Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Compilation
Case Compilation
2|In General
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation
no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and
CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for transport
lumber using "recycled" documents. 7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's
permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner
to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumberdealer's permit should not be cancelled.
3|In General
Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside
and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to
report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as
directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute
the appropriate action before the proper court regarding the
Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No.
CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus oficio upon
compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan,
supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned
above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned
to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the
proper court has taken cognizance and determined how
those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of;
and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the
warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded
with large volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend
the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of
the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless
search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April
1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day and was still
pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did
not even question. 17 And, although the search warrant did
not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that
the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands
observed during the conduct of the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's
order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized
articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since
the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been
returned to him in compliance with the directive in the
warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been
rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the
4|In General
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which
was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila
handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell
lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) the
seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a
warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.
33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778
for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by
the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz.,
"timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the
English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes," the respondent
Court held that since wood is included in the definition of
forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term
forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest
officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in
a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to
Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which
provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed
or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined
in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor
of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by the offender in the process of committing the
offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in
said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products or possession of
timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied
by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February
1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February
1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R.
No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
5|In General
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in
the possession of the private respondent, without the
required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1)
are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the
"lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the
words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction
"and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be
raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top,
resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or
other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources in forest
lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered
by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in
Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall
within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests
in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether
the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of
the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the
conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in
the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges
an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are
insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the
Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,
which is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead
one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found
approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings
and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31
of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis
6|In General
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a
valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search
could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3)
search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and
by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said
period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished
in one day, the same may be continued the following day
or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a
warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued
under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still
within the ten-day period. 36
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
7|In General
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th
August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the
motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the
information that has charged him with the Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705
(otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the
18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI
CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or
subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense,
or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber
in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent
to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the
possession of "timber or other forest products" (without
supporting legal documents), the mere possession of
"lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense
under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to
come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26
(b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986.
The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes
"timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other,
and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series
of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is
8|In General
show any CLO or other legal document required by
administrative issuances raises the presumption that the
lumber has been shipped or received from illegal sources;
and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9053648 sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered
moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in
G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not
the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a
criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging
private respondent with the possession without required
legal documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan
and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has
failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there
mentioned refer to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal
of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however,
would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment. For instance -(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, 3 subscribed and sworn to
before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read,
as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended
and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler
truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck
driver failed to produce any documents covering the
shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as
amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession
prohibited wood and wood products without the required
documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that
-" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to
monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the
compound of Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the
shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the
latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required
documents. 6
9|In General
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers
who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section
68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the
decree defines "forest product" to mean -(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin,
gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other
forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the
associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geologic resources in forest lands
(emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the
law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest
raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various
finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to
be --
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th
August 1991 Order of respondent Judge granting the
motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the
information that has charged him with the Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705
(otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 277 1) and the
18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged
inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
10 | I n G e n e r a l
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the
quashal of the information on the ground that the facts
comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense,
or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question, private respondent having
formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber
in question in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court
("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now
questioned order granting the motion of private respondent
to quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the
possession of "timber or other forest products" (without
supporting legal documents), the mere possession of
"lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense
under Section 68 of PD 705. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to
come within the purview of "timber" defined by Section 2.26
(b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986.
The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution
before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes
"timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other,
and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga,
supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series
of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition of
almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is
not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or
gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species
(supa included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make
possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa
included) punishable by mere inference; and (4) that
Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of
1983, clarified by DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of
1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on
lumber shipped outside the province, city or the greater
Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO,
an invoice to accompany a lumber shipment from
legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are
both within the greater Manila area or within the same
province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the
lumber is not removed from the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan
lumber products found in the compound of Mustang
Lumber, Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as
amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without
requisite legal documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated
17 March 1989, that defines "lumber" to be a -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,
resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;
11 | I n G e n e r a l
the latter recommended the filing of the information, read,
as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the
security detail from our agency continued to monitor the
activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended
and later on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler
truck loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber after the truck
driver failed to produce any documents covering the
shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a
criminal complaint against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of
Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as
amended by Executive Order 277, having in its possession
prohibited wood and wood products without the required
documents." 4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by
Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that
-" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to
monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact
apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the
compound of Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber without the necessary legal documents covering the
shipment." 5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., was issued because of, among other things, the
latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required
documents. 6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued
by Secretary Factoran, authorized the confiscation of
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and
almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks of various sizes and
dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc. 7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A.
Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the Department of
Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for
possession of lauan and almaciga lumber without required
legal documents, 8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by
EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's
motion to quash, sought to argue that the possession of
"almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound
of Mustang Lumber, Inc., 9 was covered by the penal
provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section
32 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal
order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber"
should be held to be among the items that are banned
under Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information
should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following
the standing rule that the allegations of the information
12 | I n G e n e r a l
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the
law, from that which has undergone processing. In defining
a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to
refer to -. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest
raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard,
block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the
law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various
finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28
December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to
be -. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at
least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long, except all
mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered
as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes -. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing,
resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged
lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988,
dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest
products" shall include "lumber -cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the
basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an
interpretation or construction of a statute by the
government agency called upon to implement the
enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the
extent that such interpretation or construction is congruous
with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can
aptly carry the law into effect 15 but it would be legal
absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect,
particularly those which are penal in nature, of extending
the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in
G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784.
I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the
well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36,
Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving
whatever remains of the country's forest reserves can
never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed
and checked, the continued denudation of forest resources,
already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well
as of untold loss of lives and property, could well be on end
13 | I n G e n e r a l
G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City,
and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANIO, respondents.
HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman,
intervenor-respondent.
Contrary to law.
14 | I n G e n e r a l
As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to
or connected with or arising from the performance of official
duty, it must be investigated by the Ombudsman or any of
its duly deputized representative:
The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of
the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee
that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require
that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special
classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular court
functioning within the framework of the judicial department
of the government. It is a "trial court and bound by the rules
governing trial courts. It is one of the 'inferior courts' in
Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction may be
questioned before the Supreme Court and whose
judgments are subject to its review, revision, affirmance or
setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined
in the Constitution calls for the unitary judicial system with
the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up"
(Rules of Criminal Procedures by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr.,
1986 Edition, p. 26).
Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the
regular court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act 6975
(An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) is the
Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide, the charge
against the accused, carries the penalty of reclusion
temporal, said case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate it. (Art. 249, RPC).
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed for refiling with the Sandiganbayan.
On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration 5 of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6 that "crimes
committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" because "[t]hey fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in Section 46
of R.A. No. 6975 and "[t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular
court but a special court."
The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7
October
1992: 7
The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992
[sic] . . . is not binding to this Court.
This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in
Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine
National Police) includes the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies
committed by public officers in relation to their office,
whether simple or complex with other crimes where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606)
What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to
the exclusion of non-regular courts such as military courts
15 | I n G e n e r a l
and under the operational control and administrative set-up
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No.
1850, were subject to court-martial proceedings for all
crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if it were the
intention of R.A.
No. 6975 to include the Sandiganbayan in the term "regular
courts" in
Section 46, then it should not have provided therein that
"criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have
not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall
be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or
municipal trial court judge"; instead, it should have directed
such transfer to "the Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor is mandated by law to entertain cases
cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan" under Section 15
of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict
between Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 (revising P.D. No. 1486 which created the
Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over "[o]ther
offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office . . . where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional . . . or
a fine of P6,000.00"; the latter then should be deemed
impliedly repealed by the former, which is a later law.
Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
is a general law of it applies to all public officers, while R.A.
No. 6975 is a special law for it sets out a special rule of
jurisdiction for PNP members. The latter should thus
prevail.
Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent
Judge of
24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992 be reversed and
set aside and that the respondent Judge be directed to
reinstate and continue the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-9123224.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view
that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the subject criminal case
in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint Circular
of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts"
in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the Sandiganbayan
and that R.A.
No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the
Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within
the context of Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 because it is a "court normally functioning with
continuity within the jurisdiction vested in it," and that the
term "regular courts" is used in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
to distinguish the said courts from the court-martial for it
seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates
its transfer to the former pursuant to the policy of the law to
establish a police force national in scope and civilian in
character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan
is mandated by the Constitution 14 to take cognizance of
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office
and P.D. No. 1606 created it pursuant to such mandate,
then the repeal of the latter, as suggested by petitioner,
16 | I n G e n e r a l
Police forces have traditionally been under civilian
authority. However, the dictatorial regime of then President
Ferdinand Marcos, consistent with his own agenda to
strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited to
his advantage the provision of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated the establishment and maintenance of "an
integrated national police force whose organization,
administration, and operation shall be provided by law." 19
First, he issued a series of decrees consolidating and
integrating various local police forces and placing them
under the operational control, direction, and supervision of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC); 20 then on 8 August
1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which "established and
constituted the Integrated National Police which shall be
composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus,
and the integrated police forces as established by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as
components, under the Department of National Defense."
By this decree, Mr. Marcos succeeded in militarizing the
police forces by making them mere components of the PC
which was then one of the four major commands of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He did not stop
there. For, even after the farcical lifting of Martial Law in
1981 through Proclamation No. 2045, and pursuant to the
infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, 21 he
promulgated on 4 October 1982 P.D. 1850 which provided
for court-martial jurisdiction over police officers, policemen,
firemen, and jail guards. Section 1 thereof reads:
SENATOR ANGARA:
17 | I n G e n e r a l
PNP MEMBERS SHALL BE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS. 25
In the course of the interpellation on his amendment, Mr.
Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of the
law and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts of criminal
cases involving members of the PNP:
MR. ALBANO:
Considering that we are creating here a purely civilian
police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also
fall under our civil force, and there should be no iota of
military syndrome [referring to the proviso in Sec. 68] so to
speak. 26
During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense on House Bill No. 23614
and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on Section 68 of
the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda, used
the term "regular courts" in lieu of civil courts. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Okay, Rey at saka iyong House, you work on the flow
chart.
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong
"Jurisdiction in criminal cases?" What is this all about?
REP. ZAMORA:
In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Ah, the previous one is administrative, 'no. Now, if it is
charged with a crime, regular courts. 27
The term regular courts was finally carried into the
reconciled bill, 28 entitled "An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganization
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for
Other Purposes," and incorporated in the Conference
Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary
of the Senate on 19 November 1990. Section 46 of the
proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No.
23614, with further modifications and amendments. The
reconciled bill was approved by such both House of
Congress and became R.A. No. 6975.
The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms
civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably
or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral
Conference Committee and then by the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular
courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts.
There could have been no other meaning intended since
the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courtsmartial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our
judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as
contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular
courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of
the government and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power. 29 Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not
regular courts.
18 | I n G e n e r a l
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolution or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction. . . .
Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court
and is thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46
of R.A. No. 6975.
Petitioner's insistence that it is not because, by the
Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a
special court and, therefore, not a regular court is
untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the
words regular and special is inappropriate since the
opposite of the latter is not the former and vice versa.
Special means "designed for a particular purpose; confined
to a particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is,
therefore, the antonym of general. 40 On the other hand,
regular means "steady or uniform in course, practice, or
occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In
other words, special and general are categories in the
distributive order. 42 With reference then to the courts, they
principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are courts of
general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of
course, incorrect to say that only courts of general
jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction,
which are permanent in character, are also regular courts.
The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction
because its creation as a permanent anti-graft court is
constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to
certain classes of offenses.
That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is
further strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606
which vests upon it "all the inherent powers of a court of
justice" and places it on "the same level as the Court of
Appeals," and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over certain
cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over members of the
PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption
that the Sandiganbayan, being a special court, is not a
regular court within the contemplation of Section 46.
Second, both provisions are not irreconcilable and the
presumption against an implied repeal has not been
overcome. Implied repeal may be indulged in only if the two
laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant
as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then,
an attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws. In
Valera vs.
Tuason, 43 this Court stated:
One of the well-established rules of statutory construction
enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the
provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be
effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent.
19 | I n G e n e r a l
inevitable that members of the PNP, as public officers and
employees, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan with respect to (a) violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and (b)
other offenses or felonies committed by them in relation to
their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. All other offenses committed by them are
cognizable by the appropriate courts within the judicial
system such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
That the public officers or employees committed the crime
in relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the
information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over
a case under Section 4(a) (2). 48 This allegation is
necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the information. 49
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case
No. Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty
prescribed for the crime charged which is homicide is
higher than prision correccional, 50 then pursuant to Deloso
vs. Domingo, 51 it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case. In order to avoid a
misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which was based
on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we had
unequivocally ruled in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 52 that for
the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction
over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or
employees, under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D.
No. 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed
therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary
that such offenses or felonies were committed in relation to
their office. We then concluded:
Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine
whether that offense was committed or alleged to have
been committed by the public officers and employees in
relation to their offices.
In the recent case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 53 we
reiterated our ruling on the requirement that the offenses or
felonies covered by Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office and
likewise elucidated on the meaning of offenses committed
in relation to their office by reiterating the principle in
Montilla vs. Hilario 54 that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the office if "the offense cannot
exist without the office," or that "the office must be a
constituent element of the crimes as . . . defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code," and the principle in People vs.
Montejo 55 that the offense must be intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetuated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the
offense was committed in relation to the office must be
alleged in the information.
20 | I n G e n e r a l
same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a
quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the
trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.
Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or felony
committed by a public officer or employee (including a
member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed by law
is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime
was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If
it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the
Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over
the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of
R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to
Section 31 thereof. 60 If the investigating officer determines
that the crime was not committed by the respondent in
relation to his office, he shall then file the information with
the proper court.
In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other
collateral issues raised has become unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING
the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary
hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine
whether the crime charged was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office, and
(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed
by the private respondent in relation to his office,
DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the
records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall
docket and proceed with the case as if the same were
originally filed with it; or
(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set
aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and 7
October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment thereon.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
21 | I n G e n e r a l
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and
NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"
respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of
the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and other "subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party
or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer
and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal
means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training
school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military
arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or
with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford
impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint
was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
22 | I n G e n e r a l
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or
disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the
validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in
its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute
void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No
bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." 2 A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle
of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation
of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes
and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of
attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned
by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to
the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the
judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards
of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused
is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption
of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
23 | I n G e n e r a l
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this
title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC
sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act
was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations
setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth
a general definition. Although the Board has determined in
1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to
be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of
Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist
Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character
and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control
and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred
to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party.
That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of
the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes
an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as
officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be
24 | I n G e n e r a l
is a matter of common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods
and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into
the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years.
Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no
complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts
said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the
association or organization of which the relator is
concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens.
But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later
said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized
lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the
Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative
scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that
the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather
than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing
"the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing
that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," meaning in that state, said:
"Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities
have existed for many years, and, while not immune from
hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their
existence."
25 | I n G e n e r a l
the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it
mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is
describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard
as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is
found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long
as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who
engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can
escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own
present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder.
33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAntiSubversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines
and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after
June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of
the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time
of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of
purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law
expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to
exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2
of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment
is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of
guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of
expression and freedom of association are sofundamental
that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred
position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35
Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe
justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe
reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated
itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of
the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose
of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien dominationand control;
26 | I n G e n e r a l
we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the
United States, but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of
thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion
Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself
againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of
society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in
Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial
governmentsis without force where the existing structure of
government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We
rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to
its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could
conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force
and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as
explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed
its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as
a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when membership
is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization
is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself
a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad
because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the
Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful
means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely
a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in
section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist
Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first
"whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow
contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence
but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The
absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due
more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
27 | I n G e n e r a l
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the
problemsof accommodating the exigencies of selfpreservationand the values of liberty are as complex and
intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because
the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether
it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an
effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative
compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the
court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its
resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional
commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle
of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with
anyother person to overthrow the Government of the
Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion
or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory
penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes
notonly membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any
local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not
to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic
power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even
an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe
Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and
forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short
title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject
matter is subversionin general which has for its
fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its
contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a
valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature,
scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be
28 | I n G e n e r a l
ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay
themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment fornegligence
had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the
nation against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where
the overthrow of the government wasusually through the
rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than
those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue of
the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met
with force. It was as clearcutas that. Advances in science
as well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty and
weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced
complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be
then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater
understanding for the governmentalresponde to situations
of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the AntiSubversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and
I am not presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only
perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that there was
an insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the
constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and
abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought
that evenhad my view prevailed, all that it would mean is
that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of
thinkingto what is ordained by the fundamental law,
wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be
entertained thenthat a setback would be occasioned to
legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive
activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof
the bill of attainder clause is the meaning attachedto it by
the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people
who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on
November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall.
277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an
act of Parliament by which a man was tried, convictedand
sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in
court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and
without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas
attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable
quality of acquiring and disposing property bydescent.
(Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty
imposed was less than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill
of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto
laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the
name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of
attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform
activities." 5 Two American SupremeCourt decision were
thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v.
Missouri 6 and Ex parte Garland. 7 They speak
unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form,
that apply either to named individuals or
easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflicton them punishment amounting to a deprivation
ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa
Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath
requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865.
29 | I n G e n e r a l
UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in conscience
subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such
actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue
inpractice contending that the test oath requirement
wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any
rate,he was pardoned. The same ruling was announced by
theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a
punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other
of the actsit adds a new punishment to that before
prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition
of the Consitutionagainst the passage of an ex post facto
law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ...
wehave had occasion to consider at length the meaning of
abill of attainder and of an ex post facto law in the clauseof
the Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and
it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like
prohibition is contained in the Constitution
againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the
argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of
the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act
ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and
Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in
1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents,
Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for several
yearsworking for the government. The government
agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully
satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep
thememployed on their jobs. Over their protest, Congress
providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency
AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an amendment
attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943,
no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of
any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for
services as jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless
they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again appointed to
jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the
Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional enactment,
and thefailure of the President to reappoint the
respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work
on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943,
but their compensationwas discontinued after that date.
Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for
the salariesto which they felt entitled. The Ameican
Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to
whether theaction in the light of proper construction of the
Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether
Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents
wereconcerned.
After holding that there was a juditiciable, view
theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304
fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional
actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No
Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall be passed.'
InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be
lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
30 | I n G e n e r a l
have committed the specifiedacts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no
uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec
characteristics and therefore cannothold union office
without incurring criminal liability members of the
Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party
ofthe United States to register was sustained, the opinionof
Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a fivemanmajority, did indicate adherence to the
Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party
been outlawed,the outcome certainly would have been
different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches
notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The
singlingout of an individual for legislatively prescribed
punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis
called by name or described in terms of conduct
which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a
designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive
Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the
registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the
Act,are found to be under the direction, domination, or
controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily
toadvance certain objectives. This finding must be
madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial
reviewwhich opens the record for the reviewing
court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as
tofact are supported by the preponderance of the
evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element
to whichthe statute attaches legal consequences, not
merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of
particularly personsineluctably designated by the
legislature." 19
The teaching of the above cases, which I find
highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in the
mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the AntiSubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder
clause. Itshould be noted that three subsequent cases
upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were
likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation
accorded to themby my brethren is, of course, different but
I am unable togo along with them especially in the light of
the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is not to
lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive
such aholding of its explicit character as shown by this
excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the
Anti-SubversionAct a bill of attainder it would be totally
unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law
alone,without more, would suffice to secure their conviction
andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to
bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its
subversive character and with specific intentto further its
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the
control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not
implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In
31 | I n G e n e r a l
isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by the
philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to
theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be
absolute for even the right to non-heretical speech
cannot beabsolute it still seems wise to tolerate the
expression evenof Communist, fascist and other heresies,
lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies,
and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly
sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount
to an incitement to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion.
The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of
Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is loyalty
shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the
Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof views
affecting the very life of the state, even ifopposed to its
fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require
as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely
ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled
constitutionalprinciple "that even though the governmental
purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an
areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24
This is so for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over breadth"
in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If such be the
case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally
infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion to be
drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe
dissent of Justice Black in the Communist Party
casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a
legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment
ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found
inthe opinion of this noted jurist offensive to the
FirstAmendment of the American Constitution
safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing
certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment
was designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas
aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the
interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be
viewed inother countries and whatever change in the
existing structureof government it may be hoped that these
ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is trying to
spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world
ideals that are revolutionary in many countries seems to
be aparticularly inappropriate time to stifle First
Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments
that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas
here couldbe used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of
democracyin other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I
believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the
internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot
be made todepend upon the use of force by Government to
make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a
commonmold on any single subject. Such enforced
32 | I n G e n e r a l
our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters
radically.At least, it should take earnest steps in that
direction.What is important for those at the bottom of the
economicpyramid is that they are not denied the
opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children,
cannot evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional
regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion. Such
a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit
of thinning,if not completely eliminating, the embattled
ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That
forme would be more in accordance with the basic
propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent
on the adoption of a way of life so totally opposed to the
deeply felt traditions of our people. This is, for me at least,
an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed, with
an expression of regret that it could not have been more
impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find
myself unable to yield concurrence to the ably-written
opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the
validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
33 | I n G e n e r a l
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those
whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege.
It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,1[1] that cannot be taken lightly by anyone either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which
raise a single question of profound importance to the
nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the
rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that
could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission
on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ
34 | I n G e n e r a l
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No.
04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642[2] in an
action for certiorari under Rule 653[3] of the Revised Rules
35 | I n G e n e r a l
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary
form of government under the 1973 Constitution might
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
36 | I n G e n e r a l
subjects."13[13] In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all
of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the
Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;15[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,16[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in
the Philippine Islands,17[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera
de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July
1870.18[18]
Thus
(a)
(b)
Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if
they were born outside of Spain,
(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.20[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
would remain virtually intact.
37 | I n G e n e r a l
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."23[23]
38 | I n G e n e r a l
(4)
law.
2.
3.
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940;
4.
5.
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
39 | I n G e n e r a l
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d)
When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value
given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1)
the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which
makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.31[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death. It
would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
40 | I n G e n e r a l
In Pareja vs. Pareja,35[35] this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment
could be demanded generally in cases when the child had
in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action
to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of
the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the
child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article
172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
xxx
x x x.
41 | I n G e n e r a l
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x
x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes
for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree
it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships
found in different parts of the Civil Code,39[39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.40[40] In adoption,
for instance, an adopted child would be considered the
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights
as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only
to define his rights under civil law41[41] and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were
strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
2.
Sr.
3.
Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4.
Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20,
1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxx
xxx
xxx
7.
Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and
became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had
their first child in 1938.
42 | I n G e n e r a l
9.
Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their
first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando
II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until
the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were
blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxx
xxx
xxx
18.
I am executing this Declaration to attest to the
fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe,
Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of
January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,42[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence
is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate
case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
43 | I n G e n e r a l
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father.
But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof
that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin.
Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x
It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the
obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
44 | I n G e n e r a l
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1.
G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
"Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2.
G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
45 | I n G e n e r a l
G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992
MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25
September 1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). His appointment was classified as
"Reinstatement/Permanent". Before said appointment, he
was working at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a
government-owned and controlled corporation under the
Department of Agriculture.
On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary,
covering the period from 25 September to 31 October
1989. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI
deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his
absences during the covered period, namely, 29
September 1989 and 20 October 1989, inclusive of
Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically, the dates of
said absences for which salary deductions were made, are
as follows:
1. 29 September 1989 Friday
2. 30 September 1989 Saturday
3. 01 October 1989 Sunday
4. 20 October 1989 Friday
5. 21 October 1989 Saturday
6. 22 October 1989 Sunday
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief,
General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989
inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the
employee has no leave credits.
Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a
memorandum dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49
of the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil
Service which states that "when an employee is on leave
without pay on a day before or on a day immediately
preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday,
Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay (CSC, 2nd
Ind., February 12, 1965)."
Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990
addressed to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas raising the following question:
Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay
on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of
absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday? 1
Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued
that a reading of the General Leave Law as contained in
the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil
Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service
46 | I n G e n e r a l
does not show that a government employee who is on
leave of absence without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday
is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Further, a
reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of
House Bill No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that
while the law excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in
the computation of leave credits, it does not, however,
include a case where the leave of absence is without pay.
Hence, applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit. Moreover, to
take a different posture would be in effect giving more
premium to employees who are frequently on leave of
absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from
incurring further absence without
pay. 4
47 | I n G e n e r a l
Sec. 284. After at least six months' continues (sic) faithful,
and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of
department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal
employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or
laborer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national
government, the provincial government, the government of
a chartered city, of a municipality, of a municipal district or
of government-owned or controlled corporations other than
those mentioned in Section two hundred sixty-eight, two
hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof,
fifteen days vacation leave of absence with full pay,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for each
calendar year of service.
The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave
of 15 days each year of service to be with full pay. But
under the present law, in computing these periods of
leaves, Saturday, Sunday and holidays are included in the
computation so that if an employee should become sick
and absent himself on a Friday and then he reports for
work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the
Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be
considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday,
Sunday and Monday, or four days.
48 | I n G e n e r a l
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
State
Bank: 14
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects
with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly
situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted
salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein
invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial
burden on the national and local governments considering
the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also,
administrative and practical considerations must be taken
into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective
application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the
respondent Commission and the Congress of the
Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice
and equity to all affected government employees.
It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 amending
the herein invalidated policy was promulgated on 26
April 1991, deductions from salaries made after said date
in contravention of the new CSC policy must be restored to
the government employees concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions
No. 90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The
respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate
action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts
previously but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary
as above indicated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
49 | I n G e n e r a l
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro
D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro
D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to
record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use
of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation
and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the
said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
50 | I n G e n e r a l
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200
refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other
than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing
the information based on the ground that the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal
issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that
the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a
private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that
the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11
or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
51 | I n G e n e r a l
observations are being made should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of
persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you
say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest, well,
he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take
a recording of the observations and remarks of a person
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12,
1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12,
1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks
to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice
to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to
a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
52 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced
the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of
the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous
success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR
THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
53 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,
where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
54 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all
forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit,
nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have
expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos
and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it
could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply
means that the local government units are permitted to
prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories,
including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed
out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of
inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers
of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to
its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding
the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its
liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units.
Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of
the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government
unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;
55 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the
other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the
problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their
advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they
contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to
this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot
prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change
has been made by the Local Government Code itself,
which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in
the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over
the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another
law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words.
While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may
now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in
fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated
by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used
therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local
government units have now no choice but to prevent and
suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes
both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate
or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed
upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white
elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers
as a prime source of government revenue through the
operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f)
of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of
the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code,"
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No.
319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such
other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and
56 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except
only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two
kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized
by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so.
The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them
to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction
between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere
ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169
and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
57 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Separate Opinions
58 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this
regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying
phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's
Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution
No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
# Separate Opinions
59 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 1869.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a
separate opinion that:
. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the
prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity
known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is,
therefore, the political departments of government, namely,
the legislative and the executive that should decide on
what government should do in the entire area of gambling,
and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.
(emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government's own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is
generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon
government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the
government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal
is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify
the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with
gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render
it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the
government can be realized from it. The same is true of
gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should reexamine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the
gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City;
for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is
very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of
the Filipino sense of values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to
express my views on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to
issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
60 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs
which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it. (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
"Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of
lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's
Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution
No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and
61 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna
seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1
in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna,
defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2
rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner
guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act
(Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of
Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads
as follows:
That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of
an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized
insurance company, registered under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a
Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the
amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused
having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such
agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner,
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals
are quoted hereunder:
IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7
March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's husband,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with
license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at
Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S.
Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with
beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00;
apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present
information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private
prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec.
189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance
by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S.
Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaa de Seguros, ...
62 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
No insurance company doing business within the Philippine
Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission
or other compensation to any person for services in
obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have
first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a
certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company
as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance, any commission or other
compensation from any insurance company doing business
in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually
on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter.
Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance
Commissioner only upon the written application of persons
desiring such authority, such application being approved
and countersigned by the company such person desires to
represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the
Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he
may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the
right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be
valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the
year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal
certificates may be issued upon the application of the
company.
Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or
transmits for a person other than himself an application for
a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or
assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall
be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and
shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company
is subject.
Any person or company violating the provisions of this
section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On
the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or
broker, of the commission of any offense connected with
the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner
shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued
to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to
such convicted person.
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that
the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as
agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes
the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is
prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189
of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus
... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most
active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to
Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and
received the pay thereof her defense that she was only
acting as helper of her husband can no longer be
sustained, neither her point that she received no
compensation for issuance of the policy because
any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits
for a person other than himself an application for a policy of
insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to
act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an
insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall
thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of such
company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she
had obtained the insurance,
for compensation
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the
Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant
apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under
the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it
is provided that,
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or
receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent
thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to
act from the insurance commissioner, which must be
renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six
months thereafter.
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of
the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled. 12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate
court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance
agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not
applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first
paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes
that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person
is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph,
there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent.
We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance
agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first
and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within
the intent of Section 189. Hence
Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, ...
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the
second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent
mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section.
The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent"
63 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the
aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three
paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it
must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any
single part, portion or section or from isolated words and
phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context. This means that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment,
not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides
that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The
appellate court has established ultimately that the
petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for
the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate
court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an
essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911,
Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without
a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an
information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive
compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no
offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision
of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma
1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as
insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in
such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance
contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation
is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
the crime must be alleged and proved. 20
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65 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. 183137
xxx
66 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a
proper remedy. On the validity of Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance, the RTC noted that, while Section 59,
Article X imposes a percentage tax, Section 133 (i) of the
LGC itself allowed for exceptions. It noted that what the
LGC prohibits is not the imposition by LGUs of percentage
taxes in general but the "imposition and levy of percentage
tax on sales, barters, etc., on goods and services only."5 It
further gave credence to the Province of Benguet's
assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase
other places of amusement in Section 140 of the LGC.
On May 21, 2008, the RTC denied Pelizloys Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10,
2008 on pure questions of law. It assailed the legality of
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as being a
(supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 (i)
of the LGC.
In its Comment, the Province of Benguet, erroneously
citing Section 40 of the LGC, argued that Section 59,
Article X of the Tax Ordinance does not levy a percentage
tax "because the imposition is not based on the total gross
receipts of services of the petitioner but solely and actually
limited on the gross receipts of the admission fees
collected."6 In addition, it argued that provinces can validly
impose amusement taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots, these being
amusement places.
For resolution in this petition are the following issues:
1. Whether or not Section 59, Article X of Provincial Tax
Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet
Revenue Code of 2005, levies a percentage tax.
2. Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose
amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being
"amusement places" under the Local Government Code.
The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty,"7 and as
such, inheres in the State. Such, however, is not true for
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays as they are
not the sovereign;8 rather, they are mere "territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines".9
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities,
muncipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City
Council of Baguio:10
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign
state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any
doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting
that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no
place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a
municipal corporation.11 [Underscoring supplied]
Therefore, the power of a province to tax is limited to the
extent that such power is delegated to it either by the
67 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods
sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or
earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale of
services." Also, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known
as the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in Section
125, Title V,16 lists amusement taxes as among the (other)
percentage taxes which are levied regardless of whether or
not a taxpayer is already liable to pay value-added tax
(VAT).
Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the
gross receipts incurred by certain specified establishments.
Thus, applying the definition in CIR v. Citytrust and drawing
from the treatment of amusement taxes by the NIRC,
amusement taxes are percentage taxes as correctly
argued by Pelizloy.
However, provinces are not barred from levying
amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of
percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of the LGC prohibits the
levy of percentage taxes "except as otherwise provided" by
the LGC.
Section 140 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 140. Amusement Tax - (a) The province may
levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at
a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross
receipts from admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be
deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or
operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the
gross receipts are divided between said proprietors,
lessees, or operators and the distributors of the
cinematographic films.
(c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals,
painting and art exhibitions, flower shows, musical
programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop,
rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment
of the tax herein imposed.
(d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time,
manner, terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In
case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and
penalties.
(e) The proceeds from the amusement tax shall be shared
equally by the province and the municipality where such
amusement places are located. [Underscoring supplied]
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception
to the general rule in Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly
allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes
on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are not among those places
expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of
68 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
halls and circuses" which were already mentioned in PD
No. 231. Also, 'artistic expression' as a characteristic does
not pertain to 'boxing stadia'.
In the present case, the Court need not embark on a
laborious effort at statutory construction. Section 131 (c) of
the LGC already provides a clear definition of amusement
places:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title,
the term:
xxx
(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing
the show or performances [Underscoring supplied]
Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and
boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying
characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the
staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows,
exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be
viewed by an audience. Accordingly, other places of
amusement must be interpreted in light of the typifying
characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances" or being venues primarily used to stage
spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances,
and other events meant to be viewed by an audience.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22
show means "a spectacle or display of something,
typically an impressive one";23 while performance means
"an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other
form of entertainment."24 As such, the ordinary definitions
of the words show and performance denote not only
visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things)
but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or
presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and
(correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be
considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission
to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". While it is true that they may be venues
where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display,
stage or present shows and/or performances.
Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or
class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and
boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as
among the other places of amusement contemplated by
Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject
to amusement taxes.
At this juncture, it is helpful to recall this Courts
pronouncements in Icard:
The power to tax when granted to a province is to be
construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be
resolved against the province. Inferences, implications,
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G.R. No. L-15045
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application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural
establishments, or enterprises. .
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted
pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of the Philippines to
develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the
police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to
working women and minors, and is in full accord with the
constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with
the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of
the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the
extent of its provisions to relations between capital and
labor in industry and agriculture.
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious
organizations under the coverage of the Social Security
Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the
application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of
any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds
contributed to the System created by the law are not public
funds, but funds belonging to the members which are
merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate,
assuming that said funds are impressed with the character
of public funds, their payment as retirement death or
disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the
cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment
shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but
because he is an employee.
Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the
Social Security Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate
religious information. All that is required of appellant is to
make monthly contributions to the System for covered
employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to
appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on
employment." Together with the contributions imposed
upon the employees and the Government, they are
intended for the protection of said employees against the
hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line
with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572
kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social Security
Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs
against appellant.
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[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002]
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG
and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari49[1] of the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC
for brevity) en banc50[2] dated June 10, 1999 and October
26, 2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the
complaint51[3] filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias
for brevity) and Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 664652[4] and
Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.53[5]
The Facts
Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas
Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative
of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.54[6]
The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of
election returns at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol
Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998
to May 15, 1998.55[7]
On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint
with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of
Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i)
of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz,
Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who
was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez
(Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent
Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province.
Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain
Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was
then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc,
Mountain Province.
Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police
checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province
blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc,
and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial
Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that
policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented
their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the
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as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the
province. There are other checkpoints established in other
parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban
and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on
Election during the election period.
4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol
grounds in response to earlier information that some
groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which
were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial
Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this
had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the
canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of
individuals identified with no less than affiantscomplainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was
conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting
invectives at certain candidates and their leaders. This
group likewise were holding placards and posted some in
front of the capitol building.
x x x58[10]
73 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have
the right to examine the returns being canvassed without
touching them, make their observations thereon, and file
their challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by
the board of canvassers.
In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to
substantiate his claim that private respondents denied him
his right to be present during the canvassing. There was
even no showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents
prevented him from entering the canvassing room.
As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias,
Pilando was present and even participated actively in the
canvassing.63[15] Malinias failed to show that his rights as
a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged
failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias
claimed that even though Pilando was present during the
canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room after
eluding the policemen and passing through the rear
entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building.64[16] This
allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and
convincing evidence. Pilando himself, who was purportedly
prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing
room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement
rendering the same self-serving and baseless.
In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher
failed to attend the canvass proceedings, this Court held:
Another matter which militates against the cause of
petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered
prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the
canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what
substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does
not disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher was
present, the result of the canvassing would have been the
same?
There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that
respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as
emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 853,
this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the
absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of
the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the
respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its
competence is entitled to the utmost respect, xxx. There is
justification in this case to reiterate this principle.65[17]
Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room
only after successfully evading the policemen surrounding
the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily
complained of this alleged unlawful act during the canvass
proceedings. He could have immediately reported the
74 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the
security or police organizations or government ministries,
commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities,
or government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or
operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence
agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the
room where the canvassing of the election returns are held
by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty
meters from such room: Provided, however, That the board
of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary,
may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any
peace officers for their protection or for the protection of the
election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of
the board, or for the maintenance of peace and order, in
which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be
in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a
radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by
the board of canvassers at any time.
Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked
that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election
offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it
is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election
offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262
of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of
B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election
offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the
penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262
is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more
than six years.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the
COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged
violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because
this is a non-criminal act.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is
the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
xxx
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
75 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees.
Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those
holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force,
special forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units and all other para-military units that now exist
or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages
in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term
partisan political activity as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to
a public office.77[29] Malinias asserts that, in setting up a
checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain
Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and
Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and
to counsel during the canvassing. This interference
allegedly favored the other candidate.
While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting
up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the
COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2968, among others.78[30] There was no
clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the
setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other
candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz
and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in
implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no
basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived
Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the
canvassing.
The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the
checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed
duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the
vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted
with any color of political activity. There was also no
showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol
grounds favored the election of the other candidates.
In summary, we find that there is no proof that the
COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with grave
abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited
power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and
prosecute actions for election offenses.79[31] Thus, where
there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual
findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings
on the sufficiency of evidence.80[32]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
76 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
SHARICA MARI L. GOTAN
Petitioner,
- versus
SPOUSES PERFECTO
C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN,
Promulgated:
Respondents.*
September 30,
2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
77 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No.
9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of
the law.
78 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
xxx
79 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
80 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. 202242
81 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the
failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when
there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a
plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress
would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate
the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale
of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition
would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not
exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in
amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the
assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the
first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second
grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of
this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall
discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino
people by which the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited and defined and by which those
powers are distributed among the several departments for
their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on
one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and
society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have
been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every
word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to
exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained
inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels
acceptance and bars modification even by the branch
tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument
of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in
opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through
the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one
(1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided,
as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that
several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune
with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4,
Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential
election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20
Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to
replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
82 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction
and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."
xxx
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Respondents contention that the current irregular
composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through
the present action, deserves scant consideration. Wellsettled is the rule that acts done in violation of the
Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious
cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of
estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as
an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very
beginning and cannot be the source of any power or
authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a
general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the
Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents
perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the
Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of
the Constitution, read into the law something that is
contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would
otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment
to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative
omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court
cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted
from inadvertence or because the case in question was not
foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply
what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its
84 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. 78585 July 5, 1989
JOSE ANTONIO MAPA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive
Secretary, and LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Francisco T. Mamaug for petitioner.
Emiliano S. Samson for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
We are called upon once again, in this special civil action
for certiorari, for a pronouncement as to whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the executive branch
of Government, particularly in the adjudication of a
controversy originally commenced in one of its regulatory
agencies.
Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Office of the President, rendered by the Deputy Executive
Secretary on April 24,1987, 1 which dismissed his appeal
from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC, for short),
promulgated on January 10, 1986 and affirming the
decision of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner
avers that public respondent "gravely transcended the
sphere of his discretion" in finding that Presidential Decree
No. 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in
this case and in consequently dismissing the same. 2
The established facts on which the assailed decision is
based are set out therein as follows:
Records disclose that, on September 18, 1975, appellant
Jose Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development
Corporation (Labrador, for short), owner/developer of the
Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into
two contracts to sell over lots 12 and 13 of said subdivision.
On different months in 1976, they again entered into two
similar contracts involving lots 15 and 16 in the same
subdivision. Under said contracts, Mapa undertook to make
a total monthly installment of P2,137.54 over a period of
ten (10) years. Mapa, however, defaulted in the payment
thereof starting December 1976, prompting Labrador to
send to the former a demand letter, dated May 5, 1977,
giving him until May 18, 1977, within which to settle his
unpaid installments for the 4 lots amounting to P15,411.66,
with a warning that non-payment thereof will result in the
cancellation of the four (4) contracts. Despite receipt of
said letter on May 6,1977, Mapa failed to take any action
thereon. Labrador subsequently wrote Mapa another letter,
dated June 15, 1982, which the latter received on June 21,
1982, reminding him of his total arrears amounting to
P180,065.27 and demanding payment within 5 days from
receipt thereof, but which letter Mapa likewise ignored.
Thus, on August 16, 1982, Labrador sent Mapa a notarial
cancellation of the four (4) contracts to sell, which Mapa
received on August 20, 1982. On September 10, 1982,
however, Mapa's counsel sent Labrador a letter calling
Labrador's attention to, and demanding its compliance with,
85 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters letters or in
any form of advertisements, within one year from the date
of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may
be fixed by the Authority.
86 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
by the OAALA and its subsequent report reveal that
Labrador substantially complied with its obligation. 10
Furthermore, the initial non-construction of the cul-de-sac,
as private respondent Labrador explained, was because
petitioner Mapa requested the suspension of its
construction since his intention was to purchase the
adjoining lots and thereafter enclose the same. 11 If these
were not true, petitioner would have invoked that supposed
default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted, petitioner
"stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as
December, 1976, which is a mere five months after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 957 or about a year after the
execution of the contracts. This means that respondent still
has 1 and 1/2 years to comply with its legal obligation to
develop the subdivision under said P.D. and two years to
do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for
complainant to have suspended payments in December,
1976 on the ground of non-development since the period
allowed for respondent's obligation to undertake such
development has not yet expired." 12
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition
should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
87 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. L-13160
88 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
bureau or office and in the absence of special provision,
any other officer appointed by him, pending an
investigation of the charges against such officer or pending
an investigation of his bureau or office. With the approval of
the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or
office may likewise preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee in his bureau or under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer,
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if
there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service. (Emphasis supplied).
It will be noticed that it introduces a small change into
Section 694 of the Revised Penal Code by placing a
comma after the words "grave misconduct," so that the
phrase "in the performance or neglect", as it did under
Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, now
qualifies only the last word "neglect", thereby making clear
the person charged is guilty merely to neglect, the same
must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is
charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct
these need have no relation to the performance of duty.
Thus is readily understandable. If a Government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his force, they affect his right to continue in
office. The Government cannot well tolerate in its service a
dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly
and well, because by reason of his government position, he
is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the Government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty
less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his
evil acts and actuations. As the Solicitor General well
pointed out in his brief, "the private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee
to continue in office and the discipline and morals of the
service."
It may not be amiss to state here that the alleged
misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not
entirely disconnected with the office of the petitioner. True,
the Maternity Employee's Cooperative Association that
own, the funds said to have been misappropriated is a
private entity. However, as its name implies a, it is an
association composd of the employees of the Maternity
Children's Hospital where petitioner was serving as an
employee. Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and
occupied the position of manager and cashier of said
association, it was because he was an employee of the
Maternity and Children's Hospital. The contention though
indirect, and, in the opinion of some, rather remote, exists
and is there.
The trial court cites a cases of Mondano vs. Silvosa 97
Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6], 284 Lacson vs. Roque (92
Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93), and others to support its
holding that an official may not be suspended
for]irregularities not committed in connection with his office.
89 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR
OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely,
respondents and intervenors separate motions for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17,
1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our
Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein we voted
two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our
earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve
the said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the
matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en
banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our
Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted
without action the intervenors Motion For Reconsideration
With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc
filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations,
to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek
redress before the Court after their motion for leave to
intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998
Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the
Court En Banc, was also denied in the November 17, 1998
Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of
December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of movants December
3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering
that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join
them (movants) in seeking a reconsideration of the
November 17, 1998 Resolution.i[1]
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed their Motion For Reconsideration Of
The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc
(With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)
on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a Manifestation
and Motionii[2] and a copy of the Registered Mail Billiii[3]
evidencing filing of the said motion for reconsideration to
this Court by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both
respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not
90 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that local government units need
not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The
dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case
states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial courts order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires
the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx
xxx
91 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or
paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result, he maintain his original position that
the case should go to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO, J.:
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno
that this case should be referred to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for
reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its
resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am
bound to abide by the Court En Bancs Resolution No. 991-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the issue of
an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote
with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the
above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my
views on this issue and put them on record, so, in the event
that the Court decides to re-open and re-discuss this issue
at some future time, these considerations may be referred
to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the
majoritys position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a
division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division
when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the
division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by
the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such
members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by a
majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a
larger division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the
Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some
questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO:
banc?
MR. SUAREZ:
xxx
xxx
92 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original
cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed with the Court.
However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
the only original cases which are taken cognizance of by
this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction.
But, invariably, these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So, there
will be no instance when a division will be ever taking
cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the
divisions are either petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for
review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should
there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of a case by the
division, although apparently no action is passed, a
decision may still be rendered-the petition is hereby
DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This is
definitely in consonance with the majoritys line of reasoning
in the 2-2 vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is
that, the 2-2 vote in the deliberation of the case at the first
instance should still be referred to the Court En Banc? The
reason is simple. Because the express provision of the
Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for
there to be a valid and binding decision of the Court. But,
why do we not apply the same rule to motions for
reconsideration? Even on this score alone, it is my view
that, in all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a
case at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a
division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to
motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates cases or matters (which for me has no
material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration
cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks
to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum
majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To
say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to
construe something which cannot be sustained by a
reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for
reconsideration is not a case but only a matter which does
not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon
in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to
elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of
unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the
issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be
sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a
division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the
motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc
which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative
body, an even vote results in the failure of the proposition,
only because there is no higher body which can take over.
In our own Court En Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a
7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or
93 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,
petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.
DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN,
and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in
the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life
as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held
the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .
3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable
as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had
already ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
94 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
authorities who should be held liable Liability under this
rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The
modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades"
should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in
Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits
parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court
declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not
been sued that the school was not liable because it was
not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the
custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other
members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in
the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although
the wrongdoer who was already of age was not
boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in
charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court
declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10
including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to
the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age
were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and
submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed
by students not yet of age as the school would be acting
only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with
Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that
"since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school,
the question as to the applicability of the cited codal
provision to academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not
95 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its
custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or
the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply because
the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. There does
not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature
and for increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused
by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result
of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly
should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing
that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of
the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school
only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a
school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the
head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of
the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the
school of arts and trades was such a master and so was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students,
who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with
his students and exercised only administrative duties over
the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the
students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and
trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and
the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the
provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into
96 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the
student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of
the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by
this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held
to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior,
but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as
the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher
will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be
liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case,
liability attached to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed
by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc
that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under
this article in view of the increasing activism among the
students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be
sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the
present ruling, it is not the school that will be held directly
liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available
to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal
for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases
now, in fact, these measures are effected through the
assistance of an adequate security force to help the
teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students.
Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken
adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be
committed by its students.
97 | P r o v i s o s , E x c e p t i o n s , a n d S a v i n g C l a u s e s
the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And
while it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view
of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated
an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned
the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him
to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held
to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the
record and in the light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize
with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a
balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
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G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL
OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN
POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO
BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO
RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN,
MARCELO LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and
TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City
Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City
Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding
Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS
CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City,
Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil
Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San
Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted against the City of San
Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer
of San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is
the incumbent City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan,
that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its
creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a
third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became
effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries
of city judges of second and third class cities shall be
P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then
actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which
P350.00 was the share of the national government and
P650.00 is the share of the city government, which salary
was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City
Judge of a third class city; that under Republic Act No.
5967, the difference between the salary actually being
received by a City Judge and the basic salary established
in said act shall be paid by the city government; that from
June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition on January 21,
1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of
P9,500.00 with the respondent City of San Carlos
(Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested
the respondents to enact the necessary budget and to pay
him the said differential but the respondents, without any
justification, whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the
same; that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the
necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of
the petitioner as provided for in Republic Act No. 5967; that
petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy
except the present action for mandamus; and that because
of the refusal of the respondent to comply with their
obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the
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of said Section 7 should give way to the provisions of said
section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took
effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was
a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received
an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of
San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00
which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary
of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No.
17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the following
discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I
recall that there will be some cities where the city judges
will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And
in all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a
department head theoretically, at least, under the
mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes of public
administration that a city department head should receive a
salary higher than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I
would like to congratulate Your Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the
concern of the distinguished gentleman from Davao. But in
this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished
lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay it
at P100.00 exactly less than the salary of the mayor. It is
just the limit the maximum but they may fix it at much
less than that. That is why the words "at least" were
suggested by the Committee. It need not be exactly just
P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example
the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod or Manila for that matter.
The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now,
under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva
Ecija and
Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor
does it mean that if the salary of the city mayor is
P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention
to lines 13 to 20. We presented this amendment because it
says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and
other first class cities, the city judge shall receive one
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge".
So it will happen, and my attention was called by the
gentlemen from Iloilo that the city judge win be receiving
more salary than the city mayor. Hence the amendment,
Mr. President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas,
and this was their objection. We have proposed this
amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city
judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they
will be receiving less than what is proposed in this Bill. (Vol.
IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages 27732787. (Emphasis supplied .) 4
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G.R. No. L-43182 November 25, 1986
MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City,
THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, both of
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL
and FELICIANO C. TALENS, respondents.
Hermenegildo V. Lopez and Amado B. Cresini, Jr. for
petitioners.
Dominador G. Magno for private respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is the legality of
Administrative Order No. 3, issued on January 10, 1972, by
the then mayor Marcial F. Samson, of Caloocan City, one
of the petitioners herein, whereby petitioner mayor
summarily terminated the services of the private
respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who held the position of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on the ground of "lack
and loss of confidence" and appointing in place of the latter
Hermogenes Liwag, a co-petitioner in this case. Cited in
support of the challenged administrative order is section
5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Act of 1959, as amended. The above-cited
provision declares the position of secretaries to city mayors
non-competitive and this was interpreted by herein
petitioner Mayor as to include the position of Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor.
In a resolution dated October 29, 1982, this Court granted
the motion of the widow of private respondent to substitute
the heirs of private respondent Feliciano C. Talens in place
of respondent, in view of the latter's death on August 28,
1982.
There is no dispute as to the factual antecedents of this
case. Private respondent Feliciano C. Talens, a civil
service eligible, was appointed on March 16, 1970 by then
City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan City, as Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor. His appointment was attested to as
a permanent one under Section 24(b) of Republic Act No.
2260, as amended by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary to the
Mayor and even twice received increases in salary.
On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, who
succeeded City Mayor Macario Asistio, furnished private
respondent herein with the questioned Administrative
Order No. 3, which is hereunder reproduced:
TO: Mr. Feliciano C. Talens
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor
Caloocan City
Pursuant to the provision of Sec. 5 (f) of R.A. No.2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, as
amended, making the positions of Secretaries of City
Mayors, among others, non-competitive, and it being the
inherent nature of your position to be primarily and highly
confidential, you are hereby informed and advised that
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which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature" and continues with an
enumeration of specific officers and employees embraced
within the scope of non-competitive service. Among those
included in the enumeration are heads of departments
created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial
governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.
Although the position of assistant secretary to the city
mayor is not among those expressly declared in Section 5
of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, to be within the
non-competitive service, petitioners, however, argue that
an assistant secretary is also a secretary, and thus
comprised within the general term "secretaries" as provided
for in Section 5(f).
We are not persuaded and find unacceptable such
submission of the herein petitioners. As may be noted, the
general purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act No.
2260) is "to insure and promote the consitutional mandate
regarding appointment only according to merit and fitness,
and to provide within the public service a progressive
system of personal administration to insure the
maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and
courteous civil service in the Philippines." (Section 2, R.A.
2260).
As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the
government, including those in government owned or
controlled corporations, belong to the competitive service.
The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to
be in the non-competitive service and those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature. (Section 3, R.A. 2260, as amended by R.A. No.
6040).
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication ...
(Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J.,
Section 643, pp. 1092-1093, emphasis supplied).
Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on
which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding
from its effects all those not expressly mentioned (Martin,
Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing Dave's Place
vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504).
The exceptions provided for in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 2260, as amended should be, therefore, strictly
construed. It follows then that on this general governing
principle, the position of assistant secretary to the City
Mayor of Caloocan City should be considered as belonging
to the non-competitive service.
The parties are agreed that the nature of the functions
attaching to officer position ultimately determines whether
such position is policy-detrermining, primarily confidential
or higly technical. It is the nature of the position which
finally determines a position to be primarily confidential
(Leon A. Pinero, et al. vs. Rufino Hechanova, et al., 18
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Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any
application to the instant case because the position therein
involved was that of Chief Legal Counsel which, by its very
nature, was rightfully ruled to be both impressed with a
highly technical aspect and confidential character. It can be
readily noted that the facts and circumstances in the
present case and even the principal issue involved in the
case at bar are distinctly different from the cases cited by
petitioners.