THIRDDIVISION

REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES, G.R.No.169067
Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIOMORALES,J.,

Chairperson,
versus
BRION,

BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA,JR.,and

SERENO,JJ.

ANGELO
B.
MALABANAN,

PABLO
B.
MALABANAN,
Promulgated:
GREENTHUMB REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION October6,2010
and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
OFBATANGAS,
Respondents.
xx

DECISION
VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:
ThispetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,as
amended,seekstooverturntheResolution

[1]
datedJuly20,2005oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)in

CAG.R.CVNo.70770dismissingpetitionersappeal.
Thefactsareasfollows:
Respondents Angelo B. Malabanan and Pablo B. Malabanan were registered owners of a
405,000squaremeter parcel of land situated in Talisay, Batangas and covered by Transfer
[2]
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T24268 of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. Said
parcel of land was originally registered on April 29, 1936 in the Register of Deeds of Batangas

[3]
[4]
pursuanttoDecreeNo.589383 issued

underOriginalCertificateofTitle(OCT)No.017421

inL.R.C.RecordNo.50573.OCTNo.017421wascancelledandwasreplacedwithTCTNo.T
9076 from which respondents title, TCT No. T24268, was derived. The parcel of land was later
subdividedintosmallerlotsresultinginthecancellationofTCTNo.T24268.Thederivativetitles
arenoweitherinthenamesoftheMalabanansorrespondentGreenthumbRealtyandDevelopment
Corporation.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines claims that in an investigation conducted by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Region IV), it was revealed that the land
coveredbyTCTNo.T24268waswithintheunclassifiedpublicforestofBatangas per L.C. CM
No. 10. This prompted petitioners filing of a complaint

[5]
for reversion and cancellation of title

against respondents on March 30, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. T1055 and
raffled off to Branch 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas. The case was later re
docketedasCivilCaseNo.C192.
On May 5, 1998, the Malabanans filed a Motion to Dismiss.

[6]

They argued that the

complaintfailedtostateacauseofactionthecourthasnojurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterthe
[7]
Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, since

complaint violates Section 7,

petitionerdidnotattachacopyofDecreeNo.589383oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBatangas,
pursuant to which OCT No. 017421 was issued in LRC Record No. 50573 and that a similar
complaintforreversiontothepublicdomainofthesameparcelsoflandbetweenthesameparties
hasalreadybeendismissedbythesamecourt.
[8]
InanOrder datedDecember11,1998,thetrialcourtdismissedthecomplaint.Thesalient
portionsoftheorderread:
Asimilarcomplaintforreversiontothepublicdomainofthesameparcelsoflandwasfiled
withthisCourtonJuly14,1997byplaintiffagainstdefendantsmovants.Thecase,docketedasCivil
CaseNo.T784,wasdismissedonDecember7,1992(sic)forlackofjurisdiction.
Aspointedoutbymovants,thenullificationofOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.017421andallits
derivativetitleswouldinvolvethenullificationofthejudgmentoftheLandRegistrationCourtwhich
decreed the issuance of the title over the property. Therefore, the applicable provision of law is
Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive
jurisdictionoveractionsforannulmentofjudgmentsoftheRegionalTrialCourt.

Moreover, this Court is aware, and takes judicial notice, of the fact that the parcels of land,
subject of reversion had been the subject of several cases before this Court concerning the
ownershipandpossessionthereofbydefendantsmovants.Thesecaseswereevenelevatedtothe
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which, in effect, upheld the ownership of the
propertiesbydefendantsMalabanans.SaiddecisionsofthisCourt,theCourtofAppeals,and

[9]

theSupremeCourtshouldthenalsobeannulled.

(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.)

[10]
OnJanuary5,1999,petitionerfiledaNoticeofAppeal
fromtheorderofdismissal.On
January 18, 1999, the Malabanans moved to deny due course and to dismiss appeal arguing that
petitioner, in filing a notice of appeal, adopted an improper mode of appeal. The Malabanans
contendedthattheissueofjurisdictionofthetrialcourtoverthecomplaintfiledbypetitionerisa
question of law which should be raised before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
[11]

certiorariunderRule45.

[12]
On June 29, 1999, the trial court issued an Order
denying due course and dismissing
petitionersappeal.However,oncertiorari,

[13]
docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.54721,saidorderwas

reversedbytheCAonFebruary29,2000.TheCAruledthatthedeterminationofwhetherornotan
appeal may be dismissed on the ground that the issue involved is purely a question of law is
exclusively lodged within the discretion of the CA. Consequently, the trial court was directed to
giveduecoursetopetitionersappealandorderthetransmittaloftheoriginalrecordsonappealto
theCA.

[14]

[15]
Petitioner,initsAppealBrief
filedbeforetheCA,raisedthisloneassignmentoferror:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF

[16]

LACKOFJURISDICTION.

Aperusaloftheargumentsinthebriefrevealsthatnotonlydidpetitionerraisethejurisdictionalissue,
it likewise questioned the portion of the dismissal order where it was held that several cases
involvingthesubjectlandhavealreadybeenfiledandinthosecases,theCAandtheSupreme
Court have upheld respondents ownership. Petitioner argued that the question of whether the
rightoftheMalabananshad,infact,beenupheldisfactualinnatureandnecessarilyrequires
[17]
presentationofevidence.

On July 20, 2005, however, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners
appeal,holdingthattheissueofjurisdiction,beingapurequestionoflaw,iscognizableonlybythe
SupremeCourtviaapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.ItdismissedpetitionersappealunderSection
[18]
2,
Rule50ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,asamended.
Beforeus,petitionerraisesthesoleissueof:
WHETHERTHECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDAREVERSIBLEERRORINDISMISSING
PETITIONERS APPEAL FOR BEING THE WRONG MODE TO ASSAIL THE TRIAL COURTS

[19]

ORDER.

Petitionerarguesthattheissuesurroundingthevalidityoftheorderdismissingthecomplaint
doesnotonlyinvolveaquestionoflawbutalsoinvolvesaquestionoffact.Thequestionoffact
pertainstotheportionofthetrialcourtsassailedorderwhichstatedthattheMalabanansownership
hadbeenupheldbytheCAandtheSupremeCourt.Petitionercontendsthatthequestionofwhether
such right had in fact been upheld is factual in nature. Petitioner adds that the trial court has
jurisdictionoverthecomplaintandshouldnothavedismissedthecomplaintinthefirstplace.
Respondents,ontheotherhand,counterthattherearenofactualissuesinvolvedbecausethey
aredeemedtohavehypotheticallyadmittedthetruthofthefactsallegedinthecomplaintwhenthey
filedamotiontodismiss.
Thepetitionismeritorious.
[20]
we had the opportunity to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal

In Murillo v. Consul,

fromdecisionsoftheRTC,towit:(1)byordinaryappealorappealbywritoferrorunderRule41,
[21]
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of
originaljurisdiction(2)bypetitionforreviewunderRule42,

[22]

wherejudgmentwasrenderedby

theRTCintheexerciseofappellatejurisdictionand(3)bypetitionforreviewoncertioraritothe
[23]
ThefirstmodeofappealistakentotheCAonquestionsoffact

SupremeCourtunderRule45.

ormixedquestionsoffactandlaw.ThesecondmodeofappealisbroughttotheCAonquestionsof
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the
[24]

SupremeCourtonlyonquestionsoflaw.

[25]
AndinLeonciov.DeVera,
thisCourthasdifferentiatedaquestionoflawfromaquestion
offact.Aquestionoflawariseswhenthereisdoubtastowhatthelawisonacertainstateoffacts,
whilethereisaquestionoffactwhenthedoubtarisesastothetruthorfalsityoftheallegedfacts.For
aquestiontobeoneoflaw,thesamemustnotinvolveanexaminationoftheprobativevalueofthe
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
questionisoneoflaworoffactisnottheappellationgiventosuchquestionbythepartyraisingthe
same rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
[26]
evaluatingtheevidence,inwhichcase,itisaquestionoflawotherwiseitisaquestionoffact.
Here,petitionersappealdoesnotonlyinvolveaquestionoflaw.Asidefromthetrialcourts
rulingthatithasnojurisdictionoverthecomplaint,petitionerlikewisequestionedtheotherbasis
forthetrialcourtsruling,whichreferstopreviouslydecidedcasesallegedlyupholdingwithfinality
theownershipoftheMalabanansoverthedisputedproperty.Ascorrectlyarguedbypetitioner,the
question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is
factualinnatureasitrequiresthepresentationofevidence.
Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on
petitionerforinvokingtheappellatejurisdictionoftheCAthroughanordinaryappealunderRule
41.
WHEREFORE,theResolutiondatedJuly20,2005oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.
70770isREVERSEDandSETASIDE.PetitionersappealisREINSTATEDandtheinstantcase
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to proceed with the usual appeal
processthereinwithdeliberatedispatch.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:

CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbefore
thecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 2628. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices
BienvenidoL.ReyesandElviJohnS.Asuncionconcurring.
[2]
Records,p.11.
[3]
Id.at1213.
[4]
Id.at1415.
[5]
Id.at110.
[6]
Id.at2231.
[7]
SEC.7.Actionordefensebasedondocument.Wheneveranactionordefenseisbaseduponawritteninstrumentordocument,the
substanceofsuchinstrumentordocumentshallbesetforthinthepleading,andtheoriginaloracopythereofshallbeattachedtothe
pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading.
[8]
Records,pp.8586.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.at9091.
[11]
Id.at9396.
[12]
Id.at103104.
[13]
Id.at107120.
[14]
Id.at195202.
[15]
CArollo,pp.2750.
[16]
Id.at38.
[17]
Id.at4647.
[18]
SEC.2.DismissalofimproperappealtotheCourtofAppeals.AnappealunderRule41takenfromtheRegionalTrialCourttothe
CourtofAppealsraisingonlyquestionsoflawshallbedismissed,issuespurelyoflawnotbeingreviewablebysaidcourt.Similarly,
an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be
dismissed.
AnappealerroneouslytakentotheCourtofAppealsshallnotbetransferredtotheappropriatecourtbutshallbedismissedoutright.
[19]
Rollo,p.15.
[20]
Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK9748 dated March1,1990ascitedinMacababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237,
January14,2009,576SCRA70,83.
[21]
Rule41AppealfromtheRegionalTrialCourts.
[22]
Rule42PetitionforReviewfromtheRegionalTrialCourtstotheCourtofAppeals.
[23]
Rule45AppealbyCertioraritotheSupremeCourt.
[24]
Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, supra note 20,at8384seealsoAbedes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 174373, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA268,285286andSuarezv.Villarama,Jr.,G.R.No.124512,June27,2006,493SCRA74,80.
[25]
G.R.No.176842,February18,2008,546SCRA180.
[26]
Id.at184,citingBinayv.Odea,G.R.No.163683,June8,2007,524SCRA248,255256,furthercitingVelayoFongv.Velayo,G.R.
No.155488,December6,2006,510SCRA320,329330.