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Walt - 1989 - International Relations One World
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International
Relations:
One
World,
Many Theories
M. Walt
byStephen
Why
shouldpolicymakersand practitioners
care about the scholarlystudy of international affairs?Those who conductforeign
policy often dismiss academictheorists(frequently,
29
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FOREIGN
POLICY
Walt
Realism
Realismwas the dominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughoutthe Cold
affairsas a struggleforpoweramongselfWar.It depictsinternational
interestedstatesand is generallypessimisticaboutthe prospectsfor
eliminatingconflictandwar.Realismdominatedin the ColdWaryears
becauseit providedsimplebutpowerfulexplanations
forwar,alliances,
obstacles
to
and
other
international
imperialism,
cooperation,
phenomena,andbecauseits emphasison competitionwasconsistentwiththe
centralfeaturesof the American-Soviet
rivalry.
Realismis not a singletheory,of course,andrealistthoughtevolved
the ColdWar."Classical"
realistssuchasHans
considerably
throughout
Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states,like human
beings,hadan innatedesireto dominateothers,whichledthemto fight
wars.Morgenthau
alsostressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar,
systemandsawthe bipolarrivalrybetweenthe Unitbalance-of-power
ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especiallydangerous.
By contrast,the "neorealist"
theoryadvancedby KennethWaltz
human
nature
and
focused
on the effectsof the international
ignored
For
system. Waltz,the international
systemconsistedof a numberof
greatpowers,each seekingto survive.Becausethe systemis anarchic
(i.e., thereis no centralauthorityto protectstatesfromone another),
each statehas to surviveon its own.Waltzarguedthat thiscondition
wouldlead weakerstatesto balanceagainst,ratherthan bandwagon
he claimed
with, morepowerfulrivals.And contraryto Morgenthau,
thatbipolarity
wasmorestablethanmultipolarity.
An importantrefinementto realismwas the additionof offensedefensetheory,as laid out by RobertJervis,GeorgeQuester,and
StephenVan Evera.These scholarsarguedthat warwas morelikely
whenstatescouldconquereachothereasily.Whendefensewaseasier
thanoffense,however,securitywasmoreplentiful,incentivesto expand
declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the
andstatescoulddistinguish
betweenoffensiveanddefensive
advantage,
then
states
could acquirethe meansto defendthemselves
weapons,
withoutthreatening
the effectsof anarchy.
others,therebydampening
Forthese"defensive"
realists,statesmerelysoughtto surviveandgreat
powerscouldguaranteetheirsecurityby formingbalancingalliancesand
choosingdefensivemilitarypostures(such as retaliatorynuclearforces).
Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the
United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War.Their
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itsfavorable
positionbyadoptprinciplefearwasthatit mightsquander
foreignpolicy.Thus,bytheendof theColdWar,
inganoverlyaggressive
darkbrooding
abouthuman
realismhadmovedawayfromMorgenthau's
natureandtakenon a slightlymoreoptimistictone.
Liberalism
The principalchallengeto realismcamefroma broadfamilyof liberal theories.One strandof liberalthoughtarguedthateconomicinterdependencewould discouragestatesfrom using force againsteach
otherbecausewarfarewouldthreateneachside'sprosperity.
A second
often
associated
with
President
Woodrow
strand,
Wilson, saw the
of
as
the
to
world
spread democracy
key
peace,basedon the claimthat
democraticstateswere inherentlymorepeacefulthan authoritarian
states. A third, more recent theory argued that international
institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergyAgencyand the InternationalMonetaryFundcouldhelp overcomeselfishstatebehavior,
statesto foregoimmediategainsforthe greater
mainlybyencouraging
benefitsof enduringcooperation.
Althoughsomeliberalsflirtedwiththe ideathatnew transnational
actors, especially the multinationalcorporation,were gradually
on thepowerof states,liberalism
sawstatesasthe
encroaching
generally
centralplayersin international
affairs.All liberaltheoriesimpliedthat
wasmorepervasive
thaneventhe defensiveversionof realcooperation
ismallowed,buteachviewoffereda differentrecipeforpromoting
it.
RadicalApproaches
Until the 1980s,marxismwasthe mainalternativeto the mainstream
realistand liberaltraditions.Whererealismand liberalismtook the
statesystemforgranted,marxismofferedboth a differentexplanation
forinternational
conflictanda blueprintforfundamentally
transformorder.
ing the existinginternational
Orthodoxmarxisttheorysawcapitalism
asthe centralcauseof internationalconflict.Capitaliststatesbattledeachotheras a consequence
of theirincessantstruggleforprofitsandbattledsocialiststatesbecause
they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.Neomarxist
"dependency"theory, by contrast, focused on relations between
advancedcapitalistpowersand lessdevelopedstatesand arguedthat the
former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the
developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu32
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Walt
NEW WRINKLES
IN OLD PARADIGMS
1998
35
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Waiting
for
Mr.
-S.W.
36
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Walt
insofarasits
foreignpolicyis generallyconsistentwithrealistprinciples,
andto shapea
actionsarestilldesignedto preserveU.S. predominance
postwarorderthatadvancesAmericaninterests.
withinthe realistparThe mostinteresting
conceptualdevelopment
the
"defensive"
and"offenhas
been
the
between
adigm
emergingsplit
sive"strandsof thought.Defensiverealistssuchas Waltz,VanEvera,
andJackSnyderassumedthatstateshadlittleintrinsicinterestin militaryconquestand arguedthat the costs of expansiongenerallyoutweighedthe benefits.Accordingly,
they maintainedthat greatpower
warsoccurredlargelybecausedomesticgroupsfosteredexaggerated
perceptionsof threatandan excessivefaithin the efficacyof militaryforce.
Thisviewis nowbeingchallengedalongseveralfronts.First,asRandallSchwellernotes,the neorealistassumption
thatstatesmerelyseek
to survive"stackedthe deck"in favorof the statusquobecauseit precludedthe threatof predatory
revisioniststates-nationssuchasAdolf
Francethat "valuewhat
Hitler'sGermanyor NapoleonBonaparte's
far
and
covet
more
than
what
they
theypossess" arewillingto riskannihilationto achievetheiraims.Second,PeterLiberman,in his book
DoesConquest
Pay?,usesa numberof historicalcases-such astheNazi
of
occupation WesternEuropeand Soviet hegemonyover Eastern
Europe-to showthatthe benefitsof conquestoftenexceedthe costs,
therebycastingdoubton the claimthatmilitaryexpansionis no longer
cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John
and FareedZakariaarguethat anarchyencouragesall
Mearsheimer,
statesto tryto maximizetheirrelativestrengthsimplybecauseno state
can everbe surewhena trulyrevisionistpowermightemerge.
Thesedifferences
helpexplainwhyrealistsdisagreeoverissuessuch
as the futureof Europe.FordefensiverealistssuchasVanEvera,waris
rarelyprofitableandusuallyresultsfrommilitarism,
hypemrnationalism,
or someotherdistortingdomesticfactor.BecauseVanEverabelieves
suchforcesarelargelyabsentin post-ColdWarEurope,he concludes
that the regionis "primedfor peace."By contrast,Mearsheimer
and
otheroffensiverealistsbelievethatanarchyforcesgreatpowersto comof theirinternalcharacteristics
andthatsecuritycompete irrespective
will
return
to
petition
Europeassoonasthe U.S. pacifieris withdrawn.
New Life for Liberalism
The defeatof communismsparkeda roundof self-congratulationin the
West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama'sinfamous claim that
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COMPETING
PARADIGMS
MainTheoretical
Proposition
REALISM
Self-interested
states
for
compete
constantly
orsecurity
power
Economic
and
especially
military
power
Modern
Theorists
Hans
Morgenthau,
Kenneth
Waltz
of
Waltz,
Theory
International
Politics
"Back
to
Mearsheimer,
theFuture:
Instability
inEurope
after
theCold
War"
(International
Security,
1990)
Representative
Modern
Works
Post-Cold
War
Prediction
MainLimitation
of
Resurgence
overt
great
power
competition
Does
notaccount
for
international
change
38
FOREIGN
LIBERALISM
CONSTRUCTIVISMI
forpower
Concern
overridden
byeconomic/
considerations
political
forprosperity,
(desire
commitment
to
liberal
values)
States
Varies
(international
economic
institutions,
exchange,
promotion
ofdemocracy)
Michael
Doyle,
Robert
Keohane
Keohane,
After
Hegemony
"The
End
of
Fukuyama,
(National
History?"
1989)
Interest,
Increased
cooperation
asliberal
free
values,
and
markets,international
institutions
spreac
Tends
toignore
the
role
ofpower
State
behavior
shaped
beliefs,
byl61ite
collective
norms,
andsocial
identities
Individuals
(especially
l61ites)
Ideas
and
discourse
Alexander
Wendt,
John
Ruggie
Is
Wendt,
"Anarchy
What
States
Make
ofIt"
(International
1992);
Organization,
Koslowski
&
Kratochwil,
"Underin
standing
Changes
International
Politics"
(International
1994)
Organization,
it
because
Agnostic
cannot
the
predict
content
ofideas
Better
atdescribing
the
than
past
anticipating
thefuture
POLICY
Walt
humankind
hadnowreachedthe "endof history."
Historyhaspaidlitto
but
attention
this
the
of
the
West did give a
boast,
triumph
tle
notableboostto all threestrandsof liberalthought.
andimportant
hasbeenthe
Byfarthe mostinteresting
development
lively debateon the "democratic
peace."Althoughthe most recent
of
this
debate
had
even
beforethe SovietUnioncollapsed,
phase
begun
it becamemore influentialas the numberof democraciesbeganto
increaseandas evidenceof thisrelationship
beganto accumulate.
Democraticpeacetheoryis a refinementof the earlierclaimthat
wereinherently
democracies
morepeacefulthanautocratic
states.Itrests
the
on
beliefthat althoughdemocracies
seemto fightwarsas oftenas
other states,they rarely,if ever,fight one another.Scholarssuch as
MichaelDoyle,JamesLeeRay,andBruceRussetthaveoffereda number
of explanations
forthistendency,the mostpopularbeingthatdemocracies embracenormsof compromise
that bar the use of forceagainst
similar
It
espousing
groups
principles. is hardto thinkof a moreinfluenrecent
academic
don't
tial,
debate,insofarasthebeliefthat"democracies
each
other"has been an importantjustification
for the Clinton
fight
administration's
effortsto enlargethe sphereof democratic
rule.
It is thereforeironicthatfaithin the "democratic
peace"becamethe
basisforU.S. policyjustasadditional
research
wasbeginningto identify
severalqualifiersto this theory.First,Snyderand EdwardMansfield
pointedout thatstatesmaybe moreproneto warwhentheyarein the
midstof a democratictransition,which impliesthat effortsto export
democracymightactuallymakethingsworse.Second,criticssuchas
absenceof
JoanneGowaandDavidSpirohavearguedthatthe apparent
warbetweendemocracies
is due to the waythat democracy
has been
definedandto the relativedearthof democratic
states(especially
before
1945). In addition,ChristopherLaynehas pointedout that when
democracies
havecomecloseto warin the pasttheirdecisionto remain
at peaceultimately
hadlittledo withtheirshareddemocratic
character.
clearcut
evidencethatdemocracies
donotfighteachotherisconThird,
finedto the post-1945era,and,asGowahasemphasized,
the absenceof
conflictin thisperiodmaybe duemoreto theircommoninterestin containingthe SovietUnionthanto shareddemocratic
principles.
Liberalinstitutionalistslikewisehave continued to adapttheir own
theories.On the one hand,the coreclaimsof institutionalisttheoryhave
become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate
cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterestto do so, but it is widely
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Walt
coursereflectsandshapesbeliefsandinterests,andestablishes
accepted
normsof behavior.Consequently,
constructivism
is especiallyattentive
to the sourcesof change,andthis approach
has largelyreplacedmarxismas the preeminentradicalperspective
on international
affairs.
The end of the ColdWarplayedan importantrolein legitimating
constructivisttheoriesbecauserealismand liberalismboth failedto
anticipatethis event andhad sometroubleexplainingit. Constructivists had an explanation:Specifically,formerpresidentMikhail
Gorbachevrevolutionized
Sovietforeignpolicybecausehe embraced
new ideassuchas "commonsecurity."
Moreover,given that we live in an erawhereold normsarebeing
aredissolving,andissuesof identichallenged,once clearboundaries
thatscholarshave
ty arebecomingmoresalient,it is hardlysurprising
been drawnto approachesthat place these issuesfrontand center.
Froma constructivistperspective,in fact, the centralissue in the
post-ColdWarworldis howdifferentgroupsconceivetheiridentities
and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism
how ideasandidentitiesarecreated,howtheyevolve,and
emphasizes
how theyshapethe waystatesunderstand
andrespondto theirsituation. Therefore,it matterswhetherEuropeans
definethemselvespriin
national
or
continental
whether
terms;
marily
GermanyandJapan
redefinetheirpastsin waysthatencouragetheiradoptingmoreactive
international
roles;andwhetherthe UnitedStatesembracesorrejects
its identityas "globalpoliceman."
Constructivist
theoriesarequitediverseanddo not offera unified
set of predictionson anyof theseissues.At a purelyconceptuallevel,
AlexanderWendthas arguedthat the realistconceptionof anarchy
doesnot adequatelyexplainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The
realissueis how anarchyis understood-inWendt'swords,"Anarchy
is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrandof constructivist
theoryhas
focusedon the futureof the territorial
state,suggestingthat transnationalcommunication
andsharedcivic valuesareundermining
traditionalnationalloyaltiesandcreatingradicallynew formsof political
association.Otherconstructivists
focuson the roleof norms,arguing
thatinternational
lawandothernormativeprincipleshaveerodedear-
1998
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DomesticPoliticsReconsidered
As in the ColdWar,scholarscontinueto explorethe impactof domestic politicson the behaviorof states.Domesticpoliticsareobviously
centralto the debateon the democraticpeace,and scholarssuch as
Snyder,JeffreyFrieden,andHelenMilnerhaveexaminedhowdomestic interestgroupscandistorttheformation
of statepreferences
andlead
to suboptimalinternationalbehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke,
andothershavealsoexploredhowdomesticinstitutions
canhelpstates
dealwith the perennialproblemof uncertainty,
whilestudentsof psychologyhave appliedprospecttheoryandothernew tools to explain
why decisionmakersfail to act in a rationalfashion.[Forfurtherdiscussionaboutforeignpolicydecisionmaking,pleasesee the articleby
HermannandJoeHagan.]
Margaret
The pastdecadehas alsowitnessedan explosionof interestin the
conceptof culture,a developmentthatoverlapswiththe constructivist
of ideasandnorms.Thus,ThomasBerger
emphasison the importance
andPeterKatzenstein
haveusedculturalvariables
to explainwhyGerand
have
thus
far
eschewed
more
self-reliant
many Japan
militarypoliof Britishand
cies;ElizabethKierhas offereda culturalinterpretation
Frenchmilitarydoctrinesin the interwar
period;andlainJohnstonhas
tracedcontinuitiesin Chineseforeignpolicyto a deeplyrootedformof
realism."
"cultural
SamuelHuntington's
direwarningsaboutan imminent "clashof civilizations"
aresymptomatic
of thistrendaswell,insofaras his argumentrestson the claimthatbroadculturalaffinitiesare
now supplantingnationalloyalties.Thoughthese and other works
defineculturein widelyvaryingwaysand have yet to providea full
explanationof how it worksor how enduringits effectsmightbe, culturalperspectives
have been verymuchin vogueduringthe pastfive
This
trend
is
years.
partlya reflectionof the broaderinterestin cultural
issuesin the academicworld(andwithinthe publicdebateaswell)and
partlya responseto the upsurgein ethnic,nationalist,andculturalconflictssincethe demiseof the SovietUnion.
TOMORROW'S
CONCEPTUAL
TOOLBOX
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1998
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identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and
societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may
differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically,because U.S. protection reducesthe dangerof regionalrivalriesand reinforcesthe "liberal peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmaybecome relatively
more important, as long as the United States continues to provide
securityand stability in many partsof the world.
Meanwhile,constructivisttheoriesare best suited to the analysisof
how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing
subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionallytriggeringfarreaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if
political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-stateto
more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it
matters if nationalism is graduallysupplantedby the sort of "civilizational" affinitiesemphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say
about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by
change if they ignorethese possibilitiesentirely.
In short, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant
aspects of world politics. Our understandingwould be impoverished
were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleatdiplomat"of the futureshouldremaincognizantof realism'semphasison the
inescapablerole of power,keep liberalism'sawarenessof domesticforces
in mind, and occasionallyreflecton constructivism's
vision of change.
WANT
TO
KNOW
MORE?
FOREIGN
POLICY
Walt
worldpolitics,see John
native realistassessmentsof contemporary
Mearsheimer's
"Backto the Future:Instabilityin Europeafterthe
Summer1990) and RobertJervis'
Cold War"(International
Security,
"TheFutureof WorldPolitics:WillIt Resemblethe Past?"(InternationalSecurity,
Winter1991-92).A realistexplanationof ethnicconflict is BarryPosen's"The SecurityDilemmaand EthnicConflict"
(Survival,
theory
Spring1993);an up-to-datesurveyof offense-defense
canbe foundin "TheSecurityDilemmaRevisited"byCharlesGlaser
(WorldPolitics,October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is
explained in Michael Mastanduno's"Preserving the Unipolar
Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. GrandStrategyafterthe Cold
War"(International
Security,
Spring1997).
The liberal approachto internationalaffairsis summarized
in
AndrewMoravcsik's
Preferences
A
Liberal
Theo"Taking
Seriously:
Autumn
ry of InternationalPolitics" (International
Organization,
to the debateon the democra1997).Manyof the leadingcontributors
tic peacecan be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones,
eds.,Debatingthe
DemocraticPeace (Cambridge,
MA: MITPress,1996) and Miriam
Elman,ed.,Paths to Peace: Is Democracythe Answer?(Cambridge,
MA:MITPress,1997).The contributions
of institutionalist
theoryand
thedebateon relativegainsaresummarized
in DavidBaldwin,ed.,Neorealismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary
Debate (New York,
NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).An importantcritiqueof the
institutionalist
literature
is Mearsheimer's
"TheFalsePromiseof InternationalInstitutions"(Intemrnational
Winter1994-95),butone
Security,
shouldalsoexaminethe responses
in the Summer1995issue.Forapplicationsof institutionalist
"NATO's
theoryto NATO,seeJohnDuffield's
Functionsafter the Cold War"(PoliticalScienceQuarterly,
Winter
and
Robert
McCalla's"NATO's
Persistenceafterthe Cold
1994-95)
War"(International
Summer1996).
Organization,
Authorsquestioningthe roleof the stateincludeSusanStrangein
The Retreatof the State:The Diffusionof Powerin the WorldEconomy(Cambridge:
Cambridge
UniversityPress,1996);andJessicaMathews in "PowerShift" (Foreign
1997). The
Affairs,January/February
Hendrik
in
The
emergenceof the stateis analyzed
by
Spruyt
Sovereign
Stateand Its Competitors
(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin
Question: The InternationalEconomyand the Possibilitiesof Governance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThompSPRING
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45
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Affairs
gplace
aheanwaaetl
ah
fregng
gg
icyCmuiy
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