Professional Documents
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L-2659
OZAETA, J.:
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary,
or is it capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the
remainderman? That is the question raised in the appeal.
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his
widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made
various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate as
follows:
Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my
beloved wife Mary McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and
usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after payment of the
legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy
said usufruct and use or spend such fruits as she may in any manner
wish.
The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald
Bachrach, one-half of the all his estate "shall be divided share and
share alike by and between my legal heirs, to the exclusion of my
brothers."
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of
the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000
shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000
shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as
usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to
authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company as administrator of
the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to her the said 54,000 share of stock
In Hite vs. Hite (93 Ky., 257; 20 S. W., 778, 780), the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, speaking thru its Chief Justice, said:
. . . Where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based upon the
earnings of the company, it is in reality, whether called by one name
or another, the income of the capital invested in it. It is but a mode of
distributing the profit. If it be not income, what is it? If it is, then it is
rightfully and equitably the property of the life tenant. If it be really
profit, then he should have it, whether paid in stock or money. A stock
dividend proper is the issue of new shares paid for by the transfer of
a sum equal to their par value from the profits and loss account to
that representing capital stock; and really a corporation has no right
to a dividend, either in cash or stock, except from its earnings; and a
singular state of case it seems to us, an unreasonable one is
presented if the company, although it rests with it whether it will
declare a dividend, can bind the courts as to the proper ownership of
it, and by the mode of payment substitute its will for that of that of the
testator, and favor the life tenants or the remainder-men, as it may
desire. It cannot, in reason, be considered that the testator
contemplated such a result. The law regards substance, and not
form, and such a rule might result not only in a violation of the
testator's intention, but it would give the power to the corporation to
beggar the life tenants, who, in this case, are the wife and children of
the testator, for the benefit of the remainder-men, who may perhaps
be unknown to the testator, being unborn when the will was executed.
We are unwilling to adopt a rule which to us seems so arbitrary, and
devoid of reason and justice. If the dividend be in fact a profit,
although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. It has
been so held in Pennsylvania and many other states, and we think it
the correct rule. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Cook, Stocks & S.
sec. 554. . . .
We think the Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory
laws than the Massachusetts rule. Under section 16 of our
Corporation Law, no corporation may make or declare any dividend
except from the surplus profits arising from its business. Any
dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits.
Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be
entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct. And articles 474 and 475 provide as follows:
ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to
the usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last.
ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an
income or periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest
on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured payment
shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits such right.
When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an
interest in an industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which
are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have the same
consideration.
lawphil.net
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs.TALISAYSILAY MILLING CO., ET AL., defendants-appellees. THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, intervenor-appellant.
Roman J. Lacson for intervenor-appellant.Mariano Ezpeleta for
plaintiff-appellee.Nolan and Hernaez for defendants-appellees
Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and Cesar Ledesma.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This proceeding originated in a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of
the amount P13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments or
credit for that sum payable on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of
Mariano Lacson Ledesma; the complaint further prays that the sugar
central be ordered to render an accounting of the amounts it owes
Mariano Lacson Ledesma by way of bonus, dividends, or otherwise,
and to pay the plaintiff a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment
mentioned in the complaint, and that the sale made by said Mariano
Lacson Ledesma be declared null and void.
rentals, holding that the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale in the
mother case did not confer on Equatorial any vested or residual
proprietary rights, even in expectancy.
In granting the Motion to Dismiss, the court a quo held that the critical
issue was whether Equatorial was the owner of the subject property
and could thus enjoy the fruits or rentals therefrom. It declared the
rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale as avoid at its inception as though it
did not happen."
The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
"The meaning of rescind in the aforequoted decision is to set aside.
In the case of Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97442, June 30,
1994, the Supreme Court held that, 'to rescind is to declare a contract
void in its inception and to put an end as though it never were. It is
not merely to terminate it and release parties from further obligations
to each other but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore parties
to relative positions which they would have occupied had no contract
ever been made.'
"Relative to the foregoing definition, the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Equatorial and Carmelo dated July 31, 1978 is void at its
inception as though it did not happen.
"The argument of Equatorial that this complaint for back rentals as
'reasonable compensation for use of the subject property after
expiration of the lease contracts presumes that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 30, 1978 from whence the fountain of Equatorial's all
rights flows is still valid and existing.
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"E.
The sole ground upon which the Regional Trial Court dismissed Civil
Case No. 97-85141 is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Dismiss
under Sec. 1 of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."
Basically, the issues can be summarized into two: (1) the substantive
issue of whether Equatorial is entitled to back rentals; and (2) the
procedural issue of whether the court a quo's dismissal of Civil Case
No. 97-85141 was based on one of the grounds raised by respondent
in its Motion to Dismiss and covered by Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:Ownership of Subject Properties
We hold that under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case
at bar, as found by this Court en banc in its Decision promulgated in
1996 in the mother case, no right of ownership was transferred from
Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the
property to the buyer.
Rental a CivilFruit of Ownership
To better understand the peculiarity of the instant case, let us begin
with some basic parameters. Rent is a civil fruit 16 that belongs to the
owner of the property producing it 17 by right of accession.18
Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of
the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final
judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that
period.
By a contract of sale, "one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent." 19
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, 20 which the buyer acquires
only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in
articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement
sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to petitioner
arose.32 That time arose upon the perfection of the Contract of Sale
on July 30, 1978, from which moment the laws provide that the
parties to a sale may reciprocally demand performance. 33 Does this
mean that despite the judgment rescinding the sale, the right to the
fruits34 belonged to, and remained enforceable by, Equatorial?
Article 1385 of the Civil Code answers this question in the negative,
because "[r]escission creates the obligation to return the things which
were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price
with its interest; x x x" Not only the land and building sold, but also
the rental payments paid, if any, had to be returned by the buyer.
Another point. The Decision in the mother case stated that
"Equatorial x x x has received rents" from Mayfair "during all the
years that this controversy has been litigated." The Separate Opinion
of Justice Teodoro Padilla in the mother case also said that Equatorial
was "deriving rental income" from the disputed property. Even herein
ponente's Separate Concurring Opinion in the mother case
recognized these rentals. The question now is: Do all these
statements concede actual delivery?
The answer is "No." The fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial
during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either actual
delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorial's title.
The CA Records of the mother case 35 show that Equatorial as
alleged buyer of the disputed properties and as alleged successor-ininterest of Carmelo's rights as lessor submitted two ejectment suits
against Mayfair. Filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, the
first was docketed as Civil Case No. 121570 on July 9, 1987; and the
second, as Civil Case No. 131944 on May 28, 1990. Mayfair
eventually won them both. However, to be able to maintain physical
possession of the premises while awaiting the outcome of the mother
case, it had no choice but to pay the rentals.
The rental payments made by Mayfair should not be construed as a
recognition of Equatorial as the new owner. They were made merely
to avoid imminent eviction. It is in this context that one should
understand the aforequoted factual statements in the ponencia in the
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"Since Equatorial is a buyer in bad faith, this finding renders the sale
to it of the property in question rescissible. We agree with respondent
Appellate Court that the records bear out the fact that Equatorial was
aware of the lease contracts because its lawyers had, prior to the
sale, studied the said contracts. As such, Equatorial cannot tenably
claim to be a purchaser in good faith, and, therefore, rescission lies.
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We uphold the trial court's disposition, not for the reason it gave, but
for (a) the patent failure to deliver the property and (b) petitioner's bad
faith, as above discussed.
Second Issue: Ground in Motion to Dismiss
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Procedurally, petitioner claims that the trial court deviated from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it dismissed
Civil Case No. 97-85141 on a ground not raised in respondent's
Motion to Dismiss. Worse, it allegedly based its dismissal on a
ground not provided for in a motion to dismiss as enunciated in the
Rules of Court.
@lawphil.n et
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"(B)
Plaintiff's cause of action, if any, is barred by prior judgment." 39
The court a quo ruled, inter alia, that the cause of action of petitioner
plaintiff in the case below) had been barred by a prior judgment of
this Court in G.R No. 106063, the mother case.
Although it erred in its interpretation of the said Decision when it
argued that the rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale was avoid," we
hold, nonetheless, that petitioner's cause of action is indeed barred
by a prior judgment of this Court. As already discussed, our Decision
in G.R No. 106063 shows that petitioner is not entitled to back
rentals, because it never became the owner of the disputed
properties due to a failure of delivery. And even assuming arguendo
that there was a valid delivery, petitioner's bad faith negates its
entitlement to the civil fruits of ownership, like interest and rentals.
Under the doctrine of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, a matter
that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must
even if its legal reason for nullifying the sale was wrong. The correct
reasons are given in this Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
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SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and
Carpio, JJ., concur.Bellosillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Gutierrez.
Melo, J., concurring opinion.Puno, J., concur and also join the
concurring opinion of J. Melo. Vitug, J., see dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, J., join the dissenting opinions of Justices Vitug and
Sandoval-Gutierrez.Mendoza, J., concur in this and Melo, J.'s
concurring opinion.De Leon, Jr., J., join the dissenting opinion of
Justice J.C. Vitug.
Concurring Opinion
MELO, J., concurring:
While I express my conformity to the ponencia of our distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I would just like to
make the following observations:
1. The issue in this case was squarely resolved in our 1996 En Banc
decision in the main case. What petitioner is asking us to do now is to
reverse or modify a judgment which is accurate in every respect,
conformable to law and jurisprudence, and faithful to principles of
fairness and justice.
2. Petitioner's submissions are deceiving. It is trying to collect
unjustified and unbelievably increased rentals by provoking a purely
academic discussion, as far as respondent is concerned, of a nonapplicable provision of the Civil Code on contracts.
3. To grant the petition is to reward bad faith, for petitioner has
deprived respondent of the latter's property rights for twenty-three
(23) years and has forced it to defend its interests in case after case
during that lengthy period. Petitioner now tries to inflict further injury
In light of the Court's judgments in G.R. No. 106063 and G.R. No.
136221, the present petition in G.R. No. 133879 for back rentals
should now be finally resolved, applying the rulings in those earlier
decisions.
Indubitably, the 1978 deed of sale executed by Carmelo in favor of
Equatorial over the disputed property has been set aside by this
Court. Equatorial was declared a buyer in bad faith. The contract was
characterized as a fraudulent sale and the entirety of the indivisible
property sold to Equatorial was the property we ordered to be
conveyed to Mayfair for the same price paid by Equatorial to
Carmelo.
It is also beyond question that the method of execution of the 1996
decision by the RTC, the direct payment by Mayfair to Equatorial,
bypassing and detouring the defunct Carmelo corporation, has been
validated by this Court. There are no longer any procedural obstacles
to the full implementation of the decision.
And finally, the property sold to Equatorial in violation of Mayfair's
right of first refusal is now indisputably possessed by, and owned and
titled in the name of, respondent Mayfair.
Parenthetically, the issue on the payment of back and increased
rentals, plus interests, was actually settled in the 1996 decision in
G.R. No. 106063. It could not be enforced at the time only because of
the controversy unfortunately raised by Equatorial over the proper
execution of the 1996 decision.
It is now time to reiterate the 1996 decision on interests and settle the
dispute between Mayfair and Equatorial once and for all.
Thus, we reiterate that:
On the question of interest payments on the principal amount of
P11,300.000.00, it must be borne in mind that both Carmelo and
Equatorial acted in bad faith. Carmelo knowingly and deliberately
broke a contract entered into with Mayfair. It sold the property to
Equatorial with purpose and intent to withhold any notice or
knowledge of the sale coming to the attention of Mayfair. All the
circumstances point to a calculated and contrived plan of non-
further collect rentals from Mayfair is to allow the former to profit from
its own act of bad faith. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. (Respondent's
Comment, pp. 338-339, Rollo).
This brings me to my third and final observation in this case. This
Court emphasized in the main case that the contract of sale between
Equatorial and Carmelo was characterized by bad faith. The Court
described the sale as "fraudulent" in its 1996 decision. It stated that
the damages which Mayfair suffered are in terms of actual injury and
lost opportunities, emphasizing that Mayfair should not be given an
empty or vacuous victory. Moreover, altogether too many suits have
been filed in this case. Four separate petitions have come before us,
necessitating full length decisions in at least 3 of them. The 1996
decision stressed that the Court has always been against multiplicity
of suits.
There was bad faith from the execution of the deed of sale because
Equatorial and Carmelo affirmatively operated with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for ulterior purposes (Air
France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 166 [1966]). There was breach of a
known duty by the two parties to the unlawful contract arising from
motives of interests or ill-will calculated to cause damage to another
(Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 123 Phil. 264 [1966]).
The presence of bad faith is clear from the records. Our resolution of
this issue in 1996 (G.R. 106063) is res judicata.
We stated:
First and foremost is that the petitioners (referring to Equatorial and
Carmelo) acted in bad faith to render Paragraph 8 "inutile".
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Since Equatorial is a buyer in bad faith, this finding renders the sale
to it of the property in question rescissible. We agree with respondent
Appellate Court that the records bear out the fact that Equatorial was
aware of the lease contracts because its lawyers had, prior to the
sale, studied the said contracts. As such Equatorial cannot tenably
claim to be a purchaser in good faith and, therefore, rescission lies.
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LAUREL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by both the plaintiff and the defendant from
the order of September 26, 1935, hereinabove referred to, of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil Case No. 2428.
There is no controversy as to the facts. By a contract of sale
executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of
land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, Cavite.
To secure possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff,
on July 20, 1929, instituted Civil Case No. 1935 in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite. The trial court found for the plaintiff in a decision
which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on appeal (G.R. No.
33017). 1 When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however, he
found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan between the herein respondents Elias Hilario
and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners
Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants,
concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and
partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided
over by Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as
the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants
the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the
residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in
accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code. The dispositive part of
the decision, hub of this controversy, follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
(1) That the plaintiffs are the owners of the whole property described
in transfer certificate of title No. 12872 (Exhibit A) issued in their
name, and entitled to the possession of the same;
(2) That the defendants are entitled to hold the position of the
residential lot until after they are paid the actual market value of their
houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs prefer to
sell them said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the
plaintiffs the proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a
basis the price paid for the whole land according to Exhibit B; and
(3) That upon defendant's failure to purchase the residential lot in
question, said defendants shall remove their houses and granaries
after this decision becomes final and within the period of sixty (60)
days from the date that the court is informed in writing of the attitude
of the parties in this respect.
No pronouncement is made as to damages and costs.
Once this decision becomes final, the plaintiffs and defendants may
appear again before this court for the purpose of determining their
respective rights under article 361 of the Civil Code, if they cannot
come to an extra-judicial settlement with regard to said rights.
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building
and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it
from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same. But this is not the case before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling
defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land
belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose
neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void,
for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and
is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a question of
procedure which calls for the clarification, to avoid uncertainty and
delay in the disposition of cases. In that decision, the rights of both
parties are well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code,
but it fails to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where
they are erected as well as the periods of time within which the option
may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars
having been left for determination apparently after the judgment has
become final. This procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has
become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be
done therewith except its execution. And execution cannot be had,
the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what
time may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority is vested
in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial
discretion. Thus the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never
become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a
subsequent proceeding, matters which remained unsettled up to the
time the petition is filed in the instant case.
For all the foregoing, the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad
is hereby set aside and the lower court ordered to hold a hearing in
the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the
buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as
the period of time within which the plaintiffs-respondents may
exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land,
and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the
defendants-petitioners may pay for the land, all these periods to be
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
+.wph!1
We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view
of the peculiar circumstances under which they had constructed the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As far as they knew, the LAND was owned
by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on
the property, could reasonably be expected to later on give them the
LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:
t.hqw
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and
the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Paragraphing
supplied)
The value of the LAND, purchased for P15,000.00 on September 7,
1974, could not have been very much more than that amount during
the following January when ERNESTO and wife were asked to
vacate. However, ERNESTO and wife have not questioned the
P25,000.00 valuation determined by the Court of First Instance.
In regards to the valuation of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, the only
evidence presented was the testimony of ERNESTO that its worth at
the time of the trial should be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The
Municipal Court chose to assess its value at P20,000.00, or below the
minimum testified by ERNESTO, while the Court of First Instance
chose the maximum of P40,000.00. In the latter case, it cannot be
said that the Court of First Instance had abused its discretion.
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DIGEST
FACTS:
Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo wed,
Rebeccas mother offered a lot in Paranaque that they could
build their house on. In 1967, they finally built their home
which cost about PhP8,000-10,000, thinking that someday,
the lot would be transferred to them in their name. It turns
out, though, that the lot was owned by the Spouses Santos
who , in turn, sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A
year later, Sarmiento ordered the Valentinos to vacate their
lot, then eventually filed and Ejection Suit against them.
The lower court ruled in Sarmientos favor and ordered her
to pay 20,000 as the value of the house. But the case was
then elevated to the CFI of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and
pursuant to Art.448 of the CC (March 1979), the Court
ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60 days to pay
Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the house or to let them
purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able to
exercise this option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit
the 25,000 purchase price with the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise
either option: to buy the building or to sell the land?
HELD:
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they
believed that Rebeccas mother has the capacity to
eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line with
this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to exercise only 2 options:
To purchase the house or to sell the land to them, in this
case, based on the value decided by the courts. Since
Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted
period, and based on Art. 448, the LO is compelled by law to
exercise either option. Not choosing either is a violation of
the law.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of First Instance
of Iloilo to the then Court of Appeals, which the latter certified to this
instance as involving pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T3087, known as Lot
No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area
of approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao, defendantappellant, owns an adjoining lot, designated as Lot No. 683, with an
approximate area of 231 sq. ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot,
the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four (34)
square meters of DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was
discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made on November
2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after writing a demand letter asking
DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for
Unlawful Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the
Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil Case No 1, Said
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO,
DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and
void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of
possession, whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an
encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of
First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the
Municipal Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgment
in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7,
Rule 70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-stepped its bounds
when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like
"forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an
interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; 2
Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). 3 Since the Municipal Court, acted
without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operate as
res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if
the Decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to
difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action
was the deprivation of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the
cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case
"shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land. " 4
have questioned the preference in favor of the owner of the land, but
Manresa's opinion is that the Article is just and fair.
. . . es justa la facultad que el codigo da al dueno del suelo en el
articulo 361, en el caso de edificacion o plantacion? Algunos
comentaristas la conceptuan injusta, y como un extraordinario
privilegio en favor de la propiedad territorial. Entienden que impone el
Codigo una pena al poseedor de buena fe y como advierte uno de
los comentaristas aludidos 'no se ve claro el por que de tal pena . . .
al obligar al que obro de buena fe a quedarse con el edificio o
plantacion, previo el pago del terreno que ocupa, porque si bien es
verdad que cuando edifico o planto demostro con este hecho, que
queria para si el edificio o plantio tambien lo es que el que edifico o
planto de buena fe lo hizo en la erronea inteligencia de creerse
dueno del terreno Posible es que, de saber lo contrario, y de tener
noticia de que habia que comprar y pagar el terreno, no se hubiera
decidido a plantar ni a edificar. La ley obligandole a hacerlo fuerza su
voluntad, y la fuerza por un hecho inocente de que no debe ser
responsable'. Asi podra suceder pero la realidad es que con ese
hecho voluntario, aunque sea inocente, se ha enriquecido
torticeramente con perjuicio de otro a quien es justo indemnizarle,
En nuestra opinion, el Codigo ha resuelto el conflicto de la manera
mas justa y equitativa y respetando en lo possible el principio que
para la accesion se establece en el art. 358. 7
Our own Code Commission must have taken account of the
objections to Article 361 of the Spanish Civil Code. Hence, the
Commission provided a modification thereof, and Article 448 of our
Code has been made to provide:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner
retained his options.
The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as
follows:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict
of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to
the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state
of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving
the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to
pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because
his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. (3 Manresa 213;
Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 37 Off. Gaz. 1382; Co Tao vs. Chan Chico,
G.R. No. 49167, April 30, 1949; Article applied: see Cabral, et al vs.
Ibanez [S.C.] 52 Off. Gaz. 217; Marfori vs. Velasco, [C.A.] 52 Off.
Gaz. 2050). 8
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside,
and this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo for further proceedings consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of
the kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34
square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than
LRC(GLRO)Rec.No.19645coveredbyTransferCertificateof
TitleNo.279838,oftheRegistryofDeedsfortheProvinceof
Rizal;thatsaidlandwhichadjoinsplaintiffslandwaspurchasedby
defendantfromacertainEnrileAntonioalsoin1970;thatin1971,
defendantpurchasedanotherlotalsoadjoiningplaintiffslandfrom
acertainMiguelRodriguezandthesamewasregisteredin
defendantsnameunderTransferCertificateofTitleNo.31390,of
theRegistryofDeedsfortheProvinceofRizal;thatportionsofthe
buildingsandwallboughtbyplaintifftogetherwiththelandfrom
ParizIndustriesareoccupyingaportionofdefendantsadjoining
land;thatuponlearningoftheencroachmentoroccupationbyits
buildingsandwallofaportionofdefendantsland,plaintiffoffered
tobuyfromdefendantthatparticularportionofdefendantsland
occupiedbyportionsofitsbuildingsandwallwithanareaof770
squaremeters,moreorless,butdefendant,however,refusedthe
offer.In1973,thepartiesenteredintoaprivateagreementbeforea
certainCol.RosalesinMalacaang,whereinplaintiffagreedto
demolishthewallatthebackportionofitslandthusgivingto
defendantpossessionofaportionofhislandpreviouslyenclosed
byplaintiffswall;thatdefendantlaterfiledacomplaintbeforethe
officeofMunicipalEngineerofParaaque,MetroManilaaswellas
beforetheOfficeoftheProvincialFiscalofRizalagainstplaintiff
inconnectionwiththeencroachmentoroccupationbyplaintiffs
buildingsandwallsofaportionofitslandbutsaidcomplaintdid
notprosper;thatdefendantdugorcausedtobedugacanalalong
plaintiffswall,aportionofwhichcollapsedinJune,1980,andled
tothefilingbyplaintiffofthesupplementalcomplaintinthe
aboveentitledcaseandaseparatecriminalcomplaintformalicious
mischiefagainstdefendantandhiswifewhichultimatelyresulted
intotheconvictionincourtofdefendantswifeforthecrimeof
maliciousmischief;thatwhiletrialofthecasewasinprogress,
plaintifffiledinCourtaformalproposalforsettlementofthecase
butsaidproposal,however,wasignoredbydefendant.
WhetherornottherespondentCourtofAppealserredin
holdingthepetitionerabuilderinbadfaithbecauseitis
presumedtoknowthemetesandboundsofhisproperty.
(B)
WhetherornottherespondentCourtofAppealserredwhenit
usedtheamicablesettlementbetweenthepetitionerandthe
privaterespondent,wherebothpartiesagreedtothe
demolitionoftherearportionofthefence,asestoppel
amountingtorecognitionbypetitionerofrespondentsright
overhispropertyincludingtheportionsofthelandwherethe
otherstructuresandthebuildingstand,whichwerenot
includedinthesettlement.
(C)
WhetherornottherespondentCourtofAppealserredinordering
theremovalofthestructuresandsurroundingwallsonthe
encroachedareaandinwithdrawingitsearlierrulinginitsAugust
28,1992decisionforthepetitionertopayforthevalueoftheland
occupiedbythebuilding,onlybecausetheprivaterespondenthas
manifesteditschoicetodemolishitdespitetheabsenceof
compulsorysalewherethebuilderfailstopayfortheland,and
whichchoiceprivaterespondentdeliberatelydeletedfromits
September1,1980answertothesupplementalcomplaintinthe
RegionalTrialCourt.
In its Memorandum, petitioner poses the following
issues:
A
Thetimewhentodeterminethegoodfaithofthebuilderunder
Article448oftheNewCivilCode,isreckonedduringtheperiod
whenitwasactuallybeingbuilt;andinacasewherenoevidence
waspresentednorintroducedastothegoodfaithorbadfaithof
thebuilderatthattime,asinthiscase,hemustbepresumedtobea
builderingoodfaith,sincebadfaithcannotbepresumed.[9]
B.
Inaspecificboundaryoverlapsituationwhichinvolvesabuilderin
goodfaith,asinthiscase,itisnowwellsettledthatthelotowner,
whobuildsontheadjacentlotisnotchargedwithconstructive
noticeofthetechnicalmetesandboundscontainedintheirtorrens
titlestodeterminetheexactandpreciseextentofhisboundary
perimeter.[10]
C.
TherespondentcourtscitationofthetwincasesofTuason&Co.
v.LumanlanandTuason&Co.v.Macalindongisnotthejudicial
authorityforaboundarydisputesituationbetweenadjacenttorrens
titledlotowners,asthefactsofthepresentcasedonotfallwithin
norsquarewiththeinvolvedprincipleofadissimilarcase.[11]
D.
QuitecontrarytorespondentUysreasoning,petitionerTecnogas
continuestobeabuilderingoodfaith,evenifitsubsequently
built/repairedthewalls/otherpermanentstructuresthereonwhile
thecaseaquowaspendingandevenwhilerespondentsentthe
petitionermanyletters/filedcasesthereon.[12]
D. (E.)
Theamicablesettlementbetweenthepartiesshouldbeinterpreted
asacontractandenforcedonlyinaccordancewithitsexplicit
terms,andnotoverandbeyondthatagreedupon;becausethe
courtsdonothavethepowertocreateacontractnorexpandits
scope.[13]
E. (F.)
Asageneralrule,althoughthelandownerhastheoptiontochoose
between:(1)buyingthebuildingbuiltingoodfaith,or(2)selling
theportionofhislandonwhichstandsthebuildingunderArticle
448oftheCivilCode;thefirstoptionisnotabsolute,becausean
exceptionthereto,onceitwouldbeimpracticalforthelandowner
tochoosetoexercisethefirstalternative,i.e.buythatportionof
thehousestandingonhisland,forthewholebuildingmightbe
rendereduseless.Theworkablesolutionisforhimtoselectthe
secondalternative,namely,toselltothebuilderthatpartofhis
landonwhichwasconstructedaportionofthehouse.[14]
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
petition is suffering from the following flaws:[15]
1.Itdidnotgivetheexactcitationsofcasesdecidedbythe
HonorableSupremeCourtthatallegedlycontradictsthe
rulingoftheHon.CourtofAppealsbasedonthedoctrine
laiddowninTuasonvs.LumanlancasecitingalsoTuason
vs.Macalindongcase(Supra).
2.AssumingthatthedoctrineintheallegedCoTaovs.Chico
caseiscontradictorytothedoctrineinTuasonvs.
LumanlanandTuasonvs.Macalindong,thetwocases
beingmorecurrent,thesameshouldprevail.
Further,privaterespondentcontendsthatthefollowing
unmistakablypointtothebadfaithofpetitioner:(1)private
respondentspurchaseofthetwolots,wasaheadofthepurchaseby
petitionerofthebuildingandlotfromParizIndustries;(2)the
declarationoftheGeneralManagerofTecnogasthatthesale
betweenpetitionerandParizIndustrieswasnotregisteredbecause
ofsomeproblemswithChinaBankingCorporation;and(3)the
DeedofSaleinfavorofpetitionerwasregisteredinitsnameonly
inthemonthofMay1973.[16]
The Courts Ruling
Theownerofthelandonwhichanythinghasbeenbuilt,sownor
plantedingoodfaith,shallhavetherighttoappropriateashisown
theworks,sowingorplanting,afterpaymentoftheindemnity
providedforinarticles546and548,ortoobligetheonewhobuilt
orplantedtopaythepriceoftheland,andtheonewhosowed,the
properrent.However,thebuilderorplantercannotbeobligedto
buythelandifitsvalueisconsiderablymorethanthatofthe
buildingortrees.Insuchcase,heshallpayreasonablerent,ifthe
ownerofthelanddoesnotchoosetoappropriatethebuildingor
treesafterproperindemnity.Thepartiesshallagreeupontheterms
oftheleaseandincaseofdisagreement,thecourtshallfixthe
termsthereof.
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that,
instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can
compel the landowner to make a choice between the two
options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the
indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from
the land.[27]
The question, however, is whether the same benefit can
be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier stated, is not the
builder of the offending structures but possesses them as
buyer.
We answer such question in the affirmative.
In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that
petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it
acquired the property from Pariz Industries. We agree with
the trial court that various factors in evidence adequately
show petitioners lack of awareness thereof. In any case,
contrary proof has not overthrown the presumption of good
faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code, as already stated,
Thatthepartiesheretohaveagreedthattherearportionofthe
fencethatseparatesthepropertyofthecomplainantand
respondentshallbedemolisheduptothebackofthebuilding
housingthemachinerieswhichdemolision(sic)shallbe
undertakenbythecomplainantatanytime.
Thatthefencewhichserve(s)asawallhousingtheelectroplating
machineriesshallnotbedemolishedinthemeantimewhich
portionshallbesubjecttonegotiationbyhereinparties.
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner agreed only
to the demolition of a portion of the wall separating the
adjoining properties of the parties -- i.e. up to the back of the
building housing the machineries. But that portion of the
fence which served as the wall housing the electroplating
machineries was not to be demolished. Rather, it was to be
subject to negotiation by herein parties. The settlement may
have recognized the ownership of private respondent but
such admission cannot be equated with bad faith. Petitioner
was only trying to avoid a litigation, one reason for entering
into an amicable settlement.
As was ruled in Osmea vs. Commission on Audit,[30]
Acompromiseisabilateralactortransactionthatisexpressly
acknowledgedasajuridicalagreementbytheCivilCodeandis
thereindealtwithinsomedetail.`Acompromise,declaresArticle
2208ofsaidCode,`isacontractwherebytheparties,bymaking
reciprocalconcessions,avoidalitigationorputanendtoone
alreadycommenced.
xxxxxxxxx
TheCivilCodenotonlydefinesandauthorizescompromises,itin
factencouragesthemincivilactions.Art.2029statesthat`The
Courtshallendeavortopersuadethelitigantsinacivilcaseto
agreeuponsomefaircompromise.xxx.
In the context of the established facts, we hold that
petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the Civil
Code on the basis merely of the fact that some years after
acquiring the property in good faith, it learned about -- and
aptly recognized -- the right of private respondent to a
portion of the land occupied by its building. The supervening
awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not
militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in
good faith. In fact, a judicious reading of said Article 448 will
readily show that the landowners exercise of his option can
only take place after the builder shall have come to know of
the intrusion -- in short, when both parties shall have
become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for
exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties
will have been aware that a problem exists in regard to their
property rights.
Options of Private Respondent
What then is the applicable provision in this case which
private respondent may invoke as his remedy: Article 448 or
Article 450[31] of the Civil Code?
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private
respondent, their rights and obligations are to be governed
by Art. 448. The essential fairness of this codal provision has
been pointed out by Mme. Justice Ameurfina MelencioHerrera, citing Manresa and applicable precedents, in the
case of Depra vs. Dumlao,[32] to wit:
Wherethebuilder,planterorsowerhasactedingoodfaith,a
conflictofrightsarisesbetweentheowners,anditbecomes
necessarytoprotecttheowneroftheimprovementswithout
causinginjusticetotheowneroftheland.Inviewofthe
impracticalityofcreatingastateofforcedcoownership,thelaw
hasprovidedajustsolutionbygivingtheownerofthelandthe
optiontoacquiretheimprovementsafterpaymentoftheproper
indemnity,ortoobligethebuilderorplantertopayfortheland
andthesowertopaytheproperrent.Itistheowneroftheland
whoisauthorizedtoexercisetheoption,becausehisrightisolder,
andbecause,bytheprincipleofaccession,heisentitledtothe
ownershipoftheaccessorything.(3Manresa213;Bernardovs.
Bataclan,37Off.Gaz.1382;CoTaovs.ChanChico,G.R.No.
49167,April30,1949;Articleapplied;seeCabral,etal.vs.Ibanez
[S.C.]52Off.Gaz.217;Marforivs.Velasco,[C.A.]52Off.Gaz.
2050).
The private respondents insistence on the removal of the
encroaching structures as the proper remedy, which
respondent Court sustained in its assailed Decisions, is thus
legally flawed. This is not one of the remedies bestowed
upon him by law. It would be available only if and when he
chooses to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a
reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price. [33] This
has not taken place. Hence, his options are limited to: (1)
appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioners building
after payment of proper indemnity, or (2) obliging the latter to
buy the lot occupied by the structure. He cannot exercise a
remedy of his own liking.
Neither is petitioners prayer that private respondent be
ordered to sell the land[34] the proper remedy. While that was
dubbed as the more workable solution in Grana and Torralba
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.,[35] it was not the relief
granted in that case as the landowners were directed to
exercise within 30 days from this decision their option to
either buy the portion of the petitioners house on their land
a)thepresentfairpriceofprivaterespondents520squaremeter
areaofland;
b)theincreaseinvalue(plusvalue)whichthesaidareaof
520squaremetersmayhaveacquiredbyreasonof
theexistenceoftheportionofthebuildingonthe
area;
c)thefairmarketvalueoftheencroachingportionofthebuilding;
and
d)whetherthevalueofsaidareaoflandisconsiderably
morethanthefairmarketvalueoftheportionofthe
buildingthereon.
2.Aftersaidamountsshallhavebeendeterminedbycompetent
evidence,theregionaltrialcourtshallrenderjudgmentasfollows:
a) The private respondent shall be granted a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to exercise his option
under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to
appropriate the portion of the building as his own by
paying to petitioner its fair market value, or to oblige
petitioner to pay the price of said area. The amounts
to be respectively paid by petitioner and private
respondent, in accordance with the option thus
exercised by written notice of the other party and to
the court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen
(15) days from such notice of the option by tendering
the amount to the trial court in favor of the party
entitled to receive it;
b) If private respondent exercises the option to oblige
petitioner to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial
court, the value of the land is considerably more than
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
FACTS
Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and
improvements including the wall which encroached that of
the defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment,
petitioner offered to buy the land but defendant refused.
After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to
demolish the wall (but the case did not state what happened
to this agreement, my assumption is that it did not happen
due to conflicts that arose after)
Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion
of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re
the action and a separate criminal action of malicious
mischief (which the wife was convicted of)
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because
it is 'presumed to know the metes and bounds of his
property.'B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a
proper remedyC. Whether or not respondent can opt to
demolish the structure without exercising the option to sell
the land to the petitioner and the latter cannot do buy the
same
1.
2.
ANTONIO, J.:
1wph1.t
II
The judgment having become final and executory private
respondents filed a motion for the execution of the same, praying as
follows:
t.hqw
The records further disclosed that from March 1967 to December 31,
1968, piaintiff Bartolome Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the
propertv in question wherein he has not introduced anv improvement
particularlv on Lot No. 5785-A; PLS-45 awarded to defendant Quirino
Comintan, thru which vehicular traffic was detoured or diverted, and
again from September 1969 to March 31, 1970, the plaintiff resumed
the collection of tools on the same portion without rendering any
accounting on said tolls to the Receiver, who, was reappointed after
submitting the required bond and specifically authorized only to
collect tolls leaving the harvesting of the improvements to the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
ln virtue of he findings of this Court as contained in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the defendants are jointly obligated to pay the
plaintiff in the amount of P13,632.00 as reasonable value of the
improvements he introduced on the whole property in question, and
that he has the right of retention until fully paid. It can be gleaned
from the motion of the defendants that if plaintiff submits an
accounting of the tolls he collected during the periods above alluded
to, their damages of about P25,000.00 can more than offset their
obligation of P13,362.00 in favor of the plaintiff, thereafter the
possession of the land be delivered to the defendants since the
decision of the Supreme Court has already become final and
executory, but in the interregnum pending such accounting and
recovery by the Receiver of the tolls collected by the plaintiff, the
defendants pray that they allowed to put up a bond in lieu of the said
P13,632.00 to answer for damages of the former, if any.
On the other hand, plaintiff contends in his opposition, admitting that
the decision of the Supreme Court has become final and executory;
(1) the offer of a bond in lieu of payment of P13,632.00 does not, and
improvements for each lot should have been raised by them at the
opportune moment by asking for the modification of the decision
before it became final and executory; and that the tolls on the
property constituted "civil fruits" to which the petitioner is entitled
under the terms of the decision.
IV
The issue decisive of the controvery isafter the rendition by the trial
court of its judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 on March 22, 1966
confirming the award of one-half of the property to Quirino Comintan
whether or not petitioner is still entitled to retain for his own
exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property, such as the tolls
collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968, and
September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to about P25,000.00.
In other words, petitioner contends that so long as the aforesaid
amount of P13,632,00 decreed in the judgment representing the
expenses for clearing the land and the value of the coconuts and fruit
trees planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his
exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may derive from the property,
without any obligation to apply any portion thereof to the payment of
the interest and the principal of the debt.
We find this contention untenable.
There is no question that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. 11
Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the
recovery of the property. 12 Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may
receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the
complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful
possessor. 13
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor in fact can
still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546 of the New Civil Code,
until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful
expenses made by him on the property. This right of retention has
been considered as one of the conglomerate of measures devised by
the law for the protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is
Regarding Lot 5785-B, it appears that no public sale has yet been
conducted by the Bureau of Lands and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to remain in possession thereof. This is not disputed by
respondent Eleuterio Zamora. 25 After public sale is had and in the event
that Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder, then he should be
reimbursed by respondent Zamora in the corresponding amount for the
improvements on Lot 5785-B.
1wph1. t
DIGEST
Ortiz vs. Kayanan
Facts: Plaintiff used to be the legal guardian of Martin Dolorico II. When his ward died,
plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess the latters property, which was formerly
a subject of homestead application. In the said application, the wards uncle was
named as his heir and successor in interest. Thus, the uncle executed an affidavit
relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of Comintan and Zamora, his
grandson and son-in-law and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the
homestead application. The homestead application was cancelled to the protest of
Ortiz saying that he should be given preference to purchase the lot inasmuch as he is
the actual occupant and has been in continuous possession of the same. Still, the lot
in question was sold at a public auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only
bidder.
The plaintiffs protest was investigated upon but his claim was not given due course.
On appeal, respondent court rules that half of the portion of land should be given to
the defendant, being the successful bidder. The other half should be awarded to
Zamora without prejudice to the right of Ortiz to participate in the public bidding of
the lot. If Ortiz is to be not declared the successful bidder, defendants should
reimburse jointly said plaintiff for the improvements introduced on the land, with him,
having the right to retain the property until after he has been paid for.
Plaintiff appealed the judgment. It was later found out that Ortiz collected tolls on a
portion of the property wherein he has not introduced any improvement.
The judgment became final and executory. Private respondents filed a motion for its
execution requesting that they file a bond in lieu of the amount that should be paid to
Ortiz, on the condition that after the accounting of the tolls collected by plaintiff,
there is still and amount due and payable to the said plaintiff, the bond shall be held
answerable.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that in having issued the Order
and Writ of Execution, respondent Court "acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
and/or with grave abuse of discretion, because the said order and writ in effect vary
the terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to enforce." He argued that since
said judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in good faith, he is entitled to the
payment of the value of the improvements introduced by him on the whole property,
with right to retain the land until he has been fully paid such value. He likewise
averred that no payment for improvements has been made and, instead, a bond
therefor had been filed by defendants (private respondents), which, according to
petitioner, is not the payment envisaged in the decision which would entitle private
respondents to the possession of the property. Furthermore, with respect to portion
"B", petitioner alleges that, under the decision, he has the right to retain the same
until after he has participated and lost in the public bidding of the land to be
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It is claimed that it is only in the event that he
loses in the bidding that he can be legally dispossessed thereof.
It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property, including the tolls
collected by him from the passing vehicles, which according to the trial court
amounts to P25,000.00, belongs to petitioner and not to defendant/private
respondent Quirino Comintan, in accordance with the decision itself, which decreed
that the fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the amount to be paid to
petitioner as reimbursement for improvements. Any contrary opinion, in his view,
would be tantamount to an amendment of a decision which has long become final
and executory and, therefore, cannot be lawfully done.
The issue decisive of the controvery isafter the rendition by the trial court of its
judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 on March 22, 1966 confirming the award of one-half
of the property to Quirino Comintanwhether or not petitioner is still entitled to
retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property, such as the tolls
collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968, and September 1969 to March
31, 1970, amounting to about P25,000.00.
RULING: Negative
1.
No contention that the possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received
before the possession is legally interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true
owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may
receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint,
must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
2.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor can still retain the
property (Art 546) until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful
expenses made by him on the property. he principal characteristic of the right of
retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation.
Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his
good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order that this right to retain may be useful, to
concede to the creditor the right to secure reimbursement from the fruits of the
property by utilizing its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the
principal of the debt while he remains in possession.
3.
Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls which he
collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty under the law, after
deducting the necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such amount
collected to the payment of the interest, and the balance to the payment of the
obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting petitioner's expenses for
administration, belong to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land through which the toll
road passed, further considering that the same was on portions of the property on
which petitioner had not introduced any improvement. The trial court itself clarified
this matter when it placed the toll road under receivership. The omission of any
mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be attributed to the fact that the tolls
appear to have been collected after the rendition of the judgment of the trial court.
4.
As to the other lot, it appears that no public sale has yet been conducted by
the Bureau of Lands and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to remain in possession
thereof. This is not disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After public sale is had
and in the event that Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder, then he should be
reimbursed by respondent Zamora in the corresponding amount for the
improvements on Lot 5785-B.
This petition for review on certiorari has its origins in Civil Case No.
9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and damages. The petitioners ask
the Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, which, in turn, reversed the MTCC; ordered the
petitioners to reimburse the private respondents the value of the
house in question and other improvements; and allowed the latter to
retain the premises until reimbursement was made.
It appears that Lot No. 3765-B-1 containing an area of 314 square
meters was originally owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina
Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of that lot
stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold
in November 1978 to the private respondents for the sum of
P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of
the lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother
executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the
lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of the
private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of seven years
commencing on 15 November 1978. 1 The private respondents then
introduced additional improvements and registered the house in their
names. After the expiration of the lease contract in November 1985,
however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which
resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. In 1982, Lee sold
the lot to Lily Salcedo, who in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses
Agustin and Ester Dionisio.
On 14 February 1992, the Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of
Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. 2 As such,
the lot was registered in the latter's name. 3
The trial court thus ordered the private respondents to vacate the
premises, pay the petitioners P40.00 a month as reasonable
compensation for their stay thereon from the filing of the complaint on
14 April 1993 until they vacated, and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus costs. 5
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City
reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a new judgment: (1)
ordering the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents for the
value of the house and improvements in the amount of P180,000.00
and to pay the latter P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and (2) allowing the private respondents to
remain in possession of the premises until they were fully reimbursed
for the value of the house. 6 It ruled that since the private respondents
were assured by the petitioners that the lot they leased would eventually
be sold to them, they could be considered builders in good faith, and as
such, were entitled to reimbursed of the value of the house and
improvements with the right of retention until reimbursement and had been
made.
In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally
owned by the petitioners' mother. The land was allegedly acquired
later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of possession in order
that she gain possession of the property in question. 12 The petitioners'
mother therefore remained in possession of the lot.
Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to sell the lot occupied by
the private respondents' house, the same was not substantiated by
convincing evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the house nor the
contract of lease contained an option in favor of the respondent
spouses to purchase the said lot. And even if the petitioners indeed
promised to sell, it would not make the private respondents
possessors or builders in good faith so as to covered by the provision
of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere
expectancy or ownership of the aforementioned lot because the
alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven.
The first thing that the private respondents should have done was to
reduce the alleged promise into writing, because under Article 1403
of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real property or an
interest therein is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum
thereof be produced. Not having taken any steps in order that the
FACTS:
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of
the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished bungalow to
the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good
faith?2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
RULING:
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents
knew that their stay would end after the lease contract
expires. They cant bank on the promise, which was not in
writing, of the petitioners that the latter will sell the land to
them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless some
note or memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the
alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no other
evidence to prove their claim.
2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678
may apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the
improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise
that option, the private respondents cant compel them to
reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until
reimbursement is made. The private respondents sole right
then is to remove the improvements without causing any
more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
February 1, 1996
shall bear interests (sic) at the rate of 12 per cent (sic) per annum.
3. Third-Party Defendant C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and
Pleasantville Subdivision are ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and
severally the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and P700.00 as
cost and litigation expenses.4
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC)
ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not
negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they
directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee 5. It found Kee a
builder in bad faith. It further ruled that even assuming arguendo that
Kee was acting in good faith, he was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully
usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he
was served with notice to vacate said lot, and thus was liable for
rental.
The RTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with respect to
the order against the defendant to vacate the premises of Lot No. 9
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106367 of the land
records of Bacolod City; the removal of all structures and
improvements introduced thereon at his expense and the payment to
plaintiff (sic) the sum of Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a day as reasonable
rental to be computed from January 30, 1981, the date of the
demand, and not from the date of the filing of the complaint, until he
had vacated (sic) the premises, with interest thereon at 12% per
annum. This Court further renders judgment against the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos as
attorney's fees, plus costs of litigation.
The third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants
Pleasantville Development Corporation and C.T. Torres Enterprises,
Inc. is dismissed. The order against Third-Party Defendants to pay
attorney's fees to plaintiff and costs of litigation is reversed. 6
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on October 20,
1986, Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he
was unaware of the "mix-up" when he began construction of the
improvements on Lot 8. It further ruled that the erroneous delivery
was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery
was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein. The
appellate court also ruled that the award of rentals was without basis.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the appealed decision is
REVERSED, and judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Wilson Kee is declared a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he introduced on Lot 9, and is entitled to the rights
granted him under Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the New Civil Code.
2. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and
Pleasantville Development Corporation are solidarily liable under the
following circumstances:
A.
If Eldred Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements
and, thereafter, remove these structures, the third-party defendants
shall answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the
improvements thus destroyed or rendered useless;
b. If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, the third-party
defendants shall answer for the amount representing the value of Lot
9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.
3. Third-party defendants C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. and
Pleasantville Development Corporation are ordered to pay in solidum
the amount of P3,000.00 to Jardinico as attorney's fees, as well as
litigation expenses.
4. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the
determination of the actual value of the improvements and the
property (Lot 9), as well as for further proceedings in conformity with
Article 448 of the New Civil Code.7
Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and
CTTEI.
The Issues
The petition submitted the following grounds to justify a review of the
respondent Court's Decision, as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way probably not
in accord with law or the the (sic) applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court on third-party complaints, by ordering third-party
defendants to pay the demolition expenses and/or price of the land;
2. The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
course of judicial proceedings, by granting to private respondent-Kee
the rights of a builder in good faith in excess of what the law provides,
thus enriching private respondent Kee at the expense of the
petitioner;
3. In the light of the subsequent events or circumstances which
changed the rights of the parties, it becomes imperative to set aside
or at least modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to harmonize
with justice and the facts;
4. Private respondent-Kee in accordance with the findings of facts of
the lower court is clearly a builder in bad faith, having violated several
provisions of the contract to sell on installments;
5. The decision of the Court of Appeals, holding the principal,
Pleasantville Development Corporation (liable) for the acts made by
the agent in excess of its authority is clearly in violation of the
provision of the law;
6. The award of attorney's fees is clearly without basis and is
equivalent to putting a premium in (sic) court litigation.
From these grounds, the issues could be re-stated as follows:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres
xxx
xxx
steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. There
was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as
being present during the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or
hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors,
for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the
regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEI's
blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's
efforts all went to naught.8
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title 9.
And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving
bad faith on the part of Kee 10.
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot
was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot
delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith. Petitioner
failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of
paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on
whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind
at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged
violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee
under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to
negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also points out that, as found by the trial court, the Contract
of Sale on Installment covering Lot 8 between it and Kee was
rescinded long before the present action was instituted. This has no
relevance on the liability of petitioner, as such fact does not negate
the negligence of its agent in pointing out the wrong lot. to Kee. Such
circumstance is relevant only as it gives Jardinico a cause of action
for unlawful detainer against Kee.
Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot "claim that another lot was
erroneously pointed out to him" because the latter agreed to the
following provision in the Contract of Sale on installment, to wit:
13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his
contract he/she has personally examined or inspected the property
made subject-matter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as
the natural condition of the lots and from the date hereof whatever
consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee
shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is
so desired by him/her. 11
The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of
the location, contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely
provides that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the
execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting
from such change.
We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee
contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from
petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public
policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law." 12
The Second Issue: Petitioner's Liability
Kee filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI, which
was dismissed by the RTC after ruling that there was no evidence
from which fault or negligence on the part of petitioner and CTTEI can
be inferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found CTTEI
negligent for the erroneous delivery of the lot by Octaviano, its
employee.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that CTTEI was its agent. But it
contends that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was an act which
was clearly outside the scope of its authority, and consequently,
CTTEI I alone should be liable. It asserts that "while [CTTEI] was
authorized to sell the lot belonging to the herein petitioner, it was
never authorized to deliver the wrong lot to Kee" 13.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent,
done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage
caused to third persons 14. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds
his authority is personally liable for the damage 15
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate
representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In
acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is this
negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of
CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code.
Pending resolution of the case before the Court of Appeals, Jardinico
and Kee on July 24, 1987 entered into a deed of sale, wherein the
former sold Lot 9 to Kee. Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court
of Appeals of such deal.
The deed of sale contained the following provision:
1. That Civil Case No. 3815 entitled "Jardinico vs. Kee" which is now
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, regardless of the outcome
of the decision shall be mutually disregarded and shall not be
pursued by the parties herein and shall be considered dismissed and
without effect whatso-ever; 16
Kee asserts though that the "terms and conditions in said deed of
sale are strictly for the parties thereto" and that "(t)here is no waiver
made by either of the parties in said deed of whatever favorable
judgment or award the honorable respondent Court of Appeals may
make in their favor against herein petitioner Pleasantville
Development Corporation and/or private respondent C.T. Torres
Enterprises; Inc." 17
Obviously, the deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of
petitioner. As we have earlier stated, petitioner's liability is grounded
on the negligence of its agent. On the other hand, what the deed of
sale regulates are the reciprocal rights of Kee and Jardinico; it
stressed that they had reached an agreement independent of the
outcome of the case.
Petitioner further assails the following holding of the Court of Appeals:
2.
Third-party
defendants
C.T. Torres
Enterprises,
Inc.
and