CUI VS CUI (tan)

FACTS: Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and
Doa Antonia Perales who died intestate in1939. Jesus alleged that during the
marriage of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain
properties in the City of Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319.
Upon the death of their mother, the properties were placed under the
administration of their dad.that while the latter was 84 years of age, Antonio by
means of deceit, secured the transfer to themselves the said lots without any
pecuniary consideration; that in the deed of sale executed on March 8, 1946,
Rosario Cui appeared as one of the vendees, but on learning of this fact she
subsequently renounced her rights under the sale and returned her portion to
Don Mariano Cui by executing a deed of resale in his favor on October 11, 1946;
that defendants, fraudulently and with the desire of enriching themselves
unjustly at the expense of their
Sales | Case Digests| 65
father, Don Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co- heirs,secured a loan of
P130,000 from the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained,
defendants constructed thereon an apartment building of strong materials
consisting of 14 doors, valued at approximately P130,000 and another building
on the same parcels of land, which buildings were leased to some Chinese
commercial firms a monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected
and will continue to collect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs;Jesus alleged that the
sale should be invalidated so far as the portion of the property sold to Antonio
Cui is concerned, for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was
then acting as the agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano
Cui.Jesus lays stress on the power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by
Don Mariano in favor of Antonio Cui on March 2,1946, wherein the former has
constituted the latter as his "true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name
and that of the intestate heirs of Doa Antonia Perales.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD: YES. While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or
administrator is disqualified from purchasing property in his hands for sale or
management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui
while he was already the agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano
Cui, we however believe that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.
The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but
this prohibition has already been removed.
Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent
may now buy property placed in his hands for sale or administration, provided
that the principal gives his consent thereto. While the new Code came intoeffect
only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for the
first time, the same may be given retroactive effect if no vested or acquired right
is impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During the lifetime Don Mariano,and
particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested
or acquired right in these properties, for,as heirs, the most they had was a mere

expectancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical and liberal provision of
our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.
B. Attorneys
Director of Lands vs Ababa (remoroza)
FACTS: Adverse claimant Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by
petitioner, Maximo Abarquez, for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of
repurchase and for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter
thereof. Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his
lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to compensate his lawyer whom
he also retained for his appeal executed a document whereby he obliged himself
to give to his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from the
appeal.
The property in question was actually the share of the petitioner in Lots 5600 and
5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which were
partitioned the heirs which included petitioner and his sister.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner,
adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with
his obligation under the document executed by him b u delivering the portion
of the said parcels of land. Pet refused to comply with his obligation and instead
offered to sell the whole parcels of land to spouse Larrazabal. Then, adverse
claimant immediately took steps to protect his interest by filing a motion to
annotate his attorneys lien and by notifying the prospective buyers of his claim
over the portion of the parcels of land.
The motion was granted. The annotation of adverse claim appeared on the new
TCT. This adverse claim became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by
petitioner spouses. RTC resolved in favor of adverse claimant.
On appeal, pet contended that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article
1491 because it involves an assignment of a property subject of litigation. ISSUE:
WON the contract for a contingent fee as basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez
is prohibited by Article 1491 of the Civil code
RULING: NO. The contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale
or assignmenet between the lawyer and his client of property which is the
subject of litigation. FOR the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property.
The prohibition does not apply to "cases where after completion of litigation the
lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest the assets realized by the
litigation
A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the
transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the
finality of a favorable judgment.
In the instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half
(1/2) of whatever Maximo Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots in
question, is contingent upon the success of the appeal. Hence, the payment of

the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half (1/2) of the
property in litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the
trasnfer actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered
on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the property in
question. Consequently, the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by
Article 1491. DOMINGO D.RUBIAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISAIAS BATILLER,
defendant-appellee. (Pinili)
Facts: On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to
recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu-99791
located in Barrio General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his
father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant,
Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot on two occasions in
1945 and in 1959. Plaintiff prayed also for damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-7,
Record on Appeal). In his answer with counter- claim defendant claims the
complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter
being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open
and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of
the portions of the lot in question and for the alleged malicious institution of the
complaint he claims he has suffered moral damages in the amount of P 2,000.00,
as well as the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees. ...
During the pre-trial conference, the parties have agreed that the following facts
are attendant in this case and that they will no
Sales | Case Digests| 66
longer introduced any evidence, testimonial or documentary to prove them: 1.
That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the
Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he
caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934, whereby he was issued a plan Psu99791 (Exhibit "B"). (The land claimed contained an area of 171:3561 hectares.)
2. Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the land
technically described in psu-99791 (Exh. "B") opposed by the Director of Lands,
the Director of Forestry and other oppositors . However, during the war with
Japan, the record of the case was lost before it was heard, so after the war
Francisco Militante petitioned this court to reconstitute the record of the case.
The record was reconstituted on the Court of the First Instance of Iloilo and
docketed as Land Case No. R - 695, GLRO R e c . N o . 5 4 8 5 2 . The Court of
First Instance heard the land registration case on November 14, 1952, and after
the trial this c o u r t dis mis s e d t h e a p p lic a tio n f o r r e gis t r a tio n . The
appellant, Francisco Militante, appealed from the decision of this Court to the
Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-GR No. 13497-R.. 3.
Pending the disposal of the appeal in CA-GR No. 13497-R and more particularly
on June 18, 1956, Francisco Militante sold to the plain tif f, D o min g o R u bi a s t
h e la n d technically described in psu- 99791 (Exh. "A"). The sale was duly
recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Iloilo as Entry
No. 13609 on July 11, 1960 (Exh. "A-1"). (NOTE: As per deed of sale, Exh. A, what
Militante purportedly sold to plaintiff-appellant, his son-in-law, for the sum of
P2,000.00 was "a parcel of untitled land having an area Of 144.9072 hectares ...
surveyed under Psu 99791 ... (and) subject to the exclusions made by me, under

(case) CA - i3497, Land Registration Case No. R - 695, G.L.R.O. No. 54852 , Court
of First Instance of the province of Iloilo.
RTC and CA dismissed the application of Registration of Francisco Militante.
Issue: WON the sale of the land between Franicisco Militante and Domingo
Rubias was null and void in accordance with Article 1409 and 1491. Held. The
sale is void. 'Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning: xxx xxx xxx (7) Those expressly prohibited by law. 'ART. 1491. The
following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public auction, either
in person of through the mediation of another: . xxx xxx xxx (5) Justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring an assignment and shall apply to lawyers , with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.'
No error could be attributed either to the lower court's holding that the purchase
by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited
by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra ; 6
and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his
client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as
already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and
rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409,
paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly
prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts
cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived."
In the very case of Abagat itself, the Court, again affirming the invalidity and
nullity of the lawyer's purchase of the land in litigation from his client, ordered
the issuance of a writ of possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the
adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other
expenses, and ruled that "the appellant Palarca is a lawyer and is presumed to
know the law. He must, therefore, from the beginning, have been well aware of
the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad faith." As already
stated, Wolfson and Abagat were decided with relation to Article 1459 of the Civil
Code of Spain then adopted here, until it was superseded on August 30, 1950 by
the Civil Code of the Philippines whose counterpart provision is Article 1491.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code)
prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust
or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their
trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial
auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public
officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys,
and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and
cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain
paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the

permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded

on p u blic p oli c y differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and
administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been
opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact
, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the
time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have
ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object
which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become
lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was
impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be
ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second
contract would then be v ali d f r o m it s e x e c u tio n ; however, it does not
retroact to the date of the first contract." 19
As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon
defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's
alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged
cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendantappellant. The principles governing the nullity of such prohibited contracts and
judicial declaration of their nullity have been well restated by Tolentino in his
treatise on our Civil Code, as follows: Parties Affected. Any person may invoke
the in existence of the contract whenever juridical effects founded thereon are
asserted against him. Thus, if there has been a void transfer of property, the
transferor can recover it by the accion reinvindicatoria ; and any prossessor may
refuse to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the contract. Creditors
may attach property of the debtor which has been alienated by the latter under a
void contract; a mortgagee can allege the inexistence of a prior encumbrance; a
debtor can assert the nullity of an assignment of credit as a defense to an action
by the assignee.
Sales | Case Digests| 67
The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in all
instances against plaintiff-appellant. Valencia vs. Cabanting (Miles) FACTS:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio
Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an
MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal
profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No . 1302 and 1391 . In 1933, complainant Paulino
Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an
heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the
sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty.
Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo
(Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses
since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing
to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing
ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect.
However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino

and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating
Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff,
versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services
of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed
of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose,
Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would
falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo , p. 7). A
"Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the
questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court
expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari , under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to
provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was
pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating
that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits
3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said
counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II
of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under
litigation by a counsel
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in
violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
RULING:
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code: The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another: xxx xxx xxx (5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part
by virtue of their profession. Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the
lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice
(In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension.
(Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the
litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the
lot after finality of judgment , there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A
thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it
in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action
of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari
proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition.
Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation
has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a
certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property
by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491
and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for
suspension.
REGALADO DAROY vs. ATTY ESTEBAN ABECIA October 26, 1998 JAVIER
March 25, 1971 - To satisfy the judgment of an ejectment case won by plaintiff
Daroy with his counsel Abecia, sheriff sold at public auction on a parcel of land
belonging to one of the defendants to Daroy as highest bidder. Upon failure of
the defendants to redeem the land, its ownership was consolidated in Daroy.
Daroy alleged that he entrusted the title to the land to Abecia as his counsel and
allowed him to take possession of the land upon the latters request. Abecia was
able to obtain new transfer certificates of title first: March 31, 1971 in the name
of Jose Gangay by means of forged Deed of Sale and then April 17, 1971 in a
fictitious Deed of Sale, Gangay in turn sold it to Nena Abecia (wife of Regalado
Daroy). Daroy claimed he discovered the fraud only in 1984.
Abecia maintained that Daroy indeed sold the land to Gangay and the latter sold
it to Nena Abecia. He cited the sheriffs return,
Sales | Case Digests| 68
dated August 6, 1973, in which it was stated that on August 4, 1993 Re galado
Daroy and his assignee Nena Abecia were . . . placed in actual possession of the
parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of Conveyance and Possession . He
also referred to the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis
Oriental, who dismissed the complaint for grave coercion and malicious mischief
filed by Gertrudes De Bajuyo, one of the defendants in the ejectment case,
against Regalado Daroy and Nena Abecia for the demolition of her
house,precisely on the basis of the right of Mrs. Nena Abecia . . . as assignee to
do whatever she wants to do of the things she owns.
July 15, 1993 Commissioner found Abecia guilty of malpractice and
recommended disbarment
March 26 1994 Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
approved the report but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension
HELD: It would appear that as early as August 4, 1973 Daroy already knew that
title to the land had already been transferred in the name of Abecias wife.
Daroys claim that he came to know of such transfer only in 1984 is thus belied.

Nor does it appear that the transfer was made without his knowledge and
consent. To the contrary, the sheriffs return suggests that Daroy had agreed to
such transfer. It appears further that as a consequence of the demolition of the
former owners house, complainant and Mrs. Abecia were charged, together with
Deputy Sheriff Eufrosino P. Castillo, with grave coercion/malicious mischief in the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental. Hence, the references to Mrs.
Abecia as Daroys assignee.
The aforementioned documents were attached to the answer of Esteban Abecia.
However, despite the parties agreement made at the hearing held, that the said
documents would be considered the evidence of Abecia, they were not even
mentioned in the report of the Commissioner who investigated the case.
Indeed, what appears to have happened in this case is that the parties thought
that because the land had been acquired by complainant at a public sale held in
order to satisfy a judgment in his favor in a case in which respondent was
complainants counsel, the latter could not acquire the land. The parties
apparently had in mind Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which provides, in pertinent
parts, as follows:
A R T . 1 4 9 1 . The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
....
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
Of course, the parties were mistaken in thinking that respondent could not
validly acquire the land. In Guevara v. Calalang, on facts similar to those in this
case, we held that the prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a
parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his
attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the litigation. For indeed,
while judges, prosecuting attorneys, and others connected with the
administration of justice are prohibited from acquiring
property or rights in litigation or levied upon in execution, the prohibition with
respect to attorneys in the case extends only to property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
The point is, the parties in this case thought the transfer of the land to
respondent Abecia was prohibited and so they contrived a way whereby the land
would be sold to Jose Gangay, whose wife Anita is the sister of Mrs. Nena Abecia,
and then Gangay would sell the land to Mrs. Abecia. The sale of the land to
Gangay may be fictitious and, therefore, void, but that Daroy intended to convey
the land ultimately to respondent Esteban Abecia appears to be the case.

It is true that the NBI found the signature of Regalado Daroy on the deed of sale
made in favor of Jose Gangay to have been forged. But Erasmo Damasing, the
notary public who notarized the deed, affirmed that Daroy and his wife appeared
before him on March 31, 1971 and, in his presence, signed the document in
question. Daisy Felicilda likewise stated in an affidavit executed on February 17,
1986 that she was a witness to the execution of the deed of sale and that she
saw Daroy signing the deed of sale.
Daroy never denied these claims of the notary public and a witness to the
execution of the deed of sale. Nor was the NBI writing expert ever called to
testify on his finding that the signature of Daroy in the deed of sale appeared to
have been signed by a different hand. The finding that the deed of sale was
forged was simply implied from the report of the NBI writing expert.
WHEREFORE, complaint against Abecia is DISMIS
Ramos v Ngaseo (Canada)
Facts: Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseos Makati
office to engage his services as counsel in a case involving a piece of land in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance
fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of
meals, transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that
he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance
fees. On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision
ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his
siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002. o
On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand- letter from the
respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he
allegedly promised as payment for respondents appearance fee. In the same
letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would
not confer with him and settle the matter within 30 days. o On February 14,
2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel,
respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject
of litigation. o Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil
Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which
was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has
been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare
parcel of land to the family of the complainant. o Respondent further contends
that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on
the basis of the principle of quantum meruit . o He claims that his acceptance
and appearance fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner,
would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00
per court appearance.
Sales | Case Digests| 69
o In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. Issue: WON Atty.
Ngaseo violated Article 1491 Held: NO. In the instant case, there was no actual
acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written

demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand
for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership,
hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondents act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of
demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case
No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Under Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of
the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.[7] The
prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private
individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the
prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
control exercised by these persons.[8] It is founded on public policy because, by
virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.[9]
However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the
property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients
property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of
the case, no