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(Wiki) Battle of Kursk
(Wiki) Battle of Kursk
(Wiki) Battle of Kursk
The Battle of Kursk was a Second World War engagement between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern
Front near Kursk (450 kilometres or 280 miles southwest of Moscow) in the Soviet Union during July and August 1943. The German oensive was code-named Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) and
led to one of the largest armoured clashes in history,
the Battle of Prokhorovka. The German oensive was
countered by two Soviet counter-oensives, Operation
Polkovodets Rumyantsev (Russian: ) and Operation Kutuzov (Russian: ). For the
Germans, the battle represented the nal strategic oensive they were able to mount in the east. For the Soviets,
the victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for
the rest of the war.
1 Background
The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet oensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting o a large
number of forces that they anticipated would be in the
Kursk salient.[22] The Kursk salient or bulge was 250
kilometres (160 mi) long from north to south and 160
kilometres (99 mi) from east to west.[23] By eliminating the Kursk salient, the Germans would also shorten
their lines of defence, nullifying Soviet numerical superiority in critical sectors.[24] The plan envisioned an envelopment by a pair of pincers breaking through the northern and southern anks of the salient.[25] German dictator
Adolf Hitler thought that a victory here would reassert
German strength and improve his prestige with his allies,
who were considering withdrawing from the war.[26] It
was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners
would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments industry.[24]
As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion the Soviet army moved to a general oensive in
the south, pressuring the exhausted German forces who
had survived the winter. By January 1943, a 160 to
300 km (99 to 186 mi) wide gap had opened between
Army Group B and Army Group Don, and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut o all German forces
south of the Don River, including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus.[37][38] Army Group Center came
under signicant pressure as well. Kursk fell to the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February.[39]
The Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly-created Central
Fronts prepared for an oensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Center between Bryansk and
Smolensk.[37][40] By February 1943 the Wehrmacht was
in danger of a general collapse.
BACKGROUND
The heavy losses sustained by the Heer since the opening of Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry
and artillery.[55] Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Germans to undertake an oensive in
1943, the burden would have to be carried by the panzer
divisions. In view of the exposed position of Army Group
South, Manstein proposed that his forces should take the
strategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet oensive
would attempt to cut o and destroy Army Group South
by a move across the Donets River toward the Dnieper.
In February, he proposed waiting for this oensive to
develop and then delivering a series of counterattacks
into the exposed Soviet anks.[56] Hitler, concerned about
the political implications of taking a defensive stance,
and preoccupied with holding the Donbass, rejected this
plan.[57] On 10 March, Manstein presented an alternative plan whereby the German forces would pinch o the
Kursk salient with a rapid oensive commencing as soon
as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.[58][59]
1.1
BACKGROUND
1.2
BACKGROUND
Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German
invasion.[131][132] Soldiers were packed into trenches and
tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were
gone.[lower-alpha 17][132] This training exercise was referred
to by the soldiers as ironing.[118] In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured
vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles now vulnerable to infantry armed with anti-tank ries, demolition
charges and Molotov cocktails could then be disabled
or destroyed at point-blank range.[133] These types of attacks were mostly eective against the massive Ferdinand
tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary
armament.[133] The soldiers were also promised nancial
rewards for each tank destroyed, with the Peoples Commisariat of Defence providing 1,000 rubles for destroyed
tanks.[134]
Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, antiaircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank
defence.[125] Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns
further strengthened the anti-tank defences.[115][125]
Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level
of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with
the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and
the remainder amply spread out elsewhere.[125] Each
anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to
six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank ries, and ve
to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were The Soviets employed maskirovka (deception techniques)
supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and
by infantry with automatic rearms.[126] Independent to conceal the movement of men and materiel.[135][136]
1.3
Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground forces
These included camouaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airelds and depots, generating false
radio-trac, and spreading rumours among the Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the
German-held areas.[137] Movement of forces and supplies
to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with
the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and res
were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor
transport in and around them forbidden.[138][139]
According to a Soviet General Sta report, 29 of the 35
major Luftwae raids on Soviet airelds in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airelds.[137] The
Soviet deception eorts were so successful that German
estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks.[140][141] The result was
not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a
misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.[138] According to historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500
Luftwae aircraft on the ground.[142]
The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34,
considered the best all-around tank design of the entire war, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large
numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th
Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and
500 T-34s. In the salient itself the Soviets assembled
a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included
U.S.-manufactured M3 Lees and British-built Churchills,
Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34 made up
the bulk of the Soviet armour.[143] Without including
the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front,
the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks,
20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend the
salient.[102][144] This amounted to 26 percent of the total
manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars
and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of
its tanks.[102]
1.3
Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground forces
Both the Luftwae and the VVS were air forces designed with the primary mission of supporting their respective ground forces. Though the VVS was always
In 1943 the Luftwae could still achieve local air superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of Luftwae aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were
slated for Citadel.[142] The changing strengths between
the two opponents prompted the Luftwae to make operational changes for the battle. Previous oensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwae raids against opposing airelds to achieve air superiority. By this point in
the war Soviet equipment reserves were extensive. The
Luftwae commanders realised that whatever aircraft
they could destroy on the ground could be replaced by
the Soviets within days, making such raids futile. Therefore this mission was abandoned.[149] In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers ying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted
during Citadel.[149] For Citadel, the Luftwae conned
its operations to the direct support of the forces on the
ground.[150] In this mission the Luftwae continued to
make use of the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers. A
new development to this aircraft was the Bordkanone
3,7 cm calibre cannon, one of which could be slung un-
8
der each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod. Half of the
Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped
with these.[151] The air groups were also buttressed by the
recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK
103 cannon, and the ground attack (jabo) version of the
Focke-Wulf Fw 190.[152]
OPPOSING FORCES
and skill than the Luftwae had seen earlier.[156] The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5
ghters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwae in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2
Shturmovik and the Pe-2, had become available as well.
The Soviet Air Force also elded large quantities of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies
and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Soviets would be able to conduct an extended campaign
without slackening in the intensity of their eort.[149]
2 Opposing forces
See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle
2.1 Germans
For the operation, the Germans used four armies along
with a large proportion of their total tank strength on the
Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group
Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained
335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south,
the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf,
of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000108,000 men (66,000 combat
soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In
total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000
779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained
438,271 combat soldiers.[157][95] Army Group South was
Luftwae ak units
equipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center.[158][95]
The Luftwae command understood that their support The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf
would be crucial for the success of Operation Citadel, but had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army
problems with supply shortfalls hampered their prepara- possessed 988 tanks and assault guns.[157]
tions. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group The two new Panther battalions the 51st and 52nd
Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which
Luftwaes ability to build up essential stockpiles of the oensive had been delayed, were attached to the
petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Grodeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of
the Soviets, there were no reserves of aircraft that could Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions
be used to replace damaged aircraft over the course of arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time
the operation.[153] Fuel was the most signicant limiting to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the
factor.[154] To help build up supplies for the support of terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of the
Citadel, the Luftwae greatly curtailed its operations dur- methods of the panzerwae, considered essential for the
ing the last week of June.[152] Despite this conservation of successful use of armour.[159][160][49] Though led by exresources, the Luftwae did not have the resources to sus- perienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews
tain an intensive air eort for more than a few days after were new recruits and had little time to become familiar
the operation began.[155]
with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as
In the months preceding the battle, Luftotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the
strength of the opposing VVS formations. The Soviet
forces encountered displayed better training, and were
ying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness
2.4
Preliminary actions
thermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically
unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost
16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only
184 available for the launching of the oensive.[163]
2.2
Soviets
The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk,
and created a third front behind the battle area which
was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts
elded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat
soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional
573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet
force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat
soldiers.
2.3
Comparison of strength
2.3.1
Operation Citadel
2.3.2
2.4
Preliminary actions
9
Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the
evening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched
attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts
prior to the main assault.[170] During these attacks, a number of Soviet command and observation posts along the
rst main belt of defence were captured. By 16:00, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division Grodeutschland, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka before midnight.[171][172][170] At around 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers,
of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzer
Corps.[173][171][174]
To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports of
the anticipated German oensive came in. At around
02:00 5 July, Zhukov ordered his preemptive artillery
bombardment to begin. The hope was to disrupt German
forces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome was
less than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the German formations, but failed in the goal of disrupting their
schedule or inicting substantial losses. The Germans
began their own artillery bombardment at about 05:00,
which lasted 80 minutes in the northern face and 50 minutes in the southern face. After the barrage, the ground
forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by
the Luftwae.[175][171][176][177]
10
11
backed up by close air support, to counterattack the German 9th Army the following day on 6 July. However due
to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd
Tank Army commenced the counterattack on the dawn
of 6 July after the preparatory Soviet artillery barrage.
The 16th Tank Corps, elding about 200 tanks, attacked
the the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger tanks
of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked out
69 Soviet tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the
17th Guards Rie Corps of the 13th Army.[194] Later that
morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its own
attack against the 17th Guards Rie Corps entrenched
around the village Olkhovatka in the second defensive
belt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage and
was spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505th
Heavy Tank Battalion,[195] but it failed to break the Soviet
defence at Olkhovatka, and the German suered heavy
casualties.[196][197] Olkhovatka was on a high ground that
provided a clear view of much of the frontline.[198] At
18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th Guards
Rie Corps further bolstering Soviet resistance.[196][197]
Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his remaining
tanks to minimize their exposure.[199] Ponyri, defended
by the Soviet 307th Rie Division of the 29th Rie Corps,
was also concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German
292nd and 86th Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9th
Panzer Divisions, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the defenders from heavily fortied village.[200]
terparts have also realized this, but Kluge wished to maintain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the southern oensive.[210]
At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Mansteins
main attack was delivered by Hoths 4th Panzer
Army, which was organized into densely concentrated
spearheads.[157] Opposing the 4th Panzer Army was
the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed of
the 22nd Guards Rie Corps and 23rd Guards Rie
Corps.[159] The Soviets had constructed three heavily fortied defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking armoured forces.[112] Though they had been provided superb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters had
still not been able to pinpoint the exact location where
the Germans would place their oensive weight.[112]
While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with a 45-kilometre-wide (28 mi) attack front, by 6
July it had been reduced to 40-kilometre-wide (25 mi).
The following day the attack frontage dropped to 15kilometre-wide (9.3 mi), and on both the 8 and 9 July
penetrations of only 2-kilometre-wide (1.2 mi) occurred.
By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German
advance.[211]
On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, their
counter-oensive upon the Orel salient, which threatened the ank and rear of Models 9th Army. The 12th
Panzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to be
committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient,[212]
along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and
20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Soviet
spearheads.[213]
12
4.1
The panzergrenadier division Grodeutschland, commanded by Walter Hrnlein, was the strongest single
division in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supported
on its anks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.[159]
Grodeutschlands Panzer IIIs and IVs had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tigers, which were used to
spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, Grossdeutschland, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a
three-kilometre front upon the 67th Guards Rie Division of the 22nd Guards Rie Corps.[159] The Panzerfsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, stalled in
a mineeld and subsequently 36 Panthers were immobilized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage
of Soviet anti-tank and artillery re, which inicted numerous casualties. Engineers were moved up and cleared
paths through the mineeld, but suered casualties in the
process. The combination of erce resistance, mineelds,
thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With
paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towards
Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy casualties were
sustained including the regimental commander Colonel
Kassnitz. Due to the ghting, and the marshy terrain
south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream,
the regiment once more bogged down.[214][215][160]
Panzer IIIs and IVs advance against the southern face of the
salient.
The panzergrenadier regiment of Grodeutschland, advancing on the right wing, pushed through to the village
of Butovo.[216] The tanks were deployed in a classic arrow
formation to minimise the eects of the Soviet Pakfront
defence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVs
and assault guns fanning out to the anks and rear. They
were followed by infantry and combat engineers.[216] Attempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsed
by the Luftwae.[217]
The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left ank
of Grodeutschland, made good progress and by the
end of the day had captured Gertsovka[72] and reached
Mikhailovka.[218] The 167th Infantry Division, on the
right ank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made sucient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the day.
By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the rst
To the east, during the night of 45 July, SS combat engineers had inltrated no-mans land and cleared
lanes through the Soviet mineelds.[220] At dawn, 5 July,
the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS
Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf attacked the 6th Guards
Armys 52nd Guards Rie Division. The main assault
was led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers, but in total 494
tanks and assault guns attacked across a twelve-kilometre
front.[220] Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divisions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened the
right ank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced on the left ank towards Bykovka. The 2nd
SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center.[220] Following closely behind the tanks
were the infantry and combat engineers, coming forward
to demolish obstacles and clear trenches. In addition,
the advance was well supported by the Luftwae, which
greatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillery
positions.[221]
By 09:00 hours, the II SS Panzer Corps had broken
through the Soviet rst belt of defence along its entire
front.[222][223] While probing positions between the rst
and second Soviet defensive belts, at 13:00, the 2nd SS
Panzer Divisions vanguard came under re from two T34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched. Forty more
Soviet tanks soon engaged the division. The 1st Guards
Tank Army clashed with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in a
four-hour battle, resulting in the Soviet tanks withdrawing. However, the battle had bought enough time for
units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rie Corps, lodged in
the Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforced
with additional anti-tank guns.[224] By the early evening,
2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the mineelds that
marked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second belt of
defence.[225] The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka by
4.3
13
through the 7th Guards Army and cover the right ank
of the 4th Panzer Army.[228] The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with 45 Tigers was also attached to
the III Panzer Corps, split up so that one company of 15
Two Tiger tanks of Totenkopf and a StuG assault gun carrying Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer divisions
infantry
of the corps.[228] Although the river was bridged during
the night of 4 July, the crossing points were bombarded
The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress. by Soviet artillery.[228]
They had managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment,
of the 52nd Guards Rie Division (of the 23rd Guards At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod,
Rie Corps), from the rest of its parent division, but its eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division assemattempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the ank bled to make a crossing. They were subjected to heavy
of the neighbouring 375th Rie Division (of the 23rd artillery re during the Soviet defensive bombardment,
Guards Rie Corps) had failed when the regiment was but most of the infantry got across to the eastern bank.
reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the com- An eort was made to cross a company of Tigers from
mander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested aid from the III the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, but the bridge was bomPanzer Corps to his right, but the panzer corps had no barded and destroyed before the entire company could get
units to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Division across. The remainder of the 6th Panzer Division was
[228]
Clemens Graf Kagehad made very limited progress due in part to a tributary forced to cross further south.
a
battalion
commander,
described
it thus:
neck,
of the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined the
advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the right
Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the far
ank of the corps to Soviet forces.[226] German crews,
side
as hundreds of Stalins organs hurled their
working in boiling tanks in sweltering weather condi[227]
rockets
exactly onto the crossing site. The
tions, frequently suered from heat exhaustion.
bridge was totally demolished and the engiThe 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack by
neers, unfortunately, suered heavy losses.
the XLVIII Panzer Korps and II SS Panzer Korps, was reNever have I hugged the dirt so tightly as when
inforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd
these terrible shells sprayed their thin fragGuards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The
ments just above the ground.[228]
51st and 90th Guards Rie divisions were moved up to
the vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, 40 kilome- The diversion to the south pushed the 6th Panzer Divitres (25 mi) to the north-east), in the path of the 1st sion behind schedule, and the problem was aggravated
SS Panzer Division.[219] The 93rd Guards Rie Division when the new crossing became clogged with trac. Failwas deployed further back, along the road leading from ing to nd another crossing, the rest of the division rePokrovka to Prokhorovka.[185]
mained on the western bank of the river throughout the
day.[228] Those units of the division that had crossed the
river launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary Gorod,
4.3 Army Detachment Kempf
which was repulsed due to poorly cleared mineelds and
[229]
Facing Army Detachment Kempf, consisting of III Panzer strong resistance.
Corps and Corps Raus (commanded by Erhard Raus), To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer
were the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground on Division crossed the river but was delayed by mines that
the eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The two Ger- damaged some of the Tigers spearheading the advance
man corps were tasked with crossing the river, smashing and division had moved forward 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)
14
After a erce battle, involving some hand-to-hand ghting, Corps Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani,
penetrating the rst Soviet belt of defence. A Soviet
counter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beaten
o, with the assistance from artillery and ak batteries.
Having suered 2,000 casualties since the morning and
still facing considerable resistance, the corps dug in for
the night.[233]
The thrust of Army Detachment Kempf had been slowed,
allowing the Soviets time to prepare their second belt of
defence to meet the German attack on 6 July.[233] The
7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of III
Panzer Corps and Corps Raus, was reinforced with two
rie divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards Rie
Division was moved up to the second belt of defence, in
the path of the III Panzer Corps.[233]
The conditions during the battle were hot and humid. Here, Alfred Kurzmaul, of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, drinks water aboard a Tiger I during a lull in the ghting.
By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rie divisions
under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army.[233][234] The XLVIII Panzer
Corps along the Oboyan axis, where the third defensive
belt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Soviet second defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough into
the free Soviet rear.[235][236] This forced the Stavka to
commit their strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh
Front: the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, both
from the Steppe Front, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps
4.5
Battle of Prokhorovka
from the Southwestern Front.[237][236] Ivan Konev objected to this premature piecemeal commitment of the
strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced
his complaints.[238] In addition, on 7 July Zhukov ordered
the 17th Air Army the air eet serving the Southwestern Front to support the 2nd Air Army in serving the
Voronezh Front.[236][239][240] On July 7, the 5th Guards
Tank Army began advancing to Prokhorovka. 5th Guards
Tank Army commander, Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, described the journey:
By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds,
settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes,
grain elds, tanks and trucks. The dark red
disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, selfpropelled guns, artillery tractors, armoured
personnel carriers and trucks were advancing
in an unending ow. The faces of the soldiers
were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was
intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst
and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their
bodies.[199]
15
vanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) since the start of
Citadel and broken through the rst and second defensive belts.[248][249][250][251] However, slow progress by the
XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements of
the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help the XLVIII
Panzer Corps regain its momentum. On 10 July the full
eort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward
progress. The direction of their advance now shifted from
Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka.
Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early
May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Armys plan since
the outset of the oensive.[252][253] By this time, however,
the Soviets had shifted reserve formations into its path.
The defensive positions were manned by the 2nd Tank
Corps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division
and 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the
33rd Guards Rie Corps.[254][255]
Though the German advance in the south was slower than
desired, it was much faster than the Soviets expected.
On 9 July, the rst German units reached the Psel River.
The next day, the rst German infantry crossed the river.
Despite the deep defensive system and mineelds, German tank losses were low.[256] At this point, Hoth turned
the II SS Panzer Corps from a northward heading directed toward Oboyan to a northeast heading towards
Prokhorovka.[257][258] The main concern of Manstein and
Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempf
to advance and protect the eastern ank of the II SS
Panzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf
nally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the
Donets.[259] Once across, Breith made every eort to
push troops and vehicles across the river for an advance
on Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SS
Panzer Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Army
becoming encircled. It appeared the hoped for breakthrough was at hand.[260]
16
17
he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive 6 Soviet counteroensives
oensive against his sector, but Manstein was less welcoming. Mansteins forces had just spent a week ghting
6.1 In the north: Operation Kutuzov
through a maze of defensive works and he believed they
were on the verge of breaking through to more open terMain article: Operation Kutuzov
rain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the
Soviet oensive operations for the summer of 1943 were
Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein
stated, On no account should we let go of the enemy until
the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely
beaten.[282] Hitler agreed to temporarily allow the continuance of the oensive in the south part of the salient,
but the following day he ordered Mansteins reserve the
XXIV Panzer Corps to move south to support the 1st
Panzer Army. This removed the force Manstein believed
was needed to succeed.[283]
On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line.
The following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corps
to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.[284][285] The
strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly
underestimated by German intelligence, and the Soviets
Soviet soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession, 5
soon went onto the oensive.[283]
August 1943.
5.1
Controversy
18
RESULTS
the 4th Panzer Army and cut o the extended southern portion of Army Group South.[299] After the heavy
losses sustained by the Voronezh Front, during Operation Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and ret,
delaying the start of the oensive until 3 August. Diversionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across the
Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces
that would face the main blow.[300] The oensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against
the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove
through the German positions, making broad and deep
penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Bel- Prokhorovka Cathedral, on the former battleeld, commemogorod.
rates the Red Army losses and victory.
By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached.
The Soviet advance was nally halted by a counter-attack
fered a decisive defeat. The armoured forby the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuing
mations, reformed and re-equipped with so
tank battles, the Soviet armies suered heavy losses in
much eort, had lost heavily in both men and
armour.[301][302] After this setback, the Soviets focused
equipment and would now be unemployable
on Kharkov. After heavy ghting the city was liberated
for a long time to come. It was problemon 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germans
atical whether they could be rehabilitated in
as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer
time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless
to it as the BelgorodKharkov oensive operation.[303]
to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to
Results
8.1
Soviet losses
19
8.1
Soviet losses
20
8.2
German losses
The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August along the entire Eastern Front amount to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimates
that 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.[319]
Beevor writes that the Red Army had lost ve armoured
During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault vehicles for every German panzer destroyed.[10]
guns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk Frieser reports Luftwae losses at 524 planes, with 159
started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within lost during the German oensive, 218 destroyed durtwo days, this had dropped to 40.[320] On 17 July 1943 ing Operation Kutuzov, and a further 147 lost durafter Hitler had ordered a stop to the German oensive, ing Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.[324] In reviewGuderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of ing the reports of the quartermaster of the Luftwae,
the Panthers:
Bergstrm presents dierent gures. Between 5 and 31
Due to enemy action and mechanical
breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly
during the rst few days. By the evening of 10
21
Notes
[1] After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold the
strategic initiative in the East. (Glantz & House 1995, p.
175).
[2] With the nal destruction of German forces at Kharkov,
the Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strategic initiative, the Red Army advanced along a 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) front. (Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171).
[3] The breakdown as shown in Bergstrm (2007, pp. 127
128) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army
and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector
(Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front).(Bergstrm 2007, p. 21).
[4] The breakdown as shown in Zetterling & Frankson (2000,
p. 20) is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army
(Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front),
735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for
Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (Steppe Front)
and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command.
[5] Operation Citadel refers to the German oensive from 4
to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 523
July.
[6] The breakdown as shown in Frieser (2007, p. 154) is as
follows: 9,063 KIA, 43,159 WIA and 1,960 MIA.
[7] The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German oensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
[8] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, pp. 132
134) is as follows: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter:
429,890; Belgorod-counter: 255,566.
[9] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, p. 262)
is as follows: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter; 2,586.
Belgorod-counter; 1,864.
[10] Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, or
at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such. Some of the historians taking this view are: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p.
187), Roger Moorhouse (Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), Mary
Kathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p. 10), David Glantz
(Glantz 1986, p. 24; Glantz & House 2004, pp. 63, 78,
149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House
2004, pp. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Willmott (Willmott 1990, p. 300), and others. Also, Niklas
Zetterling and Anders Frankson specically considered
only the southern pincer as a classical blitzkrieg attack
(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137).
[11] Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel
make no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization
of the operation. Several German ocers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the
battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts
were collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these ocers are: Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 327), Erhard Raus (Newton 2002, pp. 2964), Friedrich Fangohr (Newton 2002, pp. 6596), Peter von der Groeben
22
10
below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd
Armies. (Clark 2012, p. 204). Perhaps the order of battle
below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel.
[19] The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The
German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in
1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of
the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel. (Bergstrm 2007, pp. 2627).
REFERENCES
10
References
23
[67] Battistelli 2008, pp. 46, The main purpose of this [99] " []
new oensive was to regain the initiative, and unlike the
.. ". Militera.lib.ru. Archived from the origtwo previous summers, no one was thinking any longer
inal on 4 July 2010. Retrieved 6 August 2010.
of blitzkrieg.... Facing its own shortcomings and the
growing capabilities of the enemy the notion of blitzkrieg [100] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829, mentions Nikolai
died. Firepower prevailed over speed and manoeuverabilVatutin and Mikhail Malinin.
ity with the result being that Operation Citadel would be
based on a concept inconceivable a year earlier: attacking [101] Clark 2012, p. 189, mentions Stalin.
the enemy where it was strongest..
[102] Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 168.
[68] Newton 2002, p. 13.
[103] Clark 2012, p. 189.
[69] von Mellenthin 1956, p. 218.
[104]
,
. .: , 1988 (in
[70] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196.
Russian). Militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 17 June 2013.
[71] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 5153.
[105] Clark 2012, p. 190.
[72] Clark 2012, p. 197.
[106] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 28.
[73] Clark 2012, p. 194.
[107] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829.
[74] Healy 2010, p. 79.
[108] Clark 2012, p. 204.
[75] Clark 2012, p. 193.
[109] Glantz 2013, p. 195.
[76] Glantz & House 2004, p. 13.
[110] Clark 2012, p. 202.
[77] Manstein 1983, pp. 480482.
[111] The Fronts history.
[78] von Mellenthin 1956, p. 216.
[112] Clark 2012, p. 203.
[79] Guderian 1952, p. 307.
[80] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 10.
[81] Glantz 2013, p. 183.
[82] Clark 2012, p. 192.
[88] Kursk Press releases July 1943. Dial Pixpex News. Re- [120] Glantz & House 2004, p. 65, Glantz states there were
trieved 2 June 2013
2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..
24
10
[121] Healy 1992, p. 31, Healy states there were 2,400 anti-tank [157]
and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..
[158]
[122] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 39.
[159]
[123] Glantz & House 2004, p. 67.
[160]
[124] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 290.
[161]
[125] Glantz 1986, p. 20.
[162]
[126] Glantz 1986, p. 24.
[163]
[127] Healy 2010, p. 74.
[164]
[128] Barbier 2002, p. 58.
[129] Clark 2012, p. 208, Clark states 300 locomotives instead
of 298..
[130] Newton 2002, p. 151.
[131] Glantz & House 1995, p. 90.
REFERENCES
25
[244] Clark 2012, p. 299, tank losses are given as 50 in the rst
air raid and another 30 in subsequent air raids.
[248] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820
miles.
[249] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820
miles.
26
10
REFERENCES
[317] Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5 SS Panzer Division Wiking, p. 119; U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise Phase III (KOSAVE II), p. 5-12; Healy, Kursk,
pp. 8588; Steve Zaloga and Peter Sarson, T-34/76
Medium Tank 194145, p. 34
27
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12
External links
30
13
13
13.1
13.2
Images
13.2
Images
31
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2925-17,_Russland,_motorisierte_Truppen.jpg
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32
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