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AGRA 0720 Fulltext
AGRA 0720 Fulltext
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order
issued by the public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon.
Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal
case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private
respondent as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60)
square meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo
and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba
Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of
about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder
of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by
Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus
consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor
of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said
landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes.
The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty
basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the
landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant
bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for
the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea
Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners,
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to
build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling
to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay
the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was
not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises,
saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The
parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in
Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the
landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter
simply refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit
stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property
worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against
Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all
the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been
done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in
open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the
case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the
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Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification dated January
24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for
hearing on the bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land
owned by the complaining witness, which is devoted to
bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the
tenant from his farmholding, which act is prohibited by law;
and
consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a
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total of sixty (60) square meters."
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse
of power and discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that
private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating
only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the
petitioner.
II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003
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is not proper for trial and hearing by the court.
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by
RA 3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is
preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those
who live and work on the land as tillers, ownercultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence,
divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of
farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm
family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of
living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education
with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and
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reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income."
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters)
of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas,
camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as
an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn
on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient
to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.
The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the
products of the land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry
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jobs on the side. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary
to the declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land
with the former owner, Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public
respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the
petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents
continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner
new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of
the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
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Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of
the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This
is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way
of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not
automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area
tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area
and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession
for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this
case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who
was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the
premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather
than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the
former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since
Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief
filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the
petitioner, we hold that the remand of the case to the lower court for the
resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice.
Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends
of justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position
to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest,
and towards the expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on
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the merits and dispose of the case with finality.
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the
private respondent for allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly
P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to
the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore,
the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance
his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were
to resume. Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in
the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of such litigations.
The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished
that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can
only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty,
deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the
misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of
justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from
heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the
Court finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of
further deferring its final termination.
possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said
crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the
land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by the previous
owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private
respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and
present owners. Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and
cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the
landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief,
which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent
because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the
petitioner's affidavit stating that after she reprimanded private respondent
Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property
worth about P50.00.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims
to be a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of
tenancy laws. The private respondent objects, contending that the petitioner
is only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the subject land ended with the
termination of their contract of employment.
The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao,
Laguna, and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and
his parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written
contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the
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land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. On September 4, 1973, after
Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the
land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services and to
demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working
on the land.
On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and
asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later
withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which
granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer
against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was
declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. Alzona was
rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of the Ministry
of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On
appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared
proper for trial and so de-archived and reinstated.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken
over the Court of Agrarian Relations under PB 129) rendered a decision
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dated April 21, 1987, dismissing the complaint. It found Gelos to be a
tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The
plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs.
The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its
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judgment promulgated on November 25, 1988, it held that Gelos was not a
tenant of the land in question and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona. He
was also held liable for the payment of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit.
The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially
factual and therefore not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Only questions of law may be raised in this kind of
proceeding. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. The petitioner has not shown that his case comes
under any of those rare exceptions on such findings may be validly reversed
by this Court.
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Laguna, where the document was executed. 8 At any rate, the lack of
notarization did not adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the
agreement, which, significantly, Gelos and his wife do not deny having
signed.
Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests
that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so.
The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may
also be done by a hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner,
as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the
intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them.
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Appeals observed, the petitioner has not shown that he paid rentals on the
subject property from 1970 to 1973, before their dispute arose.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person
who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. (Emphasis supplied)
For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the
absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
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cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are:
1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages;
3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's
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conduct although the latter is the most important element.
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that made the said payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner
never denied having received them.
The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is easily
resolved. There being no tenancy relationship, the contention that the private
respondent's complaint has prescribed under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must
also fail. That section is not applicable. It must be noted that at the very
outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's claim of agricultural tenancy and
immediately instituted his action for unlawful detainer in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. As it happened, the said case was
held not proper for trial by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. He then resorted
to other remedies just so he could recover possession of his land and,
finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The action,
which was commenced in 1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive
period provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code for actions based on a
written contract. *
The Court quotes with approval the following acute observations made by
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
It might not be amiss to state at this juncture that in
deciding this case in favor of defendant, the lower court
might have been greatly influenced by the fact that
defendant is a mere farmer who is almost illiterate while
plaintiff is an educated landlord, such that it had felt that it
was its duty to be vigilant for the protection of defendant's
interests. But the duty of the court to protect the weak and
the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an
extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth
and justice happen to be on his side. Besides, defendant's
economic position vis a visthe plaintiff does not
necessarily make him the underprivileged party in this
case, for as testified by plaintiff which defendant never
denied, the small land in question was the only
landholding of plaintiff when he and his father bought the
same, at which time he was just a lowly employee who did
not even have a house of his own and his father, a mere
farmer, while defendant was the agricultural tenant of
another piece of land and also owns his own house, a sari
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an
inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29,
1972, Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
gave notice to this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was
survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador
Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and
Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with
this Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and
was survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O.
Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel,
married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and
Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted
by her heirs herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the
prayer for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the
Court of Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio
Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond
situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and
measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime
during the last war she entered into an oral contract of
lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis,
i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance
in the month of January; that desiring to develop and
cultivate the fishpond by herself, she notified the
defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was
terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that
upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for
another year; that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote
the defendant that he should surrender possession of the
fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however
ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be
ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her
and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter
filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that
the land in question was originally leased to him, also
verbally, by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano Gabriel in
1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and the part which was already a fishpond be
improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the
lease for whatever cause; that when the plaintiff became
the owner of the property through inheritance, she told the
payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13,
1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in the fishpond
consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae
would not grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond,
changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and
planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that these were done by
defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until
1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan,
who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and
his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his
instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between
the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844,
and the present case is therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in
effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or
with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has
been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore
the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the
interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or
1
with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household.
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of
2
Appeals which, as a general rule, bind this Court.
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the
relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a
civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land;
that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention
and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may
exist, the following requisites must concur.
12
At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered to file their
Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public
respondents, one from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial
15
16
Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were
17
submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply.
18
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or which has been distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the
DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for
the reclassification to become effective. If, however, the land sought to be
reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in
order for the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall
within the DARs conversion authority. Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the
CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and allencompassing power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or
conversions of all agricultural lands. Said section only grants the DAR
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands which have already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and
which have already been distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
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(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use
by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under
Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of
the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;
(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy
against the order of the DAR enjoining development works on the subject
lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to
issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to
reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set
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forth in Section 20
of the Local Government Code. According to them, if
the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one
which has already been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive
". . . True, the DARs express power over land use conversion is limited to
cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years,
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or
the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that
these are the only instances when the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner
may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it
should logically follow from the said departments express duty and function
to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be cleared
by the DAR."
Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v.
Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).
The Court of Appeals reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in
order. In the said opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to
conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to nonagricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be
exercised from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988. This
conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of
DARs mandate and extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural
before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any
conversion clearance:
I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ
Opinion No. 44, the following guidelines are being issued for the guidance of
the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis
...
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
V. COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. It shall also
include agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses,
after June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54, Series
of 1993 of the Office of the President and those proposed to be used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising as provided in DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1993.
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,
25
we held:
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may
be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands
that are already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15
June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR,
the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate
courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v.
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Mag-isa Vda. De Villena, found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction
Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or
not an injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land, we rule in the negative.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his
discretion is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS
THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING
AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO
REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL
AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
IV.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
V.
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
9
POWER.
xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by
the LGU or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA
6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x. [Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No.
10
8435, the term agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and
not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in the definition of agricultural
lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988." In effect, lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes
of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no
authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural
lands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it
must conform to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No.
6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be
questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as
11
amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657
because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance
and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in
the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative
issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of
rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in
essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy for the
petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court
has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of
certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional
and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of the
existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to
declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise
36
of judicial discretion."
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed.
37
Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive
order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies,
rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation.
Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has
given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion
of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land
uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive
order clearly provides that "the authority and responsibility for the exercise of
the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall
be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x."
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so
doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his
authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A,
which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform
implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for
purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of
agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural
uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of
land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified
that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR
38
has been given the authority to approve land conversion. Concomitant to
such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of
agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial
or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include
"lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands
39
finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, this
Court has enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657,
agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However,
agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from
40
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures
for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use.
He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use
44
the agricultural land for other purposes.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the
process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they
are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion
authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
45
on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any
46
DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of
agricultural lands is already subject to DARs conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by
the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they
must still undergo conversion process. It bears stressing that the act of
reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not
automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other
purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994,
cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the
47
Department of Agrarian Reform, reclassification of lands denotes their
allocation into some specific use and providing for the manner of their
utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall
be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified agricultural
lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended there
is still a need to change the current use thereof through the process of
conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is mandated
to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus,
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 0102, as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction for conversion lands which
had already been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for
other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification
of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land
use conversion procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may,
through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following
cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited
to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No.
6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,"
shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such
lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
xxxx
in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice
cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
SO ORDERED.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining,
in an administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been
committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use
conversion; and
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent
conversion applications that they may file with the DAR.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties
provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the
illegal or premature conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction, i.e., "lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1998."
The petitioners argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional,
as it suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow
ground.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of
prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made
in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of
5
the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this
case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The abovequoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other
hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party
files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of
this case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate
motions are of first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio
M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on
November 17, 1998, the following was expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the
Court En Banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power
of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided
by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government
units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or
reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The
dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:
xxx
x x x(Emphasis supplied)
therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in
the said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President
had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion
for reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win"
Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of
protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties
for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that
notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was
disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as
what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration,
the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive
rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
8
the finality of the resolution of his/her case."
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly
vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on
the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case,
9
therefore, is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit.
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule
once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their
present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership
award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the
plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of
the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they
have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of
our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the
subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their
10
right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the
"Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to
be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian
11
Reform. Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest
in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the
issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing
in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc," dated December 3, 1998; respondents' "Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer
For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)," dated December 2, 1998; and
intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En
Banc To Annul The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999
And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration
Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with
FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this
case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., please see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result. I maintain my original position that the case should go
to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
Separate Opinions
MELO, J., separate opinion;
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case
should be referred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the
Court En Banc's Resolution No. 99-109-SC dated January 2, 1999, which
settled the issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote
with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the above-captioned
case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my views on this issue and put them or
record, so, in the event that the Court decides to open and re-discuss this
issue at some future time, these consideration may be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding majority's position regarding
an even (2-2) vote in a division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required
majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and
decided by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall e decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendereden banc or in division may be modified or reversed by the
court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the
case is not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En
Banc and not to a longer division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to
theBanc shall be automatic. Thus,
xxx
xxx
number of 3 votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be decided
by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member
having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has
retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any
valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances
when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view
that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if
the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should
automatically got to the Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between "cases" and "matters" referred to in
the above-quoted constitutional provision. "Cases" being decided, and
"matters" being resolved. Only "cases" are referred to the Court En Banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained Matters" are
not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that "cases" would only refer to deliberations at first
instance on the merits of a case filed with the Court, and other deliberations,
such as motions, including motions of reconsideration, are "matters" to be
resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the
voting on motions for reconsideration, the decision which already been
passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed
to appealed cases, filed with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to only original cases which are taken cognizable of by
this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably,
these cases are all required by the Constitution to be heard by the Court En
Banc. so, there will be no instance when a division will be ever taking
cognizance of an original actions filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizable of by the divisions are either
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of
petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be
disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that
is the end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there
being recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being expressly
directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.