FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN INDIA

Dissertation Submitted To

AMITY UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW CAMPUS UTTAR PRADESH

FOR THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE
OF
B.A. L.L.B.(HONS)
BY

ANAND PRAKASH MISHRA

ENROLLMENT NO : A 8111110038
UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF
MS. MUDRA SINGH

AMITY LAW SCHOOL

AMITY UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW CAMPUS UTTAR PRADESH
MOC, GOMTI NAGAR EXTENSION, LUCKNOW

DECLARATION
Title of Project Report on FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the Universitys policy in this regard.
I declare that

(a) The work submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of
degree B.A.LLB Assessment in this FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS is my own; it
has not previously been presented for another assessment.
(b) I declare that this FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS is my original work. Wherever
work from other source has been used, all debts (for words, data, arguments and
ideas) have been appropriately acknowledged and referenced in accordance with the
requirements of NTCC regulations and Guidelines.
(c) I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to
submit it as my own.
(d) I have not permitted, and will not permit, anybody to copy my work with the purpose
of passing it off as his or her own work.
(e) The work conforms to the guidelines for layout, content and style as set out in the
Regulations and Guidelines.

Date :
Name of the Student ANAND PRAKASH MISHRA
Enrolment No: A8111110038
Programme name: B.A.LL.B.(Hons.)

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that

(a) ANAND PRAKASH MISHRA, A8111110038. Student of B.A.L.L.B.at AMITY LAW

SCHOOL, Amity University Uttar Pradesh has completed the Project Report on
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, during Semester 9th/ Summer break under my
supervision.
(b) The presented work embodies original research work carried out by the student as per the
guidelines given in University Regulations.
(c) The Research and writing embodied in the thesis are those of the candidate except where
due reference is made in the text.
(d) I am satisfied that the above candidates prima facie, is worthy of examination both in
terms of its content and its technical presentations relative to the standards recognized by
the university as appropriate for examination.
(e) I certify that in accordance with NTCC guidelines, the report do not exceed the
prescribed maximum word limit; or Prior approval has been sought to go beyond the
word limit.
(f) Wherever work form other source has been used, all debts (for words, data, arguments and
ideas) have been appropriately acknowledge and referenced in accordance with the
requirements of NTCC Regulations and Guidelines.

Signature of the Faculty

Name of the Faculty MS MUDRA SINGH
Designation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
On the completion of this project, I want to acknowledge to a lot of people who
have helped me in preparing it and making my endeavours worthwhile. Without their help,
assistance and guidance in the preparatory process of this assignment it would have been a
daunting task to complete it.
I would like to thank, MS. MUDRA SINGH who gave me the privilege to peep in
to the realms of this project and made me to increase my knowledge in this particular field
ofFUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Sincere thanks to our Head of Institution Prof. Mahesh Sharma who has been
constant force of inspiration. It would be failure on my part if I dont convey my gratitude to
him for his encouragement and support throughout the course of this dissertation.
It would not have been possible to complete this study without the constant
support of my parents and friends especially Anupam chaturvedi who installed confidence in
me at every step of this work and motivated me to manifest my ideas into this structural form.
Place: Lucknow
Date:
[ANAND PRAKASH MISHRA]
Amity Law School
9ThSemester
Enrollment No A8111110038

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION I
CHAPTER3
ANOTHER CHAPTER5
A section of the second chapter6
Another section 8
Subsection of the section..10
Another Subsection..10
Subdivision of the third level...11
Further subdivision..12
ANOTHER CHAPTER...15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.18
APPENDIX A. TITLE OF THE FIRS APPENDIX20
APPENDIX B. ANOTHER APPENDIX.21
REFERENCES.23

CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION

Human rights are rights that are basic in nature and entitled to every human being,
irrespective of his nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, language, or any other status. Such rights would include right to life, equality before
the law, freedom of expression, the right to work, right to social security, right to education,
collective rights, such as the rights to development and self-determination, etc. Therefore as
is evident human rights are inseparable, interrelated and interdependent. The improvement of
one right makes the progress of the others possible. Correspondingly, the denial of one right
has negating affects on the others. The basic right that is protected by the term human right is
right to life with dignity. A human rights-based approach to education is therefore
necessitated since it assures every child a quality education that respects and promotes her or
his right to dignity and optimum development. The right to education is marked priority on
the agenda of the international community since right to education is not only a human right
in itself but also is quintessential for the exercise of all other human rights.
Last human rights in Indian Legal Parlance means the rights relating to life, liberty,
equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the constitution embodies in the
international covenants and enforceable by courts in India. According to Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer:
Human rights are those irreducible minima, which belong to every member of the human
race when pitted against the State or other public authorities or group or gangs and other
oppressive communities. Being member of the human family, he has the right to be treated as
human, once he takes birth or is alive in the womb with a potential title to personhood.
Basic education and higher education one of the most important functions of the State
consists of providing education to its citizens. Arguments for the provision of education at
different levels are very often based on the view that education is a human right. However it
is not difficult to see that from the perspective of human rights the different levels of
education do not really enjoy the same status. In order to examine the validity of arguments
relating to the status of right to education it is important to distinguish among different levels
of education and examine whether human rights considerations entail the provision of
education at all levels.
There are a large number of human rights problems, which cannot be solved unless
the right to education is addressed as the key to unlock other human rights. The right to
6

education is clearly acknowledged in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, which states: "Everyone has the right to education.
Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
(Article 26) and such as the following:
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958) Article 3
Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) - Article 13
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
(1981) Article 10
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Article 28 & 29
During recent years no other issue has dominated the development discourse more
fiercely than elementary education. The impulse of this single issue led the apex judicial
institution, the Supreme Court, to pass a judgment that the right to education must be seen in
conjunction with the right to life, as such right to education was asserted as fundamental right
under Mohini Jain vs. State of Karnataka and Unni Krishnan vs. Andhara Pradesh.
Subsequently, the Indian parliament amended the Constitution through the 86th Constitution
Amendment, an provided Article 21A which says, that State shall provide free and
compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as
State may, by law determine then Article 45 says that, the State shall endeavour to provide
early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years
and further Article 51A (k) says that, who is a parent of guardian to provide opportunities for
education to his child or as the case may be, ward between the age of six to fourteen years.

Fundamental rights in India

Fundamental rights is a charter of rights contained in the Constitution of India. It

guarantees civil liberties such that all Indians can lead their lives in peace and harmony
as citizens of India. These include individual rights common to most liberal democracies,
such as equality before law, freedom of speech and expression, and peaceful assembly,
freedom to practice religion, and the right to constitutional remedies for the protection of civil
rights by means of writs such as habeas corpus. Violation of these rights result in
punishments as prescribed in the Indian Penal Code or other special laws, subject to
discretion of the judiciary. The Fundamental Rights are defined as basic human freedoms
which every Indian citizen has the right to enjoy for a proper and harmonious development of
personality. These rights universally apply to all citizens, irrespective of race, place of birth,
religion, caste or gender. Aliens (persons who are not citizens) are also considered in matters
like equality before law. They are enforceable by the courts, subject to certain restrictions.
The Rights have their origins in many sources, including England's Bill of Rights, the United
States Bill of Rights andFrance's Declaration of the Rights of Man.

The eight fundamental rights recognised by the Indian constitution are:

1. Right to equality
Which includes equality before law, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, gender or place of birth, and equality of opportunity in matters of employment,
abolition of untouchability and abolition of titles.

2. Right to freedom
Which includes speech and expression, assembly, association or union or cooperatives,
movement, residence, and right to practice any profession or occupation (some of these rights
are subject to security of the State, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order,
8

decency or morality), right to life and liberty, right to education, protection in respect to
conviction in offences and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.

3. Right against exploitation

Which prohibits all forms of forced labour, child labour and traffic in human beings;

4. Right to freedom of religion

Which includes freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of
religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from certain taxes and freedom from
religious instructions in certain educational institutes.

5. Cultural and Educational rights

Preserve the right of any section of citizens to conserve their culture, language or script, and
right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

6. Right to constitutional remedies

Which is present for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

7. Right to elementary education

Which implies that any child between the age of 6 to 14 should and can be educated.

8. Right to Information.
Right to property was originally a fundamental right, but under 44th Amendment Act, right to
property ceased to be a Fundamental right. Instead the right to property is mentioned under
300A of Indian Constitution, stating that no person can be deprived of his property save by
law.
Fundamental rights for Indians have also been aimed at overturning the inequalities of preindependence

social

practices.

Specifically,

they

have

also

been

used

to

abolish untouchability and thus prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste,
sex, or place of birth. They also forbid trafficking of human beings and forced labour. They
also protect cultural and educational rights of ethnic and religiousminorities by allowing them
to preserve their languages and also establish and administer their own education institutions.

GENESIS
The development of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights in India was
inspired by historical examples such as England's Bill of Rights (1689), the United States Bill
of Rights (approved on 17 September 1787, final ratification on 15 December 1791)
and France's Declaration of the Rights of Man(created during the revolution of 1789, and
10

ratified on 26 August 1789). Under the educational system ofBritish Raj, students were
exposed to ideas of democracy, human rights and European political history. The Indian
student community in England was further inspired by the workings of parliamentary
democracy and Britishers political parties.
In 1919, the Rowlatt Act gave extensive powers to the British government and police, and
allowed indefinite arrest and detention of individuals, warrant-less searches and seizures,
restrictions on public gatherings, and intensive censorship of media and publications. The
public opposition to this act eventually led to mass campaigns of non-violent civil
disobedience throughout the country demanding guaranteed civil freedoms, and limitations
on government power. Indians, who were seeking independence and their own government,
were particularly influenced by the independence of Ireland and the development of the Irish
constitution. Also, the directive principles of state policy in Irish constitution were looked
upon by the people of India as an inspiration for the independent India's government to
comprehensively tackle complex social and economic challenges across a vast, diverse nation
and population.
In 1928, the Nehru Commission composing of representatives of Indian political parties
proposed constitutional reforms for India that apart from calling for dominion status for India
and elections under universal suffrage, would guarantee rights deemed fundamental,
representation for religious and ethnic minorities, and limit the powers of the government. In
1931, the Indian National Congress (the largest Indian political party of the time) adopted
resolutions committing itself to the defence of fundamental civil rights, as well as socioeconomic

rights

such as

the minimum

wage and the abolition

of untouchability

and serfdom. Committing themselves to socialism in 1936, the Congress leaders took
examples from the constitution of the erstwhile USSR, which inspired the fundamental duties
of citizens as a means of collective patriotic responsibility for national interests and
challenges.
Task of developing a constitution for the nation was undertaken by the Constituent Assembly
of India, composing of elected representatives. Constituent Assembly first met on December
9, 1946 under the presidency of Dr. Sachidanand later Dr. Rajendra Prasad was made its
President. While members of Congress composed of a large majority, Congress leaders
appointed persons from diverse political backgrounds to responsibilities of developing the
constitution and national laws. Notably, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar became the chairperson of
11

the drafting committee, while Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel became
chairpersons of committees and sub-committees responsible for different subjects. A notable
development during that period having significant effect on the Indian constitution took place
on 10 December 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and called upon all member states to adopt these rights in their
respective constitutions.
The fundamental rights were included in the First Draft Constitution (February 1948), the
Second Draft Constitution (17 October 1948) and final Third Draft Constitution (26
November 1949), prepared by theDrafting Committee.

SIGNIFICANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS

The fundamental rights were included in the constitution because they were considered
essential for the development of the personality of every individual and to preserve human
dignity. The writers of the constitution regarded democracy of no avail if civil liberties, like
12

freedom of speech and religion were not recognised and protected by the State. According to
them, "democracy" is, in essence, a government by opinion and therefore, the means of
formulating public opinion should be secured to the people of a democratic nation. For this
purpose, the constitution guaranteed to all the citizens of India the freedom of speech and
expression and various other freedoms in the form of the fundamental rights.
All people, irrespective of race, religion, caste or sex, have been given the right to move
the Supreme Court and the High Courts for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. It is
not necessary that the aggrieved party has to be the one to do so. Poverty stricken people may
not have the means to do so and therefore, in the public interest, anyone can commence
litigation in the court on their behalf. This is known as "Public interest litigation". In some
cases, High Court judges have acted on their own on the basis of newspaper reports.
These fundamental rights help not only in protection but also the prevention of gross
violations of human rights. They emphasise on the fundamental unity of India by
guaranteeing to all citizens the access and use of the same facilities, irrespective of
background. Some fundamental rights apply for persons of any nationality whereas others are
available only to the citizens of India. The right to life and personal liberty is available to all
people and so is the right to freedom of religion. On the other hand, freedoms of
speech andexpression and freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country are reserved
to citizens alone, including non-resident Indian citizens. The right to equality in matters of
public employment cannot be conferred to overseas citizens of India.
Fundamental rights primarily protect individuals from any arbitrary state actions, but some
rights

are

enforceable

against

individuals. For

instance,

the

Constitution

abolishes untouchability and also prohibits begar. These provisions act as a check both on
state action as well as the action of private individuals. However, these rights are not absolute
or uncontrolled and are subject to reasonable restrictions as necessary for the protection of
general welfare. They can also be selectively curtailed. The Supreme Court has ruled that all
provisions of the Constitution, including fundamental rights can be amended. However,
the Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the constitution. Features such as
secularism and democracy fall under this category. Since the fundamental rights can only be
altered by a constitutional amendment, their inclusion is a check not only on the executive
branch, but also on the Parliament and state legislatures.

13

A state of national emergency has an adverse effect on these rights. Under such a state, the
rights conferred by Article 19 (freedoms of speech, assembly and movement, etc.) remain
suspended. Hence, in such a situation, the legislature may make laws which go against the
rights given in Article 19. Also, the President may by order suspend the right to move court
for the enforcement of other rights as well.

RIGHT TO EQUALITY

14

Right to equality is an important right provided for in Articles 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the
constitution. It is the principal foundation of all other rights and liberties, and guarantees the
following:
Article 14
Equality before law: Article 14 of the constitution guarantees that all people shall be equally
protected by the laws of the country. It means that the State will treat people in the same
circumstances alike. This article also means that individuals, whether citizens of India or
otherwise shall be treated differently if the circumstances are different.

CASE STUDY
Girish vs State Of Karnataka on 22 December, 1993
Even though the Supreme Court had occasion to pronounce upon different dimensions
of Article14 of the Constitution having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, its
subsequent pronouncements do not in any way change the Ruling in Rajamallaiah's case1. 15.
He further submitted that there is no proper pleading in each of the Writ Petitions giving rise
to specific points of law to be considered by this Court. In other words, his submission is that
the pleading is incomplete. The last submission of the learned Advocate General is that the
Constitutional validity of Section 21 of the Act having been upheld by a Division Bench of
this Court and the Special Leave Petitions filed before the Supreme Court against the said
Decision having been withdrawn, the petitioners cannot once again reopen the issue in these
Petitions. 16. Among several learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners urging their points
in support of their Petitions, Sri Santosh Hegde, learned Senior Counsel, specifically argued
the following points:- (i) The law declared in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case by the Supreme Court
considering different dimensions of Article 14 of the Constitution is in favour of the
petitioners. Therefore, in view instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the
Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. To satisfy this requirement of
non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight
to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the
decision. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate is a question of
15

fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the
claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important
considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of
the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would
satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny." . Highlighting
the scope and ambit of the Ruling in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case, Sri Hegde and other learned
Counsel who adopted his arguments, urged that in view of the interpretation of Article 14by
the Supreme Court and the Decision therein by which the State actions taken through the
Circular in question was found fault with and the Decision of the Allahabad High Court was
reversed, the Decision rendered by this Court in Rajamallaiah's case is no longer a good law.
25. It may be necessary to point out that in Rajamallaiah's case similar contentions as are
taken in these Cases were taken in support of their case.

Article 15
Social equality and equal access to public areas: Article 15 of the constitution states that no
person shall be discriminated on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Every
person shall have equal access to public places like public parks, museums, wells, bathing
ghats and temples etc. However, the State may make any special provision for women and
children. Special provisions may be made for the advancements of any socially or
educationally backward class or scheduled castes orscheduled tribes.
CASE STUDY
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Others
Summary
In April 2006, the Indian parliament passed a bill to bring out an amendment in the
constitution to provide for nearly 27% reservation of seats for students from the Other
Backward Classes (OBC) segment in institutes of higher learning in India. This would have
reduced the seats for a general, unreserved candidate to about 50% (after taking into account
other reserved seats). The validity of the amendment was challenged on the grounds that the
Union of India failed to perform the constitutional and legal duties toward the citizenry, and
16

that the Act would have the effect of dividing the country on caste basis. It was alleged that
the act would lead to chaos, confusion, and anarchy which would have destructive impact on
the peaceful atmosphere in the educational and other institutions and would seriously affect
social and communal harmony. The constitutional guarantee of equality and equal
opportunity shall be seriously prejudiced.
India's Supreme Court ruled against the reservations on the Act on two grounds. First, it held
that the exact proportion of OBCs in India's population was not accurately identified, but was
based on projections made in 1978 by a specially appointed official commission (Mandal
Commission). The Commission projected that 52% of the population belonged in the OBC
category, but the Court found that the methodology used to reach this figure was flawed.
Second, the Court held that setting quotas or reservations might not be an appropriate means
of promoting diversity or affirmation action because it discriminates against "meritorious"
candidates who do not suffer social disadvantage on account of caste, race or ethnicity.
Comment
This is a regressive judgment by India's Supreme Court which seriously hampers the
government's efforts to promote affirmative action. It contradicts the rationale of a 1992
judgment of a much larger bench, composed of nine judges, which upheld such reservations
for the low castes (called Other Backward Classes or OBCs in officialese) in central
government jobs. It has been widely criticized for dismissing the arguably reliable findings of
the Mandal Commission and for basing part of its judgment on the rationale of Grutter v.
Bollinger, a controversial affirmative action U.S. Supreme Court case.

Article 16
Equality in matters of public employment: Article 16 of the constitution lays down that the
State cannot discriminate against anyone in the matters of employment. All citizens can apply
for government jobs. There are some exceptions. The Parliament may enact a law stating that
certain jobs can only be filled by applicants who are domiciled in the area. This may be
meant for posts that require knowledge of the locality and language of the area. The State
may also reserve posts for members of backward classes, scheduled castes or scheduled tribes
17

which are not adequately represented in the services under the State to bring up the weaker
sections of the society. Also, there a law may be passed which requires that the holder of an
office of any religious institution shall also be a person professing that particular
religion. According to the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003, this right shall not be
conferred to Overseas citizens of India.
Article 17
Abolition of untouchability: Article 17 of the constitution abolishes the practice
of untouchability. Practice of untouchability is an offence and anyone doing so is punishable
by law. TheUntouchability Offences Act of 1955 (renamed to Protection of Civil Rights
Act in 1976) provided penalties for preventing a person from entering a place of worship or
from taking water from a tank or well.
Article 18
Abolition of Titles: Article 18 of the constitution prohibits the State from conferring any
titles. Citizens of India cannot accept titles from a foreign State. The British government had
created an aristocratic class known as Rai Bahadurs and Khan Bahadurs in India these titles
were also abolished. However, Military and academic distinctions can be conferred on the
citizens of India. The awards of Bharat Ratna and Padma Vibhushan cannot be used by the
recipient as a title and do not, accordingly, come within the constitutional prohibition". The
Supreme Court, on 15 December 1995, upheld the validity of such awards.

RIGHT TO FREEDOM

18

The Constitution of India contains the right to freedom, given in articles 19, 20, 21, 21A and
22, with the view of guaranteeing individual rights that were considered vital by the framers
of the constitution. It is a cluster of four main laws. The right to freedom in Article 19
guarantees the following six freedoms:

Freedom to assemble peacefully without arms, on which the State can impose reasonable
restrictions in the interest of public order and the sovereignty and integrity of India.

Freedom to form associations or unions or co-operative societies on which the State can
impose reasonable restrictions on this freedom in the interest of public order, morality and the
sovereignty and integrity of India.

Freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India though reasonable restrictions can
be imposed on this right in the interest of the general public, for example, restrictions may be
imposed on movement and travelling, so as to control epidemics.

Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India which is also subject to
reasonable restrictions by the State in the interest of the general public or for the protection of
the scheduled tribes because certain safeguards as are envisaged here seem to be justified to
protect indigenous and tribal peoples from exploitation and coercion. Article 370 restricts
citizens from other Indian states and Kashmiri women who marry men from other states from
purchasing land or property inJammu & Kashmir.

Freedom to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business on which
the State may impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. Thus, there
is no right to carry on a business which is dangerous or immoral. Also, professional or

19

technical qualifications may be prescribed for practising any profession or carrying on any
trade.

21A. Right to elementary education.The State shall provide free and compulsory education
to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law,
determine.
The constitution also imposes restrictions on these rights. The government restricts these
freedoms in the interest of the independence, sovereignty and integrity of India. In the interest
of morality and public order, the government can also impose restrictions. However, the right
to life and personal liberty cannot be suspended. The six freedoms are also automatically
suspended or have restrictions imposed on them during a state of emergency.

CASE STUDY
1) M. C. Mehta v. Union of India
The case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India originated in the aftermath of oleum gas leak from
Shriram Food and Fertilisers Ltd. complex at Delhi. This gas leak occurred soon after the
infamous Bhopal gas leak and created a lot of panic in Delhi. One person died in the incident
and few were hospitalized. The case lays down the principle of absolute liability and the
concept of deep pockets.
Facts
The case came up before the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court after a three-judge bench
had referred it to a higher bench because certain questions of seminal importance and high
constitutional significance were raised in the course of arguments when the writ petition was
originally heard.
The Bench of three Judges permitted Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries (hereinafter
referred to as Shriram) to restart its power plant as also plants for manufacture of caustic

20

chlorine including its by-products and recovery plants like soap, glycerine and technical hard
oil, subject to the conditions set out in the Judgment.
The main issue in the original writ petition which was filed in order to obtain a direction for
closure of the various units of Shriram on the ground that they were hazardous to the
community.
But while the writ petition was pending there was escape of oleum gas from one of the units
of Shriram on 4 and 6 December 1985 and applications were filed by the Delhi Legal Aid &
Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association for award of compensation to the persons who
had suffered harm on account of escape of oleum gas.
The Court thought that these applications for compensation raised certain important issues
and those issues should be addressed by a constitutional bench.

Preliminary objection of the defendants

There was only one preliminary objection filed by the counsel for the defendant, and this was
that the Court should not proceed to decide these constitutional issues since there was no
claim for compensation originally made in the writ petition and these issues could not be said
to arise on the writ petition. However, the Court, while rejecting this objection, said that
though it is undoubtedly true that the petitioner could have applied for amendment of the writ
petition so as to include a claim for compensation but merely because he did not do so, the
applications for compensation cannot be thrown out. These applications for compensation are
for enforcement of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution
and while dealing with such applications we cannot adopt a hyper-technical approach which
would defeat the ends of justice.

Judgment

21

The first question which requires to be considered is as to what is the scope and ambit of the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32.
The Court wholly endorsed what had been stated by Bhagwati, J. in Bandhua Mukti Morcha
v. Union of India and Ors. as regards the true scope and ambit of Article 32. It may now be
taken as well settled that Article 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue a
direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a
constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for
that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge
new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights.
The next question which arises for consideration on these applications for compensation is
whether Article 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited,
a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public
interest and with potential to affect the life and health of the people. The issue of availability
of Article 21 against a private corporation engaged in an activity which has potential to affect
the life and health of the people was vehemently argued by counsel for the applicants and
Shriram.
The Court traced the evolution of the Doctrine of State Action to ascertain whether the
defendants in this case fall under the definition of the term state, as provided under Article 12,
or not. The Court also looked into the Industrial Policy of the Government. Under the
Industrial Policy Resolution 1956 industries were classified into three categories having
regard to the part which the State would play in each of them. The first category was to be the
exclusive responsibility of the State. The second category comprised those industries which
would be progressively State owned and in which the State would therefore generally take the
initiative in establishing new undertakings but in which private enterprise would also be
expected to supplement the effort of the State by promoting and development undertakings
either on its own or with State participation. The third category would include all the
remaining industries and their future development would generally be left to the initiative and
enterprise of the private sector.
If an analysis of the declarations in the Policy Resolutions and the Act is undertaken, we find
that the activity of producing chemicals and fertilisers is deemed by the State to be an
industry of vital public interest, whose public import necessitates that the activity should be
22

ultimately carried out by the State itself, in the interim period with State support and under
State control, private corporations may also be permitted to supplement the State effort. The
argument of the applicants on the basis of this premise was that in view of this declared
industrial policy of the State, even private corporations manufacturing chemicals and
fertilisers can be said to be engaged in activities which are so fundamental to the Society as to
be necessarily considered government functions

2) Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India speaking about the utility of

freedom of press the court observes:-

The expression freedom of the press has not been issues in article 19 but it is
comprehended within article 19(1)(a). The expression means freedom from interference from
authority which would have the effect of the interference with the content nd the circulation
of the newspapers and cannot be any interference with that freedom in the name of public
interest. Freedom of press is the heart of social and political intercourse it is the primary duty
of the courts to up hold the freedom of the press and in validate all laws or administrative
actions with interfere with it contrary to the constitutional mandate.
The question of validity of censorship came up for consideration in the case of Brij Bhushan
v. State of Delhi . In that case the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, in pursuance of Section 7 of
the East Punjab Safety Act, 1949 issued an order against the printer, publisher and the editor
of an English Weekly of Delhi, called the Organizer, directing them to submit for analysis in
duplicate before publication till further orders, all communal matters and news and views,
about the Pakistan including the photographs and cartoons other than those derived from
official source of supplied by the news agencies.
The Court struck down the order, observing that the press which is the essential part of the
freedom of the speech and expression declared by Article 19(1)(a). Similarly, prohibiting
newspaper from the publication of its own views or the views of the correspondence about
the burning topic of the day is the serious encroachment on the valuable rights of the freedom
of speech and expression.

23

3) In Express Newspapers v. Union of India .

In this case the validity of the Working Journalist Act 1955 was challenged. This Act
was enacted to regulate conditions of service of persons employed in newspaper
industries. The Court held that Act is valid .It is said that press was not immune from
laws of general application or ordinary forms of taxation or laws of industrial
relations .The Act was passed to improve the service conditions of the women in the
newspaper industry and therefore, impose reasonable restriction on the right
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).

4) Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (case
citation: AIR 1973 SC 1461) is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of India that
outlined the Basic Structure doctrine of theConstitution. Justice Hans Raj Khanna asserted
through this doctrine that the constitution possesses a basic structure of constitutional
principles and values. The Court cemented the prior precedent Golaknath v. State of Punjab
AIR 1967 SC 1643, which held that constitutional amendments pursuant to Article 368 were
subject to fundamental rights review.
The Basic Structure doctrine forms the basis of power of the Indian judiciary to review, and
strike down, amendments to the Constitution of India enacted by the Indian parliament which
conflict with or seek to alter this basic structure of the Constitution.
The 13-judge Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court deliberated on the limitations, if
any, of the powers of the elected representatives of the people and the nature of fundamental
rights of an individual. In a sharply divided verdict, by a margin of 7-6, the court held that
while the Parliament has "wide" powers, it did not have the power to destroy or emasculate
the basic elements or fundamental features of the constitution.
Although the court upheld the basic structure doctrine by only the narrowest of margins, it
has since gained widespread acceptance and legitimacy due to subsequent cases and
24

judgments. Primary among these was the imposition of the state of emergency by Indira
Gandhi in 1975, and the subsequent attempt to suppress her prosecution through the 39th
Amendment. When the Kesavananda case was decided, the underlying apprehension of the
majority bench that elected representatives could not be trusted to act responsibly was
perceived to be unprecedented. However, the passage of the 39th Amendment proved that in
fact this apprehension was well-founded. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, a
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court used the basic structure doctrine to strike down
the 39th amendment and paved the way for restoration of Indian democracy.
The Kesavananda judgment also defined the extent to which Parliament could
restrict property rights, in pursuit of land reform and the redistribution of large landholdings
to cultivators, overruling previous decisions that suggested that the right to property could not
be restricted. The case was a culmination of a series of cases relating to limitations to the
power to amend the Indian constitution.

Facts
In February 1970 Swami HH Sri Kesavananda Bharati, Senior Pontiff and head of "Edneer
Mutt" - a HinduMutt situated in Edneer, a village in Kasaragod District of Kerala, challenged
the Kerala government's attempts, under two state land reform acts, to impose restrictions on
the management of its property. Although the state invoked its authority under Article 21, a
noted Indian jurist, Nanabhoy Palkhivala, convinced the Swami into filing his petition under
Article 26, concerning the right to manage religiously owned property without government
interference. Even though the hearings consumed five months, the outcome would
profoundly affect India's democratic processes.

Judgement
The Supreme Court reviewed the decision in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, and considered the
validity of the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th Amendments. The case was heard by the largest ever
Constitutional Bench of 13 Judges. The Bench gave eleven judgements, which agreed on

25

some points and differed on others. Nani Palkhivala, assisted by Fali Nariman, presented the
case against the government in both cases.

Majority judgement
Upholding the validity of clause (4) of article 13 and a corresponding provision in article
368(3), inserted by the 24th Amendment, the Court settled in favour of the view that
Parliament has the power to amend the Fundamental Rights also. However, the Court
affirmed another proposition also asserted in the Golaknath case, by ruling that the expression
"amendment" of this Constitution in article 368 means any addition or change in any of the
provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution
to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles. Applied to
Fundamental Rights, it would be that while Fundamental Rights cannot be abrogated,
reasonable abridgement of Fundamental Rights could be effected in the public interest. The
true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided the basic
foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same

RIGHT AGAINST EXPLOITATION

26

Child labour and Begar is prohibited under Right against exploitation.

The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions,
namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour), and abolition
of employment of children below the age of 14 years in dangerous jobs like factories, mines,
etc. Child labour is considered a gross violation of the spirit and provisions of the
constitution.[24] Begar, practised in the past by landlords, has been declared a crime and is
punishable by law. Trafficking in humans for the purpose ofslave trade or prostitution is also
prohibited by law. An exception is made in employment without payment for compulsory
services for public purposes. Compulsory military conscription is covered by this provision.

RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

27

Right to freedom of religion, covered in Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28, provides religious
freedom to all citizens of India. The objective of this right is to sustain the principle
of secularism in India. According to the Constitution, all religions are equal before the State
and no religion shall be given preference over the other. Citizens are free to preach, practice
and propagate any religion of their choice.

Religious communities can set up charitable institutions of their own. However, activities in
such institutions which are not religious are performed according to the laws laid down by the
government. Establishing a charitable institution can also be restricted in the interest of public
order, morality and health. No person shall be compelled to pay taxes for the promotion of a
particular religion. A State run institution cannot be impart education that is proreligion. Also, nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent
the State from making any further law regulating or restricting any economic, financial,
political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice, or
providing for social welfare and reform.

RIGHT TO LIFE
28

The constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which in turn cites specific
provisions in which these rights are applied and enforced:

Protection with respect to conviction for offences is guaranteed in the right to life and
personal liberty. According to Article 20, no one can be awarded punishment which is more
than what the law of the land prescribes at that time. This legal axiom is based on the
principle that no criminal law can be made retrospective, that is, for an act to become an
offence, the essential condition is that it should have been an offence legally at the time of
committing it. Moreover, no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. "Compulsion" in this article refers to what in law is called "Duress" (injury,
beating or unlawful imprisonment to make a person do something that he does not want to
do). This article is known as a safeguard against self incrimination. The other principle
enshrined in this article is known as the principle of double jeopardy, that is, no person can be
convicted twice for the same offence, which has been derived from Anglo Saxon law. This
principle was first established in the Magna Carta.

Protection of life and personal liberty is also stated under right to life and personal liberty.
Article 21 declares that no citizen can be denied his life and liberty except by law. This means
that a person's life and personal liberty can only be disputed if that person has committed a
crime. However, the right to life does not include the right to die, and hence, suicide or an
attempt thereof, is an offence. (Attempted suicide being interpreted as a crime has seen many
debates. The Supreme Court of India gave a landmark ruling in 1994. The court repealed
section 309 of the Indian penal code, under which people attempting suicide could face
prosecution and prison terms of up to one year. In 1996 however another Supreme Court
ruling nullified the earlier one.) "Personal liberty" includes all the freedoms which are not
included in Article 19 (that is, the six freedoms). The right to travel abroad is also covered
under "personal liberty" in Article 21.

29

In 2002, through the 86th Amendment Act, Article 21(A) was incorporated. It made the right
to primary education part of the right to freedom, stating that the State would provide free
and compulsory education to children from six to fourteen years of age. Six years after an
amendment was made in the Indian Constitution, the union cabinet cleared the Right to
Education Bill in 2008. It is now soon to be tabled in Parliament for approval before it makes
a fundamental right of every child to get free and compulsory education.

Rights of a person arrested under ordinary circumstances is laid down in the right to life and
personal liberty. No one can be arrested without being told the grounds for his arrest. If
arrested, the person has the right to defend himself by a lawyer of his choice. Also an arrested
citizen has to be brought before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours. The rights of a person
arrested under ordinary circumstances are not available to an enemy alien. They are also not
available to persons detained under the Preventive Detention Act. Under preventive
detention, the government can imprison a person for a maximum of three months. It means
that if the government feels that a person being at liberty can be a threat to the law and order
or to the unity and integrity of the nation, it can detain or arrest that person to prevent him
from doing this possible harm. After three months such a case is brought before an advisory
board for review.

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

30

The Flag of India

As India is a country of many languages, religions, and cultures, the Constitution provides
special measures, in Articles 29 and 30, to protect the rights of the minorities. Any
community which has a language and a script of its own has the right to conserve and
develop it. No citizen can be discriminated against for admission in State or State aided
institutions.

All minorities, religious or linguistic, can set up their own educational institutions to preserve
and develop their own culture. In granting aid to institutions, the State cannot discriminate
against any institution on the basis of the fact that it is administered by a minority institution.

But the right to administer does not mean that the State cannot interfere in case of
maladministration. In a precedent-setting judgement in 1980, the Supreme Court held that the
State can certainly take regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellence of
educational standards. It can also issue guidelines for ensuring the security of the services of
the teachers or other employees of the institution. In another landmark judgement delivered
on 31 October 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that in case of aided minority institutions
offering professional courses, admission could only be through a common entrance test
conducted by State or a university. Even an unaided minority institution ought not to ignore
the merit of the students for admission.

RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

31

Right to constitutional remedies [Article 32 to 35] empowers the citizens to move a court of
law in case of any denial of the fundamental rights. For instance, in case of imprisonment, the
citizen can ask the court to see if it is according to the provisions of the law of the country. If
the court finds that it is not, the person will have to be freed. This procedure of asking the
courts to preserve or safeguard the citizens' fundamental rights can be done in various ways.
The

courts

can

issue

various

kinds

of writs.

These

writs

are habeas

corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. When a national or state
emergency is declared, this right is suspended by the central government.

CASE STUDY
1) Bandhua

Mukti

Morcha

vs

Union

Of

India

&

Ors

Bench: K Ramaswamy, S Saghirahmad - Date Of Judgment: 21/02/1997

Judgment:
ORDER
This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed by way of public interest
litigation seeking issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Government to take steps to stop
employment of children in Carpet Industry in the State of Utter Pradesh; to appoint a
Committee to investigate into their conditions of employment; and to issue such welfare
directives as are appropriate for total prohibition on employment of children below 14 years
and directing the respondent

to give them

facilitieslike education, health, sanitation,

nutritious food ,etc. The main contention of the petitioner-group isthat employment of the
children in any industry or in a hazardous industry, is violative of Article 24 of the
Constitution and derogatory to the mandates contained in Article 39(e) and (f) of the
Constitution read with the Preamble. Pursuant to the filing of the writ petition, this Court
appointed Prem Bhai and otherto visit factories manufacturing carpets and to submit their
findings as to whether any

number

of children below the age of 14 years are working in

the carpet industry etc. The Commissioner submitted his preliminary report. Subsequently, by
Order dated August 1, 1991,this Court appointed a Committee consisting of Shri J.P. Vergese,
32

Ms. Gyansudha Mishra and Dr. K.P. Raju to go around Mirzapur area and other places where
carbets

are being weaved to find out whether children are being exploited and to submit a

comprehensive report. In furtherance thereof, a comprehensive report was submitted on

November 18, 1991. The matter was heard and arguments were concluded. The judgment was
reserved by proceedings dated October 18, 1994. Since the judgment could not be delivered,
matter was directed to be posted before a Bench consisting of S. Saghir Ahmad, J. We have
heard the counsel on both sides.

2) I.C. Golaknath and Ors. vs State of Punjab and Anrs.

Golaknath v. State Of Punjab (1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762), or simply the Golaknath
case, was a 1967 Indian Supreme Court case, in which the Court ruled that Parliament could
not curtail any of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution.
Facts
The family of Henry and William Golak Nath held over 500 acres of farmland
in Jalandar, Punjab. In the face of the 1953 Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act, the state
government held that the brothers could keep only thirty acres each, a few acres would go to
tenants and the rest was declared 'surplus'. This was challenged by the Golak Nath family in
the courts and the case was referred to the Supreme Court in 1965. The family filed a petition
under Article 32 challenging the 1953 Punjab Act on the ground that it denied them their
constitutional rights to acquire and hold property and practice any profession (Articles 19(f)
and (g)) and to equality before and equal protection of the law (Article 14). They also sought
to have the Seventeenth Amendment - which had placed the Punjab Act in the Ninth Schedule
- declared ultra vires.
The issues involved were whether Amendment is a law under the meaning of Article 13(2),
and whether Fundamental Rights can be amended or not?

Judgment

33

The judgment reversed the Supreme Court's earlier decision which had upheld Parliament's
power to amend all parts of the Constitution, including Part III related to Fundamental Rights.
The judgement left Parliament with no power to curtail Fundamental Rights.
The Doctrine of Prospective Overruling
It was in this case that the then Chief Justice Koka Subba Rao had first invoked the doctrine
of prospective overruling. He had taken import from American Law where Jurists like George
F. Canfield, Robert Hill Freeman, John Henry Wigmore and Cardozo had considered this
doctrine to be an effective judicial tool. In the words of Canfield, the said expression means:
"........ a court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future
transactions whenever the court has reached the conviction that an old rule (as established by
the precedents) is unsound even though feeling compelled by stare decisis to apply the old
and condemned rule to the instant case and to transactions which had already taken place".
Taking cue from such formulation, Justice Subba Rao used this doctrine to preserve the
constitutional validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, legality of which
had been challenged. He drew protective cover offered by the doctrine over the impugned
amendments while manifestly holding that the impugned amendments abridged the scope of
fundamental rights. Justifying his stand, he held that:
What then is the effect of our conclusion on the instant case? Having regard to the history of
the amendments, their impact on the social and economic affairs of our country and the
chaotic situation that may be brought about by the sudden withdrawal at this stage of the
amendments from the Constitution, we think that considerable judicial restraint is called for.
We, therefore, declare that our decisions will not affect the validity of the constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, or other amendments made to the Constitution taking
away or abridging the fundamental rights. We further declare that in future Parliament will
have no power to amend Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the
fundamental rights.

Critical analysis
34

The fundamental rights have been revised for many reasons. Political groups have demanded
that the right to work, the right to economic assistance in case of unemployment, old age, and
similar rights be enshrined as constitutional guarantees to address issues of poverty and
economic insecurity, though these provisions have been enshrined in the Directive Principles
of state policy. The right to freedom and personal liberty has a number of limiting clauses,
and thus have been criticised for failing to check the sanctioning of powers often deemed
"excessive". There is also the provision of preventive detention and suspension of
fundamental rights in times of Emergency. The provisions of acts like the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act (MISA) and the National Security Act (NSA) are a means of countering
the fundamental rights, because they sanction excessive powers with the aim of fighting
internal and cross-border terrorism and political violence, without safeguards for civil rights.
The phrases "security of State", "public order" and "morality" are of wide implication. People
of alternate sexuality are criminalized in India with prison term up to 10 years. The meaning
of phrases like "reasonable restrictions" and "the interest of public order" have not been
explicitly stated in the constitution, and this ambiguity leads to unnecessary litigation. The
freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms is exercised, but in some cases, these
meetings are broken up by the police through the use of non-fatal methods.

"Freedom of press" has not been included in the right to freedom, which is necessary for
formulatingpublic opinion and to make freedom of expression more legitimate. Employment
of child labour in hazardous job environments has been reduced, but their employment even
in non-hazardous jobs, including their prevalent employment as domestic help violates the
spirit and ideals of the constitution. More than 16.5 million children are employed and
working in India. India was ranked 88 out of 159 in 2005, according to the degree to which
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians worldwide. The right to
equality in matters regarding public employment shall not be conferred to overseas citizens of
India, according to the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003.

As per Article 19 of Part 3 of the Indian constitution, the fundamental rights of people such as
freedom of speech and expression, gathering peaceably without arms and forming
associations or unions shall not effect the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India
35

but not unity of India. The words sovereignty and integrity are the qualities to be cultivated /
emulated by Indian people as urged by the Indian constitution but not used related to territory
of India. Article 1 of Part 1 of the Indian constitution,defines India (Bharat) as union of
sovereign states. Constitutional amendment under Article 368 provides for peaceful division
of India in to number of countries provided fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian
constitution are ensured in the resultant countries. In nutshell, India is its people not its land
as enshrined in its constitution.

AMENDMENTS

36

Changes to the fundamental rights require a constitutional amendment which has to be passed
by a special majority of both houses of Parliament. This means that an amendment requires
the approval of two-thirds of the members present and voting. However, the number of
members voting should not be less than the simple majority of the house whether the Lok
Sabha or Rajya Sabha.

The right to education at elementary level has been made one of the fundamental rights under
the Eighty-Sixth Amendment of 2002.

RIGHT TO PROPERTY
37

The Constitution originally provided for the right to property under Articles 19 and 31.
Article 19 guaranteed to all citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article
31 provided that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." It also
provided that compensation would be paid to a person whose property has been taken for
public purposes.

The provisions relating to the right to property were changed a number of times. The FortyForth Amendment of 1978 deleted the right to property from the list of fundamental rights A
new provision, Article 300-A, was added to the constitution which provided that "no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law". Thus if a legislature makes a law
depriving a person of his property, there would be no obligation on the part of the State to pay
anything as compensation. The aggrieved person shall have no right to move the court under
Article 32. Thus, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, though it is still a
constitutional right. If the government appears to have acted unfairly, the action can be
challenged in a court of law by citizens.

The liberalisation of the economy and the government's initiative to set up special economic
zones has led to many protests by farmers and have led to calls for the reinstatement of the
fundamental right to private property. The Supreme Court has sent a notice to the government
questioning why the right should not be brought back but in 2010 the court rejected the
PIL[49]

RIGHT TO EDUCATION
38

Article 21A On 2 April 2010, India joined a group of few countries in the world, with a
historic law making education a fundamental right of every child coming into force. Making
elementary education an entitlement for children in the 614 age group, the Right of Children
to Free and Compulsory Education Act will directly benefit children who do not go to school
at present.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the operationalisation of the Act. Children, who
had either dropped out of schools or never been to any educational institution, will get
elementary education as it will be binding on the part of the local and State governments to
ensure that all children in the 614 age group get schooling. As per the Act, private
educational institutions should reserve 25 per cent seats for children from the weaker sections
of society. The Centre and the States have agreed to share the financial burden in the ratio of
55:45, while the Finance Commission has given Rs.250 billion to the States for implementing
the Act. The Centre has approved an outlay of Rs.150 billion for 20102011.

The school management committee or the local authority will identify the drop-outs or outof-school children aged above six and admit them in classes appropriate to their age after
giving special training.

CONCLUSION

39

Under the doctrine of judicial review the Supreme Court performs the role of interpreting the
Constitution and exercises power of declaring any law vor administrative action which may
be inconsistent with the constitutional provisions as ultra vires the Constitution and hence
void. The Supreme Court plays a very vital role in the interpretation of the Constitution of
India especially fundamental rights. For appreciating the correct position of law regarding
any fundamental right, it is necessary to read the text in the Constitution along with the gloss
put thereon by the Supreme Court.

Bare text of Article 22 will not give correct idea of the fundamental rights included in it on it.
In order to portray the whole panorama of Article 22, the research problem under study was
defined as Review of the Judicial Gloss on Article22 of the Constitution of India. This
research is essentially a doctrinal research. Analytical methodology is adopted by the
researcher for obtaining the findings and coming to the conclusion. To some extent, a
comparative method is adopted Global perspective of the right against arbitrary arrest and
detention, where provisions in other countries and International Conventions 371
corresponding to Article 22 of the Constitution of India are briefly given and some relevant
case law is also cited.The field of research was limited to reviewing of the judicial gloss put
on Article 22 of the Constitution of India.

The decisions of only Supreme Court of India were studied. All the decisions of the Supreme
Court of India from January 1950 to December 2001 were studied. Research study also
depicts global perspective comparable to Article 22.The main data for this research is
primary. The source of this primary data being all the cases reported in All India Reporter
from January 1950 to December 2001; the cases relating to Article 22 decided by the
Supreme Court only being collected.

The total number of cases was 300. Out of these 300 cases only 18 cases were related to
clause (1) and (2) of Article 22 and all remaining cases i.e. 282 cases were related to
40

preventive detention provisions. The secondary data consisted of sixty-three treatises (text
books, reference books etc.) written by renowned authors, one official report (Constituent
Assembly Debates) and few periodicals and legal journals of international repute.

In this research study, methodology of data collection was of Census Survey as the whole
Universe was studied. The Universe comprised the cases relating to Article 22 decided by the
Supreme Court of India and reported in the Journal, All India Reporter from January 1950 to
December 2001. Consequently, there was no sampling. This ensured accuracy and
comprehensiveness of the research study.

The main objectives of this study were, to trace the genesis of Article 22, to explore the
relationship of Article 22 with Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21, to identify the different component
parts of Fundamental Right under Article 22, to analyse the trend of judicial decisions
relating to Article 22, to study foreign 372legal provisions corresponding to Article 22, to
come to a conclusion whether the Supreme Court of India is gradually moving fromstatic and
literal interpretation to dynamic and liberal interpretation of Article 22.

In the original Draft Constitution submitted by the Drafting Committee to the President of the
Constituent Assembly on 21st February 1948, no Article containing provisions of present
Article 22 was existing. A new Article, Article 15 A (now Article 22) was later introduced on
15th September 1949. The reasons for the incorporation of this Article lie in the dropping
ofdue process clause from Article 15 (now Article 21).

Article 21 had been severally criticised by the public outside as it merely prevented the
executivefrom making any arrest. All that was necessary was to have a law allowing arrest
and that law need not be subject to any conditions or limitations. It was felt that while this
matter was included in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, Parliament was being given
plenary powers to make and provide for the arrest of any person under any circumstances as
41

Parliament may think fit. What was being done by Article 22 was a sort of compensation for
what was done in Article 21.

The Constituent Assembly provided the substance of due process by different door i.e. the
introduction of Article 22. This Article in its first two clauses merely lifted from the Code of
Criminal Procedure two of the most fundamental principles which every civilised country
followed as principles of 373international justice.

However, by making them a part of the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly made a
fundamental change by putting a limitation on the authority of both Parliament and State
legislatures not to abrogate those provisions.

While denying the safeguards under clause (1) and (2) to a person who is preventively
detained, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar defended the sub-clause (b) of clause (3) by observing that in
the circumstances prevailing then in the country, it may be necessary for the executive to
detain a person who tampers either with public order or with the Defence Services of the
country and that the exigency of the liberty of the individual should not be placed above the
interests of the State. While defending generally the provisions relating to preventive
detention in Article 15 A (now Article 22), he pointed out that this power of preventive
detention had been hedged in by two limitations : One is that the Government shall have
power to detain a person in custody under these provisions only for three months.

If they want to detain him beyond three months, they must be in possession of a report made
by an advisory board which will examine the papers submitted by the executive and will
probably also give an opportunity to the detenu to represent his case and come to the
conclusion that the detention is justifiable. It is only under that that the executive will be able
to detain him for more than three months. Secondly, detention may be extended beyond three
months if Parliament makes a general law laying down in what class of cases the detention
42

may exceed three months and state the period of detention. A large number of amendments
were moved to Article 15 A. There was a prolonged, stormy and spirited debate in which
about twenty members of Constituent Assembly participated.

The consensus of opinion amongst the members who spoke was that the draft Article 15 A as
proposed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar left much to be desired. In reply, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar dealt
with the draft Article and the criticism against it clause by clause. One point raised was that
while clause (1) of Article 15 A gave a right to an accused person to consult a legal
practitioner of his choice, it made no 374provision for defending by a legal practitioner. In
other words, a distinction was made between the right to consult and the right to be defended.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar thought that the words to consult included also the right to be defended
because, in his view, consultation would be utterly purposeless if it was not for the purpose of
defence. However, in order to provide clarity and remove any ambiguity he added the words
and be defended by a legal practitioner after the words to consult. In the case of the
persons who are being arrested and detained under the ordinary law as distinct from the law
dealing with preventive detention, a provision was made in clause (1) of Article 15 A that the
accused person shall be informed of the grounds of his arrest.Suchprovision was not made in
the case of a person who is detained under preventive detention. This omission was criticised
by some members of the House.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar agreed that this was legitimate criticism and consequently he amended
that part of the Article requiring the authority passing an order of detention to communicate
the grounds of such detention to the detenu, as soon as may be, unless it was against the
public interest to disclose the facts. When the Indian Constitution was being discussed in the
Constituent Assembly, national security was being threatened by infiltrators and invaders at
the borders and by reactionaries within.

The partition of the country had led to turmoil and communal violence resulting in huge loss
to life and property. Then again, Pakistan had let loose raiders and infiltrators in the State of
43

Jammu and Kashmir resulting in arson, looting and other acts of lawlessness. These
conditions were perhaps responsible for the inclusion of provisions with respect to preventive
detentions in the Constitution of India.Various Articles in Part III of the Constitution may be
seen as bodies of one solar system influencing one another with their gravitational pull and
held together by their celestial force. Articles 19 to 22 appear in Part III of the Constitution of
India under the common heading Right to Freedom.

Article 19 confers various freedoms there mentioned on citizens alone, whereas the 375 rights
conferred by Articles 20 to 22 are not restricted to citizens but apply to all persons. The
subject matter of Articles 20, 21 and 22 falls under criminal law. Article 14 falls into the
category Right to Equality. The procedure prescribed by law for arrest, detention, trial and
conviction resulting in a sentence of imprisonment must conform to Article 22 (1) and (2), to
Article 20, to Article 14. However, to preventive detention,

Article 20 has no application. Article 21 and 22 are the two organs of integrated constitutional
machinery which provides the safeguards available against unauthorised invasion upon
personal liberty. In Gopalan's case1 Kania C.J. held that Article 19 has no application to
preventive detention laws because by their very nature the rights given under Article 19 (1)
are freedoms of a person assumed to be in full possession of his personal liberty. He did not
accept the contention that Article 22 is a complete code. According to him Article 21 has to
be read as supplemented by Article 22. To the extent the procedure is prescribed by Article
22, the same is to be observed; otherwise Article 21 will apply.

To the extent the points are dealt with, and included or excluded, Article 22 is a complete
code. On the points of procedure which expressly or by necessary implication are not dealt
with by Article 22, the operation of Article 21 will remain unaffected. Patanjali Sastri, Das
and Mukherjea JJ. were in complete agreement with Kania C.J. on the point of correlation of
Article 22 to Article 19 and 21. Only Mahajan J. held that Article 22 was a self-contained
code in respect of the laws on the subject of preventive detention and that the validity of the
44

law on the subject of preventive detention cannot be examined either by the provisions of
Article 21 or by the provisions of Article 19 (5).

Fazl Ali J. (minority opinion) said that Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 overlap each other to some
extent. The case of a person who is convicted of an offence will come under Articles 20 and
21 and also under Article 22 so far as his arrest and detention in custody before trial are
concerned.As to the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice
mentioned in Article 22 (1), the Supreme Court held in 1951 in Janardhan Reddi v. State of
Hyderabad7 that the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice could only
mean a right of the accused to have the opportunity to engage a lawyer and does not
guarantee an absolute right to be supplied with a lawyer by the State.

This is a literal view of Article 22 (1). Nandini Satpathy's case8decided in 1978 makes a clear
departure from the literal interpretation stance of the Supreme Court in earlier cases. The case
added an additional fortification to the right to counsel. The Supreme Court went a step
forward in holding that Article 22 (1) does not mean that persons who are not strictly under
arrest or custody can be denied the right to counsel.

The Court enlarged this right to include right to counsel to any accused person under
circumstances of near-custodial interrogation. However, the Court took the help of Article 20
(3) and Miranda9decision for this liberal interpretation. In Joginder Kumar's case10 a
dynamic approach was adopted to the interpretation of Article 22 (1) but with the help of
Article 21. The Supreme Court recognised three incidental rights of arrested person in this
regard : i) The right to have some one i.e. his relative or friend informed about his arrest. ii)
The right to consult privately with lawyer. iii) The right to know from the police officer about
this right. The Supreme Court imposed corresponding duties on the police officers. In
D.K.Basu v. State of W.B.11, a Public Interest Litigation, the Supreme Court issued 11
requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest and detention.

45

D.K.Basu's case not only travels a path of few steps ahead of Joginder Kumar but also takes a
big leap forward. In it's anxiety to protect the interests of the arrested person, the Court has
exhibited 378an instance of judicial over-activism, rather judicial waywardness. The Supreme
Court arrogated to itself the Constituent or at least legislative power in laying down eleven
requirements in this connection. It is submitted that it is a case of out-right judicial
legislation.

The Supreme Court while interpreting a provision of the Constitution may fill in the
interstices but the zeal to artificially create such interstices and then fill it should be
deprecated. Though these eleven requirements comprise human rights jurisprudence and it
would be in the fitness of the things, if these were law. These sweeping eleven requirements
laid down by the Supreme Court, it is submitted, cannot have the status of law as its source is
not legislature but judiciary. It may be noted that these requirements were held to flow from
Article 21 and 22 (1) jointly. In Article 22 (1) the opportunity for securing services of lawyer
is alone guaranteed.

The Article does not require the State to extend legal aid as such but requires allowing all
reasonable facilities to engage a lawyer to the person arrested and detained in custody.
However, in M.H.Hoskot's case12 theSupreme Court did not hesitate to imply this right in
Article 22 (1) and 21 jointly while pressing into service application of Directive Principle of
State Policy under Article 39 A of Equal Justice and free legal aid. This is an example of
dynamic and liberal interpretation of Article 22 (1) which carves out a right for the indigent
prisoner or the prisoner in incommunicado situation to be assigned a counsel by the Court at
the State's cost. It seems that after the decision of Maneka Gandhi giving a new dimension to
Article 21, the Supreme Court's judicial activism started blossoming in this regard.
Hussainara Khatoon's case13 reiterates the right of every accused person who is unable to
engage a lawyer on account of reasons such as poverty, indigence or incommunicado
situation, to have free legal services provided to him by the State.

46

The Court added a further protection to this right by holding that if free legal services are not
provided to such an accused, the trial itself may run the risk of being vitiated as contravening
Article 21.On the point of preventive detention the Supreme Court has drawn several
propositions to ensure that the detaining authority effectively communicates grounds to the
detenu in such manner that his constitutional right to make a representation against his
detention is exercised properly.

The Court can examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they are relevant to
the object which the legislation has in view.21 By holding that giving vague ground to the
detenu infringes the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22 (5), the Supreme
Court in Atma Ram's case22created a possibility of an indirect judicial review of subjective
satisfaction of the necessity of detention apparently with a view to securing to detenu an
opportunity for an effective representation. The Supreme Court analysed the implications of
vague, irrelevant and non-existent grounds on the rights of the detenu in Mohd. Yousuf v.
State of J. & K.23

The Court observed that a detenu has two rights under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution : (1)
to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based,
that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and (2)
to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of
detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a
representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him. In State of Bombay v.
Atma Ram26 the Supreme Court held that grounds are conclusions of facts and not a
complete detailed recital of all the facts. However, the person detained is entitled in addition
to the right to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to
have particulars as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him so as to
enable him to make a representation against the order of detention.

47

It was further held that the sufficiency of the particulars is a justiciable issue, the test being
whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation. In course of
time, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of ground so as to include more and more
things under its umbrella.The right of the detenu under Article 22 (5) to be furnished with the
grounds of detention and particulars thereof is subject to the limitation under Article 22 (6)
whereby disclosure of facts considered to be against public interest cannot be required. It was
held in Lawrence DSouza v. State of Bombay31 that the duty to consider whether the
disclosure of any facts involved therein is against public interest is vested in the detaining
authority, not in any other. In Bhut Nath v. State of W.B.32 the Supreme Court held that the
fundamental constitutional mandate of Article 22 (5) is that the authority shall communicate
to the detenu all the material grounds on which the order has been made The communication
of facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation and orders of detention based on
uncommunicated materials are unfair and illegal.

In Wasi Uddin v. District Magistrate, Aligarh33 the Supreme Court held that it is imperative
that the detaining authority must apprise a detenu of his constitutional right under Article 22
(5) to make a representation against the order of detention and of his right to be heard before
the Advisory Board. It is significant to note that this rule of apprising detenu of his
constitutional rights is neither to be specifically found in the Constitution nor in statutory
provision. This judicially evolved rule shows judicial concern for ensuring constitutional
rights to detenus. This is dynamic interpretation of Article 22 (5).

The second right given by Article 22 (5) to the detenu is that he should be given the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. The Supreme Court in
various decisions expanded the scope of the detenus right of representation. In Pankaj
Kumar v. State of W.B.38 the Court held that it is clear from clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22
that there is a dual obligation on the appropriate Government and a dual right in favour of the
detenu, namely (1) to have his representation irrespective of the length of detention
considered by the appropriate Government and (2) to have once again that representation in
the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board before it gives its opinion.

48

Whereas the Government considers the representation to ascertain whether the order is in
conformity with its power under the relevant law, the Board considers such
representationfrom the point of view of arriving at its opinion whether there is sufficient
cause for detention. In Jayanarayan v. State of W.B.39 the Supreme Court stated four
principles to be followed in regard to representation of detenus : (1) The appropriate authority
is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the
representation of the detenu as early as possible. (2) The consideration of the representation
of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the
Advisory 385 Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the
Advisory Board. (3) There should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. However,
no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to measure of time taken by the appropriate
authority for consideration. (4) The appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and
judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the detenus
representation to the Advisory Board. In J.N.Roy v. State of W.B.40 it was made clear by the
Court that consideration of representation need not as a rule be done before the Government
refers to detenus case to the Board. Such consideration, however, must be done without any
inordinate delay.
The order of the Government rejecting the representation of the detenu need not be a
speaking order.41 The detaining authority is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at
the time of considering the representation. A detenu does not have any right to be heard in
person by the detaining authority, nor can he be permitted cross-examination of rebuttal
evidence. The detenu has no right to appear before the detaining authority by a legal
practitioner.42 It was held in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of
India43 that the time imperative for consideration of representation can never be absolute or
obsessive. It depends upon the necessities and the time at which the representation is made.
The representation may be received before the case is referred to the Advisory Board but
there may not be time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the
Advisory Board. In that situation the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board
along with the case of the detenu.
The representation may be received after the case of the detenu is referred to the Board. Even
in this situation the representation should be forwarded to the Advisory Board provided the
49

Board has not concluded the proceedings. In both the situations there is no question of
consideration of the representation before the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board.

Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc. ordinarily it
is not needed when the detenu is already in custody, the detaining authority must show its
awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account
while making the order; but even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on
cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities
which are proximate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from
indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made even in
anticipation to operate on his release.50

The preventive detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute
the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one
whom the ordinary law would take care of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the
inconvenience of proving guilt in Court is unfair abuse.51 The power of preventive detention
is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an
offence. An order of preventive detention may be made before or during prosecution. An
order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or
after discharge or even acquittal.

The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of

preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.52 There is no reason why executive
cannot take recourse to its powers of preventive detention in those cases where the executive
is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution can possibly succeed against the detenu because he
has influence over witnesses and against him no one is prepared to depose.53Once the
detaining authority is satisfied regarding the necessity to make an order of detention a quick
action is contemplated.
50

Unreasonable delay in making of an order of detention may lead to an inference that the
subjective satisfaction of the authority was not genuine as regards the necessity to prevent the
person from indulging in any prejudicial activity and to make an order of detention for that
purpose. The grounds of detention have to be reasonably proximate in time.54 But there can
be no hard and fast rule as to what is the length of time which should be regarded sufficient to
snap the nexus between the incident and the order of detention.55 It is not right to assume
that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay.

Enforcement of Article 22 was suspended in 1962 Emergency for purposes of the Defence of
India Act and the rules made thereunder. The Makhan Singhs case was decided during the
period of this Emergency. Enforcement of Article 22 was suspended generally in 1975
Emergency. The Habeas Corpus case was decided during the period of this Emergency.

Makhan Singhs case,71 a 7 Judge-Bench decision is an authority for the proposition that in
spite of the Presidential Order under Article 359 (1) suspending right to move the Courts for
enforcement of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, the detenus right to challenge
his detention on following grounds remains intact :
(i)

The detention order is in violation of the mandatory provisions of the preventive

detention law.

(ii)

The detention has been ordered mala fide.

(iii)

The operative provision of the law under which he was detained suffers from the
vice of excessive delegation.

(iv)

The lawauthorising detention was colourable exercise of legislative power i.e. it

was passed by the legislature having no legislative competence.

(v)

The violation of fundamental rights other than those rights specified in the
Presidential Order. Makhan Singhs case held that the detenu can move the Court
for a writ of habeas corpus on any one of the above pleas.

51

The plea thus raised by the detenu cannot at the threshold be said to be barred by the
Presidential Order. In terms, these are not pleas relatable to the fundamental rights specified
in the Presidential Order. These are the pleas which are independent of the said rights. It is
submitted by the researcher that the above ruling of the Supreme Court lays down the correct
law on the point and majority judgment in Habeas Corpus case72 passing the following order
is patently wrong :There is a contradiction between the judgments and the final order of the
Court. The startling conclusion was reached in this case that the effect of the Presidents
Order under Article 359 was that no redress was available against violation of the law or
against mala fide actions of the executive authorities.
It is important to note in this regard that Article 359 does not confer power on the President to
issue an Order providing that the right of any person to move any court for any purpose is
barred. The Supreme Court was wrong in not following Makhan Singhs case in Habeas
Corpus case. It appears that the majority judges in deciding this case were placed in the
vortex of confusion. In deciding this case the judges were more concerned with the language
of the law than with the spirit of the Constitution; more concerned in protecting executive
action than the oppressed detenus. Dissenting judgment of Khanna J. is convincing and
correct. During the dark days of 1975 emergency on the ground of internal disturbance the
Supreme Court blew off the light of liberty. It gave absolute judicial approbation to
authoritarianism and emergency excesses.

SUGGESTIONS

52

In the interest of Human Rights Jurisprudence, the researcher suggests some amendments to
be made to Article 22 of the Constitution of India. These are as follows :

1) The Parliament alone should be authorised to pass the legislation of preventive detention.
Presently, the Parliament as well as State legislatures can pass laws relating to preventive
detention. It is better in the interest of the nation that there should be uniform law throughout
India with respect to this unwholesome and unpopular matter of detaining people without
trial. Central Government may take a dispassionate view rather than the State Government. It
should be noted that in U.S.A., only the Congress is empowered to enact laws for preventive
detention.

2) There should be periodical review of detention cases by Advisory Board every three
months. Presently, once a person is detained and once the Advisory Board agrees to his
detention for a period longer than three months, the fate of that person is virtually sealed. He
will, then, be absolutely at the mercy of the Executive. After three months, conditions in the
country may change. Something more may come to the light and those changed
circumstances may be placed before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board in view of
the changed conditions and the fresh facts being placed before them would be in a position to
advise the Government whether the continued detention for another three months is
necessary.

3) Maximum period of detention of one year should be mentioned in Article 22 itself instead
of giving power to the Parliament to fix this period by legislation. One year is certainly not a
very short period because if the police are not able to secure evidence within that year and
place before the court, then the evidence on which the detenu is sought to be detained is not
worth considering. This will require amendment of Article 22 (7) (b) accordingly.

53

4) Parliament should not be empowered to dispense with the consultation of the Advisory
Board in any case where the detention is to last for more than three months. This will require
repeal of clause 7 (a) and consequently clause 4 (b) of Article 22 of the Constitution.

5) There may be a justification for preventive detention for reasons of defence, foreign
affairs and security of India (List I, Entry 9). But there is no need for the categories set out in
Entry 3 of List III i.e. maintenance of public order, maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community. 'Security of State' in this Entry may be interpreted as a part of the
Security of India in Entry 9 of List I.Consequently, this Entry 3 in Concurrent List should be
deleted. Providing preventive detention for purposes of maintenance of public order,
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community is putting the individual
liberty of persons in great jeopardy. The ordinary laws are more than enough for the
categories set out in List III Entry 3.

6) As to composition of the Advisory Board, only sitting High Court Judges or persons who
had been High Court Judges should be appointed. It is dangerous to appoint persons who are
merely qualified to be appointed as High Court Judges as the fundamental idea underlying the
Constitution of the Advisory Board is that the matter should go before a judicial tribunal or
before any authority which is capable of judiciously thinking. This provision may be abused.
This provision would enable an unscrupulous executive to nominate persons who might be
their own persons. High Court Judges and persons who had acted in that position are likely to
be more independent and fair. Clause 4 (a) of Article 22 requires to be amended to
incorporate this suggestion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

54

Books
1. Akthar, Najma; Higher Education for the future; MANAK Publications PVT. LTD;
2000
2. Vsha Rai Negi Veena Bhalla; Effective and Quality in Higher Education; Association
of Indian Universites New Delhi; October 2002
Acts
Right Of Children To Free And Compulsory Education Act 2009
The Assam Primary Education Act, 1947
The Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947
The Cochin Free Compulsory Primary Education Act, 1950
Articles
1. Shenoy, Amritha Viswanath; Case Comment on Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India &
Others; (2009) 6 SCC 398 by on March 22, 2011
2. Juneja Nalini; Constitution Amendment to Make Education a Fundamental Right;
National Institute of education Planning and Administration, 17-B, Sri Aurobindo
Marg, new Delhi 110016 (India) March 2003
Journals
The Problems of Education Technology: A Case Study of Selected Schools; S. Sivaraj
Pandian; Department of Education; Arunachal University Research Journal; Vol. 3(2),
2000
Report
1. Planning Meeting: Research on child labour in South Asia, Jaipur, June 18, 2000
CUTS-CITEE, Jaipur
2. Recommendations in the context of the NCMP commitments on education and the
Fundamental Right to Education
Internet Sources
1. http://ajayshahblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/right-to-education-act-critique.html

55

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

http://economicsinfo.cz.cc/labour-economics/critical-analysis-of-provisions-relatingto-children-under-indian-contitution/
http://education.nic.in/Elementary/RTI_Model_Rules.pdf
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/2133/Islam.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brown_v._Board_of_Education
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_England
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_education
http:// www. escr_net.org / usr_doc/kundu_right.pdf

News Paper Articles and Magazines

1.

The Hindu; C. RAJ KUMAR; Human rights and human development; Volume 19 -

Issue 04, Feb. 16 - Mar.1, 2002

2. Pratiyogita Darpan; HANSRAJ BISHT; Fundamental Right to Education: A New
3.

Dimension; (Hindi publication); June 2010

Pratiyogita Darpan; SHANKAR PRASHAD TIVARI; Commissions and Committees

on Education; (Hindi publication); January 2011

4. Pratiyogita Darpan; YOGENDRA Kr. KUMAVAT; Right of Children to Free and
5.
6.
7.
8.

Compulsory Education Act; (Hindi publication); May 2010.

Civil Services chronicle; India 2010 (Program and value addition Polices special-2)
Civil Services chronicle; September, 2009; Vol. XX No. 2
Daynik Jagran (Hindi); Lucknow publication
RAMNARAYAN SHRIVASTAVA; Editorial Deink Jagran; 1 April 2011; Lucknow

9.

publication
Commentary: Elementary Education as a Fundamental Right, Madhav Godbole,
Economic and Political Weekly, December 15, 2001

56