Pelaez vs Auditor General

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to
be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been
impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities
are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the
RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that the President may
exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of
power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the
proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative
(not executive).

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality
by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city
ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative
districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the
number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.