Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

appeal. No such motion for reconsideration having been filed

by herein movant-appellant, said Resolution has become
final as of March 5, 1993.
On July 5, 1993, Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied on October 20, 1993.

G.R. Nos. 112389-90 August 1, 1994

In her petition for review before this Court, she alleges that:
MERCEDES D. NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for petitioner.

a) She never sought reinstatement of her appeal but asked that a new trial
be granted on the ground of "newly-discovered evidence.
b) The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that she should have filed a motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal before she filed her motion
for new trial has no support under the present rules and jurisprudence.

CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Mercedes D. Navarro was convicted of violating B.P. 22 in Criminal
Cases Nos. L-3848 and L-3849 in the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan. 1 She went to the Court of Appeals. In a motion dated
September 15, 1992, she asked for an extension of 90 days from September
17, 1992, within which to file her brief. The motion was granted. However,
she failed to file her brief within the extension, and even beyond. On
February 9, 1993, the appellate court dismissed her appeal 2 pursuant to
Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. *
On March 1, 1993, Navarro filed a motion for new trial on the ground of
"newly-discovered evidence." This was denied on June 9, 1993, the appellate
court observing as follows:
While this Court's Resolution dismissing the above-entitled
cases has not yet become final when the present motion for
new trial was filed, appellant-movant failed to show any
compelling reason or justifiable cause for the reinstatement
of the appeal. Hence, the dismissal of the appeal stands and
the filing of the motion for new trial is out of order. Before the
motion for new trial could be considered by us, it is
incumbent
upon
appellant-movant
to
move
for
reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dismissing the

In his comment on the petition, the Solicitor General contends that the appeal
had already been dismissed. What she should have done first was to move
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal and have the appeal reinstated.
The respondent court could not entertain and give due course to any other
pleading filed after the dismissal of the appeal.
The petition must fail.
As Navarro filed only a notice of appeal and not an appellant's brief, her
appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of interest in prosecuting it.
The Court of Appeals was also correct in denying her motion for new trial,
although not simply on the technical ground of failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order.
Rule 124, Sec. 14, of the Rules of Court provides:
At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court
convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move
for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence
material to his defense, the motion to conform to the
provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 121.

In the present case, the motion for new trial was filed with the Court of
Appeals after the dismissal of the appeal for non-filing of the appellant's brief.
The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the appellate court
after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused or
his counsel unless the period is suspended by a motion for new trial.
At the time the motion for new trial was filed by the petitioner with the
appellate court, the resolution dismissing the appeal (and thus affirming the
judgment of the trial court) had not yet become final. Navarro received notice
of the resolution on February 17, 1993. The judgment became final on March
5, 1993. The motion for new trial was filed on March 1, 1993, within the
period fixed under Rule 124. In fact, the appellate court itself admitted that its
resolution dismissing the appeal "ha(d) not yet become final when the motion
for new trial was filed."
It would appear, however, that the petitioner decided to file the motion for
new trial only when she received a copy of the resolution of the appellate
court dismissing her appeal.
After the alleged accidental meeting with the saleslady to whom she claims
to have made payment, the petitioner had taken no step, either by herself or
her counsel, to manifest before the Court of Appeals that she was filing a
motion for new trial because of "newly-discovered evidence."
Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was dismissed,
nor did she offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It was only on
March 1, 1993, or more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-day extension
granted by the appellate court, that she filed her motion for new trial.
The petitioner probably hoped that her lost appeal could be retrieved by a
motion for new trial. It was not.
There is another justification for the denial of the petitioner's motion for new
trial. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion capriciously or
whimsically because the so-called "newly-discovered evidence," if admitted,
would at most have been corroborative only. We do not consider it of so
substantial a character as to overturn the judgment of conviction.
The alleged newly-discovered evidence would have made a difference if the
date of payment made by Navarro to Tamayo's saleslady had been stated

therein, to prove that payment was made within 5 banking days from notice
of the dishonor of the checks. The prima facie presumption laid down in B.P.
22 that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds at the time
of the issuance of the check would have been rebutted. The alleged payment
would have precluded the filing of the charges were it not for the significant
fact that the receipt wasundated.
The conviction was correctly sustained by the respondent court. The
elements of the offense punished in B.P. 22 are: (1) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment. 3
Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee
bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer
is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption that the drawer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the
issuance and on its presentment for payment is rebutted by such payment.
This defense lies regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the
prosecution to prove the elements of the offense. In the case at bar, the
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption by substantiating her allegation
of payment. There is no proof that the payment, if it was really made at all,
was done within 5 days from the notice of dishonor.
Worthy of special note are the following acute observations of Judge Antonio
M. Belen, with which we fully agree:
It is rather strange why the accused did not immediately
inform the complaining witness that she had already paid the
amounts covered by exhibits A and B (checks in question)
when oral as well as written demands were made to her
before the filing of the cases. It is likewise hard to believe
that the accused will just pay and give the sum of P28,750 to
a mere saleslady of the complainant without any receipt.
There is a legal maxim that evidence to be credible must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must

be credible in itself. No better test has yet been found to

measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity
to the knowledge and common experience of mankind
(People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451).
We are satisfied that the respondent court did not err in not granting the
motion for new trial based on the supposed newly-discovered evidence,
which, even if admitted, would not have reversed the petitioner's conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO
LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review
by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case
for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff,
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order
was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased
plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to
have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married
civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that
they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband
cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street,
Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S.
Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several
other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent
was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June
1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May
1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal
separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation
was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil
Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the

deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the
case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss
and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether
or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in
the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on
15 September 1969.

for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for
nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will
abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .

After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the
order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given
due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the
affirmance of the said order. 3

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-andboard separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else)
to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses
can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it
follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio,

filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed
the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for
the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal
separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage
to be null and void ab initio.

... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for

divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place
during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81;
Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .

But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute

for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the
principal issue to be as follows:

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the

sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that
relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the
absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that
death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over
the persons of the parties to the action and of the subjectmatter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to
a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.
1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v.
Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89
N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v.
Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland,

When an action for legal separation is converted by the

counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a
legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is
without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has
acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22).
Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to
declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim,

80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md.

185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60
Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence,
they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute
conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in
the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint
a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of
right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and

disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent,
such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby
extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions
that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the
Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be
deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of

nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such
action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as
one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to
costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28298 November 25, 1983
ROSITA SANTIAGO DE BAUTISTA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Jose D. Villena for plaintiffs-appellees.
Antonio Gonzales for defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City branch, in Civil Case No. 3530, ordering the defendantsappellants to pay the plaintiffs-appellees damages and attorney's fees and
dismissing the former's counterclaim. As no questions of facts were raised by
the appellants in their brief, the Court of Appeals certified this case to us for
decision.
The facts, as stated in the resolution of the appellate court, are as
follows: t.hqw

On May 10, 1952, Numeriano Bautista, husband and father

of the plaintiffs-appellees, respectively, was a passenger of
jeepney bearing Plate No. TPU-4013, owned and operated
by Rosendo de Guzman, deceased husband and father of
defendants-appellants, respectively, as one of the jeepneys
used in his transportation business. Eugenio Medrano y
Torres was employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as the
driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove and managed said
jeepney at that time along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, in a
negligent and reckless manner and, as a result, the jeepney
turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano
Bautista sustained physical injuries which caused his death.
Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence by the trial court in a
decision promulgated on May 27, 1952 and sentenced to a
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano
Bautista, plaintiffs-appellees herein, in the sum of P3,000.00.
A writ of execution was issued against said driver, Eugenio
Medrano for the said sum of P3,000.00 but the same was
returned to the Court unsatisfied.
On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died.
Because of their failure to collect the said sum of P3,000.00
from the driver, Eugenio Medrano, plaintiffs-appellees filed a
complaint (Civil Case No. 2050) dated October 7, 1952, with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,
against defendants-appellants alleging, among other things
besides the above-mentioned incidents, that they demanded
from Rosendo de Guzman and from the defendantsappellants the payment of the sums of P3,000.00 as
subsidiary liability; P10,000.00 as actual exemplary and
moral damages and Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees for the suit
by reason of the death of Numeriano Bautista as related
above, but Rosendo de Guzman and later the herein
defendants-appellants refused to pay the same. Plaintiffsappellees therefore prayed that the defendants-appellants
be ordered to pay the said sums as well as the costs of suit.

Defendants-appellants through counsel filed a motion to

dismiss predicated on two grounds, namely, that the lower
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
litigation and that the complaint stated no cause of action. In
support of said motion, they maintained that the suit was for
a money claim against the supposed debtor who was
already dead and as such it should be filed in testate or
intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such
proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors
should initiate such proceedings, that the heirs could not be
held liable therefor since there was no allegation that they
assumed the alleged obligation.
The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss in an order
dated May 11, 1953, stating, among other things, that: t.
hqw
The procedure thus opened for a money
claimant against a deceased person, as in
the instant case, is for said claimant to file
proceedings for the opening of the judicial
administration of the estate of said
deceased person and to present his claim in
said proceedings. The claimant may only
proceed to sue the heirs of the deceased
directly where such heirs have entered into
an extra-judicial partition of such estate and
have
distributed
the
latter
among
themselves, in which case, the heirs
become liable to the claimant in proportion
to the share which they have received as
inheritance. Plaintiffs' complaint does not
state that the defendants have received any
such inheritance from their said deceased
father, Rosendo de Guzman, and hence,
there is no cause of action against aforesaid
defendants.
This order became final.

Then on December 14, 1954, plaintiffs-appellees filed with

the same trial court Civil Case No. 3530 (subject of this
appeal) against the same defendants in the former case, the
complaint containing analogous allegations as those
embodied in the first complaint but in this second complaint
they further allege that on June 12, 1952, Rosendo de
Guzman died intestate and that intestate proceedings were
filed in the same court and docketed therein as Special
Proceedings No. 1303-P, wherein on April 20, 1953, a project
of partition was presented in and approved by said Court
with the five heirs receiving their shares valued at P2,294.05
each, and on May 14, 1953, said intestate proceedings were
closed. They also alleged that Numeriano Bautista during his
lifetime was the only one supporting them and his death
caused them shock, sufferings and anxiety and therefore
defendants-appellants should pay to them, aside from the
P3,000.00, an additional amount of P15,000.00 as moral,
exemplary and compensatory damages, plus the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees for the prosecution of this case,
besides the costs of suit.
Defendants-appellants again filed a motion to dismiss on
May 5, 1955, alleging the same grounds as those interposed
in the first complaint but adding the further ground of res
judicata in view of the dismissal of the first case which
became final as no appeal or any other action was taken
thereon by the appellees. On August 22, 1955, the lower
court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient merit.

Then on July 11, 1961, the parties through their respective

counsel submitted a partial stipulation of facts found on
pages 63 to 67 of the amended record on appeal which
stipulation of facts, was made the basis of the decision of the
lower court which was rendered on August 26, 1961 (should
be August 14, 1961), aside from the testimony of the widow
of Numeriano Bautista, appellee Rosita Bautista, who
testified on the same incidents already recited herein and on
the sufferings and shock she and her children, all appellees
in this case, suffered. From said decision, the present appeal
has been interposed ...
Defendants-appellants assign the following errors:
It.hqw
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS MOCION DE SOBRESIMIENTO)
FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ON OR
ABOUT MAY, 1955, APPEARING ON PAGE 10 ET SEQ. OF
THE AMENDED RECORD ON APPEAL.
IIt.hqw
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES IS
ALREADY BARRED FOR FAILURE ON THEIR PART TO
FILE THEIR CLAIM IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE DECEASED ROSENDO DE GUZMAN (SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 1303-P) OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL.

xxx xxx xxx

IIIt.hqw
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE DEFENSE
OF RES JUDICATA INTERPOSED BY DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS BY VIRTUE OF THE FINAL ORDER
RENDERED OR ISSUED BY THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 2050, DATED
MAY 11, 1953, COPY OF SAID ORDER IS ATTACHED AS

EXHIBIT "F" AND MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE

PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS.
IVt.hqw
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
ORDERING THE HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
TO JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY PAY THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLEES THE SUM OF THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(p3,000.00), WITH INTERESTS AND COSTS.
V t.hqw
HE
COURT
BELOW
ERRED
IN
DISMISSING
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' COUNTER-CLAIM AND IN
NOT RENDERING A DECISION IN ACCORDANCE
THEREWITH.
The only question presented in the assigned errors is whether or not the trial
court erred in giving due course to the complaint on the grounds stated
above. We sympathize with the plight of the plaintiffs-appellees but they have
lost their right to recover because of negligence and a failure to observe
mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that
they were no longer suing Rosendo de Guzman who died shortly after the
accident but his heirs.
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: t.hqw
All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedents, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever; except that they may be set forth as counterclaims
in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants ... Claims not yet due, or contingent,
may be approved at their present value.

The above-quoted rule is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the

purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or
administrator is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismiss of the first complaint of
herein plaintiffs-appellees in Civil Case No. 2050, they should have
presented their claims before the intestate proceedings filed in the same
court and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1303-P. Instead of doing so,
however. the plaintiffs-appellees slept on their right. They allowed said
proceedings to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs
pursuant to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such
do not sanctioned by the above rule for it strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue. (See Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, 70 SCRA 130). With
the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein plaintiffsappellees to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar
to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same
import.
Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that the
plaintiffs-appellees had a cause of action against the defendants-appellants
who are the heirs of the deceased against whom the liability is sought to be
enforced, much less take cognizance of the complaint. As in the first
complaint, said court could not have assumed jurisdiction over the second
case for the simple reason that it was no longer acting as a probate court
which was the proper forum to file such complaint. The termination of the
intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not
alter the fact that plaintiffs-appellees' claim was a money claim which should
have been presented before the probate court. The liability of the late
Rosendo de Guzman arose from the breach of his obligations under the
contract of carriage between him and the unfortunate passenger. The
obligations are spelled out by law but the liability arose from a breach of
contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim.
The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of
the debtor's asset is under Section 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court which
provides: t.hqw

If such contingent claim becomes absolute and is presented

to the court, or to the executor or administrator, within two (2)
years from the time limited for other creditors to present their
claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by the
executor or administrator, and, if disputed, it may be proved
and allowed or disallowed by the court as the facts may
warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall
receive payment to the same extent as the other creditors if
the estate retained by the executor or administrator is
sufficient. But if the claim is not so presented, after having
become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the
assets retained in the hands of the executor or administrator,
not exhausted in the payment of claims, shall be distributed
by the order of the court to the persons entitled to the same;
but the assets so distributed may still be applied to the
payment of the claim when established, and the creditor may
maintain an action against the distributees to recover the
debt, and such distributees and their estates shall be liable
for the debt in proportion to the estate they have respectively
received from the property of the deceased.
Even under the above rule, the contingent claims must first have been
established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an
action directly, against the distributees. Such is not the situation, however, in
the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed after the intestate

proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If
we are to allow the complaint to prosper and the trial court to take
cognizance of the same, then the rules providing for the claims against the
estate in a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period would be
rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money against the distributees
may be filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely is what the
rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid further delays in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to the heirs,
legatees or devisees.
Furthermore, even assuming that the plaintiffs-appellees had no knowledge
of the intestate proceedings which is not established, the law presumes that
they had such knowledge because the settlement of estate is a proceeding in
remark and therefore the failure to file their claims before such proceedings
barred them from subsequently filing the same claims outside said
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside and another one entered dismissing the
complaint and the counterclaim. No costs.
SO ORDERED.