SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

MANUELA ALCALA and

JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants
from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said
marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the
parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned
passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein
defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession
of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had
inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana
Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question,
particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of
Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has
no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the
plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit
C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the
plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated
the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de
la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3
Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing
here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter
of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the
third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some
other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo
Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property
in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an
illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not
his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to
the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said
article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying
whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate
relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal. However,
eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the
intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now
before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only
tolegitimate relative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we

can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the
persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather
reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not
distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other
hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the
legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows
that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence
of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father
or mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an
indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural
relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks
only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those
who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not
say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural child; it does not
speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural
parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to
legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants
included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, and as we will see also article 812,
continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary
succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class
being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of
proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering
the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is
just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of
intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary
succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither
admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not
pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the
system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights
(troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family.
Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from
the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra,
Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales);
only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as the
question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute
law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be
strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d
ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points in the
interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who
are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920.
It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family
of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of
one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits
from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be
no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in
favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the
patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise.
Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it
must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones ; the law in the
article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass
by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La
reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the
legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law,
would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So
ordered.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents. G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010
(Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition,
reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for
the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for
the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the
expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not
limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the
property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia
Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the
Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles)
which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal
property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in
La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan
to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told
Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan

of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that
herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister
of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition
they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of
the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other.
(p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No.
2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an
amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to
her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the
estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side;
and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter,
she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the
denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia JavellanaVillanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to
submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia
averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988,
the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this
petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition
and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the
probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through
extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in
the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with
said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been
transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the

administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that
brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator
from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al.,
L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated
March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these
proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the
late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the
late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His
nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and
with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of
the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be
terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23),
Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No.
2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the
same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate
court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court
should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate
action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the
debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to
determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the
court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
(Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the
range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v.
Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271,
1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative

proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos
v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis
supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that
they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his onehalf share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case
declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we
ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No.
2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet,
in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years,
the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir
in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in
Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of
Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia,
to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters
he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is
noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in
her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party
which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which
prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was
procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through
fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was
prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment
was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his
own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31,
1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the
trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court
or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz,
L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She
admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the
necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the
lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant
shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do
everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the
plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was
to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she
knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to
place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the
petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court).
Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April
25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition
of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of
the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived
of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the
same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was
declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite
which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her
alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a
motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in
rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So.
20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's
side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban
had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the
rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in
her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or
defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489,
citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d
842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested
person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her
own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it
pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the
Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation
of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within
the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the
property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an
ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving
spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and
1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree
in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his
mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No.
2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely
known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent
but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no
evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National
Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v.
Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161
SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case,
although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the
agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to
give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas
State College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a
deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of
the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this

foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be
able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana
mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West
Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban
S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic
beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February
and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as
part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from
whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the
income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer,
or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of
every kind and description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any
of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or
benefit of the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned
upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars
graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with
honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for
being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was
donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region
VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied
at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of
the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become
Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban
Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West
Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic
and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET
ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.
However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the
deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and
the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its
charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting
of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein. SO ORDERED.
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees. G.R. No.
6878 September 13, 1913
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved.
Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a
son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro
also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to
oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the
right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land
which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as
indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had
acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise
acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been
adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title],
and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for
what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of
blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence
the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the
nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by
operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is
required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly,
the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the
opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right,
admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two
parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of
fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother
became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the
exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her
possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any
transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption
is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the
predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore
been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not
be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate
ascendant.

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the
children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is
established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by
operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to
be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her
inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro
Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also
presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish
and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right
required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in
the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers
at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those
rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the
lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required
by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to
her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges
prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in
the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law;
and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds:
"Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first
instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the
right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are
entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage
Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking
entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be
recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the
right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of
the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the
mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but
because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required
by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in
the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by
law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which
did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in
the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to
reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the
enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does
not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable,
even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement
of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first
assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry
newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped
into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights
required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of
place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first
enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968
thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged
to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may
have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable
consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain
any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of
the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor
of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the
holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has
been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be
reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not
thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason,
which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either
testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property
required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them
applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already
declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to
which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists
and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a
right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute,
against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977
and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in
the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the
guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly
alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a
principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the
remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of
said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required
by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by
the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the
property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative
to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article
168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be
reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the
right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required
by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that
such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of
the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person
who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the
foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article
199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the
proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date
of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the
interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal
representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right
must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set
in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must
be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that
end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the property
be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that
should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action
cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation
in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in
the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording
therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its
decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the
deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B.
of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who
has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct
title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an
enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the
Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose
favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title,
but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be
admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June
18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining
features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which
only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for
other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is, that the surviving
spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the
hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the

property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If
there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation
consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal
and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has
been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference
between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner
of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case,
there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can
dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property
(except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code),
or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because
he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the
former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may
unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform
any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the
property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit:
"If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be
null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law
says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage
Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it,
provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving
that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried
spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right
should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition
subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved
would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently,
the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of
the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to
exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968,
wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the
children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must
make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the
existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the
extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has
been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the
manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the
property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on
this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and
975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the
attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the
right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly

be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the
condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the
time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line
whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of
the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may
alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and
revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while
the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the
third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind
the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell,
Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of
use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved
has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within
the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been
assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act
would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible
to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of
the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person
die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by
law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely
all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party
acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent.
In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within
the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because
this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident
of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere
usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made
of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two
parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an
alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of
the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in
alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question
as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the
case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor
in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy,
dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,
although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his
right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose
favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land
be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title,
however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser
may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with
the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the
thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition
subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of
a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the
vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely
contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited.
The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision
therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and
conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled
to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the
registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No.
L-12957 March 24, 1961
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina
and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia
spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and
(3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs
of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April
20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the
ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that
said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in
continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim,
they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having
been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole
surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as
owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368
made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the
reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of
defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title
thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly,
that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property;
secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana
Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton,
Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.
According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which
does not clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot
3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the
cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for
taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May
29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public
instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in

consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275
which was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the
cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco,
and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and
thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property.
Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and
without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13,
1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions,
namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman
1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property;
that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival
of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person
entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in
favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a
real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve,
died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be
true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion
of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not
appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever
action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the
property in question.
FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-22066 December 2, 1924

ATILANO

BALCITA,

ET

--------------------------------GREGORIO EMPALMADO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

22067 December 2, 1924

SERGIA

GUTIERREZ, opponent-appellant.

G.R.

No.

L-

By the appeal in civil cause No. 2643 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sergia Gutierrez seeks to reverse a
decision of said court, whereby two parcels of land were declared to be the exclusive property of Gregorio Empalmado
and of Esteban Reyes, respectively, free from the claim of Sergia Gutierrez that said lots are held by said defendants
subject to a contingent reservable interest in her favor. Connected with the action above mentioned is the proceeding
in the second appeal, wherein the trial court declared that the first of the two lots in controversy should be registered
in the name of Gregorio Empalmado, free from the same claim. Because of the intimate relation between the action
instituted in behalf of the appellant, Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, and the registration proceeding in which she is
opponent, the two causes were heard together in the trial court and will be here disposed of in a single opinion.
The basis of the claim put forth by the plaintiff Gutierrez is the same as to both parcels, but the facts constituting the
respective defenses of the two defendants are different. It will therefore be convenient to state first the points
pertaining to the two parcels in common and then such as pertain especially to the controversy over each.

It appears that the original owner of both parcels was one Bonifacio Gutierrez, who died about the year 1902, after
having been thrice married. The first wife left no children, but the second wife left a daughter, Zoila Gutierrez, who
intermarried with Atilano Balcita, one of the defendants herein. To this pair was born a daughter, Gertrudis Balcita.
Zoila Gutierrez predeceased her father; and upon the death of the latter, the two parcels of land with which we are
concerned passed by inheritance directly from Bonifacio to his granddaughter Gertrudis, then a mere child. Gertrudis
Balcita herself died on December 9, 1912, at the age of 16, leaving no heir except her father, Atilano Balcita. The
plaintiff, Sergia Gutierrez, is a daughter of Bonifacio Gutierrez by his third wife, one Francisca Maghirang. Sergia was
therefore the aunt of Gertrudis Balcita, on her mother's side, and as reservee under article 811 of the Civil Code she
should succeed to the title of the two parcels which Atilano Balcita inherited, or should have inherited, from Gertrudis,
provided all the conditions necessary to the assertion of the reservation right are fulfilled.
GUTIERREZ VS. EMPALMADO
Parcel A. In the year 1905 Atilano Balcita sold the parcel A to one Vicente Almario. As the land belonged to
Gertrudis, a lawsuit was instituted in her behalf in 1912 with a view to recovering it. The litigation was compromised by
the reconveyance of the land by Almario to Gertrudis and the payment to him of P1,200, which was the amount that
he had paid for the property. The money necessary to effect this compromise had to be borrowed by Gertrudis, or
those representing her; and although the point is subject to discussion, the preponderance of the testimony is to the
effect that the money was obtained from Gregorio Empalmado under an agreement by which Gertrudis Balcita
undertook to convey the land to him for the sum of P2,100. The document, Exhibit B, constituting the evidence of this
agreement is dated November 28, 1912. In addition to the signature of Gertrudis Balcita, which is questioned, it bears
the signature of Atilano Balcita and two subscribing witnesses. Gertrudis Balcita died of dysentery on December 9,
1912, and on December 12 thereafter her father, Atilano Balcita, executed the document Exhibit C, whereby he
conveyed, or purported to convey, the same parcel to Gregorio Empalmado, it being recited that he had inherited the
land from his daughter Gertrudis. Gregorio Empalmado immediately entered into possession, and he has subsequently
maintained possession under claim of ownership.
For the plaintiff, Gutierrez, it is insisted that the document, Exhibit b, is not authentic and that the name of Gertrudis
Balcita subscribed thereto is a forgery. The trial judge was of the opinion that the due execution of this instrument had
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence; and although the question is debatable, and the point not altogether
free from doubt, we are of the opinion that the trial court's conclusion on this point should be affirmed. The two
subscribing witnesses both say that they saw the girl sign the document upon the date stated therein, and this is
corroborated not only by the testimony of Gregorio Empalmado, who was present at the execution of the instrument,
but also by Atilano Balcita himself. The only testimony to the contrary is that of Sergia Gutierrez, who says that the girl
was too sick for some time prior to her death to admit the possibility of her having signed the instrument. It is true that
the questioned signature appears somewhat suspicious, but we have not sufficient data upon which to pronounce it a
forgery, considered as a mere question of penmanship. Certainly, the instrument expresses the agreement that would
naturally have been drawn upon under the proven circumstances which gave rise to the transaction.
Upon the foregoing state of facts the trial judge found as a matter of law that the title to parcel A passed out of
Gertrudis Balcita and became vested in Gregorio Empalmado before her death; and although Gertrudis was then a
minor, the conveyance was only voidable and not void. Moreover, as his Honor pointed out, the contract was evidently
advantageous to the minor because she thereby obtained the money necessary to get the property back from Vicente
Almario, with the consequent saving of P900.
These conclusions of the trial court seem to us well founded, and the result is that, as to this parcel, the inchoate
reservable right asserted by Sergia Gutierrez never came into existence. In this view the conveyance executed by
Atilano Balcita a few days after the death of his daughter Gertrudis operated as a mere quit-claim from him, as title
had already vested in Empalmado under the prior agreement with her.
No error was therefore committed by the trial judge in dismissing the complaint in case No. 2643 in so far as it affects
parcel A and the right of the defendant Empalmado thereto; nor did his Honor err in ordering the registration of the
same parcel in the name of Empalmado and his wife Felipa Brion, regardless of the opposition of the plaintiff Gutierrez.
GUTIERREZ VS. REYES
Parcel B. As already stated, this parcel comes from the same source as the parcel A, that is, from the estate of
Bonifacio Gutierrez. With respect to this parcel it appears that on May 28, 1906, Atilano Balcita, being then in
possession and asserting a claim of ownership, sold the same by a contract of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of
P200 to the defendant Esteban Reyes. In the document constituting the evidence of this sale Atilano Balcita falsely
declared that he was owner by virtud of having inherited the property from his parents and that he had been in quiet
and pacific possession for fifteen years. Esteban Reyes was a purchaser for value and bought in belief that the land
really belonged to his vendor. The period for repurchase under this contract was ten years, which passed in 1916
without redemption having been effected. It is not clear whether the purchaser under this contract entered into
possession during the time stipulated for redemption or not; but it is agreed that, with this exception, the defendant
Reyes had, until the institution of this action on May 10, 1918, exercised actual and adverse possession, to the
exclusion of all other persons.lawphi1.net
Upon the facts above stated the trial judge gave Reyes the benefit of prescription under the ten years statute (sec. 41,
Code of Civ. Proc.) and held that the right of Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, had been thereby destroyed.

We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may accept the legal proposition that
occupancy by Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the contract of sale with pacto de retro by which he acquired the property,
and prior to the expiration of the period for redemption, may be considered an adverse possession as against
everybody having a prescriptible interest, notwithstanding the existence of the stipulation for repurchase. As was said
by this court in Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation for
repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create a right inconsistent with the right of
ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option, and the possible exercise of its rests upon
contingency. It creates no subsisting right whatever in the property, and so far from being inconsistent with the idea of
full ownership in the purchaser, it really rests upon the assumption of ownership in him.
But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis Balcita, a minor, and the period of
limitation did not begin to run against her or any person claiming in her right until the date of her death, which was
December 9, 1912. It must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim in the character of an ordinary
successor to the rights of Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is based upon a positive provision of law, which could no operate
in any wise until the death of Gertrudis Balcita, when the reservable character first attached to the property in
question. From this it is obvious that the right of the plaintiff which even yet is of a purely contingent nature could
not be affected by anything that had occurred prior to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in
May, 1918, the ten-year period necessary to confer a complete prescriptive title had not then elapsed.
What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon he more recondite question whether Sergia
Gutierrez really has a prescriptive interest in the parcel B, but we may observe that the position of the reservee under
the Spanish law is very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at common law, who is entitled to take after the
termination of a particular life estate; and it is generally accepted doctrine in common law jurisdictions that if the life
tenant loses his life estate by adverse possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby destroyed. (17 R. C.
L., 982; 21 C. J., 972, 975, 1013.) The reason for the rule is said to be that, during the existence of the life estate, the
remainderman has no right to possession and consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C. J., 974.) As was
said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs. Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co. (15 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1154), "No possession
can be deemed adverse to a party who has not at the time the right of entry and possession."
From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment must be affirmed in so far as concerns the registration of
parcel A in expediente No. 409, G. L. R. O., record No. 14769, and in so far as relates to the dismissal of the complaint
against Gregorio Empalmado in case No. 2643; but the judgment in the same case must be reversed in so far as
relates to parcel B, now in the possession of Esteban Reyes, and it is hereby declared that said parcel is reservable
property and upon the death of Atilano Balcita will pass to Sergia Gutierrez, if she be then living. Let a certified copy of
this pronouncement be filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Laguna for record pursuant to the provisions
of Act No. 2837 of the Philippine Legislature. So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.

AGUSTINA DE GUZMAN VDA. DE CARRILLO, (deceased) substituted by PRIMA CARRILLO, plaintiffappellant, vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ, ET ALS., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-4133 May 13, 1952
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendant in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac seeking the reconveyance
to the plaintiff of one-half () portion of lot No. 221 originally belonging to the spouses Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia, the cancellation of the lease executed on said lot in favor of the spouses Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes
as well as the mortgage executed thereon by the lessees in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and the
payment of damages suffered by the plaintiff.
The facts alleged in the complaint are: lot No. 221 was originally owned by the spouses Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia, their title being evidence by original Certificate of Title No. 41453 of the register's office of Tarlac; on December
20, 1939, said spouses mortgaged said lot for the sum of P1,200 to spouses Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva, the
mortgage having been registered in accordance with law; on May 22, 1943, Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva assigned
their mortgaged rights to Honaria Salak for the sum of P1,632 with the consent of the surviving debtor Severino Salak,
his wife having already died; on August 16, 1943, Severino Salak transferred his interest in the property to Honaria
Salak for the sum of P612, representing of the consideration paid by her to the mortgagees Pedro Magat and
Filomena Silva; this transaction, as well as the assignment of the mortgage credit, were never registered in the office
of the Registered of Deeds, nor annotated on the certificate of title No. 41453; Severino Salak died on December 5,
1944, while Honaria Salak died on January 13, 1945; intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia, including lot No. 221, and after proper
proceedings, said lot was adjudicated to Ernesto Bautista, Aurea Sahagun, Rita Sahagun and Francisca Salak in the
proportion of interested each; Francisca Salak acquired later the shares of the other heirs in said lot by virtue of
which transfer certificate of title No. 970 was issued in her name; Honoria Salak died single living as sole heir Agustina
de Guzman, plaintiff herein.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action, which motion
the court granted in an order which reads as follows:
Acting on the motions to dismiss dated November 16, 1948, and November 27, 1948, filed by defendant
Francisca Salak de Paz and defendant spouses Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes, respectively, the Court
finds the grounds of said motions well-taken.

Besides judging from the facts alleged in the complaint, the action filed by plaintiff would call necessarily for
the undoing of all the proceedings taken in Special Proceedings No. 3, intestado de los finados Severino Salak
y Petra Garcia, an expediente now close more than two years ago. This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
any collateral attack in the present action against the proceedings taken in the said Special Proceeding No. 3.
It is admitted in the complaint that the property sought to be recovered by plaintiff from defendants in this
present case had regularly been adjudicated by the Court in favor of the latter as heirs of the deceased
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia after compliance with all the steps and proceedings established in the Rules of
Court for the settlement of the estates of deceased. This means that property now sought to be recovered
from the defendants was adjudicated in their favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable
against the intestate estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted
for out of the estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the
complaint should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but
plaintiff not having done so, she can not now bring this action against the defendants, for it is clear that there
exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her action
against the present defendants.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court dismisses the complaint with cost against the plaintiff.
The case is now before this Court on Appeal taken by the plaintiff imputing the five errors to the court a quo.
One of the grounds which was considered by the lower court in dismissing the complaint is the fact that the property in
question has already been the subject of adjudication in the intestate proceedings instituted for the settlement and
distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia, and the court a quo entertains the view
that, having said property been duly adjudicated in said intestate estate proceedings, and having all the claims filed
therein, as well as all obligations charged against the estate, being considered, passed upon, and settled, and said
proceedings closed and terminated, the property now in question can no longer be reached by the plaintiff upon the
theory that it has been adjudicated to the heirs free from all lien or claim whatsoever. The Court further holds that the
claim of the plaintiff should have been claimed in said proceedings within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court,
and having failed to do so, her claim is now barred and cannot be entertained.
We do not subscribe to these findings of the court a quo. While we admit that the sale made by Severino Salak of his
undivided interest in the property to Honoria Salak, predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, has not been registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens Title covering it, such technical deficiency does not
render the transaction ineffective, nor does it convert it into a mere monetary obligation. but it simply renders the
transaction not binding against a third person because, being a registered land, the operative act to bind the land is
the act of registration(section 50, Act No. 496). Said transaction however is valid and binding between the parties and
can serve as basis to compel the register of deeds to make the necessary registration (id.). Such being the case, it is
error to say that plaintiff should have filed her claim in the intestate proceedings of the late Severino Salak if she
wanted to protect her interest in the land for, the transaction being binding between the parties, the same can be
invoked against them or their privies. This means that plaintiff can still press her claim against the heirs of the
deceased Severino Salak who were made parties-defendants in this case. These heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of this transaction because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. The fact that Francisca Salak bought the shares of her co-heirs in said property is of no moment
because in so far as the portion of the land acquired by Honoria Salak is concerned, Francisca Salak can recoup what
she has parted with from her co-heirs when the time for read judgment comes. This matter can be threshed out when
the case is decided on the merits. For the present suffice it to state that the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint for the reasons set forth in its order subject of the present appeal.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, with costs against the appellees. Let this case be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.