CURRENT US STRATEGIC

TARGETING DOCTRINE ( U )
'

(U). "Doctrine" used here as statement'of principles

for employmentof strategic nuclear resources.

--

(U) Based on President's initial guidance for

strategic forces (PRM-10, Jul 7 7 ) .
(01 Maintenance of "essential equivalence".
--_ -fTS.L

---

---

No strategically
inferior
position
CUJ
0
No

'&

un ess

x --Y

---.
---

'&

Maintenance of secure reserve force.

Maintenance of forces and C3 capabilities

to secure limited employment options.

$&

Maintenance of adequate attack warning

and assessment.

--

Aids in maximizing our weapon systems and reduce

the probability of being overwhelmed
by the systems'
technology.

--

Provides the framework for policies (ground rules

for nuclear weapon employment) and objectives (specific
qualitative and quantitative goals for targeting within
capabilities plans).

--

US disarming first strike capability

Soviets do s o first.

(U)

(U)

(U)

Influences acquisition and deployment policies.

\ "J

-f4W Current doctrine result of evolutionary changes in

strategic realities.

--

CUI
4-53)
Achievement of a secure strategic retaliatory
capability by Soviet Union in1 9 6 0 s .

__

HO SAC/XOK/XPS
Col Kearl/2328, Lt Col Locke/4325
3 .Dec 1 9 7 9
.
CLASSIFIED BY:

Multiple SourcesY March 1 9 9 9

2-301C
I

(U) Continuous uncertaintythatthethreatof

large-scale nuclear retaliation provided the
best deterrence.
(U) Erosion o f US a l l i e s 'c o n f i d e n c e
i n strength
and c r e d i b i l i t y of US nuclear deterrent.

({Jj

Decline in confidence of ui, councarcorce

attacks holding damage to theUS to a low level.

cul

Reductions i n US d e f e n s i v ec a p a b i l i t i e s .

Articulated via five

0)

x --

(U)

Formal p o l i c y documents (NSDM 2 4 2 , PD-18).

(U)

Elaboration documents (NUWEP, JSCP)

(U)

Declaratorystatements

(U)

Capabilities
plans

(SECDEF Report t o Congress).

(SIOP).

(U)
Forces,related
command, c o n t r o l , and i n t e l l i g e n c e
which develop,support,
and executethe
plans.

Fundamental Objective:

"Flexible
Nuclear

Response".

Deterrence of nuclear (and conventional)

attacks and coercion by nuclear powers againstUS
and allies.

---

(U)

Concept:

--__
____
-----_

<

(U)

Discourages enemy from takingactions.

(U)

Worksonenemy

intentions.

(U) P r i m a r i l y a peacetime objective.

(U)
F o rc r e d i b i l i t y ,d e t e r r e n c e
must be
e f f e c t i v e o v e r wide range o f p o s s i b l e contingencies.

--__
----

majorelements.

(U)

Rests on many options.

(U)

Requiresspectrum

of c a p a b i l i t i e s .

---

k$

Requiresforcesdesignedto
promote
n u c l e a r s t a b i l i t y and reduce S o v i e t i n c e n t i v e
t o use nuclear weapons.

---- CD.)
(+FA

S u r v i v a b i l i t yc:o n t r o l l e d
able to retaliate.

J
---- Lb
f4E2

---

c!J,

---

Flexibility:

3.

Control escalation

&A

should c o n f l i c t o c c u r .

Confine c o n f l i c tt ol o w e s tl e v e l .

Display restraint
options.

U)

(W

terms.

r(

--

CLJ)

----

Coerce c o n f l i c tt e r m i n a t i o n

( 0)

on acceptable

damage t o US.

PP64

US counterforcecapability

wanning.

IUJ
TTt4-I

Lack of improved c i v i l defensemeasures.

Requires "communication" of US determinat i o n and a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t a g g r e s s i o n c o u p l e d

w i t h i n t e n t and c a p a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e r e s t r a i n t .
(U)

Maximize US power r e l a t i v e to the enemy i f

e s c a l a t i o n cannot be controlled.

Y&

---

by executing limited

IU !
f&4
One of few means f o rl i m i t i n g

X ----

---

c a n provide
options.

(4W)
Communicated p r i m a r i l y through declaratory
policy.

----

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and

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fslsr
CV J

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(U)

--

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uj

L i m i t damage t o US.
M a i n t a i n a s t r a t e g i c force i n reserve.

---

Seeks t o a c h i e v e a f a v o r a b l er e l a t i v ep o s t war position.

---

$&I G u i d e st a r g e t i n g

for g e n e r aw
l ar.

C h r o n o l o g y o f c u r r e n td o c t r i n e
(VJ
W

---

cuj

@S& O r i g i n a l l yf o r m e db y

Zt.

Sec. L a i r di n 1 9 7 0
o f US n u c l e a r d e t e r -

---

TE3 Recommended i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i m i t e dn u c l e a r
employment o p t i o n s t o e n h a n c e d e t e r r e n c e
and limit damage b y c o n t r o l l i n g e s c a l a t i o n .

---

tTs)- F i n d i n g s were b a s i s f o r NSDM 2 4 2 .

tu)

(g

NSDM 2 4 2 (24
Jan
7 4 ) , " P o l i c y for P l a n n i n g
t h e Employment o f Nuclear Weapons".

---

&

Expansion of NSSM 1 6 9 c o n c e p t s .

-----

&%

Primary source of c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e .

Introduced

---:I
4

and p o l i c i e s .

NSSM 1 6 9 ( 1 3 Feb 7 ~ 3 ) , "US N u c l e a rP o l i c y . "

to determineeffectiveness

--

to e a r l yp o s t -

D e s t r o yr e s o u r c e sc r i t i c a l
warrecovery.

L
----

--

i
IUJ

)(

----

c%UJ
---- I
-!

1Regional
Nuclear
Options
(RNO)
Small-scale attacks designed
to counter
deployed attacking enemy-forces
and
their supporting resources to achieve
specific military objectives;

Includes
provision
for
ReserveForce.

Secure

LO)

@W NUWEP ( 4 Apr 7 4 ) Nuclear Weapons Employment

Policy.

---

cu_,

-@E%Translates

NSDM 242 by SECDEF into

policy guidance for employment of nuclear
weapons

iu,,)
---- W

Elaborates on national

policy.

.
----

--

W) JSCP Annex C - Provides specific JCS guidance

for developmentof the SIOP - revised annually.

--

PD 18 ( 2 4 Aug 1977).

---

{UJ

W ) Present administration's statement of

overall nuclear policy.
*J
---- \@&-I
Broad

--- L!J

x -------

--- (01
W

enough to encompass range

of possible employment policies.
Not a radical
policy
change.

( u)

f'W

Reafirms deterrence, damage limitation and escalation control.

U)

Documents strategic posture of

essential equivalence.
k2YG-j

Continues the three-part interrelated

objectives.

----

x -------

-- -

$&

Deter nuclear attack against US

and enhance deterrenceof nonnuclear
aggression against NATO and Asian allies.
f-!

If deterrence fails, provide options

for limited retaliatory responses to control
escalation and flexibly respond
to
aggression.
[ UJ
%)
If control of escalation fails,
seek to limit damage to US and allies
and inflict unacceptable levels of
damage on Soviet Unionso conflict terminates
on most favorable possible terms
to US and

-t"fs)

allies.

NSDM 2 4 2 and NUWEP continue as elaboration

to carry out above objectivesalthough,PD 1 8
supersedes NSDM 2 4 2 .

---

--

(0)
W 3 )

(0)

Directs review o f US nuclear

targeting
policy (NTPR)

NTPR.

(Nuclear
Targeting
Policy

Review)

(0,

---

Evaluates
current
employment p o l i c i e s
and i d e n t i f i e s a l t e r n a t i v e s .

---

(UJ

(XPS3

(4S-l

Major f i n d i n g s .
Lb)

Deterrence
systems.

targethighervalue

$%J!
Escalationcontrol
developa
broader range o f options w i t h more
politicalinputs.

Major issues.

(u)

..-.

:-

.- . .

<.

tps) F l e x i b i l i t y
Recommends b u i l d i n g
blockapproach,restructure
and increase
number o f SAOs ( 2 added t o SIOP 5D and
4 proposed foradditionto
SIOP 5E).

(u)

crs) Endurance

Concentrate on C 3 1 ,
Requirement f o r refinement of SRF and
optionalwithholds.

Counterforce
Give equal p r i o r i t y
compared t o recoveryresources,attack
r e u s a b l et a r g e t s , modernize US forces.
SRF

- Size

and composition change.

("J
@S-)

Escalationcontrol
- More f u l l y
i n t e g r a t e p o l i t i c a l guidance and p a r t i c i p a tion.

(0)

US-NATO i n t e r f a c e - Strengthen
cooperation and i n t e g r a t i o no ff o r c e s
and plans.

"Rf.

----

----

k ---

LO?

for Minuteman ICBM (implemented in SIOP 5 D ) .

ICBM only LUA
against.10~collateral military and
leadership subsets. ,

-@VSJ

LUA

LUA.

--

Maintains
three
planning
assumptions
AWD

GWOD
GWD

Generated with damage, added SIOp

to
sc, Postulates fully generated forces which receive
damage from Soviet first strike.