CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: RIGHT TO HEALTH AND

ENVIRONMENT
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which
the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of

the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the
RTC decision is SET ASIDE

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE
DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
THE
SECRETARY
OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement
with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by
then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to
cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified
portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the
municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965
until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum
order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces,
and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest

concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum

order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent
a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought
reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its
contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but
no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly
covered by petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and
Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009,
while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc.
without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were
controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a
letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter
dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural
Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin
Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an
order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the
concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied.
Petitioner
moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the
timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and
void. The MNR however denied this motion.
Petitioner subsequently
appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The
Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed
with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of
the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting
of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
HELD:

NO.
The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a
reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse
legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is
that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an
alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the
right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep
upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three
years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking
the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering
that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at
the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect,
tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the
reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which
bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against
public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging
company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public
policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide
latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources,
and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290

October 23, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG
as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the
above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought
to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the
principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decisionmaking process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard
of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise
his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all
activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages

resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a
project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case
before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this
Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We
brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e.,
a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use
CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to
a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
J. Corona
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. Ordinance No.
8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the
Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled
down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations.
In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to
2003.

Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance

8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been
superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of
a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the
clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless
the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution
of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they
need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of
manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent
the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He
has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if
these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.

2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effect only until April 30, 2003

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly
and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general
or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate
the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water
Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree
where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government
agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It
shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation
shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such
pollution.

HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to
a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 &
20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by
Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is
institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.
20 days Temporary restraining order

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: UTILIZATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
Facts :
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in
the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim

procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,

development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing
agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within
one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative
Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of
the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of
the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective
effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an
organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality
before this Court.
Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?
Ruling :
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of
declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has

been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue

of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed
repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other
words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands,
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279
provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause,
mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may
not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or
agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with
the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all
the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR
Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PICOP V. BASE METALS
G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006

Ponente: Tinga
FACTS: In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
(CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw
Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as
Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial
operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to
the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining
Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April
29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing
it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims.
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner
PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and
petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA whereby petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims. In 1991, Banahaw Mining
converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw
Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests
over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development,
CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby
recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its
claims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended
Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to
substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support
of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted,
as required. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals' application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be
prejudicial to herein petitioner. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for
petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was in
favor of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of
September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely
confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's
peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It
was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the
boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty

did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not
create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus,
the non-impairment clause finds no application.
Issue: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities
and that the conversion of the agreement into MPSA will run counter to the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution. NO, a Timber license agreement
is not a contract, but a mere privilege. RATIO: We should state at this
juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards
the end that the country's natural resources may be rationally explored,
developed, utilized and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the
equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor
the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that
the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any
damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. Firstly,
assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government
reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other
than mineral reservations, such does not necessarily preclude mining
activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government
reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written
clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such
reservation. Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in
reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the
DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow
mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area
covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines
in the issuance of area status and clearance or consent for mining
applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands,
military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest
reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR
Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among
others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance.
Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the
MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of
the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.

DENR et al VS. YAP et al

NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President
No. 1801declaring

Boracay

Island,

among

other

Marcos issued Proc.

islands,

caves

and

peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under

the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).

President

Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September
3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr.,
and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands.

They declared that they themselves, or through their

predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief.
The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the

public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public

forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
the

Revised

Forestry

Code, as

amended.

The

OSG

maintained

that

respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82

was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by
Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay
Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic
then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines
apublic forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD
No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso
factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition:

national

parks. Of

these, only agricultural

lands

may

be

alienated.Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island

had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under any of these
grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.

The

records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural.

At that time, the courts were free to make

corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit

power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land
Act,

gave

the

Executive

Department,

through

the

President,

the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable

or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands
of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the
other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a
matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are

agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved
in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land
must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof
in each particular case
Forests,

in

the

context

of

both

the

Public

Land

Act

and

the

Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or

timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestryis
particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and
forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and
not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments,

it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable

agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic
ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied alienable lands.

Lack of title does not

necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements.

They can take steps to preserve or protect their

possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to
the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to
acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
requirements under the present land laws.

There is one such bill now

pending in the House of Representatives.

CONSTITUTIONAL
PEOPLES RIGHT
G.R. No. 2869

PROVISIONS:

INDIGENOUS

March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for
writ of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application.
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his
ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. Cario

inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the
land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the
Spanish Crown. In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under
the Spanish Mortgage Law. The North American colonial government,
however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land
prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration
court.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner is granted ownership of the land.
Held:
Yes. The petitioner is entitled to ownership of said land.
The petitioner's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made. And also under the
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, 30.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or

the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an
unlawful

deprivation

of

the

States

ownership

over

lands

of

the

public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in

violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the

Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et
al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the
rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA
law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.