Acta Biotheor (2007) 55:341355

DOI 10.1007/s10441-007-9024-7
REGULAR ARTICLE

Can We Define Ecosystems? On the Confusion Between

Definition and Description of Ecological Concepts
Kurt Jax

Received: 2 January 2006 / Accepted: 2 October 2007 / Published online: 20 October 2007

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract Sound definitions of its basic concepts are fundamental to every scientific discipline. In some instances, like in the case of the ecosystem concept, the
question arises if we can define such concepts at all. And if we can define them, how
should we choose from the multiple definitions available? And what are the preconditions for a scientifically sound and useful definition? On the basis of the
ecosystem concept, this paper illustrates a major, often neglected distinction in the
definition of ecological concepts, namely that between defining criteria and additional descriptive statements connected to those definitions. As is demonstrated by
examples from the literature, mixing up these categories leads to false inferences
about the properties of physical objects (e.g. a particular forest) subsumed by the
concept (e.g. the ecosystem). As a further consequence, this inference becomes
problematic in terms of theory development and/or the application of ecological
concepts for management decisions.
Keywords Ecological concepts
Ecosystem
Definitions
Concept formation

Philosophy of ecology

1 Introduction
Managing ecosystems or developing general theories of ecosystem functioning
Necesidade do
requires a clear understanding of what ecosystems are (Schaeffer and Cox 1992;
entendimento
Sagoff 2003; Jax 2005). However, there are different and sometimes incompatible do conceito de
ecossistemas
K. Jax (&)
Department of Conservation Biology, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ,
Permoserstr. 15, Leipzig 04318, Germany
e-mail: kurt.jax@ufz.de
K. Jax
Lehrstuhl fur Landschaftsokologie, Technische Universitat Munchen, Munich, Germany

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definitions of the ecosystem (see e.g. Jax et al. 1998; Jax 2006). But must, and can,
phenomena like ecosystems be defined at all? Are ecosystems real and evident
entities of nature or are they mere figments of the human mind? And if they are real,
what is the proper and scientifically sound definition of an ecosystem? What
properties do these systems haveare they, for example, self-regulated or
cybernetic? And if they are not self-evident and unequivocal, how can we
distinguish those definitions which really are useful and at least grasp some relevant
aspect of nature from those that are not? What are the characteristics of definitions
that can be applied in a useful way to empirical situations?
A major problem, which impedes the solution to these questions, is a common
confusion between definitions and additional descriptions of concepts. This confuso entre
confusion often leads to false inferences about the properties of concepts and the definio e
objects they denote and to major obstacles in usefully applying such concepts to descries
adicionais do
empirical phenomena. In this paper, I will illustrate this thesis through the example conceito.
of the ecosystem concept, although it could easily be extended to other concepts
within ecology. To this end, I will first develop some notions on the kinds and
purposes of definitions in the empirical sciences. I will then present two case studies
from ecological literature to clarify my point, finally ending up with conclusions on
the productive use of definitions within ecology.

2 Definitions and their Purposes

Definitions are used to provide words with a precise meaning (Radnitzky 1992), i.e.
they fix the meaning of a concept that is denoted by the word. A classical question is
whether concepts display reality as such, that is, if they characterize something
given, or whether they are just fixed deliberately by those who coin them. This is the
background of a traditional distinction between two types of definition, namely
between realist definitions and nominal definitions. Realist definitions claim to
make statements about the nature or essence of phenomena, about reality as such,
so to speak, while nominal definitions are conceived as pure conventions about the
meaning of a word (Stegmuller 1989, p. 368ff.).
Classical nominal definitions are for example: freshwater = water with a salt
content of less than 5%. Such definitions are primarily abbreviations for complex
statements. They substitute a complex semantic expression with a simpler one, often Definio
by just a single word or even a single character. Real definitions can be true (if they real e nominal
grasp the essence of the phenomenon they describe) or false (if they do not), while
for nominal definitions this distinction does not make sense. They can only be
adequate or inadequate. In contemporary philosophy of science, however, the
original notion of realist definitions has become modified and the strong
juxtaposition between nominal and realist definitions is questioned (Essler 1982
p. 69ff.; Pawlowski 1980, p. 28ff.). Most definitions we use are in fact somewhere in
between the extremes of a nominal definition and a classical real definition, as
they neither refer to something completely artificial nor do they grasp the very
nature (or essence) of phenomena. Instead they try to sharpen the meaning of a

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concept which already exists, but which exists only in a vague and more intuitively
perceived manner.
Because the notion of the essence of phenomenain an ontological senseis
too vague for scientific purposes (Stegmuller 1989, p. 373; Radnitzky 1992, p. 30),
modern philosophers have tried to differentiate several meanings of real
definitions in terms of the practical usage of the term (Stegmuller 1989, p.
373ff.). In this context, Carl Gustav Hempel introduced the terms meaning analysis
and empirical analysis as distinctions of how real definitions may be understood
today (Hempel 1952, p. 6ff.).1
Meaning analysis, also called analytical or descriptive definition (see e.g. anlise de
Stegmuller 1989; Radnitzky 1992 p. 29f.) is the kind of definition which is usually significado
found in dictionaries. It tries to extract and describe the established meaning of a
concept already in use and analyses its components. A descriptive definition differs
from a classical real definition insofar as it no longer aims at describing the
(ontologically understood) nature of a thing, but aims at the analysis of
approximately uniform patterns of usage (Hempel 1952, p. 10) of terms.
An empirical analysis states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the anlise
emprica
application of a term on behalf of empirical conditions or even empirical laws. In a
way it is an empirical explanation of a phenomenon of interest and thus not a
definition in the strict sense (Essler 1982, p. 70f.). In practice, is it not always clear
if a specific statement is meant as an analytical definition or an empirical analysis
(see below and Hempel 1952, p. 7f.).

3 Definition and Description

definio est dentro de uma classe formada por um conceito definido

A definition should supply the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an
object (or a phenomenon) falls into the class that is formed by the concept defined.
These conditions are expressed by what can be called definition criteria. But Essa definio
frequentlyespecially in dictionary definitionsdefinition criteria are presented que uma
together with some supplementary factual information about the concept (Hempel condio
1952, p. 9). To take an example from chemistry: in addition to the necessary and suficente e
sufficient definition of sodium through its atomic structure (11 protons and necessria
electrons) the information can be added that it is fluid or solid under specific pelo qual um
fenmeno cai
conditions or that it is used in a specific way in technology.
dentro de uma
These kinds of definitions are at first descriptive definitions. This means, they do classe
not define the concept de novo, but they provide the necessary and sufficient formada por
conditions (e.g. with the number of protons and electrons of sodium) to attribute an um conceito,
object to the concept, taking up empirical experiences and specific background pode ser
theories from physics and chemistry. Moreover, with the concept thus defined, a definida por
number of other features are correlated empirically, e.g. the freezing point of critrios, tipo
voc pode
sodium. These features are added to the definition as factual information and they
1

definir de
difernetes
As a third procedure, which is likewise adumbrated in the vague traditional notion of real definition maneiras...

Hempel (1952, p. 11) names explications. Explications deal with expressions which are rather vague and/
or ambiguous and provide new and more precise meanings to them (see Stegmuller 1989, p. 374 ff.).

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K. Jax

apply to all singular objects (atoms), which fall within the realm of objects that the
concept denotes (i.e., the extension of the concept). A large number of these
correlations characterize a strong concept.
We could also say that such strong concepts denote phenomena that are closer
to natural classifications or even natural kinds than other concepts. Hempel states:
The rational core between natural and artificial classifications is suggested by the
consideration that in so-called natural classifications the determining characteristics
are associated, universally or in a high percentage of all cases, with other
characteristics from which they are logically independent. (Hempel 1952, p. 53).
This means that these concepts are highly useful because they allow a lot of general
statements and theories about the objects they denote.
artificial e natural
It is important to note that this correlation is not symmetrical in the sense of a
one-to-one correspondence. Definition criteria (as necessary and sufficient characteristics) and the other features (added as factual information) are very different in
their status. There can be other substances that have the same freezing point as
sodium without having exactly 11 protons and electrons.
In connection with the definition of ecological units such as ecosystems, it often
remains unclear what parts of a statement are definition criteria and which are
factual information. A rather typical definition of an ecosystem is, for example, that
of Klotzli (1993):
An ecosystem is an interaction-structure of organisms and their inorganic
environment, which is open and, to a certain degree, capable of selfregulation. This summarizing and nowadays generally valid definition is the
result of ecological observation and research over centuries. (Klotzli 1993, p.
288)2
From the second sentence of this quotation it becomes evident that Klotzli
considers his definition to be analytical or even coming close to a realistQuais as
definition in the classical sense, and not a stipulative definition. But which of the caractersticas
statements of the first sentence then represent definition criteria (necessary and da primeira
sufficient properties of the unit) and which are just descriptions of further sentena
characteristics? That is, which are meant as characteristics which all ecosystems represente
feature, without however being sufficient and necessary criteria for attributing uma
something to the class (the concept) ecosystem? Is an interaction structure which propriedade
suficiente e
is not to a certain degree capable of self-regulation not an ecosystem? It seems
necessria de
that it is presupposed here that it ison the basis of empirical experiences uma unidade e
intuitively clear what the ecosystems are, whose properties are described, apenas uma
especially if reference is made to observations over centuries.
descrio?
Thisand, in particular, the missing clarity concerning the status of statements
(definition criteria or factual information)causes problems for ecology and its
applications. I will demonstrate this and the specific kind of problems in the course
of the following text by two examples from the ecological literature.

Translation K.J. The first sentence is the slightly modified reproduction of the popular ecosystem
definition of Ellenberg (1973), p. 1.

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4 Two Case Studies

ciberntico: relativo ao controle de movimentos e transmisso de informao.

4.1 The cybernetic nature of Ecosystems

More than 25 years ago a paper from Engelberg & Boyarsky was published in the
American Naturalist in which the authors raised the question of whether ecosystems
were cybernetic systems. The paper gave a negative answer to the question it posed.
It initiated a number of reactions in the same journal (Patten and Odum 1981;
Knight and Swaney 1981; McNaughton and Coughenour 1981; Jordan 1981) that
strongly opposed the thesis of Engelberg and Boyarsky (1979) and argued in favor
of ecosystems being cybernetic systems. The discussion did not come to a real
conclusion. One reason for this failure was that it missedalthough touching it
implicitlyimportant questions of adequately defining their subject, namely the
ecosystem.3
Ecosystems, depending on the definition embraced, are characterized and defined
by a number of different criteria, such as those consisting of organisms and abiotic
elements and their elements being connected by interactions (see Jax 2006 for an
overview). The property of a system to be a cybernetic system, around which the
discussion revolved, is obviously not the only property of ecosystems. Or, in other
words, it is not the property which alone is sufficient to define a system as an
ecosystem. There are various cybernetic systemsbeginning with the prototype of
cybernetic systems, the guided missiles of Norbert Wienerbut not every
cybernetic system is an ecosystem. The question that is really raised is, thus,
whether the opposite conclusion is valid: is every ecosystem also a cybernetic
system?
Engelberg and Boyarsky (1979) deny this, on the basis of their definition of a
cybernetic system. They argue that it is central for a cybernetic system to possess an
information network whose function is to steer and regulate the system. This would
also imply a goal-directedness of the system. Such an information network
functioned through informational interactions. For these interactions the energy,
which is transmitted, would only serve as a trigger. They contrast these with noninformational interactions, such as fluxes of energy and matter in food chains, which
were characterized by performing actual physical-chemical work. Cybernetic
systems were also characterized by feedback loops and internal stability. Engelberg
and Boyarsky do not see the existence of all these properties as given in ecosystems,
in particular they see no information network. In their perspective only direct
energetic and material interactions exist, but no coordinated goal-directed steering.
Thus, ecosystems were no cybernetic systems.
The responses to this paper, however, argued in favor of the perception of
ecosystems as cybernetic systems and tried to disprove the arguments described
above. This was done partly on the basis of theoretical considerations, partly by
3

I have chosen this rather old example, because it demonstrates in a very clear and explicit way the
points I want to make. A special advantage of this example is also that the different papers relate directly
to each other, while mostly such arguments are carried out only verbally and thus are not documented.
The question of an ecosystem as being a cybernetic system might today be rephrased e.g. as
discussions about ecosystems as being self-organized systems or self-sustained systems.

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empirical examples, partly also, however, with the aid of mere plausibility
arguments grounded in particular world-views4.
There clearly existed difficulties to agree on the meaning of basic concepts like
system and cybernetics, or cybernetic system, respectively. What is most
remarkable about the detailed discussion on the cybernetic or non-cybernetic
nature of ecosystems, however, is that the meaning of the most fundamental
concept of this debate, namely that of the ecosystem, is not considered at all in
three of the five papers. Most of the authors obviously take the meaning of
ecosystem so much for granted or even evident, that there is no need to exemplify
it in advance. Only in two of the five articles can brief comments on the definition of
ecosystem be found. McNaughton and Coughenour (1981) write:
For completeness, we must include here the well-established definition of an
ecosystem. An ecosystem consists of living organisms in some abiotic
environment. What makes it a system is the fact that there exist specific
dynamic relationships between these constituents. What makes it cybernetic is
the existence of coordination, regulation, communication, and control in these
relationships. (p. 985)
Jordan (1981) quotes an older definition of Patten as he writes:
... an appropriate definition of an ecosystem would be: The ecosystem can
be taken to consist of biotic and abiotic components that change and evolve
together, and the term ecosystem implies a unit of co-evolution (p. 285)
But even these explanations do not produce much clarity altogether. For what is
really the subject of the debate? It takes place, in fact, in a sort of vacuum. It does
not become clear whether the property of being a cybernetic system (or in the
second definition also a unit of co-evolution) is a true necessary definition
criterion for ecosystems or, instead, factual information.
Given the first case, i.e. that these properties were definition criteria, all
ecosystems would be cybernetic systems, by definition. Then the question to answer
would be restricted to a clarification of what is exactly meant by cybernetic. A
specific material system, however, must then be examined if it has the very quality
(to be cybernetic) in order to be subsumed under the class (the concept) of
ecosystems. Also, in this case, the other criteria that distinguish ecosystems from
other cybernetic systems (e.g. that they consist of living organisms, as with
McNaughton and Coughenour) must be made explicit. Together with the criterion of
being a cybernetic system, these other criteria will then constitute the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the definition.
If, on the other hand, the property of being a cybernetic system is no decisive
definition criterion for an ecosystem, it will be impossible to answer the question as
to whether (all) ecosystems are cybernetic systems, or it will only be a matter of
4

For example: Either the ecosystem is orderly in the way we have described, or its lack of chaos just
happened to develop from unregulated Darwinian struggles between competing populations, all alone and
uninfluenced except by each other, on a neutral stage of life. The latter seems implausible to us. (Patten
and Odum 1981, p. 891) and If ecosystems are not cybernetic, then by what other means could the
perceived harmony of the biosphere have evolved? (op. cit. p. 894)

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research in each specific case. The only way to give a general answer to the disputed
question would be to provide the exact definition of the ecosystem that is assumed
and to investigate these definitions as to whether they really imply the contested
property. That is, to inquire whether the property of being a cybernetic system might
either directly be deduced logically from the definition criteria or - which would
make the definition very strongif it is correlated empirically with these (Hempel
1952, p. 53). As I said, however, explicit definitions were given only by two of the
participants in the debate. As a consequence, the whole discussion is without
substance as it is not clear as to whether all participants mean the same thing when
they use the term ecosystem. Even the definition of McNaughton and
Coughenour is so broad that one might doubt, with good reason, that all systems
consisting of organisms and their environment may be considered cybernetic
systems just because they obviously display some interactions (specific ones as
McNaughton and Coughenour say, without, however, being more precise on this
issue). The definition that is favored by Jordan probably has more opportunities for
empirical correlations, which might indicate the cybernetic nature of the systems
thus defined. The property of being a unit of co-evolution, if it is to be conceived
of as a defining criterion, will, however, apply only to very few of those objects
which are commonly called ecosystems. At a minimum, it will be necessary to
specify what exactly is meant by the phrase change and evolve together.
Another possibility for understanding and answering the question of Engelberg and
Boyarsky would be to inquire if there are any ecosystems that are also cybernetic
systems, even within the extremely broad spectrum of possible definitions.
The missing clarity of the definition and the missing clarification of what is
definition criterion and what is factual information, in this case, led to a highly
unproductive discussion. Nevertheless, it seems that all authors commenting on
Engelberg and Boyarsky at least agreed that ecosystems were cybernetic systems. If,
however, such discussions are the basis for deriving generalizations about the
properties of ecosystems or other ecological unitsalthough these properties do not
serve as definition criteria in the sense discussed abovethis may lead to serious
methodologically-based mistakes and to improper inferences in the application of
ecological theories (see below).

4.2 Ecosystems emerging?

That such generalizations of (supposed) properties of ecological units are made on
the basis of insufficiently clear definitions can be demonstrated by another example.
Herein contrast to the discussion described abovean explicit definition of the
ecological unit is provided beforehand.
In a programmatic paper on the theory of ecosystems Jrgensen and coworkers
defined an ecosystem as follows:
We define an ecosystem as a partition unit of nature:
a whole whose parts include all living and nonliving processes or objects
(slow processes), and their associated biogeo- and physico-chemical,

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energetic, material, and informational parameters within a region of time and

space:
together with portions of the surroundings of these units.
All ecosystems together comprise all nature. (Jrgensen et al. 1992, p. 5)
The text that follows this statement aims at the discussion of a general ecosystem
theory, the establishment of general principles for ecosystems. As such cooperation,
principles of self-organization, and adaptability are discussed. Thus the authors inter
alia state:
Ecosystems are adapted systems (op. cit., p. 19; emphasis in the original)
and:
ecosystems do not have a genome or punched tape program for existence.
They possess no brains or known goals. They simply self organize and exist, in
cooperative, synergistic modes of organization that extend life, freedom and
ultimately experience to its most advanced members. (op. cit., p. 26)
Again, it must be asked if these additional properties are part of the definition, or
if they are only supplementary factual information. If these properties would belong
as necessary criteria to the definition, the domain of those objects that can be
conceived of as ecosystems would be reduced with respect to many common
usages of the word. The general ecosystem theory which the authors aim at would
then be confined to very special parts of the living world, namely those which also
fulfill the demands of being adapted or having adaptability etc. (which would have
to be proved in each case). It would then not be applicable to many systems that, by
most authors, are called ecosystems. The above statement that all ecosystems
together comprise all nature then also becomes obsolete, because in this case
parts of (living) nature exist, which are not ecosystems.
The alternative, namely that the properties of ecosystems mentioned (adaptability, self-regulation, cooperation) are factual information which applies to all systems
that come under the definition given in the first statement is highly implausible. As
the definition criteria are formulated very broadly and, for example, boundary
criteria are not defined at all, any spatio-temporal part of the Earth which only
contains some organisms that interact with each other and with their abiotic
environment in some way would be an ecosystemand thus also a self-regulated,
adaptive and cooperative system.
In fact the domain of application of the term ecosystem (the extension of the
concept), and thus also the domain of application of the desired ecosystem theory, is
not clarified here. Such a clarification would, however, be urgently needed.
The broad general definition of an ecosystem of Jrgensen et al.which only
slightly differs from a kind of minimal consensus for all ecosystem definitions (see
Jax 2006)is not sufficient as a basis for building an ecosystem theory that allows
far-reaching generalizations. Only for ecological units that are defined more
specifically (i.e. subclasses of this definition, so to speak) does it seem possible to
build strong ecosystem theories.

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5 Can We Define Ecosystems? An Intermediate Conclusion

The examples described above demonstrate that the missing distinction between
definition criteria and factual information is of practical relevance and leads to
problems in the formation of concepts and theories in ecology. It was not my
intention to blame particular authors by means of these examples but only to
demonstrate a rather common and mostly unconscious misuse of definitions in
ecology. In the everyday practice of ecology this mingling of definition criteria and
factual information manifests itself, for example, when spatial boundaries are taken
for functional ones without testing (see Jax et al. 1998). It is common to speak of a
piece of nature such as a piece of woodland or a pond that has been delimited
spatially as an ecosystem. The boundary criterion in the (often implicit) definition
of the ecosystem is a topographical one in this case. The designation of this section
of nature as an ecosystem in general is made without prior examination of
functional relationships within the spatially delimited system of organisms and their
abiotic environment. It can be taken for granted or even considered as certain that
some functional relations exist here. The issue becomes problematic in those cases
when some specific features are invoked as factual information to characterize
such a piece of woodlandfeatures such as those that an ecosystem is always a selfregulated system, or characterized by more or less closed cycles of matter, an
ecological equilibrium, or other properties. These aspects must be questions of
research because the practical attribution of the forest to the concept of the
ecosystem was only done on a much simpler basis. It was done on the basis of
spatial discontinuities of an assemblage of organisms and the abiotic conditions
connected with this chunk of space, i.e. to be precise, on the basis of an everydayphysiognomic delimitation. If the definition contains the functional properties
mentioned above, like equilibrium etc., as necessary features, these have to be tested
at first for the specific forest, before it can be treated as an ecosystem.
The direct methodological and practical consequences (stemming from the neglect
of this distinction) were also demonstrated in a very clear manner by Wiens (1984). He
referred to the (then) common assumption that communities were always in a state of
equilibrium. Equilibrium was here only seen as factual information about species
assemblages that were defined by completely different criteria. Unexamined, this
assumption leads to a smaller amount of samples taken, because it was assumedand
if the premise of equilibrium was true this would in fact be validthat the crucial
variables of the system do not change significantly through time. Few samples thus
clearly characterize the normal condition of the species assemblage. As a
consequence, any existing temporal trends or fluctuations are missed from the start;
because they are either not perceived on the basis of theory and method or are
interpreted in the sense of an abnormal, and thus, negligible phenomenon.
Alternatives for the above example of a forest as an ecosystem are, thus:

either the forest is an ecosystem already on behalf of being a spatially delimited

part of nature: then the particular nature of functional relations within the system
is a matter of research. The system is an ecosystem even it is does not display
self-regulation or equilibrium;

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or the forest is an ecosystem then and only then if also particular functionally
defined criteria are given, which have to be proved in advance. In this case it is
not allowed to call the forest an ecosystem just because of its spatial
delimitation.

Cases like the one just described are rather frequent. So what are the reasons why
this appears time and again? It seems that there is often still an implicitly
ontological understanding of ecological units (Jax 1998), perceiving of ecosystems
as existing as such or at least as natural kinds. If ecosystems did exist as
suchindependent of an observers definitionit would be possible and reasonable to make enquiries, exclusively, regarding their properties; the real
definition is then given by nature as such. We might, as I would suggest,
explain this perception also by an idea from cognitive psychology, namely that the
meaning of concepts is often linked to some prototype object (see e.g. Medin and
Smith 1984). Although the definitions given (starting from the first explicit
definition of the ecosystem by Tansley in 1935) are mostly highly abstract and
broad, the guiding idea of what an ecosystem is seems still to be a physiognomically
delimited entity, with rather clear topographical boundaries. At these boundaries
also many processes (movement of many species, flow of many substances) show
gradients of their rates (this is also valid for ecosystem-like ideas that precede
Tansleys term; see Jax 1998). The typical examples given for an ecosystem (also
those used in this paper) are a lake, a pond or a forest.5 These physiognomically
delimited objects appear to be much better candidates of distinguishing ecosystems
as natural kinds than e.g. the whole ocean, a rotting tree stump or some rather
abstract chunk of nature, delimited primarily by the rates of matter and energy
flows. Even the understanding of a concept such as ecosystem functioning
which obviously is more related to processes than to spatial patternsis strongly
influenced by this prototypic, physiognomic perception of ecosystems. It is a change
in physiognomy which is mostly seen as a real loss of functioning (or at least as
its indication): when the trees of a forest die (but not when just some herbs
disappear, when trees are replaced by similar species, or when production levels
change), or when a lake changes from a clear oligotrophic lake to a turbid eutrophic
lake. Put such examples are misleading, when it comes to generalizing over all
ecosystems. Given this prototypic notion of ecosystems it often takes only a small
step to perceive of ecosystems as natural kinds, even thoughas the struggle about
the many possible ways in which they can be conceptualized showsthey are not
(but see below).
In addition to perceiving of ecosystems as given in nature, there are fallacies in
making inferences from patterns to processes (Cale et al 1989), since the same
pattern (e.g. a particular recurrent combination of the same species in different
places) may be produced by completely different processes (e.g. biotic or abiotic
interactions). In particular, with the topic of equilibrium or stability there are

The first object to which Tansleys ecosystem concept was explicitly applied was in fact also a
(senescent) lake (Lindeman 1942).

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problems of perception based on differing temporal scales of humans and long-lived

natural objects such as trees (see Gleason 1939; Grimm et al. 1992). Ecological
units often appear constant (as one of the most frequent meanings of equilibrium
and stability) to us simply due to the fact that large and long-lived organisms, once
they get established, persist at a location for long periods of time as measured by the
scale of human life times.
So as an intermediate conclusion, the answer to the initial question can we
define ecosystems? is: yes we can define them, and we must even define them. But
the decisive question is how to define them. Creating good definitions is still much
more than a matter of pure convention, if these definitions are to be useful for theory
building and empirical research.

6 Discussion
Given the history of the concept ecosystem (Hagen 1992; Golley 1993; Jax 1998)
and the epistemological status of ecological units (Jax 2006), there is not a single
right definition for the term ecosystem. There can be different useful
definitions for different purposes. This does not mean that all ecosystem definitions
are created equal or that each definition is unique for a specific case (which would
make generalizations impossible). What counts as a good definition is dependent as
well on logical considerations as those described above (with other classical
criteria for good definitions added, such as freedom from contradiction and
explicitness) and on its adequacy for specific purposes and contexts. Depending on
these purposes demands on the precision and exactness of a definition and the
concept it embraces vary. The ecosystem concept has been used for many different
purposes with meanings which diverge strongly (Jax 2006). Most important
perhaps, ecosystem is today both used as an object and as a perspective (Jax
2002, 2006). As an object, the ecosystem refers to a unit which is realized in space
and time, while the perspective is more a way look at nature or deal with it. This
perspective has in itself different expressions: the ecosystem as a specific level of
organization (or as I would prefer: level of observation), which is often connected to
a specific research approach, namely ecological research focused on pathways of
matter and energy flow (Aber and De Melillo 2001) and/or a focus on larger (rather
unspecified) chunks of nature consisting of organisms and their abiotic environment.
More recently, however, especially in the context of ecosystem management, it also
has become a perspective extending beyond the domain of scientific ecology toward
the social sciences and society, describing a kind of policy or philosophical
approach. It here has become a cipher for holistic thinking (in a colloquial sense)
or systems thinking (Jax 2002). This kind of perspective is also strongly connected
to a diverse (and sometimes contradictory) array of societal values. Pickett and
Cadenasso (2002) have called this use of the ecosystem concept its metaphorical
dimension and have given a number of other examples for that metaphorical use.6
6

The distinction of meaning, model and metaphor as three dimensions of the use of the ecosystem
concept made by Pickett and Cadenasso (2002) does not match completely with the distinction between

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Conservation approaches like most ecosystem management strategies and the

Ecosystem Approach of the CBD (Secretariat on the Convention on Biological
Diversity 2004) handle the ecosystem in a dual way, using the same word for the
object and for the perspective. Demands on the precision and explicitness of the
ecosystem as a perspective are of course much less than when we speak about it
as an object. An ecosystem concept that serves as an organizing scheme should even
be rather vague and conceptually open to stimulate research and concept
development; an overly strict definition would here be counterproductive.7
The term ecosystem is not unique in this sense. There is an increasing number
of ecological concepts which are used both for a phenomenon which can (in
principle) be operationalized in empirical contexts and at the same time are used in
either a metaphorical sense or for describing particular perspectives. This trend
increases with the use of ecological terms in applied (e.g. management) contexts,
where such terms also serve to build bridges between normally disparate disciplines
and/or between science and society. Prominent examples are biodiversity (Eser
2001), resilience (Brand and Jax 2007) or complexity (Proctor and Larson
2005). In terms of an object, biodiversity is at best a generic term, but due its very
broad meaning (encompassing both genetic diversity, species diversity and
ecosystem diversity: e.g. Hooper et al. 2005) it is not a term that can be
operationalized and measured in its totality, but is in factas also major proponents
of the concept have stated (see in Takacs 1996)often merely another expression
for living nature. Biodiversity can be operationalized as an object only in more
restricted specifications. Nevertheless, as a kind of perspective, biodiversity has
given rise to whole research programs andin a further transformed manner
political agendas (e.g. the Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD). Resilience
is likewise used both as a term that can be applied to analyze specific systems
conditions (and thus as an operationalizable object or thing) andespecially
in extension to coupled social and ecological systemsas a perspective guiding
research and management (Anderies et al. 2006; Folke 2006), or as a metaphor
(Carpenter et al. 2001). The problem is not the simultaneous existence of such
different uses of resilience as such, as long as this distinction becomes clear from
the context (we also use many words from our natural languages both in one or
several literal senses and in metaphoric senses). But within the literature on
resilience, is often very difficult to decide if the treatment deals with the objectmeaning of resilience or with resilience as a perspective (Brand and Jax 2007).
Footnote 6 continued
object and perspective which I make here. While their model coincides largely with what I
describe as the use of ecosystem in the sense of an object, some of the examples they give for the
metaphorical dimensions of the ecosystem may well be understood as a special kind of (implicit) definition of an object. Thus I would consider the use of the expression marsh ecosystem not as spatial
metaphor (Pickett and Cadenasso 2002, p. 6) but as an expression of either a physiognomic perception of
ecosystemand thus an objector as a classification scheme. Likewise, their meaning, which they
also call the basic definition of the ecosystem, is what I would call a generic definition, being in fact a
kind of (scientific) perspective organizing and inspiring ecological research, because it is not possible to
unambiguously delimit a specific spatial object by it.
7

Similar things can be said for other concepts, within and beyond ecology. Examples are Charles Eltons
community concept (Jax 2006) or the gene concept (Hull 1968).

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353

The statements made in this paper thus primarily pertain to the uses of concepts
as denoting objects (of research and management). It is here, where we have to be as
clear as possible about untested assumptions (disguised as part of the definition),
and about the criteria by which we operationalize the concepts. In the case of the
ecosystem, there are also many research questions where we can completely do
without a definition of an ecosystem as an object and where using the concept as a
(heuristic) perspective is completely sufficient. But there are many other cases,
where conceptualizing the ecosystem as an object is relevant, namely for questions
as: how we can delimit, identify, map or count them, or find ways to determine
their status as being intact or functioning, degraded or dysfunctional?
There are also here many different purposes and no single definition will match the
demands of the different purposes equally well (see also Jax 2006 p. 252f.).
Likewise, the specific individual units that are determined in space and time on the
basis of these definitions will not necessarily coincide as physical objects. A concept
of ecosystem that allows rapid assessment and delimitation of ecosystems in
space, e.g. for mapping purposes, may not be coincident with one that is best for
investigating functional relationships between assemblages of organisms and their
environment in order to describe the size of self-sustaining units (e.g. to include
complete ecosystems within the boundaries of a natural park, as IUCNs 1994
criteria for national parks demand). If ecosystems were natural kinds, the
problem would not occur at all, but as they are not, we have to find at least ways to
arrive at strong concepts of ecosystems (or, as Allen and Hoekstra 1992, p. 26 have
called it, concepts that are robust to transformation). The solution is not to say
that all definitions are equal and that each case and instance is special and only
needs a clear definition. Instead, we must strive to delimit clusters of sufficiently
similar definitions within the abstract space of possible definitions (see e.g. the
model used in Jax et al. 1998; Jax and Rozzi 2004), clusters of definitions that are
useful for different categories of purposes, or ecological situations. Although
such categories are by necessity artificial to some degree, we can and should strive
to come as near as possible to a small number of strong and thus more natural
concepts, concepts characterized by a high number of empirical correlations (as
described above). Such concepts will allow for a maximum of generalizations
without, however, being able to fulfill the dream of a unified theory of ecosystems in
the sense of covering all currently existing definitions. As emphasized in this paper,
the definitions have to distinguish clearly between definition criteria and factual
information to avoid the pitfalls described. The desired correlations between
definition criteria and factual information thus have to be scrutinized very carefully
for the conditions of their validity, i.e. for the possibility to generalize these
correlations with respect to the intended extension of the concept.
The classical physiognomic ecosystem concepts (but more explicitly defined
than is the case today) are likely to be a good candidate for a main category, as will
be the watershed-ecosystems of Likens and Borman (1995).8 But there will be
certainly other useful types of definitions. Developing an new taxonomy of
8

Aber and Mellilo (2001, p. 10 f.) also describe watershed and stand (the latter corresponding to what I
call physiognomic ecosystem) as two common and useful ways of delimiting ecosystems.

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ecosystems and other ecological units, perhaps even running across traditional
levels of organization, will be an important task for the future, a task in which
empirical and philosophical work must go hand in hand.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Volker Grimm, Leipzig, two anonymous reviewers, and the
journal editor for constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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