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Spouses ABRIGO vs.

DE VERA
Spouses ABRIGO vs. DE VERA
G.R. No. 154409
June 21, 2004
FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go covered by a
tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over
the parcel of land involved.The said free patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the Spouses Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary
injunction, restraining order and damages Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant (RTC) case that
neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.
The RTC rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said
Decision, Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house
and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall
remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any
demand. Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as damages.
Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed
the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.The CA also dismissed
the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate
court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.9
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.
HELD: DE VERA
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision affirmed.The present case involves what in legal
contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was executed by
Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens
system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since
neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was
covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344 For her part,
respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had
presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the
land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system,
petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the
Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a
party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another
who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time
principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the
conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale
to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the
sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al Leave a comment

OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al


G.R. No. 150707
April 14, 2004
FACTS: The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo,
they begot ten (10) children. 2 of them, Fidela, and Felicidad are respondents herein.
The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo,
they acquired 3parcels of land and, upon their death, left the following properties. Only one of them, lot a is the
subject of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur
that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses although the land
denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but
acknowledged by her as a property owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire
to partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to
do so; that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their coheirs ;and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy
but because of defendants utterly unreasonable and unjustified actuations, the same failed.
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties; ordering
defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances which they had caused
to be annotated on the TCT; requiring Fidela and Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering said properties;
further ordering Fidela and Felicidad to indemnify plaintiffs .
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses;
that in 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled
and, in lieu thereof aTCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.
That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when a TCT was issued to
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said properties were
owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.

The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following
properties. The CA affirmed with modifications (for damages) the said ruling. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED
Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Coownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in
finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary
evidence that were adduced by respondents, such as:
1. On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and presented
preponderant proof of her claim. she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the
subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The document dated
in 1948, was acknowledged before a notary public. Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo
declared his exclusive ownership of the property, having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in
[his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his]
predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons.20
2. Respondent Belen proved that in 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable
consideration; and that Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of
dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
3. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented a Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia
Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues
that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in
question.
4. Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela
as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the formers claim of sole ownership of the property
5. In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating that she, as owner,
had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property
was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of ones interest in the ideal or abstract
part of the undivided thing co-owned with others. The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to
the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership. In this case, Fidela
mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement of co-ownership.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the
donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed
by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the
Acknowledgement assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven the property had
already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent
with the document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prove their ownership.
Having filed an action involving property, they should have relied on the strength of their own title and not on
the alleged weakness of respondents claim.
Neither can we accept petitioners contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the children
of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly

found that since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive
that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, coownership among the parties cannot be presumed.
It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property commencing in
1948 and eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 1984 it was only after 1984 that petitioners
started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof
REPUBLIC vs. ORFINADA, SR. Leave a comment

REPUBLIC vs. ORFINADA, SR.


G.R. No. 141145
November 12, 2004
FACTS: In 1985, the petitioner Rapublic represented by the Land Registration Commissioner, filed with the
RTC Pasay City, a complaint for annulment of title. Impleaded as defendants were spouses Orfinada,
respondents, and the RD of Pasay City.
The complaint alleges that the TCT issued by the RD of Pasig, Rizal, now Pasig City, in the names of
respondents, is spurious.
In their answer, respondents claimed that they purchased their land from Guillermo Cruz in 1955. The
corresponding Deed of Sale was duly registered in the RD of Pasig, Rizal and annotated at the back of the OCT
(OCT no. 383) in the name of Guillermo Cruz. This OCT was cancelled and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued in
their names (TCT no. 38910-A)
Contrary to petitioners allegations, the Free Patent granted by the President of the Philippines in favor of
Guillermo Cruz was issued on May 12, 1937, not May 12, 1935. This Free Patent covers a parcel of land in Las
Pias, Rizal (now Las Pias City). On the basis of this Free Patent, an OCT was issued to Guillermo Cruz in
1937. On the same day, this title was registered in the Registration Book of the RD of Pasig, Rizal.
Both OCT in the name of Guillermo Cruz and its derivative title the TCT in the names of respondents, are
intact and in the files of the RD of Pasig. Due to the decentralization of this Office, such TCT was one of those
transferred to the RD of Pasay City which was given a new number and then to the RD of Las Pias.
Eventually, in 1981, they (respondents) sold the land to the Insurance Savings and Investment Agency (ISIA).
Meantime, ISIA, being the new owner of the same parcel of land, filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for
recovery of the subject property against Enrique Factor and Pilar Development Corporation, occupants therein.
In due course, the RTC rendered a Decision dated in favor of ISIA, ordering the defendants to vacate the land.
The defendants then interposed an appeal to the CA.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The case was appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE: Petitioner, in the instant petition, ascribes to the CA the following errors:
1. The Ca grossly erred and acted under a misapprehension of facts in ruling that the title of the Orfinadas is
valid.
3. The basic issue for our resolution is whether petitioner has proved by preponderance of evidence that the
TCT in the names of respondents is spurious.
HELD: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Joint Decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED

1. Obviously, petitioner here, in its first assigned error, is raising factual issues. Time and again, we had
occasion to rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court. Moreover, factual findings of the trials courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive on this Court, but there are exceptions.
In Go vs. Court of Appeals,3 we held that:
[I]n Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; except:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Petitioner, in filing this petition, is invoking one of the exceptions mentioned above, i.e., when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts. We, therefore, opt to evaluate the evidence of both
parties on the basis of the old and cold records before us.
2. Let it be stressed that respondent spouses Orfinada purchased the property from Guillermo Cruz as early as
1955, as shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig. However, it was
only after 26 years, that the Director of Lands came to realize that respondents land title is spurious. What
prompted the Director of Lands, after such length of time, to conclude that this title is not genuine? Records are
silent on this point.
Petitioner maintains that the TCT in Respondents names is spurious just because it was derived from O.C.T.
No. 383. Petitioner insists that there is only one O.C.T. No. 383 and it is in the name of Paulino Cruz, not
Guillermo Cruz. But Atty. Manalastas, then Acting Register of Deeds of Pasig, a witness for petitioner, admitted
that O.C.T. No. 383 in the name of Paulino Cruz is no longer available.
Considering that O.C.T. No. 383 in the name of Paulino Cruz no longer exits, petitioner, in maintaining that
T.C.T. No. 38910-A originated therefrom, relies on a certified copy of a Free Patent in the name of Paulino
Cruz. According to petitioner, this Free Patent was the basis for the issuance of O.C.T. No. 383 to Paulino Cruz.
Such assertion does not persuade us considering that per admission of petitioner itself, O.C.T. No. 383 in the
name of Paulino Cruz, is not in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig. Indeed, the Committee Reports state
that the investigators merely presume that the description of the land covered by O.C.T. No. 383 (in the name
of Paulino Cruz) should be the same as what appears on the said Free Patent. This means that while a Free

Patent was granted by the Governor General to Paulino, it does not follow that the corresponding O.C.T. was
actually issued to Paulino Cruz and registered in his name.
There being no O.C.T. No. 383 in the name of Paulino Cruz as admitted by petitioner, its allegations that
respondents secured their title through fraud and misrepresentation by making it appear that it originated from
such O.C.T. No. 383 must fail. Even assuming that O.C.T. No. 383 was issued to Paulino Cruz on the basis of
the Free Patent, still we cannot conclude that respondents committed fraud in obtaining their title. The land
covered by the Free Patent is in Tanay, Rizal, while the property embraced by the Free Patent of Guillermo Cruz
is in Las Pias.

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