Summary of Craig v.

Boren
S. Ct. (1976)
Relevant Facts: Appellant Craig and Whitener brought an action to have an
injunction issued against Oklahomas enforcement of the 3.2% beer law.
That law prohibits the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21 and females
under 18. Appellants allege this law is unconstitutional by way of invidious
discrimination.
Legal Issue(s): Whether each of the Appellants has standing to sue
Courts Holding: Whitener has standing, Craig does not.
Law or Rule(s): Article III U.S. Constitution, the asserted injury was the
consequence of the defendants actions, or that prospective relief will
remove the injury. Case or controversy requirement. Jus tertii is a rule of self
restraint by the court. Minimizes unwarranted intervention into controversies
where the applicable constitutional questions are ill defined or speculative.
Procedure: District Ct. sustained the constitutionality and dismissed action.
S. Ct. Reversed.
Court Rationale: Craig attained the age of 21 after this court noted
jurisdiction. Whitener evidenced that appellees caused an injury in fact
sufficient to guarantee concrete adverseness. She is either obliged to heed
the discrimination, and suffer economically, or disobey the statutory
command and suffer, sanctions and loss of liberty.
Plaintiffs Argument: The state statute places discriminatory action
mandatorily upon vendors, and therefor vendors have standing to sue.
Defendants Argument: Appellees do not have standing absent a showing
of an injury in fact. A litigant may only assert his/her own constitutional
rights.
jus terrii: Right of third party.

Tatad vs. Garcia

Facts:
Petitioners filed to prohibit respondents from further implementing and
enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a
Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and supplemental agreement of the
former. Petitioners are suing in their capacities as senators and taxpayers.
The argument of the petitioners were: the winning bidder for the
construction and operation of the LRT is a foreign corporation violating the
constitution; build-lease-transfer is not defined nor recognized by the law nor
its implementing rules and regulations; award of the contract on negotiated
basis violates RA 6957; award of contract violates requirements provided in
the implementing rules and regulations of the BOT law; agreement violate
EO 380 for failure of bearing presidential approval; and agreements are
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Respondents contend the petitioners have no legal standing; writ of
prohibition as not a proper remedy and requires ascertainment of facts;
scheme adopted is actually a Build-Transfer scheme allowed by BOT law;
nationality requirement for public utilities does not apply; the presidentially
approved agreements are not disadvantageous to the government; the
negotiation granting the award of the contract and not through public
bidding is allowed by BOT law; and direct negotiation as mode of award for
infrastructure projects is supported by RA 7718.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing on the petition.
Held:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to
questions contracts entered into by the national government or GOCCs
allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only
municipal contracts are involved. The Supreme Court upheld the legal
standing of the petitioners as taxpayers.
Agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of
its governmental function. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the
government agencies entrusted with said function. Petitioners claim that
Build-Lease-Transfer scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not
contemplated by the BOT law has now been rendered moot and academic.
RA 7718 Sec. 3 authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, GOCCs
and local government units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified
proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
financially viable infrastructure or development facilty.
Ultimately, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

IBP vs. Zamora

Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The President directed the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking
his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved
A special civil action filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine
Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols around the
metropolis.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to sue.
Held:
The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is
in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition.
Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case

Philconsa v Enriquez
Petition: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
Petitioner: Philconsa, 16 members of the Senate, FDC
Respondent: Sec. Enriquez of the DBM
Ponente: Quiason
Date: Aug. 19, 1994
Facts:

Case at bar is consolidation of 5 cases relating to claims of authority

between the Legislative and Executive on the General Appropriations
Act of 1994
GAB of 1994 was passed on December 17, 1993; said bill fixed the
budget of the government for the following fiscal year. On December
30, President FVR signed the bill into law (turning it to RA 7663). FVR
delivered Veto Address on the same day.
Petitioners (claiming to have standing as taxpayers and/or legislators)
primarily assail the constitutionality of: 1) conditions imposed by the
President in some of the items in the budget, and 2) the veto made by
FVR on the appropriation for debt service.
Particular items/special provisions were on: 1) debt servicing 2)
revolving fund for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) 3) road
maintenance by the DPWH 3) purchase of military equipment &
medicines 4) AFP pension fund 5) CAFGU deactivation (specific items
tackled in the ratio)

Pertinent laws/provisions:
Sec. 24 & 25, Art. VI pertaining to appropriation bills
Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI Presidential power to veto items in money bills
Issues:
1. WON petitioners have standing
2. WON veto of special provision for debt ceiling is constitutional
3. WON vetoes and conditions set by the President on particular items are
constitutional
Ruling:
1. YES
2. YES
3. (See ratio regarding the validity of the particular vetoed items)
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Case at bar concerns appropriation of national budget, taxpayer suit
stands. Legislators likewise granted standing because the petition
touches on the legislative power on appropriation as stated in the
Constitution.

2. Debt Servicing was one of the special provisions in the GAA (Guingona
Jr. v Carague explains why Congress was allowed to appropriate so
much for this item). The President vetoed said special provision,
without vetoing the amount set aside by Congress (around 86B pesos).
The Court relied on the ruling in Gonzales v Macaraig Jr. that defined
inappropriate provisions, which introduced items that are more
appropriate to be tackled in a separate legislation. Moreover, the
vetoed provision on debt servicing appeared to be an attempt to repeal
PD 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and EO 292. Repeal should be made
in another law and not in the GAA.
Inclusion of debt servicing policy in the GAA was out of place and was
clearly an attempt to log-roll legislation; Court sustained the veto
since the provision was inappropriate anyway and the action was part
of the executives prerogative/presumption that the President will
execute the law faithfully.
3. A) on SUCs: Petitioners argue that the Presidents veto of the
provision that gave SUCs revolving funds was a grave abuse of
discretion, since other govt. agencies were allowed to retain theirs.
Court said that agencies such as the Natl. Stud Farm (lol), which had a
revolving fund as per the GAA, have already been enjoying such as
privilege by operation of other laws. Veto valid.
B) on 70/30 division for road maintenance: the GAA as crafted by
Congress laid down explicitly that only 30% of costs for road
maintenance should be contracted out to the private sector. The
provision is in consonance with Sec. 25(2), Art. VI of the Constitution
and is not an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed. If the
President wished to veto this portion, he would have to veto the entire
GAA. Veto invalid.
C) on medicine purchases by AFP: President vetoed the provision in
light of the Generics Drugs Law. Court said that Congress inserted this
item in the GAA to ensure compliance of procurement of medicines for
the AFP with the National Drug Policy of the DOH. FVR vetoed w/ the
belief that it is more appropriate to have a transition period for the
AFPs medicine procurement system to comply w/ Generics Act. Court
did not find this reasoning valid enough to justify the veto. Veto
invalid.
D) on military equipment: Congress legislated that modernization
fund for AFP will not be released w/o Table of Organization and
Equipment (I suppose a budget plan) to be duly reviewed and
approved by the legislature. This amounted to a legislative veto. The
Executive asserted that this violated certain contractual obligations,
hence its rejection of the provision. Court found said provisions to be
inappropriate in character also. Veto valid.
E) on AFP pension: provision allowed for money to be reappropriated by AFP. Violated Secs. 25(5), 29(1), Art. VI. Veto valid.
F) on deactivation of CAFGUs: Congress in effect legislated that
CAFGUs (vigilantes created by Cory heh) will be deactivated and shall

receive benefits, by providing in the GAA of 1994 that CAFGUs were to

receive a separation pay. President vetoed as he saw the measure as
premature due to ongoing operations of said units in the field.
Petitioners claim that by vetoing, the President disregarded the
deactivation requirement (and the appropriation of funds thereof). This
was an act of impoundment or refusal to tap into appropriations made
by Congress; it is in effect an implied veto. Likewise, the subject matter
should be tackled in another law, as it appeared to repeal PD 1597 and
RA 6758 (again, inappropriate to be placed in an appropriations bill.)
Veto valid.
G) on SC, CHR, etc: President set conditions on the appropriations for
certain items. Presidents creation of guidelines on what Congress has
legislated is part of his executive power.
Dispostion: Petitions (except those pertaining to debt servicing) dismissed.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan vs. Zamora
Facts:
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement
in 1991. The Philippines and US negotiated for a possible extension of the
military bases agreement. On July 18 1987 Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of VF. Negotiations by both panels on the
VFA led to a consolidated draft text. Thereafter, President Ramos approved
the VFA.
On October 5 1998 President Estrada through respondent Secretary of
Affairs Zamora, ratified the VFA. Officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter to the VFA and the
creation of a Legislative oversight its implementation. Debates then ensued.
Respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the
latter have not shown any interest in the case. Petitioners on the other hand,
counter that VFA is a matter of transcendental importance.
Issue:
WON petitioners have legal standing?
Held:
The court said that petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result fo the enforcement of VFA. They also
dont have standing to sue as tax payers since VFA does not involve the
exercise of Congress taxing or spending power. In a taxpayers suit. The act
complained of should directly involve the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. The other petitioners who filed as petitionerslegislators do not have the requisite of locus standi to maintain this suit.
According to the court, while it may be true that petitioners pointed to
provisions of the VFA which may allegedly impair their legislative powers,
they failed to show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. IBP, another
petitioner also lacks standing since there is no board resolution from its
Board of Governors authorizing the National President to commence the
present action. The court, nevertheless decided to take cognizance of the
issues raised. The court upheld its ruing in previous cases such as that of
Gonzales vs Comelec and Kilosbabayan vs Guingona. Technicalities of
procedure may be brushed aside in view of the transcendental importance to
the public where cases are demanded to be settled promptly and definitely.
The court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper

even when there is no direct injury to the party suing if the case is of
transcendental importance.

People vs. Vera

Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC), are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal
case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of
the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of
Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in
the said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC
intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial
unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of
time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the
bulk of the exhibits presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty
ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of
prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified
the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of
prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but
affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied
on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18
December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the
petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24
November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for
leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the
judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before

the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of
the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that
he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro
Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937.
Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding,
set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the
City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng.
The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging,
among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed
by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces
(sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of
the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised
concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O.
Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por
duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme
court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July
1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying
probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13
July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set
for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition
of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case
as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial
court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with
the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of
this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in
obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order
requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to
appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution
of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the
postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the
hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have

been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People
came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which
fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing
the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed
on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the
trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General
and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the SolicitorGeneral and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action
is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws.