Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their
rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA
to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and
order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Case Digest: Lozano v. Martinez

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
YAP, J:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid

reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less
than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double
said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves
a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge
where payment of the check "is refused by thedrawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the
bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in
evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written
thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the
reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary
to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.
HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check,
since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the

swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

Tiro v. Judge Hontanosas (G.R. No. L-32312.

November 25, 1983)
18AUG
FACTS:
Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the formers collection of salary
checks of school teacher from division office, following the issuance of Circular No. 21 s. 1969 by the Director
of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney and to declare Circular
No. 21 as illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of Zafra. Tiro sought a petition for review and reversal of trial
courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-impairment clause under the
Constitution.
HELD:
No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition is granted.
RATIO:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is
physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is
actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the
Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56450 July 25, 1983
RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA, in his capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff
of Iloilo,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding Judge, Branch I of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT and ESTEBAN C. TAJANLANGIT, respondents.
Salvador A. Cabaluna, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Hannibal de los Reyes for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May the respondent court order that a mortgage on real property be substituted by a surety bond
and direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated on the Torrens Title since the
surety bond already secures the obligation earlier secured by the cancelled mortgage?
The petitioner comes to us stating that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of its jurisdiction in so ruling.
On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a
real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage executed on March 19, 1979 (Annex "A", Petition) between Randolph Tajanlangit and
Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other
hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00
in favor of Ganzon, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
That whereas, the MORTGAGORS are justly indebted to the MORTGAGEE in the amount of
FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by their promissory
note for said sum, in the words and figures as follows:
P40,000.00
Iloilo
City
March 19, 1979
For value received, we promise to pay RODOLFO T. GANZON, or order, at his residence in Molo,
Iloilo City, the sum of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, in two (2)
installments as follows: P20,000.00 on or before 25 May 1979; and P20,000.00 on or before 25
August 1979. This note shall not draw interest. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 15)
The mortgage covered a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1- F of the subdivision plan
Psd-274802, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T50324.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo served
personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on the private respondents. Lira also caused the
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Iloilo of a Notice of Extra
Judicial Sale of Mortgaged Property, setting the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property at
10:00 a.m. on September 28, 1979, at his office at the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City.
On September 27, 1979, a day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a
civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
petitioners with the respondent court. The action, docketed as CFI Case No. 13053, sought to
declare the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith
null and void. The private respondents asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioners from proceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the
urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial
sheriff from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979.
On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. For purposes of the
instant petition, the pertinent allegations in the amended complaint are the following: (1) On August
25, 1978, defendant, now petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of
land in favor of plaintiff, now respondent Esteban Tajanlangit. The parcel of land, subject of the sale
is described as Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo located at Molo, Iloilo City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579 with an area of 24,442 square meters, more or less; (2) The
deed of real estate mortgage which is the subject of the extra-judicial proceedings initiated by
defendant Rodolfo Ganzon executed by plaintiffs Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in
his favor was for the purpose of securing the payment of P40,000.00 which formed part of the
purchase price of Lot No. 1900; (3) Incorporated in the aforesaid deed of absolute sale was a
proviso to the effect that vendor-defendant Rodolfo Ganzon guaranteed to have the occupants of the
lot to vacate the premises within 120 days after the execution thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

The vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above- mentioned parcel of land and
that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at the execution of this deed shall
vacate the premises within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days computed from the date of the
execution of this document.
(4) The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot
up to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is illegal
since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate mortgage
does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged property.
On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint. They admitted the
veracity of the deed of absolute sale covering said Lot No. 1900 but denied that the real estate
mortgage covering Lot No. 1901 subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was executed
by Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon to secure the payment
of the balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. They maintained that the real estate mortgage
was an entirely different transaction between the Tajanlangits and Ganzon from the sale of Lot No.
1900 embodied in the absolute deed of sale of realty. They further maintained that the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings would be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For
Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to
which the petitioners interposed an Opposition.
In an order dated November 20, 1980, the respondent court granted the respondents' motion. The
order states:
This is a Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to Accept Bond or
Cash in Lieu Thereof.
It appears that defendant sold to Esteban Tajanlangit, Jr. Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of
Iloilo under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579. The document of sale provides that the vendee
who is the defendant herein, promised to exclude from the premises the occupants. To secure the
unpaid balance of P40,000.00, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage on their Lot No. 1901-4-61B-1-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-274802. Because defendant failed to clear the occupants of Lot
No. 1900, as provided for in the contract of sale, plaintiffs withheld payment of the P40,000.00. To
clear the title of Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-1 plaintiffs are willing to submit a bond in the sum of
P80,000.00 which is double the consideration of the mortgage.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, considering that plaintiffs are willing and able to pay the
P40,000.00 and considering further that defendant has not yet cleared the premises he sold to
plaintiffs of tenants, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered to cancel the mortgage lien on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324, upon showing by the plaintiffs that they have put up the
surety bond in the sum of P80,000.00. " (Annex "F", Rollo, p. 58)
On January 28, 1981, the respondents after receipt of the aforesaid order, put up a surety bond in
the amount of P80,000.00 with the Summa Insurance Corporation as surety (Annex " G ") for the
approval of the respondent court,
On February 14, 1981, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of The Order
Dated November 20, 1980, And Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond.
The respondent court in its order dated February 24, 1981, denied the aforesaid motion. The order
states:
Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond well taken and
considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not question the validity of the surety bond
itself but is anchored upon grounds that had already been passed upon by this Court in the order
dated November 20, 1980, the surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa
Insurance Corporation is hereby approved.
The defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon, through Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, Jr., is hereby ordered to
surrender to the plaintiffs, through Atty. Hannibal de los Reyes the owner's copy of TCT No. 50324,
so that the mortgage annotated therein in favor of defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon could be duly
cancelled. (Annex "I", Rollo, p. 65).

Hence, the instant petition.

On March 18, 198 1, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch I at Iloilo City.
On July 8, 1981, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
As stated earlier, the issue raised before us is whether or not the trial court may order the
cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a
promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to
secure the payment of the promissory note.
In issuing its November 20, 1980 order, the trial court before trial on the merits of the case assumed
that the real estate mortgage subject of the extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings was indeed a
security for the payment of a P40,000.00 promissory note which answered for the balance of the
purchase price of the sale between Ganzon as vendor and Esteban Tajanlangit was vendee of Lot
No. 1900. With this assumption, the trial court concluded that Rodolfo Ganzon violated his warranty
that he would clear the parcel of land of its occupants within 120 days after the execution of the deed
of absolute sale of realty. On this premise and upon motion of the private respondents, the court
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Title covering the mortgaged parcel of land and to substitute therein a surety bond approved by the
trial court.
It must be noted that petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon vehemently denied the allegation that the P
40,000.00, consideration of the promissory note which resulted in the execution of the real estate
mortgage to secure its payment was a balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. As earlier
stated, Ganzon maintained in his Answer that the real estate mortgage arose from a different
transaction. At the pre-trial, what the parties admitted were the existence and due execution of the
documents, including the absolute deed of sale of realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In
connection with the documents, the issues per the pre-trial order were "... whether or not the
documents express the true intention of the parties, and whether or not they complied with the
provisions of the document. (Rollo, p. 78) Hence, at that stage of the case, the trial court's order
dated November 20, 1980 had no factual basis.
Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were justified by
evidence in the records the same would still not be proper.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same
consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract."
(Banco de Oro v. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation v. Lichauco, 46 Phil.
460). On the effects of a mortgage we ruled inPhilippine National Bank v. Mallorca (21 SCRA 694):
xxx xxx xxx
... By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.) a
'mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or
transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge
and respect the encumbrance to which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of
the creditor 'in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit
therefrom.' (Bischoff vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690, 700) For, a recorded real estate is a right in rem, a lien
on the property whoever its owner may be. (Altavas, The Law of Mortgages in the Philippine Islands,
1924 ed., p. 2) Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists
notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first
one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. (Id.,
at p. 6) So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent
purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the
consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows the property. (Pea,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1961 ed., p. 225; emphasis supplied. See also V. Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1962 ed., p. 477)

Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as
ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable
from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage
with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This
conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage
contract.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under
the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the
P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even
before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation
from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated November 20, 1980 and
February 24, 1981 of the trial court are SET ASIDE. Our March 18, 1981 Temporary Restraining
Order is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
Vasquez, J., is on leave.

BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776

TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts

of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges
started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit
assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said
ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation
and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers
camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed
on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on
January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the
accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed
against
On

Mach

Issue:
ex

them.
16,

1982

Batas

Pambansa

Blg

195

was

passed

amending

RA

3019.

Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an

post

facto

law.

Held:

The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended

by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public
Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension
from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the
constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC
suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a
penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if
acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the
constitutional

provision

against

ex

post

facto

law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a validinformation under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon
the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word office applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended
by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his
other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that
PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings
violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk
and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial
evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts,
i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection
insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the
creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving

public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response
to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought
to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution
came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a
private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set
forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more
conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Read full text

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to
appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and
malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption
committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact
that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial
distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same
case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court
presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual
competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate
tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the
people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits
the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In
other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all

questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To
repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts
judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the
evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality
unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the
trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC

1972]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or

the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and
insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to affordimpunity. 2.)
Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people
to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances
of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt
of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational

guilt

by

being

members

of

the

CPP

regardless

of

voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP
and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the
security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliationwith full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated
prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section
6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in

open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of
membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality
of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:
(1)
(2)

Whether

or

Whether

Held:

The

not

RA1700

or

Not

court

holds

is

bill

RA1700

the

of

attainder/

violates

VALIDITY

Of

ex

freedom

the

post

facto

of

expression.

Anti-Subversion

Act

of

law.

1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for
a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct.

(A

bill

of

attainder

relatively

is

also

an

ex

post

facto

law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and
their

successors.

The

Acts

focus

is

on

the

conduct

not

person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was

acquired with the intent to further the goals of theorganization by overt acts. This is the
element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of
a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibitsacts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this
Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes

having

been

made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine

Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of
the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression andAssociation in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute
and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is
excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY

and

PRESERVATION

of

DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition
to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that theorganization
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully
and

knowingly

done

by

overt

acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141710. March 3, 2004]

EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., petitioners, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to
quash the second amended information, [1] denying the motion to defer arraignment, [2]and entering a plea
of not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead to the information, [3] are assailed in the present
petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been
going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines
confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and
sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay
Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of
Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some
were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the custody of
2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding
the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut
timber, duly indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO, it was
denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner,
Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor
Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the same
without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez,
Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound accompanied by two fully armed policemen
who then and there forcibly took possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of
Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for
robbery[4] and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829 [5] (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF
APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS) against petitioners Mayor
Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution[6] of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the
filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829, [7]and the forwarding
of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further proceedings,
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review
Action[8] of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information [9] for violation of Section 1(b) P.D.
1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25065.
A warrant of arrest[10] was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before the
1 Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash
bond on January 4, 1999,[11] as did Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29, 1999. [12]
st

On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment, [13] they having filed on even
date a Motion to Quash[14]. By Order[15] of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment to
February 26, 1999.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to defer the
arraignment as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the Ombudsman.
Without objection from petitioners counsel, the arraignment was reset [16] to April 8, 1999.
In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition [17] to petitioners Motion to
Quash.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information [18] which was filed by
the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Order [19] of April 8, 1999.

Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash [20] the amended information, to which motion the
special prosecutor filed a comment/opposition [21] on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing thereof
was due to the transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new office at the
Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit
Amended Information[22] which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled hearing on
November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled and reset [23] to December 3, 1999 upon urgent motion by
petitioners counsel upon the ground that on said date, he needed to appear before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong.
By Order[24] of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended
information, denied the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of
petitioners on January 17, 2000.
On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss [25] the second amended
information.
During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in
open court the assailed separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended
information,[26] denying the motion to defer arraignment, [27] and entering a plea of not guilty for both
accused[28] herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for
almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused to
due process,[29] they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[30] They add that the repeated and ex-parte
amendment of the information by the Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial,
which is a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8493
(The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).[31]
Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations against
them, one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the Regional Trial
Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject matter constitutes
forum shopping which is expressly prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91
directing the summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and necessarily places both of them in
double danger of conviction and punishment for the same offense. [32]
Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not
tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere executive
officials of their respective local government units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the
accusation against them is not in relation to their office. [33] Petitioners thus conclude that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.[34]
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[35] cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present case.
The cases against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss them in
light of the following observations: political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process; there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law for
the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation
could not be justified on the basis of the record. [36]
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took
only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution finding
probable cause against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months to review the
case and come up with the joint review action on October 19, 1998. On the other hand, the Office of the

Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months. Considering that the records were passed upon
by three offices, the period of preliminary investigation, which did not exceed two years, cannot be
deemed to have violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process and to a
speedy disposition of cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37] instructs:

The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination of
whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that maybe considered and
balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.
[38]

Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners

themselves contributed to the delay, thus:

With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in
finally getting the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated
that, to a certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused not
unreasonably but because of the exercise of the right of the accused to determine
whether or not they could be charged under the Information for which they have filed
Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor the grounds
for setting aside the amended Information as it now stands. (Underscoring supplied)
[39]

The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
[40]

In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7 [41] and 13[42] of R.A. 8493,
averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of the
case, they having been arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated amendments of
the information.
The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of motions that the
arraignment was deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the
pendency of petitioners motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and pretrial) provided under Section 2 of said law.

Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial
if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The

period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause
justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated
amendments of the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be
amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time before an accused enters his plea. [43]
In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed
forum shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional Requisites for
Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple
Filing of Petitions and Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was
also filed before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the Office of
the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, since the Information in
Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information
before the regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if there is any case to be
dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one before the Regional trial Court, as it was the
second action filed.[44]
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were
indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for instead
of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
(obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that they are not tasked with the
enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 the offense subject of the investigation which
petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners argument
that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as
long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, [45] the
Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public
officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees in relation to their office.[46](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of Grade 27 under the Local Government Code of
1991[47], committed the offense charged in relation to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario[48], this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, in
that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office. [49]
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,[50] held that although public office is not
an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, [51]
the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,[52] held that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person, whether a
public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a

member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of trying to restore local
public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely within the meaning of an offense committed in
relation to the [accuseds] public office.[53]
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to
have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have been
committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general
and operational control and supervision over the local police forces [54], used her influence, authority and
office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber
which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits[55] signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the
letter of petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:

To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan and

PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;
PNP Members of Taytay
Municipal Police Office,
Taytay Palawan
Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion
Taytay, Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul
the flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal Government of
Taytay and to turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict compliance.
[56]

Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution [57] of the
Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the Joint Review
Action[58] of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the information[59]. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal
mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct
the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR.
of Violation of Section 1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:
That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality
of Taytay, Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both
public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang
of the same municipality, respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office
and taking advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring with each other enter
the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion,
Taytay, Palawan and while inside with force, intimidation and against the will of the
one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully,

feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet
of assorted dimensions of ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team
of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNP-TINIGUIBAN COMMAND and
PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while waiting
for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and brought the
same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the
primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in
the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended. (Italics supplied)
[60]

There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of
January 17, 2000, denying petitioners motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not
guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), is a ruling by the United States Supreme
Court which held that a municipal loyalty oath which required an oath and affidavit about one's
beliefs and actions for the previous five years and which was enacted more than five years previous
is not an ex post facto law nor a bill of attainder.
In 1941, the California State Legislature amended the charter of the city of Los Angeles so that no
person could obtain or retain public employment with the city if they advocated the violent overthrow
of either the state or federal government, belonged to any organization that did so advocate, or had
advocated or been a member of an organization which advocated such action in the last five years.
In 1948, the city of Los Angeles passed local ordinance No, 94,004, which required all employees to
take the loyalty oath.
Fifteen employees with the Los Angeles Board of Public Works refused to execute the required
affidavit. At an administrative hearing on January 6, 1949, all 15 individuals were fired. They sued for
back pay and reinstatement in their jobs, claiming that the oath and the affidavit they were required
to execute constituted a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. The District Court of Appeals
denied relief.
The petitioners then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Decision[edit]
Majority opinion[edit]

Associate Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the opinion for the majority.

Clark discussed the oath and the affidavit separately. In three sentences, Clark held that since past
actions and beliefs may impugn present fitness for duty, the affidavit was justified. [1] The question for
the oath (which reached back five years into the past) was its constitutionality, and here Clark relied
heavily on United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), to answer that the oath was valid.[2]
Since the charter change had occurred seven years before, and the oath reached back only five
years, the oath was also not a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.[3] Clark distinguished United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), which was not a general law establishing qualifications for
office but which specifically named certain individuals and required their separation from government
service.[4]
Petitioners had argued that the charter amendment required scienter (knowledge that the
organizations they belonged to did, in fact, advocate the violent overthrow of the government or a
communist political philosophy). Clark assumed that the city would not implement the law in such a
way as to punish those individuals who lacked scienter, and assumed that scienter was implicit in
the ordinance.[4]
The decision of the District Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Frankfurter's dissent[edit]

Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part.

Frankfurter noted in his dissent that the majority had repeatedly referred to public employment as a
privilege, which to his mind invoked the "doctrine of privilege." [5] Invoking this doctrine, he concluded
"does not meet the problem."[6]
But Frankfurter was unable to agree that the Los Angeles ordinanace implied scientier. He wrote: "To
find scienter implied in a criminal statute is the obvious way of reading such a statute, for guilty
knowledge is the normal ingredient of criminal responsibility. The ordinance before us exacts an oath
as a condition of employment; it does not define a crime. It is certainly not open to this Court to
rewrite the oath required by Los Angeles of its employees..."[7] The lack of an explicit requirement for
scienter in the law, he concluded, asked the employees "to swear to something they cannot be
expected to know. Such a demand ... can no more be justified than the inquiry into belief which [was]
invalid inAmerican Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)."[8]
Frankfurter would have remanded the case back to the state court with instructions that the
petitioners be allowed to take the oath under the scienter requirement imposed by the Court.
Burton's dissent[edit]

Associate Justice Harold Hitz Burton dissented in part. Under the Court's decisions in United States
v. Lovett, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867),
Burton concluded, the oath as currently framed was an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder.[9]
However, Burton would have affirmed the lower court concerning the judgment regarding the two

employees who had refused to sign the affidavit. The affidavit merely represented an assertion of
true facts, Burton said, and as such could be required of the employees. [10]
Douglas' dissent[edit]

Associate Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Associate Justice Hugo Black.
Douglas concluded that the entire case was governed by the decisions in Ex parte Garland and
Cummings v. Missouri.[11] A bill of attainder as defined in these cases inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial, and may be inflicted against an individual or a class (contrary to the majority's
conclusion that it applies only to an individual).[12] That Garlandand Cummings involved professionals
rather than laborers and that Garland and Cummings involved vague accusations of misconduct
rather than the single specific accusation in Garner was irrelevant, Douglas said.[13] Since the Los
Angeles ordinance permitted no hearing, it was a bill of attainder and not constitutionally valid. [14]
Douglas did not reach the issue of whether the ordinance was an ex post facto law.[15]
Black's dissent[edit]

Justice Black further dissented from the majority by making two additional points. First, he argued
that the majority mischaracterized the decision in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors. The Maryland
law in Gerende was limited to actual acts of violence or overthrow, while the Los Angeles ordinance
was not.[16] Second, Black believed that the majority's decision in Garner significantly weakened the
Court's holdings in Ex parte Garland, Cummings v. Missouri, and United States v. Lovett.[17]
The arrest of defendant for failure, owing to insolvency, to pay past and present
support was declared invalid.

The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contemptdoes not refer to a

judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights
of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined as a judgment "which
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or
delivery of real or personal property.

Facts:
CFI of Negros Occidental rendered a decision ordering defendant Vicente S. Martin, Sr. to pay
past and future support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
latter court affirmed said decision.

A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the
Sheriff's return of service, dated September 21, 1964, stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless,

and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this
province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached
is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental,
where debtor legally resides."

In 1964, counsel for plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, be
adjudged guilty of contempt of court.

In the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, CFI of Negros Occidentalordered the arrest
and imprisonment of defendant Martin.
Issue:
Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contemptof court for
failure to satisfy the judgment were legal
Held:

The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of
court for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerandos:

(1) The writ of execution was a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was
directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could
not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ.

(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of 9
and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the
Constitution.

(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which
is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act
than thepayment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property."

According to Moran:

Generally, any order or judgment of a court finally disposing of an actionshould be

enforced by ordinary execution proceedings, except special judgments which should be
executed by contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 39, sec. 9," citing Caluag, et
al. vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol.
3, p. 320.)

People v. Lagman and Sosa, 66 Phil. 13, July 13,

1938Avancea, C.J.Facts:
The appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with aviolation of Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1,
known as the National Defense Lawfor being Filipinos
having been reached the age 20 years in 1936,
willfully andunlawfully refused to register in the military
service between the 1
st

and 7
th

of April of the said year, notwithstanding the fact that they

had been required to do so. TheCourt of First Instance of
Bataan sentenced each of the appellants one month and
oneday of imprisonment with the cost.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Constitutionality of said law was upheld. The appellants
do not deny the facts, but they alleged in defense that
they have notregistered in the military service because
Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has amother and a
brother to support and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to
support,has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed.Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution,
The defense of the State is aprime duty of government,

and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may

berequired by law to render personal military or civil
service. The National DefenseLaw, insofar as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against theconstitution, but in the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of theGovernment to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army, andto leave the organization of an army to the will of
the citizens would be to make thisduty of the Government
excusable should there would be no suffi cient men
whovolunteer to enlist therein.It was also held by the court that
the right of the Government to require compulsorymilitary
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal withits duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen.Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts,
the court said that, without violatingthe Constitution, a
person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his
will,against his pecuniary interests, and even against his
religious or political convictions,to take place in the ranks of
the army of his country, and risk the chance of beingshot
down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it was also said that this is
not deprivationof property without due process of the law
since in its just sense, there is no right of property to an
office or employment. These justify that compulsory military
service isthe defense of the State, whether actual or
whether in preparation to make it moreeffective, in case of
need. The circumstance that the appellants have
dependent families to support does notexcuse them from
their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance
Boardbecause, if such circumstance exists, they can ask
for deferment in complying withtheir duty and, at all
events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance toattend to these family responsibilities
U.S. Supreme Court

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897)

Robertson v. Baldwin
No. 334
Argued December 15, 1896
Decided January 25, 1897
165 U.S. 275
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
Section 4598 of the Revised Statutes is not unconstitutional by reason of its
authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants to apprehend deserting seamen and
deliver them up to the master of their vessel.
The judicial power of the United States is defined by the Constitution, and does not
prevent Congress from authorizing state officers to take affidavits, to arrest and
commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens,
and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial
power, rather than a part of it.
Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts
contained in their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment
forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the
provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to such contracts.
The contract of a sailor has always been treated as an exceptional one, and involving
to a certain extent the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract.
This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of
California, rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon
the petition of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson.
The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of
their liberty by Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the
county jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a
United States commissioner, committing them for trial upon a charge of disobedience
of the lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine Arago; that such
commitment
Page 165 U. S. 276
was made without reasonable or probable cause, in this, that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, petitioners were held on board the Arago against
their will and by force, having been theretofore placed on board said vessel by the
Marshal for the District of Oregon, under the provisions of Rev.St. 4596,
subdivision 1, and 4598, 4599, the master claiming the right to hold petitioners by
virtue of these acts; that 4598 and 4599 are unconstitutional and in violation of
Section 1 of Article III of, and of the Fifth Amendment to, the Constitution; that

4598 was also repealed by Congress on June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 262, and that the first
subdivision of 4596 is in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment in that it compels
involuntary servitude.
The record was somewhat meager, but it sufficiently appeared that the petitioners had
shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton, in the State of
Washington, thence to Valparaiso, and thence to such other foreign ports as the master
might direct, and return to a port of discharge in the United States; that they had each
signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of the
voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they left the vessel at
Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the provisions
of Rev.Stat. 4596 to 4599, taken before a justice of the peace, and by him
committed to jail until the Arago was ready for sea (some sixteen days), when they
were taken from the jail by the marshal, and placed on board the Aragoagainst their
will; that they refused to "turn to" in obedience to the orders of the master, were
arrested at San Francisco, charged with refusing to work in violation of Rev.Stat.
4596, were subsequently examined before a commissioner of the circuit court, and by
him held to answer such charge before the District Court for the Northern District of
California.
Shortly thereafter they sued out this writ of habeas corpus, which, upon a hearing
before the district court, was dismissed, and an order made remanding the prisoners to
the custody of the marshal.
Page 165 U. S. 277
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Upon what ground the court below dismissed the writ and remanded the petitioners
does not appear, but the record raises two questions of some importance: first, as to
the constitutionality of Rev.Stat. 4598, 4599, insofar as they confer jurisdiction
upon justices of the peace to apprehend deserting seamen and return them to their
vessel; second, as to the conflict of the same sections, and also 4596, with the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery and involuntary
servitude.
Section 4598, which was taken from 7 of the Act of July 20, 1790, reads as follows:
"SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall
at any port or place desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel without leave of
the master or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for
any justice of the peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the master, to
issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter and bring him before such justice, and if
it then appears that he has signed a contract within the intent and meaning of this title,
and that the voyage agreed for is not finished, or altered, or the contract otherwise
dissolved, and that such seaman has deserted the vessel or absented himself without
leave, the justice shall commit him to the house of correction or common jail of the

city, town, or place, to remain there until the vessel shall be ready to proceed on her
voyage, or till the master shall require his discharge, and then to be delivered to the
master, he paying all the cost of such commitment, and deducting the same out of the
wages due to such seaman. "
Page 165 U. S. 278
Section 4599, which was taken for 53 of the Shipping Commissioners' Act of June
7, 1872, authorizes the apprehension of deserting seamen, with or without the
assistance of the local public officers or constables and without a warrant, and their
conveyance before any court of justice or magistrate of the state, to be dealt with
according to law.
Section 4596, which is also taken from the same act, provides punishment by
imprisonment for desertion, refusal to join the vessel, or absence without leave.
1. The first proposition, that Congress has no authority under the Constitution to vest
judicial power in the courts or judicial officers of the several states, originated in an
observation of Mr. Justice Story, inMartin v. Hunter's Lessees, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S.
330, to the effect that "Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the
United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself." This was repeated
in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 18 U. S. 27, and the same general doctrine has
received the approval of the courts of several of the states. United States v. Lathrop,
17 Johns. 4; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; United States v. Campbell 6 Hall's Law Jour.
113. These were all actions for penalties, however, wherein the courts held to the
familiar doctrine that the courts of one sovereignty will not enforce the penal laws of
another. Huntington v. Attrill,146 U. S. 657, 146 U. S. 672. In Commonwealth v.
Feely, 1 Va.Cases 325, it was held by the General Court of Virginia, in 1813, that the
state courts could not take jurisdiction of an indictment for a crime committed against
an act of Congress.
In Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300, it was also held that Congress had no power to
confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a state to naturalize aliens, although, if such
power be recognized by the legislature of a state, it may be exercised by the courts of
such state of competent jurisdiction.
In State v. Rutter, 12 Niles' Register 115, 231, it was held in 1817 by Judges Bland and
Hanson of Maryland that Congress had no power to authorize justices of the peace to
issue warrants for the apprehension of offenders against the laws of
Page 165 U. S. 279
the United States. A directly contrary view, however, was taken by Judge Cheves of
South Carolina in Ex Parte Rhodes, 12 Niles' Register 264.
The general principle announced by these cases is derived from the third article of the
Constitution, the first section of which declares that
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,"

the judges of which courts "shall hold their offices during good behavior," etc., and,
by the second section,
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states;
between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states;
between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and
between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."
The better opinion is that the second section was intended as a constitutional
definition of the judicial power, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 2 U. S. 475, which
the Constitution intended to confine to courts created by Congress -- in other words,
that such power extends only to the trial and determination of "cases" in courts of
record, and that Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the
several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of
record -- such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for
trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to
perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power,
rather than a part of the judicial power itself. This was the view taken by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in Ex Parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156, wherein the authority of justices of
the peace and other such officers to arrest and commit for a violation of the criminal
law of the United States
Page 165 U. S. 280
was held to be no part of the judicial power within the third article of the Constitution.
And in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, it was said that, as to the
authority conferred on state magistrates to arrest fugitive slaves and deliver them to
their owners under the Act of February 12, 1793, while a difference of opinion existed
and might still exist upon this point in different states, whether state magistrates were
bound to act under it, no doubt was entertained by this Court that state magistrates
might, if they chose, exercise the authority, unless prohibited by state legislation. See
also Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103.
We think the power of justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and deliver
them on board their vessel is not within the definition of the "judicial power" as
defined by the Constitution, and may be lawfully conferred upon state officers. That
the authority is a most convenient one to entrust to such officers cannot be denied, as
seamen frequently leave their vessels in small places, where there are no federal
judicial officers and where a justice of the peace may usually be found with authority
to issue warrants under the state laws.
2. The question whether sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment, forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, depends upon the

construction to be given to the term "involuntary servitude." Does the epithet

"involuntary" attach to the word "servitude" continuously, and make illegal any
service which becomes involuntary at any time during its existence, or does it attach
only at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because
unlawfully entered into? If the former be the true construction, then no one, not even a
soldier, sailor, or apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even for a day, and the soldier
may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the sailor abandon his ship at any
intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea, provided only he can find
means of escaping to another vessel. If the latter, then an individual may, for a
valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite
time and for a recognized purpose, and subordinate his going and coming to the will
of
Page 165 U. S. 281
another during the continuance of the contract; not that all such contracts would be
lawful, but that a servitude which was knowingly and willingly entered into could not
be termed "involuntary." Thus, if one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another
in a particular capacity during his life, and never to leave his estate without his
consent, the contract might not be enforceable for the want of a legal remedy, or might
be void upon grounds of public policy; but the servitude could not be properly termed
"involuntary." Such agreement for a limited personal servitude at one time were very
common in England, and by statute of June 17, 1823, 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, 3, it was
enacted that if any servant in husbandry or any artificer, calico printer, handcraftsman,
miner, collier, keelman, pitman, glassman, potter, laborer or other person should
contract to serve another for a definite time and should desert such service during the
term of the contract, he was made liable to a criminal punishment. The breach of a
contract for personal service has not, however, been recognized in this country as
involving a liability to criminal punishment, except in the cases of soldiers, sailors,
and possibly some others; nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.
But we are also of opinion that even if the contract of a seaman could be considered
within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of
involuntary servitude. The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments
to the Constitution, commonly known as the "Bill of Rights," were not intended to lay
down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties
and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had,
from time immemorial, been subject to certain well recognized exceptions arising
from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental
law, there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be
recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of
the press (Art. I) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent
articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right
of the people

Page 165 U. S. 282

to keep and bear arms (Art. II) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy (Art.
V) does not prevent a second trial if upon the first trial the jury failed to agree or if the
verdict was set aside upon the defendant's motion, United States v. Ball,163 U. S. 662,
163 U. S. 627, nor does the provision of the same article that no one shall be a witness
against himself impair his obligation to testify if a prosecution against him be barred
by the lapse of time, a pardon, or by statutory enactment, Brown v. Walker,161 U. S.
591, and cases cited. Nor does the provision that an accused person shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him prevent the admission of dying
declarations, or the depositions of witnesses who have died since the former trial.
The prohibition of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment is well known to have been
adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in certain states of the
Union since the foundation of the government, while the addition of the words
"involuntary servitude" were said, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have
been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade,
the practical operation of which might have been a revival of the institution of slavery
under a different and less offensive name. It is clear, however, that the amendment
was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions
of service which have always been treated as exceptional, such as military and naval
enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their
minor children or wards. The amendment, however, makes no distinction between a
public and a private service. To say that persons engaged in a public service are not
within the amendment is to admit that there are exceptions to its general language, and
the further question is at once presented, where shall the line be drawn? We know of
no better answer to make than to say that services which have from time immemorial
been treated as exceptional shall not be regarded as within its purview.
From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor
Page 165 U. S. 283
has been treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the
surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract. Indeed the business of
navigation could scarcely be carried on without some guaranty, beyond the ordinary
civil remedies upon contract, that the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical
moment or leave her at some place where seamen are impossible to be obtained -- as
Molloy forcibly expresses it, "to rot in her neglected brine." Such desertion might
involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking another crew, an
abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the ship itself. Hence,
the laws of nearly all maritime nations have made provision for securing the personal
attendance of the crew on board, and for their criminal punishment for desertion, or
absence without leave, during the life of the shipping articles.

Even by the maritime law of the ancient Rhodians, which is supposed to antedate the
birth of Christ by about 900 years, according to Pardessus (Lois Mar. vol. 1, page
250), if the master or the sailors absented themselves by night, and the vessel were
lost or damaged, they were bound to respond in the amount of the loss.
In the compilation of maritime laws known as the "Consulate of the Sea," it was also
provided that a sailor should not go ashore without permission, upon the penalty of
being obliged to pay any damage occasioned by his absence, and, in default of his
being able to respond, of being thrust in prison until he had paid all such damage.
Chapters 121, 124; 2 Pardessus 146-148.
A like provision is found in the Rules of Oleron, promulgated in the reign of Henry
III., by which, Art. V, the seamen were forbidden to leave the ship without the master's
consent. "If they do, and by that means she happens to be lost or damnified, they shall
be answerable for the damage." 1 Pet.Ad. xi. A similar prohibition is found in article
17 of the Laws of Wisbuy. 1 Pet.Ad. lxxiii.
The laws of the towns belonging to the Hanseatic League, first enacted and
promulgated in 1597, were still more explicit and severe. No seaman might go ashore
without the consent
Page 165 U. S. 284
of the master or other officer, and if he remained longer than the time allowed, was
condemned to pay a fine or suffer an imprisonment (Arts. 22 and 23); and, by article
forty, if a seaman went ashore without leave, and the ship happened to receive any
damage, "he shall be kept in prison upon bread and water for one year," and if any
seaman died or perished for the want of the assistance of the absent seaman, the latter
was subject to corporal punishment, and, by article forty-three,
"if an officer or seaman quits a ship and conceals himself, if afterwards he is
apprehended, he shall be delivered up to justice to be punished; he shall be
stigmatized in the face with the first letter of the name of the town to which he
belongs."
1 Pet.Ad. cii.
By the Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV., which was in existence at the time the
Constitution was adopted (Title Third, Art. III),
"if a seaman leaves a master without a discharge in writing before the voyage is
begun, he may be taken up and imprisoned wherever he can be found, and compelled
to restore what he has received, and serve out the time for which he had engaged
himself for nothing, and if he leaves the ship after the voyage is begun, he may be
punished corporally."
Art. V:
"After the ship is laded, the seamen shall not go ashore without leave from the master,
under pain of five livres for the first fault, and may be punished corporally if they
commit a second."

The present Commercial Code of France, however, makes no express provision upon
the subject; but by the general mercantile law of Germany, Art. 532,
"the master can cause any seaman, who, after having been engaged, neglects to enter
upon or continue to do his duties, to be forcibly compelled to perform the same."
By the Dutch Code, Art. 402,
"the master or his representative can call in the public force against those who refuse
to come on board, who absent themselves from the ship without leave and refuse to
perform to the end of the service for which they were engaged."
Nearly all of the ancient commercial codes either make provision for payment of
damages by seamen who absent
Page 165 U. S. 285
themselves from their ships without leave or for their imprisonment or forcible
conveyance on board. Some of the modern commercial codes of Europe and South
America make similar provisions. Argentine Code, Art. 1154. Others, including the
French and Spanish Codes, are silent upon the subject.
Turning now to the country from which we have inherited most immediately our
maritime laws and customs, we find that Malynes, the earliest English writer upon the
law merchant, who wrote in 1622, says in his Lex Mercatoria (vol. I, c. 23) that
"mariners in a strange port should not leave the ship without the master's license, or
fastening her with four ropes, or else the loss falls upon them. . . . In a strange country,
the one-half of the company at least, ought to remain on shipboard, and the rest who
go on land should keep sobriety and abstain from suspected places, or else should be
punished in body and purse; like as he who absents himself when the ship is ready to
sail. Yea, if he give out himself worthier than he is in his calling, he shall lose his hire
-- half to the admiral and the other half to the master."
Molloy, one of the most satisfactory of early English writers upon the subject, states
that if seamen depart from a ship without leave or license of the master and any
disaster happens, they must answer, quoting Art. V of the Rules of Oleron in support
of his proposition.
There appears to have been no legislation directly upon the subject until 1729, when
the Act of 2 Geo. II. c. 36, was enacted "for the better regulation and government of
seamen in the merchants' service." This act not only provided for the forfeiture of
wages in case of desertion, but for the apprehension of seamen deserting or absenting
themselves, upon warrants to be issued by justices of the peace, and, in case of their
refusal to proceed upon the voyage, for their committal to the house of correction at
hard labor. Indeed, this seems to have furnished a model upon which the act of
Congress of July 20, 1790 (1 Stat. 131), for the government and regulation of seamen
in the merchants' service, was constructed. The provisions of this act were
substantially repeated by the
Page 165 U. S. 286

Act of 1791 (31 Geo. III, c. 39), and were subsequently added to and amended by the
acts of 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c.19, and 7 & 8 Vict., c. 112.
The modern law of England is full and explicit upon the duties and responsibilities of
seamen. By Merchants' Shipping Act 1854, 17 & 18 Victoria, c. 104, section 243, a
seaman guilty of desertion might be summarily punished by imprisonment, by
forfeiture of his clothes and effects, and all or any part of his wages. Similar
punishment was meted out to him for neglecting or refusing to join his ship or to
proceed to sea, or for absence without leave at any time. By section 246,
"whenever at the commencement or during the progress of any voyage, any seaman or
apprentice neglects or refuses to join, or deserts from or refuses to proceed to sea in
any ship in which he is duly engaged to serve,"
the master was authorized to call upon the police officers or constables to apprehend
him without warrant and take him before a magistrate who, by article 247, was
authorized to order him to be conveyed on board for the purpose of proceeding on the
voyage.
The provision for imprisonment for desertion seems to have been repealed by the
Merchants' Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act of 1880, but the tenth section
of that act retained the provision authorizing the master to call upon the police officers
or constables to convey deserting seamen on board their vessels.
This act, however, appears to have been found too lenient, since, in 1894, the whole
subject was reconsidered and covered in the new Merchants' Shipping Act, 57 & 58
Vict., c. 60, of 748 sections, section 221 of which provides not only for the forfeiture
of wages in case of desertion, but for imprisonment with or without hard labor, except
in cases arising in the United Kingdom. The provision for the arrest of the deserting
seaman and his conveyance on board the ship is, however, retained both within and
without the kingdom. 222, 223. This is believed to be the latest legislation on the
subject in England.
The earliest American legislation which we have been able
Page 165 U. S. 287
to find is an act of the Colonial General Court of Massachusetts, passed about 1668,
wherein it was enacted that any mariner who departs and leaves a voyage upon which
he has entered shall forfeit all his wages and shall be further punished by
imprisonment or otherwise, as the case may be circumstanced, and if he shall have
received any considerable part of his wages and shall run away, he shall be pursued as
a disobedient runaway servant. Mass.Col.Laws (ed. 1889) 251, 256.
The provision of Rev.Stat. 4598, under which these proceedings were taken, was
first enacted by Congress in 1790. 1 Stat. 131, 7. This act provided for the
apprehension of deserters and their delivery on board the vessel, but apparently made
no provision for imprisonment as a punishment for desertion; but by the Shipping
Commissioners' Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 243, 51, now incorporated into the Revised
Statutes as section 4596, the court is authorized to add to forfeiture of wages for

desertion imprisonment for a period of not more than three months, and for absence
without leave, imprisonment for not more than one month. In this act and the
amendments thereto, very careful provisions are made for the protection of seamen
against the frauds and cruelty of masters, the devices of boarding house keepers, and,
as far as possible, against the consequences of their own ignorance and improvidence.
At the same time, discipline is more stringently enforced by additional punishments
for desertion, absence without leave, disobedience, insubordination, and barratry.
Indeed, seamen are treated by Congress, as well as by the Parliament of Great Britain,
as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited
to ordinary adults, and as needing the protection of the law in the same sense in which
minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians.
Quemadmodum pater in filios, magister in discipulos, dominus in servos vel
familiares. The ancient characterization of seamen as "wards of admiralty" is even
more accurate now than it was formerly.
In the face of this legislation upon the subject of desertion and absence without leave,
which was in force in this country
Page 165 U. S. 288
for more than sixty years before the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, and similar
legislation abroad from time immemorial, it cannot be open to doubt that the provision
against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to their contracts.
The judgment of the court below is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
The appellants shipped on the American barkentine Arago, having previously signed
articles whereby they undertook to perform the duties of seamen during a voyage of
that vessel from San Francisco (quoting from the record)
"to Knappton, State of Washington, and thence to Valparaiso, and thence to such other
foreign ports as the master may direct, and return to a port of discharge in the United
States."
The vessel was engaged in a purely private business.
As stated in the opinion of the Court, the appellants left the vessel at Astoria, Oregon,
without the consent of the master, having become dissatisfied with their employment.
The grounds of such dissatisfaction are not stated.
Upon the application of the master, a justice of the peace at Astoria, Oregon,
proceeding under sections 4596 to 4599 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
issued a warrant for the arrest of the appellants. They were seized, somewhat as
runaway slaves were in the days of slavery, and committed to jail without bail, "until
the Arago was ready for sea." After remaining in jail some sixteen days, they were
taken by the marshal and placed on board the Arago against their will. While on
board, they refused to "turn to" or to work in obedience to the orders of the master.

Upon the arrival of the barkentine at San Francisco, they were arrested for having
refused to work on the vessel and committed for trial upon that charge.
If the placing of the appellants on board the Arago at Astoria against their will was
illegal, then their refusal to work while thus forcibly held on the vessel could not be a
criminal offense, and their detention and subsequent arrest
Page 165 U. S. 289
for refusing to work while the vessel was going from Astoria to San Francisco were
without authority of law. The question, therefore, is whether the appellants, having left
the vessel at Astoria, no matter for what cause, could lawfully be required, against
their will, to return to it and to render personal services for the master.
The government justifies the proceedings taken against the appellants at Astoria by
sections 4596, 4598, and 4599 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
By section 4596 it is provided:
"SEC. 4596. Whenever any seaman who has been lawfully engaged, or any apprentice
to the sea service, commits any of the following offenses, he shall be punishable as
follows: First. For desertion, by imprisonment for not more than three months, and by
forfeiture of all or any part of the clothes or effects he leaves on board, and of all or
any part of the wages or emoluments which he has then earned. Second. For
neglecting and refusing, without reasonable cause, to join his vessel, or to proceed to
sea in his vessel, or for absence without leave at any time within twenty-four hours of
the vessel's sailing from any port, either at the commencement or during the progress
of any voyage, or for absence at any time without leave and without sufficient reason
from his vessel, or from his duty, not amounting to desertion, or not treated as such by
the master, by imprisonment for not more than one month, and also, at the discretion
of the court, by forfeiture of his wages, of not more than two days' pay, and, for every
twenty-four hours of absence, either a sum not exceeding six days' pay, or any
expenses which have been properly incurred in hiring a substitute. Third. For quitting
the vessel without leave after her arrival at her port of delivery, and before she is
placed in security, by forfeiture out of his wages of not more than one month's pay.
Fourth. For willful disobedience to any lawful command, by imprisonment for not
more than two months, and also at the discretion of the court, by forfeiture out of his
wages of not more than four days' pay. Fifth. For continued willful disobedience to
lawful commands, or continued willful neglect of duty, by imprisonment
Page 165 U. S. 290
for not more than six months, and also, at the discretion of the court, by forfeiture, for
every twenty-four hours' continuance of such disobedience or neglect, of either a sum
not more than twelve days' pay or sufficient to defray any expenses which have been
properly incurred in hiring a substitute. Sixth. For assaulting any master or mate, by
imprisonment for not more than two years. Seventh. For combining with any others of
the crew to disobey lawful commands, or to neglect duty, or to impede navigation of

the vessel, or the progress of the voyage, by imprisonment for not more than twelve
months. . . ."
These provisions are brought forward from the Act of June 7, 1872, c. 322, 51, 17
Stat. 273.
Section 4598 provides:
"SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall
at any port or place desert or shall absent himself from such vessel without leave of
the master or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for
any justice of the peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the master, to
issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter and bring him before such justice, and if
it then appears that he has signed a contract within the intent and meaning of this title,
and that the voyage agreed for is not finished or altered, or the contract otherwise
dissolved, and that such seaman has deserted the vessel or absented himself without
leave, the justice shall commit him to the house of correction or common jail of the
city, town, or place, to remain there until the vessel shall be ready to proceed on her
voyage or till the master shall require his discharge, and then to be delivered to the
master, he paying all the cost of such commitment and deducting the same out of the
wages due to such seaman."
This section is the same as section 7 of the Act of July 20, 1790, c. 29, 1 Stat. 134..
By section 4599 -- which is substantially the same as section 53 of the above Act of
June 7, 1872 -- it is provided:
"SEC. 4599. Whenever, either at the commencement of or during any voyage, any
seaman or apprentice neglects or
Page 165 U. S. 291
refuses to join, or deserts from or refuses to proceed to sea in, any vessel in which he
is duly engaged to serve, or is found otherwise absenting himself therefrom without
leave, the master or any mate, or the owner or consignee, or shipping commissioner
may, in any place in the United States, with or without the assistance of the local
public officers or constables, who are hereby directed to give their assistance if
required, and also at any place out of the United States if and so far as the laws in
force at such place will permit, apprehend him without first procuring a warrant, and
may thereupon in any case, and shall in case he so requires and it is practicable,
convey him before any court of justice or magistrate of any state, city, town, or county
within the United States authorized to take cognizance of offenses of like degree and
kind, to be dealt with according to the provisions of law governing such cases, and
may, for the purpose of conveying him before such court or magistrate, detain him in
custody for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours, or may, if he does not so
require, or if there is no such court at or near the place, at once convey him on board.
If such apprehension appears to the court or magistrate before whom the case is
brought to have been made on improper or on insufficient grounds, the master, mate,
consignee, or shipping commissioner who makes the same or causes the same to be

made shall be liable to a penalty of not more than one hundred dollars, but such
penalty, if inflicted, shall be a bar to any action for false imprisonment."
The decision just made proceeds upon the broad ground that one who voluntarily
engages to serve upon a private vessel in the capacity of a seaman for a given term,
but who, without the consent of the master, leaves the vessel when in port before the
stipulated term is ended and refuses to return to it, may be arrested and held in
custody until the vessel is ready to proceed on its voyage, and then delivered against
his will, and if need be by actual force, on the vessel to the master.
The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States declares that
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party
Page 165 U. S. 292
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place
subject to their jurisdiction."
Slavery exists wherever the law recognizes a right of property in a human being, but
slavery cannot exist in any form within the United States. The Thirteenth Amendment
uprooted slavery as it once existed in this country, and destroyed all of its badges and
incidents. It established freedom for all. "By its own unaided force and effect, it
abolished slavery and established freedom." The amendment, this Court has also said,
"is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery or
involuntary servitude, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in any part of the United States."
Civil Rights Cases,109 U. S. 1, 109 U. S. 20.
As to involuntary servitude, it may exist in the United States, but it can only exist
lawfully as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted.
Such is the plain reading of the Constitution. A condition of enforced service, even for
a limited period, in the private business of another is a condition of involuntary
servitude.
If it be said that government may make it a criminal offense, punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, for anyone to violate his private contract voluntarily made, or
to refuse without sufficient reason to perform it -- a proposition which cannot, I think,
be sustained at this day, in this land of freedom -- it would by no means follow that
government could, by force applied in advance of due conviction of some crime,
compel a freeman to render personal services in respect of the private business of
another. The placing of a person, by force, on a vessel about to sail is putting him in a
condition of involuntary servitude if the purpose is to compel him against his will to
give his personal services in the private business in which that vessel is engaged. The
personal liberty of individuals, it has been well said,
"consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law."

1 Bl., c. 1, p. 134.
Page 165 U. S. 293
Can the decision of the Court be sustained under the clause of the Constitution
granting power to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states? That power cannot be exerted except with due regard to other
provisions of the Constitution, particularly those embodying the fundamental
guaranties of life, liberty, and property. While Congress may enact regulations for the
conduct of commerce with foreign nations and among the states, and may perhaps
prescribe punishment for the violation of such regulations, it may not, in so doing,
ignore other clauses of the Constitution. For instance, a regulation of commerce
cannot be sustained which, in disregard of the express injunctions of the Constitution,
imposes a cruel and unusual punishment for its violation, or compels a person to
testify in a criminal case against himself, or authorizes him to be put twice in jeopardy
of life or limb, or denies to the accused the privilege of being confronted with the
witnesses against him or of being informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. And it is equally clear that no regulation of commerce established by
Congress can stand if its necessary operation be either to establish slavery or to create
a condition of involuntary servitude forbidden by the Constitution.
It is said that the statute in question is sanctioned by long usage among the nations of
the earth, as well as by the above Act of July 20, 1790.
In considering the antiquity of regulations that restrain the personal freedom of
seamen, the Court refers to the laws of the ancient Rhodians, which are supposed to
have antedated the Christian era. But those laws, whatever they may have been, were
enacted at a time when no account was taken of a man as man, when human life and
human liberty were regarded as of little value, and when the powers of government
were employed to gratify the ambition and the pleasures of despotic rulers, rather than
promote the welfare of the people.
Attention has been called by the Court to the laws enacted by the towns of the
Hanseatic League four hundred years ago, by one of which a seaman who went ashore
without leave could, in certain contingencies, be kept in prison "upon bread
Page 165 U. S. 294
and water for one year," and by another of which an officer or seaman who quit his
ship and concealed himself could be apprehended and "stigmatized in the face with
the first letter of the name of the town to which he belongs." Why the reference to
these enactments of ancient times, enforced by or under governments possessing
arbitrary power inconsistent with a state of freedom? Does anyone suppose that a
regulation of commerce authorizing seamen who quit their ship, without leave, to be
imprisoned "upon bread and water for one year," or which required them to be
"stigmatized in the face" with the letter of the town or state to which they belonged,
would now receive the sanction of any court in the United States?

Reference has also been made to an act of the Colonial General Court of
Massachusetts, passed in 1647, declaring that a seaman who left his vessel before its
voyage was ended might be "pursued as a runaway servant." But the act referred to
was passed when slavery was tolerated in Massachusetts, with the assent of the
government of Great Britain. It antedated the famous declaration of rights,
promulgated in 1780, in which Massachusetts declared, among other things, that
"all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property -- in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."
The effect of that declaration was well illustrated in Parsons v. Track, 7 Gray 473.
That case involved the validity of a contract made in a foreign country in 1840 by an
adult inhabitant thereof with a citizen of the United States, "to serve him, his
executors and assigns," for the term of five years,
"during all of which term the said servant her said master, his executors or assigns,
faithfully shall serve, and that honestly and obediently in all things, as a good and
dutiful servant ought to do."
It was sought to enforce this contract in Massachusetts. After carefully examining the
provisions of the contract, the court said:
"As to the nature, then, of the service to be performed, the place where and the person
Page 165 U. S. 295
to whom it is to be rendered, and the compensation to be paid, the contract is
uncertain and indefinite -- indefinite and uncertain, not from any infirmity in the
language of the parties, but in its substance and intent. It is, in substance and effect, a
contract for servitude, with no limitation but that of time; leaving the master to
determine what the service should be and the place where and the person to whom it
should be rendered. Such a contract, it is scarcely necessary to say, is against the
policy of our institutions and laws. If such a sale of service could be lawfully made for
five years, it might, from the same reasons, for ten, and so for the term of one's life.
The door would thus be opened for a species of servitude inconsistent with the first
and fundamental article of our declaration of rights, which, proprio vigore,not only
abolished every vestige of slavery then existing in the commonwealth, but rendered
every form of it thereafter legally impossible. That article has always been regarded
not simply as the declaration of an abstract principle, but as having the active force
and conclusive authority of law."
Observing that one who voluntarily subjected himself to the laws of the state must
find in them the rule of restraint as well as the rule of action, the court proceeded:
"Under this contract, the plaintiff had no claim for the labor of the servant for the term
of five years or for any term whatever. She was under no legal obligation to remain in
his service. There was no time during which her service was due to the plaintiff, and
during which she was kept from such service by the acts of the defendants."

It may be here remarked that the shipping articles signed by the appellants left the
term of their service uncertain, and placed no restriction whatever upon the route of
the vessel after it left Valparaiso except that it should ultimately return to some port in
the United States.
Under the contract of service, it was at the volition of the master to entail service upon
these appellants for an indefinite period. So far as the record discloses, it was an
accident that the vessel came back to San Francisco when it did. By the shipping
articles, the appellants could not quit the vessel until it returned to a port of the
Page 165 U. S. 296
United States, and such return depended absolutely upon the will of the master. He
had only to land at foreign ports, and keep the vessel away from the United States, in
order to prevent the appellants from leaving his service.
Nor, I submit, is any light thrown upon the present question by the history of
legislation in Great Britain about seamen. The powers of the British Parliament
furnish no test for the powers that may be exercised by the Congress of the United
States. Referring to the difficulties confronting the convention of 1787, which framed
the present Constitution of the United States, and to the profound differences between
the instrument framed by it and what is called the "British Constitution," Mr. Bryce,
an English writer of high authority, says in his admirable work on the American
Commonwealth:
"The British Parliament had always been, was then, and remains now, a sovereign and
constituent assembly. It can make and unmake any and every law, change the form of
government or the succession to the crown, interfere with the course of justice,
extinguish the most sacred private rights of the citizen. Between it and the people at
large there is no legal distinction, because the whole plenitude of the people's rights
and powers resides in it, just as if the whole nation were present within the chamber
where it sits. In point of legal theory, it is the nation, being the historical successor of
the Folk Moot of our Teutonic forefathers. Both practically and legally, it is today the
only and the sufficient depository of the authority of the nation, and is therefore,
within the sphere of law, irresponsible and omnipotent."
Volume 1, p. 35. No such powers have been given to or can be exercised by any
legislative body organized under the American system. Absolute, arbitrary power
exists nowhere in this free land. The authority for the exercise of power by the
Congress of the United States must be found in the Constitution. Whatever it does in
excess of the powers granted to it, or in violation of the injunctions of the supreme
law of the land, is a nullity, and may be so treated by every person. It would seem
therefore evident that no aid in the present discussion can be derived from the
legislation of Great Britain touching the rights, duties, and
Page 165 U. S. 297
responsibilities of seamen employed on British vessels. If the Parliament of Great
Britain, her Britannic majesty assenting, should establish slavery or involuntary

servitude in England, the courts there would not question its authority to do so, and
would have no alternative except to sustain legislation of that character. A very short
act of Parliament would suffice to destroy all the guaranties of life, liberty, and
property now enjoyed by Englishmen. "What," Mr. Bryce says,
"are called in England 'constitutional statutes,' such as Magna Charta, the Bill of
Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland, are merely
ordinary laws, which could be repealed by Parliament at any moment in exactly the
same way as it can repeal a highway act or lower the duty on tobacco."
Parliament, he further says,
"can abolish, when it pleases, any institution of the country, the crown, the House of
Lords, the Established Church, the House of Commons, Parliament itself."
Volume 1, p. 237. In this country, the will of the people, as expressed in the
fundamental law, must be the will of courts and legislatures. No court is bound to
enforce, nor is anyone legally bound to obey, an act of Congress inconsistent with the
Constitution. If the Thirteenth Amendment forbids such legislation in reference to
seamen as is now under consideration, that is an end of the matter, and it is of no
consequence whatever that government in other countries may, by the application of
force or by the infliction of fines and imprisonment, compel seamen to continue in the
personal service of those whom they may have agreed to serve in private business.
Is the existing statute to be sustained because its essential provisions were embodied
in the act of 1790? I think not, and for the reason, if there were no other, that the
Thirteenth Amendment imposes restrictions upon the powers of Congress that did not
exist when that act was passed. The supreme law of the land now declares that
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall not exist any where within the United States.
The only exceptions to the general principles I have referred
Page 165 U. S. 298
to, so far as they relate to private business, arise out of statutes respecting apprentices
of tender years. But statutes relating to that class rest largely upon the idea that a
minor is incapable of having an absolute will of his own before reaching majority. The
infant apprentice, having no will in the matter, is to be cared for and protected in such
way as, in the judgment of the state, will best subserve the interests both of himself
and of the public. An apprentice serving his master pursuant to terms permitted by the
law cannot, in any proper sense, be said to be in a condition of involuntary servitude.
Upon arriving at his majority, the infant apprentice may repudiate the contract of
apprenticeship if it extends beyond that period. 2 Parsons on Contr. 50. The word
"involuntary" refers primarily to persons entitled, in virtue of their age, to act upon
their independent judgment when disposing of their time and labor. Will anyone say
that a person who has reached his majority, and who had voluntarily agreed, for a
valuable consideration, to serve another as an apprentice for an indefinite period, or

even for a given number of years, can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the
service of the master?
It is said that the grounds upon which the legislation in question rests are the same as
those existing in the cases of soldiers and sailors. Not so. The army and navy of the
United States are engaged in the performance of public, not private, duties. Service in
the army or navy of one's country according to the terms of enlistment never implies
slavery or involuntary servitude, even where the soldier or sailor is required against
his will to respect the terms upon which he voluntarily engaged to serve the public.
Involuntary service rendered for the public, pursuant as well to the requirements of a
statute as to a previous voluntary engagement, is not in any legal sense either slavery
or involuntary servitude.
The further suggestion is made that seamen have always been treated, by legislation in
this country and in England, as if they needed the protection of the law in the same
sense that minors and wards need the protection of parents and guardians, and hence
have been often described as "wards of admiralty."
Page 165 U. S. 299
Some writers say that seamen are in need of the protection of the courts "because
peculiarly exposed to the wiles of sharpers and unable to take care of themselves." 2
Parson, Shipp. & Adm. 32. Mr. Justice Story, in Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 541, 555,
said that
"every court should watch with jealousy any encroachment upon the rights of seamen,
because they are unprotected and need counsel, because they are thoughtless and
require indulgence, because they are credulous and complying, and are easily
overreached."
Mr. Justice Thompson, in The Cadmus v. Matthews, 2 Paine 229, 240, said:
"In considering the obligation of seamen, arising out of their contract in shipping
articles, according to the formula in common use, due weight ought to be given to the
character and situation of this class of men. Generally ignorant and improvident, and
probably very often signing the shipping articles without knowing what they contain,
it is the duty of the court to watch over and protect their rights, and apply very liberal
and equitable considerations to the enforcement of their contracts."
In view of these principles, I am unable to understand how the necessity for the
protection of seamen against those who take advantage of them can be made the basis
of legislation compelling them, against their will and by force, to render personal
service for others engaged in private business. Their supposed helpless condition is
thus made the excuse for imposing upon them burdens that could not be imposed upon
other classes without depriving them of rights that inhere in personal freedom. The
Constitution furnishes no authority for any such distinction between classes of persons
in this country. If, prior to the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the arrest of a
seaman, and his forcible return, under any circumstances, to the vessel on which he
had engaged to serve could have been authorized by an act of Congress, such

deprivation of the liberty of a freeman cannot be justified under the Constitution as it

now is. To give any other construction to the Constitution is to say that it is not made
for all, and that all men in this land are not free and equal before the law, but that one
class may be so far subjected to involuntary servitude
Page 165 U. S. 300
as to be compelled by force to render personal services in a purely private business
with which the public has no concern whatever.
The Court holds that, within the meaning of the Constitution, the word "involuntary"
does not attach to the word "servitude" continuously, and make illegal a service which
was voluntary at the outset, but became involuntary before the agreed term of service
was ended; consequently,
"an individual may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his
personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose, and subordinate his
going and coming to the will of another during the continuance of the contract -- not
that all such contracts would be lawful, but that a servitude which was knowingly and
willingly entered into could not be termed involuntary. Thus,"
the Court proceeds,
"if one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a particular capacity during
his life and never to leave his estate without his consent, the contract might be void
upon grounds of public policy, but the servitude could not be properly termed
involuntary. Such agreements for a limited personal servitude at one time were very
common in England, and by Statute of June 17, 1823, 4 Geo. IV, c. 34, it was enacted
that if any servant in husbandry, or any artificer, calico printer, handcraftsman, miner,
collier, keelman, pitman, glassman, potter, laborer, or other person should contract to
serve another for a definite time, and should desert such service during the term of the
contract, he was made liable to a criminal punishment. The breach of a contract for a
personal service has not, however, been recognized in this country as involving a
liability to criminal punishment except in the cases of soldiers, sailors, and
apprentices, and possibly some others; nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to
that effect."
It seems to me that these observations rest upon an erroneous view of the
constitutional inhibition upon involuntary servitude.
Of the meaning and scope of the constitutional interdict upon slavery no one can
entertain doubt. A contract by which one person agrees to become the slave of another
Page 165 U. S. 301
would not be respected in any court, nor could it become the foundation of any claim
or right, even if it were entered into without constraint's being used upon the person
who assumed to surrender his liberty and to become the property of another. But
involuntary servitude, no matter when it arises, if it be not the result of punishment for
crime of which the party has been duly convicted, is as much forbidden by the
Constitution as is slavery. If that condition exists at the time the authority of the law is

invoked to protect one against being forcibly compelled to render personal services
for another, the court cannot refuse to act because the party seeking relief had
voluntarily agreed to render such services during a given period. The voluntary
contracts of individuals for personal services in private business cannot justify the
existence anywhere or at any time in this country of a condition of involuntary
servitude not imposed as a punishment for crime, any more than contracts creating the
relation of master and slave can justify the existence and recognition of a state of
slavery anywhere or with respect to any persons, within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The condition of one who contracts to render personal services in connection
with the private business of another becomes a condition of involuntary servitude
from the moment he is compelled, against his will, to continue in such service. He
may be liable in damages for the nonperformance of his agreement, but to require
him, against his will, to continue in the personal service of his master is to place him
and keep him in a condition of involuntary servitude. It will not do to say that, by
"immemorial usage," seamen could be held in a condition of involuntary servitude
without having been convicted of crime. The people of the United States, by an
amendment of their fundamental law, have solemnly decreed that, "except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted," involuntary
servitude shall not exist in any form in this country. The adding another exception by
interpretation simply, and without amending the Constitution, is, I submit, judicial
legislation. It is a very serious matter when a judicial tribunal, by the construction of
an act of Congress, defeats the expressed will of the
Page 165 U. S. 302
legislative branch of the government. It is a still more serious matter when the clear
reading of a constitutional provision relating to the liberty of man is departed from in
deference to what is called "usage," which has existed for the most part under
monarchical and despotic governments.
In considering this case, it is our duty to look at the consequences of any decision that
may be rendered. We cannot avoid this duty by saying that it will be time enough to
consider supposed cases when they arise. When such supposed cases do arise, those
who seek judicial support for extraordinary remedies that encroach upon the liberty of
freemen will, of course, refer to the principles announced in previous adjudications
and demand their application to the particular case in hand.
It is therefore entirely appropriate to inquire as to the necessary results of the sanction
given by this Court to the statute here in question. If Congress, under its power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, can authorize
the arrest of a seaman who engaged to serve upon a private vessel, and compel him by
force to return to the vessel and remain during the term for which he engaged, a
similar rule may be prescribed as to employees upon railroads and steamboats
engaged in commerce among the states. Even if it were conceded -- a concession to be
made only for argument's sake -- that it could be made a criminal offense, punishable

by fine or imprisonment, or both, for such employees to quit their employment before
the expiration of the term for which they agreed to serve, it would not follow that they
could be compelled, against their will and in advance of trial and conviction, to
continue in such service. But the decision today logically leads to the conclusion that
such a power exists in Congress. Again, as the legislatures of the states have all
legislative power not prohibited to them, while Congress can only exercise certain
enumerated powers for accomplishing specified objects, why may not the states,
under the principles this day announced, compel all employees of railroads engaged in
domestic commerce, and all domestic servants, and all employees in private
establishments, within
Page 165 U. S. 303
their respective limits, to remain with their employers during the terms for which they
were severally engaged under the penalty of being arrested by some sheriff or
constable and forcibly returned to the service of their employers? The mere statement
of these matters is sufficient to indicate the scope of the decision this day rendered.
The Thirteenth Amendment, although tolerating involuntary servitude only when
imposed as a punishment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted,
has been construed by the decision just rendered as if it contained an additional clause
expressly excepting from its operation seamen who engage to serve on private vessels.
Under this view of the Constitution, we may now look for advertisements not for
runaway servants as in the days of slavery, but for runaway seamen. In former days,
overseers could stand with whip in hand over slaves, and force them to perform
personal service for their masters. While, with the assent of all, that condition of
things has ceased to exist, we can but be reminded of the past, when it is adjudged to
be consistent with the law of the land for freemen, who happen to be seamen, to be
held in custody that they may be forced to go aboard private vessels and render
personal services against their will.
In my judgment, the holding of any person in custody, whether in jail or by an officer
of the law, against his will for the purpose of compelling him to render personal
service to another in a private business places the person so held in custody in a
condition of involuntary servitude forbidden by the Constitution of the United States;
consequently, that the statute as it now is, and under which the appellants were
arrested at Astoria and placed against their will on the barkentine Arago, is null and
void, and their refusal to work on such vessel after being forcibly returned to it could
not be made a public offense, authorizing their subsequent arrest at San Francisco.
I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY was not present at the argument, and took no part in the
decision of this case.
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States
Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may
not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties

or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information

contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official
sources.

U.S. v. Pompeya

G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

police power of the state

"general welfare" clause

FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo,
charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally,
and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required
under
said
municipal
ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being
repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Hence,

this

appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their
rights
therein
guaranteed
HELD:
Is

the

assailed

municipal

ordinance

violation

of

the

Philippine

Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the
ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in
the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as
well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment
contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to
render
the
same.
The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or
otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any
governmental entity connected therewith, fromadopting or enacting rules and regulations for the
maintenance
of
peace
and
good
government?
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal
system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the
individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls
within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in
conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the

provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of
the
persons
affected
thereby.
Is

there

cause

of

action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b)
that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d)
that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the
services
mentioned
in
the
law.
"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered."

CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN

1949]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by
Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to hertransportation expense from the province should be paid
by

Estelita

Issue:

before

she

could

be

allowed

to

leave.

Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a

maid

without

returning

the

advance

payment

it

gave?

Held:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a

prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of

movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or
the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to
place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of

justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944)

Pollock v. Williams
No. 345
Argued February 10, 1944
Decided April 10, 1944
322 U.S. 4
Syllabus
1. A statute of Florida which makes guilty of a misdemeanor any person who, with
intent to defraud, obtains an advance upon an agreement to render services, and which
provides further that failure to perform the services for which an advance was
obtained shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud, held violative of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the federal Anti-peonage Act. Pp. 322 U. S. 5, 322 U. S.
17.
2. In view of the history and operation of the Florida statute, it cannot be said that a
plea of guilty is uninfluenced by the statute's threat to convict by its prima facie
evidence section; hence, the entire statute is invalid, and a conviction under it, though
based upon a plea of guilty, cannot be sustained. P. 322 U. S. 15.
3. That, upon a trial of the defendant, his testimony in respect of his intent would have
been competent is immaterial. P. 322 U. S. 25.
153 Fla. 338, 14 So.2d 700, reversed.
Page 322 U. S. 5
Appeal from the reversal of a judgment which, upon a writ of habeas corpus,
discharged the prisoner, appellant here.
Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States
Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may
not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties
or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information
contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official
sources.
Constitutional Law. Political Law. Effects of Cession.
ALCANTARA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 749
FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison
correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only a

creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the
issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?
HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is now
serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes a new
act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent
occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished under Art 134 of the RPC. Their
offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They
were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final and
executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC. Hernandez
Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed to rebellion as it is
necessarily absorbed therein. Hence, without such complexion the penalty must be
lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon precisely assert a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners were
convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were
convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under
which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same
crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez
Doctrine.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after
the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it
life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is
that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction
of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly
sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If
Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be
repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt
with.

What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of

legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was
noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on
the rest.