt receive compensation for it. SC
acquitted her.
Doctrine: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses, & phrases shouldnt
be studied as detached & isolated expressions, but the whole & every part
of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
& in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statue must
be interpreted w/ reference to the context.
Doctrine of associated words (noscitur a sociis) states that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear &
specific by considering the company in w/c it is found or in w/c it is
associated.
Sooo..when a word is ambiguous look at the words surrounding it
to understand its meaning.
Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr.
Refresher: This is a case about an employee who worked in another
company which was the same line of business as his former company, Daichi. His former company and he had in their contract an agreement that
an employee should not work for another company that is in the same line
of business. Labor Arbiter has the exclusive jurisdiction for employeremployee relations cases but SC held here that this is not one of them.
There must be a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims
provided in the article 217 before Labor Arbiter can assume jurisdiction.
Doctrine: Although there's no explicit phrase that says damages from
employer-employee relations, it's clear from the reading of the whole
article that the circumstances are exactly those within the employeremployee relations. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the Court held
that it is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through pars.
1 to 5 and that is that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in
connection with an employer-employee relationship. This, is in other
words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully

invoked in clarifying the scope of par. 3 and any other par. Of Art. 217 of
the Labor Code.

Ejusdem generis
PBA vs CA [2000]

Refresher: PBA claiming that it shouldnt anymore pay BIR since it paid
local tax.

Doctrine: but PBA [sports] not a place of amusement] under local tax
code
where general words follow and enumeration of persons or things,
by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed to their widest extent but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos
FACTS:

Officers of a Civic Organization, Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon

ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for renovating the chapel of Tikay,
Bulacan. Martin Centeno (chairman of the group) & Vicente Yao
approached Judge Adoracion Angeles & solicited from her a
contribution of Php 1,500

The solicitation was made without a permit from DSWD. As a

consequence, Judge Angeles filed a complaint against the
petitioners for violating PD 1564 (the Solicitation Permit Law).
Sec. 2 Any person, corporation, organization or association desiring
to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare
purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Dept. of Social Service and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon filing of a written application for
permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Dept. of
Social Service and Development, the Regional Director or his duly
authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or
temporary permit to disapprove the application. In the interest of the
public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued
under Act 4075.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts do

not constitute an offense since the decree only covers solicitations
made for charitable or public welfare purposes not those made for
a religious purpose. This was denied and trial ensued.

The TC rendered judgments against the petitioners & ordered

them to pay a fine of Php200 each. Nonetheless, they also
recommended that the petitioners should be pardoned since they
acted in good faith & should not have been held liable were it not
for the PD.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Bulacan. (One of the petitioners
withdrew his appeal but it continued with respect to the other
one)
RTC judge affirmed the decision of the LC & modified the penalty
because the perversity of the act committed which caused
damage & prejudice to the complainant. The penalty was
increases to Php1000, without subsidiary imprisonment, and
imprisonment of 6 months.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner questions the applicability of PD 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes in that :
1) religious purposes is not expressly included in the provisions
of the statue what the law does not include, it excludes
2) Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state &
liberally in favor of the accused
3) State regulation of solicitations made for a religious purpose
would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the constitution

ISSUES: (main issue is #1)

1) WON the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. NO
2) WON regulation of solicitations for religious purposes would
abridge the right of freedom of religion. NO
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1) WON the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in
its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose NO
It is the elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one thing, person, act or consequence excludes all the
others
o Expressio unius est exclusion alterius where a statute
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters
o Proceeds from the premise that the legislature would have not
made a specific enumeration in a statute, had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning & confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
The 1987 Constitution & several other statutes treat the words
charitable & religious separately & independently of each other

Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution: charitable is only 1 of

the 3 words used to describe those institutions exempt from
tax
o Sec. 26(e): corporations exempt from income tax
o Sec. 28(8)(e): exclusions from gross income of the National
Internal Revenue Code
o Sec. 88 of the Corporation Code: organization of non-stock
corporations
o Sec. 234 of the Local Government Code: exceptions from real
property tax
Since the aforementioned statutes specifically spelled out charitable
& religious, while PD 1564 merely states charitable or public welfare
purposes, shows that the framers of the law never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes. If the opposite were their intent,
there is no reason why it would not have expressly stated so.
All religious activities are charitable in nature. The converse may not
be true since charitable purposes can also include those which are not
religious.
There is a distinction between charitable purpose & religious
purpose except where the 2 terms are used synonymously or where
the distinction has been done away with by the statute.
Charitable is capable of meaning different things, but since PD 1564
is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it
would be prejudicial to the petitioner (accused).
Provisions of the Constitution & the statutes makes use of the
disjunctive or to relate charitable & religious. Or is a disjunctive
article indicating an alternative. When or is used, the various
members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. There is no
compelling consideration to deviate from this application in construing
the provisions of PD 1564.
To include religious purpose to the intent of PD 1564 by virtue of the
word charitable, under the pain of penal liability without the necessary
permit, would be prejudicial to the petitioner.
Charitable should be strictly construed. This is consisted with the
doctrine that all penal legislation should be interpreted to favor the
accused.
Charitable is a matter of description rather than a precise definition,
the determination of that which is charitable, must be decided on its
own particular facts & circumstances.
o

2) WON regulation of solicitations for religious purposes would

abridge the right of freedom of religion. NO
Even the exercise of religion may be regulated in order for the state to
protect its citizens from injury.
A state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger to establish his identity & his authority to act for the cause
which he purports to represent in the interest of public safety, peace,
comfort or convenience.

A regulation which does not involve any religious test or delay that
collection of funds would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint
on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to
its exercise.
The State, under its exercise of police power, has the authority to
determine WON there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent
purposes which are also prejudicial to the interest of worthy & proper
charities. Some regulation is in the public interest.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation of
the State, but since religious solicitations are not covered by PD 1564, the
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.
Malinias v COMELEC
Refresher: This is the case where Malinias claims that he was not able to
enter the canvassing area during the elections because of the police
checkpoint instituted by a congressman to deliberately prevent him form
going there. He wants the policemen & the congressman to be criminally
punished, but the court held that those offenses are just administratively
sanctioned because they are not included in the enumeration of election
offenses criminally chargeable.
Doctrine: The rule of expression is formulated in a number of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to
that which is implied. Expression facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a
statute by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio
Garvida vs. Sales
Refresher:
Lynette Garvida ran and won for SK Chairman.
Her
proclamation was suspended by the COMELEC en banc because she was
beyond the age limit for elective members.
Doctrine: The Local Govt Code had a different maximum age for a
member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an
elective SK official. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification.

Casus omissus
Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu
Refresher: Provincial Governor of Cebu appointed teachers for extension
classes. COA saw that the salaries & personnel-related benefits & college
scholarship grants were charged against the SEF. SC said the salaries
could be charged to the SEF but not the college scholarship grants.
Doctrine: Doctrine of necessary implication: every statute is construed,
by implication, to have all the provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate it (this is how the SC arrived at the decision that the salaries
could be charged). Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est: a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to
have been omitted intentionally (w/c is why SC said college scholarship
grants cant be charged).
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos
Ramirez v. CA
FACTS:

Soccoro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Ester

Garcia, who allegedly insulted and humiliated her in a hostile & furious
mood & in a manner offensive to the petitioners dignity & personality. To
support this claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation
w/c was based on a tape recording that she made.
Garcia thus filed a criminal case w/ the RTC of Pasay City for
violation of RA 4200 (wiretapping), stating that the secret taping was
illegal. Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the information w/c was granted
by the RTC. Garcia appealed to through certiorari to the SC w/c referred
the case to the CA, w/c declared the TCs decision null & void. After
denying Ramirezs motion for reconsideration, she petitioned to the SC.
Petitioner argues:
1) the applicable provision of RA 4200 doesnt apply to the taping of
the private conversation by one of the parties to the convo
2) the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
convo by a party other than those involved in the communication
3) the substance or content of the convo must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of RA 4200
4) that RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication
not a private conversation.
ISSUE(s):
1) WON RA 4200 applies to the taping of a private convo by one of
the parties to it

2) WON the substance of the convo must be alleged in the

Information
3) WON RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication,
not a private convo"
HELD: 1) Yes, 2&3) No. Judgment affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1) YES. Legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute &
when it is clear & unambiguous, the law is applied accdg to its express
terms. Sec.1 of RA 4200 clearly makes it illegal for anyone, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record the
convo. The law makes no distinctiong as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private convo. The intent of the statute is
underscored by the use of the qualifier ANY.
Further, Senate Congressional records, supports this conclusion. Thus,
where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. And
RA 4200 does NOT make a distinction.
2) NO. The nature of the convo is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
And its substance doesnt need to be specifically alleged in the
information. Nowhere in the law is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the convo, as well as its
communication to a 3rd person should be professed.
3) NO. By interpreting that private communication in Sec.1, RA 4200
doesnt include private convo narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
communication to a point of absurdity. Communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by w/c
meanings or thoughts are shared btwn individuals through a common
system of symbols. Its definitions are broad enough to include verbal or
non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or
thoughts. Thus, the confrontation that took place btwn the petitioner &
respondent it included.
Further, the terms convo & communication were used interchangeably
by Sen. Tatad in his Explanatory Note to the bill. And the statute explicitly
mentions the unauthorized recording of private communications w/ the
use of tape-recorders.
Cebu Institute of Medicine v CIM Union [2001]
Refresher: Union charges school with violation of law for using part of the
70%-tuition-increase money to pay participation fee for employee
benefits.
Doctrine: employer is right! the law says so
Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not.

Reddendo singular singulis

Ppl v Tamani
Reddendo singula singulis referring each to each; referring each
phrase/expression to its appropriate object; let each be put in its
proper place; words should be taken distributively
Amadora v CA

Refresher: Kid shot classmate. Parents of dead son, suing for damages
against the school. Art 2180 CC: "Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts & trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils & students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody."
Doctrine: Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, "teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students" & "the heads of
establishments of arts & trades" to the word "apprentices".
*but we all know that they said there's no difference anymore between the
two.
Doctrine of Necessary implication
NATU v Torres
Refresher: NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of Planters Banks employees
occupying supervisory positions. Bank said such supervisory positions are
actually managerial and/or confidential employees ineligible to join, assist
or form a union.
Doctrine: Using the doctrine of necessary implication, Managers/OICs,
cashiers and controllers are confidential employees even though the labor
code singled out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization.
The rationale is that the said position are
considered confidential employees, which are supposed to be on the side
of the employer and to see to it that its interests are well protected.

3. Provisos, Exceptions, and Saving Clauses

Provisos, exceptions and saving clauses
(Agpalo article)
> Generally, the office of a proviso is either to limit the application of the
enacting clause, section or provision of a statute or to except something
therefrom or to qualify or restrain its generality or to exclude some
possible ground or misinterpretation of it.

> An exception is a clause which exempts something from the operation of

a statute by express words. The express mention of exceptions operates to
exclude other exceptions and conversely those which are not within the
enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule.
> A saving clause is a clause in a provision of law which operates to except
from the effect of the law what the clause provides or to save something
which would otherwise be lost.
> Exception is different from a proviso in the sense that: (1) an exception
exempts something absolutely from the operation of a statute, by express
words in the enacting clause. A proviso defeats its operation conditionally,
(2) An exception takes out of the statute something that otherwise would
be a part of the subject matter of it. A proviso avoids them by way of
defeasance or excuse (3) exception is generally a part of the enactment
itself, absolutely excluding from its operation some subject or thing that
otherwise would fall within its scope. But when the enactment is modified
by engrafting upon it a new provision, by way of amendment, providing
conditionally for a new case, it is in the nature of a provision.
> However, one of the functions of a proviso is to except something from
an enacting clause. In this sense, an exception and a proviso are similar.